m-s. stan power vs the greater hyderabad municipal ... on 24 june, 2010

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Andhra High Court

Andhra High Court

M/S. Stan Power vs The Greater Hyderabad Municipal ... on 24 June, 2010

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN

Writ Petition No.11187 of 2010

24-06-2010

M/s. STAN POWER

The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Rep., by its Commissioner, Lower Tank Bund, Hyderabad and

others.

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri K.V. Bhanu Prasad

Counsel for the Respondents: Smt. Kalpana Ekbote, Standing Counsel for GHMC

:ORDER:

The relief sought for in this writ petition is to declare the action of the 1st and 2nd respondents in seeking to

remove the traffic signals, and the hoardings erected thereon, though the permission granted in proceedings

dated 25.03.2008 was in force, as arbitrary, illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice. The

petitioner seeks a consequential direction to respondent nos.1 and 2 not to remove the traffic signals and

hoardings.

2. Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner is a registered partnership firm undertaking works of arranging

cameras and traffic signals at important traffic junctions. It is their case that the Intelligent Traffic

Management System, which they have set up, is widely used and accepted abroad; the 3rd respondent, with a

view to protect the cantonment area, had planned for a complete systematic traffic control system in the entirecantonment area; when the petitioner presented their intelligent traffic management system the 3rd respondent

was satisfied therewith and, after a proper tender process, had entered into an agreement with them on

11.09.2008; as a result they were permitted to erect traffic signals in the entire cantonment area on a build

operate and transfer (B.O.T) basis; and were permitted to erect advertisement boards over the traffic signals to

augment their resources for maintenance of such traffic signals.

3. The 3rd respondent, vide letter dated 07.01.2008, requested the 1st respondent to allow the petitioner to

maintain the junctions, at the entry points of Secunderabad cantonment area, with a view to establish an

intelligent traffic control system for the Secunderabad cantonment. The 3rd respondent also requested the 1st

respondent to permit the petitioner to install, maintain and place advertisements wherever technically feasible

as per the agreement entered into with them. The 1st respondent, vide letter dated 25.03.2008, while according

permission to the 3rd respondent to take up traffic signals at four junctions, informed them that the restoration

work should be taken up by the 3rd respondent under the supervision of the concerned Executive Engineer

duly obtaining necessary permission from the Roads & Buildings department of the State Government,

and the National Highways Authority wherever the traffic signals were being commissioned, and that the

matter should also be informed to the Additional Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Hyderabad/Cyberabad

before the traffic signal works were taken up. The 3rd respondent was further informed that advertisement tax

may be paid to the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) wherever the traffic signals fell within

the GHMC area, and the traffic signals existing in the GHMC limits/area, requiring relocation, may be done

by the 3rd respondent Cantonment Board at its own cost. The Petitioner claims to have addressed letter dated

04.04.2009 informing respondent No.2 of the locations, and to have requested that they be informed of the tax

due on the sizes and locations. It is their case that the 1st respondent, responding to the request of the 3rd


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8. In their reply affidavit the petitioner would submit that the letter addressed to the 3rd respondent dated

25.03.2008 was the permission accorded to them; pursuant thereto they had installed traffic signals at the

entry points suggested by the 3rd respondent; even if the traffic signals erected at the entry points were

unauthorized the 2nd respondent was bound to put the petitioner on notice; having asked the petitioner to pay

advertisement tax to the GHMC it was not open to the 2nd respondent to contend that no permission was

granted to the petitioner; established advertising agencies were behind the entire episode and respondent nos.1

and 2 were acting at their behest and that of the Minister; the letter addressed by the Minister to the 1st

respondent spoke volumes of how interested persons were working against the petitioner; the letter dated17.11.2009, addressed by the 2nd respondent to the 3rd respondent, was proof that authorization had been

given the petitioner; there was abundant material to show that the petitioner had a valid authorization to erect

traffic poles and advertisement boards; after they had erected the traffic signals no complaint had been

received from the traffic police; and there was no justification in respondent nos. 1 and 2 directing the

petitioner to remove the traffic signals and the advertisement hoardings thereon.

9. Sri K.V. Bhanuprasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that by proceedings dated

25.03.2008 permission was accorded to the petitioner; the very fact that the GHMC authorities had not

objected to the installation of traffic signals, and erection of advertisement hoardings, till the impugned

proceedings were issued on 17.03.2010 was itself proof that they were also satisfied that permission had been

accorded to the petitioner; the proceedings dated 17.11.2009 reflected the 2nd respondent's awareness of thepetitioner having been permitted to install the traffic signals; having permitted the petitioner to install traffic

signals, and erect hoardings, it was not open to the 2nd respondent to now turn around and contend that the

traffic signals and the hoardings should be removed on the ground that there was no permission; neither was

any notice issued calling upon the petitioner to remove the traffic signals nor were they given an opportunity

of being heard; and, as the impugned action of the 2nd respondent was at the behest of big advertising

agencies and the Minister of Municipal Administration, the proceedings dated 17.3.2010 was vitiated by

malice.

10. On the other hand Smt. Kalpana Ekbote, Learned Standing Counsel for the GHMC, would contend that

the correspondence between respondent nos.1 and 2 on the one hand, and the 3rd respondent on the other, was

merely an internal communication; neither was a letter of authorization given to the petitioner permitting themto execute the works in question nor was an agreement entered into in this regard; the petitioner having

installed these traffic signals, and the advertising hoardings, on his own accord without written authorization

from the GHMC, or an agreement having been entered into with them, could not now turned around and

contend that, despite their illegal act, the traffic signals installed and the hoardings erected by them should not

be removed; the petitioner was earning huge revenue from the advertisement hoardings; not a single paise had

been paid to the GHMC for the hoardings erected on roads belonging to it; the Corporation was being denied

revenue, legitimately due to it, on erection of these advertisement hoardings on GHMC roads; and the

petitioner could not take advantage of his own wrong, in installing the traffic signals and erecting hoardings,

to contend that he would suffer irreparable loss if they were removed.

11. Section 373 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the 'GHMC

Act') relates to vesting of public streets in the Corporation and, thereunder, all streets within the city being, or

which at any time become, public streets and the pavements, stones and other material thereof, shall vest in

the Corporation and be under the control of the Commissioner.

12. Section 421(1) of the Act relates to regulation and control of advertisement and reads as under:

(1) No person shall without the written permission of the Commissioner, erect, exhibit, fix or retain any

advertisement whether now existing or not, upon any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure:

Provided always that such permission shall not be necessary in respect of any advertisement which is not an

illuminated advertisement nor a sky-sign and which-




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23. The petitioner cannot take advantage on his own wrong, in installing traffic signals and erecting

advertisement hoardings without prior written permission of the Commissioner, GHMC or a written

agreement having been entered into with the Corporation, to contend that the traffic signals and advertisement

hoardings should not be removed except after putting them on notice and giving them an opportunity of being

heard. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as a result of respondent nos.1 and 2 not complying with

principles of natural justice. Even before this Court, the petitioner has not shown that he had obtained prior

written permission of the Commissioner under Section 421(1), or that he had entered into a written agreement

with the Corporation under Section 124 of the GHMC Act. The challenge to the impugned proceedings, onthe ground of violation of principles of natural justice, must fail.

24. In the light of the statutory prescription in Section 124 and Section 421(1) of the G.H.M.C. Act, failure on

the part of the petitioner to have either entered into a written agreement with the G.H.M.C, or to have obtain

prior permission of the Commissioner, G.H.M.C for erection of advertisement hoardings would require this

Court refraining from interfering with the impugned proceedings dated 17.03.2010. Suffice to hold that, in

case the petitioner makes a written request to the 1st respondent within one week from today seeking

reasonable time, (say a week or two), to remove the advertisement hoardings and the traffic signals installed

by them, the first respondent shall consider the said request in accordance with law. It is made clear that in

case the petitioner does not make any such request, or in case he fails to remove the advertisement hoardings

and the traffic signals within the time, if any, granted by the first respondent, it is open to respondent nos.1and 2 to proceed further in accordance with law to have the traffic signals dismantled and the advertisement

hoardings removed.

25. While the petitioner may not be entitled for the relief sought for, the officials of the GHMC have not

acquitted themselves well either. It is disheartening to note that officials of the GHMC, who are required to

discharge their statutory functions/duties, as prescribed under the GHMC Act and the Rules made thereunder,

have turned a blind eye, and have failed to prevent the petitioner from installing traffic signals and erecting

advertisement hoardings without complying with the procedural requirements of the GHMC Act of obtaining

written permission of the Commissioner, GHMC under Section 421(1), or entering into an agreement under

Section 124 of the GHMC Act. It is, indeed a matter of great concern that, despite absence of a written

agreement and prior written permission of the Commissioner, GHMC, the petitioner was not prevented frominstalling traffic signals, and erecting hoardings, on roads belonging to the GHMC. How the officials

concerned remained silent when the petitioner erected the advertisement hoardings on lands vested in the

GHMC and had, in fact, encouraged the petitioner to do so by their failure to act with promptitude remains a

mystery. While the revenue generated on these advertisement hoardings has benefited the petitioner, the

GHMC has suffered a huge loss on that score. It is a sad reflection of the efficiency and conduct of the

officials, at various rungs of the GHMC that the petitioner has, all these days, not been prevented from

brazenly erecting advertisement hoardings, pocketing the revenues generated therefrom, and thereby

depriving the GHMC of advertisement revenues legitimately due to it. Respondent nos.1 and 2 would do well

to ensure that such incidents do not recur.

26. Subject to the above observations, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the

circumstances, without costs.

?1 Judgment in Writ Appeal No.1220 of 1991 and Writ Petition Nos.4513/91 and 14942/91 dated: 29.08.1992

2 1992(3) SCALE 499

3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 713

4 AIR 1991 SC 1260

5 (1995) 2 SCC 570




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6 AIR 2006 SC 3542

7 AIR 1996 SC 1669

8 (2006) 7 SCC 558

9 (2007) 4 SCC 54

10 (2007) 13 SCC 352

11 (2008) 11 SCC 502

12 (1984(1 SCC 43

13 1996(5) SCC 460

14 (2000) 7 SCC 529

15 AIR 1968 SC 850

16 AIR 1972 SC 32

17 Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75

18 (1980) 4 SCC 379

19 (2004)5 SCC 263

20 (2002)2 SCC 240

21 (1993) 4 SCC 727

22 AIR 1970 S C 679



m-s. stan power vs the greater hyderabad municipal ... on 24 june, 2010

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