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Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean ReconciliationAuthor(s): Michael OtsukaSource: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1998), pp. 65-92Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672843

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MICHAELOTSUKA Self-Ownershipand Equality:A LockeanReconciliation

G.A. Cohen has argued that the preservationin more than name onlyof a libertarian right of self-ownershipwill come into conflict with therealization of any strongly egalitarian principle of distributivejustice,and vice versa. One can have either self-ownership or equality only atthe cost of the virtual abandonment of the other.1On this point, he andRobert Nozick are in agreement.2 Nozick's modus ponens is Cohen'smodus tollens, since Cohen draws the conclusion that self-ownershipshould give way to make room for equality,whereas Nozick draws theopposite conclusion that equality should yield to self-ownership.In this article, I argue that the conflict between libertarianself-owner-ship and equalityis largelyan illusion. As a matter of contingent fact, anearly complete reconciliation of the two can in principle be achievedthrough a properly egalitarian understanding of the Lockeanprincipleof justice in acquisition. Toput my thesis more precisely:Barringunu-sual circumstances, equalityof access to welfareamong individualswhodiffer n their capacity (productiveand otherwise)to derive welfare fromresources can in principle be achieved through an egalitariandistribu-tion of initiallyunowned worldly resources. Moreover,such a distribu-

I thank the members of the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group n Los Angelesandthose who attended a talk sponsored by the philosophy department at New YorkUniver-sity,where Ipresented earlierversions of this paper.I would also like to thank G.A.Cohen,Stephen Munzer,Seana Shiffrin,PeterVallentyne,Andrew Williams, and the editors ofPhilosophy&PublicAffairs,who read and providedwrittencommentary on earlierdrafts.i. See Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sity Press, 1995), pp. 15, 105.

2. See Nozick,Anar-chy,tate,and Utopia (New York:Basic Books, 1974),Chapters7 and8, especially pp. 167-74 and 232-38.


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66 Philosophy & Public Affairs

tion is compatible with each person's possession of an uninfringed lib-ertarianright of self-ownership that is robust rather han merely formal.Before I defend this thesis, I must provide an explanation of whatlibertarian self-ownership is. To this task I turn in Section I.I. LIBERTARIAN SELF-OWNERSHIP

every man has a property n his own person:this nobody has any right to but himself. Thelabourof his body, and the workof his hands, wemay say, are properlyhis.Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ?27

"The central core of the notion of a property right in X,"according toNozick, "is the right to determine what shall be done with X."3 Nozickmaintains that "[t]hisnotion of property helps us to understand whyearlier theorists spoke of people as having propertyin themselves andtheir labor. They viewed each person as having a right to decide whatwould become of himself and what he would do, and as having a rightto reap the benefits of what he did."4Nozick condemns the egalitarian or abandoning, and commends thelibertarian for honoring, a full right of self-ownership.5Insofar as thelibertarian endorses, while the egalitarian rejects, a stringent6 right toreap all of the income from one's labor,the libertarianendorses a fullerright of self-ownershipthan the egalitarian.But does the libertarianad-vocate a full rightof self-ownership?For the purposes of answeringthisquestion, I shall adopt the following plausible definition of a full right

3. Nozick, Anarchy, p. 171.4. Ibid. In this passage, Nozick appears to distinguish a right to reap the benefits ofone's labor from a right of self-ownership. In this articleI will, if only for ease of exposi-tion, treata rightto reap such benefits as an aspect of a right of self-ownership.5. Ibid., pp. 171-72.6. The more stringent a right, the more difficultit is for it to be justifiably nfringedinthe lightof countervailingconsiderationsthat override he right.An absolute rightis onethat can neverbe justifiably nfringed.WheneverI speakof the infringementor the viola-tion of a right,I shall follow JudithJarvisThomson'suse of these terms:"Suppose hat someone has a right that such and such shall not be the case. I shall say

that we infringea rightof his if and only if we bring about that it is the case. I shall saythat we violate a rightof his if and only if bothwe bring about that it is the case and weact wronglyin so doing." ("Some Ruminationson Rights," n Thomson, Rights, Restitu-tion, and Risk [Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1986], p. 51.)Thomson notes that some infringements of rights are justifiable, some are wrong butexcusable,and some arejust plain wrong.


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67 Self-Ownership and Equality:A Lockean Reconciliation

of self-ownership:a person's rightof self-ownershipis full if and only ifthat person possesses, to the greatest extent and stringency compatiblewith the same possession by others, the aforementioned rights "to de-cide what would become of himself and what he would do, and ... toreap the benefits of what he did."7In defending the claimthat she respects a full right of self-ownership,the libertarianmust confront the following dilemma: one's possessionof a full and uninfringed right of self-ownership either is, or it is not,compatiblewith some incursions upon one's body (without one's con-sent) that result in serious harm.Suppose, for the sake of exposing the firsthorn of this dilemma, thatit is not compatible with any such incursions.8It follows that a libertar-ian is, contrary to the doctrine of the double effect, committed to theclaim that one may not turn a trolley that will otherwise run over fiveonto a side track where it will instead run over a sixth, and that theforeseen but unintended killingof the innocent in even a self-defensivewar is neverpermissible.9The libertarian s also committed to the claimthat one acts impermissibly if by one's actions one unforeseeably killsor injures an innocent, nonthreatening person even though what onedid was not known to carry a risk of harm, or the known risk of harmassociatedwith the activitywas so minuscule that most would deem theactivity justifiable.10On this construal of a full right of self-ownership,

7. Here I follow Cohen, who defines a full right of self-ownership as the "fullestright aperson (logically)can have over herself providedthat each other person also has just sucha right"(Cohen, Self-Ownership, . 213).I should note that this notion of a "full rightofownership"s a technical philosophical one that does not track the ordinary anguage orlegal notion of "fullyowning"something. One can, in ordinary anguage terms or legallyspeaking, fully own a house that one cannot destroy because it is a historical landmarkeven though it is both plausible to hold and a consequence of the definition I have justintroduced that one's right of ownership over that house is less full than it would havebeen if, ceteris paribus,one had the right to destroy it.8. Cohenmaintains that it is not compatible with any such incursions. See ibid., p. 227.9. Libertarians o not object to harmingvillainous aggressors n self-defense or punish-ing them. But those harmed might plausiblybe regardedas having forfeited heir full rightof self-ownership. (Note that Nozick believes that it is also permissible to kill innocentthreats and aggressors n self-defense and flirts with the idea that it is permissible to killinnocent shields of threats as well. See Nozick, Anarchy,pp. 34-35. It is difficult to justifysuch self-defensivekillings by an appeal to forfeiture.)

10. Nozick, however,claims that it is permissible to impose risks of death on another.He is favorablydisposed to the view that one may act permissiblyeven if one ends upkilling another person without ftilly compensating him for being killed. See ibid., pp. 77-78.Nozick also claims that it is permissible unforeseeably o kill n some cases, since a ban


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a libertarian can maintain that she holds the morallypure, principled,and uncompromising position that our rightsof self-ownership arefullonly at the price of a hitherto underemphasized moral fanaticism. Thefanaticism of which I speak is not the oft-noted fanaticism of a libertar-ian that rules out even the most trivial amount of forced labor or taxa-tion for the purpose of alleviating a great deal of misery. Rather it is afanaticism that rules out any seriously harmful incursions whatsoeverupon the bodies of innocents, even when such incursions are merelyforeseen as a necessary byproduct of the minimization of harm ratherthan intended as a means of minimizing harm, and even when they arethe unforeseen result of activities that carryeither no known or the mostminuscule known risk of doing harm.11 uch fanaticism is, moreover,unnecessary insofar as the libertarian could permit such unintentionalincursions without also having to abandon her opposition to redistribu-tive taxationforthe purposes of promoting equality.This is because thelibertarian's ase against redistributive axation is premised upon a rightagainst being used as a means by being forced (viaincursions or threatsof incursions upon one's mind and body) to sacrifice life, limb, orlabor.12t is not premised upon a right against harmfulincursions uponone's body simpliciter.Now suppose, for the sake of exposing the other horn of the dilemma,that one's possession of a full and uninfringed right of self-ownershipis compatible with some incursions upon one's body (without one'sconsent) that result in serious harm. In this case, the libertarianmustexplain why these incursions, but not others that the libertariande-nounces as violations of a full right of self-ownership, are compatibleon such killingwouldplaceone at too much riskand fear of being imprisonedon accountof eventsbeyond one'scontrol.See ibid., p. 71.

ii. Coulda libertarianclimb off of this horn of the dilemma by holding that such casesinvolve infringementsof rights that arein the final analysis morally ustifiable (or at leastexcusable)? think not, since the dilemma is about what is compatible with a full right ofself-ownership,wherethis is defined as one that is of maximaluniversalizable tringency.A right that is not so stringent as to condemn such infringements as unjustifiable (i.e.,violations) would not be of maximaluniversalizable tringency.Moreover,one is open tothe chargeof moralfanaticismeven if one holds that these infringementsare unjustifiablebut excusable.

12. Nozick says that libertarian"constraintsupon action reflect the underlyingKantianprinciple that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed orused forthe achievingof other ends without their consent" (Nozick,Anarchy,pp. 30-31).I shall discuss his case againstredistributive axation below.


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69 Self-Ownershipand Equality:A LockeanReconciliation

with such a right. The libertarian must explain why, for example, onedoes not violate someone's full right of self-ownership if one kills himin the trolley case, yet one does if one kills him in order to transplanthisvital organs. But I do not think such an explanation is possible.13The libertarian position that I consider in this article avoids this di-lemma because it is not committed to a full right of self-ownership. Ishall define a "libertarian ightof self-ownership"as one that, while lessthan full because it does not prohibitall unintentional incursions uponone'sbody, encompasses the following two rights:14

(i) A very stringent right of control over and use of one's mind andbody that bars others from intentionally using one as a means byforcing one to sacrifice life, limb, or labor,where such force oper-ates by means of incursions or threats of incursions upon one'smind and body (including assault and battery and forcible arrest,detention, and imprisonment).15

13. Nozick attempts to do so simply by asserting that a right of self-ownership s full ifit fills all of the logical space within the boundaries set by the libertarian constraintsagainstaggression hat people possess. He maintains that a propertyright n Xis "therightto choose which of the constrained set of options concerningX shall be realized or at-tempted.Theconstraintsare setby other principlesorlaws operating n the society;in ourtheory, by the Lockeanrights people possess (underthe minimal state)" (ibid., p. 171).These constraints condemn some, but not all, bodily incursions that result in seriousharm. In so bounding his rightof self-ownership,Nozick opens himself up to the followingegalitarianrejoinder."Solong as the fullness of rights of self-ownership is a matteroffilling all the space inside of moral 'constraints [that] are set by other principles or lawsoperating n the society,'I too can show that Irespecta fullrightof self-ownershipsimplyby bounding our rights of ownershipby (among other rights and duties) the rights ofothers to our assistance (financialand otherwise)and our correlativeduties to assist."IfNozick'snotion of self-ownershipis full only because it presupposes libertarianratherthanegalitarian ightsandduties,he cannot offer a defense of libertarianism veregalitar-ianism on the groundsthat it respects,but egalitarianismdenies,a fullright of self-owner-ship.Thatjust amounts to a tendentious defense of libertarianismon the grounds that itrespects, and egalitarianismrejects, ibertarianconstraints.14. An analysisof the concept of a libertarianrightof self-ownership n terms of suchrightsshould layto rest worries about the coherence of this concept. BrianBarrypressessuch worriesin his review of Cohen'sbook entitled "YouHave to Be Crazy o BelieveIt,"TimesLiteraiySupplement October25, 1996), p. 28. (Cohen responds, ibid. [November8,19961, p. 19.) I concede that talk of property n persons might strike some modern earsasanartificialandunwarranted xtension of the concept of property.Butnothingwillbe lostif those who resistsuch talksimplymentallydelete the words "property" r "ownership"throughoutthis paperand replacethem with an assertionof the relevantrights.15. The notion of "usingas a means,"though intuitive, has proven resistant to phi-losophical analysis.Thebest analysisI know of is in WarrenQuinn's"Actions, ntentions,


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(2) A very stringent right to all of the income that one can gain fromone'smind and body (including one's labor)either on one's own orthrough unregulated and untaxed voluntary exchanges with otherindividuals.16

Egalitarianswho are also liberals would say that they are happy to en-dorse the first of the two libertarian rights of self-ownership just enu-merated.17Liberalegalitarians would express agreement with libertari-ans that individuals possess stringent rights of ownership over theirbodies that stand in the way of their being used as means by beingforced to donate vital bodily organs such as a heart or a liver,or beingforced to donate nonvital body parts or products such as an eye or akidney, or blood or bone marrow.Liberalegalitarianswould also professagreementwith libertarians that individualspossess stringent rights ofself-ownership that stand in the way of their being used as means bybeing forced via threatof imprisonment to work for the sake of the goodof others.Although they affirmthe firstof the two libertarianrightsof self-own-ership, liberal egalitarians typically reject the second, which is widelyregardedas prima facie far less compelling than the first.18Yet Nozickhas arguedthat this second rightfollows from the first. He has famouslyargued that "[t]axationof earning from labor is on a par with forcedlabor."19f Nozick'scomplaint against redistributive axation is correct,then, insofar as egalitarianismis achieved through a redistributivetaxand Consequences:The Doctrine of Double Effect,"Philosophy& PublicAffairs18, no. 4(fall 1989): 334-51.16. Aswillbecome clearbelow, these rights must be exercisedwithin the confines of ourrights of world-ownership.17. I takeJohn Rawlsand RonaldDworkin o be exemplarsof liberalegalitarianism.SeeRawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971);andDworkin,"What s Equality?Part3:The Place of Liberty,"owa Law Review 73 (1987): 1-54;and "Foundationsof LiberalEquality,"n Grethe Peterson, ed., The TannerLecturesonHuman Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), vol. 11,pp. 3-119.

18. John Christman, or example,has attackedthose aspects of libertarian elf-owner-ship that he calls "income rights,"which include the rightto benefit from the exchange ofone's aborfor goods. But he endorses those aspects of self-ownership hathe calls "controlrights,"which include rights against injuryand forced labor. See Christman,"Self-Owner-ship, Equality, nd the Structureof PropertyRights,"Political Theoiy 19 (1991):28-46.

19. Nozick,Anarchy,p. 169. Moreprecisely,he says that "taking he earningsof n hoursof labor ... is like forcing the person to work n hours for another'spurpose" (ibid.).


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on income, it will infringe a right against forced labor that liberal egali-tarians claim to recognize.In Section II, I show that Nozick'sargument is not essentially a com-plaint that such taxation is on a par with forced labor but rather thecomplaint that such taxation violates one's rights of ownership simplic-iter.Furthermore,I show that, with the exception of cases in which weneed not make use of worldly resources in order to perform labor,Nozick'sargumentrelies upon a suppressed and controversialpremiseregardingthe justifiabilityof inequality-generatingrights of ownershipover the world. Having exposed this premise, I rejectit in Section III infavor of a welfare egalitarianLockeanaccount of ourrightsof ownershipover the world. In Sections IV-VMshow how such an egalitarianismneed not come into conflict with an uninfringedlibertarianright of self-ownership that is, moreover,robust rather than merely formal.II.TAxATIONNDFORCED ABORIn order to assess Nozick's claim that redistributive axationis on a parwith forced labor,we need to consider the various ways in which onecan generate income from one's labor. One can generate income withor without performinglabor on worldly resources and with or withoutengaging in tradewith others. These two distinctions generate the fol-lowing four possibilities:

WORDLYESOURCES No WORDLY ESOURCES

Trading e.g., Farming e.g., Entertaining

No trading e.g., Farming e.g., Hairweaving

Most forms of income-generating labor involve the use of worldly re-sources. A paradigmaticcase of such labor is farming,which involvesplowing soil, planting seeds, watering, and harvesting crops. Someforms of income-generating labor do not, however, involve the use ofworldly resources. Performing a song and dance for a paying audience


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in a public place is one example. In the case of most labor, one cangenerate income through trading:the farmercan trade crops for othercommodities or for money, and the performer can trade her entertain-ment formoney. One does not, however, always need to engage in trad-ing in order to generate income. The farmer can generate an incomethat consists of the food that she harvests even if she never trades withanybody else, where income is to be understood, in the context of thisdiscussion, as any beneficial material goods that one gains as the resultof one's labor.It is more difficultto imagine cases in which one mightgain income, so defined, in the absence of tradingas the result of laborthat does not involve worldly resources. One example is the weavingtogether of loose strands of one's hair into a toupee to cover one's baldspot or into clothing to keep oneself warm.In assessing Nozick'sargument that redistributive axationis on a parwith forcedlabor,I will first consider a ratherbizarre case that does notinvolve the use of worldly resources. It is important to consider such acase in isolation from cases that involve worldly resources, since it isonly in cases that do not involveworldlyresources that Nozick'sobjec-tion to redistributive axationis very persuasive.20Nozick'sobjection toredistributive taxation in general is persuasive only if one mistakenlyassimilates cases that involve worldlyresourceswith cases that do not.Imagine a highly artificial"society"of two strangers,each of whomwill freeze to death unless she is clothed. Unfortunately, he only sourceof material for clothing is human hair,which can be woven into cloth-ing. One of the two is hirsuteand capable of weaving,whereas the otheris bald and incapable of weaving. The weaver would, however, prefer toweave only one set of clothingfor herself and none for the otherperson.The "state" which we might imagine to be a third person with enforce-ment powersbut no needs of her own) imposes a 50 percent income taxon the weaver by declaring that she must give half of whatever shechooses to weave to the nonweaver. If she does not do so of her ownaccord, then the state will literallyforce her to do so by seizing thatwhich she owes in tax and giving it to the nonweaver.

20. Cf.Cohen, Self-Ownership, . 170nmo,where he envisions a scenarioin which thereare no worldlyresources or people to exploit:"people loatin space, and all necessary andluxuryservices take the form of other people touching them in various ways."He main-tains that "it is far more difficult to object to inequalityin this worldthan it is to objectto it"in a world in which differences n welfarearesolely a function of differentialaccessto worldlyresources.


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There is a clear sense in which this tax forces the weaver to work forthe sake of the nonweaver. She will, after all, freeze to death if she doesnot work at all. But if she works, then she must weave one out of everytwo articles of clothing, not for her own sake, but for the sake of thenonweaver. She must, therefore,on pain of freezing to death, spend halfof her time working for the sake of the nonweaver.21But not all schemes of redistributive taxation force those who aretaxed to work for the sake of others on pain of death. The state couldinstead refrain from imposing any redistributive tax until a fairly highlevel of income has been reached. It could, for example, tax the weaveronly on the items she produces that are surplus to a sizeable wardrobewhich she has woven for her own benefit. Nozick is opposed to such a"luxury ncome tax." He believes that it, no less than a "necessity in-come tax," amounts to forced labor.22Yet such a tax cannot literallyconstitute forced labor, since it would be so easy to avoid. Toillustrate

this point, consider the following pair of cases that are analogous to anecessity income tax and a luxury income tax at least insofar as thequestion of forced labor is concerned. In the first,a thug ordersyou behis slave for the afternoon on pain of death. In the second, a thug an-nounces that you must be a slave for the afternoon if and only if younow hum a certain song that you happen to have no particular desireto hum. In the firstcase, he forces you to be his slave for the afternoon.In the second, he does not. In both cases, however, you have a decisivecomplaint againstthe thug:that by his threats he violatesyour propertyrightto do as you choose with thatwhich is rightfullyyours (yourself nboth cases).These observations demonstrate that Nozick'scomplaint against re-distributive axationis not essentiallya complaint about being forcedtowork. Rather, t is essentially an objection to the violation of propertyrights.Nozick'scomplaint against the imposition of a luxuryincome taxon the weavermust be grounded in the claim that she has not forfeited

21. Ishould, however,note that Nozick denies that the fact thatsomeone must work onpainof deathis asufficient condition of forced abor,since he denies that the propertylessworkerwho must work on pain of starvation s forced to work. See Nozick, Anarchy,pp.262-65.

22. In the case of any system of redistributive axation, accordingto Nozick, the "factthat othersintentionally ntervene,in violation of a side constraint against aggression,tothreaten force to limit the alternatives[thatwould be open to the taxed individualif thetax were not imposed],makes the taxationsystem one of forced labor...." (ibid., p. 169).


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her rights to, but ratherlegitimatelyowns, that which she has used toweave and has woven, and thata redistributive ncome tax would violateher rightsof ownershipin these things.Theweaver'srightsof ownershipover her means of production and the fruits of her labor can plausiblybe groundedsolely and completely in her libertarianrightof self-owner-ship. Her means of production consist of nothing more than her mindand partsof her body and the fruits of her laborconsist of nothing morethan parts of her body that have been transformedinto items that aresuitable to be worn as clothing. In orderto rebutthe libertarian's bjec-tion to taxationin this instance, the egalitarianmust hold either that theweaverdoes not possess a libertarianright of self-ownershiporthat thisrightis not as stringentas the libertarianthinksit is and may justifiablybe infringedin these circumstances. But this is to acknowledgethat, ifthere is such a thing as a libertarian right of self-ownership, then itcomes into conflict with equality in these circumstances.If the imposi-tion of a luxuryincome tax on the weaverwere both necessary and suf-ficient to prevent another human being from freezing to death, oppo-nents of libertarianismcould justifiablyhold that only an unreasonablyfanatical devotee of a right of self-ownership could insist that such aright is so stringent that it rules out the imposition of this tax. But Ibelieve that the libertariangains the upper hand when the opponentgoes so far as to claim that a tax may be imposed on the weaver, notmerely in orderto ensure that the nonweaver does not freeze to deathor is able to enjoy a certain amount of comfort, but in orderto ensurethat the nonweaver end up with a wardrobe that is no less luxuriousthan the weaver's.23 The libertarian's case against this latter tax isstrong.24

23. Exceptperhapsfor thatwhich is necessary to compensatethe weaver orthe disutil-ity of labor of which she alone is capable.24. If, contra the egalitarian,Nozick'sargument soundly condemns taxation for thepurposes of realizingan egalitariandistribution as a violation of one'sproperty rightsinself, why doesn'tit similarlycondemn taxation for the purposes of providingfor the na-tionaldefense, police protection,and the judicialsystem?A libertariandoes not objecttocoercivetaxationfor these purposes. Buthere one is forced to pay for goods that one has

received.In this respect,this case is analogousto the government'sunobjectionableforc-ingof an individual o workto pay off her credit cardbill for goods that she has contractedto receive on promiseof later payment.In the case of the goods of national defense, etc.,one never enteredany voluntaryagreement. Nevertheless,one has receivedgoods. I be-lieve that payment for these goods can often be justifiedby the "principleof fairness,"accordingto which one may be forced to pay for "public goods" from which one has


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So farthe property rightsthat the redistributive ax is thought by thelibertarian to violate have involved only rights of self-ownership. Wehave not yet considered cases in which one needs to make use of theworld in order to earn income. But when, as is often the case in actualfact, one must make use of the world in order to earn income, Nozick'scomplaint against redistributivetaxation is much more difficult to getoff the ground. Considerthe case of a farmerwho is forced by the gov-ernment, on pain of imprisonment, to give half of whatever income sheearns fromfarmingto hungry orphans.This case might seem morallytobe on a parwith the case of the weaverwho must give half of whatevershe earns from weaving to the needy. Butthey are,in fact, on a par onlyif the following premise is true: in addition to having a right of self-ownership that is as full as the weaver's,she also possesses a right ofownership over the land that she farms that is as full as her right ofownership over herself. Although Nozick is elsewhere sensitive to theneed to justify world-ownership,nowherein his argument against redis-tributivetaxation does he disclose that his complaint relies on the fol-lowing generalizedversion of this premise:that one'srightof ownershipoverworldly resources that one uses in order to earn income is as fullas one's right of ownership over oneself.25Were the farmerto possesssuch a right of ownership over land, then the tax would be at the verybenefitted and which it is impossible selectivelyto exclude people fromreceiving.(Nozick,however,rejectsany appeal to the principle of fairness.See his discussion of this principlein Nozick,Anarchy, pp. 90-95.)

25. That it relies upon this premise is a point to which Cohen is oddly insensitive.I say"insensitive" ecause Cohen affirmsthat redistributive axation conflicts with libertarianself-ownership.Yethe does not supply the qualification hat it need not conflict in casesin which one must labor upon worldly resources in order to earn income and one's rightof ownershipover these resourcesis not as full as one's rightof ownershipoveroneself.(For both the affirmationand failure to qualify, see Cohen, Self-Ownership,pp. 216-21,240.) I say "oddly"because it was he who demonstrated that libertarianself-ownershipamong the unequally talented does not by itself imply inequalityin holdings. One mustconjoin a premiseof self-ownershipwith an inegalitarianpremiseof world-ownership norderto reachthis result. See ibid., Chapters3-4, especially pp. 112-15. hese chaptersarerevisions of a pair of pioneering articles entitled "Self-Ownership,World-Ownership, ndEquality" nd "Self-Ownership,World-Ownership, nd Equality:Part II."The formerap-pearedin FrankLucash,ed.,JusticeandEqualityHereand Now(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1986), pp. 108-35, and the latter appeared n Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1986):77-96. These articles drew attention to the centralityof a right of self-ownership toNozick'spolitical philosophy. Theyalso preparedthe way,without travellingdown it, toa proper understandingof the relationshipbetween self-ownershipand equalityas medi-ated by world-ownership.


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least a justifiable infringement of and at worst an unjustifiableviolationof her rights of ownership. Butif the farmer'sright of ownership over theland she farms were less full, then the tax on her income would involvea lesser infringement of her property rights. If, for example, the farmerhad voluntarilypurchased the land she farms from someone on the con-dition that she givehalf of herharvest to the needy,then the state woulddo no wrong by stepping in to force her to give this portion away to theneedy. Such force would not even infringe (much less violate) any prop-erty rightof the farmer'sbut ratherwould be a justifiablemeans of en-forcing a voluntary contractual obligation. Similarly, f the farmerhadstolen all of the land she farms, the statewould be justifiedin confiscat-ing some of the product of her labor and giving it, as well as the land,backto the rightfulownerin compensation for the theft. Such confisca-tion would not even infringe (much less violate) any right of the thief.Egalitarianscorrectly question whether there could be a moral pre-sumption analogous to that of a libertarianrightof self-ownershipin thecase of the farmer's itle over her land, since a presumption in favor ofsuch a right of ownership over any bit of land has a good deal less primafacie plausibilitythan a presumption in favorof such a right of owner-ship over self. As Cohen has noted:

[0]ne may plausibly say ... of raw land and worldly resources (out ofwhich all unrawexternalthings are, be it noted, made), that no personhas, at least to begin with, a greaterright in them than any other does;whereas the same thought is less compelling when it is applied tohuman parts and powers. Jean-JacquesRousseau described the origi-nal formation of private property as a usurpation of what should befreelyaccessible to all,and many havefound his thesis persuasive,butfew would discern a comparable injustice in a person'sinsistence onsovereigntyover his own limbs.26Perhaps, even if we possess a libertarianright of ownership over our-selves, we can only ever come to have a less full rightof ownershipoverland. Perhapswe can come to own anybit of land only on the conditionthatwe share some of whatever we reapfrom it with others. If this weretrue, then the state'sforcingeach of us to share our harvest with otherswould be no more an infringementof a libertarianright of self-owner-

26. Cohen, Self-Ownership, p. 71.


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ship than in the case in which one purchased a plot of land from some-one else on the condition that one share a part of one's harvestwith theneedy.III. WORLD-OWNERSHIPUnderwhat conditions can one come to have rights of ownership overbits of the world?To answer this question, I will, in this section and thenext, consider hypothetical cases in which childless adults with noworldlyresourceson theirpersons have washed ashore on an uninhab-ited and undiscovered and therefore unowned island.27 believe, andargue in Section VMhat the principle of justice in acquisition that ap-plies in such cases is directly relevant to the question of justice in theholdings of members of contemporarysocieties.According to the Lockeanprinciple that I endorse of justice in acqui-sition of previouslyunowned worldly resources,an individual can cometo acquire rights of ownership over a previously unowned bit of theworld if and only if such acquisition places nobody else at a disadvan-tage. Such acquisition that leaves "enough and as good" for others toacquire is justified because it is "no prejudiceto any others."28

27. Locke, however,appears to be committed to the denial of this inference. He be-lieved that God has given the earthto "mankind n common" (Locke,Second TreatiseofGovernment,25). Moreover,he thought that this gift implied a "rightand power over theearth and inferior creatures n common" (Locke,FirstTreatise f Government, 67). Thisright is a propertyright. Here I follow A. John Simmons, The LockeanTheoiy of Rights(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1992),pp. 239-40. But in the absence of any suchbelief that the earth had previouslybeen owned by some being who transferredhis rightof ownershipof human beings, it is appropriate o regard he earthas initiallyunowned.Justas one cannot simply assume that there are any individualistic or private propertyrightsat the outset, one cannot simply assume common or otherwisecollectivepropertyrightsat the outset. Cf. Nozick, Anarchy,p. 178.28. Locke,Second Treatise, 33. In order to come to acquiresuch rightsof ownershipthat place nobody else at a disadvantage, here must have been some method of acquisi-tion. ForLocke, he method consisted of the mixing of one's laborwith worldlyresources.See ibid., ??27-35.But on my own account, the method need not involve the mixing ofone'slabor with any bit of the world. It can instead involve the mere stakingof a claim.Laboringon something maybe a way of stakinga claim.But it oughtnot be the only way,since, if it were,then incapacitatedindividuals who are incapableof mixing any of theirlaborwith worldly resourceswould be unfairly deprivedof any method of acquiringre-sourceswhich mightnevertheless be usefulto them. They ought to be entitled to stake aclaimsimply by publiclyproclaimingthe boundaries of the worldlyresources overwhichthey claim rightsof ownership. Perhapsthe mere stakingof a claim that does not leave


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Nozick would, I think, concur that one can acquire property rightsinpreviously unowned worldly resources so long as such acquisition doesnot place others at a disadvantage.29 n his version of the Lockeanproviso:Nozick'sproviso:You may acquire previously unowned land (and itsfruits) if and only if you make nobody else worse off than she wouldhave been if she had instead been free to gather and consume foodand water from this land and make use of it but not to privatizetheland itself.

As a means of ensuring that nobody is placed at a disadvantage,Nozick's version of the Lockean proviso is too weak, since it allows asingle individual in a state of nature to engage in an enriching acquisi-tion of all the land there is if she compensates all others by hiring themand paying a wage that ensures that they end up no worse off than theywould have been if they had continued to live the meager hand-to-mouth existence of hunters and gatherers on nonprivate land.30Suchacquisitionwould preemptothers frommaking any acquisitions of theirown that would improvetheir situations over that in which they live nobetter than a meager hand-to-mouth existence. This acquisition is ob-jectionable both because it condemns others to such a miserable exis-tence and because it is manifestly unfair that a first grabberbe allowedto acquire a much greatershare than others, at a cost in terms of theopportunities of others, of worldly resources over which she has nogreatermoral claim than anybody else. The charge of unfairness wouldbe mitigatedsomewhat if each person had a genuinely equal chance toengage in such firstgrabbing (as they would if, for example, permissionto grab first were determined by lot). But Nozick'sproviso permits firstgrabbingeven when chances are not equal.Andeven if his provisoweremodified so as to permit firstgrabbing only when chances were equal,others at a disadvantagewould not be sufficient to generate a property right.One mightneed to add that the resources n questionmust be of some use to the claim-staker. Evenif the planet Neptune never was and never will become of any use to anyone, and hencemy coming to own it will not place anyone at a disadvantage, t seems odd to say that Icome to own it simply by staking a claim to it by means of public proclamation.)I willignore this qualification and will concern myself only with the staking of claims on re-sources that are of some use.

29. See Nozick, Anarchy, pp. 174-82.30. Cohenis the inventorof this counterexampleto Nozick'sproviso. See Cohen, Self-

Ownership, Chapter 3.


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the following weaker complaint of unfairness would remain:holdingswould be allowed to varyat a cost in terms of the opportunitiesof others(even though they need not vary) as the result of factors beyond thecontrol of individuals.The following version of the Lockean proviso provides a remedy tothese defects in Nozick'sversion:Egalitarianproviso:Youmay acquirepreviouslyunowned worldlyre-sources if and only if you leave enough so that everyone else can ac-quire an equally good share of unowned worldlyresources.31

The egalitarianprovisohas prima facie plausibilityfor the followingrea-son: One's coming to acquire previously unowned resources underthese terms leaves nobody else at a disadvantage (or,in Locke'swords,is "no prejudice to any others"), where being left at a disadvantage isunderstood as being left with less than an equally good share of re-sources (or,in Locke'swords, being left with less than "enough and asgood"). Any weaker,less egalitarian versions of the proviso would, likeNozick's,unfairly allow some to acquire greateradvantage than othersfrom their acquisition of unowned land and other worldly resourcesoverwhich they have no strongermoral claim than anybody else.32I intend the phrase "equally good shares of unowned worldly re-sources" that I employ in the egalitarianprovisoto be a term of art thatis neutral among a range of familiarmetrics of equality.33 ome wouldsay that shares are equally good if they are such that none would preferto trade her bundle of worldly resources with anybody else's.34Otherswould say that shares areequally good if they are such that none would

31. Inthis article,I ignore complicationsthat would need to be introduced for the sakeof preservingunspoiled wildernessand otherpublic land.32. Perhapssuch greateradvantagewould not be unfairif it were secured at no cost interms of the opportunities of others to better themselves through acquisition. Anycom-plaint of unfairness might be thought especially weak when the greateradvantage re-dounds to the maximal benefit of the least well off. It is not, however, mportantfor mypurposesto adjudicate he merits of equalityversus apareto-superior negalitarianprinci-ple such as maximin,since the arguments hat I will employin order o show how equality

can be reconciled with self-ownership can also be employed in order to show how sucha pareto-superior negalitarianprinciple can be reconciled with self-ownership.33. It is, however,difficult o phrase things in a manner thatdoes not tend to favorsomemetrics over others.I have not been able to do so.34. See HillelSteiner,"Capitalism, ustice,andEqualStarts,"Social Philosophyand Pol-icy 5 (1987): 49-71.


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8o Philosophy & Public Affairs

preferto tradethe sum of her bundle of worldly resourcesand personalresources (wherethe latter consists of one's mental and physical capac-ities).35And others would say that shares are equally good if they aresuch that each is able to attainthe same level of welfare as anybody elsegiventhe combination of herworldlyand personal resources.36 will notadjudicatethe merits of these metrics here. RatherI will simply arguethat it is possible to reconcile libertarianself-ownership with equalitywhen equality is measured in terms of the latter metric of equality ofaccess to welfare.37 choose to reconcile self-ownershipwith equalityofaccess to welfare because the latter is, among the leading candidates,the metric of equalitywhose realizationwould seem, prima facie, to bemost inimical to the preservation of a libertarianright of self-owner-ship.38In the remainderof this article,I employ the followingwelfaristread-

35. SeeDworkin,"What s Equality?Part2: Equalityof Resources,"Philosophy&PublicAffairs lo, no. 4 (fall 1981): 283-345.36. FollowingCohen, I will call this metric "equalityof access to welfare."Cohendefines a state of affairs n which people'saccess to welfare is equal as roughly one inwhichthe levelsof welfare hat people have attaineddifferonly as the resultof choices forwhich they can be held morally responsible.See Cohen, "On he Currencyof EgalitarianJustice,"Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44, 916.

37. Iwould,however, ike briefly o motivatethe claim (towardwhich Iam sympathetic)that the notion of a fairbecause equallygood share of worldlyresources s plausiblymeas-ured in terms of equality of access to welfare. Suppose that the only worldly resourceavailable or use by each of two individuals s a blanketthat can be dividedinto portionsof any size. If the blanket did not exist, then both would freeze to death. One of theseindividuals s, throughno fault of his, twice as largeas the other. If the blanketis dividedinto equally large portions, then the smaller of the two will have enough to enjoy theluxuryof being able wrap the blanketaround himself twice,whereas the largerof the twowill suffer the painful (but non-life-or-limb-threatening) iscomfortof partialexposuretothe cold because he will be able to cover only a portion of his body. The blanketcould,however,be divided nto unequalportionsthat enable each to cover his entire body once,thereby eavingthem equallycomfortable.(Butneither is as comfortableas he would havebeen if he had a greatershare of the blanket.)It intuitivelyfollows fromthe assumptionthat each has an equally strongmoral claim on the blanket that they each have a claim onenough to leavehim as comfortableas the other ratherthan that they each have a claimto portions of the blanket that are of the same size.

38. Mystrategyof reconciliationwill go throughwith minor modificationsif one meas-uresequally good sharesin terms of eitherof the othertwo metricsof equalitymentioneda moment ago. It will also go throughif one measures equally good shares in terms ofeither of the followingwell-motivatedmetrics:Cohen'smetricof "access to advantage"orAmartyaSen'smetricof "capabilities." ee Cohen, "On he Currency"; nd Sen, "Equalityof What?"in Sterling McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City:Universityof UtahPress,1980), vol. 1, pp. 197-220.


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ing of the phrase "equally good share of unowned worldly resources"that occurs in the egalitarian proviso: someone else's share is as goodas yours if and only if it is such that she would be able (by producing,consuming, and trading) to better herself to the same degree as you,where "betterment" s to be measured in terms of increases in welfare.The phrase "to the same degree" can be interpretedeither as (i) "bythesame increment of increase in welfare"or (2) "to the same absolute levelof welfare."39t follows from this readingof the egalitarianproviso thatthose who are, through no fault of theirs, less able to convert worldlyresources into welfare are entitled to acquire additional resources inorderto compensate for this lesser ability.40IV.THE RECONCILIATION OF SELF-OWNERSHIP AND EQUALITYI now turn to the task of reconciling libertarianself-ownership with anequalityof the sort that is called forbythe egalitarianproviso (underthewelfaristreadingthat I havejust proposed). Cohen would arguethat the

39. This proviso acks intuitiveplausibilityunder the first interpretationwhen those onthe island start off at very different absolute levels of welfare in the absence of worldlyresources. I shall assume throughout that the islanders enjoy the same absolute level ofwelfare at the outset. It follows from this assumption that either interpretationwill yieldthe same result. This assumption is not unreasonable, given that the islanders start offwith no claims of ownership over the island'sworldly resources and with no worldly re-sources on their persons and that, as a matter of contingent fact, every human beingwould enjoy roughly the same extremely ow level of welfare in the absence of access toany worldly resources whatsoever.40. Althoughit is not my purpose to defend a welfaristreadingof the egalitarianpro-viso, Iwould like to forestalltwo objectionsthat might arise at this point:that it is unfairand inefficientto distribute resources so that those who areless efficient than others inconverting resources into welfare get more. In response to the unfairness objection, Ishould note that awelfaristreadingof the egalitarianproviso amountsto an endorsementof equality of access to welfare rather than equality of welfaresimnpliciter.Recall that astate of affairs n which people's access to welfareis equal is roughlyone in which thelevels of welfare hat people have attaineddifferonly as the result of choices for which theycan be held morally responsible. People should not, however, suffer differencesin theirwelfare as the result of factors beyond their control (and for which they thereforecannotbe held morallyresponsible).A concern for fairness is thereforebuilt into the verynotionof equalitythatI have endorsed. See Cohen, "On he Currency." s faras the inefficiencyobjectionis concerned, I should note that the less talented who enjoya greatershare ofland would be free to sell or rent their land to those who can put it to more productiveuse.The most efficient egalitariandistribution of resources would likely be one in which theless talented could gain access to the same level of welfare as the more talented onlythroughsuch sale or rent.


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82 Philosophy& PublicAffairs

affirmationof the egalitarian proviso implies the denial that we have alibertarianright of self-ownership, since he claims:An egalitarianmight reject initial resource equality [i.e., a distributionof bundles of resources such that no one would want to swap hisbundle with anybody else's] on the ground that resources need to bedifferentially distributed to compensate for talent differences. Butthat ground of rejection of resource equality requires denial of thetenet, derivedfrom the [claim that we have a right]of self-ownership,that people areentitled to the differentialrewardswhich (uncompen-sated for) talent differences produce.... 41

Contrary o Cohen, I do not believe that the aforementioned tenet canbe derived from a libertarianright of self-ownership, since, as Cohennotes elsewhere, "the principleof self-ownership ... says, on the face ofit, nothing about anyone's rights in resources other than people, and,in particular, nothing about the substances and capacities of nature,without which the things thatpeople want cannot be produced."42Moreprecisely, libertarian self-ownership says nothing about rights inworldly resources beyond those that one is able to acquire through theexchange of one's labor (or partsof one'sbody) forgoods that others areentitled to trade. It cruciallydoes not have implications regardingthebackground of acquisition and distribution of worldly resources thatprovides the context forsuch exchanges.Therecognitionof a libertarianright of self-ownership does not rule out a distribution of resources inaccordance with the egalitarian proviso any more than it rules out adistributionof worldly resources in accordancewith a principle of jointownership of the world that renders this right virtually worthless.43Cohen might argue that my grounds for affirmingthe egalitarian pro-

41. Cohen, Self-Ownership, p. 162 n31.42. Ibid., p. 13.43. Cohen has famously argued that joint ownership of natural resources-wherebyany use or consumption of the island's resources by one requiresthe consent of all-isconsistent with the presence of an uninfringed libertarian right of self-ownershipandwould, given standard assumptions of bargaining heory, give rise to equality of welfare.

In circumstances of joint ownership, libertarianself-ownership would, however, be ren-dered virtuallyworthless, since one would be permitted to consume any bit of food orwater or move, stand, or rest on any bit of land only with the collective permission of all.One would, in fact, be hardlybetter off than one would have been if one had been ownedby the collective. See ibid., Chapter 4. Cf. Locke'sattackson joint ownership in Locke,Second Treatise, ??28-29.


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83 Self-Ownershipand Equality:A LockeanReconciliation

viso, unlike the grounds that he has hypothesized for a right of jointownership, imply the denial of a libertarian right of self-ownership.Nothing I say, however, implies that I deny the existence of either of thetwo rights that together constitute a libertarianright of self-ownership.44Considerthe case of a land reformpolicy that is relevantlyanalogous tothe egalitarian proviso. Under this policy, ownership of governmentland is transferred to individuals in inverse proportion to the value(measuredin terms of the access to welfare that it provides) of the landthat they have already nheritedfrom their ancestors so that the welfarethat each can derive from the sum total of her holdings in land after thistransfer s equal. Just as the egalitarianproviso compensates people fordifferences in their mental and physical capacities that bear on theirabilityto convert resources into welfare,this policy compensates peoplefor differencesin the value (in terms of welfare)of their initial holdingsin land. Yet the land reform policy does not come into conflict with theclaim that people had and continue to have equally strong ownershiprights over the initial holdings that they had inherited, where theserights include rights analogous to each of the two rights that togetherconstitute a libertarian right of self-ownership. Their rights of controlover and use of this inherited land are no less strong than they werebefore the transfer of government land. Theirrightto whateverincomethey could gainfrom this inheritedland, either through unregulatedanduntaxed trading or simply through laboring upon the land without trad-ing, is also unchanged by the transfer of government land. The statewould, no doubt, infringea libertarianrightof ownershipover inheritedland if, instead of pursuing the above policy, it seized some of that landand transferred t to the less well off or forced individualsto givethe lesswell off half of whatever they gain through unregulated and untaxedexchanges. But it does not infringe any libertarianright of ownershipover land by giving more land to those who have less and less to thosewho have more. Similarly,the state does not infringe any libertarianrightof ownershipover self by allowing those who have lesser talents toacquiremore land than those who have greatertalents.

Even though the egalitarian proviso is, as I have just shown, consis-tent with an uninfringedlibertarianrightof self-ownership,it places noconstraints upon the achievement of equality of access to welfare by44. These rights are listed on pp. 69-70 above.


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means of a distribution of worldly resources that leaves the able bodiedwith so few resources that they would be forced, on pain of starvation,to come to the assistance of the less talented. Imagine an island whoseinhabitants consist of one able-bodied woman named Able and oneman named Unable who is incapable of engaging in any productivelabor whatsoever. Able is a non-altruistic ascetic who has no desire forany land or other materialgoods beyond that which is sufficientfor hersurvival.In these circumstances, the only division of worldlyresources(consistentwith libertarianself-ownershipand the survivalof each) thatwould give rise to equality of access to welfareis one in which Unableis entitled to acquire so much of the island that Able would be left witha sliver of land that is insufficientforher to draw the sustenance neces-saryfor her survival. Given such a distribution, Unable would have thepower to exclude Able fromland that is essential to her sustenance andwould thereforehave the powerto force Able to work forhim for the restof his life by granting her permission to work his land on the conditionthat she share a portion of the fruits of her labor on his land with him.Since the two partieswould have equal bargaining power under such adistribution, and assuming that they are purely rationally self-inter-ested, it is reasonable to infer that Unable would settle for no less thanan arrangement n which Ablemust workfor his sake for the restof theirlives, and thatAble would agreeto such an arrangement,but only underconditions that ensure their equalityof access to welfare. Able'spredic-ament is consistent with her possession of an uninfringed libertarianright of self-ownership. But, as in the case of joint ownership, such aright would not be worth very much to her, since she would not haverights over a sufficient amount of worldly resources to provide anybuffer against her being forced to work for the sake of Unable.The worth of one's right of self-ownership-what one can do withit-normally increases with increases in the extent of one's rights overworldlyresources.45 shall define a libertarianrightof self-ownershipas"robust" f and only if, in addition to having the libertarianright itself,one also has rightsoverenough worldlyresources so that others cannot,by means of withholding access to theirresources,force one to come tothe assistance of another via sacrifice of life, limb, or labor.If it could be

45. The distinctionI draw between the right of self-ownership and its worth is akin tothe distinction that Rawls draws between the right to liberty and its worth. See Rawls,ATheoiy of Justice, pp. 204-5.


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shown that the egalitarianproviso could be rendered consistent with alibertarian right of self-ownership only when the able-bodied are de-prived of so many resources that their right is not robust and they areforced, on pain of starvation, o workforthe badly off, then one will haveachieved nothing more than a Pyrrhicreconciliation of self-ownershipand equality.The task of reconciliation is to show that egalitarianism sconsistent, not merelywith an uninfringedlibertarianrightof self-own-ership, but with such a right that is, moreover,robust.As the story of Able and Unable illustrates,there are some circum-stances involving unusual preferencesregardingmaterial goods amongthe able-bodied in which equality can be achieved only if the able-bod-ied are entitled to acquire so few worldlyresources that their libertarianright of self-ownership is not robust. Thathaving been said, I would liketo offermy promised demonstrationof how a robust libertarianright ofself-ownershipfor all could as a matter of contingent fact be reconciledwith equalityin more ordinarycircumstances.The libertarian's ritiqueof egalitarianism s enfeebled in the following manner. Barringunusualcircumstances such as those of Able and Unable, it is in principle (i.e.,leaving aside problems of institutional or political infeasibility) possibleto provide allof the badlyoff in a society with the opportunityto acquireenough worldly resources to generate a steady, generous, and lifelongflow of income from the investment, rental, or sale of these resourcesthat allows them to better themselves to the same degreeas able-bodiedindividuals who are themselves provided with the opportunity to ac-quirea fairlygenerous portion of worldlyresources. The holdings of theable-bodiedwould be sufficiently generous that the badly off would beable to support themselves through trulyvoluntary exchanges with theable-bodied that do not involve forced assistance. By these means, onecould achieve equalitywithout any encroachmentsupon anyrobust lib-ertarianright of self-ownership.Toprovidea simple and artificial llus-trationof such an arrangement, imagine an island society divided intoa largenumber of able-bodied and a smaller number of badly off indi-viduals.Allthe beachfrontpropertyis divided among the badly off, andfarmable land in the interior is divided among the able-bodied. Theable-bodied each voluntarily purchase access to the beach in exchangefor the provision of food to the badly off. The result of this division ofland is that the badly off and the able-bodied are each able to betterthemselves to an equal degree without anyone'sbeing forced to come


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to the assistance of anybody else.46The bounty of worldlyresources andthe preferences and number of the able-bodied that typify morerealisti-cally large and heterogeneous societies will ensure that land and otherworldly resources can in principle be divided in a manner that allowsjust about all of the badly off-even those so badly off that they areincapable of farming, harvesting, or gathering any food from the land-to better themselves from their holdings of worldly resources to thesame degree as the able-bodied without forcing the able-bodied tocome to their assistance. It is, for example, difficult to see what wouldin principle rule out the redistributionof land and other worldly re-sources to almost all of the badly off in a relatively prosperous societysuch as the United States so that they would have enough capital withwhich to purchase the goods of life through voluntary exchanges withable-bodied individuals.47

46. In conversation, Frances Kammhas said that libertariansand other deontologistscould object that the able-bodied are used as means in the following respect in this sce-nario. The distribution of resources that the egalitarianproviso mandates is specificallydesigned to achieve equality of welfare by inducing the able-bodied to enter into labor(and other) contracts with the disabled that they would not choose to enter into if re-sources had instead been divided equally (i.e., into shares of equal marketvalue).Even ifthis amounts to a using of the able-bodied as means, I do not regard his as an objection-able use, since the means employedin this case are non-coercive and do not deprive theable-bodiedof anything to which they have even a prima facie entitlement. This arrange-ment involves no more objectionable a using of persons as means than Rawls'sdifferenceprinciple,which gives the able-bodied a greater-than-equaldivision of resources n orderto induce them to produce more than they otherwise would when this would benefit thebadly off. (See ibid., ?13.)Of course, Rawls'sdifference principle gives the able-bodiedmore than they would have had under an equal division of resources,whereas the egalitar-ian proviso gives them less. Therefore, he able-bodied would (insofar as they are self-interested) prefer Rawls'sdifference principle to an equal division, whereas they wouldpreferan equal division to the distribution called for by the egalitarianproviso. But thisfact would providethe able-bodiedwith grounds for complaint against the egalitarianproviso only if there is an initial moral presumption in favor of an equal division of re-sources.I deny any such presumption.47. But,in addition to the highly unusual circumstances of Able and Unable, it wouldbe impossible to provide equalityfor all without forcingsome to come to the assistanceof others in less unusual circumstances n which the resourcesrequired o raise the levelof some badly off individuals would be so fantastically great (e.g., the spending of theenormous amounts of money that would be necessaryand sufficientto find the cure tocertain debilitating diseases) that people would have to be forced to labor in order togenerate the resources. (I believe that utilitarianconsiderationshaving to do with thepromotionof the generalwelfarealsoprovidea decisive barrier o the realizationof equal-ity in these circumstances.)AndrewWilliamsnotes that theremay be other ordinarycir-cumstances in which no amount of natural resources (consistent with the robust


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We are now in a position to see why the followingassertion of Cohen'sis misleading (even if not, strictly speaking, false):[N]o egalitarianrule regardingexternal resources alone will, togetherwith self-ownership, deliver equality of outcome, except, as in thecase of joint ownership, at an unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy[i.e., the circumstances of genuine control over one's life]. There is atendency of self-ownership to produce inequality, and the only wayto nullify that tendency (without expressly abridgingself-ownership)is through a regime over external resources which is so rigid that itexcludes exercise of independent rights over oneself.48

This statement is misleading because it fails to acknowledge that, as acontingent fact, it will be possible, viaa distributionofworldly resourcesin accordance with the egalitarian proviso, virtually to nullify the ten-dency of an uninfringed and robust libertarianright of self-ownershipto produce inequality.In a society in which resources are distributedinaccordance with the egalitarian proviso, the munificently endowedbadly off could justifytheir equality of welfare,not on the grounds of apositive rightto demand that unwilling others come to their assistanceby sharing the hard-earned fruits of their labor, but rather on thegrounds that they have a right to a share of worldly resources that ena-bles them to secure the same degree of benefits as anybody else. Theywould not, therefore,need to respond to any charges of parasitism orfree riding,49ince their case for equality of welfarewould rest on noth-ing more than the stakingof a claim to a fair share of worldlyresourcesto which nobody else has a prior or stronger moral claim. Libertarianssuch as Nozick have sought to build their political philosophy on highmoral ground-that of a stringent libertarianright of self-ownershipthat is supposed to reflect our elevated status as inviolable persons. Thepurpose of this article has been to show that egalitarianscan build theretoo. The Lockean egalitarianismI have sketched is, indeed, far moreself-ownershipof others)could compensate somebody fora disability,yet a forced trans-fer of body parts could. (A otally blind person who could have her vision partiallyrestoredonly through the transplantationof an eye from a sighted two-eyed person might be insuch a situation.)

48. Cohen, Self-Ownership, p. 105.49. David Gauthierhas leveled these two charges against egalitarianism.See Gauthier,MoralsbyAgreeme7zt(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986), pp. 217-21.


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88 Philosophy &PublicAffairs

deferentialto the preservationof a robustlibertarianright of self-owner-ship than Nozick's ibertarianism,since the inegalitarianproviso of thelatter provides very little protection against the forced labor of the prop-ertyless.V. MULTIPLE GENERATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF GIVING ND SHARINGSo far, I have, for the sake of simplicity, restricted myself to a highlyschematized model of a single generation of strangerson an island inorder to make a case for the egalitarianproviso.Even if one accepts theegalitarian proviso as a valid principle of justice in acquisition of un-owned worldly resources in this context, one might wonder what rele-vance it has to the question of justice in holdings in the real world inwhich there are now very few worldly resources left to discover andtherehave been and will continue to be multiple generationsof inhabi-tants.Itis no doubt truethat nearly every bit of the world has some legalclaim of ownership attached to it today.But it does not follow that theegalitarian proviso is irrelevantto the question of the distribution ofresources in the present day. It is not irrelevantbecause, as I will argue,the egalitarian proviso,when fully spelled out, requires that the mem-bers of each succeeding generationhave at least as greatan opportunityto own worldlyresourcesas did the firstgenerationto acquireresourcesout of a state of nature.Letus assume, for the sake of simplicity,that generationsarediscretecollections of equal numbers of individuals of the same age;that a newgeneration comes into adulthood only after the old generation haspassed away;and that the composition of futuregenerations does notdepend on the decisions of past generations.Underthese conditions, areasonable interpretation of the egalitarian proviso would place somelimitations on what one is entitled to do at the time of one's death withthat which one has acquired.Assume, for the sake of reductio ad absur-dum, that the egalitarian proviso calls for acquisitions that preserveequality of abilityto better oneself among only members of one'sowngeneration; yet it sanctions rights of ownership overworldly resourcesthat include the right to consume or destroy that which one owns. Itwould follow that the first generation to confront unowned resourceswould be permitted by the egalitarian proviso to divide all worldly re-sources among themselves and bleed dry and then scorch the earth at


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the end of their lives, therebyrendering it worthless for all subsequentgenerations.Such an interpretationof the egalitarianprovisowould in-troduce an arbitraryand indefensible bias against future generations.Problems of a similarnature would arise if one were to allow rights tobequeath one's holdings to whomever one chooses. If the egalitarianproviso were to sanction bequests of one'sentire holdings to whomeverone chooses, then the members of the first generation could divide allworldly resources among themselves and then bequeath all of theirholdings to a very few, leavingthe majorityof the next generation land-less paupers.Again, the unlucky many among subsequent generationscould complain that the proviso is arbitrarilyand indefensibly biasedagainst them.Onecould eliminate these biases by modifyingthe egalitarianprovisoso that it instead demands acquisitions that leave enough for the mem-bers of all generations to better themselves to the same degree. But ifpeople were still to retain, and regularlyto exercise, a right completelyto consume, destroy, or bequeath to whomever they choose whateverthey have acquired out of a state of nature,then we would be faced witha new and only slightlyless embarrassingdifficulty:rightsof acquisitionwould need to be severelylimited in the face of multiple generations.Inorder to guarantee such intergenerationalequality of ability to betteroneself, and still assuming that generations are of the same size, eachindividual would need to be restricted so that she has the right to ac-quire no more than roughly one-"n"th of the island, where "n" s thetotal number of individuals who will ever inhabit this island.50If weassume a very largenumber of generations,then each individual wouldbe entitled to acquire only a minute sliver. (If we assume an infinitenumber of generations,then nobody would be entitled to more than aninfinitesimally small sliver.)In the light of these difficulties,it is reason-able to deny the existence of complete rights to consume, destroy,orbequeath those resources that one has acquired out of an unownedstate. It would make far more sense to insist that the members of eachgeneration ensure that, at their deaths, resources that are at least asvaluableas those that they have acquiredlapse back into a state of non-ownership. Each succeeding generation would therefore face anew a

50. HereI assume, forsimplicity,roughly equal abilities on the part of each to convertresourcesinto welfare. Similardifficultieswill arise even if such abilities are highly une-qual.


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go Philosophy & PublicAffairs

world of unowned resources that is undiminished when comparedwiththat which faced the previous generation. The members of each genera-tion would thereforehave the same opportunity as their predecessorsto acquire resources out of an unowned state.For all I have said, the members of one generation could, throughlabor, investment, or technological innovation, greatly ncrease the totalvalue of their holdings so that a surplus of wealth would remain evenafter they have ensured that, at their deaths, resources that are at leastas valuable as those that they have acquiredlapse back into a state ofnon-ownership. Imagine that a number of equally talented individualsfind themselves on a previously undiscovered and forested island. Inaccordance with the egalitarian proviso, they divide the island intoequal-sized plots. Some harvest the timber from their justly acquiredportionof the island to buildyachts and thereafterplant additionaltreesto ensure that the plot of land that they let lapse into a state of non-ownership at their deaths is just as good as the ones that they first ac-quired. The others, who are less industrious, simply gather nuts andberriesby day and sleep under the stars at night. Givenwhat I have saidin the previous paragraph,the egalitarian proviso would be satisfied ifthe members of the first generationburned their yachts upon their de-mise. Would t also be satisfiedif they bequeathed theiryachts to whom-ever among the members of the second generation they choose? I be-lieve that it would, so long as those in the second generation who endup with the yachts arerestrictedfromacquiringanymore land than thatwhich enables them to betterthemselves to the same degreeas anybodyelse in their generation, where we include the contribution of theseyachts to their welfare. Members of one generation would be free tobequeath theiryachts to members of the next generation.But such be-quests would not confer any net benefits to the recipientover and abovethat which is available to others in her generation. This is within thespirit of the egalitarianproviso, since economic resources with whichone starts off are treated no differentlyfrom one's natural talents. Justas the person who is, as luck would have it, twice as capable as othersof convertingresources into welfareis permittedto acquire only half asmuch land, so is the person who, as luck would have it, starts offlifewithmore resources because of the generosity of the dead, permitted to ac-quire fewer unowned resources than those who start off life with less.This discussion of bequests raises a more general difficulty regarding


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the compatibility of any strongly egalitarian principle of distributionwith either of the following two things: (1) nonmarket transfers ofworldly resources in the form of intragenerationalgifts as well as inter-generational bequests or (2) nonmarket pooling and sharing of worldlyresources (as occurs, for example, in marriages).Assume that a distribu-tion of holdings that is consistent with the egalitarian proviso wouldobtain in the absence of such nonmarket transfersand sharing.In thesecircumstances, the proviso would permit such transfers and sharing,but only under the extreme condition that nobody derivesany net ben-efit from them. The proviso is therefore inimical to the practices of ben-eficial giving and sharing of worldly resources in a distributively justsociety. (It would, however,welcome such practices in an unjust soci-ety, so long as the benefits bring that society closer to justice.) The in-compatibility of equality with such giving and sharing poses anenormous problemforegalitarianism.51Whether t also poses a problemfor my project of reconciling libertarian self-ownership and equalityturns on the question of whether the second of the two rightsof libertar-ian self-ownership (the right to all of the income one can gain fromone's mind and body, including one's labor) implies a rightto give awayor share one's income. If, as many would no doubt insist, it does, thenI will have shown self-ownership and equality to be compatible onlyoutside of a context that includes nonmarket giving and sharing. Thiswould be a serious concession to those who deem self-ownershipto beincompatible with equality.Nevertheless,I will have shown that a liber-tarianright of self-ownership does not make the world safe for selfish-ness unbridled by the constraints of equality even if it does make theworld safe for a certain amount of altruism unbridled by these con-straints.Libertarians hould not be happywith this result,since they areinterestedin more than the rightto be altruistic.Theyare also interestedin the rightto line their own pockets.VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to conclude with some remarks on the practicalrelevanceof my in principle reconciliation of self-ownership and equality. It51. Formoreon this incompatibilityand the problem it poses for egalitarianism, ee my"Equality nd the Conflictof Values," orthcoming n JustineBurley,ed., Dworkinand HisCritics Oxford:Blackwell).


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would be difficult to know, at the outset of any given generation, whatdivision of resources would guarantee equality of access to welfareamong individuals whose robust libertarianself-ownership is respectedand hence what division of resources would satisfy the egalitarianpro-viso. Hence, any initial distribution of property rights would be provi-sional and subject to revision.The statewould need to engage in ex postfacto adjustments to people's initial shares in orderto achieve equality.It would not be proper for the state to level differences that arise fromchoices for which individuals can be held morally responsible so longas these choices are made against a backgroundof property rights thatensure equality of access to welfare. But it would be necessary for it toengage in relativelyfrequentredistributionin orderto ensure that sucha backgroundexists and persists. It would be a mistake to regardtheseinterventions as objectionable on the groundsthat they constitute viola-tions or infringements of the property rights of individuals, since theyare instead a necessary means of realizinga just distribution of worldlyresources in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition.Such an adjustmentwould be no more a violation or even an infringe-ment of somebody's property rightsthan the takingof someone's hold-ings in order to rectify the fact that these holdings were unjustly passeddown to him.52One might nevertheless object that the institutions andpractices that would be necessary to gather the relevant informationand make the relevantadjustmentswould either be practically mpossi-ble or too costly in terms both of the funding they would requireand oftheir intrusiveeffects on the lives of individuals.Nothing I have said inthis article can lay to rest these practicaldifficulties with egalitarianism.Rather I have been concerned to address a problem of a different sort:the putativeconflict between self-ownershipand equalityat the level ofideal theory. My aim has been to refute one prominent philosophicalargumentfor the claim that the complete realization of equalitywouldbe unattractive even in the absence of these practicaldifficulties.I be-lieve that the most serious objections to egalitarianismarepractical,notprincipled. There are already enough problems in the world. Philoso-phers should not add to the mess.

52. Nozick himself is rightlysensitive to the grounds that one offers for redistribution.He believes that an egalitarianpatternof distribution can be imposed just in case it isnecessary to rectifypast injustices.See Nozick, Anarchy, p. 230-31.

m otsuka- self ownership and equality

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