[lynne phillips the third wave of modernization i

title:TheThirdWaveofModernizationinLatinAmerica:CulturalPerspectivesOnNeoliberalismJaguarBooksOnLatinAmerica;16

author: Phillips,Lynne.publisher: ScholarlyResources,Inc.

isbn10|asin: 0842026088printisbn13: 9780842026086

ebookisbn13: 9780585281629language: English

subject

LatinAmerica--Economicpolicy,LatinAmerica--Economicconditions--1982-,Structuraladjustment(Economicpolicy)--Socialaspects--LatinAmerica,LatinAmerica--Socialconditions--1982-

publicationdate: 1998lcc: HC125.T5151998ebddc: 338.98

subject:

LatinAmerica--Economicpolicy,LatinAmerica--Economicconditions--1982-,Structuraladjustment(Economicpolicy)--Socialaspects--LatinAmerica,LatinAmerica--Socialconditions--1982-

Pagei

JaguarBooksonLatinAmerica

SeriesEditors

WILLIAMH.BEEZLEY,NevilleG.PenroseChairofLatinAmericanStudies,TexasChristianUniversity

COLINM.MACLACHLAN,Professor,DepartmentofHistory,TulaneUniversity

VolumesPublished

JohnE.Kicza,ed.,TheIndianinLatinAmericanHistory:Resistance,Resilience,andAcculturation(1993).ClothISBN0-8420-2421-2PaperISBN0-8420-2425-5

SusanE.Place,ed.,TropicalRainforests:LatinAmericanNatureandSocietyinTransition(1993).ClothISBN0-8420-2423-9PaperISBN0-8420-2427-1

PaulW.Drake,ed.,MoneyDoctors,ForeignDebts,andEconomicReformsinLatinAmericafromthe1890stothePresent(1994).ClothISBN0-8420-2434-4PaperISBN0-

8420-2435-2

JohnA.Britton,ed.,MoldingtheHeartsandMinds:Education,Communications,andSocialChangeinLatinAmerica(1994).ClothISBN0-8420-2489-1PaperISBN0-8420-

2490-5

DariénJ.Davis,ed.,SlaveryandBeyond:TheAfricanImpactonLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(1995).ClothISBN0-8420-2484-0PaperISBN0-8420-2485-9

DavidJ.WeberandJaneM.Rausch,eds.,WhereCulturesMeet:FrontiersinLatinAmericanHistory(1994).ClothISBN0-8420-2477-8PaperISBN0-8420-2478-6

GertrudeM.Yeager,ed.,ConfrontingChange,ChallengingTradition:WomeninLatinAmericanHistory(1994).ClothISBN0-8420-2479-4PaperISBN0-8420-2480-8

LindaAlexanderRodríguez,ed.,RankandPrivilege:TheMilitaryandSocietyinLatinAmerica(1994).ClothISBN0-8420-2432-8PaperISBN0-8420-2433-6

GilbertM.JosephandMarkD.Szuchman,eds.,ISawaCityInvincible:UrbanPortraitsofLatinAmerica(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2495-6PaperISBN0-8420-2496-4

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RodericAiCamp,ed.,DemocracyinLatinAmerica:PatternsandCycles(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2512-XPaperISBN0-8420-2513-8

OscarJ.Martínez,ed.,U.S.-MexicoBorderlands:HistoricalandContemporaryPerspectives(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2446-8PaperISBN0-8420-2447-6

WilliamO.WalkerIII,ed.,DrugsintheWesternHemisphere:AnOdysseyofCulturesinConflict(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2422-0PaperISBN0-8420-2426-3

RichardR.Cole,ed.,CommunicationinLatinAmerica:Journalism,MassMedia,andSociety(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2558-8PaperISBN0-8420-2559-6

DavidG.Gutiérrez,ed.,BetweenTwoWorlds:MexicanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates(1996).ClothISBN0-8420-2473-5PaperISBN0-8420-2474-3

LynnePhillips,ed.,TheThirdWaveofModernizationinLatinAmerica:CulturalPerspectivesonNeoliberalism(1998).ClothISBN0-8420-2606-1PaperISBN0-8420-

2608-8

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TheThirdWaveofModernizationinLatinAmericaCulturalPerspectivesonNeoliberalism

LynnePhillipsEditor

JaguarBooksonLatinAmericaNumber16

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©1998byScholarlyResourcesInc.AllrightsreservedFirstpublished1998PrintedandboundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

ScholarlyResourcesInc.104GreenhillAvenueWilmington,DE19805-1897

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

ThethirdwaveofmodernizationinLatinAmerica:culturalperspectivesonneoliberalism/LynnePhillips,editor.p.cm.(JaguarbooksonLatinAmerica;16)Includesbibliographicalreferences.ISBN0-8420-2606-1(alk.paper:cloth).ISBN0-8420-2608-8(alk.paper:pbk.)1.LatinAmericaEconomicpolicy.2.LatinAmericaEconomicconditions19823.Structuraladjustment(Economicpolicy)SocialaspectsLatinAmerica.4.LatinAmericaSocialconditions1982I.Phillips,Lynne.II.Series.HC125.T5151997338.98dc2197-22853CIP

ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsoftheAmericanNationalStandardforpermanenceofpaperforprintedlibrarymaterials,Z39.48,1984.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSTheexigenciesofdoingfieldworkdonotusuallyfitwellthedemandsofaneditedvolume,andIwantfirsttothankthecontributorstothisvolumefortheirjust-in-timeproductionofhigh-qualitypapersandtheirpromptresponsestomyendlessqueries,despitebeinginvariouspartsoftheworldduringtheprocess.IwouldalsoliketothankBillBeezleyforhisinvitationtoconsiderorganizingabookonmodernization.Hissupportthroughouttheprojecthasbeenmuchappreciated,andIhopethattheproducthasnotsteeredtoofarfromwhathehadinmind.ThankstoNicoleNoëlforhercomputerexpertiseandeditorialassistance.FortheirintellectualsustenanceonLatinAmericanissues(anthropologicalorotherwise),IwanttothankTanyaBasok,DenisBaranger,MarioBoleda,GracielaDinardi,CarlosLarrea,IgnacioLlovet,BlancaMuratorio,LuciaSalamea,GabrielaSchiavoni,PatiTomic,andRicardoandCamiloTrumper.Forfinancialaid,thanksgototheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanadaandtheAssociationofUniversitiesandCollegesofCanada.AlanHallandRachelPhillipsHalldeservespecialmentionfortheirsupportandgood-naturedacceptanceofmymanyabsences.Theirpatienceandhumorremindmeabouttheimportantthingsinlife.

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ABOUTTHEEDITORLynnePhillipsteachesintheDepartmentofSociologyandAnthropologyattheUniversityofWindsorinCanadaandiscurrentlyinvolvedinaresearchprojectontheimpactoffreetradeonruralhouseholdsinArgentinaandEcuador.ShehaspublishedarticleswithRicardoTrumperonthecholeraepidemicinLatinAmericainAlternatives(1995)andRaceandClass(1996).SheeditedEthnographicFeminisms:EssaysinAnthropology(1995)withSallyColeandiscurrentlyeditingTransgressingBorders:CriticalPerspectivesonGender,Households,andCulture(1998)withSuzanIlcan.

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CONTENTS

Introduction:NeoliberalisminLatinAmericaLynnePhillips xi

IChangingRuralLives

1TheThirdWaveofModernization:Liberalism,Salinismo,andIndigenousPeasantsinMexicoPierreBeaucage

3

2EconomicDevelopmentandtheOriginsoftheBolivianCocaineIndustryMichaelD.Painter

29

3TheLocalizationoftheGlobal:ContemporaryProductionPracticesinaMayanCommunityinGuatemalaLindaGreen

51

IITransformingUrbanEnterprises

4SurvivalPoliticsandtheMovementsofMarketWomeninPeruintheAgeofNeoliberalismLindaJ.Seligmann

65

5FinancingSmall-ScaleEnterprisesinBoliviaHansBuechler,Judith-MariaBuechler,SimoneBuechler,andStephanieBuechler

83

6FromCooperativestoMicroenterprises:TheNeoliberalTurninPostrevolutionaryNicaraguaFlorenceE.Babb

109

IIIRestructuringSocietyandNature

7NeoliberalismandPublicEducation:TheRelevanceoftheBolivianTeachers'Strikeof1995LesleyGill

125

8VitalSigns:TheDynamicsofFolkMedicineinNorthwesternArgentinaConstanceClassenandDavidHowes

141

9Eco-Imperialism?EnvironmentalPolicyVersusEverydayPracticeinMexicoMarilynGates

155

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10NeoliberalRecipes,EnvironmentalCooks:TheTransformationofAmazonianAgencyGustavoLinsRibeiroandPaulE.Little

175

Conclusion:AnthropologyintheAgeofNeoliberalismLynnePhillips 193

AbouttheContributors 199

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INTRODUCTION:NEOLIBERALISMINLATINAMERICALynnePhillips

LatinAmericaisundergoingadramatictransformationcommonlyreferredtoasneoliberalism.1Althoughneoliberalism,asanideologyandasapractice,hasmadesignificantinroadsthroughouttheAmericas,theabout-faceinLatinAmericaisparticularlyremarkablegiventhepreviouswaysofthinkingaboutdevelopment,trade,andNorth-Southrelations.Neoliberalisminvolvesashiftfrom"inward-oriented"strategiesofdevelopmentpromotingnationalself-sufficiencyto"outward-oriented"freetradeaimedattotalintegrationintotheworldmarket.Thistransformationhashadfar-reachingimplicationsinLatinAmericanotonlyforhoweconomiesaremanagedbutalsoforpolitics,theorganizationofsociety,andthedynamicsofculture.

Thecontributionstothisvolume,alloriginalessays,considerthechangestakingplaceinLatinAmericatodayspecificallythroughthelensofanthropology.WhilethereisanincreasingamountofliteratureavailabletostudentsaboutneoliberalisminLatinAmericafrom"macro"perspectives(see,forexample,Gustafson,1994),TheThirdWaveofModernizationinLatinAmericaconsiderstheimpactofneoliberalpoliciesonthepeoplewedonotusuallyhearfromthosemostoftenmarginalizedorexcludedfromeconomicdecisionmaking.Focusingonawiderangeofissues,thecontributorsusethecurrentmethodsandtheoreticalframeworksofanthropologytoanalyzelocalchangesaspartofbroaderinternationaltransformations.Inthissense,thebookalsomarksthedevelopmentofthediscipline,especiallyinhowanthropologistshavecometounderstandtherelationshipsbetweenthelocalandtheglobal,thetraditionalandthemodern.ThoseanthropologistsworkinginLatinAmericainthepostwaryears,usingmodernizationframeworkstoguidetheirquestions,tendedtotreatthelocalasadiscreteentity,assumingthatmodernizationwould,overall,beapositivedevelopmentinpeople'slives.Today,anthropologistsunderstandthelocalandtheglobalasamoredynamic,multidirectionalrelationshipsomuchsothatsomespeakofthe

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localizationoftheglobal(seeChapter3,thisvolume).2Recentanalysesfocusnotonlyonhowthemoderncreatesthetraditional(O'BrienandRoseberry,1991)butalsoonhowmodernityitselfisatradition(seeChapter1,thisvolume)andhowthetraditionalmaybemoremodernthanmodernity(seeChapter8,thisvolume).Dependingonone'stheoreticalperspective,thereisoptimismorskepticismaboutthebenefitsofsuchchanges.Fortheoptimists,thereexiststhepossibilityofreconfiguringpowerrelationsandrethinkingsocialrelationsandglobalalternatives.Theskepticsorcriticsexpressconcernaboutthepotentialandcurrentcostsofglobalizationforpeople'sabilitiestomaintaincontrolovertheirwaysoflifeandmodesofthought.OurgoalinthisvolumeisnottoportrayLatinAmericansasvictims,buttoprovidethebasisforacritiqueoftheglobalprocessesthatarecurrentlyunderwayandthathaveimplicationsforallofus.ThecontributorstothisvolumeclarifythatLatinAmericansdisplayaremarkableresiliencyandcreativityintheirengagementswithneoliberalismandmodernityandNorthAmericanreadersmayhavesomethingtolearnfromtheirstruggles.

InTheThirdWaveofModernizationinLatinAmerica,theneoliberal''turn"isnotviewedasentirelynewforLatinAmerica.Asanumberofhistoricallyorientedessaysmakeclear,theobjectivesofmanyaspectsofneoliberalismhavebeenaroundforsometimeunderdifferentguises.NeitherisneoliberalthinkingcompleteinLatinAmerica;therearemanydebatestakingplacetodayaboutthevalueandappropriatenessofneoliberalismforLatinAmericanrealities.Neoliberalismisnotviewedasalogicaloutcomeoftoday'sglobaleconomynorastheinevitablepathalongwhichLatinAmericamustfollow.Instead,itisunderstoodasapoliticalprojectthatvariesgeographicallyandhistoricallyandissubjecttotransformation.

Modernization

Thisbookwasdevelopedaroundanthropology'shistoricalconnectionwiththeconceptofmodernization.CraigWaggaman,apoliticalscientist,hasreferredtoneoliberalismas"neo-modernization"(1994:223).Aquickreviewofthepost-WorldWarIIliterature,however,indicatesthatthereisoneimportantdifferencebetweenthepreviousexplorationsofthistopicandthecurrentsituationtheabsenceofanthropologicalanalyses.WhileanthropologistswereverymuchinvolvedinearliertreatmentsofmodernizationinLatinAmerica,therehasbeennosystematicattempttounderstandthecurrenttransformationsfromananthropologicalperspective.Withthis"gap"noted,thecontributorsherewereaskedtoas-

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sessthecurrentmodernizationprocessbasedontheirfieldworkinLatinAmerica.

AsthecontributionsofPierreBeaucageandMichaelPaintermakeclear,theprocessestakingplacetodaysharesomeimportantcommonalitieswithpastmodernizationpractices,includingtheimpositionofvaluesystemsbytheNorth,thedevelopmentofthemarket,andthetransferofresourcesoutoflocalcommunitiesandregions.Asthisvolumetookshape,however,significantdifferencesalsobecameevident,particularlytheneoliberalassumptionsabouttheroleofthestateandofsocietyitself.Becausetheconceptofneomodernizationoverlooksthesedistinctions,thetermneoliberalismhasbeenretainedheretodescribethecurrentpoliciesbeingadoptedbyLatinAmericangovernments.

ThemodernizationthattookplaceafterWorldWarIIinsistedthattheworldwasdividedintotwokindsofsocieties,thetraditionalandthemodern.Whilecriticslaterpointedoutthatthiswasafalsedichotomywhichfailedtotakeintoaccountthehistoricaldynamicofcolonialism,amongotherthings,itwasstillaverypowerfulvisionoftheworldthattosomeextentpersiststoday.Modernizationtheoryenvisionedaprocesswherebythethinkingandpracticesoftraditionalpeopleswouldbecomemodern(like"ours")throughtheexpansionofthemarket.Thistransformationassumedthedualfunctionofcreatingmodernpopulationsinthe"ThirdWorld"(apost-WorldWarIIterm)andrescuingthemfrompoverty.Thepremisewasthatpeoplewouldbeprovidedwithemploymentthroughtheindustrializationprocess,anexperiencethatwastoalterculturalvaluesaboutproductionandconsumption.Thepromotionofthemarket,specificallywagelaborandmassconsumption,actedverymuchasthe"hiddenhand''ofthemodernizationproject(Rostow,1960).

Because"internal"factorswereofprimeimportancetowhycountriesremained"undeveloped"inthemodernizationschema,anthropologistswhohadrecognizedexpertiseinunderstandinglocallevelpracticesweredrawnintothemodernizationquestion.Muchoftheirworkfocusedonthe"worldviews"ofLatinAmerican(primarilyrural)communities(Foster,1963,1965;Lewis,1965;Redfield,1955,1956;Tax,1953).Notsurprisingly,giventhepredominanceofthemodernizationparadigm,theseworldviewswereidentifiednotonlyasdifferentbutastraditional.Moreover,duetotheinfluentialworkofDavidMcClelland,whowasconcernedwithidentifyingintraditionalsocietiesapsychologicalorientation(whichhecalledachievementmotivation)consideredimperativeformodernity,itwasgenerallyunderstoodthatLatinAmericancommunitiesmustbecomemodernandthatculturaltransformationswerenecessaryinorderforthistooccur.

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Therewereafewothervoicesinanthropologyduringthistimethat,althoughnotexplicitlycriticalofthemodernizationperspective,providedmodelsforalternativeinterpretations.WorkbyanthropologistssuchasEricWolf(1955;1957),whofocusedonsocialrelationsandstructureinLatinAmericaratherthanexclusivelyonculture,notonlyofferedusefultoolsfordismantlingtheneutralityofmodernizationtheorybutalsohelpedtotransformanthropology'sapproachestoempiricalstudiesinLatinAmericaoncecriticismsofmodernizationbegantoemerge.

DependencyPerspectives

Bythelate1960smodernizationtheorywasbeingseriouslyquestioned,particularlybythe"dependency"school.3ThisgroupofscholarsemphasizedthedependentrelationsbetweenNorthernandSoutherneconomiesandargued,fromavarietyoftheoreticalpositions,thatmodernizationtheorywasathinlyveiledrationalizationforinterventionintheSouthontheNorth'sterms.AndreGunderFrank(1969)focusedonthehistoricalsignificanceofcolonialism,ignoredbymodernizationtheorists,tomaketheargumentthattheSouthwasunderdevelopedratherthanundeveloped.PabloGonzálezCasanova(1970)usedtheterm"internalcolonialism"tocharacterizeunderdevelopmentinMexico,incontrasttotheidentificationofdistincttraditionalandmodernsectorsmadepopularbymodernizationtheorists.

Duringthe1970smostofthedebatefromscholarscriticalofthemodernizationperspectivefocusedonhowtodescribeglobalandlocaleconomies.Someresearchers,arguingthatLatinAmericaneconomiesshouldbecharacterizedascapitalist,understoodthedependentrelationbetweentheNorthandtheSouthascreatedprimarilythroughthemarket,andtheyfocusedonunequaltraderelations(Amin,1976;Emmanuel,1972)andthehistoricaldevelopmentofthecapitalistmarketfromthesixteenthcentury(Wallerstein,1972,1974).Othersarguedthatthesiteofproductionwasessentialtoconsider(Laclau,1971),andbecausewagelabor,especiallyinagriculture,wasnotthenorminLatinAmerica,thecontinentshouldnotbeconsideredcapitalist.SeveralLatinAmericanscholars,offeringin-depthanalysesofthecomplexityofcapitalistandnon-capitalistrelationsinparticularcountries,madeprofoundcontributionstothesedebates.4

ThecontributionsofanthropologytothedependencyperspectivewereimportantforspecifyingthechangingcharacteroflocalandregionalproductionsystemsinLatinAmerica.TheworkofStephenGudeman(1978),BillieJeanIsbell(1978),JuneNash(1979),CarolSmith(1978),andMichaelTaussig(1980),amongothers,markedashiftinthediscipline,

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particularlytheinsistenceonlocatinglocalcommunitiesandregionsmoreexplicitlywithinthewidercontextofthenation-stateandtheglobaleconomy.

Bythe1980sanumberofverysignificantchangesweretakingplacebothintheglobaleconomyandinsocialsciencethinking.Ontheonehand,neoliberalismwasbecomingpositionedasLatinAmerica'ssalvationforthefuture.Notonlyhadneoliberalpoliciesbeensuccessfully"tested"ontheChileanpopulationunderthebrutalregimeofGeneralAugustoPinochet,butsomeAsianeconomies(thoseofthenewlyindustrializedcountries)werebeingtoutedassuccessstoriesforaneoliberalformofglobaldevelopment.Ontheotherhand,acuriousphenomenoncalledpostmodernismhadmadeconsiderableinroadsinthesocialsciences,apointofviewthat,inanthropology,begantoquestionthevalueofbothfieldworkandradical"metanarratives,"suchasMarxismandfeminism,whichhadinfluencedmuchofthedependencyliterature.Byrejectingpoliticaleconomyperspectivesasalegitimatepursuit,manyanthropologistsreturnedtoculturalapproaches(signaledbythepublicationin1986ofCliffordandMarcus'sWritingCulture)thatsidesteppedthecontextofanincreasinglyneoliberalworld.ThisconfluenceofideaswastohaveaprofoundimpactonLatinAmericainthe1980sand1990s.

DebtCrisisandStructuralAdjustment

The1980shavebeencalledthe"lostdecade"forLatinAmerica,referringtothedevastatingimpactofthedebtcrisisandthestructuraladjustmentpoliciesproposedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheWorldBankto"rescue"debtorcountries.ThedebtcrisisreflectedtheincreasinglyseriousbalanceofpaymentproblemsofLatinAmericancountries.ManynationshadbeenwooedbycommercialbanksintheNorthtoborrowlargeamountsofmoneyforeconomicdevelopmentpurposes.Whentheworldeconomyfellintorecessionin1979,thesecountries,receivingdecliningpricesfortheirproducts,wereunabletorepaytheirloanstothecommercialbanks,andmostwereforcedtodefaultontheirloans,beginningwithMexicoin1982.

Inresponse,theIMFproposedconditionalfinancingtoLatinAmericancountries,arguingthatfutureloanswouldbeforthcomingifcountriessteeredtheireconomiesawayfromprotectionismandtowardtheneedsoftheworldmarket(Drake,1994).Thisreformtookplacethroughstructuraladjustmentplansthatemphasizedwagefreezes,decreasesinpublicexpenditures,andsupportforexports.ThedevastatingimpactofstructuraladjustmentpoliciesonthelargesectorsofLatinAmericanpopulations,andparticularlyonwomen,hasbeendocumented(Beneriaand

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Feldman,1992;Deereetal.,1990;Moser,1987),andtheunethicalnatureofthissolution,whichsqueezesthepoorinordertoensurethestabilityofthebankingsystemintheNorth,hasbeennoted(Corbridge,1993).Yet,thesekindsofpoliciesarestilllargelyintact,afactthatcanbeexplainedinpartbythepoweroftheseexternalorganizationstodirectnationalagendas,andtotheapparentinabilityofcriticalanalysestoinfluencedecisionmakingatthehigherlevels.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalismistheprocessofagrowingrelianceonthemarketfororganizingsocialandeconomicactivities.WhythisprocesshastakenplaceinLatinAmericaisamatterofdebate.Someresearchersviewneoliberalismasthecureforthecurrenteconomiccrisis,othersviewitasasymptomofthecrisis,whilestillothersviewitasthecause.Manyeconomistspointtothewrongheadednessofpastpracticessuchasimportsubstitutionandstate-supporteddevelopment,blamingthemforthecurrentproblemsofcountriesthataredebtladen,andemphasizeneoliberalismasthesolutionforresolvingsuchproblems.Otherresearchersarguethatneoliberalismhasbeenabletogainsupporterstotheextentthatithasbecauseofthedearthofalternativethinking(includingincreasingconcernsabouttheviabilityofsocialisminthelate1980s)abouthowsocialchangeshouldtakeplace,whatFransSchuurman(1993)referstoasthe"impasse"indevelopmenttheory.OthersidentifyexternalagenciessuchastheIMFandtheWorldBankasthemaininstigatorsofthisprocess.WhyneoliberalismhasbecomeadominantwayofthinkingatthisparticularpointinLatinAmerica'shistoryismostlikelyattributabletoavarietyofinternalandexternalpressures,manyofwhichareoutlinedwithvaryingdegreesofsympathyforneoliberalismintheanalysesofDavidHojman(1994),CristobalKay(1993),andIanRoxborough(1992).

ConclusiveassessmentsoftheimpactofneoliberalisminLatinAmericaaredifficulttomakebecauseoftheambiguouswaysinwhichneoliberalismhasbeenconceptualizedandthedifferentapproaches(fromempiricallygroundedstudiestohighlypolemicalarguments)thathavebeenundertakentoengageintheneoliberaldebate.Itisusefultoclarifythatneoliberalismisneitheratheorynoraneutralpolicythatcansimplybeappliedlogicallytotheworld'sproblems.Ontheotherhand,itisamistaketoviewneoliberalismasonlyanideologyofcapitalists,withoutanyresonanceforlargesectorsoftheLatinAmericanpopulation.

HansOverbeekandKeesvanderPijl(1993)defineneoliberalismasthecurrentprofit-seekingprojectoftransnationalcapitalthatderivesits

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moralsupportfromneoconservativevalues.Thisisausefuldefinitionfortworeasons.First,itgroundstheideologyofneoliberalisminthepoliticalprojectofaparticularsegmentofthepopulationwhilerecognizingthehegemonicpotentialoftheproject.5Thatis,neoliberalismisunderstoodtobeaprojectthataimstogainconsentfromthemajorityofthepopulationbydrawingonpeople'sconcernsintheirdailylives.Inthiswayaccusationsofthecoercivecharacterofneoliberalismareminimized.Forexample,neoliberaladvocatescommonlyarguethatthroughthedevelopmentofafreemarketsociety,peoplewillhaveaccessnotonlytowealthbuttogreaterfreedomandsocialorder.Muchoftheappealofneoliberalismisitsemphasisonindividualautonomy,flexibility,andchoicewithinthegeneralcontextofprotectinglawandorder,privateproperty,andfamilylife.Totreatneoliberalismonlyascapitalistideologywoulddiscounttheextenttowhichmuchofthepopulationisconcernedabouttheseissues.However,asanumberofessaysinthisvolumeshow,whenthereremainsagapbetweentherhetoricaboutsuchconcernsandtheprogramsinplacetodosomethingaboutthem,thehegemonicpotentialoftheprojectisclearlycompromised(seeespeciallyChapter6).

AsecondusefulaspectofOverbeekandvanderPijl'sdefinitionisthatitindicateshow,asapoliticalproject,thefaceofneoliberalismmayvarydependingon(amongotherthings)acountry'srelationshiptotheglobaleconomyanditsparticularpoliticalandsocioeconomicformation.Thus,whileneoliberalismisaglobal(transnational)project,wemayidentifydifferentneoliberalisms.InthecaseofLatinAmerica,certainlytherearesomeunderlyingsimilaritiesinthewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratingneoliberalpolicies,buttherearealsosomeimportantdifferencesthatareevidentinthevariouscontributionstothisvolume.Forexample,LindaGreenarguesthatthelonghistoryofviolenceinGuatemalamustbeconsideredacentralcomponentofthe"success"ofneoliberalisminthecountryside(Chapter3).Thisisa"militarized"neoliberalism,withechoesoftheChileancaseand,increasingly,Peru,imposedonapeopleoftentoofearfultoprotest(Chapter4).

Ontheotherhand,theBuechlersnotethatsomenongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)arewillingtotryneoliberalpoliciesbecausetheygivesomeattentiontosectorsofthepopulation(inthiscase,small-scaleenterprises)previouslyignoredbymacrodevelopmentmodels(Chapter5).Thisisakindof"experimental"neoliberalism.Instillothercases,inwhatmightbeconsidered"contested"neoliberalism,alternativepracticesregardingtheorganizationofworkandsocietyarestillwidelyavailable,permittingmoreroomfordebateandprotestabouthowneoliberalpoliciesareapplied(Chapters2and7).Whentheecologicalconsequencesofagrowth-at-any-costorientationbecomepartoftheeverydayproblems

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thatpeoplemustconfront,thistoocanformpartofthecontestationoverthesuitabilityofaneoliberalapproach(Chapters9and10).Thesearethekindsofprocessesthatcantransformthecharacterofneoliberalpolicies.Indeed,someauthors(FlorenceBabb,Beaucage,andGustavoRibeiroandPaulLittle)hintatthefuturepossibilityof,ifnotan"inclusiveneoliberalism"(whichappearstobeanoxymoron),atleastan"inclusivemodernity"inwhichprevioushistoriesofcollectivismorautonomyareabletoreshapecontemporaryeconomicstrategiessothattheymaybecomemoreredistributive.Inanycase,thesepotentialdifferencesinneoliberalapproachesspeaktotheneedtointegratespecificitiesintothedebatesaboutthechangestakingplaceinLatinAmericatoday.

Alackofinterestinspecificitiesthesedaysmightwellbeaproductof"globalization,"aconceptthatoftengivestheimpressionthateconomicsystemsandculturehaveeverywherebecomethesame.Butitisimportanttoaddressthequestionofwhatglobalizationmeansandtoclarifywhatexactlyhasbeenglobalized.Certainly,therehasbeenashiftinlabor-intensiveproductioninvolvingthefragmentationofproductionprocessesandtherelocationofpartsoftheproductionprocesstoareasoftheworldwherelaborischeaper.Thisprocesshasengenderedaninternationaldivisionoflaborthatlinksworkersaroundtheworldatthesametimethatitimposescompetitionamongthem(NashandFernandez-Kelly,1983;PeckandTickell,1994;RothsteinandBlim,1992).Meanwhile,newideasaboutsociety,culture,andpoliticshaveemerged.

Thus,wefindbothpostmodernistsandeconomistsdiscussingthevirtuesofglobalization,althoughtheymaymeanquitedifferentthingsbyit.Whatisimportantforourpurposesisthat,muchlikethepastmobilizationandinstitutionalizationofaparticularkindofdevelopmentinthepost-WorldWarIIera(asdescribedbyArturoEscobar,1995),argumentsaboutthemarketasthekeymechanismfortheconstructionofanewsocietyhavebecomewidelydispersed.Theeducationaltrainingofintellectualsandpoliticalfiguresinnorthernschools(CollinsandLear,1995)andtheactivitiesofinternationalorganizations,includingmanyNGOs,inwhichobjectivesaimedtowardtheeliminationofpovertyhavebeenrecastasdevelopmentthroughtrade,6arejustsomeofthemeansbywhichthisdispersalhastakenplace.

Yet,evenwhennewproductionsitessuchasfreetradezonestransformtheworkinglivesofLatinAmericans,thisaccomplishmentbynomeansproducesafunctional,predictablerefittingofpeople'sideasabouthowtheirlivesoughttobelived.Despiteglobalization,everyonedoesnotthinkthesameway.Toargueotherwiseistocastdoubtuponpeople'sabilitiestoconceptualizetheworldcreativelyanddynamically.Thegoalofthisvolumeistoofferstudentstheopportunitytoseehowanthropolo-

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gistsmakesenseofthemassivechangesbeingexperiencedbyLatinAmericanstodayinthenameofneoliberalismandtohighlightthecontoursandcontradictionsofLatinAmericanmodernity.

TheThirdWaveofModernizationisdividedintothreeparts.Thefirstsectionistitled"ChangingRuralLives,"referringbothtotheexternalinterventionsthathaveproducedtransformationsinLatinAmericaandtohowpeople'sliveshavebeenalteredbyrecenteventsinMexico,Bolivia,andGuatemala.PierreBeaucage'sopeningchapterisacarefulconsiderationofMexico'shistoricalengagementwithmodernity.BeaucageunderstandsSalinismo(theneoliberaleconomicorientationofthecountryunderCarlosSalinas)tobeacontinuationofalonghistoryofliberalisminMexicothathashadparticularimplicationsforitsindigenouspopulations.HediscussesthedecidedlypragmaticapproachtothesechangestakenbytheNahuaoftheSierraNortedePuebla,apeoplewho"stubbornlywantamodernitythatbringstechnologyundertheircontrol."Next,MichaelPainterfocusesonhowtheextensiveinterventionoftheUnitedStatesinBoliviasince1952hasfosteredaparticulardevelopmentmodelinthecountrythatbothdiscouragesindustrializationandmakesitextremelydifficultforsmallfarmerstosurvivebygrowingfoodcrops.HearguesthatthewayinwhichthemisdirectedU.S.''warondrugs"policyintersectswiththeneoliberalpoliciesadoptedbytheBoliviangovernmentdoublyhurtsthesmallfarmerswhogrowcocatosurvive.Finally,LindaGreenexplorestheconnectionsbetweeneconomyandculturefortheMayainGuatemala.Shedemonstratesthatathoughtfulanalysisoftheseconnectionsenablesustoidentifytheextensivechanges,inparticulartheeclipsingofspacesthatpermitalternativesurvivalstrategies,thathaveoccurredintheGuatemalancountrysidewiththeentranceofexportstrategiessuchascontractfarmingandmaquilas(assemblyfactories).

Theessaysundertheheading"TransformingUrbanEnterprises"discussthechangingurbanenvironmentsinPeru,Bolivia,andNicaraguaandspecificallyconsidertheirimpactonwomen.LindaSeligmann'scontributionlooksatthecomplexityofgenderandethnicrelationsamongmarketwomeninPeruandshowshowPresidentAlbertoFujimori'sneoliberal"medicine"bothencouragesandlimitsthepossibilitiesforpoliticalpracticeandsurvivalforthesewomen.TheBuechlers'chapterassessestheimpactofnewlendingpoliciesonsmall-scalevendorsandproducersinBolivia.Theyarguethatwhilethepromotionofmicro-enterprisesaneoliberalpolicymaybeofsomeeconomicbenefittothismarginalizedsector,itmayalsothreatenimportantkinshipties,encouragelongerworkingdays,and,ultimately,failtoempowerurbanwomen.FlorenceBabbthenlooksatthecaseofNicaragua,acountryin

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transitionfromasocialistorientationthatemphasizedcooperativestoaneoliberalonethatpromotesmicroenterprises.ShearguesthatthetransformationsundertakenbythepreviousSandinistagovernment,combinedwiththeeconomiccrisisthathasnotbeenresolvedthroughtheneoliberalpoliciesofsubsequentgovernments,hasproduced"adesiretoraiseissuesthathadbeenoverlookedorsilencedbyestablishedpoliticalpartiesbeforeandafterthe1990elections."Thissituation,nottomentiontheinitialeagernessoftheUnitedStatestogiveeconomicsupporttotheNationalOppositionUnion(UniónNacionalOpositora,orUNO),madeadifferenceforthekindofneoliberalismthathasdevelopedinNicaragua.

Thethirdsection,titled"RestructuringSocietyandNature,"encompassesabroadsetoftopics,includingeducation,health,andtheenvironment.LesleyGill'sfocusonthe1995teachers'strikeinBoliviahighlightshowtheliteratureonsocialmovements,influencedbythepostmoderndisinterestinclassissues,failstoexplaintherootsandthepotentialofthisconflict.Throughhervividportrayalsofthepeopleinvolvedintheevents,Gillisabletoshowustheincreasinganxietyandfearinthelivesofbothteachersandparents,asneoliberalpoliciestorestructuretheeducationsystemareappliedwithoutreferencetotherealitiesoftheBoliviancase.AtheoreticalcontrasttoGillmaybefoundinConstanceClassenandDavidHowes'sessay.Theytakeapostmodernapproachtotheconceptsofhealth,healing,andthebodyinnorthwesternArgentinatoarguethatglobalizationoffersthepotentialtomixtheconceptsoftraditionalandmodernmedicine,transformingtheboundariesofbothinawaythatmaybebeneficialtoconsumers.

ThefinaltwocontributionsconsiderthelinksbetweenneoliberalismandtheenvironmentinMexicoandBrazil.MarilynGatesreviewstheMexicanenvironmentalrecordtorevealthat,overall,concreteconcernforecologicalissuesisfoundonlywhenitisevidentthatsuchconcernswillnotinterferewithMexico'sprofit-seekinggrowthmodelstrategies.HeranalysisofthedifferencesbetweenWesternviewsoftheenvironmentandthoseofruralpeasantfarmersclarifiesthecomplexpicturethatneedstobeconsideredbeforesolutionsareproposed.Finally,GustavoLinsRibeiroandPaulLittlefocusonthediscourseofenvironmentalisminAmazonianBrazil.Theyarguethatglobalizationoffersanew"place"forlocalactorsintheglobalarena,onethatholdsthepotentialfortheirtransformationintosubjectswhocanchallengetheexclusivepoliciesofneoliberalism.

Intheconclusiontothisvolume,thechaptersareputintoperspectivethroughadiscussionofthecontributionofanthropologytotheneoliberaldebateandanelaborationofsomeoftheproblemsinvolvedinchallengingneoliberalismwithinthesocialsciences.Itishopedthatthe

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followingessaysmakeatimelyandvaluablecontributiontothedebatesaboutthis"thirdwave"ofmodernizationandareabletherebytoadvancethedevelopmentofalternativeideasabouttransformingourfuture.

Notes

1.Theterm"neoliberalism"isstillnotfamiliartomanyNorthAmericanreaders,thoughitiswellknowninLatinAmerica.Manyscholarsusetheterm"neoconservatism"(familiartoNorthAmericanreadersthroughthepoliciesoftheU.S.governmentinthe1980s)interchangeablywiththeterm"neoliberalism,"althoughthediscussionaboutneoliberalismthatfollowsclarifiesthatthetwotermsshouldnotbeviewedassynonymous.

2.Robertson(1995)usestheterm"glocalization."

3.Mostauthorsnowagreethatdependencyisnotatheoryasmuchasaperspective.AusefulsummarythatcomparesthedependencyandmodernizationapproachescanbefoundinValenzuelaandValenzuela(1978).

4.SeetheseminalcontributionsofFernandoEnriqueCardoso(1972),CardosoandEnzoFaletto(1979),AgustínCueva(1977),TheotonioDosSantos(1970;1978),CelsoFurtado(1970),RaúlPrebisch(1950;1980),AníbalQuijano(1971),andOsvaldoSunkelandPedroPaz(1970),tonamejustafew.

5.TheworkofAntonioGramsci(1971),especiallyhisnotionofhegemony,isakeyinfluenceonthisperspective.

6.LauraMcDonald(1995)cautionsthatNGOworkmaynotbeasprogressiveforthedevelopmentofanewcivilsocietyinLatinAmericaasitisoftenassumed(comparewithChapter10,thisvolume).

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andNicolson,1984.

ICHANGINGRURALLIVES

1TheThirdWaveofModernization:Liberalism,Salinismo,andIndigenousPeasantsinMexicoPierreBeaucage

ErnestoZedillobecameMexico'spresidentin1995andtwoyearslaterthecountrywasstilltryingtorecoverfromthepoliticalandfinancialearthquakethatmarkedtheendofsixyearsofSalinismo(19881994).Fewpresidentshavehadatermcoinedaftertheirname.OneofPresidentCarlosSalinas'sfamouspredecessorswasLázaroCárdenas(19341940),whosesix-yearmandategaveCardenismoasenseofprogressive,nationalistic,andpopularpolicies(forhissupporters)andapopulist,demagogic,andanti-enterprisedoctrine(forhisenemies).Thetwopresidentseachcouldstandastheperfectantithesistotheother:Cárdenasadvocatednationalself-sufficiency,whileSalinaspromotedopeninguptointernationalmarkets.Cárdenascreatedanall-embracingnationalpartytounifytheorganizedpopularsectorsandmademassmobilizationandstateinterventionthekeytodevelopment,whileSalinasfavoredaslimmed-downstate,runbyhigh-leveltechnocrats,withpartieslimitingtheirconcernstoelections.Finally,whileCárdenasassociateddevelopmentwithnationalistpoliciesanddiscourse,SalinasconsideredtheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(adistinctlyantinationalistpolicy)asthemeanstoensurefuturegrowthandtheproofofhisadministration'sgoodperformance.SalinismohadbeenpresentedtoMexicansasthegatewaytotheheavenoftheFirstWorld,althoughitsaftermathlooksmorelikeadescentintohell.In1995,whenSalinasleftoffice,theZapatistarebellioninChiapashadnotbeencrushed,inflationhadclimbedto52percent,thereweretwomillionmoreunemployedpeople,andforeigndebthadreachedsummitshigherthanthePopocatepetlvolcano.

Salinasrejectedtheneoliberallabelanddefinedhispoliticalphilosophyasliberalismosocial,the"social"sidesupposedlybeingtheaimand

"liberalism"themeans.Whateveronemaythinkofthecompatibilityofthetwoterms,oroftheiradequacyfordefiningSalinas'spoliticalorientations,whenitcametoconcretepolicytheyfusedintooneconceptmodernizationincludingmodernizationofthestateapparatus,education,farmingtechniques,andsocialrelationsinthecountryside.Salinaswasdefinitelynotthefirsttosetsuchanobjective.Infact,modernizationhasrepeatedlybeenontheMexicanagendafortwohundredyears,andithasusuallybeencloselyrelatedtoliberalism.Usually,too,modernizationwassaidtoimply"somesacrifices,"soontobeforgottenwhenthefruitsofmodernitywouldbereaped.

Salinas'ssuccessor,Zedillo,althoughthrowingtheblameforeverythingthatwentwronguponthedepartingteam,seemstobefollowingthesamepattern.Inmoregeneralterms,itcanbearguedthat,aftertheSpanishconquest,themostimportantchangesinMexicohavebeenthemanyattemptstoimplantdifferentversionsofmodernity,andthereactionsagainstsuchattempts.DuringthisprocesstheMexicanpeasantry(alargepartofwhichisindigenous)hasbeenneitheradocileobjectforstatepoliciesnorastubbornopponenttochange.WhatisreallyatstakeintheconfrontationbetweentheMexicangovernmentandtheZapatistarebels,forexample,andwhichisreflectedinabroaderdebatewithinMexicansociety,isthemeaningandcontentofmodernity.

Since1983thecountryhasbeenworkingthroughitsthirdwaveofmodernization,oneinwhichmarketforcesaremeanttobecometheprimeregulatoroftheeconomyand,byextension,ofsociety.Inthisrespect,inaveryspecificwayandunderacivilianregime,MexicomaybeseenasgoingthroughaprocesssimilartothatexperiencedinBrazilandChile,underthemilitary,twodecadesago.However,theoutcomedoesnothavetobethesame,sincemanybasicelementsofthesocialscenearequitedifferent,particularlyasaresultofthe19101917revolution.Inordertoevaluatetheimpactandcostofmodernityinthecountryside,thischapterwillfocusonanindigenousregion,theSierraNortedePuebla,inCentralMexico.AconsiderationofthislowerSierraregionwillshowthatconcreteecological,economic,cultural,andpoliticalfactorshaveastrongimpactonboththeprocessofmodernizationandthepopularresponsetoit.

Modernity:CategoryorProcess

Modernityusedtobeaworrisomeconcepttoanthropologistssinceitseemedtoimplytheverydestructionoftheirobjectofstudy,"traditional"or"primitive"societiesandcultures.JeanBaudrillartbelievesthatthenotioncannotbegivenadefinitionthatwouldbevalidforallplacesand

periods.Modernitycoversavastdomain,withblurredfrontiers,crosscuttingthefieldsofeconomicsandideology,estheticsandpoliticsthatis,quitewithinthescopeofmodernanthropology."Fluctuatinginitsforms,initscontents,intimeandspace,itisonlystableasavaluesystem,asamyth....Inthis,itresemblesTradition"(Baudrillart,1974:139;author'stranslation;emphasisadded).Thebasicvaluesofmodernityareasecularizationofthoughtandscience;thevalorizationofchangeandprogressfollowingalinearconceptionofhistory;aneconomismthataimsatsupplyinganever-increasingamountofcommodities;andabstractconceptsofpowerandthestate,andoftimeandspace.Withmodernitytheindividualemergesasthesubjectofeconomicandpoliticallibertiesaswellasasubjectivityaspiringtoindividualhappiness.Atthesametime,modernitytriestoshelterthe"personal,"nolongertobefoundinpubliclife,intheprivaterealm(Baudrillart,1974:14041).

AbsentfromBaudrillart'sdefinition(andfrommanyothers)isthefactthatthetransitionfromtraditiontomodernity,fromthevarioussocioculturalparticularismstoacertainformofuniversalism,necessarilyinvolvesashiftinpowerandaprofoundreallocationofresources.Forthisreason,althoughmodernizationisinnowayazero-sumgame,thereisusuallyagainforsomesocialactors,andacostinvolvedforthegroupswhosufferalossintheirshareofcontroland/orwealth.Thisshiftmayoccuramongthosewhohavefoughtfortheproposedchange.Theveryuseofthesemetaphorsof"costs"and"gains"needsanimmediateclarification:aretheseobjectivephenomena(tobeeventuallymeasuredthrougheconomicandsocialanalysis)orsubjectiveperceptionsbytheactorsthemselves?ThecomplexityofthesetwolevelswillbeevidentthroughanexaminationofvariousmomentsofMexico'shistoryandthemodernizationprogramdesignedandimplementedbytheSalinasadministration.

TheFirstWave:SettinguptheColonialOrder

InconformitywithBaudrillart'sdefinitionthatmodernityisaprocessandnotacategorythatcanbeidentifiedwithagivencontent,ithasbeenrecentlyarguedthattheglobalcolonizationprojectsponsoredbytheSpanishstateandtheCatholicChurchmightbeseenasanattemptatmodernizingor"westernizing"theconqueredsocietieswhilekeepinginplacesomeoftheirbasicfeatures(Gruzinski,1988).Thisproject,bestexemplifiedbythe1542NewLaws(LasNuevasLeyesdeIndias),replacedtheearlier,brutalformofdomination,calledtheencomienda,whichaimedatquickChristianizationcombinedwithrewardingSpanishveteransfortheirparicipationintheConquest.1IntheNewLawstheobligationtoconvertthe"idolatricIndians"wasmaintained,andtheCatholicChurch

wasgivenallthetoolstoobliteratethousand-year-oldcultsandcalendricalcycles,andreplacethemwiththeworldwideperspectiveandlinearhistoricityofChristianity(Gruzinski,1988).

IntheareasdesignedforIndians(repúblicasdeindios)thesameprojectincreasinglymarginalizednativenobility(caciques)infavorofauniformsystemofelectednativegovernorsandcouncillors(thecabildo),underthestricttutelageofthecolonialbureaucracy.Attheeconomiclevel,tributewasmaintainedandextendedoutsidethefrontiersoftheAztecempire,butwasprogressivelymonetized.Furthermore,undertherepartimientosystemthemalepopulationwasforcedtotakelongjourneystotheSpanish-ownedminesandfarms,andwereexposedtoforeignwaysinadministrativecitiesandmarkettowns.Asthemaininstitutionresponsiblefortheindigenouspopulation,theChurchdidnotlimititselftospiritualcontributions.MonksbroughtEuropeanherbstocurenewandoldailmentsandintroducedfowlanddonkeysaswellassheep,whosewoolwasthenusedtomakegarmentsquitesuitedtothecoldhighlands.Thus,Mexico'sindigenouspeopleswereforciblydrawnintotherealmoftheincipientworldsystemandhistory,notonlytechnologicallybutalsoeconomically,politically,andideologically(Gibson,1964:13665).

Atthesametime,though,theNewLawsestablishedafundamentaldifferentiationandsegregationbetweenthenatives,lockedintherepúblicasdeindios,andtheSpaniardswholivedintownandontheirestates.Noattemptwasmadetoeliminatenativelanguages;itwasthepriestswholearnedAmerindiantongues.Indiancommunities,someofthempre-Columbian,someofthemcreatedbytheChurch(congregaciones),obtainedtheofficialrecognitionoftheircommunallands,onwhichtheycouldraisecropsfortheirsubsistenceandforsaleinthetownmarkets.Throughoutthecolonialera,aperson'sstatusremaineddirectlylinkedtohisorhercaste,atypicalancienrégimefeature.

TheSpanishconquestdidbringvariouselementsofaRenaissancemodernity.Anabstract,lineartimereplacedtheintricatecalendarsinwhichthedaysthemselvesweregods,andtheequallyabstractpowerofthestateandcourtsreplacedpersonaltieswiththepre-Columbianlords.SteeltoolsanddomesticanimalswerespontaneouslyadoptedbyMexicannatives;thelatteralsowelcomedthedemocraticcabildosandoftenactivelycontributedtotheeliminationofcaciques.Moneywasquicklyusedinthemarkets,andinsidecommunitiesaswell.Atthesametime,Indiansshelteredlargesectorsoftheirformercultures,particularlyinthefieldsofritualandbelief,whichtheclericsdefinedas''idolatry"andpersistentlytriedtoeradicate.Theimposedcultureitselfwasonlyincipientlymodern:theabstractGodofChristianitywasconcealedbehindamultiplicityofsaintsnotsodifferentintheirattributesandcultsfromthetra-

ditionaldeities,andcolonialsociety,afterthedeclineofminingatthebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury,sawtheemergenceofapersonalizedpoweroflandowners(hacendados).Therewasadefiniteappearanceofindividualism,linkedwiththespreadofmarketrelationsandthebreak-downofmanygroups,butitwastemperedbystrongcommunitytieswithlegallyenforcedcoresponsibility,eitherfortributepaymentorforthecultofthepatronsaint.

Thisfirstcontradictoryattemptatmodernizationcarriedanenormouscost,whichwaspaidforalmostexclusivelybytheindigenouspopulation,inspiteoftheinterventionsofsomehumanists(suchasFranciscodeVitoriaandBartolomédeLasCasas)ontheirbehalf.2ThenativepopulationofCentralMexicodecreasedbyover90percentbetween1530and1610underthedoubleimpactofthenewdiseasesandoverexploitationinthemines,farms,andcities(CookandBorah,1977:96).Furthermore,theyoccupiedthelowestlevelinthisnewcastesociety.Fromtheperspectiveofmodernization,theseeventsappearastheunavoidablecoststobepaidwhenthenaturalbarriersbetweentwounequallydevelopedculturesareovercome.Inthenativeview,though,thecostsfaroutweighedthegains,aswasindicatedbythevariousformsofresistancethatdevelopedthroughoutthecolonialperiod.

ItisimportanttonotethattheIndianswhoresistedSpanishandcriollo(Mexican-bornofSpanishdescent)rule,whethertheypracticedsecretcults,proceededlegallyagainstcorruptgovernmentofficersandgreedylandowners,oropenlyrevoltedagainstthestateandtheChurch,didnotdosotodefendpristinenativeways,buttodefendthesyncreticculturethatresultedfromthecolonialprocess.Valuessuchasjustice,respectandkeepingone'sword,expressedinthedominantreligiousdiscourse,blendedquitewellwiththenewvillage-based,democraticIndianidentity.Atthesametimethedominantorderrelegatedthemtoastigmatizedsocialstatus,indios,whichdeniedthemtheseveryvalues.3

TheImpactoftheBourbonReforms(17601810)andthePorfirioDíazEra

ThelatterstagesofSpanishcolonialrulewereinspiredbyanideathatwasbecomingdominantineighteenth-centuryEurope:liberalism.LiberalideasfirstcametotheSpanishcoloniesfromoutsideandabove,thatis,fromtheBourbonreforms(Florescano,1992:64).CharlesIII(17591788)implementeddrasticchangesintheempire,withtheaimofincreasingtheproductivityofminingandagriculture,andthustheCrown'srevenues.

Thesestate-sponsored,authoritarian,liberalreformsmetwithhostilereactionsfromthedominantstratumofcolonialsociety,thecriollos,whocontrolledlandandcommerceandstaffedthemiddlelayersofthestateandChurchapparatus.Thereformsalsocreatedresentmentamongtheindigenouspopulation,sincetheyallowednon-Indianstoexploit"unused"Indianlands.Sothemainpoliticalimpactoftheinitialintroductionofstate-inspiredliberalisminMexicowastostimulateeffortsagainstanationalistmovementwhosefinaloutletwastheMexicanwarofindependence(18101821).

Thecriollosretainedpowerduringtheturbulenttwenty-fiveyearsthatfollowedMexico'sfinalindependencein1821.Meanwhile,liberalismwastakenupbythemestizolower-middleclass(pettybureaucrats,armyofficers,underemployedprofessionals),whouseditasasteppingstoneforsocialascension(Revueltas,1992:95).AftertheLiberalvictoryof1856,whichalsomarkedthemestizoascenttopower,liberalismbecametheveryideologicalbasisofthenewstate.Theliberalprogram,whichremainedessentiallyaletterofintentuntil1856,maybesummarizedbytheword"progress."Progressmeanteliminatingthe"shackles"leftbycolonialsociety.Inparticular,theland,thecountry'smainresource,hadtobetakenawayfromtheChurchandfromtheindigenouspopulation,whose"backwardness"wasseentopreventimprovementsinagriculture.

Asapoliticalregime,MexicanliberalismconsolidatedunderPorfirioDíaz(18761910).NowthatDíazhasbecomeoneofthevillainsofMexicanhistorytherehasbeenatendencytoattributetohimtheso-calleddegenerationofliberalism,but,infact,Díaz,asaliberal,firmlybelievedinprogress.Hesparednoefforttoestablishanefficientadministrationandtoendowthecountrywithamoderninfrastructureandeconomy,includingrailroadsandthetelegraph,urbanfacilities,andlarge-scalefarmingcenteredonsugarcane,coffee,cotton,andcattle.Morerecenthistoricalresearchisredefininghimasthepersonwhoexecuted,withanironhand,theplanssetbyhisillustriouspredecessor,BenitoJuárez,whowasanheirtotheBourbonreformers(Guerra,1985).

OnceDíazcameintopower,thegapbetweentheliberaldiscourseandtherealformsofstateregulationbecamemoreandmoreevident.Liberaldiscoursewasevidentintheconstitutionandinpoliticallanguage,whereitstillembodiedalltheelementsoftheideologyofprogress,suchasindividualfreedom,education,elections,andequalityinfrontofthelaw.However,inpractice"nationalunity"meantcentralizationofpowerinMexicoCity,"divisionsofpowers"meantabsolutepredominanceoftheexecutivebranchoverthelegislativeandthejudicialbranches,"publicorder"meantovertrepressionofanyopposition,and"liberationofthe

land"meanttheexpropriationofthelandofhundredsofthousandsoffarmersforthebenefitofafewlandlords.

ThiscontradictoryaspectofMexicanliberalismhelpsustounderstandthediversereactionsitmetinsuchanethnicallyandregionallydiversecountryasMexico.Whiletheoppositiontothelandexpropriationsledtoprotestsandrebellionsinmanypartsofthecountry,inotherareasindigenouspeasantsadheredtotherevolutionary,nationalisticaspectsofliberalismandusedittopromotetheirinterests.Forexample,intheSierraNortedePueblatheIndianstookarmsagainsttheFrenchInterventionArmywhichhadalliedwiththeregionallandlordsandtheclergy.UndernativeleaderssuchasJuanFranciscoLucasandDieguilloPalagosti,theNahuaexpelledtheFrenchandthecriolloelite(Thomson,1991).GiventhatLucaslaterbecamearegionalstrongmanforDíaz,theSierranativeswereabletokeepmuchoftheirland,whichtheyconvertedtoprivateplots,althoughtheydidloseimportantassetstomestizoandforeignplanters(TallerdeTradiciónOral,1994).

Privatizationinvolvedadeepchangeintheattitudetowardland.Plotscouldbeboughtandsold,andcouldalsobemortgagedwhencashwasneeded.Atwofoldprocessoflandconcentrationtookplace:attheregionallevel,inthehandsofthemestizobourgeoisiefromthecountytowns(cabeceras),andatthevillagelevel,wheresomenatives,throughcommerce,usury,and/orpoliticalmanipulation,obtainedcontrolofsubstantialtractsofland.

InthehigherSierra,whereonlyonecropofcorncanbegrownperyear,landlesspeasants(the"poor")resortedtosharecroppingfortheland-owners(the"rich")andtoseasonalmigrationtothenearbyVeracruzcoast.Eventoday,communityorganizationinthehigherSierraislessdevelopedthaninthelowerSierra,andreciprocalritualtieslikecompadrazgo(ritualcoparenthood)defineloosenetworksbetweenpeasanthouseholds.InthelowerSierra,privatizationstimulatedtheadoptionofcashcropping(firstsugarcane,thencoffee),whichprovidedagriculturalworknearlyyear-round,andpeasantagricultureproducedanotablesurplus.Today,elaboratecommunityreligiousstructuresreinforcelocalidentity,whilethemaincleavageremainsthatbetweenIndiansandmestizos(Beaucage,1994).Inneitherarea,however,didprivatizationmeanthatlandsimplybecameacommodity,tobemeasuredinabstracttermsaccordingtosurfaceandmoneyvalue.Tothisday,nativecommunitiesbelievethatthewholeland,clearedandnamedby"ourancestors"andmarkedbymilestones,belongstotheirmembers,andthatoutsiders'claimstoitresultfromillegitimatepractices(TallerdeTradiciónOral,1994:13034).

ThespreadofcoffeeorchardsinthelowerSierraallowedtheindigenouspopulationto

increasebeyondthelevelattainedwhentheregion

wasdependentonfoodcropsalone.4Asinthecaseoflandandlabor,however,monetizationdidnotsuppressthesacredcharacterofthebasicIndianstaple,corn.Peoplestilltakegreateffortstogrowatleastapartofthegraintheyneed,althoughtheyknowthatthemarketvalueofthecropisnotmuchoverthatoftherent(forsharecroppers)andismuchunderthevalueofgrowingcoffee(forsmallholders)(BeaucageandMontejo,1984:14,18).

Aseconomictransformationwastakingplaceinthecountry,thepoliticalaspectsofmodernitytrickleddowntotheindigenouspeasantryoftheSierramainlythroughtheirparticipationinnationalwars.AsaLiberalmayorofCuetzalan,Palagosti,forexample,promotededucationandpublicworks,andasanativeleaderheroseinarmswithhisfollowerstodefendtheremainingcommunallandsagainstencroachmentsbymestizoplanters(Thomson,1991).Inbothtypesofactions,theleaderdefendedthewayoflifeoftheindigenouscommunity,whichhadbeenreconstructedaftertheSpanishconquestandwasnowconsideredthebasisofindigenousidentity.WhentheNahuasawtheirwayoflifemenaced,aswasthecaseduringtheFrenchinvasion(18621867),theyspontaneouslytookarmsandfoughtundertheirleaders,yet,afterthewarwasover,theydideverythingtoavoidforcedmilitaryrecruitment.Theyextendedthispragmaticattitudetoothernewideasbroughtbyliberalism.Forexample,theywereenthusiasticsupportersofthemunicipalizationoftheircommunities,whichtheythoughtcouldempowerthemtomanagetheirownaffairs(TallerdeTradiciónOral,1994:12627).Also,albeitferventCatholics,theywelcomedtheabolitionofchurchtithessincetheyfeltthatpriestsabusedthem.Ontheotherhand,theyhadmixedfeelingsregardingtheprivatizationofcommunallandsandappearedtohaveaccepteditonlywhenitwastheonlywaylefttokeeptheirplots.Finally,theytriedtoavoidthehead-taxandforcedlaboronthenewroadsandpublicbuildingsevenwhentheordercamefromPalagosti(Beaucage,1995a:357).

Theirattitudetowardsmodernizationwouldchangeafterthelocalmestizos,whohadeducation,money,andurbancontacts,grabbedeconomicandpoliticalpowerattheregionallevel.Thereactionofmostnativeswastowithdraw,physicallyaswellasculturally,tothevillages,whileoraltraditionsoughttoexplainhow,andbywhom,theyhadbeenbetrayed.However,theydidremaincloselyintegratedforbetterandforworsewiththemodernpolitical,judicial,andeconomicapparatustheyhadfoughttosetupinPalagosti'sdays.

InWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica,liberalism,asasocialandpoliticalphilosophy,hadbeentheproductoftheslowmaturationofacapitalisteconomyandabourgeoisworldview.Inordertobeputintopracticeinnineteenth-centuryMexico,liberalism's

basicprinciplesa

maximumofeconomicandpoliticalfreedomforthecitizenandaminimumofstatepresencehadtobeturnedintotheiropposites.Directandpermanentstateinterventionoccurredinallspheres,andrepressionwasorientednotonlyagainstthe"reactionaries"butagainstthepeoplethemselves,especiallywhentheiraspirations(havinglandtotillandmaintainingvillagelife)clashedwiththeliberalviewofanationofanonymous,individualcitizens(Florescano,1992:64).

Personalizedpower,demagogyandfraudoncetrickstogetintopowerbecamethenormfortheRepublicangovernment.Thereiterationoftheliberalprinciplesbecamemostlyanexerciseofstyleforthoseinpower,definingwhathasbeencalled"elMéxicoimaginario"(theimaginaryMexico).ThemodernizationprogramthatPorfirioDíazstarted,andthathascontinuedthroughoutthiscentury,hashadincreasinglyhighcostsincludingmillionsoflandlesspeasants,urbanmisery,andeconomicandpoliticaldependenceupontheUnitedStatesandEurope.Butperhapsoneofthehighestcostswouldbethecreationofanever-wideninggapbetweentheimaginaryMexicoandtherealcultureandpracticesoftheMexicans,nativeandnon-native,whosemainworryistomakeendsmeetinaworldofauthoritarianism,deceit,andcorruption.

Intheearly1900sthiscostwasresentednotonlybythosewhosufferedmost(peasants,miners,andfactoryworkers)butbylargesectorsofthepettybourgeoisie,whohadnosayinthewaythestatewasrunandsawtheirworlddriftfurtherawayfromwhattheyhadfoughtforwithJuárezandyoungDíaz.In1910,FranciscoMaderolaunchedhisoppositioncampaignbystressingthegapbetweentheliberalidealsandtheDíazregime.Hebecamepresidentbutwasnotabletomobilizelargemasseswithhislegalisticslogan,"Sufragioeffectivo,noreelección"(Realvote,noreelection).Theaspirationsofamajorityofpeasants,inthismostlyruralcountry,werebestexpressedbyEmilianoZapata'sslogan,"Tierraylibertad"(Landandfreedom).ItwasVenustianoCarranzawhofinallyincorporatedtheagrarianandlabordemandsintothenewConstitutionof1917andwasabletoputanendtothearmedstruggle.

TheSecondWave:Cardenismo(19341940)andtheMexicanWaytoModernity

TwodecadesaftertherevolutiontheconditionsofpeasantsandworkershadhardlychangedsinceDíaz'sdaysinspiteoftheinscriptionintheconstitutionoftheirrespectiverightstoland(Art.27)andsatisfactorylaborconditions,includingtherighttoorganize(Art.123).ThegapbetweentherealandtheimaginarycountrywaswiderthaneverasPresidentPlutarcoElíasCallessucceededintwistingtheanti-reelectionclause

andgoverningfrom1924to1934throughsuccessorshehadwellinhand.Manyrevolutionaryleadersalliedwiththeoldleadingfamiliesorturnedintocaciques.Buttheparticipationoflargesectorsintherevolutionarystrugglehadmademanypeoplemoreconsciousoftheirrightsandofthepossibilityofchangingthingsbyputtingpressureonthoseinpower.Anarchistunionswerequiteeffectiveamongfactoryworkers,whileagrarianorganizationshelpedworkerstooccupytheidlefieldsofthehaciendas.

In1934thenewpresident,LázaroCárdenas,initiatedaseriesofdramaticchanges.AftertighteninghiscontroloverthestateandthearmyandsendingCallesintoexile,hedecidedtocarryoutthelandreformlawsbyturningovertothepeasantsseventeenmillionhectaresoffarmland.Bysodoing,hebrokeovertwocenturiesofrulebythelandowningclassandobtainedunprecedentedpeasantsupportfortheregime.Totheworkers,hegavetherighttounionizeandensuredamoreeffectiveapplicationofthelaborcode.Then,ontheveryeveofWorldWarII,henationalizedtheforeignoilcompanies,givingtheMexicanstateapowerfulresourcetosupportitsexpansionandfundservicessuchaseducationandpublicworks.

Atthesametime,Cárdenasincorporatedthepeasantorganizations,workersunions,andindependentassociationsintothePartidodelaRevoluciónMexicana(transformingthePartidoNacionalRevolucionariofoundedbyCalles).CárdenasjustifiedthetransformationbypointingtothedangerfacedbytheRevolutionbecauseofitsexternalandinternalenemies.5Thus,Mexicodevelopeditsunique,long-lastingcorporatiststructure,inwhichthemainsocialpartners,includingthelaborunionsandtheassociationsofpeasantsandindependentproducers,wouldjointlydeterminewhowasgoingtobeMexico'snextpresident.Eventhoseformallyexcludedfromthealliancedrewbenefitsfromthenewsocialorder.Theincipientindustrialbourgeoisiecouldrelyonstatecontractsandhighcustomduties,andcouldproducefortheinternalmarkettheconsumptiongoodsthatwerelessavailablefromabroadbecauseofthewar.Eventhelandlordswhoagreedtocooperatewiththeregimecouldconverttheirreducedassetstointensiveproductionandselltogovernmentagenciesortoathrivingpost-WorldWarIIagrobusiness.

Intheruralareaswheretheagrarianreformneverreached(suchasthenortherncattle-raisingranches,thesoutheasterncoffee-producingzone,andmostoftheIndianSierras),economicandpoliticalintegrationwasachievedbyadaptingthetraditionalsystemofthecacique.Thecacique,usuallyalargelandlordorcommercialintermediary,maintainedawidenetworkofclientsinmestizotownsandIndianvillages.Heensuredtheirpoliticalallegiancetothepartyandinreturnobtainedeconomicsupport

fromthestate(forexample,farmcredit)andablankcheckregardingitsmanagementofregionalaffairs.Hishenchmenranforpositionsasmayorsanddeputies,andheeliminatedanycompetitors.6Althoughmarginaltotheformalpoliticalstructure(thecaciqueseldomheldofficehimself)hehaddirectconnectiontothetopstateandnationallevelsthroughthepartyline,thepartyandthestatebeingoneandthesamething.

TheeconomicresultsofCardenismo,stimulatedbyafavorableinternationalconjuncture,havebeencalled,somewhatexaggeratedly,the"MexicanMiracle."Fromapoliticalpointofviewithasbeenlabeled"stabilizerdevelopment"(eldesarrolloestabilizador).From1940to1969,Mexicoexperienceditslongestperiodofuninterruptedeconomicgrowth,withGrossDomesticProductincreasingatthesteadyrateof6percentperyear.By1960morepeoplelivedincitiesthaninthecountrysideandliteracyrateshadincreasedsteadilywhiletheproportionoflandlesspeasantscametoanhistoriclow.ThecountryalsoexperiencedapoliticalstabilitythatisuniqueinLatinAmerica,withthePartidoRevolutionarioInstitutional(PRI)holdingpoweratalllevelsofgovernment,electionafterelection.MostobserversviewedMexicoasamodernsociety.Fromhightechnologytodailylife,U.S.influencewastobefelteverywhere,yetthecountrypreservedadefinitenationalpersonality,basedonitsrichculturaltradition.Itwasthoughtthatthepocketsofpovertyand"backwardness"wouldsoonerorlaterdisappear,thankstoeconomicgrowthandtheexpansionofthestate'ssocialservices.

Oneexplanationofthenew,peacefulMexicanscenewasthatitbenefitedallmajorsocialactors:peasantshadland,workershadsteadyiflow-paidjobs,theexpandingmiddleclasshadonefootinconsumersociety,andentrepreneurscouldrelyonprotectedmarketsaswellasacheapanddocileworkforce.Socialprotestexisted,suchasthestrikeoftherailroadworkersin1959andtheagrarianmovementledbyRubénJaramillouptotheearlysixties,butitremainedlocalizedandcouldbeputdowneasilythroughstateintervention.

ThereisnodoubtthatalargernumberofMexicansenjoyedahigherlevelofwell-beingfromthisparticularformofmodernization.Inthiscontext,thestatedevelopedaspecificdiscourseinwhichitslegitimacydidnotcomefromtheindividualchoiceexpressedintheballotbox(asintheclassicalliberaldiscourse)sinceeverybodyknewthewinnerofthepresidentialelectionaboutoneyearbeforetheelection.Thebasicreferenceswereto"therevolutionaryfamily"andto"thepeopleofMexico"whosefundamentalneedsthegovernmentclaimedtoknowdirectlythroughtherank-and-fileofthePRI.Theinterventionismofthepost-revolutionarystatebrokewithsomeofthebasictenetsofliberalism(such

asblindsubmissiontothe"lawsofthemarket"),yetfreeenterprisewasencouraged,andindividuallibertieswererespectedaslongastheydidnotjeopardizetheone-partyrule.

ThePRI'scorporatist,hierarchicalstructurefittraditionalconceptionsandpracticesofsocialrelationsquitewell.Peasantsandartisansoftensoughtaprotector,merchantorlandowner,whomtheyaskedtobetheirchild'sgodfather.Inthisritualizedrelationshipthepeasantswereexpectedtoremainloyaltotheirbetter-offcompadre,andtheprotectorwasexpectedtohelpthepeasantduringhardtimes.InpostrevolutionaryMexico,agroupofpeasantsaskingforlandorcreditcouldcontactthePRIdeputyorsecretaryandexchangepoliticalloyaltyforeconomicandlegalsupport.Thesystemwasflexibleenoughtoco-opttheleadersofprotestmovements,whowereoftenofferedjobsinthegovernment,thepeasantunionortheParty,whichtheyacceptedwiththejustificationthattheycouldhelptheirfollowersbetter"fromtheinside."Thiswasnotseenasabetrayalaslongassomehelpcame,whichwasusuallythecase.

ThehegemonicdiscourseandpracticeofCardenismohasbeenlabeledbothpopulistandcorporatist.Thesetermsfitwellwiththestyleofthenewleaders(populism)andthetypicalformofsocialintegration(corporatism).Buttheydonotrepresentthefactthat(contrarytohistoricalMexicanLiberalism,whichledtomassexpropriationandovertrepression)theoverallpoliciesofthePRIincorporatedmanyofthebasicdemandsthathadbeenmadeduringtherevolution.Thisiswhytheterm"popular-reformist"seemsmoreadequate,althoughpopularorganizationswereneverincontroloftheprocesseveninthegoldenyearsofCardenismo.7Ingeneral,themajorcostforthepopularmovementwasthelong-termlossofitsindependence,whichalmostinevitablycamewiththebenefitsofthelandorlaborreforms.

Overvast,ruggedareassuchastheSierraNortedePuebla,though,therewaslittlelandtoberedistributed,sotheclassicalcaciquesystempersistedwellintothe1970s.Integratedintothenational(eveninternational)economicsystemthroughthesaleoftheirlaborandfarmproducts,massesofindigenouspeasantsremainedunaffiliatedwithinthepostrevolutionarycorporatistscheme,asituationwhichwasdestinedtohaveimportantpoliticalconsequences.

SettingupfortheThirdWave:TheWearingoutoftheCárdenasModel(19701982)

Attheverymomentthatthemodelofeconomicgrowthandpoliticalstabilityseemedfirmlyinplace,varioussymptomsappearedtoindicatethatthemodelwaswearingout.Inthesummerof1968thestudentsofMexico

City,thenation'sfutureelite,manifestedtheirrejectionofasociopoliticalsystembasedonappallinginequalities,mediacensorship,andadefactoone-partystate.TheprotestwascrushedinbloodshedinOctober.Twoyearslaterthefarmerscouldnolongersupplyallthebasicstaplesthecitiesneeded,forthefirsttimesincetheAgrarianReform.Inflation,along-forgottenphenomenon,cametostay.

Mexicanpublicpolicysincethe1970scanbesummarizedasapermanent,relativelyincoherentsearchforawayoutofthecrisis.PresidentLuisEcheverría(19701976)identifiedonerootoftheproblemasthefarmingcrisis,andhethoughtthesolutionwastogobacktotheCardenistacombinationofpopulismandnationalism.Mexicowasthenheavilydependentuponitsagriculturalexports(coffee,citrusfruits,cotton)inordertoimportthetechnologicalpackageitsindustryneeded.However,his"Third-Worldist"rhetoriccouldnotestablishworkableallianceswithothersoutherncountriesthe"coffeecartel"setupin1974soonprovedtobeafailurenorcouldtheideaof"socializationoftheejido"(intheabsenceofanylarge-scalesolutionforthelandless)createanewstate-peasantallianceinsidethecountry.Ifpeasantsdidoccupyhundredsoflargedomains,primarilyintheIndianSouthandinthecapitalistmestizoNorthwest,itwasoutofdespair,andagainstgovernmentwill.WhenEcheverríaleftthepresidency,thecountrywasindisarray.Largeruralareaswereinturmoil,andinflationandfooddependencewereincreasing.

HissuccessorJoséLópez-Portillo(19761982)decidedtousetheoilwealthtostirupgrowthatallcosts.Forhim,statecapitalismshouldhelpthepeasantsraisetheirproductivityinordertolinkupwiththeprivatesectorandproducethefoodthecountryneededonceagain.Throughthe"MexicanFoodSystem"(SistemaAlimenticioMexicano),hespentbillionsofdollarsin(oftenuseless)infrastructureandineffortsto"organizethepeasant"bydistributingcredit,machinery,fertilizers,pesticides,andhigh-yieldseeds,whichledtoexcessivebureaucracyinthecountryside.

Thewholesystemcametoahaltin1982,whenoilpriceshalvedinamatterofmonths,andMexicoawokeagaintotheinwardspiralofinflation,devaluation,capitalflight,andforeigndebtpaymentsthatwereimpossibletomeet.ThistimeanumberoftopbureaucratsandbusinesspeopleinMexico,theU.S.government,andvariousfinancialcirclesrealizedthatthepoliticaleconomyofthepopular-reformistalliancewasdeadandthatanotherformulahadtobefound.

UnderMigueldelaMadrid(19821988),thekeywordwas"adjustment"conceivedinthemonetaristfashionofthosedays:bothgovernmentdeficitandbalanceofpaymentsproblemshadthesamecause,that

is,expensesbypassedincome.TheremedywasthesameasthatappliedthroughouttheThirdWorldreducegovernmentspendingandimportsandincreaserevenuesandexports.Thepesowasdevaluated,subsidiestobasicfoodsuppliesdecreased,healthandeducationserviceswerecut,andimportsdrasticallyreduced.Hundredsofpublicenterprisesconsideredunprofitablewereeithersoldtotheprivatesectoror,moreoften,closeddown.Bytheendofthedecade,soaringpricesandwagecontrolhadcutthepurchasingpoweroftheminimumwageinhalf.

Theendoftheimportsubstitutionpolicy,andwithitwhatGilly(1988)calledthe''exhaustionoftheCardenistapact,"didnotproducethesamesocialandpoliticalupheavalinMexicothatmarkedtheendofpopulisminotherLatinAmericancountriessuchasBrazilorArgentina.Onceagain,theuniquesystemdesignedbyCárdenastomobilizethemassesprovedtobeanexcellenttoolforcontrollingboththeurbanworkersandthefarmers.Theirofficialfederations"voluntarily"agreedtothenewPactofEconomicSolidarityof1987imposedbythedelaMadridadministration.Hence,itbecamemateriallyimpossibleforthegovernmenttodismantletheheavy,obsoletecorporatistsystemasentrepreneurialgroupswererequesting(Gilly,1988:31).Thetroublewouldcomefromoutsidetheorganizedworkers,essentiallyfromthedwellersofshantytownswhosemovement(MovimientoUrbanoPopular)presentedthemostseriousoppositiontothenewpolicies.Themovement'sradicalismincreasedsharplyaftertheSeptember1985earthquakeinMexicoCity,giventheobviouscynicismoftheauthoritiesandtheirlackofcareforthetensofthousandsofhomeless(Monsiváis,1987:17122).Thesystemhadstoppedgivingrewards,howeversmall,tothosewhowereloyaltoit.Aftersixyearsofimposed"sacrifices,"MexicofounditselfattheendofdelaMadrid'stermwithaparalyzedeconomy,inflationupto145percentperyear,andalarger-than-everdebt.

Afterthe1982crisis,economicliberalismwasdefinitelyontheriseinMexico.Thenewliberalismfounditsfirstclearexpressioninaright-wingoppositionparty,thePartidodeAcciónNacional(PAN).RootedintheindustrialNorth,thePANbrandishedtheall-timemodelofMexicanLiberalstheUnitedStates.Inthemiddleofthepolitical,economicalandideologicaldisarraywhichhadstruckMexico,U.S.policiesappearedtobeplaincommonsensetoamajorityofnorteños(northerners),whoalwayshadtheimpressionthattheyonlyworkedsothatMexicoCitypoliticianscouldspendmoneyanddistributefavourstolazysoutherners.IncomparisonwiththeoverallchangethatthePANproposed,delaMadrid'sbelt-tighteningmeasures,imposedbytheIMFandU.S.privatebanks,appearedhalf-heartedandprovisional.WhiletheRightwasprogressivelyimposingitsnewvisionofmodernization,theleftwasengaged

inalongprocessofredefinitionandreorganization,whichwouldstartbearingfruitattheendofthe1980s.

IndigenousMovementsduringtheTransitionPeriod(19721986)

IntheSierraNortedePuebla,twoverydifferentpeasantmovementsdevelopedafter1970.InthevillagesoftheUpperSierra,asuccessfulstruggleagainstanincreaseofthelandtaxencouragedtheformationofanagrarianmovement,theUniónCampesinaIndependiente(UCI),whosesecondtargetbecametheredistributionofsomelargedomainsbelongingtothelocalcaciques.Hereclassidentityprevailedovercommunityorethnicties,ascommunitiesoftenweredividedalongclasslines.Underacharismaticleader,theorganizationgrewrapidlyanddevelopedanotherbaseinneighboringVeracruz.In1976aUCIdemonstrationinVeracruzgatheredthousandsofpeasantsdeterminedtoobtainlandandputanendtocaciquerule.However,López-Portillo'spolicyofovertrepression,aswellasthelandlords'deathsquads,wereabletodealseriousblowstothemovement.In1979asplitoccurredbetweentwoleadersthatforcedremainingmembersunderground,and,bythebeginningoftheeighties,thegrouphaddisappeared(Beaucageetal.,1981).

InthelowerSierrathepeasantmovementwasslowertoemergebutwasofgreaterendurance.Itfinallytooktheformofacommunity-based,regionalcooperativecalledTosepanTitataniske(literally,TogetherWeShallWin).ItreachedpoorandmiddleIndianpeasantsandwasstronglydefinedalongethniclines.Inspiteofoppositionfromthelocalmestizointermediariesandtheirpoliticalallies,theTosepanreceivedsomefinancialsupportandlegalrecognitionfromLópezPortillo'sadministration,alongwithothergroupsthataimedtoincreasefarmoutput.Progressiveoutsideadvisorsofvariousideologicaltendencies,mostlyagronomistsandeducators,providedthetechnicalandadministrativeknow-howtohelpthenewlyelectednativeleaders.Atfirsttheseleaderscamefromthemiddlepeasantry.Theytooktheirmandateasaservicetothecommunitiesanddidnotsparetheirtimeandeffortstoconvincefarmersfromothervillagestojointheorganization.TheTosepansoondevelopedintoanetworkoflocalcooperativeswhosemainpurposesweretosellbasicstaplesatsubsidizedpricesandtomarketpeasantproduce(allspice,sapodilla,oranges,andsomecoffee).Intheearlyeighties,theTosepanTitataniskecouldclaimthousandsofmembersfrommorethansixtyvillages(Beaucageetal.,1982;MartínezBorrego,1991).

From1976to1986,thepeasantmovementwasthriving.Thenetworkoflocalcooperativestoresseriouslycompetedwiththeregionalcommercialbourgeoisieandputahalttospeculativepricesonbasicitems.

TheTosepanTitataniskeattractedadiversityofprojects,supportedbyinternationalandstateagenciesandvolunteers,thatpromotedimportantculturalandsocialchangesineducation(fromkindergartenstohighschools),createdlocalstoresandwarehouses,inducedroadbuildingandroadrepair,andsupportedchickenandpig-breedingbusinesses.Associationswereformedtointroducerunningwater,healthclinicsandnutritioncenters,andliteracyclassesforadults(inSpanishandNahuat,laterinTotonac).TheTallerdeTradiciónOraldevoteditselftotherecollectionanddiffusionoftraditionalNahuacultureandfolklore.Withtheregionalcooperativeasitsbackbone,neverbeforehadtherebeensomanyeffortsputforwardfordevelopingtheSierra.Amongthenatives,theco-opandthevariousprojectsgeneratedenthusiasmandintenseparticipation.Inmanycommunities,well-attendedweeklymeetingsweretheoccasiontodiscussallcollectivematters.

Atthesametime,theMexicanCoffeeBoard(InstitutoMexicanodelCafé,orINMECAFE)also"organized"peasantsintotheEconomicUnitsofCoffeeProducers(UnidadesEconómicasdeProductoresdeCafé,orUEPC)tomodernizecoffeeproductionwithcredit,anewtechnologicalpackage,andmarketingfacilities.TheparticipatorynatureoftheTosepanTitataniskewasinclearcontrastwiththeUEPCs,whereproducersweresummonedtohearwhathadbeendecidedfortheminINMECAFE'sheadoffice.8Mostpeasantsoptedforadoublecommitment:theystoodwiththeco-opregardingconsumptionissues,allspicemarketing,communitydevelopment,andpolitics,buttheyfollowedINMECAFE'sadviceregardingtheproductionandmarketingoftheirmaincashcrop,andplantedmoreandmorecoffeeofthenewhigh-yieldvarieties,whiletheco-opadvocatedcropdiversificationandtriedtomarketvariousproducts(oftensuccessfully,asinthecaseofallspice).

AtthesametimethatthemovementreinforcedIndianidentityonaregionalbasis,paradoxically,itacceleratedacculturationprocesses.Theyoungergenerationofmensoonabandonedthetraditionalnativedress(whitecottonshirtsandtrousers,broad-rimmedstrawhatsandrubber-solesandals)formanufacturedclothesandshoesofthestyleusuallywornbyruralnon-nativeMexicans.Urbanstatussymbolssuchasthedigitaldialwristwatch,metalballpointpen,andpocketcalculatorbecamestandardforco-opofficials(comisionados),teachers,andheadsofprojects.Nearlyeverywomannowworeplasticsandalsinsteadofwalkingbarefoot,butonlyasmallproportion,amongtheyoungerones,adoptedthefactory-madedressinsteadofthetraditionallargewhiteskirt,wideredbelt,andembroideredblouse.Thisstyleofdressisstillconsideredelegantandasenhancingawoman'sbeauty(Beaucage,1985:85).Atthelinguisticlevel,betterschoolinginSpanishandaccesstoradioand(in

somehouses)televisionmeantincreasedbilingualism.WhileNahuatisspokenwithinthehouseandfordailyintercourse,Spanishinvadestheco-opmeetingssinceitistheonlylanguageunderstoodbytheoutsidecounsellors.Also,theadoptionoftheformalstructureandproceedingsofacooperativeinvolvesusingalargenumberofSpanishtermsthathavenoNahuatequivalent(suchaspresidentededebates[speaker]andordendeldía[agenda]).Atregionalmeetings,participantsusuallyspeakdirectlyinSpanish,whileatvillagemeetings,theyusesentenceswhereaNahuatstructureisfilledinwithmanyNahuatizedSpanishterms.

ThenewinstitutionsinthelowerSierraprofoundlychangedthespatial-temporalparametersofthecommunity.BysettingitsmainofficeinCuetzalan,themestizo-dominatedcountyhead,theTosepanTitataniskecreatedaproperlyindigenousphysicalandsocialspace,somethingthathaddisappearedacenturyago.Afterdoingtheirbusinessintown,peasantfarmersandfamilieswouldoftencometorest,talk,andtakeshelterfromtherainattheco-opbuilding,convenientlylocatednotfarfromthemarketplace.Similarly,inthevillages,mostofwhichpreviouslyhadnoretailstores(withtheexceptionoftheliquorstores,wheremendrinkstandingundertheeaves),thelocalco-op,togetherwiththeelectriccornmill,becameanewcenterforsocialinteraction.Womenwouldlaughinglycomment,"Before,weusedtochatatthefountain.Now,withrunningwaterineverybody'shouse,wecan'tdoitanymore.Sowegoearlytothecornmillandwegossipalittle."

Socialtimewasalsodeeplymodified.Weeklyregionalmeetingsoflocalrepresentatives,whichstartedonSundaymorning,wouldusuallyendafterdark,withparticipantscomplainingbitterlyabouthavingtowalkbacktothevillagesinthepouringrain,whenthetrailsweredesertedandtheycouldbeassaulted.Inthevillages,thefactthatthefrequentmeetingswereheldatnight(sothatpeoplewouldnotloseaworkday)contradictedthetraditionaluseoftime.Inthepast,importantmattersweredealtwithat(orevenbefore)dawn,andpeoplewenttothefieldsearlyandwenttobedatdusk(Beaucage,1995b:3023).

Genderrelationsalsounderwentanotablechange.Sincethepublicspherewasconsideredessentiallyaman'sbusiness,thechangecameaboutgradually.Singlewomencomplainedaboutbeingobligedtoassistateveningmeetingsinordertogetcornattheco-opstore;whentheywent,theyremainedinacorner,breast-feeding,laughingquietlyasmenquarrelled,orrushingouttoremoveascreamingchild.Eventuallysomeliterateyoungwomenwerehiredasstoresalesgirlsanddidquitewell.Assomemencommentedironically,"Theydon'tbooze,don'tcruisecustomers,anddon'tmeddlewithaccounts."Finally,somewomenwereelectedtopositionsasco-opexecutives,onschoolboardsand

onother

committees.Today,themainproblemthatwomenfaceishowtocombinetheirnewpubliclifewiththeirrolesaswivesandmothers.AlthoughIndiansociety,albeitpatriarchal,isnotasmachistaasmestizosociety,problemswillstilloccurwhenthemotherisnotthereto"givethetortillas"(tamaka)toherhusbandandchildren.

Modernityasitwasexemplifiedbyadecadeofchange(19761986),withsubstantialmaterialimprovements,higherincomes,betterhealthandeducationservices,andmeetingswhereeverybodycouldspeakandevencriticize,hadmuchappealfortheindigenousfarmers.Thesechangeswerenotperceivedas"losingourculture"but,rather,appropriatinginvaluableoutsideelementsintotheculture.Therewerenotmanylamentsaboutthegoodolddays.Onthecontrary,thegeneraltonewasthatofajustIndianrevenge,andonecouldhearstatementssuchas:

"Before,themestizosconsideredourgrandfathersasstupid(xoxitos)becausetheyonlyknewhowtowork.Theydidnothaveagoodinstrument(arms).Butnowadays,youwon'tfrightenouryoungsters."

"Themestizoshaveexploitedusforonehundredyears,wewon'tletthemanymore."

"Theyusedtokeepallthegoodthingsforthemselvesbutitisuswhodoallthework."

WhilethesuccessoftheTosepanTitataniskeputapositivevalueonastigmatizedIndianidentity,peoplefeltthelossoftraditionalwork.Farmerswerereducingtheircornfields,thusleavingtheheavy,butsacredworkofproducingthebasicfoodforlighter,better-paidcoffeeplanting.Andmanywereleavingfarmingaltogethertobecomemasons,truckdrivers,orcomisionados.Asoneelderlypeasantwomanputit,"Here,everythinggrows.Butnobodywantstoworkanymore"(Beaucage,1989:130).

CapitalistModernity:TheContradictionsoftheThirdWave

Becausetheregiondependedonexportproducts,suchascoffeeandallspice,whichsoldwell,itdidnotimmediatelyfeeltheblowofthefinancialcrisisandthepolicychangesthathadaffectedthewholecountryafter1982.However,thepoorerpeasants,whohadtobuycornmostoftheyear,resentedDistribuidorasdelaConasupo,SociedadAnónima(DICONSA),theofficialfooddistributionagency,forthecontinualincreasesofbasicfoodpricesintheco-opstores.

In1986thecooperativepresenteditsowncandidatesformayorandcounselorsinCuetzalanandwonagainsttheangeredmestizoelite.ButthenewmayorsoondiscoveredthatwithnofundscomingfromMexico,mostcommunitydevelopmentprojectshadtobeshelved,disappointinghisonce-enthusiasticfollowers.Withalloftheoilmoneybeing

keptin

theUnitedStatesaspaymentforaonehundred-billiondollarforeigndebt,modernizationnolongerincludedthedevelopmentofpublicinfrastructurethroughoutthecountry.

Meanwhiletheregionalcooperativefacednewproblems.Theredtapeofabigorganizationandmodernagrobusinessrequiredtrainedpersonnel,andthisdidnotexactlyfittheearlierpatternwhenpeoplewerechosenbecauseoftheirrespectability.Thenewcomisionadoswereyounger,betterschooled,andestimatedthattheydeservedatleastaminimumwagesalaryfortheirwork.Theyalsodiscoveredthat,inspiteofdelaMadrid'scommitmenttoa"clean,business-like"administration,whatevermoneystillcamefromthegovernment'sagenciesdidsomainlyinreturnforpoliticalallegiance.Afewyoung,educated(andmoreambitious)Indiansmanagedtoholdofficeattheregionallevelmoreorlesspermanently.PeasantsfoundthatsomeofthemspentmoretimeintownandtravelingtoMexicoCitythanclimbingthehillsidestolistentothepeople.Moreover,becauseofthelackoffinancialassets,theTosepanhadneverbeenabletocontrolcoffeemarketing,whichstillbelongedtotheINMECAFEandthelocalintermediaries(coyotes).AstheTosepanattemptedtogetintothemarketthroughalargeloan,theinternationalcoffeepriceplummeted(198889)whentheIntenationalCoffeeOrganization,underwhoseauspicesimportingandexportingcountriesmeet,couldnotagreeonanewfloorpriceforquotaexports.Infact,persistentoverproductionintheSouthhadledthebuyercountries,headedbytheUnitedStates,toquestiontheverylogicofmaintainingquotasandfloorprices.Intheyearthatfollowed,coffeelosthalfitsvalueontheinternationalmarket.Theco-opnearlycollapsedandtheboardofdirectorsincreasinglynarrowedtheirpoliticalalliancewiththePRIinordertobeabletomaintainaminimumleveloffunding.

AsaresultofdelaMadrid'scutbackpolicies,mismanagementoftheearthquakecrisis,andpooreconomicresults,the1988presidentialelectionwasthefirstoneinsixtyyearsinwhichthePRIlost.Thenewpresident,CarlosSalinas,hadbeenthechiefeconomicadvisortodelaMadrid.WithconfirmedU.S.support(PresidentBushhaddecidedtoavoidtheriskofsupportingPAN),SalinasconfiscatedthePAN'sorientation,arguingthatMexico'sbadlyneededmodernizationcouldnotbedonebythestateandshouldbelefttomarketforces.Ofcourse,thestateismuchmorethanaspectatorintheprocess;ithastocreatetheeconomic,political,andsocialconditionsthatwillallowthemarketforcesto"playfreely."Salinas'spurposewastoreorganizetheeconomy,thestateapparatus,society,andculture.WhiledelaMadridsoldunprofitablestateconcerns,Salinasputthebestonesupforsale,includingthebanksandthepublictelephonecompany.Anewpositiveclimatewascreatedwiththeprivate

sector,andforeigncapitalstartedtoflowinagain,stabilizingthepesoandloweringinflationarypressures.

Withregardtothecountryside,hispolicywaspreciseandtwofold.Sincehispredecessors'attemptsatlinkingentrepreneursandsmallholdershadbeenmetwithsuspicionandhesitationonbothsides,hedecidedtostrikeattheheartoftheproblemand"liberate"thelandandthepeoplefromtheejidosystem,whichhadpreventedhalfthearablelandfrombeingboughtandsold.Furthermore,thenationalbank,createdtosupportfarmerswitheasycredit,nowhadtolendmoneyonthebasisofprofitability,andINMECAFE,whichhadrunintomillionsofdollarsofdebtaftertheinternationalcoffeepricefell,wassimplyliquidated(Paré,1993).

Inordertopreventasocialcrisis,SalinascreatedtheNationalSolidarityProgram(ProgramaNacionaldeSolidaridad,orPRONASOL),whichfunneledmoneytosomeofthoseexcludedfromtheneweconomicplan,suchasslumdwellers,laid-offworkers,andthepeasantIndiansoftheSierras.Thousandsofsmallcommunityprojects(schools,roads,cooperatives)werefunded.Forexample,afterthedismantlingofINMECAFE,peasantproducerswereencouragedtopurchaseitsequipmentandplantsandstartexporting.Mostorganizationsweretooheavilyindebtedtodoso,butthroughpoliticalpressuressomewereabletorescheduletheirdebts,getsomefreshmoneythroughPRONASOL,andbuycoffeefromtheirmembers.InsomeareasofGuerreroandOaxaca,thisprogramseemstobeworking(Paré,1993),whileinVeracruzandintheSierradePueblafailureseemswidespread(Hoffmann,1993).IntheSierradePuebla,privateintermediariesareoccupyingthesceneforthefirsttimesince1970.

Afterfifteenyearsoffailedeffortsandhopes,thepeasantsfromthelowerSierrawerequitebitter.TheyhadconsciouslyavoideddirectconfrontationwiththestateinordertoescapetherepressionfacedbytheirupperSierraneighbors.In1990theylearnedthattherewouldbenohelpforreplantingtheorchardsdestroyedbyfrost.Somepeasantsleftthecoffeeonthetrees,sincetheharvesters'wageswerehigherthanthevalueofthebeans.Thosewhohadlargefamiliestofeedcutdownpartoftheircoffeeorchards("coffeetreesmakegoodfirewood")andplantedcorninstead,sinceitnowtooktwopoundsofcoffeetobuyonepoundofcorn.Therestpickedwhatevertheycouldwithfreefamilylaborandbeggedthecoyotesfromnearbytownstopurchaseit.However,theintermediarieswerenoteagertobuysincethepricewaslow.

Thepeasantsarestrugglingtoadaptinthisneweconomysincetheyknowthereisnowaybacktotheoldsystem.Aftertwenty-fiveyearsofintenseexposuretomodernity,nobodywantstoreturntotheolddays,whereyouworkedfromdawntoduskandwerehappytohaveenough

corntoeatandafewpesostospendatthefiesta.Youngmenandwomenwhohavehadelementaryschooling,seeingtheycannotmakealivinginthevillages,haveleftforMexicoCitytoworkasmasons'helpersandhousemaids.

In1996,SanMiguelTzinacapan,alargeindigenoussettlementthatplayedanimportantroleinthefoundingoftheTosepanTitataniske,stillexhibitsthesymbolsofprogresspeopleweresoproudofadecadeago:aroad,electricity,newschools,andmanycementhouseswithterraceroofs.Thenoiseofanoccasionalcarortruckhasreplacedthewhinnyingofmules.Yet,itisnowmorecommontohearelderlywomeninworn-outclothesaskingformoneyandteacherscomplainingaboutthegrowingnumbersofundernourishedchildren.Meanwhile,inMexico'sSoutheast,facedwiththesameimpossibilityofappropriatingmodernity,theTzeltalfromtheSelvaLacandonadecidedtoforcetheMexicangovernmenttorenegotiateitspoliticalandeconomicrelationshipwithindigenouscommunities.TheNahuaofPueblaapparentlypreferredtotrytheirindividualluckinMexicoCity.

InAugust1995IwentwithsomeNahuafriendstoTecoltepec,apoverty-strickenvillageinthelowerpartoftheCuetzalandistrict,anareabarelytouchedbymodernity.Thetrialwasimpassableandthefrailhousesweremadeofplanksandrods.Theinvitationforbreakfastmeantthatourgroupoffourhadtobesplitintwosincenosinglehouseholdcouldtreatfourguestswithcoffee,eggs,andtortillas.Lastyearacollectiveefforthadbroughtelectricitytothevillage,buttheyalsobadlyneededpipedwatersince,duringmostoftheyear,womenhadtohaulwateruphillalongsteep,rockypaths.Thefortyablemenofthevillagewerewaitingforourarrival.Thenewswebroughtwasthatsomemoneyhadbeenfoundtobuythecementandthepipes.TheyrespondedthattheywouldworkinturnswiththeCanadianengineers;menwoulddotheroughworkandwomencouldcarrysandandlightmaterials.Thereisnolongerthehistoricaldistrustofforeignersthathadbeenpresentintheearly1970s.Atthesametimethevillagershavedefinite,andquiterealistic,expectations.Theydonotsharetheidealizedvisionoftheirpoverty("harmonywithnature")thathasbeenspreadingintheNorthandthatwouldmake"development"redundant.ThevillagersofTecoltepecstubbornlywantamodernitythatbringstechnologyundertheircontrol:"Wedon'twantapump,''saidoneoftheirspokespersons."InX[anothervillage]theygotapumpandonemonthlateritwasbrokenandnobodycouldeverrepairit.So,nomatterhowfarthespringis,weshallallworktogetheruntilthewaterflowsdownbyitselftowhereweneedit."InFebruary1996,afterthreemonthsofdifficultiesandeffort,waterranfromafaucetinthecenterofthevillage.

Conclusion

ThethreewavesofmodernizationinMexicoshowsomedifferenceswithrespecttothemeansofachievingmodernityandthesocialgroupswhoaretobeitsmainbeneficiaries.Yetthethirdwaveresemblesthefirstinthat"liberating"themeansofproductionfrom"legalshackles,"inacontextofacutesocialinequalities,meansthattheconcentrationofwealthrapidlyanddramaticallyincreases.InPorfirioDíaz'stimes,morethan75percentofarablelandcametobeheldbylessthan1percentofthecountry'slandowners.Inastrikingparallel,thereweretwenty-fourbillionairesinMexicoin1994,comparedwithsevenadecadeearlierwhenliberalpoliciesweregivenanewstart.Inbothcases,thelargemajorityfounditselfmarginalizedfromthebenefitsofthereforms:inthemid-1990s,approximately40millionpeople(outof90million)werebeingexcluded.Thefirstwavecametoahaltin1910withtherebellionofthevariousclasseswhohadtobearallthecosts.FromtheMexicanRevolutioncameadifferentconceptofmodernization,exemplifiedbyCardenismo,whichtookintoaccountsomebasicneedsofpeasantsandworkers.However,Cardenas'slackofeffectivecontrolovertheprocess,andtheall-pervasiveliberalnotionthateconomicgrowthpersecanonlybepositive,withoutanyconsiderationfordemographicorenvironmentallimits,broughtthisnewMexicanmodeltoahaltagenerationago,whenittoohadexcludedmillionsofpeople.Therisingdiscontentoftheruralandurbanpoor,inadditiontoexternalpressures,forcedtheMexicanrulingclassesreluctantlytoadmittothefailureofthemodelintheearly1980s.Andso,from1982onward,thestateproceededtodismantlethematerialandinstitutionalbasesoftheoldsocialcontract,butwithoutprovidinganewone.Asinthepreviousperiods,andquiteparadoxicallyinacountrythatisnowmostlyurban,itisfromthecountrysidethatthegreatestchallengetothenewliberalpolicyhascome,withtheZapatistauprisingofJanuary1994.Initsaftermath,alargecoalitionofpopularforcesisnowemerging,acrosspartyandclasslines,toincludethosetryingtoreinventaninclusiveformofmodernitywithinwhichcostsandbenefitscanbemoreevenlyspread.

Notes

1.Undertheencomiendaregime,nativeswere"bestowed"onaSpaniard,whohadthemissionofconvertingthemwhilehewasprofitingfromtheirlabor.ThepracticewascurtailedbytheNewLaws(1542),whereincontrolofpeopleandlandsrevertedtotheCrownwhenencomenderosand/ortheirheirsdied.

2.FranciscodeVitoria(1486-1546)wasaDominicanfriarandteacheratSalamancaUniversity.HenevercametoAmericabut,basedonthewritingsof

ThomasAquinas,hearguedforanIndianrighttoself-government,thuscontestingthelegitimacyoftheSpanishconquestandtheforcefulconversionofthenatives.In1539hewasforbiddentowriteordebateanymoreonthetopic.BartolomédeLasCasas(1474-1566),alsoaDominican,becameabishopinChiapas,Mexico.Headoptedamorepragmaticposition--heacceptedthelegitimacyoftheConquestandthenecessityofconvertingtheIndians,butheclaimedthattheverywayinwhichthetwoobjectiveshadbeencarriedoutandtheabusesoftheencomiendaregimehadledthenativestohateChristianityandwouldleadtotheirextinction.InwhatwascalledtheGreatDebateofValladolid(1550),hesuccessfullyconfrontedJuanGinésdeSepúlveda(1470-1573),asupporterofIndianslavery.

3.ThemessianicideologythatinflamedIndianprophetsandrebelsoftenwas,infact,asymmetricalreconstructionofthecolonialChristianideology,areconstructionthatplacedtheminsteadinthedominantposition(GarcíadeLeón,1985;Gruzinski,1985).

4.Withninethousandinhabitants,in1877thedistrictofCuetzalanexperiencedseasonalfoodshortages(Ramírezetal.,1992:24-25).Onecenturylater,itstwenty-fivethousandpeoplelivedessentiallyonintensiveplantationagricultureandrelatedtradesandservices.

5.TheinternalsituationwasquitecriticalsincetheCatholicChurch,antagonizedbyCalles'sextremeanticlericalism,hadsetupaguerillamovement,theCristerosinWesternMexico.Theexpropriatedlandlordsandforeigninterestscouldusedissatisfiedsectorsofthearmedforcestosetupacoup.Byacceptingthealliancewiththestate,peasantsfacilitatedtheirlandclaimsandsecuredthegrantsafterwards;workerscouldbenefitfromlegalizedunionstoensuretheapplicationofthelaborcode.Thearmyandindependentsmallentrepreneursandprofessionalswerealsoenticedintothissocialpactwhich,intimesofturmoil,assuredthemthattheirinterestswouldbetakenintoaccount.

6.IntheSierraNortedePuebla,acaciquedynastybasedinthelargedomainofApulcoruleduntilthemid-1970s.Itcontrolledtheregionalrumindustryandpreventedanyagrarianclaimonitsdomainstosucceed(Paré,19730.

7.Populismbasicallyreferstoastyleofdiscourseinwhichsymbolicreferenceismadeto"thepeople,"theworkingclassandthepeasantrybeingexaltedastherealmembersofthenationinordertoobtaintheirpoliticalsupport.Ontheotherhandapolicymaybegenuinelylabeled"popular"whenitembodiesbasicdemandsoflargesectorsofsocietysuchaslandforfarmers,decentlaborconditionsforworkers,andequalrightsforwomen.

8.Forexample,in1982-83,thecoffeeproducershadtorevoltagainstINMECAFE,andthousandsofthemblockedandoccupiedtheXalapaofficessimplyinordertogetthe

arrearsthathadbeenheldfornearlyoneyear.

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2EconomicDevelopmentandtheOriginsoftheBolivianCocaineIndustry*MichaelD.Painter

Inthemid-tolate1970scocaineproductionemergedinBolivia'sexport-driveneconomyasthedominantindustrybygeneratingasmuchforeignexchangeasallotherexportscombined.Whilemining,whichwasBolivia'sdominantexportindustryfromthecolonialperiod,neveremployedmorethan5percentoftheworkforce,thecocaineindustryemployedbetween7and20percentofthecountry'sworkforce(dependingontheperiodstudiedandthemethodusedtomakecalculations)(Crabtreeetal.,1987:58;OTA,1993:5).

*ThisdiscussionisbasedonresearchsupportedbytheHarryFrankGuggenheimFoundation,theUnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomen,andtheCooperativeAgreementonSystemsApproachestoRegionalIncomeandSustainableResourceAssistance(No.DHR-A-00-9083-00)atClarkUniversity,theInstituteforDevelopmentAnthropology,andVirginiaPolytechnicInstitute,fundedbytheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,BureauforScienceandTechnology,OfficeofRuralandInstitutionalDevelopment,DivisionofRuralandRegionalDevelopment.Theviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthor,andshouldnotbeattributedtoanyoftheabove-mentionedinstitutionsorindividualsactingontheirbehalf.Whilesolelyresponsibleforanyerrorsoffactorinterpretation,theauthorthanksSoniaArellanoLópezforcommentingontheinitialdraft.TheinstitutionsparticipatingintheresearchweretheCentrodeEstudiosdelaRealidadEconómicaySocial(CERES),theCentrodeFormaciónInterdisciplinaria(CEFON)oftheUniversidadMayordeSanSimón,theTallerdeEstudiosSociales(TES),andtheInstituteforDevelopmentAnthropology(IDA),wheretheauthorworkeduntiltheendof1994.

Cocaleafandcocaineproductionhadbecomethelivelihoodofmanyfamiliesduetoaneconomiccrisistriggeredbythreeinterrelatedcircumstancesofthe1980s:adroughtthateffectivelyeliminatedrain-fedagriculturalproductioninmostofCochabambafrom1983intotheearly1990s;aperiodofhyperinflationduringtheearly1980s,followedbyaradicalstructuraladjustmentimplementedinAugust1985,whichmarkedtheadoptionofarangeofneoliberaleconomicpoliciesbytheBoliviangovernment;andthecollapseofBolivia'smajorexportindustry,tin,duringlate1985andearly1986.ThiscombinationofcircumstancesreducedorremovedtheabilityofmanyBolivianstoearnaliving.Atthesametime,respondingtoaboomingdemandintheUnitedStatesandotherwealthycountries,cocaleafandcocaineproductionwereexpanding.Amidthewidespreadeconomicdevastation,thecocaineindustryoftenappearedtooffertheonlyeconomicalternative.

Whilethesecircumstancesweretheimmediatecauseofmuchparticipationincocaleafandcocaineproduction,referencetothemaloneisaninsufficientexplanationofthesituation.Severallong-termhistoricalfactorsneedtobeconsideredtoexplainthestagnationofCochabamba'sagriculturaleconomy.Thisstagnationreinforcedconditions,createdbythedevelopmentmodeladoptedbyBoliviafollowingits1952nationalrevolution,thathaddeterminedthecountry'ssubsequenteconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Thismodelrestrictedeconomicopportunitiesformostpeople,evenasitlaidthefoundationuponwhichthecocaineindustrywouldbeconstructed.

Thecentralfeaturesofthepost-1952developmentmodeladoptedinBoliviaincludedthecreationofanexport-orientedagroindustrialelitethatdependedonstatesubsidies;themaintenanceofalargeruralpopulation,ableneithertoearnalivingthroughfarmingnortosurvivewithoutit;anddependenceoneconomicassistancefromtheUnitedStatestomaintainthepowerrelationsonwhichtheBoliviansocialorderrested.Thisdevelopmentmodelhasdeterminedwhowouldbethebeneficiariesandwhowouldbethevictimsofthesocialandeconomicchangesthathaveoccurredsince.WhilethismodeldidnotmakeitinevitablethatBoliviawouldbecomeacenterofcocaineproduction,itdidcreatethenecessaryconditionsforthecocaineindustrytotakerootandgrow.Althoughthearchitectsofthemodelcouldnotforeseetheriseofthecocaineindustry,theywereawareofwhowouldbenefitandwhowouldbearthecostsofthemodelbeingimplemented.Theimpactthatthesebenefitsandcostshadovertime,togetherwiththedramaticincreaseininternationaldemandforcocaine,ledtococainereplacingtinasBolivia'smostimportantexportcommodity.

ThePre-1952Context

Asthemiddleofthetwentiethcenturyapproached,tinminingwasthedominanteconomicactivityinBolivia.Miningasawholeaccountedfor95percent(tinalone,74percent)ofBolivia'sexportsin1950(Crabtreeetal.,1987:5758).AllofBolivia'stinproductionwascontrolledbythreecorporationsbelongingtothePatiño,Aramayo,andHochschildfamilies.ThebenefitsthatBoliviareceivedfromitsimportantplaceasaproduceroftinweremodestsincethecountry'sinfrastructuraldevelopmentwastailoredtomeettheneedsoftheminingcompanies.Forexample,asystemofrailroadslinkingtheminingcenterswithcoastalports,fromwhichorewasshipped,andadministrativeservicesinBolivia'smajorcitieswascompletedby1917.ButtherewasnoroadlinkingthethreemajorcitiesofLaPaz,Cochabamba,andSantaCruzuntilthe1950s,aftertherevolution.

Thetaxespaidbythetinindustrywereverysmallasashareofprofit.Nevertheless,theywerethemajorsourceofrevenuefortheBoliviangovernment,whichgavethetinbaronscontrolovermuchofthecountry'spoliticallife.Whileconcentratingonthemanagementoftheirbusinessesandremaininguninvolvedinpoliticaladministration,theywereabletocallonthegovernmenttopursueeconomicpoliciesthatkeptwageslowandmadeitdifficultforworkerstoorganize.Troopswerealwaysavailabletorepressanyunrest(Crabtreeetal.,1987:58;Klein,1992:16369;Malloy,1970:4346).

Theinequitiesofthesocialorderuponwhichtheminingeconomyrestedgeneratedwidespreadpoliticalmobilizationduringtheearlydecadesofthetwentiethcentury,whichculminatedin1952inasuccessfulrevolutionledbytheNationalistRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoNacionalistaRevolucionario,orMNR).Uponseizingpower,theMNRnationalizedthetinminesandplacedthemunderthecontrolofastate-ownedminingcompany.ThedeclaredintentionwasthatthenewstatewouldadministertherichesassociatedwiththeminingindustryforthebenefitofallBolivians.

TheAftermathoftheRevolution

Soonaftertakingpower,theMNRgovernmentencounteredseveralproblemsthatunderminedthepromiseofredistributionandledtotheconsolidationofthedevelopmentmodelunderwhichBoliviacontinuestolive.ThemostimportantproblemwasthechallengetoMNRcontroloverBolivia'sruralareasposedbyuprisingsofthenativepeasantryinthe

valleysofCochabamba.TheseuprisingswerethecontinuationofanescalatingpatternofruralconflictbetweensmallholdingpeasantsandlandlordsthatdatedfromthelatenineteenthcenturyandintensifiedduringandaftertheChacoWar(Rivera,1992:10330).

Peasantleaderssawtherevolutionasanopportunitytopresstheirstruggleagainstthelandlords.Theresultinggrowthofviolenceanddisorderthreatenedtheabilityofthenewgovernmenttocontrolthecountrysideandcontributedtothedisruptionoffoodsuppliestothecities.In1953thegovernmentrespondedbyenactinganagrarianreform,whichprovidedfortheexpropriationofthelargeestatesandtheirdivisionamongsmallholdingpeasantfamilies.Toensurethatitwasnotthreatenedbyanindependentrural-basedsocialmovementagain,thegovernmentalsoestablishedanofficialpeasantunionstructure.Throughthisstructure,itdistributedpatronagetoportionsoftheruralpopulationthatitfoundcooperativeandpunishedthosewhoopposedit(Albó,1990a,1990b;Dunkerley,1984:6574;Klein,1992:23536).

Whilethesestepsbroughttheruralunrestundercontrol,thereorganizationofthelandtenuresystemandthedisruptionoftradeandtransportlinkagesbetweenruralareasandthecitiescontributedtocontinuingurbanfoodshortages.Thegovernmentrespondedbytakingcontroloftheurbanfooddistributionsystemandimportingmassiveamountsoffoodtosatisfytheneedsofcitydwellers.Inaddition,theMNRwasunderenormouspressuretosatisfytheexpectationsofthosewhohadsupportedtherevolution,includingthemineworkerswhowereseekingpayincreases,urbanpeoplewholookedtothegovernmenttoprovidejobs,andrepresentativesofvariousinterestgroupswhowerecountingonthegovernmenttofinancedevelopmentactivitiesthatwouldbenefitthem.Atthesametime,Boliviawasnotreceivingrevenuesfromtheexpropriatedminesbecauseoftheproductiondisruptionsarisingfromtheirexpropriationandreorganization.Furthermore,underinternationalpressure,thegovernmentdecidedtocompensatethemineownersfortheownershiptransfers(Klein,1992:238).

ThiscombinationofcircumstancesresultedinaprofoundfinancialcrisistowhichtheBoliviangovernmentrespondedbyturningtotheUnitedStatesforassistance.TheUnitedStates,foritspart,wasconcernedabouttheimplicationsofthe1952revolutionasamodelthatmightbeemulatedelsewhereinLatinAmerica.Thus,itsoughttousetheeconomicassistanceitgaveBoliviatoinfluencethecourseofpoliticalevents.Withinadecadeoftherevolution,Boliviahadreceivedmorethan$100millioninU.S.aid.AtthetimethismadeitthelargestrecipientofU.S.aidinLatinAmerica,andthelargestpercapitarecipientintheworld(Eder,1968:52122,59394;Klein,1992:23845).

WhileU.S.economicassistanceiswidelyregardedashavingsavedtheMNRgovernment,thestatethatwasconstructedasaresultofthatassistanceborelittleresemblancetotheonethathadbeenenvisionedbymanyoftherevolution'sparticipants.AlthoughnationalistandpopulistrhetoricremainedanimportantelementofBolivianpolitics,thecountrybecameextremelydependentoncontinuingU.S.support.During1955and1956,forexample,thevalueofU.S.economicassistancetoBoliviawasthreetimestherevenuegeneratedbytheBoliviangovernmentintaxesandcustomsduties.Overthelongerterm,between1954and1964,Boliviantaxandcustomsrevenuesamountedto$287million,whileU.S.aidcommitmentsforthesameperiodtotaled$343million(Eder,1968:79,59596).NoBoliviangovernmenthasbeenabletogovernwithoutU.S.economicassistancesince1952.

U.S.AssistanceandAgroindustrialGrowth

OneobjectiveoftheeconomicaidwastopromotethedevelopmentofcommercialagricultureinBolivia'seasternlowlands,particularlyinSantaCruz.Beforethe1950s,largeruralestatesdominatedtheeconomyofthisregion.Theboundariesoftheseestateswererecognizedbylocalcustom,andtheirclaimtomuchofthelandwasnotbasedonaformaltitle.Withintheestateslivedpeasantfamilieswhoprovidedlaborandagriculturalproductstothelandownerinreturnforbeingallowedtoliveonthelandanduseittoproducegoodsfortheirownconsumption.Lowlandnativepopulationsalsoresidedwithintheboundariesclaimedbysomeestates,andpaidtributetothelandlordswithoutbeingformallyincorporatedintothelaborforce.Theestatesproducedmostofthegoodsrequiredtosatisfythebasicconsumptionrequirementsofthepeoplelivingonthem.Sincetheyimportedwhattheydidnotproducefromoutsidetheregion,therewerenomarketsforagriculturalproduceormanufacturedgoodsfunctioningintheregion.

U.S.economicassistancesoughttotransformtheseestatesintocommercialagriculturalenterprises,producinginitiallyforBolivianmarketsandlaterforexport.Toaccomplishthischange,theUnitedStatessupportedtheconstructionofapavedhighwaylinkingthecityofSantaCruzwiththeuplandcitiesofCochabambaandLaPaz;financedtheconstructionofadistillerytoexpandthemarketforsugarcaneproducedinthearea;createdaheavymachinerypooltoencouragetheclearingofexpandedareasofforestforcultivation;providedsubsidizedcredittoencourageinvestment;andprovidedfinancialandtechnicalsupporttoformalizetitlestolandheldundercustomarylaw.Unlikeintheuplandandvalleyregionsofthecountry,littlelandbelongingtolargeestates

wasexpropriatedinthelowlands,althoughthethreatofexpropriationwasusedtoencouragelandownerstoparticipateinthemodernizationprogram(Eder,1968:8083,64857;Klein,1992:238).

TheUnitedStateshadtwomajorreasonsfortargetingaidtothelargelandownersoftheeasternlowlands.First,theU.S.andBoliviangovernmentsdidnotconsideritpracticaltopromoteagriculturaldevelopmentintheuplandareasofthecountry,duetoarangeoffactors,includingbiophysicallimitations,populationdensity,andpoliticalvolatility.Second,theUnitedStatessoughttouseagriculturalmodernizationintheeasternlowlandstocreateawealthyandpoliticallypowerfulgroupofagroindustrialentrepreneurswhodefinedtheirinterestsinwaysthatwerecongenialtoU.S.interests(Ybarnegaray,1992:6972).

TheefforttomodernizetheagriculturaleconomyofSantaCruzwaslargelysuccessful.Theregionhasgrownmorerapidlythananyotherareaofthecountrysincethe1950s,andithasbecomeanimportantcenterofproductionforarangeofagroindustrialcropssuchascotton,sugarcane,andsoybeans.Inaddition,SantaCruz'sregionalelitehascometoplayacentralroleinnationalpolitics,withpeoplefromtheregionoccupyingkeypositionsineverynationalgovernmentsincethemid-1960s.However,SantaCruz'sagroindustrialelitebecameverydependentoncontinuingeconomicsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandotherinternationaldonors,evenasitranupverylargecommercialbankdebts.Foritspart,theUnitedStates,becauseofitsinterestinmakingsurethatitremainedastrongpoliticalforceinBolivia,continuedtosupportthiselite,despiteBolivia'sinabilitytoweanitselffromdevelopmentassistanceandeasycredit.

U.S.AssistanceandRuralDevelopment

U.S.politicalinterestswerealsovisibleinotheraspectsoftheeconomicassistanceitprovidedtopromoteruraldevelopmentinBolivia.Althoughithadwrittenoffthepossibilityofpromotingagriculturaldevelopmentinuplandareas,theUnitedStatesdidprovidesignificantfundsthatwereusedbytheMNRgovernmenttoestablishandmaintainapatronagenetworktoundermineorganizedoppositionbytheuplandpeasantry.MuchoftheinstitutionalframeworkthatcharacterizedthepresenceoftheBoliviangovernmentinruraluplandareaswasfinancedbytheUnitedStates.1TheUnitedStatesalsofinancedaprogramcalledCivicAction,underwhichBoliviantroopsweredeployedinmanyareasofthecountrysidetogainthesupportofruralresidentsthroughtheconstructionofpublicworks.GovernmentinstitutionsinteractedwiththeNationalConfederationof

BolivianPeasantWorkers,anofficiallysponsoredpeasantunion,whichostensiblyrepresentedtheinterestsofpeasantfamiliesatthelocal,departmental,andnationallevels.ItsleadersweresalariedemployeesoftheMinistryofPeasantAffairsandAgriculture,andmanyofthemalsoreceivedregularpaymentsfromthemilitaryandtheMinistryoftheInterior(Albó,1990a:24351;Dunkerley,1984:88103;Frederick,1977:11958).

Whilemanyoftheprojectscarriedoutbytheseinstitutionsconstitutedimportantimprovementsinthelivesofthepeople,theirprimarypurposewaspolitical.Projectsweredesignedtorewardgovernmentsupportersandpunishitsopponents.Further,thesedevelopmentinstitutionsformedthebasisofanintelligence-gatheringnetworkthroughoutthecountrysidethatidentifiedleaderswhoshowedpotentialfororganizingeffectiveoppositiontothegovernment.ThisaspectofU.S.assistanceprovedusefulforneutralizingthegrowthofpotentiallyhostilesocialmovements.Thus,despitesteadilydeterioratinglivingconditionsinthecountryside,itwasnotuntil1979thattheindependentpeasantunionmovementthattodayrepresentsthemajorityofBolivia'sruralfamilieswasestablished(Albó,1990b).

AgroindustrialElitesandCocaine

WhileacertainamountofthecocaleafproducedinBoliviahasbeentransformedintococainesinceearlyinthetwentiethcentury,cocainemanufacturedidnotbecometheprimaryuseforcocaleafuntilthe1970s(Bascopé,1982:22;CarterandMamani,1986:92).Thischangearosefromafinancialcrisisexperiencedbothbytheagroindustrialcottonentrepreneursoftheeasternlowlands,whoseaccesstosubsidizedcreditwasbeingthreatened,andbyuplandfamiliesstillsubjecttothestagnationoftheruraleconomy.

Intheearly1970smanyofSantaCruz'sagroindustrialentrepreneurshadrespondedtoincentivesprovidedbytheBoliviangovernmentandinternationaldonorstoinvestincottonproduction.Between1967and1974,forexample,67percentoftheagriculturalloansauthorizedbytheBankoftheStateand48percentoftheagriculturalloansauthorizedbytheBankoftheStateand48percentoftheagriculturalloansauthorizedbyprivatebankswereforcottonproduction(Ybarnegaray,1992:82).Similarly,theBolivianAgriculturalBank,whichhadbeenreorganizedwithU.S.assistanceduringthe1950sandwastheprimaryvehicleforU.S.-sponsoredagriculturalcreditduringthe1950sand1960s,allocated52percentofitsagriculturalloanstopromotecottonproductionbetween1971and1977(Dunkerley,1984:222).Asaresultoftheseincentives,

cottonproductioninSantaCruzincreasedfromslightlyover8,000hectaresin196970toabout50,000hectaresin197475(Pattieetal.,1988:H-11;Ybarnegaray,1992:103).

Atthetime,creditwasavailableunderconditionsthatencouragedrecipientstotreatthefundsreceivedmoreasagrantthanaloan(Ybarnegaray,1992:7687).However,whentheinternationalpriceofcottondroppedprecipitouslyafterpeakingin197374,manywereleftindirefinancialcircumstances.TheBoliviangovernmenttookdramaticstepstobailthemout,suchasorderingtheBolivianAgriculturalBanktoassumetheprivatedebtofthecottonproducersandreschedulepayments,whichcontributedtoamountingpublicdebtinBoliviathatledtoamassivedevaluationofthecurrency.Thegovernmentabsorbedandwroteoffthegreatestportionofthecottonproducers'debt.AsofDecember1985,thegovernmentheldover$18millionindefaultedagriculturaldebts,90percentofwhichwereowedbyfarmersinSantaCruz,andtwo-thirdshadbeengrantedtosupportcottonproduction(Ybarnegaray,1992:84).

Despitethebailout,thecrisisresultingfromthefallofcottonpricesleftmanycommercialfarmersshakenandfeelingtheneedtomakeaquickprofit.Theirsenseofurgencywasinpartduetotheevaporationoftheeasycredittowhichtheyhadbecomeaccustomed.AccesstocredithaddeclinedbecauseofthegrowingindebtednessoftheBoliviangovernment(towhichthebailoutofthecottongrowershadobviouslycontributed),decliningpricesforBolivia'sexports,andincreasinglystringentconditionsbyinternationalcreditorsonthegrantingofcreditandtherepaymentofdebts.Whilethelatterchangewasglobalinscopeandaffectedgovernmentsthroughoutthecontinent,Boliviawashitparticularlyhard,sufferingthelargestdeclineinabsoluteandpercapitaGrossDomesticProductofanycountryinLatinAmerica(DunkerleyandMorales,1986:89,96;Roddick,1988:84).Inthiscontext,investmentinthetransformationofcocaleafintococaineprovedattractivetosomemembersoftheregionaleliteofeasternBolivia,includingsomeproducersofagroindustrialexportcrops,cattleranchers,andmembersofthemilitary(Bascopé,1982:5356,9096;Dunkerley,1984:22223,31525;Healy,1986:1047).

SmallholdingFamiliesandCocaLeaf

Smallholdingfamiliesintheuplandareasofthecountrywerealsoeconomicallysqueezedinthe1970s.Whilethecombinationoflandredistributionandpatronagepoliticsdid,foratime,diffusetheexplosivesocialsituationintheseareas,itdidnotaddresstheunderlyingcausesofthedeterioratinglivingconditionsofruralfamilies.Thesituationintherural

uplandsactuallybecameworseinmanyrespectsbecauseoftheapplicationofBolivia'spost-1952developmentmodel.

U.S.economicassistancewasacontributingfactorinthisdeterioration.AsdecisiveasU.S.assistancewasinshapingthecourseofagroindustrialmodernizationinSantaCruz,itaccountedforonlypartofthetotalforeignassistancepackage.ThelargestportionoftheaidwenttofinanceBolivia'simportsofsurplusagriculturalcommoditiesfromtheUnitedStates.Indeed,theUnitedStatesspentmorebetween1954and1957tofinancethefoodaidprogram($56.6million)thanitdidtodeveloptheagriculturalsectorfortheperiodbetween1952and1972($40million)(Frederick,1977:26162).Incombinationwithanartificiallylowexchangerateappliedtoimportedagriculturalcommodities,thefoodaidprogramdeepenedtheproblemsthatdomesticproducersfacedbydepressinggrainpricestolevelsthatdidnotevencoverproductioncosts.Ledbyfoodaid,importsaccountedforbetween70and90percentofBolivia'stotalgrainsupplyforallbuttwoyearsbetween1952and1985(Eder,1968:79,112,122;Pattieetal.,1988:H-13).

Thus,acombinationoffactors,includingthefailureofthegovernmenttoaddressthehistoricalcausesofstagnationintheagriculturaleconomy,thedecisionbytheBoliviangovernmentanditsU.S.sponsorsnottoinvestinuplandagriculture,unfavorableexchangerates,andtheimpactofsubsidizedgrainimports,madeitverydifficultforruralfamiliestoearnalivingthroughagriculture.Manypeoplewerecompelledtoseekwaystoearnincomeoffthefarm.By1977,forexample,ruralfamiliesintheuplandvalleyregionofsouthernBoliviaearnedanaverageofU.S.$327peryear,ofwhich56percentcamefromoff-farmsources(DeereandWasserstrom,1980:156).YetsmallholdingfamiliesinuplandvalleyscontinuedtobeveryimportantfoodproducersforBoliviatheystillproducedabout70percentofthefoodconsumedinBoliviainthelate1970s(Urioste,1988:65).Thus,despiteincreasinglyunfavorableconditions,smallholdingfamiliescontinuedtofarmand,sometimes,toincreaseproduction.Theyhadlittlechoice.Ontheonehand,theycouldnotsupportthemselvessolelythroughfarming.Ontheother,off-farmemploymentopportunitiesweresoscarce,andsopoorlypaid,thattheycouldnotaffordtostopfarming,ifonlytoprovisionthemselves.Ruralfamiliescouldcontinuetoproduceundersuchconditionsbecausetheyworkedlongerhoursatawiderrangeofproductiveactivities,andreliedincreasinglyonthelaboroftheirchildren.Nonetheless,therearelimitstopeople'sabilitytosustainthemselvesbyworkingharder,especiallywhensomanyfactorsoverwhichtheyhavenocontrolworkagainstthem.

TheU.S.position,adoptedaspolicybytheBoliviangovernment,wasthatthepopulationinuplandareaswastoodensetopermitagricultural

development.Thus,toreduceuplandpopulationdensities,andthepotentialforsocialunrestassociatedwithdeterioratinglivingconditions,theBoliviangovernment,withfinancialsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandotherinternationaldonors,begantopromotetheresettlementofuplandfamiliesintothecountry'slowlandareas.InitialeffortstookplaceinSantaCruzwherefivenewlowlandsettlementswereestablishedbytheendof1956.Asecondeffortbeganin1961,focusingonotherlowlandareasofthecountry,includingtheChapare,whichhasbecomethemajorsourceofcocaleafdestinedforcocainemanufacture.TheChaparewasdesignatedaprioritysettlementareaintheNationalDevelopmentPlanfor19621971andintheNationalColonizationPlan,whichwaspublishedin1963.In1965,withU.S.support,BoliviaestablishedtheNationalColonizationInstitutetoadministersettlementactivitiesthroughoutthecountry.

Forthemostpart,theseeffortswereconsideredfailuresbecauseofhighratesofabandonmentandthehighcostsofresettlement.Nonetheless,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopmentandotherdonorscontinuedtosponsorcolonizationprojectsuntilthemid1980s.Manyuplandfamiliesmovedintothetropicalandsubtropicallowlandsusingtheirownresourcesandwithoutthesupportofresettlementprograms.TheylaidclaimtolandandbeganproducingarangeofcropsfortheirownconsumptionandforBolivia'smarkets.IntheChapare,forexample,54settlements,whereover24,000peopleresidedin1967,hadgrownto247settlementswithapopulationofover83,000by1981(FloresandBlanes,1984:82,8889).TheeconomicimpactofChaparesettlementwassignificant.In1976,settlerfamiliesintheChaparewereproducingabout39percentofBolivia'splantains,32percentofitscitrus,and20percentofitsriceon156,000hectaresofland.PoorroadsandinadequatetransportwereregardedasthemajorconstraintoncontinuingexpansionofagricultureintheChapare(OAS,1984:181).

Otherprocesseswereatworkwhichwouldhaveanevengreaterimpactonlimitingtheexpansionoflowlandagriculture.BecauseBoliviahasasmallpopulationlessthansevenmillionpeopleandbecauseitisthepoorestcountryinSouthAmerica,themarketforagriculturalproductsissmall.Also,whiletheBoliviangovernmentandinternationaldonorspromotedsettlement,theydidnotviewthesettlementareasasplacestoinvestagriculturaldevelopmentfunds.Thus,settlerscouldnotgetaccesstomodernagriculturalinputs,orthecreditwithwhichtoacquiresuchinputs,toimprovetheproductivityoftheirlabor.Theresultwasthat,asmoreandmorepeopleenteredtheChapareandBolivia'sothersettlementareas,theycompetedwithoneanotherforaccesstothecountry'srestrictedmarketanddrovedownthepricesfortheirproduce.

Sincetheyhadnoaccesstotheinputsorcreditthatwouldallowthiscompetitiontotakeplaceonthebasisofgreaterefficiency,ittookplaceonthebasisoffamilies'abilitytoincreaseproductionbyworkinghardertoproducemore.Thisapproach,ofcourse,increasedthedownwardpressureonthepricethatsettlerfamiliesreceivedfortheirproduce.Eventuallytheyexhaustedtheirabilitytorespondtodecliningprices.Theonlyremainingoptionwastofindanothercropthathadabiggermarketandbroughtahigherprice.

Beginningin1983andcontinuingintotheearly1990s,muchofBoliviaexperiencedadroughtthatcrippledoreliminatedfarminginmostrainfedareas,forcingmanyfamiliestoabandontheirlandsinhopesofearningalivingelsewhere.ThedroughtexacerbatedtheimpactofaprofoundeconomiccrisisthatmanifesteditselfintwoareasthatwereparticularlyimportantincausingfamiliestomovetotheChapare.FirstcameafinancialcrisisthathaditsrootsinthehighlevelofdebtthatBoliviaandmanyotherLatinAmericannationswerecarrying.AsaresultoftryingtodealwithaskyrocketingdebtrateandsharplyfallingGrossDomesticProduct,Boliviaexperiencedanannualinflationratethatexceeded14,000percentbeforefinallybeingbroughtundercontrolbyradicalstructuraladjustmentmeasuresimplementedinAugust1985(DunkerleyandMorales,1986;Roddick,1988).Forpoorpeople,thecureprescribedforinflationwasaboutasbadasthe''disease"hadbeen.Thegovernmentfrozewagesforfourmonths(inayearwheninflationwasrunningatanannualrateof14,000percent)andremovedallpricecontrols,resultinginincreasesofabout1,000percentinthepricesofbasicconsumergoods.Inruralareasthiscombinationmeantthatpricesforagriculturalinputsandtransportwentupdramaticallywhilethepriceofagriculturalproducewentdownequallydramatically.

A50percentdeclineininternationaltinpricesinOctober1985compoundedtheeffectsofthecrisis.InMarch1986theLondonMetalExchangecanceleditscontracttotradeintin.ThecollapseofinternationaltintradingbroughtruintothelargestindustryinBolivia'sminingsector,thecaptureofwhichhadbeentheobjectofthe1952revolution.During198586some27,000mineworkerslosttheirjobs;someofthemthenmadetheirwaytotheChapareandotherlowlandsettlementareas.Largelyasaresultoftheminelayoffs,Bolivia'sunemploymentrateapproached30percentbytheendof1986(Crabtreeetal.,1987:5,20).Thelargenumbersofunemployedfurtherconstrictedurbanfoodmarkets,asdecliningincomescausedpeopletorelymoreheavilyonimportedfoodgrains,andtoreducetheirpurchasesoffoodproducedinBolivia.

Asthesecrisesunfoldedandcompoundedoneanother,internationaldemandforcocainewasbooming,andsomemembersofBolivia's

dominantsocialclassesrespondedthroughinvestmentinthemanufactureandsaleofcocaine.Thisinvestmentcreatedanexpansioninthemarketforcocaleaf,towhichsettlerfamiliesrespondedquickly.WhilecocaleafgrowswellthroughoutBolivia'shumidtropicalandsubtropicalregions,severalcharacteristicsoftheChaparemadeitparticularlyattractiveforproducingcocaleafforcocaine.OneisthatitislocatedalmostexactlybetweentheuplandvalleysofCochabamba,wheremostofthefamilieswhohavemigratedtotheChaparearefrom,andthecityofSantaCruz.Sittingastridethemajorroadlinkingthetwoareas,theChapareiseasilyaccessiblefrombothdirections.AnotheristhatitsbrokentopographymakestheChapareagoodlocationforconcealingandcontrollingaccesstotherusticlaboratoriesandprocessingfacilitieswheretheinitialstepsaretakentoextractthecocainealkaloidfromcocaleaf.Athirdcharacteristicoftheareaisthatthevarietyofcocaleafgrownthere,whilehavingaflavorthatcausesittoberegardedasinferiorfortraditionalformsofconsumption,doesyieldalargervolumeofcocainealkaloid,makingitpopularamongthecocaineproducers.

Withtherisinginternationaldemandforcocaine,thevariousfactorsaffectingBolivianelitesandpoorruraldwellersconvergedtocreateaboomeconomyintheChapare.Boliviancocaleafproductiongrewfrom11,800metrictonsin1975toanofficiallyestimated147,608.3metrictonsin1988.TheChapareaccountedformostoftheincreasedproduction,nearlyallofwhichwasdestinedforcocainemanufacture.Ofthe147,608.3metrictonsproducedinBoliviain1988,15,563metrictonsweredestinedforBolivia'slegalinternalmarketforcocaleaf,and138,234.6metrictonswereproducedintheChapare(DIRECO,1988:2833).TheboomwasalsoreflectedinthepopulationgrowthintheChapare.The1981populationofslightlyover83,000hadgrowntobetween196,000and234,000peopleby1987(Duranaetal.,1987).

TheEconomicsofCocaLeafProduction

BecominginvolvedincocaleafproductiondidnotsolvetheproblemsofChaparefarmfamilies.Boliviaremainsacountrywhosedevelopmentpoliciesarehostiletosmall-scalefarmfamilieswhowanttoearnalivingthroughagriculture.Asalreadynoted,Boliviadependsheavilyonsubsidizedgrainimports,whichdepressesthepricethatproducerscanreceiveforagriculturalproduce.Also,creditandotherdevelopmentresourcesthatwouldpermitfarmerstoinvestincapitalinputsandcompetewithoneanotheronthebasisofimprovedlaborproductivityaremonopolizedbytheagroindustrialeliteinthelowlandsofSantaCruzandsmallpocketsofcommercialfarmersinotherareasofthecountry.Smallholding

familiesthereforecompeteforaccesstoBolivia'slimitedmarketsbasedonwhocaninvestthemostunpaidlaborandstillcontinuetoproduceinthefaceofunfavorableconditions.Thisstrategyacceleratesthedeteriorationofagriculturalconditions,sincemorepeopleareofferingproductsatapricethatbearsnorelationtothelaborrequiredtoproducethem,drivingpricesdownevenfurther.

AsthepopulationintheChapareandotherlowlandsettlementareasincreased,familiesintensifiedtheexploitationoftheirownnonwagelaborresourcesastheyviedwithoneanothertoselltheirproduceinBolivia'surbanmarkets.Thiscompetitiondrovedownthepricesthatproducersreceivedforcitrus,plantains,andrice(forwhichtheChaparehadbeenamajorsupplierinthemid-1970s)andunderminedagriculturaldevelopmentbasedonthesecrops.Despitestronginternationaldemandforcocaine,thesameproblemaffectedfamiliesengagedincocaleafproduction.Thewell-knownprofitabilityoftraffickingincocainedoesnotextendtotheproductionofcocaleaf.Iflargeprofitsweretobemadethroughcocaleafproduction,onewouldexpectChaparefarmerstohirelargeamountsoflaboranddedicatetheirentirefarmstothatcrop.But,whilemanyfamiliesdooccasionallyhireworkers,mostdonot.ThemeanfarmsizeintheChapareis10.4hectaresandtheportionofthatkeptundercultivationisbetween1.25and4hectares.Ofthelandcultivated,theareadedicatedtococaleafrangesfrombetween.6and1.6hectares.Inasurveyof194Chaparefarmers,58percentsaidthattheyhiredlaboronoccasion,87percentsaidthattheyreliedmainlyonunremuneratedfamilylabor,and72percentreportedthattheysupplementthelaboroftheimmediatefamilybyexchanginglaborwithotherfamilies.Farmersstatedthatthelackofmoneywithwhichtohireworkers,andthelimitsonthenumberoffamilymemberswhowouldworkwithoutwages,werethemajorlimitationsontheirabilitytoproducemore(PainterandBedoya,1991b;Painter,1995).

AsthenumberofChaparefamiliesrelyingonnonwagelabortogrowcocaincreased,themeanpriceofcocaleafdeclinedfromaboutU.S.$80.00perhundredpoundsofdryleafin1986toaboutU.S.$25.00in1990.Thecompetitionamongalargeandgrowingnumberoffamiliestoselltoasmallmarketcompoundedtheproblemgeneratedbytheroleofnonwagefamilylaborinproductionbycreatingasituationinwhichpricescouldbemanipulatedbybuyers(Alvarez,1993:3334).BecausetheChapareofferedadvantagesoverotherlowlandareasofBoliviawherecocaleafcouldbecultivated,productionremainedconcentratedintheChapareratherthanbeingdispersedthroughmuchofthetropicallowlands,ashadbeenthecasewithothercrops.Asaresult,Chaparefarmfamiliescontinuedtoproducecocaleaf,despitedeterioratingconditions,

notbecauseitwasaprofitablecropbutbecauseitwastheonlycropfamiliescouldbesureofsellingatanyprice.Thus,cocaleafprovedsubjecttothesamelimitationsthathadafflictedothercrops.

ChapareFamiliesandtheWaronDrugs

TheroleofChaparefamiliesincocaleafproductionmadethemtheobjectoftheso-calledWaronDrugs,acampaignlargelyfinancedwithU.S.economicassistance.InBoliviathewarondrugshastwodimensions:tocreateeconomicopportunitiesthatgeneratealternativestococaleafproduction,andtoapprehenddrugtraffickersthroughlawenforcement.Unfortunately,effortstogeneratealternativestococaleafproductionasasourceoflivelihoodhavebeenineffective,andcoca-leaf-producingfamilies,ratherthandrugtraffickers,havebeentheonesmostlikelytobeapprehendedinpoliceactions.

EffortstocreatealternativestococaleafproductionintheChaparehaveprovenineffectiveprimarilybecausetheyhavefocusedontheintroductionofnewcropsratherthanonaddressingthesocialandeconomicreasonsthatfamiliesturnedtococaleafproductioninthefirstplace.Untilrecently,U.S.-sponsoredcropsubstitutioneffortshavefocusedontheintroductionofnewcrops,includingcoffee,blackpepper,andmacadamianuts,amongothers,andtherejuvenationofcropssuchascitrusfruitsandbananasthathadbeenimportantsourcesoffamilyincomeintherecentpast.AgenciesresponsibleforimplementingcropsubstitutionconcentratedondevelopingproductionpackagesadaptedtothephysicalconditionsoftheChapare,whichwouldthenbedisseminatedamongfarmersthroughextension.Littleattentionwasgiventoon-farmconstraintssuchaslaboravailabilityortosuchmarketingissuesaswherefarmerswouldsellthecropstheyharvested(Painter,1990:2023;PainterandBedoya,1991a:537;OTA,1993:8489).

Moreattentionwaspaidtothemarketingproblemsassociatedwithsubstitutioncropsbeginningintheearly1990s.Whiledevelopmenteffortstoconnectcropswithmarketsdemonstratedthatfarmerswouldrespondquicklytoopportunitiestosellcropsotherthancocaleaf,thelackofinvestmentinuplandagriculturaldevelopmentsincethe1952revolutionmeantthattransportfacilities,mechanismstodistributemarketinformation,andbasicinputslikepackingcratesforfruitwereonlyavailableasaresultofextraordinaryeffortsbyBoliviangovernmentagenciesattemptingtopromotethesealternatecrops.Further,thesuccessesoftheseeffortsowedmuchtoexternaltechnical,financial,andlogisticalsupport,withoutwhichtheyprobablywouldnothavebeenachieved,andcertainlywouldnotbesustained.2Theinvestmentinresourcesrequiredtoachieve

theselimitedsuccessesunderscoredthefundamentalproblemsthathadtobeovercomeifChaparefarmfamiliesweretohavearealalternativetococaleafproduction(Painter,1990:2023;PainterandBedoya,1991a:537;OTA,1993:8489,1057).

TheimpactonChaparefamiliesofthefailuretodevelopalternativestococaleafproductionwascompoundedbythefactthatthey,ratherthanthosemanufacturingandtraffickingincocaine,borethebruntofrepressionmetedoutinthenameofthewarondrugs.ThelevelofrepressiontowhichChaparefamilieshavebeensubjectedtendedtogrowthroughthe1980s,temperedprimarilybythefactthatby1987settlershadformedastrongfederationofindependentlocalunionsthatwerelinkedtoBolivia'snationalindependentpeasantconfederation.Asaresult,Chaparefamilieshaveoftenbeenabletorespondtolarge-scaleviolencewithpoliticalmobilizationthathasthreatenedstabilityinmanyareasofthecountry,arealitythathasusuallygivenpausetothosewhowouldliketoseemoreforceusedagainstthem(PainterandBedoya,1991a:7077;Painter,inpress).3

Alackofobviousviolencedoesnotmeanalackofconflict(AlbóandBarrios,1993:1112).Forexample,inJuly1994theBoliviangovernmentconductedOperationNewDawn,amilitaryoperationintheChaparethestatedobjectiveofwhichwastocatchdrugtraffickers,buttheprimaryimpactofwhichwastherepressionofsettlers.WithsupportfromBolivia'slabormovement,theChaparefederationsofcocaproducersorganizedtheMarchforLife,Coca,andNationalSovereignty,whichleftforLaPazfromtheChapareonAugust29.Themarcherswithstoodmultipleattacksbysoldiersandpolice,whofiredteargasandweresupportedbyhelicopters.Despitetheattacks,somethreethousandmarchers(men,women,andchildren)reachedLaPazonSeptember19,whereasubstantialportionofthecity'spopulationturnedouttomeettheminagestureofsolidarity.Inresponsetothispressure,thegovernmentsignedafifty-four-pointagreementwiththeorganizationsrepresentingBolivianlabor,thepeasantunionmovement,andthefederationsofcocafarmers,whichincludedprovisionstoreviewandmodifythecountry'smainantinarcoticslaw,toestablishaninterinstitutionalcommissiononhumanrights,toexercisebettercontroloverpoliceandmilitaryunitsintheChapare,andtoabolishconditionalitiesthatmadetheChapareeligiblefordevelopmentassistanceonlyiffarmerseliminatedcocacropsatalevelstipulatedbythegovernment(CEDIB,1994a,1994b,1994c,1994d).

TheabilityofChaparecocafarmerstomountthiskindofpoliticalmobilizationsuccessfullyhastemperedtheactionsofthoseinclinedtouseviolenceagainstthem,andencouragedthefarmerstomaketheircasethroughcollectivepoliticalactioninsteadofresortingtoviolence.

Nonetheless,thelevelofcontinuingconflict,andthepossibilityofitescalating,shouldnotbeunderestimated.TheBoliviangovernmenthasmadeandbrokenagreementswithcocafarmersinthepast.Moreimportantly,thepoliticalstrugglesurroundingcocatakesplacewithinthecontextofbroadmobilizationagainstthecontinuingimplementationofneoliberalpoliticalpoliciesbegunin1985.Becausetheycontributetoandreceivestrengthfromthenationalpeasantandworkermovementofwhichtheyareapart,Chaparefarmersaresubjecttotheebbandflowofthislargerstruggleaswellasthestruggletodefendthemselvesfrombeingvictimizedbythewarondrugs.Preciselybecauseoftheireffectivenessinmobilizinglargenumbersofpeopleandwithstandingrepressionbythepoliceandmilitary,theycanbecomeeasytargetsastheauthoritiesattempttoisolatethemfromtherestofthepeasantandworkermovement.Suchwasthecasein1995,whenthegovernmentdeclaredastateofsiegeinresponsetowidespreadresistancetoitseconomicpolicies,andpointedtothemobilizationofcocafarmersasajustificationforitsaction.

ThepolicesubjecttheChaparefamiliestoahighlevelofbrutality,intheformofbeatings,rapes,theft,anddestructionofproperty(Kline,1987:2527;Anonymous,1988a,1988b).MuchofthisislegitimizedbytheCocaRegulationandControlledSubstancesLaw,orLaw1008,whichwaspassedbytheBoliviancongressin1988,underpressurefromtheUnitedStates,andprovidesthelegalframeworkforactionstakenbythegovernmentinthenameofwagingawarondrugs.Law1008violatesprovisionsofBolivia'sconstitutionguaranteeingrightsofdueprocesstopeoplechargedwithcrimes,whichthelaw'ssupporterscontendisnecessarytoprotectsocietyfromtheabusesofdrugtraffickers.However,60percentofthepeoplejailedunderthelaw,betweenitsenactmentin1988and1991,werefrompoorruralfamilies.Ofthese,99.35percentwereclassifiedas"nearlyindigent,"and88percentreliedonpublicdefendersforanylegalassistancetheyreceived.Furthermore,95.5percentofthepeoplejailedunderprovisionsofLaw1008inLaPaz,Cochabamba,andSantaCruzwerethereongroundsofsuspicion,andonly4.5percenthadbeendulytriedandsentenced(Blacutt,1991:5253).

Thecredibilityofassertionsthatviolenceandrepressionagainstruralfamiliesconstituteanecessarypartofanall-out"warondrugs"isunderminedbythefactthatprominentpeoplewhoareregardedtobealliesoftheUnitedStatesinBoliviahavebeenpermittedtooperatefreely,withoutfearofarrestorprosecution(Dunkerley,1984:31819;Kline,1987:2425).Furthermore,BoliviangovernmentofficialsresponsibleforwagingthewarondrugsexpresstheviewthattherepressiveeffortsagainstsettlerfamiliesandruralworkersintheChaparearemisdirected.Forexample,followingOperationNewDawn,inwhichseveralsettlerswere

killedandmanyotherswerebeatenandarrested,theundersecretaryforsocialdefense,whocommandstheanti-narcoticsunitsofthenationalpoliceforce,statedthatnotasingleimportantdrugtraffickerwasarrested"...becausethebigfishareinthecities,andnotintheChapare"(CEDIB,1994c:3).

Conclusion

ObserversofthecocaineindustryhavenotedthatitsgrowthinBoliviahasbeenlinkedtowidespreadcorruption,resultingfrommembersofthemilitary,politicalleadership,andthebusinesssectorparticipatinginorturningablindeyetodrugtrafficking(Bascopé,1982;Kline,1987).Whiletheeffectsofthisproblemarewidelyvisible,theseedsofcorruptionsownbythecocaineindustryfellonwell-tilledandfertilizedsoil.ThehighlevelofdependenceonU.S.economicassistancethatwascreatedaspartofthepost-1952politicalordermeantthat,fromtheperspectiveofBolivianpoliticalleaders,internalpoliticalandeconomicagendaswerelargelysubordinatedtotherequirementthatthegovernmentcontinuetoreceiveeconomicassistanceatlevelsthatwereasubstantialpartoftotalstaterevenue.FromtheperspectiveofU.S.officialsresponsibleforallocatingandadministeringthatassistance,thepromotionofdevelopment,howeverdefined,wasconsistentlylessimportantthanpromotingnarrowlydefinedgeopoliticalinterests.Asaresultoftheseinterests,poorpeoplewhohaveorganizedtoopposethesocialandpoliticalorderassociatedwithBolivia'sdevelopmentmodelhavebeenthemajortargetsofrepressioninthenameofthewarondrugs,whilepoliticallypowerfulpeopleinvolvedindrugtraffickingareseldomarrestedorconvicted.

Boliviandependenceoneconomicassistanceseriouslyunderminedtheintegrityofstateinstitutionsbecausetheywouldnotfunction,oroften,wouldnotexist,ifnotforU.S.aid.TherealityofthisdependencehasbeenthepointofdeparturefornearlyeveryBoliviangovernmentsincetherevolution.Suchanarrangementimpliedaninherentpotentialforstateagenciestobesubvertedincarryingoutfunctionsonbehalfofsectorsofthenationalpopulation,whenthesefunctionsconflictedwiththeinterestsofgroupsorindividualsregardedasfriendlytotheUnitedStates.

Thispotentialisrealizedintheconductofthewarondrugs.Poorruralfamiliesweredeniedaccesstotheopportunitiesgiveninabundancetothewealthy.Astheireconomicsituationdeteriorated,cocaleafproductionofferedashort-termsolutiontotheirneedtoearnalivelihood.Theyhavebecomeobjectsofrepression,notbecauseoftheirimportanceintheproductionofcocainebutbecauseoftheinconvenienceofwaging

thewarondrugsagainstthosewhocontrolthecocaineindustryinBolivia.

Notes

1.TheseinstitutionsincludedtheNatioalCommunityDevelopmentService,whichcarriedoutpublicworksprojectsinruralcommunities;theNationalAgrarianReformInstitute,whichimplementedtheredistributionoflanddecreedbytheagrarianreform;andtheNationalColonizationInstitute,whichpromotedandadministeredtheresettlementofruraluplandfamiliesintothelowlands.

2.TheBoliviangovernmentagenciesresponsibleforplanningandimplementingcropsubstitutionefforts(whichcametobeknownasalternativedevelopment)weretheSubsecretaríaDesarrolloAlternativoySustitucióndeCultivosdeCoca(SUBDESAL),theProgramadeDesarrolloAlternativaRural(PDAR),andtheChapareprogramoftheInstitutoBolivianodeTecnologíaAgropecuaria(IBTA/Chapare).SUBDESALandPDARwerecreatedwithsupportfromtheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),andreceivedmostoftheirbudgetforsalariesandoperatingexpensesandalloftheirbudgetforimplementingactivitiesfromUSAID.IBTAisBolivia'snationalagriculturalresearchagency,andIBTA/Chapareformallycameunderitsauthority.Infact,itwasanautonomousagencywhollyfundedbyUSAID,anditsbudgetwaskeptseparatefromtherestofIBTAtoensurethatfundsearmarkedforcropsubstitutionactivitieswerenotusedtopaysalariesandoperatingexpensesinotherpartsoftheorganization.PDARandIBTA/ChapareweresupportedbyUSAID-fundedtechnicaladvisors,mostofwhomwereexpatriates,includingecologists,agronomists,foresters,hydrologists,animalscientists,extensionandmarketingspecialists,and,from1988-91,theIDAmembersofthesocialscienceteamthatconductedthisresearch.

3.ThelevelofviolenceintheChaparehasbeenmuchlowerthaninSouthAmerica'sothermajorcenterofcocaleafproductionforthecocaineindustry,Peru'sUpperHuallagaValley.IntheUpperHuallaga,largelyunorganizedsettlerfamiliesweresubjectedtoallformsofabuseandbrutalitybydrugtraffickers,thepolice,andthemilitary.Becauseofthislackoforganization,manysettlerswerereceptivetotheentryofSenderoLuminoso,theonlyorganizationopenlydefendingtherightsofcocaproducers.Senderomadetheareaamajorstronghold,andtaxeddrugtraffickerstofinanceitswaragainstthePeruviangovernment.TheconflictbetweenSenderoandthegovernmentbroughtyetanothersourceofviolencetotheUpperHuallaga(PainterandBedoya,1991a:70-73).

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3TheLocalizationoftheGlobal:ContemporaryProductionPracticesinaMayanCommunityinGuatemalaLindaGreen

Guatemalahasbeendescribedasalandof"eternalspringandeternaltyranny"(Simon,1987).TotouristswhohurtlealongthePan-AmericanhighwayenroutetotheemeraldwatersofLakeAtitlanorthefamousindigenousmarkettownofChichicastenango,thelandscapeisstunning.Alongtheway,travelersglimpsemenbentlowundertheheavyloadssuspendedontrumplinesorwomenandtheirchildreninthebrightlycoloredclothingforwhichtheMayasarerenownedlaboringoverplotsofbroccoliandsnowpeasforexport,thathavesprungupamidstthetraditionalmilpa.1ThesearetheMaya,descendantsofthecivilizationthatbuiltthefamoustemplesofTikal,Palenque,andCopan,attractionsthatbringtensofthousandsoftouristseachyeartoGuatemala.FormanytouriststheMayarepresentapicturesquemetaphorofasimplerwayoflife,freefromthedemandsofthemodernworld.

Thereality,however,isverydifferentforthemajorityofMayanpeoplewholiveintheGuatemalantownsandvillagesofthealtiplano(westernhighlands).Theyexistonthedarkersideofmodernity.Ratherthanenjoyingthebenefitsoftechnology,thesefamiliesexperiencethedegradingundersideofcapitalisteconomicrelationsshoredupbyarepressivestateapparatus.TheyliveingrindingpovertywheretheaveragelifeexpectancyforMayasisforty-fiveyearsoldandwherenineoutoftenchildrenunderfiveyearsoldaremalnourished.

RecentinscriptionsofstatepowerandchangesinthepenetrationofglobalcapitalinhighlandindigenouscommunitiesinGuatemalahavebeenprofound.Thecounterinsurgencywar,whichreacheditsheight

between1978and1984,leftoveronehundredthousandpeopledead,fortythousanddisappeared,onemillionpeopledisplacedwithinthecountry,andcompelledtensofthousandsofmen,women,andchildrentofleeacrosstheMexicanborder.BytheGuatemalanmilitary'sownadmissionoversixhundredruralvillagesinthehighlandsweredestroyedandcountlessotherswerepartiallyrazedinaneffort,theyclaimed,tosevertheguerrillasfromtheirsocialbaseofsupport.ItwasthemostextensiveattackontheindigenoushighlandcommunitiessincethetimeoftheSpanishconquest,fivehundredyearsearlier.

Oneofthenotablesideeffectsofthecounterinsurgencywarhasbeennotonlythephysicaldestructionofcommunities,buttherestructuringofcommunitysocialrelationsthroughthemilitarizationofdailylife(Green,inpress).Intheaftermathofwar,itisnotonlythatcommunityspatialboundarieshavebeentransgressed,butthatmanycommunitiesnowembodytheverymechanismsofstateterrorundertheaegisofmilitarycontrol.Armygarrisons,civilmilitias,spies,forcedmilitaryrecruitmentofyoungboys,andrumorsofdeathlistscreatedeepapprehensionsandanxiety.Peopleareafraidtospeakoutabouttheterror,violence,anddreadthatpermeatetheirlives.Theseimposedsilencesaddmorefeartotheinstability.Asaresultofthesenewarrangementsasenseoftrustamongcommunitymembershasbeenseverelyundermined.

Whilepoliticalviolencehasbeenundoubtedlydestructivetocommunityandfamilialsocialrelationsinthehighlands,lessstrikingbutimportanteconomicshiftshavealsobeentakingplacesimultaneously.NewformsofcapitalistproductionpracticesinthealtiplanoareaffectingtheexperiencesofeverydaylifeforsomeruralMayanhouseholdsintheDepartmentofChimaltenangothroughglobalization.Globalizationis"theintensificationofworldwidesocialrelationswhichlinkdistantlocalitiesinsuchawaythatlocalhappeningsareshapedbyeventsoccurringmanymilesawayandviceversa.Thisisadialecticalprocessbecausesuchlocalhappeningsmaymoveinanobversedirectionfromtheverydistancedrelationsthatshapethem"(Giddens,1990:63).

AlthoughtherestructuringofsocialrelationsthroughcapitalisteconomicarrangementsisnothingnewtoGuatemala'sMayashighlandfamilieshavebeeninvolvedinpart-timewageworkforalmostacenturyandthewagesearnedhaveinpartfinancedtheirsubsistencelivelihoodthedegreeofpenetrationintocommunity,cultural,andfamilialpracticesisqualitativelydifferent.Andthedirectintrusionintocommunities,householdsandfamilieshasbeenpossible,inpart,asaresultofthepoliticalviolence(deJanvry,1981;McCreery,1990;Smith,1990).

Inmanycommunitiesinthealtiplanotodaytheeconomicsituationisfarworsethanitwasfifteenyearsago.Theeconomicdestructionand

impoverishmentasaresultofthepoliticalviolencehasbeenmassive,leadingtoextensivechangesinlocalpatternsofcultivation,trade,andlabormovement(Smith,1990).IntheDepartmentofChimaltenango,forexample,therewerenocornharvestsinsomecommunitiesbetween1981and1983asaresultofthecounterinsurgencycampaign(KruegerandEnge,1985).Duringthissameperiodthenationaleconomyenteredaperiodofinstability,leadingtoadeclineintheproductionoftwoofthecountry'sprincipalagriculturalexportcrops(coffeeandcotton)and,asaresult,toadecreaseddemandforthemigratoryagriculturallaborthatruralfamilieshadprovided(AVANCSO,1994a).

Thebackboneofthisagro-exporteconomyhasbeenalatifundiaminifundiasystemwherepeasantfarmersfromthealtiplanomadethelongtrektothesouthcoastalplantations.2Initiallytheywereacoercedpart-timelaborforceandlaterwerepropelledbytheexigenciesofcapitalist-inducedpoverty.FortheremainderoftheyeartheseruralfamilieshavesubsistedonthesmalltractsoflandthattheUruguayanwriterEduardoGaleanohascalled"plotsoflandthesizeofgraves."Heretheyhaveekedoutasubsistencesurvivalbasedonmilpaproductionandlocalpart-timewagelaborwhenandifitisavailable.Plantationworkwithitsslave-likeconditionshasalwaysbeentheleastdesirableforMayas,andwheneverpossiblemanyhavesoughtotheralternativestomeettheirsubsistenceneeds.Bythelate1970s,forexample,mostmunicipiosintheDepartmentofChimaltenangoweresendinglessthan10percentoftheworkforcetotheplantations.3Mayaswereusingtheirsurpluscashfromtheirmigratoryworktoinvestinotherkindsoflocallaborventuresratherthanbecomingfullyproletarianizedwhentheirlandbasebecametoosmalltobetenable(Smith,1984).Somewereengagedinconstruction,othersinruraldevelopmentprojectssuchascooperativeschemesandlocalcommerceinadditiontomilpaproduction(Smith,1990).However,adecadelater,intheaftermathofwar,opportunitiesfornonagriculturalproductionhaddiminishedsignificantlyashadthedemandformigrantlaboroncoastalplantations.Today,inareversaloftheusualpredictions,campesinoshavebecomemoreratherthanlessdependentonagriculturefortheirsustenance.Yetthenatureofthatproductionhaschangeddramatically.

WhoAretheMaya?

Althoughthe21MayanindigenousgroupsinGuatemalaarethemajorityofthepopulation,comprisingatleast60percentofthepopulation,theyliveunderminorityruleandtheirlivesremainonthemargin;87percentliveinpovertyand61percentliveinextremepoverty.MostMayas

continuetoliveinruraltownsandvillagesofthewesternhighlands,althoughtherehasbeenmassiveinternaldisplacementtourbanareasasaresultofthecivilwar(BastosandCamus,1994).DespitecenturiesofdisruptionandchangeforMayancommunities,familyandcommunitysocialrelationsexpressedthroughtheweavingofclothandthegrowingofthemilparemaincentraltoMayanmaterialandculturalproductionpractices,notonlyprovidingthebasisofsurvivalformany,butalsothelocusofaMayanepistemology(Green,inpress).

Eachsocietyhasaculturalapparatusthroughwhichittransfersandrenewsculturalvaluesandbeliefs.Mayanchildrenreceivetheireducationthroughthemilpaandweaving.Youngboyslearntheimportanceofcornthroughtheirexperiencesofeverydaylife.Inthemilpatheyacquirethefundamentalsofsubsistenceagriculturalproduction.Itisherewheregrandfathers,uncles,cousins,andolderbrothersteachayoungboyprayerstotheancestorsandspiritsatthetimeofplanting.Wellbeforeaboyisoldenoughtowieldahoeonhisownheisallowedtodropthecornseedsintothesoilalongsidehisfather,whoinvokesthehelpoftheancestorsandMotherEarthforasuccessfulharvest.WorkingthesoilinthiswaynotonlyprovidesMayaswithfoodtosustainthembutreconnectsthemwiththedeadandthenaturalworld.

YounggirlslearntoweavethetraditionalMayaclothingonabackstraploom.TheproductionofclothinthismannerhasbeenanimportantmaterialandculturalexpressionforMayanwomen.Clothhasbeenusedtoclothethebody,asalocusofMayanidentity,andhasservedassupplementaryincomeforwomen.WeavinghasbeenthesiteofgenderandgenerationalsocialreproductionwhereMayanwomenproducebothartandideology(Green,inpress).AswomenweavetheircloththeyarealsoproducingaMayanepistemologythatemphasizestherelationshipbetweenhumanbeingsbothlivinganddeadandtheiruniverse.Inthiswayaweaverproduces,throughherlaborandherart,aconduitbetweenthepastandthefuture.Inthisregionitisthewomenwhocontinuetousetraje,thedistinctiveclothingoftheMaya,tofollowthetraditionofdressingliketheirancestorsandtore-createthethreadbetweenthepastandthepresent(Carlsen,1994).

NontraditionalExports

Inthe1980stheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)beganpromotingnontraditionalexportagricultureasonecomponentofitsruraldevelopmentstrategiestoamelioratepovertyinthewesternhighlandsofGuatemala.IntheDepartmentofChimaltenango,forexample,

vegetableproductionforexporthadbecomeanalternativeformanypeasantfarmerstoprocuremuchneededcash.Withthedemandsimposedbythecivilpatrolsystemandthedecreasedlaboropportunitiesofthecoffee,cotton,andsugarplantations,theconversionofpartofthemilpatocontractfarmingorhiringoneselfoutasafieldlaborerweresomeofthelimitedoptionsavailabletolocalfarmers.4However,thisnewglobalagriculturalstrategyofsmallfarmersinthe"ThirdWorld,"producingfruitsandvegetablesforexporttothe"FirstWorld,"reliesheavilyonaccesstocheaplabor(Collins,1995).

Twotypesofnewagriculturalarrangementspredominateinthisregion:contractfarmingandfieldlabor.Contractfarmingthatis,smallplotsoflandpreviouslyusedformilpaproductionbypeasantsandnowbeingusedforcultivatingbroccoli,snowpeas,andcauliflowerforsaletointermediarieshasproliferated.Whilesomesmallfarmershaveprofited,recentstudieshaveshownthatthisisariskybusinesssincemanyfarmerssuffercropfailureduetothevagariesofweather(toomuchortoolittlerainorfrost)oraglutinthemarket(Rosset,1991;AVANCSO,1994b).Asaresultmanyfarmershavehadtodefaultontheirloansandhavelosttheirland.Peasantsbearthebruntofthefailures.Intermediariesprovidehigh-interestloans,seed,andfertilizerswhicharethendeductedfromthepriceoftheharvest.Yet,pricesarenotoriouslyunstableanditisnotuncommontoseevegetablesthathavebeenrejectedfortheirpoorquality,orforhavingpesticideresiduesthataretoohigh,dumpedonthesideofroadways.Onlyafewfarmerswithsignificantlandholdingsareabletosustainprofits.

Accesstoland,credit,technicalassistanceandmarketsvaryconsiderablyaccordingtothesizeofafarmer'sholdings,withthemoderatelywell-offbeingfavoredoverthepoor.Socialdifferentiation,foodinsecurity,overuseofland,deforestationandanincreasingruralproletariataretherealitiesthatcharacterizeeconomiclifeinChimaltenangointhe1990s.Oneofthestructuraleffectsofthisshiftinlandusageisthatlandthathadbeenutilizedpreviouslytoproducebasicgrainsforaninternalmarketisnowbeingdevotedtoexportcrops(GarstandBarry,1990).Inaddition,withaninfluxofimportedbasicgrains,thelocalmarketvalueofcornandblackbeanshasbeenundercut,erodingtheindependenceofthepeasantfarmer.

Contractfarmingreworkssocialrelationsofproduction.Whilethepeasantfarmercontinuestoownthemeansofproductionandtohavecontroloverhisownlabor,itisthecontractorwhodictatestheconditionsofthatlaborandthe"paceandrhythmofwork"(Watts,1992:82).Snowpeasinparticularareextremelylaborintensiveandthereforethesuccessoftheircultivationinvolvestheuseofunpaidfamilylabor.Underthese

conditionscontractfarmingdisguisestheexploitationofpeasantfarmersvis-à-vistheirstatusasindependentruralentrepreneurs.

Thesecondagriculturalstrategythathasbeenintroducedisfieldlaborusedinthecultivationofcropssuchastomatoesandlettuceforexport.Onlargerlandholdingslocalelitesorforeignownershaveconvertedproductionofdomesticcropsforlocalconsumptiontoproductionofexportcrops.Withthehighcostsoftransportandmarketing,lowlaborcostsarecrucialfortheownerstomaintainacompetitiveedge.ThemenwhoworkthefieldsearnU.S.$2.50foraneight-hourdaywhileyoungboysearnonlyU.S.$1.25.Theworkentailsplanting,weeding,andfertilizingaswellassprayingtheplantswithpesticideswithoutthebenefitsofprotectivesafetyequipment.

Theshiftinthecommercializationoflocalagriculturehasalteredthenatureofpatron-clientrelationslocally.AlthoughMayanmenoftenworkedforlocalwealthierladinos(non-Indiansofmixedancestry)inrelationsthatwereundoubtedlyexploitative,theserelationsallowedfornegotiationswithregardtofulfillinglaborobligations.Forexample,ifafamilymemberorneighborwasillorneededassistance,aworkercouldpetitiontheownerforflexibilityintheworkschedule.Underthenewconditionsofproductionwiththemorefragileandlabor-intensiveexportcrops,labordemandsaremorerigidintermsoftime.Patron-clientrelationsarebeingreplacedbythoseofcapitalistowner-workerrelationsthatarelessresponsivetoworkerneeds.Whilethepeasantlaborersstillmaybeworkingthelandandevenperformingactivitiessimilartowhattheyhavedoneinthepast,theconditionsunderwhichtheworktakesplacehavebeenaltered.Whatisdifferentinthesenewrelationsisthatthepersonalisticcontractbetweenownerandworker,oftenfromthesameregion,isreplacedbythelogicofthemarket.

RuralIndustrialization

EacheveningseveralthousandMaya-Kaqchikeladolescents,bothboysandgirlsmanyasyoungasfourteenyearsoldleavethedozensofcement-blockfactoriesthatsince1989havesprungupalongthePan-AmericanhighwayinthecentralhighlandsofGuatemala.ThegirlsintheircolorfultrajemingleinsmallgroupswithadolescentboysastheywaittheirturntoboardrecycledAmericanschoolbusesthatwillcarrythemhometotheirvillagesforthenight,aridethatmaytakethemoneandone-halfhours.

Themaquilas,orexportapparelassemblyfactories,alsohaveflourishedoverthepastdecadeinGuatemala.In1984therewere6factories

withlessthan2,000workers,andby1992therewere275factoriesandover50,000workersemployed.In1995themaquilaswerecontractingwithmorethan80,000workers.In1992garmentsworthU.S.$350millionwereexportedtocompaniessuchasTheGap,LeslieFay,andLevi-Strauss.JusttwoyearslaterthoseearningshadincreasedtoU.S.$590million-worthofclothingbeingexportedtotheUnitedStates.Themajorityoftheinvestmentsinthemaquilafactoriesinvolvedomesticcapital,followedbyKoreanandthenNorthAmericancapital.Theyoungworkers,laboringunderdeplorableconditions,earnontheaverageU.S.$100permonth(Peterson,1992;AVANCSO,1994).

WhilemostofthemaquilashavebeenbasedontheoutskirtsofGuatemalaCity,beginningin1989maquilaswerebeingbuiltincreasinglyinthenewlycreatedfreetradezonesintheDepartmentofChimaltenango.OneofthelargestofthesemaquilasisSamLucas,whichemploysabout1,200workers.At6:30A.M.eachmorningthreeschoolbusesleavethecentralplazaofthetownofSanAndreasItzapafilledwithMayanadolescents,andreturnintheeveningbetween8:30and10:30P.M.,dependingonthequotademandsofthefactorythatday.TheworkersarechargedU.S.$.80perdayfortransport,asignificantportionoftheU.S.$4perdaythattheyearn.

Thefactory,builtfromcementblockswithaluminumroofing,isthesizeofafootballfield.Inside,longwoodentablesdividetheworkersintolinesofabout30people.Eachpersonrepeatstheassignedtaskoverandover,whetheritistosewlabelsonpants,fastensleevestoashirt,orcutthreads.Productiongoalsareestablishedforeachline.Forexample,onelinemayhavetocomplete1,500shirtseachday,whileanothermaybeexpectedtosewon1,000labelsperday.Iftheproductionlinereachesitsgoal,thentheworkersarepaidextra;ifnot,moneyisdeductedfromtheirwages.Workerscomplainofharshworkingconditionspoorventilation,theintenseheatgeneratedfromtheceilinglamps,legandbackpainfromstandingforlonghoursandverbalandphysicalharassmentandabusebythesupervisorsandmanagersforperceivedlaxityinworkhabits.

Workdisciplineandcontroloftime,notunexpectedly,seemtobeveryimportantmanagerialtechniquesininculcatingtheseadolescentsincapitalistlaborpractices(Thompson,1967).Managerscontinuallyadmonishtheworkerstonotwastetime,tofinishtheworkontime,andtoarriveontime.Ifworkersarrivelate,onehalfoftheday'spayisdeducted,andinsomeinstances,theyarenotpermittedtoenterthefactory.Ifaworkerdoesmissaday,U.S.$8isdeductedfromtheirsalaryandiftheymisstwodaystheyaredismissed.Theworkerssaytheyoftendonot

receivemoneyforovertimethattheyarepromised.Theworkhoursvaryaccordingtotheproductionschedule,soifthereisalargeordertofillthemanagermayannouncethateveryoneisobligatedtostayuntil9:30P.M.insteadofleavingat6:30P.M.Beforeenteringanduponleavingthefactory,theworkersmustlineupforinspectionbythemanagerandsupervisors.Thisformalityrequiresforty-fiveminutesand,asaresult,busesdonotleavetotransporttheworkershomeuntil7:30P.M.,anhourpastpaidworkinghours.

Therearenomaquilaunionssincepeopleareafraidtoorganize.LaborunionworkerswhohavetriedtoorganizethemaquilashavemetthesamefateasthefortytradeunionleaderswhohavebeenmurderedordisappearedinGuatemalasincetheearly1990s.ThecaseofYovanyGomezisillustrative.Gomezwasatwenty-four-year-oldorganizerwhowasthreatenedrepeatedlybytheKoreanmanagerofamaquilashetriedtoorganizeinGuatemalaCity.ShewasmurderedinMarch1995.Todate,thereisnotoneorganizedunioninthemaquilaindustryinacountrylongnotedforitsabusivelaborpractices.Bothyoungworkersandtheirfamiliesarewellawareoftheexploitativeconditionsunderwhichtheyareworking.Yetthenecessityofprocuringcashcoupledwiththelackofasufficientlandbaseonwhichtosubsistinaneconomymarkedbyhighinflationhasleftmanyfamilieswithfewoptions.

However,insomecasesadolescentsareusingtheirearningsforpersonalconsumption.Girlsareusingtheirwagestobuyeithertheirtraditionalwovenblousesorthethreadtomakethem,andtopurchasethelongwrappedskirtswornbythewomen.Becauseoffinancialconstraintswithinthefamilyandtherisingpricesoftextiles,itisdifficultforfamiliestoprovidethesegirlswiththeirtraditionalclothing.Throughfactoryworktheyareabletogarnertheresourcestheyneedtomaintainanimportantsymbolicexpressionoftheiridentity.Adolescentboysmayspendtheirwagesonelectronicequipment.Insomemaquilasthevendorscomerightintothefactorytoselltotheworkers.Popularitemsforpurchaseincludehairdryers,cassetteplayers,radios,andtelevisions.Onefathercomplainedthathissonleftthefactoryattheendofthemonthwithhispaycheckalreadyspent.However,whatwasmoredistressingforthisfatherwasthefactthathissonnolongerwishedtoworkinthemilpaalong-sidehisfather,uncles,andgrandfather.Instead,theyoungmanpreferredmodernfactorylabortoworkingthecornfieldsofhisancestors.

Thecentralpreoccupationformanyofthefamiliesandworkers,however,isthewayinwhichfactoryworkaffectstheperceptionsoftimeandsocialrelations.TheeffectsoftheselaborpracticeshavethegreatestpotentialforreshapingMayanculturalpractices.Mostyoungworkersfeel

thattheyhaveabandonedtheirfamiliesforthelonghoursoffactorywork.Theyhaveverylittletimetobeathomerisingasearlyat4A.M.andoftennotreturninghomeuntilafter9P.M.intheevening;Sundaysaretheonlydaysthattheyhavetosharetimewithotherfamilymembers.ThefactoryproductionscheduleisalsoatoddswithaMayansenseofmutualaidandobligationstofamilyandneighbors.Theyoungpeopleareunabletoparticipateinanycommunityeventsand,ineffect,theirworkseversthedailyconnectionsbetweenthemselves,theirfamily,andtheirfriends.Thus,theyareputinthedifficultsituationofchoosingbetweentheirindividualneedsandtheircommitmentstotheirfamilyandtheircommunity.Tocopewiththesepressuresmanyyoungworkershavedevisedastrategyofintermittentfactorywork.Severalworkersquitthemaquilaafterayearortwo,onlytoreturnagainaftertheyhavestayedhomeforsixmonthsormoretorestandbewiththeirfamilies.Yet,formany,theexigenciesofpovertydrivethembackonceagaintoseekmaquilawork.Itistooearlytotellwhetherthiswillbecomeacyclicalemploymentpatternandwhetherthistypeofstrategywillremainacceptabletothemaquilaowners.

Conclusion

WhatisuniqueaboutthepresentsituationforruralMayanpeopleinthehighlandsofChimaltenangoisthattherehasbeenasubstantialweakeningofthespacesthattheyhavelongutilizedtosurvive.Thelandsurroundingtheircommunitieswhereforcenturiestheyhavegrowntheirmilpasisbeingpenetratedbynewformsofglobalcapitalism.Theircommunitiesaremilitarizedinunprecedentedwaysanddailylifeisundersurveillance.Whilepoliticalrepressionshouldnotbeanecessaryfactorindiscipliningthepoorfortheintroductionofnewcapitalistworkpractices,inthecaseofGuatemalaitmustcertainlybeimplicated.Today,Mayancommunitiesasrefugesfromtheoutsideworldwhatevertheirshortcomings,factions,andcleavageshavebeenreshapedundertheweightofviolenceandrepression.

Likewise,thenatureoftheirworkpracticeshavealsobeentransformed.ItiscrucialtolocateMayancultureinwork,thatisinthemilpaandweaving,tounderstandhowcultureisproducedandwhatthecurrentchangesmaysignify.Asadolescentboysandgirlsaswellasentirefamiliesnolongerhavetimeandinsomecasesthedesiretodothatculturalwork,thestrugglessurroundingculture,power,andsocialrelationsatthecommunityandhouseholdleveltakeonnewmeaningslocallyandglobally.

Notes

1.InGuatemalathemilpareferstoaplotoflandwherecornandusuallybeansandsquasharegrowntogether.

2.Thelatifundiarefertolandholdingunitswhichrangebetween45toover900hectaresandwhichusuallycontainthemostfertileagriculturallandsinGuatemala.Minifundiarefertothesmall,fragmentedholdingswhicharelessthansevenhectaresandusuallyarenotsufficienttosustainafamilyallyear(Lovell,1985).Therelationshipbetweenlatifundiaandminifundiacanbecharacterizedbytheinequalityofthatrelationship,asGeorgeLovellnotes:''thefundamentalcharacteristicoflandholdinginGuatemalainthepresentdayistheconcentrationofsizableamountsofcultivablelandinthehandsofthesmall,wealthy(mostlynon-Indian)minority,whileanimpoverished,butdignifiedpeasantmajority,predominantlyIndian,ekesoutanexistenceonatinypercentageofthetotalnationalfarmland"(Lovell,1985:27).GuatemalahasoneofthemostinequitablelanddistributionsinallofLatinAmerica;2percentofthepopulationownover65percentofthearablelands.

3.Amunicipioisatownshipusuallycomprisingaprincipaltownandsurroundingvillages.SeeSolTaxforanearlydiscussionofthemunicipio(1937).

4.Thecivilpatrolsystemwascreatedin1982andconstitutedaruralmilitiaofoveramillionmenby1985,overhalfthehighlandmalepopulationoverfifteenyearsofage.ThePACS,astheyareknowninSpanish,functiontoaugmentmilitarystrengthandintelligenceinareasofconflict,andmoreimportantlytoprovidevigilanceandcontroloverthelocalpopulation.AlthoughtheGuatemalanconstitutionstatesexplicitlythatthePACsarevoluntary,failuretoparticipateoroppositiontotheirformationmarksoneasasubversiveinconflictivezonesinthealtiplano(AmericasWatch,1986).

References

AmericasWatch.CivilPatrolsinGuatemala.NewYork:AmericasWatch,1986.

AsociaciónparaelAvancedelaCienciasSociales(AVANCSO).ElsignificadodelamaquilaenGuatemala.Guatemala:AVANCSO,TextosparaDebate,1994a.

.Impactecologicodelloscultivoshorticolasno-tradicionalesenelaltiplanodeGuatemala.Guatemala:AVANCSO,TextosparaDebate,1994b.

Bastos,Santiago,andManuelaCamus.Sombrasdeunbatalla:LosdesplazadosporlaviolenciaenlaciudaddeGuatemala.Guatemala:ImpresoenFondodeCulturaEditorial,1994.

Carlsen,Robert."DiscontinuousWarps:TextileProductionandEthnicityinContemporaryHighlandGuatemala."InCraftsintheWorldMarket:TheImpactofGlobalExchangeonMiddleAmericanArtisans,editedbyJuneNash,199-224.Albany:SUNY,1994.

Collins,Jane."TransnationalLaborProcessandGenderRelations."JournalofLatinAmericanAnthropology1,no.1(1995):178-99.

deJanvry,Alain.TheAgrarianQuestionandReformisminLatinAmerica.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1981.

Garst,Rachel,andTomBarry.FeedingtheCrisis.Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1990.

Giddens,Anthony.TheConsequencesofModernity.Cambridge,England:PolityPress,1990.

Green,Linda.FearasaWayofLife:MayanWidowsinRuralGuatemala.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,inpress.

Harvey,David.TheConditionsofPostmodernity.London:BasilBlackwell,1988.

Krueger,Chris,andKjellEnge.SecurityandDevelopment:ConditionsintheGuatemalanHighlands.Washington,DC:WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica,1985.

Lovell,W.George.ConquestandSurvivalinColonialGuatemala.Kingston,Ontario:QueensUniversityPress,1985.

McCreery,David."StatePower,IndigenousCommunities,andLandinNineteenthCenturyGuatemala."InGuatemalaIndiansandtheState,1540-1988,editedbyCarolSmith,96-115.Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1990.

Peterson,Kurt.TheMaquiladoraRevolutioninGuatemala.NewHaven:CenterforInternationalHumanRightsatYaleLawSchool,1992.

Rosset,Peter."NontraditionalExportAgricultureinCentralAmerica:ImpactonPeasantFarmers."Workingpaperno.20.SantaCruz:UniversityofCalifornia,1991.

Simon,Jean-Marie.Guatemala:EternalSpring,EternalTyranny.NewYork:W.W.Norton,1987.

Smith,Carol."LocalHistoryinGlobalContext:SocialandEconomicTransitionsinWesternGuatemala."ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory26,no.20(1984):193-228.

."TheMilitarizationofCivilSocietyinGuatemala:EconomicRestructuringasaContinuationofWar."LatinAmericanPerspectives67,no.4(1990):8-41.

Stoll,David.BetweenTwoArmiesintheIxilTownsofGuatemala.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993.

Tax,Sol."TheMunicipiosoftheMidwesternHighlandsofGuatemala."AmericanAnthropologist39,no.3(1937):423-44.

Thompson,E.P."Time,Work-Discipline,andIndustrialCapitalist."PastandPresent20,no.38(1967):56-97.

Watts,Michael."LivingunderContract:WorkProductionPoliticsandtheManufactureofDiscontentinaPeasantSociety."InReworkingModernity,editedbyM.WattsandA.Pred,65-105.NewBrunswick:RutgersUniversityPress,1992.

IITRANSFORMINGURBANENTERPRISES

4SurvivalPoliticsandtheMovementsofMarketWomeninPeruintheAgeofNeoliberalism*

LindaJ.Seligmann

ThemainstreettotheCuzcocentralmarketislinedwithvendors,twoorthreerowsdeeponbothsides.Intheearlymorning,therusted-outpickuptrucks,taxis,andtoilingtricyclists,whoseflatbedsareloadedwithbulgingfloursacksorplasticbuckets,potatoes,andreamsofcloth,slowlywendtheirwayinserpentinefashionthroughthestreets.Theoilyair,exhaust,anddroneofhonkinghornsmakeasharpcontrasttothecrystallineandfrostypeaksthatsurroundtheentirecity.

Thevendorsaresettingouttheirwares,insideandoutsideofthemarket:razorblades,plasticwatches,peppers,shinyredapples,cassettetapes,carrots,onions,cheese,hotplatesoffoodcookingontinykerosene-runPrimuses,shinypolyestertrousers,medicinalherbs,frillychildren'sConfirmationdresses,usedbooksandnewspapers,bloodyslabsofmeat.Almostanythingyoumightneedcanbefoundhereifyouknowwheretolookforit.Sleepychildrenarealsotobeseen,somerunningerrandsfortheirmothers,othersbundledupandsandwichedbetweenmerchandiseinacornerofthestall.Thevendorsaremostlywomen,whilethemenaretransporters,haulingthemerchandisetoitsdestinationorhelpingtheirwives,sisters,ordaughterstosetuptheirstalls.

*Thisresearchtookplaceintermittentlybetween1988and1993inCuzco,Peru,oncetheancientcapitaloftheIncas.Itisastill-growingprovincialmetropoliswithapopulationofapproximately300,000,thecapitalofthedepartmentofCuzcoandatouristmecca.

Atthishour,theplaceseemsalmostorderly,withvendorsgroupedtogetheraccordingtotheirmerchandise.Comeafewhourslater,though,andthescenewillbeoneofapparentchaos.Theboundariesofgroupsarebarelyperceptible;theplaceisswarmingwithshoppersandvendorswhosquatonsidewalks,thefloorsofthemarket,anywheretheycanfindanddefendaspace.Seriousbargainingfillstheairasthemarketwomenwheedletheirwaresandtheirclientscajolethemtolowertheirprices.Nearlyinvisibletoastranger,wieldingpoweroutofproportiontotheirpositionandcuttingasinisterfigurearethemunicipalagentsandwholesalerswhoamblealongfromstalltostall,demandingfeesandtherepaymentofdebtsfromthemarketwomen.

Downbytherailroadtracksnotfaraway,thesceneisquitedifferent.Therethetracksarelinedononesidebyhugelorriesfilledwithmerchandisebeingofferedbymalewholesalers,whoaresurroundedbywomennegotiatingfortheirgoods.Theothersideofthetracksislinedbymakeshiftstallsinterspersedwithwomenwhositonthegroundbytherailswithafewgoodsspreadoutbeforethem.Above,thehillsidesarestrewnwithgarbage,anddogsscavengeforleftovers.

Allofthesemarketwomenarepartofaleadingoccupationalsectoroftheinformaleconomy.Yettheirplacewithinthateconomyvariesaccordingtoanumberofdifferentfactors.Indeed,theinformaleconomyitselfhasbeenalivelysubjectofdebateintermsofhowtodefineitandwhatitsrelationshipistotheformaleconomy.Mostsocialscientiststakeoneoftwopositions.Onepositionisthatmembersoftheinformaleconomy,becausetheyareevadingcostlystateregulationsforestablishingandoperatingformalbusinessesandbecauseofthelackoffixedcapitalcosts,socialwelfareprotection,andlaborlaws,canofferthesamemerchandiseatlowercoststhancanformalbusinesses,thusencouragingcompetitionbetweentheformalandinformaleconomies.Theotherpositionholdsthat,forthesamereasons,formaleconomiestakefulladvantageofinformalsectorbusinesses.Throughsubcontracting,informaleconomiesnicelycomplementformalones,and,infact,areresponsibleformuchofthevalueaddedtoproductsthathasoftenbeenmistakenlyattributedtotheformaleconomy.Thus,ratherthanexistinginoppositiontoeachother,whatareknownasinformalactivitiesarearguedtobecentraltothesuccessfuloperationofwell-establishedbusinessesthatarecategorizedaspartoftheformaleconomy.1Thepoliticalorientationsandactivismofpeoplewhoworkwithintheinformaleconomyarenotwellunderstood,inpartbecauseoftheirheterogeneityandmobility,inpartbecausethesearequestionswhoseanswersmustbesoughtwithinachanging,historicallyspecificcontext.

InformalEconomiesandWomen'sIdentities

Informaleconomiesarehardlyhomogeneous,andwithinthemdifferentoccupationalcategories,suchasthatofmarketwomen,arealsoremarkablydifferentiated.Informalsectorenterprisesdifferintermsofscaleandinformality.Theyrangefromself-employedindividualswhosell,trade,orputoutproductswithoutpayinganytaxestosmallworkshopsproducinggoodsonasubcontractingbasisforformalsectorindustries.

Ineithercase,structurallyspeaking,peoplewhoworkwithintheinformaleconomyactuallysharemoreincommonthanisoftenrecognized.Theyareunprotectedbyhealthbenefits,insurance,orjobstability.Also,manyinformalactivitiesappeartoresemblemodesofsocialorganizationthatexistedinruralcommunities.These"traditions"mightincludecreditarrangementswithkinandfictivekin,themoralobligationsthathedgepatron-clientrelationships,modesofmutualassistance,andinformationandsupplynetworksgroundedinkinshipties.2

InhighlandPeru,marketwomenhaveinhabitedthesociallandscapeforseveralcenturies,buttheirreasonsforbecomingmarketwomenhavevariedovertimeinaccordancewithgenderideologies,theeconomicdynamismofruralagriculture,motivationsforeconomicdiversification,andaspirationsfortheiroffspring.Inaddition,theincomethatmarketwomenhaveearnedhasvariedinaccordancewiththestateofthenationaleconomy.Forwomeninparticular,activitiessuchasmarketvendingorarduousdetailworkintextilesweatshopsofferthemjobstheywouldnototherwisehave.Sometimesitgivesthemmuchneededflexibilitysothattheycancarefortheirchildrenandworkatthesametime,anditgivesthemconsiderableautonomyfromtheirhusbands,boyfriends,orfathers.3

Marketwomenoperateatdifferentlevelsoftheeconomy.Someofthemworkfull-timeatmarketingandpayrentfortheirpermanentstallsandtaxesontheirearnings.Othersworkfull-timebutoperateatalesserscale,neitherpayingtaxesnoroccupyingpermanentstalls.Stillotherssellnowandthen,combiningdiverseoccupations,especiallyasruralproducersanditinerantvendors.Thisgroupdoesnothavestalls,paysnotaxes,anddoesnothavealicenseorhealthcard.

Patron-clientelismamongmarketwomenandtheirpoliticalrepresentativesdividesthesolidarityamongthemasmuchastheeconomiccompetition.Patronsprovidecreditandothervaluablekindsofresourcesandprotection;inreturn,marketwomenandtheirunionleaderswilloftenvoteaccordingly,sometimesforthepatronsthemselves.

Multipleimagesofmarketwomenfillthepagesoftraveloguesandmonographs.Often,theyaredepictedasfeisty,neithermalenorfemale,

neither"Indian"nor"mestizo."TheseareimagesthatinPeru,atleast,aredeliberatelycultivatedbymarketwomenthemselvesand,overtime,havecometoconstitutearepertoireofculturaltraditionsandpractices.However,theliteraturealsoincludestheadmonishmentsofresearcherswhodecrythewaythatmarketwomenhavebeenromanticizedasthevanguardoffuturerevolutions.Bothpositionsarecorrect,notsurprisingly.4Manyofthesewomen,establishedornot,willresorttothemachinationsofthetrickstertodefendtheirplaceandproducts,fendoffthemunicipalagents,andgetagooddealintheirnegotiations.However,theywillalsocometotheaidoftheircompanionsinthemarketplaceandhelpoutwithfood,credit,andmoralsupportfromtimetotime.

Classandethnicself-identificationandrelationshipsarecomplexinPeruviansociety.Barrierstoupwardmobility,traditionsofculturalensembles,suchasuniqueapparelandlanguage,competitionamongmarketwomenwhosestatusdiffersinthemarketplace,patron-clientelism,andquestionsofoccupationalchangefromonegenerationtothenextplaycriticalrolesinmarketwomen'sethnicandclassself-identification,andtheirabilitytoformaunifiedfront.5

Manymarketwomenhavealreadyinternalizedidealstatusreferents.Thatis,theybelievethatbettereducation,Westerndress,speakingSpanish,beingabletomeettheirbasicneeds,owningorrentingahouse,andeducatingtheirchildrentobeprofessionalswillpermitthemtobeacceptedasupwardlymobilePeruviancitizenswhoaremestizasratherthancampesinas,cholas,orIndians,andwhoaremiddle,ratherthanlower,class.6Forexample,GregoriaChacaQoro,anitinerantvendorwholivesinthecountrysideandonlyoccasionallysellsheragriculturalproductsinthecity,assessesherethnicandclassidentification:"IamlowerclassbecauseIamindigenous,Iampoor,andIdon'thavecontactwithotherkindsofpeople.I'macampesinabecauseIliveinavillage,notthecity,anddon'thavemoneytosparetobuyanything."7

Incontrast,ElenaQuispeandEulaliaMenéndezhavepermanentstalls.Eulalia'sresponseisthat"IammiddleclassbecauseIliveinthecity,speakSpanish,andamnotdoingbadlyeconomically.I'mamestizabecauseIdistinguishmyselfinmydressasamemberofthemiddleclass."ElenaconsidersherselftobeamestizabecausesheworksinCuzco.MarianaGonzalesRoccadoesn'thaveherownstallbutdoespayforalicense.Sheconsidersherselfmiddleclassbecauseshehasherownhouseand"doesn'thaveproblems."Shealsoconsidersherselfasamestizabecauseofherdress.JosefinaHanccodoesn'thaveherownstallanddoesn'thavealicense.Sheconsidersherselfamemberofthelowerclassbecausesheispoorandownsnothing.Shealsoconsidersherselftobeacampesinabecauseshehas''neverknownshoes"andherparentsarecampesinos.

Marketwomenarequintessential"practitionersofhyphenatedethnicities,"yettheystrugglewiththephenomenonofstatusinconsistencythatis,thecontradictionbetweentheirgrowingexpectationsofbecomingnon-Indianandmiddleclassandthepersistentnegativesanctionstheyexperiencefrom"true"mestizos(CookandJoo,1995:53).8Atthesametime,theseverystruggles,inthepast,haveencouragedsomemarketwomentoabandontheirexpectationsassocialclimbersandknittogetheradistinctidentityoutofbeingexcludedby,yeteconomicallyimportantto,boththemestizoandcampesinoranks.However,thedevastatingimpactofneoliberalmeasuresonmarketwomenhasseverelylimitedtheirpoliticalpotential,whetheritbethroughtraditionalunionorganizingoridentitypolitics.Evenemergentsocialmovements,thoughtheyhavebeenmoresuccessfulavenuesofpoliticalmobilization,remainweakandsubjecttoanumberofconstraints.

NeoliberalisminHistoricalContext

Peru'sapparentreturntodemocracycameamidstacivilwarbetweenstateandparamilitaryforcesandmembersoftwoguerrillagroups,theShiningPath(SenderoLuminoso)andtheTupacAmaruRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoRevolucionarioTupacAmaru,orMRTA).Thewarhadcostover30,000livesby1990.Theemergenceofdemocraticprincipleswassymbolizedmostexplicitlybythefreelyheldnationalpresidentialelectionsof1990.Inthatelection,manymarketwomenhelpedtoelectAlbertoFujimori,candidateoftheindependentparty,Cambio90.Theyenvisionedhimtobea"manofthepeople,"thesonofJapaneseimmigrantstoPeruwhowouldrespondtotheplightofthepoorandhardworking.Inaddition,hehadbeentrainedasanagronomistandhadapragmaticbenttohischaracter,awelcomechangefromthewarsofrhetoricthathadseemedtopreoccupymostpoliticiansandthepartieswithwhichPeruvianswerefamiliar.Inhiscampaign,Fujimorispokeoftenoftheneedtoimprovetheconditionsofthemanypeopleworkingpart-orfull-timeintheinformaleconomyaswellasthoseofQuechuapeasantsinthecountryside.

WhenFujimoricametooffice,theeconomyandnationalinfrastructurewereinshambles.Bythelate1980s,only10percentofPeru'sroadswerepaved.Theannualrateofinflationwasalmost3,000percentandpeoplerushedouttospendtheirmoneyassoonastheyreceivedany.Almostallinternationaldevelopmentagencieshadretreatedfromoperation,andafterPeru'sincumbentPresidentAlanGarcía(19851990)hadnationalizedthebanksandrefusedtopaytheforeigndebtofover

$23billion,Perulostcredibilityintheeyesofforeigninvestorsandinternationallendingagencies.

Thespecterofviolencehoveredovertheentirecountry,muchofwhichremainedunderemergencylaw.9Duringthelostdecadeofthe1980s,Peruhadexperienceddeclinesinrealwages,sinkingtolessthan40percentoftheir1980levelsby1990,afigurethatonlytakesfullyemployedworkersintoaccount.Likewise,taxrevenueshadfallenbymorethanhalfduringthe1980s.Publicsectoremployees'salariesfellbyover60percentbetween1985and1990.10

Withintwoyears,FujimorihadsucceededinarrestingmostoftheleadersandmanyofthefollowersofSenderoLuminosoandtheMRTA.Hisneoliberalmeasures,designedtolowerhyperinflationandrestoreeconomicstabilitytothecountry,wereenthusiasticallyendorsedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldBank,andotherinternationallendingagencies.Thesemeasuresaggressivelysanctionedprivatization,openedthedoorstoforeigninvestment,restructuredthepublicsector,imposedausteritymeasuresandtaxesonallbusinesses,andreversedmostagrarianreformlaws.

OnApril5,1992,Fujimoriestablishedaninformalpactwiththemilitary.Healsoabolishedthejudiciary,dissolvedthenationalcongress,andsuspendedthe1979constitution.Economicgrowthskyrocketed,notaltogetheraspositiveanachievementasithasbeenportrayed,givenhowmuchtheeconomyhadshrunkintheinterveningdecade.11Peruwas,andstillis,toutedasasecondChilewithonedifference:insteadoftheironhandofPinochet,itsregimehasthesemblanceofdemocraticprocess.

WithPeru'sformalreturntodemocracy,therewasarenewedandintenseinterestinhowtotapintothepotentialoftheinformalsector.HernandodeSoto,initiallyoneofFujimori'sadvisors,celebratedtheingenuityandresourcefulnessofindividualswithintheinformalsector.Hearguedthatifthegovernmentreducedstateinterventionandregulatoryproceduresaltogetherandencouragedmarketmechanismstoflourish,thentheseindividualswouldrescuePerufromunderdevelopmentandbecomeadynamicmiddleclass.Inshort,theinformaleconomywoulddisappearaltogetherbecauseitwouldbecomeformalized.12

Manyanalystshavearguedthattheinformalsectorisacrucialsafetyvalve,aspill-overmechanism,thatpreventsunemployment.Foratime,thatmayhavebeenthecaseforPeru,however,theseverityoftheneoliberalmeasuresthathavebeenimposedinthecountry,combinedwiththeviolenceofcivilwarthatdrovepeoplefromthecountrysidetothecities,ledtoanotableshiftintherelationshipbetweentheformalandinformalsectorsoftheeconomy.Thesemeasureshaveincreasedfull-

blownunemployment.Inotherwords,theformalsectoreconomyhassufferedsogreatlybothfromthedownsizingoftheeconomyandtheexpansionoftheurbanpopulationthattheinformaleconomycannolongertakeadvantageofitslinkageswiththeformaleconomyorthebuyingpowerofformalsectorworkers.AccordingtoPeru'sLaborMinistry,combinedunder-andunemploymentfor1994was83.1percentoftheeconomicallyactivepopulation.13

MarketWomenintheTimeofNeoliberalism

By1993manymarketwomenhadbecomeenragedbythekindsofpoliciesFujimorihadimplementedandwithelectoralpoliticsingeneral.Inparticular,theyopposedthehightaxheintendedtolevyonallmembersoftheinformalsector,regardlessofscaleofoperation.Theyalsocomplainedbitterlythattheimpositionofausteritymeasureshadcausedsalariesandwagesofmostoftheirclientstodeclinesoprecipitouslythatbuyershadreducedtheirpurchasesofbasicnecessities.Consequently,notonlyweremarketwomenwhosoldthesekindsofproductssuffering,butpeasantproducerswerealsobearingthebruntofthesebelt-tighteningmeasures.Vendors,whooperatedatdifferentlevelsoftheinformaleconomy,complainedthatnoonecouldaffordtobuyanythinganymore.Severalwomenobservedthatwhilethesemeasureswerenecessaryinordertopaytheforeigndebt,anditwasagoodthingtoreducetheforeigndebt,stillitwaswhollyunjustforthis"despotic"governmentto"bekillingthepoorestandthosewhosufferedmost,"especiallysincetheyhadnotbeenresponsibleforcreatingthedebtinthefirstplace.Inonewoman'swords,"Thegovernment,insteadoffightingforthepeopleasitpromised,wasfightingforthemostpowerfulclassesandputtingustoonesideeventhoughweplacedavoteofconfidenceinhim[referringtoFujimori]."

Thecostofneoliberalmeasureshashadseriousrepercussionsformarketwomenintheirabilitytosurviveeconomicallyandtoorganizetofightagainstthesemeasurespolitically.Duetoeconomiccompetition,existingriftsbetweenmarketwomenhavedeepenedandfewermarketwomenareabletosucceedinmakingalivingfromsellingtheirwares.Ontheotherhand,becauseitisoverwhelminglywomenwhoaremostburdenedwiththesurvivaloftheirfamilies,theysometimesdiscovercommongroundinchallengingthepatriarchalbiasesofunionsandinseekingbasicservicesthroughalternativemodesofpoliticalorganization.14

FamilyComposition,Generations,andDivisionofLabor

Onecostofneoliberalismthathasnotbeenwellstudiedistheeffectthatthesemeasureshavehadonwomen'soccupationalstrategiesandpositionwithintheirfamilies.Householdcompositionmakesanenormousdifferenceinthecapacityofmarketwomentohavegreaterorlessersuccessinthemarketplace.Marketwomenwhoaremostsuccessfularethosewhoaremarried,followedbythosewhocanrelyonthehelpoftheirextendedfamiliesandchildren.AsBarbaraGeddeshasnoted,"thecostsandbenefitsofadjustmentarenotdistributedequallywithinclasses"(1995:204).InthecaseofhighlandPeru,theeconomyofmostmarketwomenwassufferingsoextensivelypriortorestructuringthattheywerealreadyrelyingheavilyupondiversifyingthelaboroftheirfamilies,andtryingtocoordinatetheactivitiesofallhouseholdmembersinordertomaximizetheiropportunitiesandminimizerisk.AsOrlandinadeOliveiraandBryanRobertsnote,"thetypeofjobanindividualdoesisalesssignificantdeterminantoflifechancesthanotherfactorssuchashouseholdcompositionandcycle,genderandage"(1994:68).Becausethemajorityofmarketwomenaresinglemothersorwidows,responsibleforboththeeconomicwelfareandcaretakingoftheirchildren,thelabortheycandedicatetoworkoutsidethehousehold,inabsoluteterms,isusuallylessthanthatofmen.Thestressofsurvivingeconomicallyisextremeinthesecases,especiallysince,withintheinformalsector,vendingincomeswerealreadyamongthelowest,andstreetvendingwasalreadybecomingsaturated.

Despitethesecircumstances,priortothe1990smanymarketwomenhadpartiallyortotallysucceededinfulfillingoneoftheirprimarygoalsinlifeeducatingtheirchildreninorderthattheywouldbeabletofindbetteremploymentthantheyhadbeenabletofind.Inthestudyforthischaptertheoccupationaldatashowedthat,overthecourseofthreegenerations,theparentsofmostmarketwomenhadbeenpeasantsorpeonsonhaciendas;afewhadbeenvendors.Quiteafewofthemarketwomenhadbegunasdomesticservantsandthenbecomevendors,goingfromitineranttoestablishedpositionsinthemarket.Mostoftheirchildrenwereeducated;almostallhadfinishedhighschoolandsomewereintheuniversity.Thosewhowereolderhadjoinedthearmyorpoliceforces;afewwerehelpingtheirmotherinthemarketorworkinginotheroccupationswithintheinformalsector;afewhadeventraveledabroadandwereworkinginothercountriesofLatinAmericaorEurope.Manyofthemhadexpectedtofindworkinthepublicsectorsince,by1981,thepublicsectoremployed66percentofallnonmanualworkersinPeru(deOliveiraandRoberts,1994:54).

DeOliveiraandRobertsalsoobservethatasmoreandmorepeopleenterintoinformalsectoremployment,thelocaldimensionoflabormarketsisreinforced.Thisprocessmakespeopleunusuallydependentoncommunitytiesforfindingpaidworkandmeetingtheneedsoftheirhouseholds,whichcanplaceconsiderablestrainonrelationswithinhouseholdsandneighborhoods(deOliveiraandRoberts,1994).Unemployedgrownchildrenareoutonthestreets,begging,scavenging,hustling,andstealing.Daughtershelptheirmotherswithvendingorchildcare,or,insomecases,becomeprostitutes.Inmostcases,ifthegrownchildrencontinuetoliveathomewithoutbringinginmuchincome,theyconstituteanothermouththatmustbefed.

IfunemploymentcontinuestogrowandeconomicgrowthdoesnotprovidealternativejobsforthislargesectorofPeru'spopulation,women,whowilldowhatevertheycantoensurethesurvivaloftheirfamilies,willbedisproportionatelyaffected.Asonemarketwomanwitheightchildrenandanunemployedhusbandputit,"FromthetimeIwakeupuntilIgotobed,it'sthepreoccupationamotherhastofeedherchildren,tofindfoodforherchildren,whetherwesellornot,becauseifwedon'tsell,there'snofoodtoeat."

TakingtotheStreets:ThePoliticsofGenderInterests

Between1980and1994,afewpatternshavebecomemorepronouncedconcerningthepoliticalconsciousnessofmarketwomen.Neoliberalmeasureshaveheightenedtensionsandexacerbatedcompetitionamongthemarketwomen.Thesemeasureshavealsodelineated,inafarmorebrutalfashion,theundercurrentsofracismthatshapemostinteractionsinPeruviansociety.Class-basedpoliticalplatformsbecomefarlessplausibleandcredibleundertheseconditions.ImportedfromtheWest,therhetoricofmanyleftistMarxist-Leninistpoliticianshardlyresonateswiththesewomen'ssubjectiveunderstandingofPeru'ssociallandscape.Marketwomen,ratherthanbeingunitedbyclassinterests,findthemselvesevenmorefactionalizedundertheconditionsofneoliberalism(Hobsbawm,1990:152;Escobar,1992:6285).

Asthepiegetssmaller,thepracticalaspectsofdailysurvivaldevelop.Marketwomenarelesswillingtoincludeotherswhoareoperatingwithinthesamegeneraloccupationalsectorbutwhoarenotaswelleducated,whoappeartobemoreindigenousindressandlanguage,andarelesswelloff.Almostallofthewomeninterviewedforthischaptermentionedthatthemajorpoliticalproblemstheyfaceareconflictsamongthevendorsoverspace,saleprices,andcaretakingofchildrenwhoaccompanytheirmothers.Interestingly,themoreprecariouslyestablished

vendors(ambulantes)arefarmoreinclusivethanthepermanentlyestablishedones(establecidas),andarefarlesslikelytoengageinanykindofpoliticalprotestoractivity.Theambulanteswouldlikethegovernmenttocreatepermanentstallsforeveryone.Incontrast,thepermanentvendorswouldlikethegovernmenttoprohibititinerantvendorsfromcompetingwiththem.

Thepossibilitiesformarketwomentobecomeunifiedintheirpoliticaloppositiontorepressivegovernmentmeasuresoroppressivemarketforceshavediminishedintheageofneoliberalism.Less-establishedvendorswithfewerresourcesandrecoursesprimarilytakeadvantageof"everyday"formsofresistancesuchasinformation-sharingabouttheroutesofmunicipalagentsandtheuseofinaccuratescales.Theyaremostlydejectedanddesperate,focusedonsurvival,whereasmoreestablishedvendorsexperiencegreatereaseinorganizingpoliticallyandhavelesstorisk.AlthoughtheintersectionofwhatMolyneux(1985)calls"practical"genderinterests(practicalconcernsofconsumptionandsurvival)and"strategic"genderinterests(ashifttomoreunifying,generalconcernsofwomen)areperhapsmostapparentinthesedifficultandstressfulconditions,thismergingofinterestsdoesnotmeanthatmarketwomencanacteasilyontheirrecognitionoftheseinterests.15

Almostall"established"marketwomenwhorentstallsbelongtotheSindicatodeMercadosUnidos,adivisionoftheFederaciónDepartamentaldelCuzco.AsmallpercentageofnonestablishedmarketwomenwhoworkonadailybasisinthemarketbelongtotheSindicatodeVendedoresAmbulantes.Theelectedrepresentativesoftheseunionsareprimarilymen,whichhasagreatimpactontheshapeandcontentofpoliticalmobilizationamongmarketwomen(Babb,1989).16Bothkindsofunionorganizationsemphasizetheimportanceofwomenasthebulwarkofresistanceinstreetdemonstrations.Inoneleader'swords,"weusewomenastoolsofmobilizationinordertogainrespectfromtheforcesoforderbecauseonewayoranotherwedeservetheirrespect."

TheleadershipandmembersoftheSindicatodeMercadosUnidosdescribethemselvesasbeingmembersoftheworkingclass,andinthepasttheyhavebeencloselyalliedwiththeUnitedLeftistFront(IzquierdaUnida).ThewaythattheyidentifytheirmembershipcontrastswithsomeofthestatementsbyleadersoftheSindicatodeVendedoresAmbulantes,whoclaimthattheirunion"takesnopoliticalactionsbecausetheprincipalmembersofourunionarehousewives."Althoughthelatterunionmaintainsthatitsmembershipalsobelongstoasingleclass,thisassertionismorearhetoricaldevicetoencouragesolidaritybecausetheambulantesareawarethattheirpoliticalclout,incomparisontothatoftheestablecidas,isexceedinglylimited.

Becauseleadershipisinthehandsofmen,certaindemandsrepeatedlymadebywomenforrunningwater,betterhygiene,soupkitchens,andacollectivechildren'snurseryfallondeafears.Manyofthemostintenseeconomicconflictsbetweenestablishedvendorsandambulantesaredefinedbythemensimplyastheusualdomesticsquabblesofwomen.Althoughmendominateinsettlingdisputesamongvendorsandleadingprotestmarches,women,byactinginblocs,sometimespreventmenfromwhollytakingovertheirorganization.Morethanonce,womenmentionedthatiftheyfeeltheirleadersarenotactingontheirdemands,theywilltaketothestreetsontheirown.Thiskindofstatementrevealsthatasubtleshiftmaybeoccurring,frommoretraditionalformsofpoliticalorganizingtomoreinnovativesocialmovements.

However,amajorobstacletoeffectivepoliticalprotestforthemarketwomenisthesplinterednatureoftheiroccupationalsector.Establishedmarketwomencomplainbitterlythattheirleaders,aswellasmunicipalagentsandpolice,refusetobanishambulantesfromthemarketandinsteadletthemoperatewithimpunity.Thisstatementrefersbothtotheincapacityorunwillingnessofpoliticalleadersandtheforcesoflawandordertocontrolorrepressthese"bothersome"womenofthemarket,andalsotohowwomendefinetheirconcernswithinadecidedlypatriarchalgenderideology.Inadditionitpointedlyreferstothecorruptionandpatron-clientelismthatpermeatesthewaythemarketsoperate.

ThePossibilitiesandLimitationsofSocialMovements

Marketwomenarefarmoreinterestedinparticularissuesthatpartiesorindividualpoliticiansaddressthaninloyaltytoaparticularpoliticalparty.Socialmovementsoftencouchtheirissuesingeneraltermsthatrefertothecommongood,andgrowoutofsharedconcernsratherthanpartyplatforms(Babb,Chapter6,thisvolume).Thesesharedconcerns,ratherthanindividualrepresentatives,providetheunifyingdynamismandincentivetoorganize.Acertainvaguenesscharacterizesthekindsofdemandsaroundwhichsocialmovementsoftenorganize.Hence,theyaremorelikelytobeinclusiveratherthanexclusive,somewhattemperingthefierceeconomiccompetitionandsegmentationthatthecostsofneoliberalismhaveencouraged.

Recentresearchintosocialmovementsandtherolethatgenderplaysinsocialmovementshaspointedtothepowerthat"sites"cometohaveforthepurposesofdefininghowsituationsbecome"susceptibletocommonaction"andforthe"makingofcollectiveidentities"(WestwoodandRadcliffe,1993:20;Escobar,1992:78).Theconceptof"sites,''takenfromMichelFoucault,refersnotonlytodiscursivesitesbutalsoto

physical-geographicsites,suchasneighborhoodbarriosorthemarketplace.17Thesesites"invokeboththegeographyofspaceandtheFoucauldianunderstandingofdiscursivespace....Sitesmayalsoservetounifyindividualswhomightotherwisebedispersedbythemultiplicityoftheirinterests"(WestwoodandRadcliffe,1993:2021).

OutofworkinginthemarketandresidinginthebarriosthatsurroundthecityofCuzco,manymarketwomendiscovercommonconcernsandbeginstrugglingtogethertoreachcommongoals."Territorialidentities"encouragemutualsolidarityembeddedinsharedmemoriesofthehistoryofthepueblojovenes(squattersettlements)inwhichmostmarketwomenliveandofthepersonalandcollectivestrugglesineverydaylife,includingthatofthemarketplacecaringforchildrenandprovidingthemwithfood,healthservices,andeducation,dealingwithabsenthusbands,obtainingbarrioimprovements,avoidingthepolice,facingracismonadailybasis,andorganizingtransporttoandfromthemarket.Suchstrugglesacquirealegitimacyforthewomeninvolvedinrealizingthemandsimultaneouslybecomeamorepoliticizedcritiqueofexistingcentralizedpoliticalchannelsandorganizationalmodes.Therearealsomoreopportunitiesforwomentotakeonleadershiproles,oftenonatemporarybasis,withinsocialmovementsthanwithinunionsorpoliticalparties.

Thedailyworkofthemarketwomenallowsfortheinformalityofsocialmovements,oftenorganizedspontaneously.Assurvivalbecomesmoreofanissue,anincreasingnumberofmarketwomen,establishedornot,areturningtoalternativeorganizationalmodesandalliances.Thesenewsocialmovementshavethecapacitytocutacrossdifferentiatedoccupationalsectors.In1993,afterFujimoriannouncedthatallbusinesseswouldberequiredtopayan18percenttaxtothestate,aremarkabledemonstrationexplodedinthestreetsofCuzco.Theusualtensionsbetweenwholesalersandretailers,andbetweenambulantesandestablecidas,dissolved.Theenergeticprotestofmarketwomenfromalllevelsandthetruckdriverswhosuppliedtheirgoodsnotonlytookthecountrybysurprisebutalsoforcedthegovernmenttoreconsidersuchahighuniformlevyonallbusinesses.Thus,socialmovements,becauseoftheirspontaneityandissue-orientednature,havethecapacitytoopposereformsandmodifypolicies,eventhoughtheyhaveyettosucceedinsettingtheinitialdirectionofpolicymakinginPeru.

MovementsoftheMilitary

ThepeculiarrelationshipbetweenPeru'sexecutivebranchanditsmilitaryisoneoftheprincipalreasonswhysocialmovementsremainfragileasanewmotorofpoliticalmobilizationinPeru.WhenFujimoriwas

electedtothepresidency,hisneoliberalpolicieswereendorsedbyabroadspectrumofcivilsociety,allofwhomhadaninterestinstabilizingPeru'seconomy.Becauseofthedrasticmeasuresthatweretobeimplementedandtheconditionsofcivilwar,Fujimoriwasnotaversetoallowingthemilitaryextraordinarypowers.Fujimori'suseofmilitarypersonnelfortasksthathadnormallybeenperformedbythepoliceandformaintainingsocialorder,especiallyinthecaseofstrikesanddemonstrations,isevidenceoftheincreasedmilitarizationofthecountry(Mauceri,1995).18

NicolasdeBariHermoza,ChiefoftheJointCommandoftheArmedForces,brokewiththeostensibleneutralitythatthearmedforcessupposedlyhadmaintainedsince1980.Heannouncedinhisinauguraladdressthatthemilitary"asaninstitutionendorsedeachandeveryoneofFujimori'sdecrees."Thispoliticizationofthemilitarywasnotembracedbyallmilitaryofficials,butthosewhoopposeditwerepurgedfromtheranks.

ThisnewpoliticizationofthemilitaryasaninstitutionmayallowFujimoritoexertcontroloverthemilitarybutitisanunstablecontrolandservesasasubstantialthreattodemocraticprocessinPeru.Italsomakesitmorelikelythatanykindofpoliticalprotestagainsttheregimewillbeforcedtogoundergroundsincethedeploymentofthepoliceandarmythwartsmosteffortstodisruptorchallengethesocialorder.ItisironicthatmanyPeruvians,includingthemarketwomen,supportedFujimoriforbothtermsofofficebecausetheydidnotwantareturntotheviolenceofSenderoandbecauseFujimori'spolicieshadbroughtaboutforeigninvestmentandsomeeconomicgrowth.19Yet,Fujimori'sregime,whetheritbeconsidereddemocraticorauthoritarian,hasbroughtlittleinthewayofsocialjusticeformarketwomen.

Violenceandthe"Medicine"ofNeoliberalism

LilaPaqoChawaisoneofthemostwealthyandwell-establishedofmarketwomen.Shefinishedhighschoolandherchildren,unlikethoseofmostothervendors,remainathomewithaservant.Herhusband,amechanic,wantshertoquitworking.Herdeceasedmotherwasavendorwithoutapermanentstall;herfatherworkedinthepublicsector,intheMinistryofAgriculture.LilaspeaksalittleQuechuabutismorecomfortablespeakingSpanish.Incontrast,hermotherspokeonlyQuechua.Whenaskedhowshefeltaboutthecurrentgovernmentandwhathereconomicandpoliticalconcernswere,Lilatalkedalittleabouthermembershipintheunionandherparticipationindemonstrations,eventhoughshesaidshedislikedpolitics.ShewhisperedasomewhatfranticstatementthatshehadheardthatthecentralmarketwasgoingtobedestroyedandboughtbytheUnitedStates.Theyweregoingtobuildalargehotelandallthe

vendorswouldbeforciblymovedtoSanJerónimo(atownnotfarfromCuzco).Sheclaimedthatthiswasgoingtohappenbecausethegovernmentthoughtthatthevendorsweredoingsowell,whereas,inheropinion,"thegovernmentwasdrowningthemwithitspoliciesandthosewithoutstableworkweretheoneswhoweresufferingthemost."20

TheconsequencesoftherampantderegulationthattheFujimoriregimehasimplemented,supportedbymostinternationalandnationalfinancialagencies,isobliquelyreferredtoinLila'sfantasticstatement.Thereisnoquestionthatprivatizationhashaditscosts,nottheleastofwhichhasbeenthesaturationoftheinformalsector(includingthatofvending),thehighcostofmanybasicnecessities,andthedeclineinwagesandincomesformanyPeruvians.Whileithasalsohadshort-termbenefitsforthePeruvianeconomyanditsinternationalcredibility,suchasunprecedentedgrowthinextractiveandutilitiesindustries,thesebenefitshavebeenoflimitedhelptomarketwomen.Theeconomicgrowthoftheextractiveandutilitiesindustriesisnotmatchedbyasubstantialincreaseinthenumbersemployedbysuchindustries.However,thereturnoftourismmaybenefitvendorssincemanymarketwomeninCuzcomakehandicrafts,andtheyarerelievedthattourismisontheriseagain,afterhavingsuffereda70percentdropduringthecivilwar.21

ItisunlikelythatFujimori'sextremeandrepressivederegulationwilltransformtheinformalsectorintoanorganizedandefficientseriesofmicroenterprises.DeregulationandthetotalwithdrawalofthestatehasworkedsuccessfullyonlyinalreadydevelopednationssuchasinCentralItalyandHongKong.However,ratherthanrejectingstateinterventionaltogether,amoreconstructivepolicythegovernmentshouldconsider,andonewithwhichmanymarketwomenwouldagree,isonewherethestateintervenesinordertoprovideinformalsectorworkerswithgreateraccesstocredittodeveloptransportationfacilities,aidintrainingprograms,andincentivesforcooperationandlinkagesamongformerlysegmentedgroupsfortheformationofmicroenterprises(theBuechlers,Chapter5,thisvolume).Inthecaseofvendors,microenterprisescouldbeorganizedinavarietyofways,allofwhichwouldencouragesmall-scale,dynamicflexibility.AsPortes(1994:129)suggests,suchenterprisesshouldberequiredtoprovidebenefitstoworkers,offerjobtenure,andenforcelaborrules.Onlythenwillthereservoiroflaborintheinformalsectordiminishandbelesssubjecttoexploitation.Inturn,thesekindsofmeasureswillenhancesocialwelfare,preventtheflagrantabuseofvulnerablelabor,andtransform"informaleconomiesofsurvivalintoinformaleconomiesofgrowth"(Portes,1994:127).Theveryflexibilityofinformalsectorworkerswillpermitthemtohandlemarketuncertaintiesfarbetterthanhugeandunwieldycorporations.22

Becausetheseproposedpoliciesarelong-termgoals,theywouldnotprovideanyshort-termfixes.However,theymaycalmthepoliticalinstabilitythatFujimori'smedicineportends.Withoutthesepolicies,itishighlylikelythatmarketwomen,stretchedtothelimitintermsoftime,energy,andpatience,andfearfulofthepowerofthemilitaryandthememoryofSendero,willlimittheirparticipationinfuturesocialmovements.Inturn,theirwithdrawalmayleavethepoliticalspaceopentomoreviolentchallengestoFujimori'sregimeintheformofguerrillamovementsormilitarycoups.

Notes

1.Moser(1994)andRakowski(1994)provideasuccinctdiscussionofdebatesabouttheinformalsector.

2.SeeSeligmann(inpress)forexamplesofthecreativewaysinwhichmarketwomenparticipateineconomic,political,andreligiousactivitiesthatbuildonandtransformtraditionalpracticesthatoriginateinQuechuacommunities.

3.SeeSeligmann(1989,1993)foradetaileddiscussionofwhy,overtime,womentendtoentertheoccupationalnicheofstreetvendinginPeru.AsSassen(1991:285-86)pointsout,whiletheremaybegoodreasonswhywomenarefavoredtoenterparticularnichesoftheinformaleconomy,structuraleconomicprocesseslinkedtotheperformanceofadvancedindustrializedeconomiesmaycreatetheconditionsforwomentoenterthecasuallaborforceingreaternumbersandinparticularniches.

4.SeeSeligmann(1989,1993)foradiscussionoftheseperspectives.

5.AsCookandJoo(1995:54)pointout,ethnicidentitiestendtobeextremelydynamicandcomplex.Anthropologists'relianceuponessentialistandsituationalistapproachestoethnicityarestillnotentirelysatisfactory.

6.SeeSeligmann(1989)foradiscussionofhow,inPeruviansociety,racismcreatesobstaclestoupwardmobilityamongmarketwomenknownascholas.Cholasmaycomefromindigenousbackgroundsbutseekthesameeconomicstandingandsocialacceptanceasthosewhoconsiderthemselvestobenon-indigenous.

7.ThenamesofthemarketwomenhavebeenchangedtoprotectthemfromanypossiblepoliticalrepercussionssincemanyofthewomenarecriticalofPresidentFujimoriandhispolicies.

8.SeealsoZamosc(1994:56)whospeaksofthedynamicsandexperienceofstatusinconsistencyamongemergingIndianleadersinEcuador.

9.Eventhoughemergencylawhasbeenliftedinmuchofthecountry,inMarch1995,

28.5percentoftheDepartmentofCuzco'spopulationand22.3percentofitsterritorywerestilllivingunderastateofemergencylaw(WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica,1995).

10.ThestatisticsdescribingPeru'seconomyaretakenfromMauceri(1995:11-12)andLASA(1995:7).

11.AccordingtotheNationalStandardofLivingSurveyperformedin1994,internationalreserveshaveswelledfrom$150millionin1990to$5.3billionin1995.TheGNPraterosefrom6.4percentin1993to12.7percentin1994.Whilethepovertyratedroppedfourpointsbetween1991and1994,itisstillnearly

sevenpointsover1985levels.AccordingtoeconomistsJavierIguíñizandJorgeGonzálezIzquierdo(citedinHoward,1995),thecountryiscurrentlylivingat1965levels.Incomelevelsaresimilartowhattheywerethirtyyearsago.Realbuyingpowerhasdecreasedby64percentoverthepastdecade,andthreemillionPeruvianshavejoinedtheranksofthepoorsince1985,withnearlyhalfthepopulationunabletomeetbasicneedsintermsofhealth,education,andnutrition.Mostimportantofall,theeconomicgrowththathastakenplacehasnotgeneratedmoreemployment(StatisticscitedfromHoward,1995:5).

12.Bromley(1994)offersathoughtfulcritiqueofdeSoto'sprescriptionsfortheinformalsector.

13.FigurestakenfromLatinAmericanPress27,no.30,August24,1995.

14.Peru'sCongresspassedalaborreformlawinJuly1995thateliminatesmanyofthehard-wonrightsofwomenworkers,includingdaycarecentersincompaniesthatemploymorethantwenty-fivewomen,aworkweekofnomorethanforty-fivehours,andanhourbreaktobreastfeed.Protestsagainsttheeliminationoftheserightscamefromwomen'sgroups,notunions.

15.WestwoodandRadcliffe(1993:19-20)offerexcellentreasonsforwhyMaxineMolyneux'sconceptsofpracticalandstrategicgenderinterestsshouldnotbedichotomized,sincethedistinctiondoes"nottakeintoaccounttheunderstandingfromfeminismthatthe'personalispolitical.'"Onthecontrary,ittendstomaintainthedistinctionbetweenthepublicandprivateandbetweenthepersonalandpolitical.WestwoodandRadcliffearguethatpoliticalidentitiesarenotfixed,andpersonalconcernsabouthouseholdreproductionandinequalitiesinthesexualdivisionoflabormayindeedtranslateintostrategicgenderinterests.

16.Despitetheirrebelliousstances,mostmarketwomen,establishedornot,offerthreereasonsforrefusingtoconsiderleadershippositionsinunions:onlymenknowhowtolead;onemustbeliterateandeducatedtobealeader;andtheydonothavetimetotakeontheburdensofleadership.

17.Discursivesitesaredefinedas"thesocialandpowerrelationsofspecificcontextsthathavebothformalrecognitionandinformalnegotiationsaspartofthewaysinwhichtheyareconstructed"(WestwoodandRadcliffe,1993:20).

18.OneexampleMaucerioffersoftheincreasingmilitarizationofthestateisthat"throughout1991,heavilyarmedtroopswereemployedto...accompanytheSUNAT,theNationalTaxCollectingAgency(SuperintendenciaNacionaldeAdministración

Tributaria),inclosingdownstreetvendorswhofailedtopaytaxes"(1995:20).

19.Intheofficialcountoftheresultsofthe1995Peruvianelections,Fujimorigarnered64.4percentofthevotes,winningineverydepartmentofPeru.IntheCongress,Fujimori'spartyCambio90/NuevaMayoríawona52.1percentmajority,or67ofthe120seatsinCongress.Absenteeismwasreportedat28percent(StatisticstakenfromtheWashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica,April18,1995,Reportonthe1995PeruvianElections).

20.In"thosewithoutstablework"Lilaisreferringprimarilytoworkersintheinformaleconomyandtothosewhohadlosttheirjobsinthepublicsectoroftheformaleconomy.

21.Despitetheeconomicpossibilitiesformarketwomeninthetouristindustry,thereisfiercecompetitionbetweenitinerantvendorsandshopsthatselltouristgoods.Tourism,infact,constitutesapotentialavenueofhighreturnstovendorsiftheyareabletoorganizeintoeffectivemicroenterprises.Thesubject

oftheorganizationoftheproductionandsaleofartisangoodstotouristsdeservesfurtherresearch.

22.Divertingstateanddepartmentalfundsforcommunitybuilding,infrastructuraldevelopment,andtheformationofregionalmarketsintheruralprovincesofthehighlandswouldleadtosimilarresults.Thisformofstateinterventionwouldencouragethegrowthofruralagriculture,fortifyhorizontallinkages,andcreatetiesbetweenruralandurbancenters,allprocessesthatwouldeventuallyfosterfarmorecoherentanddynamicregionaleconomies.

References

Babb,Florence.BetweenFieldandCookingPot:ThePoliticalEconomyofMarketwomeninPeru.Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1989.

."AftertheRevolution:NeoliberalPolicyandGenderinNicaragua."LatinAmericanPerspectives23,no.1(1996):27-48.

."Women,InformalEconomies,andtheStateinPeruandNicaragua."InWomenandEconomicChange:AndeanPerspectives,editedbyAnnMilesandHansBuechler,89-100.Washington,DC:SocietyforLatinAmericanAnthropology,1997.

Bromley,Ray."Informality,deSotoStyle:FromConcepttoPolicy."InContrapunto:TheInformalSectorDebateinLatinAmerica,editedbyCathyA.Rakowski,131-52.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1994.

Cook,Scott,andJong-TaickJoo."EthnicityandEconomyinRuralMexico:ACritiqueoftheIndigenistaApproach."LatinAmericanResearchReview30,no.2(1995):33-59.

Corcoran-Nantes,Yvonne."FemaleConsciousnessorFeministConsciousness?Women'sConsciousnessRaisinginCommunity-basedStrugglesinPeru."In'Viva':WomenandPopularProtestinLatinAmerica,editedbySarahA.RadcliffeandSallieWestwood,136-155.London:Routledge,1993.

DeOliveira,Orlandina,andBryanRoberts."TheManyRolesoftheInformalSectorinDevelopment:EvidencefromUrbanLaborMarketResearch,1940-1989."InContrapunto:TheInformalSectorDebateinLatinAmerica,editedbyCathyA.Rakowski,51-71.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1994.

DeSoto,Hernando.Elotrosendero.BuenosAires:Sudamericana,1987.

Escobar,Arturo."Culture,Economics,andPoliticsinLatinAmericanSocialMovementsTheoryandResearch."InTheMakingofSocialMovementsinLatinAmerica,editedby

ArturoEscobarandSoniaAlvarez,62-85.Boulder:WestviewPress,1992.

Geddes,Barbara."ThePoliticsofEconomicLiberalization."LatinAmericanResearchReview30,no.2(1995):195-214.

Hobsbawm,Eric.NationsandNationalismsince1780:Program,Myth,Reality.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990.

Howard,Rebecca."DailyLifeContinuestoBeaDailyStruggle."PeruSolidarityForum(1995):5.

LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation(LASA)."The1995ElectoralProcessinPeru:ADelegationReportoftheLatinAmericanStudiesAssociation."Miami:North-SouthCenter,UniversityofMiami,1995.

Lemarchand,René."ThePoliticalEconomyofInformalEconomies."Unpublishedmanuscript,1992.

Mauceri,Philip."StateReform,Coalitions,andtheNeoliberalAutogolpeinPeru."LatinAmericanResearchReview30,no.1(1995):7-38.

Molyneux,Maxine."MobilizationwithoutEmancipation?Women'sInterests,StateandRevolutioninNicaragua."FeministStudies11,no.2(Summer1985):227-54.

Moser,Carol."TheInformalSectorDebate,Part1:1970-1983."InContrapunto:TheInformalSectorDebateinLatinAmerica,editedbyCathyA.Rakowski,11-29.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1994.

"Peru:UnionsDon'tOrganize."LatinAmericanPress27,no.30,August24,1995.

Portes,Alejandro."WhenMoreCanBeLess:LaborStandards,Development,andtheInformalEconomy."InContrapunto:TheInformalSectorDebateinLatinAmerica,editedbyCathyA.Rakowski,113-29.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1994.

Rakowski,CathyA."TheInformalSectorDebate,Part2:1984-1993."InContrapunto:TheInformalSectorDebateinLatinAmerica,editedbyCathyA.Rakowski,31-50.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1994.

Sassen,Saskia.TheGlobalCity:NewYork,London,Tokyo.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991.

Seligmann,LindaJ."AWomanofSteel:TheLifeStoryofaPeruvianMarketWoman."InWomenintheInformalSector:CaseStudiesandTheoreticalApproaches,editedbyJudithMartiandTamarWilson.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,inpress.

."BetweenWorldsofExchange:EthnicityamongPeruvianMarketWomen."CulturalAnthropology8,no.2(1993):187-213.

."ToBeInBetween:TheCholasasMarketWomeninPeru."ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory31,no.4(1989):694-721.

WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica."Reportonthe1995PeruvianElections."Memo

senttoPeruPeaceNetworkMembers,1995.

Westwood,Sallie,andSarahA.Radcliffe."Gender,Racism,andthePoliticsofIdentitiesinLatinAmerica."In'Viva':WomenandPopularProtestinLatinAmerica,editedbySarahA.RadcliffeandSallieWestwood,1-29.London:Routledge,1993.

Zamosc,Leon."AgrarianProtestandtheIndianMovementintheEcuadorianHighlands."LatinAmericanResearchReview29,no.3(1994):37-65.

5FinancingSmall-ScaleEnterprisesinBoliviaHansBuechler,Judith-MariaBuechler,SimoneBuechler,andStephanieBuechler*

Asaresultofmassiverural-urbanmigrationandtheeconomicdeclineinthe1980s,small-scaleactivitiesinurbanBoliviahaveexpandeddramatically.1Thisgrowthhasforcedsmall-scalecommodityproducersandvendorstosearchfornewwaystofinancetheiractivitiesamidstaninfluxofcompetition.Newcomerstothisfieldincludeformerfactoryworkersandminerswhoseoperationshavebeenshutdownorreducedasaresultofstructuraladjustmentpoliciesthatentailedtheeliminationofsubsidies,thecutbackofsocialservices,currencydevaluations,andwagecontrols.Competitionalsocomesfrompeoplemigratingfromruralcommunitieswhereincreasesinproductivityhavenotkeptpacewithpopulationgrowth(seePainter,Chapter2,thisvolume).2Inaddition,thoseengagedinurbanproductionmustcompetewithforeigngoodsflowingintothecountry,duetotheloweringofimporttaxesresultingfromnewtradeagreementssuchastheAndeanPactandasapartofstructuraladjustment.

Traditionalsourcesofcredittomeettheneedsofsmall-scaleproducersandmerchantshavebecomeincreasinglyinadequate.InBoliviathe

*WewishtothankMarthaLanzaMeneses,whoseinitialanalysisofthedatagatheredundertheaegisoftheInternationalCoalitiononWomenandCreditandBancoSolin1994formstheprincipalbasisforouranalysisoftheimpactofcreditonwomeninLaPaz.Thischapterisbasedonlong-termanthropologicalfieldworkonsmall-scalemarketingandproductioninLaPaz,Bolivia;animpactstudyofBancoSolconductedfortheInternationalCoalitiononWomenandCredit;andanorganizationalprofileofACCIONInternational(anNGOconcernedwithprovidingcreditforsmallenterprises).

formalfinancialsectorhasfavoredlargerborrowersinthenonagriculturalformalsector,withafocusoncommercialandindustrialactivitiescarriedoutbylargerfirms.Itisestimatedthat1percentoftheborrowersinBoliviareceive45percentoftheloans(Lizano,1992;Otero,1993:23).Theveryfewsmall-to-mediumenterprisesthatdidhaveaccesstoformalbankloanshadincreasingdifficultiesinobtainingsuchloansduetothestructuraladjustmentpoliciesthatforcedareductionofthemoneyincirculation.Inanefforttoremedythissituation,severalnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)havesetupcreditprogramstargetedtosmallenterprises.Someoftheseorganizationshavefocusedtheirlendingonwomenduetotherealizationthattheeliminationofpovertyisnotpossiblewithouttheadvancementofwomen.Itisnowarguedthatitisonlythroughanincreaseinwomen'sincomethatafamily'sstandardoflivingisenhancedbyimprovementsinhealth,nutrition,housing,andclothing.SuchanimprovementisdoublyimportantintheBoliviancontextwhere,in1991,averageincomesadjustedforinflationwereonly83percentof1987levelsandincomedistributionhasbecomeincreasinglyunequalasaresultofstructuraladjustment(Arzeetal.,1993:7778).

Small-ScaleProductionandTradeinBolivia

LikemanyothercountriesinLatinAmerica,Bolivia'snationaleconomywastraditionallydependentontheextractionandexportofrawmaterials,inthiscase,minerals.Untiltheagrarianreformof1953,andeventodayinthelowlandsofBolivia,thecountry'selitesalsoownedlargefarms.Fewlarger-scalecapitalistsinvestedinindustry;mostmanufacturedgoodswereeitherimportedorwereproducedlocallybyartisans.UnlikemanyLatinAmericancountries,Bolivianeverwentthroughaperiodoflarge-scaleimportsubstitutionprograms.TheBolivianeconomyhasalwaysbeencharacterizedbymicro-andsmall-scaleproduction.Althoughcheapimportsandasmallnumberoflocalfactorieshavemadeinroadsintourbanartisanproduction(makingsuchtradesastinsmithery,whichcontinuedtoflourishwellintothe1980s,allbutobsolete),lowwagesandhightransportationcostscontinuetofavorlocalartisanproductionofmanygoodsovercompetingimports.Themarketforthecheapgoodstheyproducecontinuestoexpandwiththeever-increasingruraltourbanmigration.

Small-scalelabor-intensiveproductionalsoprovedtobemoreflexibleduringthesevereeconomicrecession,whathasbeencalledthedebtcrisis,intheearlytomid-1980s.ThecrisishadcomeaboutinBoliviabecause,likeotherThirdWorldcountries,thecountryhadbeenencouragedtoborrowheavilyforlarge-scaledevelopmentprojectsduringthe

1970s.Whentheseoftenill-conceivedprojectsfailedtogeneratepromisedrevenues,theforeigndebt,bloatedbysharplyrisinginterestrates,becameincreasinglyburdensome.Duringthisperiod,smallerentrepreneurscouldreactmoreflexiblythanmorehighlycapitalizedonessincetheirlowerindebtednessenabledthemtocurtailproductionorevenallowedthemtomakeatemporaryswitchintocommercewithoutgoingbankrupt.

Inaddition,small-scaleentrepreneursareabletoadaptrapidlytochangingeconomicconditionsbyengaginginmorethanoneoccupation.Accordingtothecensusof1992,13.7percentoftheworkingindividualsinElAltoand10.4percentofthoseworkinginLaPazhadanadditionaljob(Bolivia,1993a).Examplesofmicroentrepreneurswithmultipleoccupationsincludeawomanwhosemainoccupationisknittingsweatersforexportwhoalsobuysandsellscottongoods,acookiebakerwhoknitssweaterstoo,andameatvendorwhoaddstoherincomebysellingcrèchefiguresduringtheChristmasfair.Inaddition,differenthouseholdmembersmayengageinseparateactivitiesbuthelponeanotherwhentheneedarises.Engaginginmorethanoneoccupationalsomakesitpossible''foranindividualtotemporarilyorpermanentlyabandonatradeandswitchtoanotherone"(BuechlerandBuechler,1992:57).Forexample,inthelate1980swhenthegovernmenteasedimportrestrictionsinconnectionwithstructuraladjustment,manyproducersswitchedtosellingimportedconsumergoods.

Retailtradeinmanygoods,includingmostfoodstuffs(whetherlocallyproducedorimported),wasalsotraditionallyinthehandsofsmall-scaleentrepreneurswhosecontributiontocommercefurtherincreasedafterthe1953agrarianreform,whichsubstantiallyreducedtheroleofhighlandlandownersinfooddistribution.Thatreform,partofawide-rangingsocialrevolutionthatalsoincludedtheintroductionofuniversalsuffrageandtheestablishmentofschoolsinruralareas,transformedpeasantsonfeudalestatesinthehighlandsintosmallholderswhooftenmarketedtheirownproduceinthecities.Inadditiontofood,small-scaleretailinginstreetstallsandsmallshopsalsoincludesartisanmanufactures,cheaperclothing,andconsumergoods.Inthelate1980sandintothe1990s,asconditionsworsened,theinvolvementinsmall-scaleactivities,particularlycommerce,furtherincreased.Miningoperationswereheavilycurtailedinanattemptbythestatetorationalizeproductionandreducemassiveinflation.Duringthatperiodthestatealsoreducedpublicemploymentandexpendituresinhealthandeducation,anddiscouragedindustrialinvestmentbymaintaininghighinterestrates(Arzeetal.,1993:47).Desperateforwork,largegroupsofpeoplesoughtretailsitesonthestreets,causingmanymarketsitestoincreaseinsize.

Evenalreadywell-establishedmarketshaveexperiencedexponentialgrowth,includingtheRodriguezmarketinLaPaz.Onceconfinedmainlytoseveralhundredestablishedmarketvendorssellinginacoveredmarket,in1967theRodriguezmarketgrewto1,067vendorsonweekdaysand2,332duringtheSaturdaymarket,whichcoveredseveralblocksofvendorssellingmainlyinthestreet(J-M.Buechler,1972:85).By1992thenumberofvendorssellinginthesamegeneralareaonaSaturdayhadincreasedto3,778(RiveraCusicanqui,1992).ThegrowthinthetotalnumberofvendorsinLaPazandthenewlyindependentsatellitecityofElAlto,wheremanyofthemorerecentmigrantsfromruralareasliveandwheremuchofLaPaz'sindustryismoving,ismoredifficulttoestablish.In1967,12,000vendorswerecountedandatotalof15,000vendorswereestimatedforthecityasawhole,whilein1992,27,371vendorswerecountedintheeightmajormarketsalone(RiveraCusicanqui,1992).

Thefirstoverallassessmentoftheimportanceofsmall-scaleactivitiesinthecityofLaPaz(whichatthetimealsoincludedElAlto)wasobtainedwiththenationalcensusin1976.Atthattime,outofatotallaborforceof225,654(inapopulationof635,283),127,415or56.5percentwereemployedinbusinesseswithfiveorfewerworkers(Bolivia,1980).TheCentrodeEstudiosparaelDesarrolloLaboralyAgrario(CEDLA)estimatedthat,in1989,93,455personswereemployedincommercealoneinLaPazandElAlto(RiveraCusicanqui,1992:18).3By1992thetotalpopulationinthetwocitieshadincreasedto1,118,870,almostdoublethepopulationin1976(Bolivia,1993a).

Theincreaseinsmall-scaleactivitiesinLaPazandElAltomirrorsthegrowththroughouturbanBolivia.In1992,55percentoftheeconomicallyactiveurbanpopulationwereengagedinsmall-scaleactivities2percentmorethanin1988and10percentmorethanin1976(Arzeetal.,1993:70).Incontrast,thoseengagedinpublicemploymentandlargerprivatefirmsshrankfrom44percentin1976to42percentin1988and41percentin1992.4

TheCharacteristicsandFunctioningofSmall-ScaleEnterprises

Socialscientistsoftenplacesmall-scaleenterpriseslikethoseinBoliviaintothecategoryof"informalsector,"usuallydefinedasbusinessesthatarenotlegallyconstitutedorregulated,arenottaxed,engageinillegalactivities,donothaveaccesstobankcredit,andsoforth.However,boththeautomaticassociationofsmallscaleandlowcapitalizationwithcharacteristicsenumeratedaboveandtheformal/informaldichotomyitselfaremisleading(BuechlerandBuechler,1992;H.Buechler,1992).Forexample,inBolivia,marketinginpermanentstreetlocationsisahighly

regulatedeconomicactivity.Furthermore,larger"formal"andsmaller"informal"firmsareoftenintricatelyinterconnectedthroughanetworkofdependentrelationships,includingworkbeingcontractedoutbylargerfirmstosmalleronesand"wages"oflargefactoriesbeingpaidpartiallyinkindtoindividualworkerswhosefamiliesthenresellthegoodsobtainedinthismanner.Inaddition,earningsfromfactoryemploymentoftenservetoestablishindependentfirms.Thus,theconceptof"informalsector"mayhideratherthanhighlightthecentralityofsmall-scaleeconomicactivitiestotheBolivianeconomy.

Openingupasmall-scaleenterprisecanalsonotbeconsideredasaninstantemploymentsolutionfortheincreasingnumberofruralmigrantstothecities.Migrantswillworkfirstforothersasmeniallaborersinconstruction,indomesticservice,asstevedores,orforsmallbusinesses.Theyareonlyinthepositiontoopenbusinessesoftheirownwhentheyarealreadywellestablishedinthecity(Casanovas,1986).

Themannerinwhichsmall-scaleentrepreneursinLaPazareinitiatedintotheiroccupationsdependsonthenatureoftheseoccupations,ongender,andontheruralorurbanoriginoftheentrepreneurs.Entrepreneursmaylearntheirtradeswithinthehouseholdbywatchingtheirparentsandotherfamilymembersandgraduallyincreasingtheirowninvolvement,orbyengaginginmoreorlessformalizedapprenticeshipsinenterprisesoutsidethehome.Often,theskillsrequiredforaproductiveenterpriseareverygeneral,transmittedtoallchildrenofthesamesex.Ruraltourbanmigrantsareparticularlylikelytousesuchskillsacquiredfromtheirparents.Manyoftheseskills,suchascooking,sewing,floorloomweaving,marketing,andadobemakingaregeneralruralskillstransmittedtoallchildrenofthesamesex,whoadaptthemtotheurbancontextandspecificcraftortradetheychoose(Albóetal.,1982;BuechlerandBuechler,1992).Otherskillsarespecifictoaruralcommunityortownthatspecializesinaparticularactivity,suchasgatheringandtradinginmedicinalherbsormanufacturingmusicalinstruments.

Long-termresidentsofLaPazhaveaccesstoawiderrangeofskillsthandorecentmigrants,andtheypasstheseskillsontotheirchildrenandtononrelatedapprentices.Indeed,apprenticeshipwithkin,acquaintances,orstrangersisthemostcommonformofacquiringspecializedskills.Migrantsaremorelikelythanlong-termresidentstoacquirespecializedskillsfromkin.However,perhapsbecauseoftheirdesireforupwardmobility,migrantproducersarelesslikelytolearntheirtradefromtheirparentsthanarenonmigrants,andfewerfirst-generationurbandwellersthanlong-termurbanitesinturnpassonthetradetotheirchildren.Someproducersalsolearntheirtradeinfactoriesand,especiallyinthecaseoflong-termurbanites,fromforeignerswhohavebroughtskills

fromtheircountriesoforigin.Marketvendors,bothmigrantsandnonmigrants,aremostlikelytolearntheirskillsfromtheirmothers.

Fromtheforegoingdiscussionoftheacquisitionofskills,italreadybecomesapparentthatsmall-scaleentrepreneursaredependentuponacomplexnetworkofinterpersonaltiestoengageintheirbusinesses.Kinarethemostimportantlaborresourceforalltypesofsmall-scaleentrepreneurssince,inasituationofjobscarcity,ahouseholdmustmaximizelaboropportunitiesforitsmembers.However,evenquitedistantlyrelatedkinarewellknowntotheentrepreneur.Theirsuitabilityforajobcanbeascertainedbymakingenquiriesthroughotherkin,whocanalsobemobilizedtoexertpressureonkinworkerstoconformtoexpectations.Ina1981sampleof196small-scaleproducers,70percentincludedkinintheirworkforce.Ofthese,almostthree-quartersincludedmembersoftheowner'snuclearfamily,andabouthalfinvolvedotherkin.Ofthetotalsample,29.4percentworkedwiththeirspousesand33percentwiththeirchildren(BuechlerandBuechler,1992).

Kinareequallyimportantforvendors,althoughtheyrarelyemploywagelaborexcepttocarrytheirgoodstomarket.Ina1994study,only14.3percentofthevendors(versus80.8percentoftheproducers)employedwagelabor.5Instead,theyreceivedlaborassistancefromclosekin.Thereisacleardivisionoflaborbetweenmenandwomen.Vendors'husbandsassistwithtransportationbutrarelywithselling(exceptonSundays),daughtersinvariablysellandoftenalsoactasbuyers,andsonshelpinmanywaysbuttheyareonlyhalfaslikelytosell.Inhalfofthecasesstudiedwheresonsdidassistinsellinggoods,therewerenodaughtersinthefamilyorthedaughterswerelessthansevenyearsold.Sonsneverhelpinsellingfruitorvegetables,astrictlyfemaledomainofthemarket.Nieces,nephews,andgodchildrenaremobilizedmainlyforselling.Kinarealmostinvariablyinvolvedinthedecisiontoenterthemarketortosellaspecificproduct,andtheyareoftentaughtbykinhowtosell.Forvendorswhoaremigrants,kinareveryfrequentlythesourcefortheproducetheysell.Stallsareoftenpurchasedfromkinorobtainedfromkinasgiftsorthroughthemediationofkin(J-M.Buechler,1972;RiveraCusicanqui,1992).6

Small-scaleproducersandvendorsaredispersedthroughouttheentirecitiesofLaPazandElAlto.Smallkiosks,newspaperstands,tailorshops,andtinygrocerystoresarelocatedeveninupper-classneighborhoods.However,mostarelocatedinthepoorersectionsofthecity,awayfromthecenterandthemiddle-classsuburbanareasofObrajesandCalacoto.Vendors,inparticular,mustwageaconstantbattletoavoidbeingdislodgedfromtheincreasinglycongestedcenter,whichmaybewhytheyhaveagreaterpropensitytoorganizemarketunionsandasso-

ciations.Suchorganizationsprovideaninterfacebetweenthevendorsandthemunicipalgovernmentandregulatetheallocationofvendingsites.Incontrast,exceptforcertainprominentartisangroupssuchasthecostumemakersandthegoldsmiths,artisans,especiallythosewhodonotalsoretailtheirproductsthemselves,tendnottojoinformalorganizations,andinsteadremainhiddenfrompublicviewand,toadegree,outsidethecontroloftaxcollectors.

TwoCaseStudies

ThelivesofDoñaAvelinaCopanadeGarnica,anartisan,andSofíaVelasquez,ameatvendor,giveabettersenseofthedevelopmentandfunctioningofsmall-scaleenterprisesinLaPaz(BuechlerandBuechler,1996).DoñaAvelinaisasmallentrepreneurwholivesinLaPaz,thesamecitywhereshewasborn.ShespeaksbothAymara,oneofthetwomainindigenouslanguages,andSpanish,andcomesfromafamilywithatraditionincostumemaking.Herentirefamily,includingherhusbandatinsmithandtheirsixchildren,areengagedinthefamilyenterprise.Herhusbandlearnedthenecessaryskillstomakeobjectsoutofsheetmetalbybeinganapprenticeinheraunt'sworkshopforashortperiodoftime.Theeightofthemliveinverysmall,rentedquartersinadistrictwithmanyotherartisans'workshops.Theirsmallworkshopisdownstairswithasmallstoveforsolderinginthecorner.Atthebackoftheroomisatinycookingareapartitionedoffbymeansofalengthoffabric.Theupstairsconsistssolelyofonebedroomwithbunkbedswhereallofthemsleepandwheretheyalsoperformworkfortheenterprise.Forsomeoftheirprojects,theGarnicasusethelargeterraceofAvelina'sparents'houseacrossthestreetfromtheworkshop.

Thebulkoftheiroutputisdestinedforritualusesaints'daycelebrationsandAlasitas,anannualfairofminiatureobjects,thepurchaseofwhichissupposedtosecurethedesiredobjectsrepresentedbytheminiatures.ProductionforritualsoccupiesalargenumberofLaPazresidents.Specifically,DoñaAvelinaandherfamilyproducemasks,noisemakers,andwhipsoutofmetal,cardboard,andclothfortheMorenodance,adancethatbringsitsperformersprestigebecauseoftheelaborateandexpensivenatureofthecostumes.Avelinaismainlyinvolvedindoingtheembroideryfortheminiatures'costumesandthecuttingandpastingofthedecorationsonthecostumes.

Avelinaisalsoverymuchinvolvedinthemanagingofthebusiness.Shekeepstheaccountsandsupervisestheworkers.Theyselltheirgoodsonthebasisoforders,andeventhoughsheonlyhasafifth-gradeeducation,Avelinaistheonewhowritesupthecontractsanddoesallofthe

accountingforthebusiness.Avelinahasfourhiredworkers,whoweretrainedbyherfatherandusedtoworkforhim.Inordertosupervisethem,shetravelseveryotherdaytotheirhomesinElAlto,aforty-minutebusrideaway,wheretheyworkwithallthemembersoftheirfamiliesandoccasionallywithassistantswhoarehiredbytheworkersthemselvestospeedupthejob.Sincedemandfluctuatesaccordingtotheritualcycle,onlyoneworkerishiredbyAvelinaandherhusbandfromNovemberuntilMay.FromMayuntilAugustallfourareemployedbecausetheyhavenumerousordersduringthesemonths.SeptemberandOctoberareslowmonthsandnoemployeesarehired.

AvelinaandherhusbandoccasionallytraveltoPerutoselltheirgoodsforfiestas.Therenownofcertaindancetypesandofparticularlytalentedartisansinvolvedinproducingcostumeshasspilledoverthecountry'sborders.However,bothsheandherhusbandhavebeencheatedbyfiestasponsorsinPeruwho,exceptforasmalladvance,haverefusedtopaytheGarnicasforthegoodstheybring.Customsofficialsalsofrequentlystealoneortwoitemsoutofeachbox,knowingthatmicroentrepreneursarepowerlesstostopthem.

Avelinaandherhusbandhaveactedassponsorsoftheannualfiestaofthepatronsaintoftheirneighborhood.Suchsponsorshipsareexpensivebutbringprestigeandimportantbusinessconnections,becausepeoplewhocometothefiestathenordertheirartisanryforotherfiestas.TheartisanproductionforAlasitas,afairheldduringtheweekfollowingJanuary24,includesanevenlargernumberofproducers,mostlyworkingseasonally.InadditiontogypsumeffigiesofEkeko,thegodofplenty,representedasanoldmanbedeckedwithminiaturebagsofstaples,artisansmakeminiatureanimals,householditems,vehicles,houses,andotherdesiredobjects.Asaspin-offoffiestaandAlasitasproduction,artisanslikeAvelinaalsoproduceforthetouristtrade,whichisbecomingincreasinglyimportantandwhichtidesthefamilyoverslackperiodsintheannualcycleofrituals.Avelinaandherfamilygetcontractsfromtouriststoresinthecity.Theadvantageofsellingartisanrytothesestores,shesays,isthatthebuyerspurchaseinlargequantitiesandtheypaycash.

Anothersmall-scaleentrepreneur,SofíaVelasquez,hasbeeninvolvedinmarketingactivitiessinceshewasasmallchild.Hermother,awomanwhohadmigratedtoLaPazinherteens,wouldtakehertodistantvalleystoexchangecracklings,theby-productofhertallowcandle-makingindustry.Sofíasoonalsohelpedhermotherdistributecandlestoretailers.Later,attheinstigationofafriend,shebegansellingpeasandothervegetablesinthemarketonthedayswhenshedidnotattendschool.Whenherfamilyreturnedtohermother'scommunityoforigin,Sofíatooktheonionstheyandothercommunitymembersproducedtothecity,soldbeer

atruralfiestas,andboughteggsatruralfairsforresaletoretailersandrestaurantsinLaPaz.Eventually,shemadethecityherprimaryresidenceandtraveledfromthere.Latersheswitchedtotradinginmuttonandfinallytopork.

Likemostmarketvendors,Sofíaestablishedlong-termeconomicrelationshipswithbothsuppliersandclients.Althoughshemustsupportherselfandherteenagedaughter,Rocío,withheractivities(withlittlehelpfromthechild'sfather,whoalsomaintainsanotherhousehold),shehasbeenabletogiveherchildaprivateeducationandplanstosendhertomedicalschool.Thisisarare,butnotunheard-of,aspirationinBoliviaforsomeoneofherbackground.7Becauseofherexceptionalintelligence,herprivateschooleducation,albeitonlyuntilsixthgrade,andherbrother'sinvolvementinpolitics,Sofíahasbecomealeaderinthemarketswhereshesells,andheadsthemarketorganizationthatcontrolsthestreetmarketinherneighborhood.Suchleadershippositionsalsoentailsponsoringmarketfeasts,oftenatconsiderablepersonalexpense.Womenoftenholdleadershippositionsatthelevelofthemarketunionsinwhichtheyoftencomprisethevastmajorityofthemembership.Atthelevelofcity-widefederationsandregionalconfederationsofunions,menaremorelikelytooccupytop-levelpositions.8

Atpresent,Sofía'sdaughtercooksfood,whichSofíasellsinfrontofherhomeonthedayssheisnotinvolvedinbuyingporkintheruralfairclosesttohermother'scommunityoforigin,orsellingporkinLaPaz.Sofíaconsidersherselfacholadecente,asocialcategorythatincludeswell-establishedurbanvendorsandartisanssuchasDoñaAvelina.Thecholasaremarkedbytheirattire:wideskirtsandashawlwithatasseledfringe.Dependingonwhetheritisforeverydayorforholidayuse,theshawlcanbemadeoutofwool,embroiderednylon,orevenvicuñawool,andtheskirtismadefromplainclothorplushvelvet.Theoutfitisnotcompletewithoutheavypearlearrings,which,inthesedaysofprolongedrecession,areusuallymadeoutofgildedsilver.Althoughlookeddownuponbytheelites,thecholaspridethemselvesontheirexpensiveattire,whichcostasmuchas$1,000foracompleteoutfiteventwentyyearsago.

MicrocreditandtheHistoryofBancoSol

Sincethemid-1980stheinternationaldevelopmentfieldhasincreasinglyturnedto"microenterprise"developmentprogramsasanapproachtocombattheeffectsofstructuraladjustmentpolicies.Thenewfocusisonprogramsthatarefinanciallysustainable,withoutlargedonorfunding,andwhichprovideloansratherthangrantstopoorpeople.Thisapproachstems

inpartfromafearthatdonorfundscaneasilybechanneledelsewherebythegovernmentordryuprapidly,aswellasfromanewbusinessorientationthatreflectsaconservativetrendineconomicthinkingamongmanygovernmentsanddevelopmentpractitioners.Thenewfocusalsostemsfromtherealizationthatthedevelopmentfieldhaslargelyfailedtobringaboutrealchangesinthelivesofmost"beneficiaries."Providingmicroentrepreneurswithcreditisseenasawaytoprovideequaleconomicopportunitiestothepoor,especiallypoorwomen,enablingthemtohelpthemselves.Theconceptofcreditfitsnicelyintotheneoliberalargumentsinceitemphasizesequalaccesstofinancialresourcestosupportgrowthofprivateenterprisesandthe"freemarket."Theconceptemphasizesprivateinitiativesratherthanpublicinvolvement.Theargumentisthatpublicservicescanbefurtherreducedifwomen'sincomefromprivatesourcesincreases.Theprevioushandicraftprojectsforwomenwhodidnotconcernthemselveswithmarketrealitiesoftendidnotbringinadditionalincomeorempowerwomenpolitically.Sincewomen'seconomicempowermentisbeginningtobeseenascrucialfortheiroveralladvancement,accesstocreditforsmallenterprisesisrecognizedtobeoneofthemostimportantstepsforachievingthisempowerment.

Supportbydevelopmentagenciesofmicrolendinginstitutionsisseenaspartofthiseconomicsolutionsincetheformalfinancialsystemhasfailedtoreachmicroentrepreneurs.Microlendinginstitutionsprovidesmallloansforshortdurationstotheself-employed,primarilyforproductiveactivities.DifferenttypesofmicrolendinginstitutionsexistinBolivia,includingnongovernmentalorganizationssuchasProCredito,theFundaciónparalaPromociónyelDesarrollodeMicroempresas(PRODEM),andprogramsofnongovernmentalorganizationssuchasCatholicReliefServices,creditunionsandcooperatives,developmentbanks,andaspecializedcommercialbank,BancoSolidarioS.A.(BancoSol).

Inthepastdecadetherehasbeenconsiderableinnovationinthedevelopmentofdifferentkindsofinstitutionalstructures,creditdelivery,andfinancingmechanismsforsmallentrepreneurs.Concertedeffortsonthepartofthelenderswerenecessaryinordertoovercometheperceptionofpoorerclientsthatlendinginstitutionswereformidableinstitutionsgearedtowardsthewealthy.Forexample,facilitiesweremademorehospitabletopoorerclients.InthecaseofBancoSol,banksweredecoratedwithphotographsofsmall-scaleproducersandvendors.Thestaffwasrecruitedfromsimilarbackgroundstothoseoftheclientsandcarefullytrained.Thebankswerephysicallydecentralized(boththroughdecentralizedbranchesandthedeploymentofmobilecreditofficers),andclientsparticipatedwithintheorganizationsasmembersoftheboardor

actuallyrantheorganization,asisthecaseincreditunionandvillagebanksoperatedbytheFoundationforInternationalCommunityAssistance(FINCAInternational)inLatinAmerica.Conduciveloanpolicieswereintroduced,includingsimpleandpersonalapplicationandrepaymentproceduresthatwereflexiblewhennecessary(SimoneBuechler,1995:812).

Morerecently,varioustypesoflinkageshavebeendevelopedbetweenmicrolendinginstitutionsandtheformalfinancialsystem.Institutionsareeitherbecomingpartoftheformalfinancialsystem,asisthecasewithBancoSol,orremainingoutsideoftheformalfinancialsystem,forminglinkagesinsteadwithcommercialanddevelopmentbanksandthemoneymarket.Loanguaranteefundshavebeensetupininternationalcommercialbanksbyinternationaldevelopmentorganizationstobeusedbylocalmocroenterpriseprogramsascollateraltogainaccesstoloansfromlocalbanksandinturnlendtomicroentrepreneurs.NationaldevelopmentbankshaveusedNGOs,creditunions,andsmallerlocalbanksasintermediariestoreachmicroentrepreneurs(SimoneBuechler,1995:1314).

BancoSolisthefirstcommercialbankinLatinAmericatofocusonservingmicroentrepreneurs.ItgrewoutofPRODEM,asuccessfulnonprofitorganizationandaffiliateofACCIONInternationalinBolivia.9Ithelpedtopopularizethesolidaritygroup-lendingapproach,acreditapproachdiscussedbelowthathasallowedmicroentrepreneurstoreceivesmallloanswithoutcollateral.

Inthefouryearsofitsoperation,PRODEMreached26,104clients,andbytheendofthe1991wasdisbursingU.S.$2millionpermonth(DrakeandOtero,1995:9091).However,itspotentialforgrowthwasultimatelyinhibitedbyalackofcapital.ThroughACCION'sBridgeFundletterofcreditmechanism,afundinaU.S.commercialbankthatservesasaguaranteetoinducelocalcommercialbankstoprovidegreateramountsoflendingresourcestotheACCIONlocalaffiliateandthereforeitsclients,PRODEMwasabletogainaccesstoasmallamountoflendingcapitalfromlocalcommercialbanks.However,itwasnotabletoacceptsavingsdepositsbecauseitwasanongovernmentalorganizationandthereforenotlegallyentitledtoactasabank.By1990,PRODEMwasonlyabletoreachlessthan3percentofallthemicroentrepreneursinBolivia(DrakeandOtero,1995:9192).

DuetothelimitationsofPRODEMinreachingmoremicroentrepreneursandtheirbeliefthatdependencyondonorsisultimatelydetrimentaltodevelopment,theideaemergedofcreatingaformalbankbasedontheexperienceoftheGrameenBankinBangladesh.InitialinvestorsinthebankincludedBolivianindividuals(U.S.$52,500),Bolivian

businesses(U.S.$1million),theCalmeadowFoundation(U.S.$406,000),ACCIONInternational(U.S.$250,000),ECOSHolding(FUNDESgroup)(U.S.$250,000),andPRODEM(U.S.$1.4million)(DrakeandOtero,1995:9297).10

OneoftheprimaryfactorscontributingtotheformationofBancoSolwastheleadershipofFernandoRomero,oneofBolivia'smostpowerfulbusinessmen,whobecamethepresidentofthebank.RomeroarguedthatanewwayofthinkingaboutdevelopmentwouldoccurwiththeestablishmentofBancoSol;"theonlydoubtishowfarthetransformationwillgo.Wecan'tcontinuewiththetraditionalpatternofdependency.Wemustbuildinstitutionsthatmaintainthemselvesandhelpthecommunitygrow.Thisisourownsortofperestroika"(Blount,1992:A17).ThepoliticalandeconomicsituationinBoliviawasalsoadeterminingfactorinthecreationofBancoSol.Crucialwerethegovernment's"no-objection"position,lowerinflation,andaprojectedgrowthratein1992of3.5percentthatattractedlocalandforeigncapital(DrakeandOtero,1995:98).

SomeofboththePRODEMandACCIONstaffandpotentialinvestorswereinitiallycriticalofstartingacommercialbankforthepoor(Otero,1993).Duetotheirpoliticalandsocialbeliefs,someofthePRODEMstaffneededconvincingthatafor-profitbankwasagoodidea.InvestorsinterestedinBancoSolwereinitiallyhesitanttoestablishabankwithsuchahighinterestrate(about20percentagepointsabovecommercialinterestrates),sinceitwasabankthatwassupposedtoservethepoor(DrakeandOtero,1995:94).TheinterestrateofBancoSoliscurrently4percentpermonthplusvariouscharges,aratedeemednecessarytocoverthehighcostsoflendingsmallamounts,whilecommercialbankschargeonly13to15percentperannum.However,accordingtoonesource,theaverageeffectiveinterestrateforloanschargedbymoneylendersinBoliviancitiesisfrom88percentto3,600percentperyear(Otero,1993:15).

BancoSolopeneditsdoorsinFebruary1992.Thefirstyear,itreached27,174clients,made58,872loans,andlentU.S.$21,720,000(SimoneBuechler,1994:7).InDecember1994,BancoSolhadtwenty-ninebranchesinfourregions.AsofDecember1995thebankhad331employees(upfrom73whenitbegan).Inthatyear,itmade122,477loansanddisbursedoverU.S.$72milliontoover61,181borrowers(outofwhomover16,000werenewborrowers).ByDecember1995thebankhadlentcumulativelyto417,334borrowerssince1992.In1993,71percentoftheborrowerswerewomen.Althoughstatisticsarenolongerdisaggregatedbygender,itisestimatedthatin1995thisfigurehaddroppedto60to65percent(ACCIONInternational,1995).

BancoSolusesthesolidaritygroupapproachtolending.Clientsmustbepartofafive-toseven-membersolidaritygrouptoreceivealoan.Themembersarenotnecessarilyrelatedtoeachother.Eachindividualinthegroupreceivesaseparateloan,butallofthemareresponsibleforensuringtherepaymentofalltheloans.Onememberofthegroupisexpectedtoactastheloanpaymentcollector.Ifoneofthemembersofthegroupdefaults,theothersareresponsibleforrepayingthatmember'sloan.Themethodologythusreliesonpeerpressure.Itisalsoconsideredalesscostlywaytoreachmicroentrepreneurswhorequireverysmallloans.

Thesolidaritygroupapproachreducesadministrativecostsbyprocessingoneloanforeveryfivetosevenmembersandimprovestherepaymentrate.TheminimumandmaximumloanamountsforanentrepreneurinvolvedincommerceareU.S.$100andU.S.$2,700respectively,andforthoseinproductionU.S.$150andU.S.$3,000.Thetermsoftheloanareeighttoforty-eightweeksforanentrepeneurincommerceandtwelvetofifty-sixweeksforaproducer.Thegroupsthemselvesdecideonthetermsoftheloan.Theamountandtermsalsodependonthenumberofpreviousloansreceivedandontherepaymentrecordsofthegroup(BuechlerandMeneses,1994:2).Inordertoreducetransactioncostsforboththeclientandthelender,BancoSolhasusedrepaymentincentives(highersubsequentloanswhenrepaymentoccursontime),solidaritygroups,simpleloanapplicationprocedures,andrapidapprovalandcollectionprocesses.TheselowertransactioncostsenableBancoSoltoreachclientsatalowercostandreachmicroentrepreneurswhodonotinterestotherbanksduetotheirlackofcollateralandtheneedforrapidandsmallamountsofcapital.

BancoSolalsocollectssavings.InDecember1995thetotalamountofsavingswasmorethanU.S.$3million,whichisusedforlendingcapital.Therearethreedifferentsavingsplans:anopenaccountinbolivianosandinU.S.dollarsinwhichthereisopenavailability;acapitalaccountinbothcurrenciesthatpermitsonlytwowithdrawalspermonth;andflexiblerate-of-interestaccounts.ThisgrowthinsavingshasallowedBancoSoltoincreasetheamountofcreditavailabletosmallenterprises(Otero,1993:1516).However,alargepartofthesesavingscorrespondstoforcedsavingsrequireduntilrecentlyfromborrowers,which,inpractice,merelyincreasedthecosttotheclientoftheloans.

ThegrowthinthenumberofborrowersandloanshasalsohadsomenegativeeffectsonBancoSol'sinstitutionalcapabilities.Withtheincreaseinnumbersofclientsandbranches,arrearshaveincreased.Arrears(latepaymentsmorethanthirtydaysoverdue)hadincreasedto5.20percentfromPRODEM'sdelinquencyrateof0.5percent(overtwenty-onedays

overdue),butwerestillbelowthecomparativefigurefortheBolivianBankingIndustryof8.3percentinDecember1994(Otero,1993:19;DrakeandOtero,1995:91).Partofthisincreasemaybeduetothelackoftrainingofcreditofficersasmorearerequiredtohandletherapidlyincreasingnumbersofclients.Inthebeginning,creditofficershadbeengivenmoreextensivetrainingabouthowtocalculatetheamountandlengthofloanthatanentrepreneurcouldhandle.

TheEffectsoftheFirstTwoYearsofBancoSol

CaseStudies

Easieraccesstocredithasaffectedthelivesofsmall-scaleproducersandvendorsinLaPaz,includingAvelinaandSofía.DoñaAvelinaandherhusbandhavebothtakenoutloansfromBancoSol.Avelinahasbeenabletohirethreemoreworkers(shenowhasfour)sinceborrowingfromthisbank.Avelinaisoneoffivepeoplewhobelongtoa''solidaritygroup."ShetakesoutloansfromMayuntilAugustwhen,shesays,theyhavethemoneytopaybacktheloansontime.Shehasinvestedthemoneysheearnsonmaterialsthatgointotheproductionprocess,suchassheetmetal,solder,paint,glitter,thread,ribbons,andsequins,andalsoonthesalariesofherworkers.Atthetimeoftheinterviewshewasmakingpaymentsona2,000-boliviano(U.S.$840)loan.

Herhusbandhassavingsofabout900bolivianos(U.S.$378)inBancoSolandshehas400bolivianos(U.S.$168).ThebankrequiresthatborrowersmakedepositsthatrepresentapercentageoftheloanintoasavingsaccountatBancoSol.Shesaystheyusethemoneyduringslowperiodstobuyfoodsuchasnoodles,rice,andsugarinlargequantities.Avelinasaysthat"sinceBancoSollentusmoney,weareworkingmoreandthereismoreincome.Wehavemorecontracts.11Sowealsoearnabitmore.Lastyear,1993,weboughtacolortelevisionset,in1992theBetamaxvideocassetterecorder.Iboughtitbecausemychildrenaskedmeto."However,Avelinahadtopawnthevideocassetterecorderandthecolortelevisionsetearlyin1993tomakeherpaymentstoBancoSolbecauseofthefailureofherPeruviancustomerstopayherforgoodsrendered.

AvelinaandherhusbandwereplanningtoopenastoreinamarketareaofElAlto."[Wewould]beabletosellmore.Wewouldhavetheuseofit,inreturnforalarge,long-term,interest-freeloantotheowner.TodothiswewanttoborrowmoneyfromBancoElSol[sic].Yousee,peoplefromruralareashaveeasieraccesstothatneighborhood[becauseitisattheedgeofthecity].Mostofourclientsarefromthecountryside."

BeforeSofístartedtoborrowfromBancoSolin1992,shefinancedmostofherbusinessfromthesavingsshehadmadeduringherearlierbusinessventures,whichbeganwithasmallgiftfromhermother.12Sometimessheboughtpigsonconsignment,payingaftershehadsoldtheporkinLaPaz.She,inturn,gavecredittothosewhoboughtfromherandwasforcedtogothroughtheweeklytediousprocessofcollectingthepaymentsjustbeforemakingthenexttriptotheruralfair.Whenhersavingswereinsufficient,suchasthetimewhenalargesumwasstolenfromherduringhertravels,shereceivedaninterest-freeloanfromarelativestrangerfromhercommunityoforigin;andwhenhermotherbecameillandrequiredmedicaltreatment,shepawnedherjewelry.Shealsoborrowedsmallersumsathighinterestratesfromtraditionalmoneylenders.

SofíahadbeengettingloansforaboutsixyearsfromPRODEM,whichshehadfoundoutaboutthroughherniecewhoisalsoavendor.Sheexplainswhyshewantedtogetcredit:"Iwantedtoobtainaloanbecauseoneneedsalotofcapitaltodealinpork.Iusedtogetloansfromotherpeopleatahighinterestrate.Forthreedaystheywouldcharge5bolivianosfora100-bolivianoloan.Sometimes,theywouldnotgivemealoanatall.Atothertimes,theywouldaskforpawns.Often,Iwouldpawnmyjewelry."

Sofíahashadproblemswiththemanysolidaritygroupsshehasbeenpartofduemainlytononpaymentonthepartofothermembers.InordertoexpandherbusinessshetookoutaloanfromBancoSol.In1994shewasthecoordinatorofagroupandtookout3,000bolivianos(U.S.$1,260)whichshesaidsheuses"totravelformeat.However,sometimes,whensalesarebad,Ilosepartofmycapital.Whenthathappens,IhavetoborrowsomemoneyorsellsomethingIowntomakethepayment.WhenIhavefinishedpayingofftheloan,Ihavetowaitforanotherloantocomethrough.ThenIstarttravelingagain."Sometimesshefindsbelongingtoagrouptedious.Inonegroup,shewouldoftenhavetolendmoneytooneofthemembers,Nati,whowasperpetuallylate;andwhenNatibecamegroupcoordinator,shewouldalwayscollecttheduesonedaylate.However,whenSofíawasunabletomakeapayment,theothergroupmembersrefusedtobailherout.Instead,theydisclosedhersituation,whichbroughtayoungcreditofficertoherdoor.Shewassoangrythatsheretiredfromthegroupandformedanewoneonherown.

In1994shewasalsotakingoutloans(albeitillegally,giventhatBancoSoldoesnotallowsimultaneousborrowingfromtwobanks)fromPROCREDITO,anongovernmentalorganizationthatgivesloanstoindividualsatalowerinterestrate.PROCREDITOdoesrequirethatthecreditorhavecollateraltobackuptheloanandencouragescreditorstobuyconsumergoodssothattheycangethigherloans.In1995,Sofíaceased

totakeoutloansfromPROCREDITOandswitchedtoborrowingfromBancoSolexclusivelybecausesherefusedtobuyconsumergoodsthatshecouldnotaffordandthereforecouldnotgetenoughcreditfromPROCREDITO.

Sofíausedtolendmoneytoothermicroentrepreneursbutnow,shesays,sheismuchmorecarefulaboutherlendingbecauseshehastopayherloansbacktothebankontime.Inthepast,shehaslostmoneybecauseherborrowersneverpaidbackthemoneyorpaidlate.OnceawomandiedwhoowedSofíatheequivalentofU.S.$378.95.AccordingtoSofía,"Everythingispurchasedoncreditandwithloans.Peoplebuycookingoil,sugar,noodles,shoesoncredit.IstilloweBs20[20bolivianos]fortheshoesIamwearing,andtheyarealreadyold.Thestoresearndoublethatway.AwomansoldmeasweaterforBs90withBs10down.WhenIcheckedintheCalleTumusla,theyweresellingthemfor40.SoshemadeBs50onthedeal."Ifmanyarebuyingoncredit,manyarealsogettingloans.Sofíasaysofmicroentrepreneurs,"EverybodyfromtheAltoondownisgettingcreditfromtheBancoSol.Eventhewomenwhoselldrinksfromapailandtheunemployedmenwhosellfromtheircartstakeoutloans.13Thesedaysthereisalotofunemployment,sotheygetloansandworkwiththem."

Eventhoughshehasmorecapitalnowduetotheloansshereceives,shesaysthatherearningshavedecreasedorhaveremainedthesame.Forthemeatsheearnsonly20centavos(U.S.$.04)perkilo;andwhenshehascalculatedthetransportation,sheearnsonlyaboutU.S.$2.00pertrip.Shesaysthatofthecookedfoodsales,fricasseeisthemostlucrative.Outofa10-kilopighertotalprofitsareU.S.$15.79.Herdaughterusedtoselltothevendorsonthestreetoncredit,butmanyneverpaidforthefoodsonowtheyhavedecidedtosellonlytopassersby.In1994,Sofíaclaimedthatcredithadmerelyacceleratedeverybody'sbusinesswithoutnecessarilyimprovingtheirlivingconditions,butduringourlastconversationwithherinNovember1995shecreditedBancoSolwithenablinghertosurviveduringeconomicconditionsthatwereagainbecomingincreasinglydifficult.

SurveyResults

In1994theeffectsofcreditonproducersandmarketvendorsinvolvedintheBancoSollendingweresurveyed(BuechlerandMeneses,1994).ThestudyshowsthatthemostlikelybeneficiariesoftheBancoSolprogramareolder,moreestablishedvendorsandproducers.InthisrespectbothAvelina,whoisaproducerinherearlyfortieswithemployees,andSofía,whoisinherlatefortiesandanestablishedvendor,aretypical.Mostof

theintervieweeswerebetween31and45yearsold(55.3percent)andonly10percentwereunder25.Womenwithmorechildrenweremorelikelytoincurloans(BuechlerandMeneses,1994;andRiveraCusicanqui,1992:2526).Inpart,thismaybethecasebecausethecreditprogramfavorsthosewithmorepermanentsalessites,whotendtobeolder,butitmayalsobebecausewomenwithlargerfamilieshavealargerpotentialworkforceandthereforesellamorerapidturnoverofgoods.ThegreaterneedtohaveaccesstofundsmayalsoexplainthefactthatwomenwhohavechildrenandwhoareinimpermanentrelationshipswithmenaresomewhatmorelikelytoknowaboutPRODEM/BancoSolthanmarriedwomen.Astudyof2,480vendorsinLaPazandElAltofoundthat60.5percentofthewomenincommon-lawrelationshipsand58.8percentofseparatedanddivorcedwomen(versus55.3percentofthemarriedwomenandonly45.8percentofthesingleones)knewabouttheprogram(RiveraCusicanqui,1992:19).TheclientsofBancoSolarenotlikelytobethepoorestentrepreneurs,buttheystillearnedincomewellbelowthenationalaverage.BothAvelinaandSofíawouldbesituatedintheupperhalfofoursampleintermsoftheirearnings.

Inspiteofthefactthatstructuraladjustmenthasledtoasharpdecreaseintheincomeofbothmediumandsmall-scaleproducersandvendorsbetween1987and1991,mostwomenengaginginsmallenterpriseshavebeenabletorepaytheloanstheyobtainedfromBancoSol(Arzeetal.,1993:23435).Avelina'sneedtoborrowfromanothersourcetorepaytheloanappearstobeexceptional.ThefactthatSofíaborrowsfromanotherNGOalsoseemstobeunusual.However,likethetwowomeninthecasestudies,alargepercentageofthewomensurveyedhadborrowedatleastfourtimes.Indeed,theymayhavebecomedependentonsuchloanstofinancetheiroperations.Theseloanscontinuetobesmall,anaverageof1,542bolivianos(U.S.$330),farlowerthanthemaximum(U.S.$2,700forcommerceandU.S.$3,000forproducers)setbyBancoSol.

BancoSolclientsinvolvedinthestudygenerallyhaveusedtheloanstobuyrawmaterials.However,theintervieweesstillneededtoselltheirpreviousinventoryinordertoaffordanewsupplyofrawmaterials.Only22percentindicatedthattheycouldnowcontinueproducingwithouthavingsoldtheirinventory.Nevertheless,accesstowhatconstitutesasizeablesumofmoneyaccordingtoBolivianstandardsdoesenablemicroenterprisestohaveahighercapitalturnoverand/orabetterassortmentofmerchandise.Producershaveoftenbeenabletoexpandtheirproductionsubstantiallybypurchasingequipment.

Theparticipantsinthesurveyfrequentlycomplainedabouthighinterestrates.Thesehighinterestratesmaybeduetohighoverheadcosts,whicharereflectedinthelife-styleoftopmanagersandthequalityofthe

banks'buildingsthatstandoutintheirsurroundings.Thisimpressionispartlyoffsetbythefactthatthecentralofficesarelocatedinaveryshrewdlypurchasedandrenovatedcolonialbuilding,wherethecostsappeartohavebeenmuchlowerthanthevalueadded.Theparticipantsalsocomplainedabouttheprocessingfeestheywereforcedtopayinadditiontotheinterest,aswellastheseverityofthepunishmentsforlatepaymentintheformoffines,penaltyinterest,lowerloanamounts,anddisbarmentfromloansforprotractedperiodsoftime.AsSofía'scaseshows,travel,latepaymentofthemicroentrepreneurs'customers,andthevicissitudesoflifeinBoliviafrequentlymakeitdifficultforallmembersofasolidaritygrouptomaketheirpaymentsontime.

Theuseofcredithasoftenresultedinahigherworkloadtopayofftheloans.Vendorscontinuetorelyonfamilylaborratherthanhiredhelp.Whilehigherworkloadsmayeaseslackperiods,italsooftenmeansthattheborrowermustmakeconsiderablesacrificestocoverinterestcosts.Indeed,34.5percentoftheparticipantswereunabletomakealltheirpaymentsontime.Theintervieweesfreelyacknowledgethefactthatapartoftheloanmaygotosupportthehusband'seconomicactivities,topurchaserealestate,consumergoods,andmedicalexpenses,oreventocoverdailysubsistenceneeds.Theypridethemselvesonhavingpurchasedland,forexample,andin38percentofthecasestheyhavemademajorimprovementstotheirhome.Thereappeartohavebeenfewchangesinfoodconsumption.Whilemostclaimthattheyhavenotchangedtheirconsumptionpatterns,thosewhohavearejustaslikelytohavedecreasedconsumptionofsuchfoodsasmeat,fruit,andvegetablesastohaveincreasedit.

Informants,includingSofíaandAvelina,complainabouttheincreaseincompetitionsincetheybeganreceivingcredit.Seventypercentsaidthatcompetitionhadincreased,20percentsaidthatithadremainedthesame,and1.8percentsaidthattherehadbeenadecrease(8.2percentdidnotrespondorhadnoopinion).Ifthisaddedcompetitionisduetotheincreaseintheurbanpopulation,itshouldbeoffsetbyacorrespondingincreaseinthenumberofconsumers.However,realwagesdecreaseddramaticallyduringthecrisisofthe1980s,andeventhoughtheincomeofsalariedworkershasincreasedinrecentyears(asdidtheGNP),in1991averagefamilyincomesankto81percentof1987levels(Arzeetal.,1993:253).14Inthatyear,70percentofalleconomicallyactivepersonsfellbelowthepovertyline,10percentmorethanin1987(Arzeetal.,1993:342).Thereforetheincreaseindemandhasnotbeencommensuratewiththeincreaseinpopulation.

Itisalsopossiblethatcredithadincreasedcompetitivepressuresbyenablingmoreindividualstoformmicroenterprisesandbypermitting

establishedentrepreneurstooffermoregoods.Inthisstudy,BancoSolclientsthoughtthattheircompetitorswereprimarilyentrepreneurssimilartothemselvesinthesizeoftheirenterprise.Only15percentthoughtoftheircompetitorsaslargerenterprisessuchasstoresorlargerworkshops,andevenfewer(7percent)thoughtoftheircompetitionascomingfromsmallerenterprisessuchasambulantes(compareSeligmann,Chapter4,thisvolume).Mobilevendorscompriseonly18percentofthevendorsweinterviewed,whichreflectsBancoSol'spolicyofallowingonlyoneambulanteforeverythreevendorswithpermanentsaleslocationstojoinasolidaritygroup.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatinthiscasethereisnostrictdivisionbetweenambulantesandvendorswithpermanentsites.Ambulantestypicallyincludevendors,oftenmenorboys,whosellsmallamountsoflightweightgoodssuchasbroomsandwhomayneverestablishthemselvesinpermanentlocations.However,thecategoryalsoincludesvendorswhoarejustbeginningtogainaholdonsitesinestablishedmarketsorwhoarepioneersinthecolonizationofnewmarketlocations.Onceanewmarketreceivesofficialrecognition,thepioneersmayeventuallybecomeelders,veneratedfortheirstrugglestoestablishthemarket.

Inordertocontendwiththeincreasingcompetition,variousstrategieshavebeendeployedbyproducersandvendors,includingbecominginvolvedinadditionalactivitiesandincreasingthenumberofvendingsites(RiveraCusicanqui,1992:30).Whenadditionalcomplementaryactivitieswerestarted,theywereoftenspunofftootherfamilymembers(RiveraCusicanqui,1992:29).InthecaseofSofía,herdaughterhelpedwiththeverticallyintegratedactivityofsellingcookedmeatatothersites.Enlargingone'svendingsitebytryingtosellmoreofaproductorbyhavingmorevendorsisoftennotpossibleduetothelimitednumberofavailableconsumersintheareaandtheactualspaceofthesite.Avelina'snextstepistoopenanothersiteinElAlto.Inbothcases,enlargingone'senterpriseseemstoindicatethattheownermightnotnecessarilyhiremoreworkersinthesamevendingsiteorworkshop,butcoordinatemorepeople'sactivitiesinothersites.

Whileinsomeothercountries,forexample,Bangladash,wheremenhavetakenoverthebusinessoncecreditwasinvolvedandthebusinesswasbecominglarger,womeninLaPazstillcontroltheirownbusinessesandfinances.BothDoñaAvelina,whodoestheaccountingforthefamilyenterprise,andDoñaSofía,whoisasinglemother,aretypicaloffemaleentrepreneursinBoliviainthisrespect.A1992studyofPRODEMshowssimilarresults.Inthoseinstanceswherewomensharedthecredittheyreceivedwiththeirhusbands,therewasnoindicationofcoercion.Instead,thewifetypicallytooktheinitiativetoteachherhusbandanew

skillorinducehimtoestablishhisownindependententerprisetodealwithasituationofunemployment(RiveraCusicanqui,1992:37).TheconclusionthatwomenenjoyconsiderablelatitudeineconomicdecisionmakinginBoliviaisreinforcedeveninthecaseswheretherepaymentofcredithascreatedconflictbetweenhusbandandwife.Thedescriptionbyoneofthisstudy'sparticipantsofsuchaquarrelistypical.Whenherhusbandcomplained,"Youshouldleavethis[obtainingcredit]alone.EverytimeIhavetogiveyoumoneytopaythequota,"sheresponded,"WhydoIhavetopleadwithyoutogivememoney?Youarenotgivingmemoneywithoutgettingsomethingforitinreturn."15

Microenterpriseprogramsclaimtoaddresswhatthepreviouschapterhasnotedaswomen's"practical"genderneeds(thoselinkedtoquestionsofsurvivalsuchasfood,water,andhealth)andwomen's"strategic"genderneeds(thoselinkedtotheirpoliticalandsocialemancipation).Whetherbydesignornot,theseprogramsrecognizethatthisdistinctionisproblematic.Economicempowermentisregardedasasteptowardotherkindsofempowerment.Manyoftheevaluationsofmicrocreditprogramshaveshownthattheyempowerwomeneconomicallybyenablingthemtoearnmore,whichinturnhasledtomoreofasaywithinthehousehold.Inadditionalthoughthisisverydifficulttomeasuresomestudiesclaimthat,duetotheirinvolvementingroupsandtheirinteractionwithanorganizationthatgivesimportancetotheireconomicactivities,womenborrowershavegainedaclearerperceptionoftheirowninterests.Thesestudieshaveshownthatothermembersofthefamilyandcommunitybegintorespectwomenmore.InthecaseofBolivia,wherewomenhavealwaysbeenseenaseconomicallyimportant,suchchangesdonotappeartobeassalient.Whatcanbeestablishedmoreclearlyisthatcreditprogramshaveenabledwomentodecreasetheirdependenceonexploitativemoneylenders,traders,landowners,andlandlords(SimoneBuechler,1994).ThestudyofBancoSolshowedthatclientsweregenerallynolongerrelyingonothersourcesofcredit.Only21percentofthosewhorespondedtothequestionofwhethertheyborrowedmoneyfromothersourcessuchasmoneylenders,relatives,androtatingcreditassociationsclaimedtohavedoneso.Significantisthefactthatonly5percentofthosewhoborroweddidsotopaybackaloantoBancoSol.

AnancillarybutimportantroleofagenciessuchasBancoSolhasbeenthecreationoflower-levelwhite-collarjobs.Thecreditofficersaremostlywomen,whooftencomefromthesamebackgroundasthesmall-scaleentrepreneursthemselves.Theseindividualsmayformasystemiclinkbetweenthesmall-scaleentrepreneursandtheelite-dominatedfinancialsystem.Wewereimpressedbytheknowledgesomeoftheseem-

ployeeshadoftheconcernsoftheirclients,whichcontrastedwiththefrequentcondescensionoftheupper(mostlymale)managers.

Nevertheless,asEscobar(1995:188)andothershaveargued,"theparticipationofwomeninsocialproductionisnecessarybutnotsufficienttoovercomewomen'ssubordination."Manymicroenterpriseprogramshavefailedtoadoptan"empowermentapproach,"developinginsteada"productiveapproach"thatdoesnotattempttotransformthewaywomenarelinkedtoproductiveandreproductiveroles.Evenso,microenterpriseprogramshaveatleastshiftedawayfromtheperceptionthatwomen'ssphereiscoterminouswiththedomesticsphere,andmovedtowardrecognizingtheirotheractivities.

Conclusion

Small-scaleenterprisesinBoliviacanberegardedasboththecontinuationofatraditionandasanintegralpartofachanging,complexnationalandinternationaleconomy.Fromthefirstperspective,theyconstitutefirmswitharepertoireoflong-termstrategiesofadaptingtoturbulenteconomicconditionsandtothechronicscarcityofcapitalandrawmaterials.Fromthelattervantagepoint,theflexibilityofthesefirmshaslongmeantthatthelessflexiblestateandlargerprivatefirmshavedevolvedonthemmuchoftheburdenofrecessions.

Thefailureofthedevelopmentmodelthatsupportedlarge-scaleenterprisesmayconstituteoneofthereasonswhydevelopmentagenciesdecidedtosupportthe"informal"sectorwhenitoncehadconsidereditbackward,outsideofthe"modernist"project,and"abnormal"(Escobar,1992).Providingcreditforsmallenterprisesconstitutesagrudgingrecognition,onthepartofthestateanddevelopmentagenciesalike,oftheabilityofsuchenterprisestogenerateemployment.Thischangeintheorientationofdevelopmentisalsocommensuratewiththechangesintheeconomicsystemtowardpostfordism,16wherelarge-scaleandsmall-scaleproductioncoexistsidebysideandthedichotomybetweeninformalandformalmakesevenlesssensethanitdidearlier.Thus,thenewemphasisindevelopmentalsoentailsarecognitionoftheinterlinkageswhichhavealwaysbeenpresent,butwhichhaveincreasedinrecentdecadesbetweenfirmsofdifferentsizes.

Thechangeintheglobaleconomy,andconcomitantlyindevelopmentmodels,hasbroughtbothnewopportunitiesandnewcostsforsmall-scaleenterprises.Whileaccesstocredithasenabledsomemicroentrepreneurstoincreasethescaleoftheiroperations,therelianceoncredithasalsoincreaseddependenceonthenewfinancialinstitutions

andproducedgreaterexposuretoadversedevelopmentsinthefinancialmarket.Small-scaleentrepreneurshavealsobeenforcedtochangetheirbusinesspracticestoreducerisksthatmightpreventthemfrompayingbacktheirloansontime.SomeofthesechangesweredirectlydictatedbyBancoSol'slendingpolicies.Therulethatprohibitstheinclusionofkininsolidaritygroupsde-emphasizestiesthatareextremelyimportantinotheraspectsofproductionandcommerce.Whiledistributingtheriskforbothlendersandclients,andperhapsprovidingsomerelieftokinnetworksthatalreadycarryaheavyload,bankpoliciesalsoplaceaheavierburdenonborrowersbecauseitisdifficultforthemtoestablishextra-kinnetworksofindividualswhoaresufficientlyreliabletomeettheirobligationstothebank.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthisincreasingdependencewillbecompensatedforbyincreasedfamilyincomeorwhethertheeffectsofstructuraladjustment,whichhavebeentoredistributeincomefromthepoorestsegmentsofthepopulationtosalariedemployeesandtheelites,willsimplymeanthattheadditionaleconomicproductivityresultingfromtheloanswillbeoffsetbyincreasingcompetitionandthehighcostofservicingtheloans.Ultimately,theimpactofcreditprogramsforsmall-scaleenterpriseswilldependonnationalandglobaleconomicconditions.Suchprogramsmayeasilybecomeanexcuseforneglectingthemoreredistributiveroleofthestateassociatedwiththeprovisionofbasicservicessuchashealthcareandeducation,andtherebyreinforceratherthancounteractreductionsbythestateintheseareasasanintegralpartofeconomicrestructuring.

Notes

1.Weusetheterms"small-scale"flexiblytoincludewhatothershavecalled"microenterprises."Wehavenotestablishedaspecificupperlimitbecausefirmsemployingdozensofworkersareoftenconstitutedinaverysimilarfashiontoverysmallonesintermsofthetechnologytheyemployand/orworkrelationships.

2.Between1985and1990alone,thepercentageofmigrantsintheurbanworkingagepopulationincreasedfrom6percentto10percent(Arzeetal.,1993:74).

3.Thisfigureissubstantiallyhigherthanthatreportedinthepreliminaryanalysisoftheofficialcensusofeconomicunitsundertakenin1992thatcountedonly80,928individualsemployedin58,236commercialestablishments(Bolivia,1993b).

4.Thebalanceofthegainintheshareofthelaborforceexperiencedbysmall-scaleenterprisesresultedfromadeclineinthepercentageoftheworkforceemployedindomesticservice.

5.Inourstudy,the64vendorsandstorekeepers(excludingfoodvendorswhocouldalsoberegardedasproducers)receivedsomeformoflaborassistance

in73.4percentofthecases,31.3percentfromhusbands,23.4percentfromsons,32.8percentfromdaughters,1.6percentfromparentsand7.8percentfromaniece,nepheworgodchild.Only7.8percentclaimedtohavehiredhelp.

6.Itisalsonoteworthythatanimportantpartofthesupportnetworkofbothproducersandvendorswithruraloriginsaremembersoftheircommunitiesoforigin,whethertheyarerelatedornot.Thosefromthesamecommunitywhohavepreviouslyestablishedthemselvesinthecityprovideplacestostayandbecomesourcesofjobsandapprenticeshipsfornewmigrants.Thosewhoremainbehindbecomesourcesforproduceorrawmaterials.

7.Sofía'smotherhadbeenupwardlymobileasaresultofhersuccessfulcandleenterprise(anechoofhergreat-grandmother'surbanmiddle-classstatus).

8.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatinthelate1980stheliaisonpersonfortheMuseumofModernArtinchargeoforganizingspecialexhibitsofartisangoodswasachola.

9.ACCIONInternationalisaprivate,nonprofitorganizationthathasanetworkoffortyrelativelyautonomousaffiliateorganizationsinfourteencountriesinLatinAmerica,theCaribbean,andtheUnitedStates.ItsheadquartersareinCambridge,Massachusetts,anditsrelativelynewregionaltrainingandresearchcenter,CentroAcción,foundedin1992,isinBogotá,Colombia.ACCIONwasfoundedin1961,butsince1973ithasconcentratedoncreatingjobsandgeneratingincomeforthepoorestoftheeconomicallyactivepopulation,recognizingthatanincreasingnumberofruralmigrantstothecitieswereturningtoself-employmentastheonlywaytosurvive.ACCIONInternational'sfundingforprogramservicesprimarilycomesfromprivatecontributions,U.S.governmentgrants,internationalandforeigngovernmentgrants,interest,andfees.ACCIONInternationalhelpsfundmostaffiliatesbyusingaguaranteefinancingmechanism.In1984,ACCIONcreatedtheBridgeFund,areserveplacedinaU.S.commercialbank,whichcanbeusedbytheaffiliatesasaguaranteetoalocalbank.Anaffiliatecangotoalocalbankforaloan,andthelocalbankisassuredapproximately55percentoftheloanfromthereserveiftheaffiliatecannotpaybacktheloan,therebyreducingtheriskitincurs.TheBridgeFundiscapitalizedwithloansanddonationsfromfoundationssuchastheFordFoundationandtheMacArthurFoundation,governments,includingtheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,individuals,andchurches.

10.TheCalmeadowFoundation,whichhasrecentlychangeditsnametoCalmeadow,isaCanadianorganizationwhichhasworkedcloselywithPRODEMandwithaboriginalgroupsinCanadaontheissueofmicroenterprisedevelopment.Inadditiontobeingafundingagency,theyareinvolvedintechnicalassistanceandhaveproducedaguideto

theplanningandimplementationofmicroenterpriseprograms.TheFUNDESgroupisaSwissfoundationthatpromotesmicrobusinessesandhassetupaguaranteefundformicrobusinessloans.

11.Thisispresumablybecausetheloansprovidethefamilywiththefinancialmeanstofulfillthem.

12.ForafullerdescriptionseeBuechlerandBuechler,1996:106-14.

13.Thisisprobablyanexaggeration.

14.Forexample,Estes(1988:151)foundthataveragefactorywagesin1986wereonlyonethird(U.S.$35amonth)ofwhattheyhadbeenin1980.Duringthesameperiodthepriceofricehadgoneup20percentandthecostofabusridehaddoubled.

15.Thepatternofgenderequalityineconomicdecisionmakingmaybeacarryoverfromthedivisionoflaborinruralcommunities.Whilewomenandmenundertakedifferenttasksinagriculture,thereislittlegenderdiscriminationexceptininheritancepatterns(seeBuechlerandBuechler,1971;CarterandMamani,1982).

16.Postfordismreferstoaneconomybasedonflexibleproductionpatternscharacterizedbyoutsourcingtosmallerfirms,whereverlaborischeap,whichenableslargercompaniestoincreaseandcontractproductionrapidly.Atthesametime,however,thepoweroflaborunionsisundercutandbenefitstoworkersareweakenedoreliminated.Postfordismalsoforcesthefirmstowhichtheworkisoutsourcedtobearthebruntofdownturnsintheeconomy.

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6FromCooperativestoMicroenterprises:TheNeoliberalTurninPostrevolutionaryNicaraguaFlorenceE.Babb*

Therapiddismantlingofsocialisteconomiesoverthelastdecade,whentheSovietUnionandEasternEuropeunderwentdramatictransformations,hasledtointensedebatesovertheperceivedfailuresofsocialismand,forsome,theinevitabilityofcapitalism.Insuchdiscussions,comparisonswithChinaaresometimesdrawn,butlittlementionismadeofLatinAmericanexperimentswithsocialism.Whenattentiondoesturntothispartoftheworld,itismostoftentoCubathatanalystsdirecttheirgaze(Weisskopf,1992).Predictionsoftheimminentfailureofthatthirty-five-yearexperimentinsocialistdevelopmenthavebeenmorefrequentsincethecollapseoftheSovietUnion.

From1979until1990,however,internationalattentionwasfocusedonNicaragua,asmallCentralAmericannationthathadsuccessfullyoverthrownaforty-three-yeardictatorship,begunaprocessofsocialtransformation,andchartedanewpathofdevelopment.TheU.S.governmenttookakeeninterestintherevolutionthatwasunderway,andsodidanumberofThirdWorldcountriesintentuponovercominghistoriesofunderdevelopmentandgaininggreaterindependenceintheinternational

*IgratefullyacknowledgetheNicaraguanwomenandmenwhogavetheirtimeandtheirfriendshipandmadethisworkpossible.ResearchinNicaraguawasfundedin1991byaFulbrightSeniorResearchAward,andin1992byaWenner-GrenFoundationforAnthropologicalResearchRegularGrantandaFacultyScholarAwardfromtheUniversityofIowa.Theresearchcontinuedthrough1993,andIreturnedin1996,withthesupportoftheFacultyScholarAwardandanInternationalTravelGrantfromtheUniversityofIowa.AnearlierversionofthisworkwaspublishedinAnthropologyofWorkReview16,nos.34(Fall-Winter1995):28.

arena(Enríquez,1991:1).AlandmarkcollectionofessaysonproblemsofThirdWorldsocialismwrittenbyleftistacademicstookitsinspirationfromtheNicaraguanexperience(Fagenetal.,1986).Yet,amorerecentcollectionofessays,FreeTradeandEconomicRestructuringinLatinAmerica(RosenandMcFadyen,1995),barelymentionsNicaragua.Inthebook'sforeword,SalvadoranpoliticalscientistandformerpresidentialcandidateRubénZamorapointstothefallofexistingsocialismandtheriseofneoliberalismsignalingareturntofreemarketeconomicsastheglobalprocessesthatframecurrentstrugglesinLatinAmerica(Zamora,1995).Hegoesontomakethesalientremarkthatpopularmovementsintheregionpresenttheleftwithalternativestotheoldpartystructuresandorganizationslinkedtothem.HecouldbedescribingpostrevolutionaryNicaragua,butthecountryisonlyreferredtoinpassing(Zamora,1995:79).

UnlikeCubaandotherexamplesofCommunist-Party-directedsocialism(or"actuallyexistingsocialistsystems"),manyofwhichhaverecentlyseentheirdemise,Nicaragua'ssocialist-orientedSandinistagovernmentwaslessorthodoxinitsplanofsocialreconstructionfollowingasuccessfulrevolutionaryinsurrection.TheSandinistaNationalLiberationFront(FrenteSandinistadeLiberaciónNacional,orFSLN)allowedforamixedeconomy,privateenterprisealongsideanexpandedstatesector.Forthisreason,itislookedtolessoftenasanexamplefromwhichtodrawlessonsaboutthefutureofsocialism.ButtheNicaraguanrevolutionbroughtaboutaprogramofsocialtransformationthatwentfarenoughtoattractbothinternationalacclaimandaratherpredictablereactionfromtheUnitedStateswhich,throughitseconomicembargoanditsfundingofthecounterrevolutionary(Contra)war,contributedsignificantlytotheproblemsthatbroughtdowntheSandinistasafteronlyadecadeinpower.

Nicaraguawentthroughtwotransitionsinafairlyshortperiodoftime:fromamarketeconomydominatedbytheeliteSomozafamilythatwastransformedbytheSandinistasin1979intoastate-regulatedeconomy,backtoamarket-drivenprogramunderthegovernmentoftheNationalOppositionUnion(UniónNacionalOpositora,orUNO),mandatedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andsetinplacebytheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)afterthe1990elections(Spoor,1994:517).Thesewerenotsimpleshiftsbackandforthbetweencapitalistandsocialistmodels,butrathernegotiatedprocessesthatoftenallowedforunexpectedeconomicjuxtapositions.TheUNOgovernmentcontinuedtobendsomewhattotheinterestsoftheSandinistas,whountiltheirrecentsplitintotwotendencies,onemoreorthodoxandonedeclaringitself"renovationist,"representedthemostpowerfulpoliticalpartyinthecountry(BarricadaInternacional,1995).Theresultisthatwhilestate

interventioninthemarketcharacterizedthelastdecade,thecurrentperiodismarkedbyasignificantdegreeofeconomicregulationbythegovernment.Atthesametime,itmaybenotedthatthemarketliberalizationandstructuraladjustmentthataregenerallyassociatedwiththeUNOregimeactuallybeganundertheSandinistasin1988.Thus,theNicaraguaneconomypresentsafarmorecomplicatedsituationthantheapparent"stateversusmarket"dichotomywouldsuggest(Spoor,1994).

"Theneoliberalturn"referredtointhetitleofthisessaymightsuggestasimplereversalofpoliticaldirectionandofeconomicpolicyafterthe1990elections.Indeed,thereisevidencesupportingtheargumentthattherehasbeenarathersystematicundoingofeconomicreformsintroducedbytheSandinistas.WheretheFSLNpromotedthedistributionofavailableresourcesamongthebroadpopulation,theUNOgovernmentadoptedaneoliberalplanthatsupportedtheprivatizationofindustry,health,andeducation,andcutbackonstate-providedservices,subsidies,andbasicfoodpackages.Inthecompetitivecontextofthe1990s,formerlandownersreclaimtheirholdingsandlargeindustriesdriveoutsmalleronesthatarenolongerprotectedbythestate.Low-incomewomenaredisproportionatelyaffectedintheprocess.

Nevertheless,therevolutionleftitslegacyandNicaraguanshavenotpassivelyallowedtheirhard-wonrightstobetakenaway.ItwaswidelyexpectedthattheUNOgovernmentwould"undotherevolution,"butthetransitionhasbeenmorecomplex.IftherevolutiontrulytransformedNicaraguansociety,itshould"buildstrongbuffersagainsttheneoliberaltide"(Spalding,1994:15657).

EconomicRestructuringundertheSandinistaGovernment

TheNicaraguanrevolutionsoughttobreakwiththeagroexporteconomyoftheSomozaperiodandtoestablisharedistributiveeconomythatwouldbenefitapopulationthathadlongsufferedfrominternationaldependency.Heavyrelianceoncoffeeandcottonproductionmadethecountryvulnerabletopricefluctuations,andtheSomozafamilyhaddonelittletopromoteeconomicdevelopment.TheSandinistasintroducedabroadprogramofagrarianreformandapolicyofself-determinationandredistribution.Tothatend,theynationalizedproductioninkeysectorsoftheeconomyandsetupimportandexchangecontrols.However,theireconomicplanningallowedforcontinuedsupportoftheprivatesectortoasignificantdegree,andgenerousloansweremadeavailabletocapitalistswillingtoreactivatetheirenterprises(Walker,1986:68).Whetherthemodelwouldhavesucceededisuncertain,asstructuralproblemsinheritedfromthe

SomozaperiodandtheassaultoftheContrawarunderminedthenation'sdevelopment(Spalding,1987:4).

Evenso,theearlyyearsoftherevolutionarygovernmentsawnotablestructuralchange.Someoutstandinginitiativeswereintheareasofhealthcareandeducation,whichweremadeavailabletoall.Resourcesmorecloselylinkedtotheeconomywereredistributedaswell.Whilerurallandreformstoodoutasacriticalelementineconomicrestructuring,changewasalsobroughtaboutintheurbanarea.Newpoliciesawardinglandtosquattersandeffortstobringwaterandelectricitytotheirsettlementsattractedlabortothecities,especiallyManagua,whosepopulationrosetoalmostamillion,oraboutaquarterofthecountry'stotalsize.Whenlow-paidurbanworkersturnedtoemploymentintheinformalsector,whereearningsweresometimeshigher,thegovernmentcounteredbyraisingwagelevelsinformalsectorjobs.Provisionofbasicfooditemsandsubsidiesofimportedgoodscontinueduntilthegovernmentcouldnolongeraffordtounderwritethebasicconsumptionoftheentirecountry,andturnedtoofferingincentivestothemostproductivesectorsoftheformaleconomy(Gibson,1987:40).

TheSandinistagovernmentencouragedformalsectoremploymentprimarilyinthestatesectorandinservices,ratherthaninindustry,andtriedtoattractthoseinformaltraderswhoswelledthemarketstonewworksites.Nevertheless,anabundanceofworkerscontinuedtoproduceandsellneededgoodsinsmall,independentassociationsoffewerthanadozenindividuals.TheseworkerswereencouragedtoorganizecollectivelywithintheNationalAssociationofSmallandMediumIndustries(CamaraNacionaldeMedianayPequeñaIndustria,orCONAPI),andwereofferedstate-supportedtrainingandlowerpricesforprimarygoodsneededintheircooperatives.Programstoprovidetrainingforwomeninnontraditionalemploymentwereamongthoseintroduced.Inmanycases,thestateboughtandsoldtheitemsproducedbythecooperatives,furtherenablingsmallproducerstoremaininbusiness.

Bythemid-1980s,effortstowardsocialandeconomicdevelopmenthadbeenseriouslyundercutbothbytheU.S.tradeembargoimposedundertheReaganadministrationandbytheneedtodefendthecountryinthefaceoftheU.S.-supportedContrawar.Nicaraguaneconomicpolicymovedfromarevolutionaryplanningprocesstoaprogramaimedatstabilization.In198889theSandinistasrespondedtohyperinflationanddecliningeconomicgrowthbycuttingbackonemploymentinthepublicsectorandonstatespendingingeneral.Nominalwageincreases,intendedtosoftentheblow,wereinadequatetoprotectthepoorestNicaraguansfromtheharsheffectsoftheadjustmentmeasures(Ricciardi,1991).

ReorganizationofWorkundertheUNOGovernment

IftheSandinistas'stabilizationandadjustmentprogramwashardonmanyNicaraguans,theIMF-directedneoliberalagendaoftheUNOgovernmentwasfarmorecrushing(Babb,1996).Newstructuraladjustmentmeasureswereintroducedquicklyafterthe1990electionsinacountrywhoseformerrevolutionarygovernmenthadprovidedasafetynetofsupport.Privatization,thewithdrawalofprotectivetariffs,andcutsinsocialservicesweresomeelementsthatclashedloudlywiththepoliciesoftheSandinistas.Yet,themeasurespromotedbytheUNOgovernmentmetresistancefromsomebusinesselitesaswellasfromthepopularsectors,withbothgroupsfearingtheywouldlosefromthewithdrawalofeconomicsupport(Spalding,1994:158).Thus,theneoliberalismendorsedbytheU.S.governmentandsomeprivilegedNicaraguansectorswasmodifiedasaresultofmobilizedoppositionbydiversesegmentsofthepopulationaconvergenceofcross-classintereststhathasbeenseeninthecountry'srecenthistory.

AmajordevaluationofthecurrencyinMarch1991wasprecededbyanextensivetelevisedexplanationbyPresidentVioletaChamorro'sson-in-lawandministerofthepresidency,AntonioLacayo,whomanagedtoavertstrongoppositiontotheplan.Soonafterward,twenty-eightthousandstateworkerswhoagreedtoleavetheirjobsweregrantedgenerousseverancepayfundedbytheUSAIDundertheOccupationalConversionprogram(Spalding,1994:169).Theseandothereffortstowinpublicacceptancepaidoffasmanyformerstateemployeesweremollifiedlongenoughtosetupsmallindependentbusinessesalargenumberofwhichwerefailingby1992,theso-calledYearofReactivation.Otherconcessionstoneoliberalism'sopponentsincludedtheprovisionthatworkersinformerstatefarmsandindustrieswouldbeallowedtocontrolaquartertoathirdofthenewlyprivatizedbusinesses.Theseconcessionsdidnotnecessarilyleadtosignificantworkerparticipationorempowerment,butreceivedapprovalfromenoughSandinistastolessendissatisfactionovertheeconomicmodel.

Yet,thedeepeningeconomiccrisisduringthe1990stookagreattollonsmallproducersinthecountry.ThemajorityofsmallproducersandbusinessesexperiencedincreasingcompetitionaslargerindustriesbothnationalandinternationalreceivedUNOgovernmentsupport.Nolongerhavingthebenefitoffavorabletermsofcreditorprotectivetariffsonimportedgoods,cooperativesandothersmallbusinessesfailedathigherrates.Meanwhile,foreigninterestswerewelcomedtoManagua'sFreeTradeZone,wheretheycouldemployworkersatrelativelylowwages.

Manylow-incomewomenandmeninManaguacametohavelessandlessconfidenceinthegovernmentbringingaboutbetterconditionsintheirlives.Thecurrencywasstabilizedinthe1990s,butunemploymentandunderemploymentapproached60percentatthesametimethatprivatizationofhealthcareandcutsinsocialserviceseliminatedstateprotectionoftheurbanpoor(Envío,1994:7).Since1990,therehasbeenagradualerosionofsmallindustriesandanexpansionoftheinformalsector,particularlyasthestatesectorhasbeencutback.

UrbanCooperativesintheTransitionfromRevolutionarytoNeoliberalNicaragua

Assmallindustrieshavebeenreconfiguredasmicroenterprises(definedasworkingunitsofuptofiveindividuals),numerouswomenworkershavebeenaffected;somehavebenefitedfromnewemploymentopportunities,butmanyothershavehadadverseconsequences.TheNicaraguancasemaybeconsideredalongsideotherformerlysocialistcountriestoexaminewhetherwomenaresetbackdisproportionatelytomenasworkistransformedtomeettherequirementsoftheneoliberalcapitalistdevelopmentmodel(Einhorn,1993).

VariousinterviewsandconversationsinManaguaduringtheyearsfollowingthe1990electionssuggestsomewaysthatnewpolicydirections,motivatedbyanideologicalshifttotheright,haveattemptedtoclosemanyoftheopeningsthatwerewonunderSandinistaleadership.Forexample,ameetingwithFatimaReyes,authoroftheMinistryofFinance'sOccupationalConversionprogram,disclosedtheviewthatcutsinpublicsectoremploymentwouldallowmanyfemaleemployeestoreturnhometocarefortheirfamilies(Reyes,interview,July18,1991).Indeed,adisproportionatenumberofwomen,andSandinistasingeneral,wereamongthosetoadopttheplan,oftenestablishingsmallbusinessesoutoftheirhomesthatweredestinedtofail.Yet,whenthespecialobstaclesconfrontingwomeninsmallindustriesandcommercewereaddressedwithministryofficials,fewwereinterestedindiscussingtheeffectsthatcurrentpolicywashavingonthesewomen.Heavierburdensathome,resultingfromcutsinsuchareasaschildcare,healthcare,andeducation,wereapparentlyinvisibletotheofficials,justastheimpactofafree-market-orientednationaleconomywasapparentlyinvisibleasaforcedrivingwomen'ssmallenterprisesoutofbusiness.

Therapiddeclineofwomen'seconomicbasecanbeillustratedthroughastudyoffoururbancooperativesthatwereformedoverthelastdecadeinvariouspartsofManagua.Thesefourworkinggroupswereseamstresses,welders,bakers,andartisanstraditionalaswellasnontradi-

tionaloccupationsforwomen(Babb,1992,1996).Twoofthecooperatives,thebakersandtheartisans,includemenaswellaswomenasmembers.Allofthecooperativeshavehadtostruggletosurviveinthepost-1990period.Twoofthem,theseamstressesandthebakers,cametogetherintheperiodsoonaftertheSandinistasrosetopowerandencouragedcollectivizationofsmallindustries.Theyorganizedservicecooperatives,whichmeantthatmembersworkedathomebuthadacentrallocationforsellingtheirproduct,holdingregularmeetings,andotheractivities.However,thesetwoco-opshavebeenforcedtoputtheirofficespacesupforsaleinthelastfewyearssincetheyhavebeenunabletokeepuppayments.DecliningsalesofbreadandlocallyproducedclothinghaveresultedbothfromNicaraguans'inabilitytoaffordeventhesebasicgoodsandfromchangingeconomicconditionswhichfavorimportedgoodsandlargerindustries.Individualsandfamiliescontinuetoproducewithoutthesupportoftheco-ops,butthebakersreportthatbreadproductionisdownasmuchas50percent,andclothingproductioninthecooperativehasgroundnearlytoahalt.

Thecooperativeofwomenwelders,formedin1991afteradozenhousewivescompletedaten-monthtrainingprogram,sufferedanumberofsetbacksandnowhasceasedtofunction.Workingtogetheroutofaworkshopinawomen'scenterinManagua,thesewomensawtheirmembershipdropsteadilyasaresultofanumberofproblemsthatincludedinterpersonaldifficulties,resistanceofhusbandstotheirwives'working,andalackofsteadywork.Althoughtheyhadaspaceinwhichtowork,theycouldnotbesurethatitwouldremainavailabletothem,makingtheabsenceofasecureworkenvironmentanissueforthemaswell.Byearly1993,thewomenhaddisbanded,someofthemseekingworkelsewhereandothersonceagainathomewiththeirfamilies.Oneofthetwoformerco-coordinatorsofthecooperative,theonlysinglewomaninthegroup,hadrecentlybeenfeaturedinanewspaperstory.Asaresultshehadreceivedofferstojoinacoupleofmaleweldersintheirwork.Shewasreadytojointhem,butafewmonthslatershereportedthatthingsdidnotworkout,andshewasoutofwork.Interestingly,theotherco-coordinatorhadtakentheopportunitytogowithagroupofUSAID-fundedNicaraguansfortechnicaltrainingintheUnitedStates;whatliesaheadforthisselectgroupremainstobeseen.

Thecooperativeofartisansincludedseveralwomenandmenmakingsilverandcoraljewelryalongwithtwowomenmakingdecorativewallhangingsandotheritemswithbarkfromthetunotree.Thecooperativemembers,whojoinedtogetherin1987,pridethemselvesonthehighqualityoftheirwork,buttheyexperiencedaseveredropinsalesastheeconomyworsenedandasfewerinternationalvisitorswereonhandto

buyfromthem.In1992thebarkworkersleftthecooperativeforfamilyreasons,anotherwomanleftbecauseherhusbandopposedherworking,andstillanotherleftbecauseshefeltthatherchildrenneededmoreattentionathome.Thewomen'slowlevelofbusinessmaywellhavecontributedtotheirdecisions,althoughthiswasnotexpresseddirectly.

Despitethiscooperative'ssetbacks,itmayinacertainsenseberegardedassuccessful.Afteralongwait,memberswereabletosecurealoanandagrantfromanongovernmentalorganization(NGO)toconstructaspaciousnewworkshop,whichwascompletedin1992.ThecooperativewasalsosingledoutasoneoftentoreceiveextrasupportfromCONAPI,thetradeunionorganizationofsmall-andmedium-sizedindustries.Nowtheartisansareseekingnewmarketsandtryingoutnewcreativetechniques,butitisstillunclearwhethertheywillsucceedinthelongrun.TheirviabilitydependsinpartonthedegreetowhichtheyturnfromaSandinista-identifiedworkorganizationtoa''microenterprise"orientationofcompetingintheopenmarket,thoughthatapproachoffersnoguaranteeofsuccess.

Formedin1983undertheSandinistas,CONAPIremainsthemajororganizationrepresentingtheinterestsofworkersinsmallindustries(ofthefourcooperativesstudied,onlytheweldershadnotjoined).StillidentifiedwiththeFSLN,CONAPIisnowsomewhatmorediversepolitically.Theorganization'sassistancetoselectedcooperativeswasanefforttodemonstratetoUSAIDthepromiseofsmallindustriesinthecountryandtoattractmoreexternalsupport.CONAPIhasnonethelessexperiencedalossofpoliticalstrengthinNicaraguaasthenumberofmembercooperativeshasfallendramatically.

Thestructuraladjustmentmeasuresthathavebeenimposedsince1990inNicaraguaarepartofanIMFformulasimilartothatfollowedinotherLatinAmericancountriessincethe1980s,buttheimpactmaybesubstantiallygreater.TheneoliberalplanhasbeensetinplacemorequicklyinNicaragua,withharsherconsequencesforthemajorityofthepopulationwhocannotcompetewithlargeindustriesorwithnewlyimportedgoodsfloodingthemarket.Moreover,thesubsidizedproductionprovidedundertheSandinistagovernmentwaseliminatedsoquicklythatevensmallerindustrieswiththepotentialtobecompetitivedonotsurvivelong.Evenso,theNicaraguans'pastrevolutionaryexperiencehasgiventhemtheabilitytoorganizeoppositionandtowinsomelimitedconcessionsfromthegovernment.

Formanyofthosewhosebusinesseshavefailedorwhosejobsinthepublicsectorhavebeeneliminated,theonlyoptionistoseekworkintheinformalsectorofsmall-scalemanufacturing,commerce,andservices.InonepopularbarrioinManaguaamixoflow-incomemerchants,arti-

sans,andserviceworkers,aswellasanumberofprofessionals,liveandwork.Manyareinformallyemployedwomen,workingoutoftheirhomesandearningamarginalincome.Agoodnumber,includingsomewhoadoptedtheOccupationalConversionplan,haveinvestedinafreezerandsetupafrontroomstoretosellsoftdrinks,ice,andoftenanarrayofotherproducts.Unfortunately,thereissuchanabundanceofthesesmallstoresthatfewdoverymuchbusiness.Manywomenexpressedthegreatdifficultyinprovidingfoodfortheirfamiliesandinmeetingotherexpenses.

FromCooperativestoMicroenterprisesinPost-SandinistaNicaragua

Inthisbleakeconomiccontext,theUNOgovernmentmadeseveralinitiativestopromotethedevelopmentofmicroenterprisesoratleastgavetheimpressionofpromotingthem.Definedasproductiveunitsofuptofiveindividualsworkingtogether,microenterprises,inrelativelymodestbutgrowingnumbers,weregivenloanstobeginoperating.Amongthese,womenworkerswereprominent.ThenewOfficeofSmallIndustriesandMicroenterpriseswithintheMinistryoftheEconomywasestablishedtooverseethedevelopmentoftheseenterprises,providingloansandtechnicalassistance.SeveralNGOsalsoofferedsupporttomicroenterprisesonalimitedbasis.Thedirectorsoftheseofficesandorganizationsrevealedthehighfailurerateofthemicroenterprises,manyofwhichhavebeenunabletorepayloansandhavegoneoutofbusiness.However,thisdidnotpreventthegovernmentfromcarryingoutbroadpublicitycampaignsorfromholdinghighlyvisiblefairsforthesaleofitemsproducedbymicroentrepreneurs.Thus,whiletheUNOgovernmentsoughttodismantletheurbancooperativesthatsignalthepersistanceofSandinistaworkorganization,itwasintentonreplacingthemwithmicroenterprisesthatsymbolizethesuccessofthefreemarketmodel.

ContradictoryobjectiveswereexpressedbyMaríaHurtadodeVigil,thedirectoroftheMinistry'sOfficeofSmallIndustriesandMicroenterprises.Whileshestatedthatthegovernmentsoughttosupportthosesmallenterprisesthatweremostlikelytosucceed,sheacknowledgedthateventhosepromisingindustriesstoodlittlechanceofsuccessinacontextofshiftingpolicythatfavoredtheentryofimportedgoodsandincreasingcompetition.Stressingthebenefitsofliberalizationoftheeconomy,shesaidshehadnotconsideredtheimplicationsforwomenmicroentrepreneursdeemed"likelytofail"(HurtadodeVigil,interview,May8,1991).

Between1991and1993,severalinterviewswereconductedwithStefanPlatteau,theheadoftheNationalProgramtoSupport

Microenterprise(ProgramaNacionaldeApoyoalaMicroempresa,orPAMIC),alsocreatedbytheMinistryoftheEconomy.AEuropeaneconomistbasedinNicaragua,hesharedaviewheldbymanyothers,includingsomeSandinistas,thattherevolutionarygovernmenthad"spoiled"workersbyofferinghandoutsandsupportwithoutofferingthetrainingthatwouldmakethemself-sustaining.Thus,hewasintentuponfindinghighlymotivatedindividualstotraininmicroenterprisesinordertomakehisprogramasuccess.In1992,ayearafterhisjobwascreated,hewasstilloptimisticthatindividualswithmanagementabilitiesanddeterminationcouldsucceedwithcreditandtraining(Platteau,interview,February24,1992).Bymid-1993herevealedmuchmorecynicismabouttheprospectsforthefivethousandmicroentrepreneurshisofficehadassisted.Henotedaproblematic"workculture"inNicaragua,inwhichpeoplefeelthatitdoesn'tpaytowork,thathetracedtothelastdecadeandtheSandinistas.Hesaysthathenowtellspeoplethatiftheywantloansandwanttosucceed,therewillbe"blood,sweat,andtears"aremarkherepeatedseveraltimesforemphasis.Whilehiscynicismextendstodoubtingthatthegrowthofmicroenterpriseswouldturnaroundtheeconomy,hethinksthatmuchisatstakeindemonstratingthegoodresultsofhisprogram(Platteau,interview,July23,1993).

AninterviewwithAntonioChávez,aleadingofficialinCONAPI,presentedadifferentperspective.Whenaskedabouttheimpactofrecenteconomicmeasuresonsmallindustries,Chávezreportedthatthesectorhadbeenparticularlyhardhitandthatwomen,whomadeup54percentoftheirmembership,werethemostaffected.Thelargestnumberofwomenworkersareinthegarmentandfoodindustries,whichhaveexperiencedgreatlossesasimporttariffshavebeenloweredongoodsenteringNicaragua.HeacknowledgedthatthedeclineinthesectorbeganundertheSandinistas,buthearguedthatthecurrent"shocktreatment"isfarworse(Chávez,interview,May8,1991).CONAPIreportedthatsomeseventhousandsmall-andmedium-sizedindustriesandservicesclosedin1992,leavingjustthreethousandshopsregisteredwiththeMinistryoftheEconomy(BarricadaInternacional,1993).

Inaneconomyinwhichthemajorityofurbanandruralworkersarelocatedinsmallindustriesandmicroenterprises,itisusefulfortheNicaraguangovernmenttogivetheimpressionofconcernandsupportforworkersinthissector(Leguizamon,1990).Thenewadministrativeapparatusanddiscoursearoundmicroenterprisesseemsdesignedtoofferhopetothemostvulnerableeconomicsector,atthesametimethatneoliberalpoliciesfurtherunderminethechanceofsuccessofthesector.ThedifferencebetweentheSandinista-organizedcooperativesandtheUNO-promotedmicroenterprisesislargelypoliticaltheformerbasedonthe

principleofstate-leddevelopmentandthelatterbasedonthemodeloffreemarketcompetitionyetbothtypesofworkorganizationaresufferingunderpresentconditions.

AlternativesforSocialMobilization

Intheabsenceofaviableeconomicprogramsupportedbythosecriticalofneoliberalism,andwiththeFSLNpartysplitintotwofactionssincelate1994,whatarethealternativesforeconomicandpoliticalchange?Toaddressthisquestionitisusefultoturnattentiontonewformsofsocialmobilizationinevidencesince1990.WhilethisessayhasfocusedontheharsheconomicmeasuresandthechangingorganizationofworksincetheUNOgovernmentwaselected,the1990shavealsoseengrowingpoliticalparticipationatthegrassrootslevelonarangeofissues.Breakingfrompartylines,autonomoussocialmovements,orsometimeslooselyorganizednetworks,havetakenupconcernsaswide-rangingastheenvironment,health,women'srights,and,notsurprisingly,theeconomiccrisis.Thereisasignificantconnectionbetweenthechangingpoliticaleconomy,withthenewemphasisonprivatizationandexport-ledindustrialization,andtheexpansionofpoliticalactivismaroundissuesofhumanrightsandgenderpolitics,atatimewhenthegovernmenthasswungsharplytotheright(Babb,1997).CriticsoftheformerSandinistagovernmentarguethatthismovementistheresultofapost-electoraldemocratizationprocess,andpartisansoftheFSLNcallitacontinuationofthelastdecadeofsocialmobilization.Infact,itisnotsimplyoneortheother.Rather,theemergenceofmoreindependentsocialmovementsmaybetheresultofaquestioningoftop-downSandinistapartypolitics,astrongoppositiontoUNOgovernmentpolicy,acontinuedmobilizationunderagovernmentthattoleratesadegreeofpoliticaldissent,andadesiretoraiseissuesthathadbeenoverlookedorsilencedbyestablishedpoliticalpartiesbothbeforeandafterthe1990elections.

Manyofthosewhohavebeenaffectedmostharshlybyrecentpoliciesarebeginningtonegotiatethetermsoftheirwiderparticipationinsocietythroughformsofcollectiveaction(Escobar,1992:83).InNicaragua,therelationshipisevidentbetweensuchapparentlydisparatedevelopmentsastheeconomiccrisis,UNOgovernmentinfightingandpoliticaldislocationsontheleft,andideologyveeringtotherightontheonehandandtheriseofautonomoussocialmovementsontheother.Theserelatedthoughsomewhatcontradictorydevelopmentscanbeunderstoodthroughthehistoricalconjunctureofeventsfollowingthe1990elections.First,theSandinistas'lossbroughtnotonlyanabruptpoliticaltransitionbutalsoamorereflectiveperiodfortheFSLN.Forcedtoacknowledgepast

errorsofatop-downleadership,thepartyopenedthewayformoreindependentorganizingtooccur.Second,itmaybepreciselyinthecontextofthemostdifficulttimesthatNicaraguansareseekingnotonlynewlivesbutnewmeaningsbywhichtoapprehendtheirlives.Puttingforwardissuesofgender,race,andclass,aswellassubstantivematterssuchashealthandenvironment,askeyelementsinanewpoliticalagendaisawaythatmarginalizedgroupsareresistingtheconservativeideologyoftheUNOgovernmentandfindingopeningsforcollectiveexpressionsofidentity.Thereareindicationsthattheserecent"cultural"movementsarebreathingnewlifeintoongoingstrugglesforeconomicandsocialjustice.

Conclusion

ThechangesinNicaragua'seconomyandintheorganizationofworksince1990havebeeninsomewaystransformativeandinotherwaysillusory.Theunexpectedjuxtapositionsremain,withelementsofbothstate-directedandmarket-drivendevelopmentthoughthelatterisrapidlygainingforce.In1979theNicaraguanrevolutionbroughtsubstantialchangestoasmall,underdevelopednation,butratherthanfollowinganyparticularmodelofsocialistdevelopment,theSandinistasallowedforamixedeconomyandheterodoxpoliciesandpractices.WhentheContrawardemandedincreaseddefensespendingandanausterityeconomy,measureswereintroducedthatboreresemblancetostructuraladjustmentmandatedbytheIMFelsewhereinLatinAmerica.However,theFSLNremainedcommittedtodeliveringbasicneedsandservicestothepopulationanorientationthatwassharplyreversedaftertheUNOcoalitioncametopower.

TheneoliberalprojectusheredinbytheUNOgovernmentcalledforareorganizationofworkasthestatesectorwascutback,industrywasprivatized,andnationalproductionwaschallengedbyconditionsfavoringimports.Evenso,Nicaraguanswerevocalintheircriticismsoftheharshconsequencesofthenewfreemarketorientationandtheywonsomeimportantconcessions,includingassistancetosmall-scaleproducers.Thepresentgovernment'ssupportformicroenterprisedevelopment,atthesametimethaturbancooperativesandsmallindustriesingeneralareseriouslyunderminedbyneoliberalpolicy,revealsadeterminedefforttocontaintheoppositionofalargepopulationinurbanNicaragua.However,judgingfromthecontinuedfailureofsomanysmallproductionunitsandthedownturnoftheeconomyoverall,itwilltakefarmoretoquelltheopposition.

IftheNicaraguanelectionin1990markedthelossofanother"historicmodel"ofsocialist-orienteddevelopment,italsopresenteduswiththeopportunitytofollowtheresponseoftheleftandofemergentpopularmovementstothechallengeofneoliberalisminonesmallCentralAmericannation.Inrecentyears,Nicaraguahasundergoneaworseningeconomiccrisisandafitfulpoliticaltransition,butithasalsoexperiencedtheproductivetensionofasocietydemandingdemocraticandpluralistapproachestonationaldevelopment.Socialrevolutionsofthefuturewillbe,withoutadoubt,differentfromrevolutionsofthepast,andwecanlearnasmuchfromcurrentstrugglesaswecanfromhistoricalones.Astheolddebatesoverstate-sectorversusprivate-sectordevelopmentandoverloyaltytoapoliticalpartylinesubside,today'ssocialmovementsinNicaraguaandelsewheremayprefigure,inalltheiruncertainties,alternativesforthefuture.

References

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."AftertheRevolution:NeoliberalPolicy,InformalEconomy,andGenderinNicaragua."LatinAmericanPerspectives23,no.1(Winter1996):27-48.

."NegotiatingSpaces:Gender,Economy,andCulturalPoliticsinPost-SandinistaNicaragua."Identities:GlobalStudiesinCultureandPower4,no.1(May1997):45-69.

Chávez,Antonio.Interviewwithauthor,Managua,Nicaragua,May8,1991.

Einhorn,Barbara.CinderellaGoestotheMarket:Citizenship,Gender,andWomen'sMovementsinEastCentralEurope.London:Verso,1993.

Enríquez,LauraJ.HarvestingChange:LaborandAgrarianReforminNicaragua,1979-90.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1991.

Escobar,Arturo."Culture,Economics,andPoliticsinLatinAmericanSocialMovementsTheoryandResearch."InTheMakingofSocialMovementsinLatinAmerica:Identity,Strategy,andDemocracy,editedbyArturoEscobarandSoniaE.Alvarez,62-85.Boulder:WestviewPress,1992.

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Gibson,Bill."AStructuralOverviewoftheNicaraguanEconomy."InThePoliticalEconomyofRevolutionaryNicaragua,editedbyRoseJ.Spalding,15-41.London:AllenandUnwin,1987.

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IIIRESTRUCTURINGSOCIETYANDNATURE

7NeoliberalismandPublicEducation:TheRelevanceoftheBolivianTeachers'Strikeof1995*LesleyGill

Thesoundwasunmistakablepah!pah!pah!Itroseabovethedinoftrafficandpunctuatedthequotidiannoisesofmid-morningsociallifeinElAlto.Whitesmokecurledupward,waftingaroundbuildingsinthedistanceanddissipatinginthecity'sthinair."Becarefulifyougooutside,"warnedmyfriendandlandlady,Felicidad,aswestoodinthecourtyardofherhome."It'sthepoliceandtheteachersagain."

Severaldaysearlier,inlateMarch1995,thousandsofstrikingpublicschoolteachersfromthesurroundingcountrysidearrivedinElAlto,a14,000-foot-highsatellitecityontheperipheryofLaPaz,Bolivia'scapital.TheyhadmarchedfordaysacrosstheBolivianhighplateautojointheirurbancolleaguesinprotestagainstaneducation-reformlaw,butsoldiersandpolicepreemptedtheirattempttoholdademonstrationbysprayingthemwithrubberbulletsandteargas.Inthedaysthatfollowed,smallbandsofangryteachers,frustratedbycontinuedpolicerepression,staged"lightningblockades"inwhichtheybarricadedroadsandinterruptedtrafficuntilpolicemovedintodispersethem.ThedismantlingofonesuchblockadewithteargaswaswhatFelicidadandIhadheard.

Boliviawasnottheonlyplacewherepubliceducationcameunderfireintheearlymonthsof1995.GovernorGeorgePatakiofNewYork

*Thispaperispartofabroaderprojectthatexaminestherelationshipbetweenpopularmovements,laborunions,andnongovernmentalorganizations.ResearchwasconductedinElAltoandLaPazforeightmonthsbetweenJune1994andJuly1995andfundedbyAmericanUniversity,theAmericanCouncilofLearnedSocieties,andtheAspenInstitute.IwouldliketothankGuillerminaSoriaandBertaChuquimiafortheirassistance.

pushedthroughdeepcutsinhisstate'seducationbudget,promptingprotestsbystudentsandfacultyinNewYorkCity.Nicaraguanteachersstagedaforty-two-daystriketosecurewageincreases,andtheircounterpartsinHaitiandColombiamountedsimilarprotests.Thesewerejustthelatestinarisingnumberofdemonstrationsthathaveexpressedthediscontentmentofpublicschoolteachersandpublic-sectoremployees.

Theworldwideshifttoneoliberalpolicies,whichseektoresolvesocialandeconomicproblemsthroughanunquestionedbeliefinthe"magicofthemarket,"hasjeopardizedteachers'jobsecurityandforcedstateagenciestoreducethenumberofpersonnel.Decliningwagesandsocialserviceshavesimultaneouslyerodedthesurvivalpossibilitiesofpeasantsandpoorurbandwellers,whohavealsoresistedtheassaultontheirlivingstandardinavarietyofsettings(forexample,Edelman,1991;Walton,1989;Nash,1992).Yet,withfewexceptions,LatinAmericanpublicschoolteachershavenotoccupiedacentralplaceinthesocialscienceliterature(Foweraker,1993;Cook,1990).Advocatesofamajorparadigmforexplainingcollectiveactiontheso-callednewsocialmovementstheoryhaveignoredordismissedthe"old"strugglesforeconomicequalitywagedbyunionsandclass-basedorganizations,which,theybelieve,havebeenlargelysupersededbyaplethoraofsocialmovementswhosegoalscenteronforgingnewidentitiesandadvancingparticulargender,ethnic,andculturalclaims(EscóbarandAlvarez,1992;Jelin,1990;cf.Edelman,n.d.).InBolivia,however,publicschoolteachersareattheforefrontoflaborandpopularstrugglesthatchallengecurrentlydominantneoliberalsocialandeconomicpolicies.1

Thisessayexploresaneight-weeknationalteachers'strikeagainstagovernment-backededucationreformlawandthetensionsfromwhichitemerged.ItfocusesonthecitiesofLaPazandElAlto,whereresistancetothereformisstrongest.Atstakefortheteachersisjobsecurityandtherighttocontinuepracticingtheirprofessionamidstanerodingpubliceducationsystem.Thegovernmentisconcernedaboutwhosevisionofeducationwillprevailatatimewheninternationalpressurehasmade"reform"virtuallymandatory.Thefermenthasputenormouspressureonteachers.Theymustcontendwithaconcertedeffortbythestatetounderminetheirjobsecurity,andtheymustconfrontparentsforwhomtheyareambivalentfigures.Parentsfrequentlybelievethatteachersdonotcareaboutchildrenandimprovingthequalityofeducationbutsimplyarelookingoutfortheirownselfishinterests.However,parentsunderstandthatteacherslikemostparentsearnpaltrysalariesthatareinadequateforsupportingafamily.TheexperiencesofBolivianteachersareimportant,becausetheyresemblethoseofpublicschoolteacherselsewhere.

PublicEducationinElAlto

Followingthe1952Boliviannationalrevolution,theNationalRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoNacionalistaRevolucionario,orMNR)supportedthedevelopmentofapubliceducationsystemthatsoughttoincorporatethousandsofQuechua-andAymara-speakingpeasants.Freepubliceducation,itsleadersbelieved,wasnotonlyawaytoconsolidatepowerandrespondtothedemandsofnewlyenfranchisedindigenouspeoplesbutalsoaninstrumentforforginganationalidentityandovercomingdeepethnicandregionaldifferences.Atthesametime,anumberofstate-sponsoredteachertrainingschoolsemergedtopreparewomenandmenforpositionsinthenewschools.Thestateguaranteedjobstograduatesinasystemthatexpandedduringthe1950s.But,afteraprolongedeconomiccrisisthatbeganinthelate1970sandaseriesoffiscalausteritymeasuresadoptedin1985,publiceducation,whichwasalwaysunderfunded,begantocrumble.Thestatenolongerguaranteedjobstograduatesofteachertraininginstitutes,andthemunicipalizationofthecountryinthe1990splacedmuchoftheburdenofpubliceducationoncash-strappedlocalgovernmentsatatimewhenpublicspendingtoimproveurbanlivingconditionswasrestrictedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund.CriticsclaimedthatthesestatepolicieswouldessentiallyprivatizeeducationinElAlto.

BoliviaisoneofthepoorestcountriesinLatinAmerica,andtoday35percentofitssixmillioninhabitantsarefunctionallyilliterate.InElAltoasprawlingslumof405,500people71percentofthemenand77percentofthewomenfifteenyearsofageorolderhavenevercompletedelementaryschool(INE,1990).Thereasonsforthissituationarenumerous.

ElAltoisacityofpoorimmigrantsthatbegantodevelopintheyearsfollowingthe1953agrarianreform,whenthefragmentationofpeasantlandholdingsanddecliningagriculturalyieldspromptedpeasantstoseekjobsinLaPaz.Overthelastfifteenyears,drought,economiccrisisandthebrutaleffectsofneoliberalreformswagefreezes,mineandfactoryclosures,socialservicecutbacks,andrisingun-andunderemploymenthaveonlymadelifeinthecitymoredifficult.ThemajorityoftheimmigrantstoElAltoarepeasantswhohaveemigratedfromruralareasinthehopeoffindingjobsandeducationalopportunitiesfortheirchildren.Othersareformertinminerswholosttheirjobsinthemid-1980s,afterthegovernmentclosedstate-operatedmines.Stillotherimmigrantsareex-residentsofLaPaz,whererisingrentsforcedthemtomovetoElAltoinsearchofcheaperaccommodations.Mostoftheimmigrantshave

incorporatedthemselvesintoElAlto'sburgeoninginformaleconomyofinsecure,low-wagejobs,suchasstreetvendingandpart-timeconstructionwork(seetheBuechlers,Chapter5,thisvolume).

Socialservicesinthecityhavenotkeptpacewiththeburgeoningpopulation.Rapidlyexpandingimmigrantneighborhoodslackschools,andstudentsfromtheseareasmusttraveltootherdistricts,whereunderfundedschools,inadequateandoutdatedinstructionalmaterials,andovercrowdedclassroomsoffiftytoseventystudentsmakelearningnexttoimpossible.Tomakemattersworse,schoolinstructionistaughtinSpanish,yetAymaraand,toalesserextent,Quechua,arethefirstlanguagesofmanychildren,whospeakSpanishimperfectly,ifatall.Theexigenciesoflifeinanimpoverishedcityalsocontributetohighratesofschooldesertion.Thedemandsoftheagriculturalcycleobligechildrentoleaveschoolandassistruralkinfolkorparentswhocontinuetoholdsmallplotsinthecountryside.Childrenarealsoobligedtoworkinthecitytoprovideanincometotheircash-strappedhouseholds.Boysworkasshoeshinersandassistantsontheminibusesthattrollthestreetsofthecityforpassengers.Girlsbecomedomesticservants,sellonthestreet,orremainathometocarryouthouseholdtasksandlookaftersmallchildrenintheabsenceofparents.

Underthesecircumstances,ElAlto's18,196publicschoolteachersarehardpressedtodeliveraqualityeducation.Theyarealsotheproductsofthesamedeficientsystemandimpoverishedenvironmentinwhichtheywork,andtheirsalaries,whichrangefromU.S.$98toU.S.$170amonth,makesatisfyingtheeconomicnecessitiesoftheirownhouseholdsaconstantstruggle.TransportationtoandfromworkcaneasilycostU.S.$10amonth,andafterdeductingexpensesforfood,rent,clothingandelectricity,itisnothardtounderstandtheeconomicdifficultiesthatteachersface.DuringadiscussionoftheproblemsofBolivianeducationandthelearningproblemsofmalnourishedchildren,RubénZambrano,ayoungteacherwithabeginningsalary,pointedoutthatteachersarealsopoorlynourished.''It'salsoaquestionoffood,"hesaid."Ifwearenotwellfed,it'shard[tothinkabout]thelessons.Onefallsasleep."

Becauseofthelowsalaries,teachingiswidelyviewedasasecond-rateprofession;itisnotthecareerofchoiceforthosewiththemeansandtheopportunitiestostudylaw,medicine,engineeringandothermorelucrativeprofessions.Notsurprisingly,54percent(2,224)ofElAltoteachersarewomen,althoughinthecountryside,wherewomenrarelystudybeyondthethirdgrade,teachingisdominatedbymen.Nearlyaquarter(24.4percent)ofallElAltoteachersdonothaveateachinginstitutedegreeandarecongregatedatthebottomofthepayscale,wheretheyareclassifiedas"interimteachers"(maestrosinterinos)(UnidaddeApoyoy

SeguimientoalaReformaEducativa,orUNAS,1994).Becauseoflowsalaries,womenareeithermarriedtomenwhoearncomparablewages,or,inthecaseofsingleparents,livewithrelativeswhohelpdefraysomeoftheirexpenses.Itisalsocommonforteachersmenandwomentoholddowntwoteachingjobsorengageinotheractivities,suchaspettycommerce,tosupportthemselves.2Butattritiondueto"burn-out"isroutine;almosthalfofElAlto'steachershaveheldtheirjobsfornineyearsorless(UNAS,1994).

Clearly,thepubliceducationsystemisindireneedofreform,andElAltoresidents,otherBolivians,andmanyteachershavelongrecognizedthisfact.Inordertounderstandthecontroversysurroundingeducationalreform,however,andespeciallythe1994EducationReformLaw,publiceducationandthereformlegislationmustbeplacedwithinthebroadercontextofglobaleconomicrestructuring.

ReformandResistance

TheimpetustoreformBolivia'seducationalsystemcameduringthe1992NationalCongressofEducation,whentheNationalCouncilofEducation(ConsejoNacionaldeEducación,orCONED)wasformedtodrawupaseriesofrecommendationsforafar-reachingeducationreformprogram.CONEDproducedadocumentbackedbyabroadconsensusoflaborandpopularorganizationsthatbecameknownastheLeyMarcodelaReformaEducativa(BasicPrinciplesforEducationalReform).Althoughanumberofitssuggestionssuchasbilingualeducation,updatedteachingmethodologies,andagreatersensitivitytogenderappearedintheEducationReformLawof1994,thelawitselflackedthepopularsupportoftheLeyMarco.ItwashurriedlypassedbytheBolivianCongress,whichtookadimviewofthesocialgroupsalignedbehindtheLeyMarco,andwhichwasunderpressurefromtheWorldBanktoapprovethelaw.Indeed,theEducationReformLaw,passedonJuly7,1994,boretheheavyimprintoftheTechnicalSupportGroupoftheEducationReform(EquipoTécnicodeApoyoalaReformaEducativa,orETARE),aWorldBank-sponsored,technicaladvisorygroupthatsubmitteditsownrecommendationstothegovernmentfortransformingpubliceducation(Codina,1994).

TheWorldBankisfinancingmanyofthechangesmandatedbythenewlaw,especiallyattheprimarylevel.IthasincreasedspendingonprimaryschooleducationinBoliviaandelsewhereasawaytoincreasethefutureproductivityofThirdWorldlaborforces,makethemmoreattractivetobusinessandpromoteeconomicgrowththroughinvestmentin"humancapital"(WorldBank,1993).Tothisend,theBolivianEducationReformLawisdesignedtodeepenthefreemarketpoliciescraftedby

PresidentGonzalo"Goni"SanchezdeLozada.Itemphasizesprimaryschoolingandtechnicaltrainingatthesecondarylevel.And,althoughnotdirectlystated,thelawseekstoreducethestatebureaucracybyeliminatingteachers,whosesalariesandbenefitsaccountfor95percentofthestate'seducationbudget,andtogenerategreaterproductivityfromtheremainingteachingstaff,byrequiringhigherprofessionalstandards.Italsocontainsaseriesofstatutesthatdemeantheteachingprofessionandunderminethejobsecurityofpublicschoolteachers.

Teachertrainingschoolgraduates,onceclassifiedasprofessionals,arerecategorizedas"superiortechnicians"(técnicossuperiores),andhiring,jobretention,andpromotionunderthenewlawaredeterminedbytheresultsofacompetencyexamination,tobetakenwithinfiveyearstime.Teachersare,inprinciple,notopposedtohigherprofessionalstandards,andthoseinterviewedforthisstudywanttofurthertheirprofessionaldevelopmentbytakinguniversitycourses,yetthestateisnotseriousinassistingthemtomeetnewgoals.Thus,teachersargue,theexamswillgraduallythintheirranksbecausetheywillbeunabletoperformwellonthem.

NoelAguirreisathirty-three-year-oldelementaryschoolteacherwhohastaughtinanElAltoprimaryschoolforelevenyears.Tosupplementhissalaryandsupporthisthreechildren,Aguirrealsoworksafternoonsinaprivateschool,wherehiswifeteaches.Hefullysupportstheideaofaneducationalreformbutcannotaffordthetimeofftotakethecoursesthatheneedstopassthecompetencyexam.Moreover,hisexhaustingscheduleleaveshimlittletimetostudy.Aguirre'sdaybeginsat8:30A.M.andendsbetween5and6P.M.Hisclassestypicallycontainfiftytoseventy-fivechildren,whocompletelydrainhimbytheendoftheday."Ileaveschooltotallyexhausted,"heexplains."Idon'thaveenergyforanything.Andmywifefeelsthesameway.Soshe'stired;I'mtired;andbothofushavelittleinterestinthechildren.Thekidsmakenoise,andwegetmadbecausewehaveabsolutelynomoreenergy.Afteralittledinnerandsomecoffeewefallintobedsowecangetupthenextdayandstartthesameroutinealloveragain."Inaddition,AguirrelivesinanewsettlementontheouterperimeterofElAlto,andtravelingtotheuniversityincentralLaPazforeveningclasseswouldtakeanhourtoanhourandahalfineachdirection."Givemetime,"hestatesemphatically,"butthegovernmentwillnotdothisforus.''

Teachers'suspicionsofgovernmentintentionsareonlydeepenedbythelaw'scontributiontounderminingtheirunion.Thelawmakesitmoredifficultfortheuniontoraisemoneybyeliminatinga1percentpayrolldeductionthatisusedtosupportunionactivities.TeacherAlexMorales

thedirectorofeducationandcultureforElAlto'sRegionalWorkers'Centralbelievesthatthegovernmentwantstobreaktheunion,whichisaconstantthorninitsside."[Thegovernment'sbehavior]isnotgratuitous,"hesays."Thefewerunionsthat[thegovernment]hasbeforeit,theeasieritwillbetoimplementneoliberalpolicy.Aunionwithoutfinancialsupportcannotsurvive,becausenothingisfree."ElAltoteacherAntonioSanchezconcurs.''Thegovernmentwantstodisappeartheunion."3Teachersalsoresentchangesinthecontrolofschoolsthattakeautonomyawayfromtheteachingbodybyencouraginglocalentitiestoassumeanactiveroleinmonitoringteachersandspending.VictorPrado,executivesecretaryoftheUrbanTeachers'Confederation,summarizedthechangesas"...anadministrativereformandnot[areform]ofeducationingeneral"(Painter,1995:4).

OppositiontothereformbegantobuildnationwideimmediatelyafteritspassageinJuly1994,andatwenty-four-hourstrikeonFebruary10,1995,onlytendaysaftertheinitiationoftheschoolyear,wasaharbingerofdeeperstrife.ManyBolivianssawthisconflictastheopeninggambitinwhat,theythought,wouldbeaseriesofprotests,strikesandnegotiationsbetweenteachersandthestatethathadcometobealmostroutineatthestartofeveryyear.But1995wasnotlikepastyears.Inadditiontotheusualdemandsforwageincreases,teachersinsistedthatthegovernmentrepealtheEducationReformLawandtherebychallengedakeyelementofthegovernment'sneoliberaldoctrine.

Teachers'resolvetoresistthelawmountedthroughoutFebruaryandMarch.Aftertwoadditionaltwenty-four-hourstrikesinFebruary,theunion,onMarch13,declaredanindefinitenationalstriketoforcethegovernmenttorepealthereformandattendtotheirwagedemands.TheyweresupportedbytheBolivianWorkers'Central(CentralObreraBoliviana,orCOB)anationalconfederationofunionswhich,onMarch22,announcedanindefinitegeneralstrike,afternegotiationswiththegovernmentdeadlockedoveraseriesofissues,includingtheeducationreform,minimumwageincreases,andcocacultivationintheChapareregion.Althoughsupportforthegeneralstrikewasweak,teachersinLaPazandElAlto,aswellasthoseinthesurroundingcountryside,weregenerallysupportiveofit.

Inthefollowingweeks,thegovernmentusedvarioustacticstopressureteachersbacktowork,includingthreateningtohirereplacementworkersandrefusingtopaywages.TheEducationMinistrydisseminatedmisinformationaboutthestrengthofthestrike,exaggeratingtheextenttowhichteacherswereworkingandignoringthecalltostrike.Whenevertheyhadachance,governmentfunctionariestriedtoisolateanddiscredit

unionleadersbybrandingthem"Trotskyistextremists"and"dictatorial."Whennoneofthesetacticsworked,thegovernmentrevertedtoovertrepression.

OnMarch22,whenruralteachersconvergedonElAlto,theyweremetwithpoliceandmilitarytroops.Soldierswieldingbatonsandshootingteargasandrubberbulletsbrokeupthemarchandarrestedleaders.Aweeklater,eightythousandresidentsofElAlto,respondingtoacallbytheCOB,marchedthroughthecity,demandingthatthegovernmentattendtotheirdemandsforwageincreases,respectforpeasantcocagrowers,andarepealoftheEducationReformLaw.Unwillingtonegotiatebutthreatenedbytheteachers'challengeandongoingconflictswithpeasantcocagrowers,thegovernment,onApril18,declaredastateofsiege.Policeroundedupoverthreehundredpeasantandlaborleadersandshippedthemofftoisolatedprisonsinthelowlandjunglesandfrontierregions.Acurfewwasimposed,anymeetingsofmorethanthreepeoplewereprohibited,andcivilrightsweresuspended.

Coordinatingthestrikeinthedaysthatfollowedproveddifficult.Unionmeetingswereoutlawedandallthemajorleaderswereeitherinprisonorinhiding.Rank-and-fileteacherswerealsouncertainabouthowfarthegovernmentwouldcarryitscampaignagainstthem,andmanywerefeelingthefinancialcrunchofastrikethathadalreadylastedfiveweeks.Onthemorningaftertheimpositionofthestateofsiege,however,teachersbeganmeetingclandestinelyintheirschoolswithlocaluniondelegatestoassessthesituationandplotastrategyforthedaysahead.OnesuchmeetingoccurredintheColegioSanSalvador.

ForgingSolidarityintheColegioSanSalvador4

TheColegioSanSalvadorisaprimaryschoolinLaPaz'snorthernzone,anareathat,untilrecently,housedlightmanufacturingindustriesandanurbanworkingclass.Muchoftheindustryisgonenowandresidentsmustmaketheirlivingintheubiquitousinformalsector.Some540childrenattendtheschool,whichisonlytwoblocksfromtheheadquartersofanelitearmybattalion,andtheyaretaughtbyatwenty-nine-memberteachingstaffthat,withonlythreeexceptions,isallwomen.

Elevenofthesewomenteachersgathered,nervously,intheschool'scourtyardonthemorningofApril19.Earlierthatmorningtheirschoolrepresentativewastohaveattendedacity-widemeetingofuniondelegatestovoteoncontinuingthestrike,butthestateofsiegeandthepoliceoccupationoftheunionhallprecludedanytypeofmajorassembly.AlthoughtheSanSalvadorstaffhadmetregularlyintheschoolsincethebeginningofthestrike,thismeetingwasclearlydifferent.Individuals

castuneasyglanceseverytimeanewarrivalknockedatthedoor,fearingthatthepolicewouldbreakinandarrestthem.Onewomancounseledotherstotellthepolice,iftheyshouldappear,thattheteachersweresimplywaitingforstudentstoarrive.Indeed,onimposingthestateofsiegethenightbefore,thegovernmenthadorderedtheteachersbacktoworkandthreatenedtofirethemandhirereplacementworkersiftheydidnotobey.

Becauseoftheuncertaintycreatedbythestateofsiege,someteachersdidnotriskcomingtoschoolthatday,butothers,accordingtoseveralwomenpresent,weresimplytreatingthestrike"likeavacation."Theseteachers,whosupplementedtheirpaltrywageswithpettycommerce,wereusingthefreedomfromteachingthatthestrikeprovidedtodedicatethemselvestotheircommercialactivities.Thosepresent,however,didnothaveotherjobsandwereborrowingmoneyandrelyingonthesupportofspousesandrelativestoseethemselvesthroughthestrike.Theywantedtodiscusstheimplicationsofthestateofsiege,allayeachothers'fears,and,morethananythingelse,decidewhetherornottocontinuethestrikeinlightofthelatestgovernmentactions.

ThemeetingwasdirectedbyBertaChoque,asinglemother,who,inrecentdays,hadbeenraisingmoneytofeedherchildbysellingapowderedmilkallotmentthatthestateprovidestoneedymothers.Choquewasalsotheschool'sdefactouniondelegate.Shehadbeentheofficialrepresentativeforeightyearsbutresignedafterthebirthofherchild.ThestaffsubsequentlydelegatedtheunionresponsibilitytoEtnaRomero,anunlikelycandidatebecause,asoneteachercomplained,"sheistooinfluencedbytheofficialistviewsofherhusband."Romeroalsohadareputationforactingagainstgroupdecisionsinthepast.Yet,byimposingthejobonher,teachershadhopedtodevelopRomero'ssenseofresponsibilityandinvolvementandlimitherdisruptivebehavior.Thesuccessofthistactic,however,wasnotevidentonApril19.Romerodidnotattendthemeeting,andBertaChoqueassumedheroldresponsibilities,whichshehadneverentirelyabandoned.

ThefirstpersontospeakwasMariadelCarmenMéndez,aforty-year-oldwomanwithtwenty-twoyearsofteachingexperience.Likeotherteachersinherposition,Méndezresentedbeingforcedtotakeacompetencyexaminationafteryearsonthejob,butsheexpresseddoubtsaboutcontinuingthestrike."Wehavetoanalyzehowfarwearewillingtogo,"shesaid."Afterall,wedependonourworkanddon'twanttogotosuchextremesastogetfiredenmasseandreplacedbyhighschoolgraduates."Otherwomenexpressedsimilarreservations,buttothesepeople,InésVelasco,afifty-year-oldwidow,counseledcautionandawait-and-seeattitude.GiventheperipherallocationoftheColegioSanSalvador,she

didnotthinkthatitsteacherswouldbethefirstfiredif,infact,thegovernmentcarriedthroughwithitsthreat.Sheurgedthosepresenttocontinueevaluatingthesituationonedayatatimeandnottobeintimidated.Aftermorediscussion,thewomenagreedtocontinuethestrikebutresolvedtomeetagaininthreedays'timetoreassesstheirposition.ChoqueandVilmaPeralta,theschool'sdirector,stressedtheimportanceoffrequentmeetings,inspiteofthestateofsiege,soteacherswillnotfeelisolatedandbecomesusceptibletogovernmentpropaganda.

Laterthatweek,onFriday,April21,theteachersmetagain.Thistimeamajoritywaspresent,andanxietiesranhigh.Althoughthegovernmenthadnotfiredanyone,theMinistryofEducationcontinuedtomakethreats.ItannouncedthatpayvoucherswouldbedistributedthefollowingMondayonlytothoseteacherswhoshowedupforworkandthatsalarieswouldbediscountedforeverydayofthestrike.Atthesametime,radiostationssympathetictothestrikersbroadcaststatementsfromunionleadersinjailorhidingthaturgedteacherstomaintainthestrike.TheColegioSanSalvadorteachersonceagainfoundthemselvesatacrossroad,wheretheyhadtomakeadecisionthatcouldpotentiallyaffecttheirjobsandtheirfutures.Andagain,opinionsweredividedoverthebestcourseofaction.

OneyoungwomandressedinbluejeansindicatedthatotherschoolswereslowlyreturningtoworkandthattheColegioSanSalvadorshoulddothesame.Nanci,theschoolsecretaryandawidowfromElAlto,declaredthatshewouldshowupat8:30A.M.Mondaysothatnobodycouldfireher,andawomanseatednexttoherquicklyassertedthatshewoulddothesame.EtnaRomero,presentforthefirsttimesincethestateofsiege,alsofeltthatteachersshouldreturntowork.

Themoreradicalteachersagaincounseledpatienceandcaution.Asshehaddonebefore,InésVelascoadvisedpeopletocomeonMondaytoevaluatethesituationandmakeadecisionbasedondevelopmentsintherestofthecity.Bybeingpresent,sheargued,theywouldbeabletodefendtheirjobs,butthatdidnotmeanthattheyhadtoteach,which,shefelt,shouldnothappenuntiltheentirerankandfilevotedtoendthestrikeandjailedleaderswerereleased.BertaChoqueandVilmaPeraltasupportedthisposition.Inasubtlerebuketothosethreateningtoactontheirown,ChoquesuggestedthateveryonearrivetogetheronMondayat8:30A.M.,soastomaintainunity.Solidarity,shestressed,wascrucial.Why,sheasked,shouldtheyreturntoworkifthegovernmentdiscountedtheirpaychecks?Giventhelengthofthestriketodate,theystillwouldbeleftwithvirtuallynothing.Shefurtherarguedthatnobodywouldbefiredonthefirstdayofasupposedreturntowork;onlyafteramajorityofschoolshadgoneback,sheclaimed,wouldthisreallyhappen.Choque

concludedbyurgingpeopletotakewithagrainofsaltgovernmentclaimsaboutschoolsendingthestrike.TheColegioSanSalvador,shepointedout,waspartofalistofschoolsbroadcastontelevisionthathadsupposedlyreinitiatedclasses.

Asteachersarguedbackandforth,severalofthewomenpresentremainedsilent.Oneofthem,EliaOrmachea,wasdeeplyconflictedaboutthestrikeandherparticipationinit.Asthemotherofthreechildren,Ormacheawashavingdifficultykeepingfoodonthetable.Shewasalreadyindebt,andsuppliesthatshehadstockpiledafterthelaststrikewererunningout.OrmacheawasalsoadevoutSeventhDayAdventistandactingagainstherreligiousbeliefsbyparticipatinginastrike."We[theAdventists]aresupposedtosupportGodandtheauthorities,"shesaidinanearlierconversation,"thereforewhenIparticipateinademonstration,Ican'tshoutinsultsbecausewerespecttheauthorities.Morethananything,Igotoavoidthefinethattheunionleviesagainstthosewhodonotparticipate."Why,then,wouldsheriskimprisonmentbyattendinganillegalmeeting?"Ihavetosupportmycompañeros,''shesaid."Iobeywhatevertheydecidesoasnottodivideus.It'salittleconflictiveforme."Giventhesecontradictionsinherownposition,Ormacheadidnotventureanyopinions,onewayortheother,duringthemeeting,andotherwomen,lesstornbytheirreligiousbeliefs,butinsecureaboutexpressingthemselvesinthedebate,alsoremainedonthesidelines.

Theteachersonceagaindecidedtocontinuethestrike,persuaded,inlargemeasure,bytheargumentsofChoqueandVelasco.Theyalsoresolvedtocontinuemeetingperiodically.Buttheirnextmeetingneveroccurred.Astheteachersassembledaweeklater,ananonymousphonecallertippedthemoffaboutanimminentpoliceraid.Alarmedbythecall,peoplequicklydispersed,exceptChoqueanddirectorPeralta,whoeventuallydiscoveredthatthecallwasahoax,perpetratedbyanirateparentangeredbytheteachers'continuedrefusaltoendthestrike.

ParentsandTeachers

ParentsinthepoorandworkingclassneighborhoodsofElAltoandLaPazaredeeplycommittedtotheeducationoftheirchildren.Education,theybelieve,isaroadoutofpovertyandawaytoinsureamoresecurefuture.Therefore,parentsfrequentlymakegreatsacrificesforeducation.Thosewhocanaffordtheexpensesendtheirchildrentoagrowingnumberofprivateschools,where,theysay,thequalityofeducationisoftennobetter,andsometimesworse,thanthepublicschools.However,classesareneverdisruptedbytheconstantstrikesthatplaguethepublicsystemsinceteachersarenotunionizedandaresubjectedtorigidadministrative

discipline.Thevastmajorityofparentscannotfurnishtheirchildrenwiththeluxuryofaprivateschooleducation.Theymustmakedowiththepublicsystem,wherelaborunrestdisruptstheeducationalprocessand,accordingtomanyparents,teachersarepoorlypreparedtoexercisetheirprofession.Giventheirviewsoneducation,parents'feelingsaboutthestrikeunderstandablyaremixed.

Thoseparentswhobacktheteachersappreciatethattheyearnlowsalaries,andmanyfearthattheEducationReformLawisanattempttoabolishpubliceducation.Theseparentsmayhavealsosufferedfromteargasenteringtheirhomesduringthefrequentclashesbetweenpoliceandstrikingteachersintheirneighborhoods.Forthesereasons,theysupporttheteachersdemandsandarehighlycriticalofthereformandthegovernment'sheavy-handedtactics.WomenlikeFranciscaMendoza,whosesixchildrenattendpublicschoolandwhoseeldestsonteachersinapublicschool,supportthestrikersbecauseherson'swagesarekeytothesurvivalofherhousehold."Hehastostrikebecausehiswagesarenotenough,"sheexplains.Taxi-driverFermínOrtega,whosetwochildrenattendpublicschool,alsobacksthestrike."Thegovernmentisn'tinterestedinsolvinganything,"hesays."[Everythingitdoes]iswithbulletsandgas.''

Otherparents,however,deeplyresentteachersandfeelthattheirchildrenaretheprimaryvictimsofthestrike.Likeallparents,theywanttheirchildreneducatedbywell-trainedprofessionals,buttheyarenotsatisfiedwithteachers'professionalbehaviorortheirqualifications.Theirregularattendancerecordofteachersisaconstantcomplaintvoicedbythem.Teachers,theysay,typicallyextendschoolvacationsbyfailingtoappearonthedaysprecedingandfollowingofficialholidays.WeekendsalsogeneratehighattritiononMondaymornings,andwhenteachersdoshowup,theyareinvariablylate.This,sayangryparents,isunprofessionalconductthatshouldbesanctionedbythestate.

Theteachingprofessionisalsoanavenueofupwardmobility,despitetheproletariansalaries,especiallyforindividualsinruralareasandurbanimmigrantslums.ItconfersahighersocialstatusthanthatofdaylaborerorpeasantandenablesindividualstodistancethemselvesfromtheirpeasantandIndianbackgrounds.ManyparentsandstudentschargethatteacherswhohaveobtainedthislimitedsocialmobilitydiscriminateagainsttheirownpeoplebydenigratingtheAymaralanguageandbecomingabusiveandauthoritarianintheclassroom.Tothem,teachersappearlessastheexploitedvictimsofanunjuststatepolicythanasdomineeringsocialclimbers.

Thestrike,fortheseparents,wasnotaboutimprovingeducationfortheirchildren;itreflectedtheintransigencyandself-servingattitudesof

teachersandtheirunion.TheelderlygrandmotheroffivestudentsattheColegioSanSalvadorwasdisturbedbytheteachers'refusaltoreturntowork."Mygrandchildrenaretiredofplaying,"shefumed."Theywanttogobacktoschool."Thiswoman,whosoldsweetsinfrontoftheschool,wasalsodistressedbythestrikebecausebusinessathersmallstandhaddroppedoffdramaticallywiththesuspensionofclasses.Anotherangrymothercomplainedthat"ayearneverpasseswithnormalclasses.Therearealwaysstrikesandthatiswhypubliceducationisviewedsopoorly.Theteachersneveragreewithanythingthatthegovernmentsays.They'rereallynotsobadlypaidgiventhenumberofhoursthattheywork,andtheygettwolongvacationsayear.Anyotherpublicemployeehastoworkalldaylong."Shefurthercriticizedthelowprofessionalqualificationsofpublicschoolteachers."Theycallthemselvesprofessionals,''shesaid,"butmanyhavenotgonetothenormalschool."

Parents'dividedopinionsaboutthestrikewerereflectedintheFederationofParentsofElAlto,anorganizationthatrepresentsamajorityoftheparentsofpublicschoolchildren.TheFederation,whichisdominatedbymembersofanoppositionpoliticalpartyConscienceoftheFatherland(ConcienciadelaPatria,orCONDEPA)andbelongstotheCOB,supportedtheteachersinsofarastheirdemandsforhigherwageswereconcerned,butitrefusedtocallfortherepealoftheeducationreformlegislation.TheFederationbackedtheEducationReformLawbecauseitbelievedthatthelawwouldcompelteacherstoimprovethemselves.Itwasalsosympathetictothenotionthatparentsshouldhavemorecontrolovertheeducationoftheirchildren.AsoneFederationleaderexplained,"Wemustrealizethatthereareteacherswhoarenotevenhighschoolgraduates.Thesepeoplehaveencrustedthemselvesontothecurrentstruggleasawayofblockingchangestothesystem.Theyarenevergoingtoagreewiththereform,becausetheyaretheoneswhowillneverpassthetest....Theyenteredtheprofessionthroughpoliticalfavoritism,...orfamilyconnections."Desperateparentsinseverallocal-levelaffiliationsorganizedfundstopayteacherstoworkduringthestrike,butbecauseofunionvigilance,theyweregenerallynotsuccessfulingettingthembacktowork.

Thegovernment'sintransigenceandrepressionfinallyprevailed.TheCOBcalledoffthenationwidegeneralstrikeonApril30,whenthreeleaders,operatingclandestinelyandwithoutconsultingtherank-and-file,signedanagreementwiththegovernment.WithouttheCOB'ssupport,theteachershadlittlechoicebuttofollowsuit.Theycouldnotholdoutindefinitelywithoutastrikefund,andtheeight-weekstrikehadalreadyexactedahighpricefromteachersandtheirfamilies.Itwasacrushingdefeat:notonlydidtheEducationReformLawremainintactbutteachers

werenotevensurethattheirlostwageswouldbepaid.Teachers'unionleadersthemostradicalintheBolivianlabormovementwereirateandaccusedCOBleadersofsellingoutthemovement.Rank-and-fileteachersalsofeltdisillusionedthattheirlongweeksofsacrificehadbroughtnothing.

Conclusion

Thedebateaboutpubliceducationislikelytocontinuewhetherornotthecurrenteducationreformlawisrepealed.Shorterworkstoppagescontinueinthewakeofthestrike;oppositiontotheEducationReformLawremainsstrong;andgovernmentofficialsandlaborleadersarediscussingpossiblerevisionsofthelaw,albeitnotitstotalrepeal.Despiteitsfailuretocompletelyreversethereform,theteachers'strikegalvanizedalevelofpopularsupportinElAltoandthepoorneighborhoodsofLaPazthathasnotbeenseenintherecentpast.FormerexecutivesecretaryoftheCOBandpeasantleaderGenároFloresfoundreasonforhopeinthepopularresponse."[Thestrike]wasnotatotaldefeat.Inthepast,itwastheminerswhofoughtforthepoorandtheworkingclass.Nowitistheteachers,andthepopulationsupportedthemandunderstoodthatitisnotjustawageproblem.Thestrikewasawayforpeopletoreorganizethemselvesandbecome[more]consciousoftheproblemswitheducationinBolivia.Thereformcameveryquicklywithoutanyonereallyunderstandingwhatitwasabout,becauseit'saprojectoftheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank"(Flores,interview,May1995).

ContrarytoonesectorofpublicopinioninLaPaz,teachersdidnotopposethelawbecausetheywereagainstreformingeducationinBolivia.Rather,theywerestrugglingtoprotectthefewshredsofjobsecuritythatremainaftermorethanadecadeofneoliberalreformsinBoliviaandtopreservetheirdignityasteachers.

Thestrikeandteachers'conceptionsofthemselvesdemonstratethatclassremainsacentralorganizingdimensionintheconflictsoverpubliceducation.Contarytotheviewsofnewsocialmovementtheorists,classisnotjustoneofamultiplicityof"identities,"norcanitbeconsignedtothedustbinofhistorybylinkingittothe"old"labormovement,whichotherkindsofsocialmovementshaveostensiblysurpassed.Althoughnewsocialmovementtheoristshaveshownthatanarrow,class-basedperspectiveisinsufficientforunderstandingthecomplexitiesofcollectiveaction,theyhaveunwiselyjettisonedtheconceptaltogether.But,asGenároFloresindicates,class-basedstrugglesandorganizationsinBoliviahaveanenduringhistory,andtheyarekeytounderstandinghowpeopleconceptualizethemselvesandtheirongoingrelationshipstoothers.''Class,"

accordingtoArgentinesociologistCarlosVilas,"doesn'treplace...otheridentities,nordoesitnecessarilytakeprecedenceoverthem.Rather,itorganizesthem"(Vilas,1993:39).

TheBolivianteachers'strikenotonlypromotedgreaterconsciousnessoftheclasswarfarethattheInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldBank,andtheBoliviangovernmentarewagingagainstteachersandpoorurbandwellersandpeasants,butitalsointensifiedthedebateaboutracismandteacheraccountabilityinthepublicschoolsystem.Buildingsolidarityinthefuturewilldependupontheabilityofteachers,parents,andstudentstoengageindiscussionsabouteducationalquality,professionalresponsibility,andculturalintegrityaswellasthebroaderissuesofpoliticalandeconomicinequalitythatshapepubliceducation.Skepticsneedtobeconvincedthatteachersaregenuinelyconcernedabouteducatingchildren,whoalsobearthebruntofthepubliceducationsystem'snumerousinadequacies,andthattheyare,indeed,thechampionsofapubliceducationsystemthatiscurrentlythreatenedbythereformistzealofneoliberalplannersinstateagenciesanddistantinternationalorganizations.

Notes

1.ThepeasantcocagrowersoftheChapareregionarealsodefendingtheirrighttogrowcocainthefaceofincreasingU.S.pressuretoeradicatecocafieldsandeliminateamajorsourceofprimarymaterialfortheinternationalcocainetraffic.Theirprotestsmultipliedin1995aftertheUnitedStatesintensifiedpressureontheBoliviangovernmenttoeradicatecocafieldsandwerealsoamajorfactorinthegovernment'sdecisiontoimposeastateofsiege(seePainter,Chapter2,thisvolume).

2.RicardoHumerezMachicadohasevensuggestedthatbecauseteachersareforcedtohavealternativesourcesofincometosurvive,theirstrikesaremoresuccessfulinachievingstatedgoals,especiallyintheabsenceofaunionstrikefund.Teachers,heargues,relyonthesealternativesduringastrikeandarethusabletoholdoutlongerthanworkersdependentononlyonesourceofincome.However,HumerezMachicadoiscriticalofasystemthatforcesteacherstohaveothermeansofsupport,becausetheyareessentiallysubsidizingpubliceducationwiththeirlowwages(HumerezMachicado,1995:2).

3.Theuseof"disappear"asanactiveverbcameintouseinLatinAmericaduringtheeraofmilitarydictatorshipsinthe1970sand1980s."Todisappear"referstothewaythatpeoplewerekidnappedandmurderedbymilitaryandparamilitarydeathsquads,whosubsequentlydeniedanyknowledgeofthevictims'whereabouts.

4.Thenamesoftheschoolandtheteachershavebeenchanged.

References

Codina,Gabriel."Losrostrosdelareformaeducativa."CuartoIntermedio,no.33(November1994):26-45.

Cook,MariaLorena."OrganizingOppositionintheTeachers'MovementinOaxaca."InPopularMovementsandPoliticalChangeinMexico,editedbyJoeFowerakerandAnnL.Craig,199-212.Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,1990.

Edelman,Marc."ShiftingLegitimaciesandEconomicChange:TheStateandContemporaryCostaRicanPeasantMovements."PeasantStudies18(1991):221-49.

."DefyingtheInvisibleHand:PeasantPoliticsandtheFreeMarketinCostaRica."Unpublishedmanuscript,n.d.

Escóbar,Arturo,andSoniaAlvarez.TheMakingofSocialMovementsinLatinAmerica.Boulder:WestviewPress,1992.

Flores,Genáro.Interviewwithauthor,LaPaz,Bolivia,May1995.

Foweraker,Joe.PopularMobilizationinMexico:TheTeachers'Movement1977-1987.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993.

HumerezMachicado,Ricardo."Porquetienenéxitolashuelgasdelmagisterio."Presencia(June13,1995):2.

InstitutoNacionaldeEstadistica(INE).Censonacionaldepoblaciónyvivienda.LaPaz,Bolivia:INE,1990.

Jelin,Elizabeth.WomenandSocialChangeinLatinAmerica.London:Zed,1990.

Nash,June."InterpretingSocialMovements:BolivianResistancetoEconomicConditionsImposedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund."AmericanEthnologist19,no.2(May1992):275-93.

Painter,Michael."MaestroscuestionanespíritudeLeydeReformaEducativa."Presencia(March29,1995):4.

UnidaddeApoyoySeguimientoalaReformaEducativa(UNAS).Registrodedocentesypersonaladministrativo.LaPaz,Bolivia:UNAS,1994.

Vilas,Carlos."TheHourofCivilSociety."NACLAReportontheAmericas27,no.2(1993):38-42.

Walton,John."Debt,Protest,andtheStateinLatinAmerica."InPowerandPopularProtest:LatinAmericanSocialMovements,editedbySusanEckstein,299-328.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1989.

WorldBank.AnnualReport.Washington,DC:WorldBank,1993.

8VitalSigns:TheDynamicsofFolkMedicineinNorthwesternArgentinaConstanceClassenandDavidHowes*

NorthwesternArgentinabordersonChiletothewestandBoliviatothenorth.TheregionwasoncepartoftheIncaempireandparticipatesinageneralpan-Andeanculturewithlocalvariations.ThelanguagespokenisSpanish,inflectedbywordsandmodalitiesfromQuechua(withpocketsofQuechua-speakerspresentintheprovinceofSantiagodelEstero).Theregionisprimarilyagricultural,producingsugarcaneandcitrusfruitsamongothercrops.

IntheNorthwest,traditionalorfolkmedicinecombinesindigenoushealingpracticeswithcolonialSpanishmedicineandothermorerecentinfluences.Whiletheethnomedicineoftheregionisasyncretismoftraditionsratherthanapurely"indigenous"bodyofknowledgeandpractice,thepeoplewhomakeuseofittreatitasanintegralwholeandavaluedpartoftheirculturalheritage.

Withintheincreasinglyheterogenousmedicalmarketplaceofglobalsociety,theplaceofethnomedicine,andtherelationshipbetween"traditional"medicineand"modern"biomedicine,constituteimportantareasofresearch.Ithasbeennotedthatthepostmodernconditionofthelatetwentiethcenturyischaracterizedby,amongotherthings,amélangeofstylesandtrendsfromvariouscultures,producingsometimesconflictinginfluencesofmodernityandpostmodernityonLatinAmerica(Canglini,

*AmongthemanypeoplewhohelpedusduringourstaysinArgentina,wewouldliketoexpressourspecialthankstoEmiliaNúñezdeFritsch,FranciscoMaza,SimonaMoyadeMaza,LuísAcosta,CristinaContreras,ElsaNúñezdeBattich,theQuirogafamily,andtheSturlafamily.ThefieldresearchonwhichthisessayisbasedwasmadepossiblebyagrantfromtheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.AnearlierversionofpartsofthisessaywaspublishedinTheInternationalJournalofAromatherapy5,no.4(1993/94):1923.

1995).WhiletheprocessesofmodernizationhavedisplacedtraditionalmedicineinNorthwesternArgentina,thisessayexploresthepossibilitythattheostensiblypluralistethosofpostmodernityhaspermittedspaceforthegrowthanddevelopmentofethnomedicalpracticesandbeliefs.

TheVocationofCurandero

InArgentina,ethnomedicalpractitionersarecommonlyknownascuranderosandmaybeeithermenorwomen.Theycustomarilylearntheirtradeasapprenticestoothercuranderos,oftenaparentorgrandparent,althoughmanyhealerswillstatethattheywerebornwiththegiftorthattheirabilitytohealcametothemthroughsometransformativeexperience,suchasbeingstruckbylightning.Acuranderowilloftenhavepassedmiddleagebeforeheorshebeginspracticing,asanindicationoftheresponsibilitywhichhealingisunderstoodtoentail.Thebetter-knowncuranderoscandrawpatientsfromgreatdistancesandmayreceivesubstantialmonetaryrewardsfortheirassistance.However,mostcuranderosdonotliveofftheirmedicalpractice,butratherdispensetheiraidasafavortotheirneighborsinreturnforsmallgifts.

Attaininginformationfromcuranderosabouttheirtechniquesofhealingcanbedifficultsincetheyareoftensecretiveabouttheirpractices.Thissecrecyisdueinparttoadesiretopreventcompetitionandinparttoanassociationofsecrecywithhealingpower.Furthermore,officialattemptstosuppressfolkmedicinehavemadecuranderosreticenttorevealinformationabouttheirpractice.Oncetheyovercametheirinitialsuspicions,mostofthecuranderosinterviewedwerequitewillingtodiscusstheirmethodsofhealing,althoughtheywereneverpressedtorevealpracticesthattheywishedtokeepsecret.

Thedesireforsecrecyincreasedproportionallywiththerenownofacurandero'spractice.Insuchcasesitisprobablethatthehighdemandfortheirservices,togetherwiththeoccasionalmediainterview,hadtaughtthecuranderostoregardtheirmedicalknowledgebothasapersonalpossessionandapotentiallyvaluablecommodity.Theless-knownormoreremotecuranderos,however,wereapttotreattheirknowledgeaspartofacommonfundoffolkwisdom,withtheexceptionofcertain"wordsofpower,"whichwerebelievedtorequiresecrecyinordertobeeffective.

ThecuranderosinterviewedforthisessaylivedprimarilyinthesmallmountaintownsoftheNorthwest,althoughaselectionofcuranderosandtheirpatientsinthecitiesoftheregionwerealsosurveyed.Theinformationgiventousbythevariouscuranderos,whethermaleorfemale,andbytheirpatientslargelyagreed,indicatingabroadlysharedunderstand-

ingofillnessanditstreatments.Whilemanycuranderosaregeneralpractitionersinthattheytreatawiderangeofailments,theymayalsospecializeinoneformoftreatment.Onecommonexampleofafolk-healingspecialististhebonesetter,whobothsetsbrokenbonesandtreatssuchailmentsasarthritisorbackachethroughmassage.Anannualvisittosuchabonesetterfora"workover"issaidtokeepone'sskeletoningoodworkingorder.Othercuranderosmaytreatonlytoothachesorthe"evileye."1

Sincetheillnessesdiagnosedandtreatedbycuranderosareconsistentwithpopularorfolkmodelsofhealthanddisease,theyarenotalwayscompatiblewithbiomedicalmodels.Thefolkmodelofdiseaseoftenincludesfluidboundariesamongphysiological,spiritual,andsocialailments.Indeed,virtuallyanysensationofunwellnesscomesunderthedomainofthecurandero,andnotsimplyphysiologicaldisorders.Commonfolkillnessessuchasmalojo(theevileye),susto(fright),andmalaire(badair)areconsideredtoaffectapersonbothinbodyandspirit.Problemsapparentlysocialoreconomicinorigin,suchasunemployment,mayalsobeincludedwithinthegeneralmodelofillnessandtreatedbythecurandero.Treatmenttypicallyincludesprayers,vitalizingteas,andprotectiveamuletsdesignedtofortifytheindividualinhisorherareasofweaknessandintegratethepersonintoanetworkofpositiveenergy.

FolkmodelsoftheorganizationandfunctionsofthehumanbodyinNorthwesternArgentinaarelikewiseoftenincompatiblewiththestructuralandfunctionalparadigmsofthebodypositedbybiomedicine.Agoodexampleofthisincompatibilityisthepaletilla,whichisheldbyethnomedicinetobeasmallbonesuspendedfromthepointofthesternum.Thisboneissaidtooccasionallybecomelooseandsinkorfall,causinggraveillness.Biomedicinedoesnotrecognizetheexistenceofsuchamigrantbone,and,infact,thepaletillahasbecomealiteral"boneofcontention"betweenpractitionersofthetwoformsofmedicineintheregion.Thatphysiciansdonotrecognizetheroleofthepaletillainillnessistakenbycuranderostosignalthelimitsofbiomedicalknowledge.Conversely,thatcuranderosdeemthepaletillacapableofcausingdiseaseistakenbyphysiciansasevidenceofthefancifulandunfoundednatureofethnomedicine.

Thesedifferencesinopinionoverthebasicorganizationofthebodybetweenthecommunityofcuranderosandthecommunityofphysiciansareindicativeoftheextenttowhichthebodyisaculturalobject,subjecttowidelydifferentconstructions.However,itmustberecognizedthatbodymodelsarenotstaticasisadiagraminamedicaltextbookineitherethnomedicineorbiomedicinebutarecontinuallyadaptedandreinterpretedaccordingtonewconcernsanddevelopments.

HealingthroughtheSenses

Whatholdstrueforthebodyalsoholdstrueforthesenses,themediathroughwhichweexperienceourbodiesandtheworldoutside.Whilepossessedofabasicphysiologicalform,thesensesareendowedwithmeaningandemployedaccordingtoculturaldictates.This"culturalconstruction"ofthesensesmeansthatsocietiescandiffersignificantlyinthewaysinwhichtheyperceiveandmakesenseoftheworld(Howes,1991;Classen,1993b).

InthecaseoftheethnomedicineofNorthwesternArgentina,thedifferentsensesplaydistinctrolesinboththediagnosisandtreatmentofillness.DiversemethodsofdiagnosisareusedbycuranderosintheNorthwest.Thepatient'snarrativeofsymptomsisusuallyanimportantfactorinthearrivalatadiagnosis.Itissupplementedbytheinformationgatheredbythecuranderofromanumberofothersensorydiagnostictechniques.

Certainhealers,forexample,diagnoseprimarilybylookingatandsmellingasampleofapatient'surine.Thecuranderonoteswhethertheurineiscloudyorclear,lightordark,andmayobservethepatterncastbyarayoflightpassingthroughtheurine.Otherhealersdiagnosebyreadingthepulse,orbyexaminingtheformofthehand,theshapeofthefingersandknuckles,andthetemperatureoftheskin.

Divinatoryaidsmayalsobeemployedtodeterminethecauseoftheillness.Ahandfulofcocaleaves,forexample,maybethrownonatabletoprovidea"reading."Theshapesoftheindividualleavesaswellasthepositioninwhichtheyfallaresaidtoofferinformationaboutthepatient.Acuranderomayalsodefineapatient'sillnessbywatchingtheflickeringofacandleflameforsupposedlytelltalesignsrelatingtothepatient'scondition.Alternativelythepatient'sbodymayberubbedwithwoolthatisthenthrownintothefire.Theresultingcolors,forms,andcracklingsareinterpretedbythecurandero(Palma,1973:7782).Themodeormodesofdiagnosisemployedbyacuranderodependonhisorherpersonalpreferenceandtrainingandthesuspectedillnessofthepatient.

Aswiththemethodsofdiagnosis,thetreatmentsemployedbythecuranderosoftheNorthwesthaveastrongsensoryfoundation.Thecuranderoisattentivetocolors,forms,sounds,smells,andtactilesensationsaccordingtotheparticularmethodsemployed.Intreatmentthepatientabsorbsasimilarrangeofsensorystimuli,fromanaromaticteatoamassagewithherbalointments.

Inthecaseofaseriousillness,anattemptwilloftenbemadetotreatthepatientthroughallofherorhissenses.Suchisthecasewithsusto

frightsicknessacommonailmentintheregion,asinotherpartsofLatinAmerica.Sustoissaidtooccurwhenapersonsuffersastrongfright,whichhastheeffectofseparatingthesoulfromthebody.Inthecountryside,comingclosetobeingstruckbylightningiscitedasatypicaleventthatwillresultinsusto.Inthecities,almostbeinghitbyacarmayproducesusto.Inthecaseofchildren,themostfrequentsufferersofsusto,simplywanderingaloneoutsideafterduskisthoughttobeenoughtoresultina"soulloss."

Apersonaffectedbysustowillfeelweakandnervous,mayspendlongperiodscrying,andmayalsohaveboutsofvomiting.Thecuranderousuallyvisitstheplacewherethefrightoccurred,ifnearby,andattemptstolurethesoulbacktoitsbodybycallingoutthenameofthepatient.Thecuranderowillalsodragapieceofthepatient'sclothingonthegroundtoleaveatrailforthesoultofollowhome.Duringthisceremonyitisimportantthattherebecompletesilence,foreventhebarkofadogissaidtobeenoughtoscarethealreadyfrightenedsoulawayagain.2

Inthemeantime,thepatientwillhavebeentreatedwitharangeoftherapies.Thesuffererfromsustoiskeptwarminbedandgivenhot,aromaticherbalteatodrink.Incensecomposedofavarietyofsubstances,suchasrosemary,rue,sugar,anddust,isburned.Thisincensehasmultiplepurposes,includingthoseofsoothingthepatient,attractingthewanderingsoul,andkeepingawayevilspirits.Thepatient'sbodyiscarefullymassagedaccordingtospecifictechniquesinordertoassuagethephysicalconsequencesofsusto.PrayerstothePachamama,"MotherEarth,"andtoanumberofsaintsinvokedivineaidonbehalfofthepatient.Finally,abrightredcharm,oftenintheformofabracelet,maybeusedtostrengthenthepatient'sresistancetoevilforces.Thismultisensorytherapycreatesapleasantaestheticenvironmentinordertoencouragehealing.Atthesametimeitintegratesthepatientintothehealingprocessthroughallofherorhissenses.

AromaticCures

AndeanhealershavetraditionallyhadaccesstoawidevarietyofplantsfortheircuresduetothenatureoftheAndeanenvironment,whichsupportsverydifferentplantlifeatdifferentaltitudes,andthevaryingamountsofprecipitationthatfallfromregiontoregion(Lira,1985;Villafuerte,1984).Aromaticplantsareadministeredtopatientsbycuranderosinavarietyofways,themostcommonmethodbeingintheformofatea.Forexample,muñamuña,astrong,musky-smellingshrub,ismadeintoteatoalleviatestomachaches.Muñamuñaisalsosaidtobeanaphrodisiacits

Quechuaname,infact,means"love."Suchteasarebelievedtoworkuponthepatientboththroughbeingswallowedandthroughtheiraromaticvapors.

Aromaticplantsmayalsobeburnedtoproduceanincense,calledsahumerio.Suchincense,inadditiontobeinginhaled,isthoughttopenetratethewholebodyofthepatient.Sometimesincensewillconsistofonlyonesubstance.Forexample,rosemaryincenseissaidtobegoodforheadcolds.Moreoften,however,anincensewillbecomposedofseveralingredients.Forinstance,anincenseconsistingofrue,anise,blackwool,andeucalyptuswassaidtohavecuredapatientsufferingfromapostpartumillness.

Whileodorsarethoughtabletocurediseases,theyarealsobelievedtobeabletocausethem.3Thegeneralnameforair-borneillnessesismalaire(badair).Malaireisavapororemanationthoughttobepresentinplacescontainingstaleair,suchascaves,andwherethereisputrefaction,suchasswampsorcemeteries.Certaintreesarealsobelievedtogiveoffamalaire,whichinfectsthosewhorestintheirshade.

Theprimarysymptomsofmalaireareastiffnessinthebodyorarash.Malaireisoftentreatedwithincense,suchastobaccosmoke,orbytheapplicationofanaromaticointment.Thefoulemanationofmalaireiscounteredbystrong-smellingherbsinthebeliefthatthe"goodair"administeredbythecuranderowilldriveouttheharmful"badair."Throughthiseconomyofodors,thecuranderoisabletoaugmentthepatient'solfactoryvitality.

Theimportanceassignedtoodorsinthemedicineofthisregioncanbeseenasevidencebothofa"non-modern"understandingofodorsassourcesofdiseaseandwell-beingandofanAndeanpreoccupationwitholfactorysensations.TheQuechualanguage,forexample,containsawiderangeofverbsdescribingsubtlevariationsinolfactoryexperience.Suchverbsincludetermsmeaning"tosmellagoododor,""tosmellabadodor,""tosmellthetracesofanodor,""tomakesomeonesmellanodor,''"toletoneselfbesmelled,"and"tosmellsomethingasagroup."Theprominencegiventosmellisduetoitscloseassociationwiththebreathandthereforewiththelifeforce(Classen,1993a:16566).

ThesensorydimensionsoftheethnomedicinepracticedinNorthwesternArgentinaaresimilarinmanywaystothosefoundincolonialSpanishmedicineandamongcertainfolkhealersincontemporaryEurope(Howes,1995).Beforetheadventofclinicalbiomedicineinthelateeighteenthcentury,Europeanphysiciansandfolkhealersalikemadeuseofsuchsensorytherapiesasincense,herbalteas,andaromaticbaths.Diagnosiswouldlikewiseusuallybeundertakenthroughvarioussensory

channels.Galen,theprimarymedicalauthorityforpremodernphysicians,recommendedthataphysicianuseallhissensestoexamineapatient:hearing,tolistentothepatient'snarrativeandtoattendtothegurglingoftheintestinesorthetremblingofthevoice;smell,toassesstheodorsemanatingfromthepatient'sbodyandexcretions;touch,totakethepulseandtemperature;sight,toexaminethepatient'sappearanceandlivingconditions;andtaste,tosamplethepatient'ssweatandtherebyascertainthebalanceofthehumorsinthepatient'sbody(eachofthefourhumorsbeingassociated,andsometimesidentified,withacorrespondingflavor)(Nutton,1993).

Bycontrast,inmodernbiomedicine,diagnosisandtreatmentarelargelydesensualized.Thethermometersubstitutesforahandontheforeheadasameansofascertainingbodytemperature.Charts,graphs,x-rays,andchemicalanalysesprovidegraphicinformationhithertoascertained,ifmuchlessexactly,directlythroughthesenses.Treatmentconsistsofpillstobeswallowedwithoutbeingtastedifthepatientcanavoiditorsurgery,duringwhichthepatientisanaesthetized.Ratherthanbeinganimportantagentinthehealingprocess,thesensesareusuallybypassedasmuchaspossibleinmodernmedicine.Thus,theinvolvementofthesensesconstitutesafundamentaldistinctionbetweenethnomedicineandbiomedicine.

FolkMedicineandModernization

Ithasoftenbeenassumedthatbiomedicinewouldsupplanttraditionalmedicalsystemsthroughouttheworldsincethismedicalrevolutionwasgenerallythoughttobebeneficial.Whileethnomedicinemightbeappreciatedasaformoffolklore,biomedicinewasbelievedbothtoofferthebestsystemofhealthcareintheworldandtoplayanessentialroleinThirdWorlddevelopment.However,attheendofthetwentiethcenturyitisevidentthattheuniversalizationofmodernmedicineisbynomeansassured.Oneapparentreasonforthisisthatmodernmedicineistoocapital-intensiveformanyThirdWorldpeoplestoafford,requiringmassiveinvestmentinhospitals,technologies,andthetrainingofphysicians(Bastien,1992:12).Anotherlessexpectedreasonisthatbiomedicine,initsspreadacrosstheworld,hasprovedunabletodisplaceethnomedicine.Twodistincttendencieshavecontributedtothecontinuingsurvivalandreinventionofethnomedicalpracticesinareaswherebiomedicinehasbeenmadeavailable.Thefirstistheadherenceoflocalpeoplestotheirownmedicalsystems.Thesecondisthegrowinginterestshownbyusersofmodernmedicineinfolktherapies.

InNorthwesternArgentinatheavailabilityofmodernhealthcareserviceshasnotresultedintheeliminationoftraditionalpracticesofhealing.Infact,asinmanyotherregionsofLatinAmerica,theinhabitantsarelikelytoresorttobothethnomedicalandbiomedicalpractitionersatdifferenttimes,ratherthanexclusivelypatronizingonesystemortheother.Furthermore,themovementofruralpopulationsintourbanareasoverthepastdecadeshasincreasedthenumberoffolkhealersavailabletourbandwellersnormallytheconsumersofbiomedicinejustastheestablishmentofbiomedicalclinicsinruralareashasmadebiomedicinemoreaccessibleforcountrydwellersnormallytheconsumersofethnomedicine.Thus,thecurrenthealthcaresceneinNorthwesternArgentinaismarkedbystrongmedicalpluralism.

Althoughmostpeopleinterviewedrecognizedvariousadvantagestomodernmedicaltreatment,andevenitsnecessityoncertainoccasions,therewasnonethelessawidespreaddistrustofbiomedicine.Aprevalentconcernwasthatbiomedicalcarewastooexpensiveandthatphysicianssometimesprescribedunnecessarytreatmentsimplytoincreasetheirfees.Aswell,manypersonsassociatedmodernmedicinewithinvasiveprocedures,andinparticular,surgery,ofwhichtheywereafraid.Evenmedicationsadministeredbyphysicianswereoftendistrustedoutofafearofdangeroussideeffects.Incontrast,herbs"neverdoanyoneanyharm."Thegeneralideaseemedtobethatthe"natural"curesofthecuranderoworkedinharmonywiththebody,whilethe"artificial"curesofthephysicianassaultedthebody.

Patientstendedtofeelmoreateasebeingtreatedbyherbswellknowntothemthanbymysteriousforeignsubstancesprocuredatapharmacy(althougha"mysterious"substancemaysometimesbeconsideredtohavesuperiorhealingpower).Relatedtothisfeelingofgreatereaseisthefactthatcuranderosworkwithinasettingfamiliarandcomfortabletotheirpatientsthatofthehomewhilephysiciansworkinanalienandalienatingenvironmentthehospitalorthedoctor'soffice.Similarly,especiallyforpatientswithruralbackgrounds,thediagnosesandtreatmentssuggestedbythecuranderoareusuallygroundedinlocalculturalbeliefs,whilethoseputforwardbythephysicianpertaintoanunfamiliarandoftenincomprehensibleworldview.

Ethnomedicineincorporatesaspiritualdimensiontohealingwhichmodernmedicinelacks.Modernphysiciansdonotprayfortheirpatients,ascuranderosdo,becausethatisinnowaypartoftheirjob.However,curanderosnotonlyinvokedivineaidonbehalfoftheirpatients,buttheyalsoofferremediesforspiritual,aswellasemotionalandsocial,problemsoftheirclientele.Ironically,modernmedicineisnotthoughtfitbymanypeopleoftheregiontocuretheveryillsthatareperceivedlo-

callyasbeingcausedbymodernization,suchasstress,unemployment,andthedisintegrationofthefamily.

Thedifferentsensorytherapiesofferedbycuranderoswouldappeartoconstituteanothermajorelementintheappealoffolkmedicine.Thesetherapiesprovidepatientswithformsoftreatmenttheyfindsensuallysatisfyingthatarenotusedinmodernmedicine.Whiletakingapillcontainingtheextractofacertainmedicinalherbmayhavethesamecurativeeffectasingestinganinfusionofthatherb,swallowingapillcannotcomparetodrinkinganaromatictea,inexperientialterms.Thedomainofthecuranderoischaracterizedbyarichsensuality,whilethatofthephysicianisde-sensualizedandaestheticallysterile.

Traditionalurbanusersofbiomedicinehavetheirownreasonsforturningtoethnomedicalpractitioners.Biomedicineiswidelyperceivedashavingfailedinitsgoaltoprovideacomprehensivesystemofhealthcare.Despitemanydecadesofmedicalresearch,curesarestilllackingformanyillnesses,fromshinglestocancer.Infact,thehabitualuseroftheresourcesofmodernmedicinehashadmoreoccasionthananyoneelsetobecomeacquaintedandfrustratedwithbiomedicine'sfailuresanddrawbacks.Thisaccumulateddisappointmentandfrustrationhascreatedalargebaseofpeoplewillingtoexplorealternativemeansoftherapeuticintervention,ifnottoentirelygiveuponbiomedicine.

Inaneraofexpandedconsumerchoice,peoplewanttobeableto"shop"forhealthcare,justastheyshopforotherconsumerproducts.InthisregarditisimportanttonotethattraditionalethnomedicineprovidesonlyoneofavarietyofalternativetherapiesavailableintheurbancentersofNorthwesternArgentina.Thesealternativetherapiesincludehomeopathy,faithhealing,andarangeofEasternandNewAge-inspiredpractices.

Inthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,modernizationwasassociatedwithamonolithicsocial,scientific,andtechnologicalmodeldrawnfromtheFirstWorld.TheattempttoimposethismodelonNorthwesternArgentinaledto,amongotherthings,themarginalizationofethnomedicineintheregion.However,attheendofthecentury,dueinparttotheforcesofconsumercapitalismandageneraldisillusionmentwithmonolithicideologies(or"metanarratives"),being"modern,"orrather"postmodern,"appearstomeanbeingabletoselecttheelementsofone'slife-stylefromarangeofchoicesthatincludeselementsmarked"traditional."Thisdevelopmentmaycontributetothesurvivalofethnomedicinebypresentingitasonemoreconsumeroptioninapluralizedmedicalmarketplace.Indeed,giventhecurrentinterestinalternativehealing,ethnomedicinehasbecomeamore"modern''medicinethanbiomedicine,whichnowseemstobelongtoaprioreraoffaithinscienceandtechnology.

TheDynamicsofFolkMedicine

ThefactthatethnomedicineissurvivinginNorthwesternArgentinadoesnotmeanthatthismedicineisnotundergoingchanges.Onlyaveryfewcommunitiesremainsoremotefromthemedicaltrendsofmodernityastoberelativelyunaffectedbythem.Traditionalcuranderosgatherinformationaboutnewtrendsnotonlythroughdirectencounterswithphysiciansoralternativepractitionersbutalsothroughradioprograms,newspaperarticles,andpatientswhohavetriedvarioustherapies.Asaresult,whenonespeakswithacuranderotodayparticularlywithanurbancuranderooneoccasionallyfindstraditionalmedicallorecombinedwithnotionsdrawnfromgermtheory,yoga,ortheshamanicbooksofCarlosCastaneda.

ChangesinlivingandworkingsituationsarealsocontributingtothealterationofethnomedicineintheNorthwest.Theincreasedpaceofmodernlifemakesitdifficultforpotentialhealerstodevotethetimedeemednecessarytoacquiremedicalknowledgeandforpatientstosubmittofull-lengthtreatments.Asaresult,bothethnomedicalknowledgeandethnomedicaltherapiesappeartohavebeensimplifiedoverthelastdecadesinordertomakethemsuitableforhealersandpatientsonthego.Ahealingritethatonceinvolveddaysoftreatmentaswellascommunityparticipationmightnowconsistofaquickconsultationandaprotectiveamuletforthe(perhapsout-of-town)patienttotakehome.

Nevertheless,itisimportantnottounderestimatethecontinuedresistancetofolkhealing,particularlyamongsomeprofessionals.ThemedicalprofessioninArgentinaisfarfromreadytoaccordanofficialstatustoethnomedicine.Physiciansinruralcommunitiessometimesattempttoprohibitlocalcuranderosfrompracticingbydenouncingthemtothepolice.Manyphysiciansclaimthatpeopleputtheirownortheirchildren'slivesatriskbyseekingtreatmentfromacuranderowhenthesituationcallsforurgentbiomedicalassistance.Curanderos,therefore,havetonegotiateaplaceforthemselvesinthecurrentmedicalscene.Onecurandera,DoñaMarcela,spokeofhowshehadarrivedatanuneasytrucewithhercommunity'sphysician:theyhadagreedtodisagreeastothecorrectdiagnosisandtreatmentofdifferentailments,withtheprovisothatthecuranderasendthosepatientswithseriousproblemsontothephysician.

Theoppositiontocuranderosisnotonlybasedontheirunofficialstatusasmedicalpractitioners.Variousphysicians,academics,andadministratorsexpresstheconcernthatturningtocuranderosforsolutionstohealthproblemscontributestotheneglectofneccesarychangessuchasensuringtheprovisionofpotablewaterthatcouldradicallyimprove

people'slivingconditionsandtheirwell-being.Also,turningtocuranderosforpersonalsolutionstodifficultiessuchasunemploymentcanbeseenasdistractingattentionfromthe"real"sourcesofsuchsocialproblems,namely,themarginalizationofNorthwesternArgentinawithinthenationaleconomyandoftheworkingclasswithintheNorthwest.However,whileitistruethatindividuals,believingthemselvesunabletochangepoliticaloreconomicstructures,willsometimeschooseaconsultationwithacuranderooversocialaction,thetwoapproachesarenotmutuallyexclusive.ThemostactiveoflaborleadersinNorthwesternArgentinamightwellconsultwithacuranderoconcerningpersonaleconomicdifficulties.Similarly,theestablishmentofbasicsanitarymeasuresinruralhouseholdsandvillagesisnotnecessarilyincompatiblewiththecontinuedpracticeofethnomedicine.Evenphysiciansandhealthcareworkersareknowntooccasionallyseektreatmentandadvicefromtheirethnomedicalcolleaguesforproblemsbeyondtheirowncompass.

AfactorthatmaysupportthesurvivalofethnomedicineinNorthwesternArgentinaandelsewhere,ormayleadtoitsfurthertransformation,isthegrowinginterestofFirstWorldpeoplesinThirdWorldpracticesoffolkhealing.Intheeraoftheglobalconsumer,onecanimagineastreamofdissatisfiedandunhealthyEuropeansandNorthAmericans,anxioustogetintouchwith"ancienttraditionsofknowledge,"lininguptobetreatedbyArgentinecuranderosastheycurrentlydowithrenownedfolkhealersinChina,thePhilippines,andPeru(Joralemon,1990;Howell,1995).OneforeseeableconsequenceofthecurrentFirstWorldinterestinethnomedicineisthatlocalbeliefsandpracticeswouldbecomeinsertedor"packaged"withinforeigndiscoursesof''shamanichealing"and"NativeAmericanspirituality."Indeed,withNewAgediscoursesbecomingglobalphenomena,manyfolkhealersmay,ontheirownaccount,rethinktheirpracticesinlightofcurrenttherapeuticandspiritualtrends.4

ThesedevelopmentsmaybeseenasleadingtothedisintegrationofethnomedicineinNorthwesternArgentina.Atthesametime,however,theypointtothecontinuedvitalityandrelevanceofethnomedicine.Itissignificantthatcitydwellerswithcompleteaccesstobiomedicinearenonethelessinterestedinethnomedicine,forthisdemonstratesthatthecuranderohasaviableroleasanalternativetherapistinthemodernurbanenvironment.Thefactthatcuranderosareabletoadapttheirpracticetourbansettingsandmodernlife-stylesensuresthat,whilespecificelementsofethnomedicinemaybetransformed,thepracticewillbeabletopersistunderchangingsocialconditionsintothenextcentury.Fromthepointofviewofthehistorianorculturalpurist,thenewethnomedicinethatresultsfromthispersistencewillhavelostitsformerauthenticity,

justasindigenousmedicinelostauthenticitywhenitbecameintegratedwithSpanishmedicineinthecolonialperiod(see,forexample,PérezdeNucci,1986:30).Fromtheperspectiveofthepeoplewhomakeuseofethnomedicine,however,suchmedicinemustrespondtothedynamicsofcontemporarycultureinordertoremainauthenticandrelevanttotheirlivedexperience.

Notes

1.Theevileye(malojo),initssimplestform,referstothenotionthattheenviousglanceofanothercanhaveadebilitatingeffectonone'shealthorfortune.

2.Forfurtherdescriptionsofthesymptomsandtreatmentofsustoandother"folk"illnessesinNorthwesternArgentina,seeRosenberg(1939)andPérezdeNucci(1988).

3.Ahistoricalandcross-culturalexaminationoftheroleofodorsinmedicineispresentedinClassen,Howes,andSynnott(1994).

4.Yet,atthesametimeasthephenomenonofglobalizationcontributestothevalorizationofcertainlocaltraditionsbyplacingthemonaworldstage,italsocontributestotheirhomogenizationandculturaldislocationbyframingthemwithinauniversalconsumerdiscourse(Howes,1996).

References

Bastien,Joseph.DrumandStethoscope:IntegratingEthnomedicineandBiomedicineinBolivia.SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress,1992.

Canglini,NéstorGarcía.Culturashíbridas:Estrategiasparaentrarysalirdelamodernidad.BuenosAires:EditorialSudamericana,1995.

Classen,Constance.IncaCosmologyandtheHumanBody.SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress,1993a.

.WorldsofSense:ExploringtheSensesinHistoryandAcrossCultures.London:Routledge,1993b.

Classen,Constance,DavidHowes,andAnthonySynnott.Aroma:TheCulturalHistoryofSmell.London:Routledge,1994.

Howell,Signe."WhoseKnowledgeandWhosePower?ANewPerspectiveonCulturalDiffusion."InCounterworks:ManagingtheDiversityofKnowledge,editedbyRichardFardon,65-79.London:Routledge,1995.

Howes,David,ed."TheSensesinMedicine."Culture,Medicine,andPsychiatry19

(1995):125-33.

.TheVarietiesofSensoryExperience:ASourcebookintheAnthropologyoftheSenses.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1991.

.Cross-CulturalConsumption:GlobalMarkets,LocalRealities.London:Routledge,1996.

Joralemon,Donald."TheSellingoftheShamanandtheProblemofInformantLegitimacy."JournalofAnthropologicalResearch46(1990):105-17.

Lira,Jorge.Medicinaandina:Farmacopeayrituales.Cuzco:CentrodeEstudiosRuralesAndinos"BartolomédeLasCasas",1985.

Nutton,Vivian."GalenattheBedside:TheMethodsofaMedicalDetective."InMedicineandtheFiveSenses,editedbyW.F.BynumandRoyPorter,7-16.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993.

Palma,NestorHomero.EstudioantropológicodelamedicinapopulardelapunaArgentina.BuenosAires:EdicionesCabargon,1973.

PérezdeNucci,Armando."MedicinapopularenelvalleCalchaquí."InVIJornadasdelValleCalchaqui,vol.6,29-34.SanMigueldeTucumán,Argentina:UniversidadNacionaldeTucumán,1986.

.LaMedicinatradicionaldelNoroesteargentino.BuenosAires:EdicionesdelSol,1988.

Rosenberg,Tobias.CuriososaspectosdelaterapeúticaCalchaquí.SanMigueldeTucumán,Argentina:GeneralImpresora,1939.

Villafuerte,Carlos.Diccionariodeárboles,arbustosyyuyosenelfolkloreargentino.BuenosAires:EditorialPlusUltra,1984.

9Eco-Imperialism?EnvironmentalPolicyVersusEverydayPracticeinMexicoMarilynGates

Whoistosaythatahungrymanshouldnotmakehismilpa[cornfield],cutatree,shootadeer?...Topreventthis,firstyoumustprovidehimwithalternativewaysofmakingaliving.Forestmanager,Campeche,January1990

Article27ofthe1917Mexicanconstitutionestablishedthatalllandsandwatersarepartofthenationalpatrimony,subjecttocontrolbythestateforthepublicgood.Thestatealsoclaimedtheright"toregulateuseofexploitablenaturalresourcesinordertomakeanequitabledistributionofthepublicwealthandtocareforitsconservation"(ZaragozaandMacías,1980:52,author'stranslation).Nevertheless,articulationofeffectiveenvironmentallegislationhasbeenslowasaresultoftheadoptedeconomicdevelopmentmodelsandthebelatedrecognitionoftheextentoftheecologicaldegradationthattheyincurred.

Bythemid-1980s,however,theenvironmentalcrisiswaswidelyacknowledged.Mediaattentionfocusedonspectaculardisasterssuchasbirthdefectsinthevicinityofbordermaquiladoras(exportmanufacturingplants),massiveoilspills,factoryandpipelineexplosions,clandestinedumpingoftoxicwastes,andtheasphyxiatedcapital,MexicoCity,arguablytheworld'smostpollutedmetropolis.Thesehorrorstoriesovershadowthemoremundaneaspectsofthecountry'senvironmentalcrisissuchasbadwater,taintedfood,opensewers,urbancongestion,andmountainsofgarbagethatmillionsofMexicanshavetocopewithroutinelyintheirdailylives.Intheirstruggletomakealiving,Mexicansarefacedwithboththeongoingdepletionofnaturalresourceswidespreaddestructionofecosystems,poisonedorerodedsoils,contaminatedlakesandrivers,

desertification,andrapidlyvanishingforestsandwithincreasingconstraintsresultingfromattemptsbythegovernmentandbyenvironmentaliststoarrestthisdegradation.

Paradoxically,Mexico'senvironmentalcrisishascometoaheadatatimeofrecentimpressiveachievementswithrespecttoenvironmentallegislation,mitigation,andconservationinitiatives.However,thegapbetweenenvironmentalpolicyandpracticeremainsvast.Anincompatibilitywithculturalmores,socialstructuralconditions,fiscalausterity,andothercontradictionsinthepoliticaleconomiccontextmilitateagainstenforcementofandcompliancewithregulationsandenduringchangesinattitudestonaturalresourceexploitation.

AchievingsolutionstothisproblemiscomplicatedbytheconceptualdistancebetweenWesternenvironmentalismandthediverseattitudesofMexicansabouttheirlivedenvironment.WhilesomeMexicansexpressaneedtoliveinharmonywiththeirnaturalsurroundings,manydonotrecognizetheconceptofenvironmentaldegradation,orhavebecomeinuredtoitsdailymanifestations.Ifproblemsareadmitted,oftentheyareconsideredtobetheresponsibilityofthegovernment,ratherthanoftheindividual,alegacyofthehighlyinterventionistroleoftheMexicanstateineconomicandsociallifeovermuchofthiscentury.Althoughpublicawarenessoftheenvironmentalcostsofmodernizationisincreasing,fifteenyearsofeconomiccrisisassociatedwithneoliberalrestructuringhaveensuredthatrelativelyfewpeoplehavetheresourcestoattempttoimproveenvironmentalpractices.

Somefundamentalethicalissuesemerge.Do"outsiders"havetherighttotellpeopletochangetheireconomicways,cleanuptheirlife-styles,orleavetheirhomesinordertoprotecttheenvironment?Whatisthelikelihoodofeffectivemodificationinenvironmentalbehavioriftheimplicationsofresourcedegradationarenotuniversallyrecognized?Proponentsofneoliberalismarguethatfreetradebringsincreasedprosperityandthatitiseasierforrichnationstobeenvironmentallyresponsible,butuntilthispropositionisprovedbyexample,whyshouldanyoneelsebelieveit?IftheFirstWorldwithitsbelatedandoftensuperficialenvironmentalconsciousness,extensivefinancialresources,andtechnologicalsophisticationhasachievedonlylimitedsuccessincontainingecosystemicdamageresultingfromitscommitmenttoindustry-basedgrowth,howcanThirdWorldcountriespreventtheacceleratingdepletionofglobalresources?Inthiscontext,doespressurebytheUnitedStatesandCanadaforenvironmentaladjunctstotheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)constituteeco-imperialismanexercisewhereinNortherninterestsarebeingimposedundertheguiseof"greenness"?Inthesamevein,dotheeffortsbytheMexicangovernmenttoarticulatean

environmentalpolicythatiscompatiblebothwiththeNAFTAandthegoalsoftheenvironmentalmovementconstituteaformofinternalecocolonialism,wheretheinterestsofdominantdomesticelitesarebeingimposedonadiversepopulation?1

TheRootsoftheEnvironmentalCrisis

ThestructuralrootsofMexico'scurrentenvironmentalcrisislieinthepost-WorldWarIIimport-substitutionindustrializationmodel(ISI).Untilthelate1950s,aroughbalancebetweenagriculturalandindustrialdevelopmentwasmaintained,contributingtothe"Mexicanmiracle"ofunprecedentedgrowthanddiversification.However,therewasanettransferofvaluefromagriculturetoindustrythroughtheproductionofcheapfoodforthenewurbanareas.

Bythelate1960s,criticaleconomicbottlenecksbegantoemergeastheindustry-firstpriorityexacerbatedpreexistingproblemssuchasskewedincomedistribution,increasingregionaldisparities,rural-urbanmigration,andinefficient,overprotectedindustries(Street,1981).Agriculturalgrowthratesdeclinedandmarketforcesreshapedproductionasstaplesincreasinglywerereplacedbyexport,industrial,andanimalfeedcrops.From1970on,Mexicowasforcedtoimportlargequantitiesofbasicfoodsasaconsequenceoftechnologicalmodernization,thefruitoftheinternationalizationoftheeconomy(BarkinandSuárez,1982).

Theconsolidationoftheshifttowardanexport-ledeconomyinthe1970sand1980sreinforceddevelopmentimbalancesandacceleratedecologicaldecline.The"petrolization"oftheeconomyinthelate1970scontributedtothe1982debtcrisisandthetransitiontofreemarketpolicies.2MexicojoinedtheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)in1986,andtheNAFTAwiththeUnitedStatesandCanadawasimplementedin1994.Ongoingausteritymeasures,includingsocialspendingcutsandwageandpricecontrols,togetherwiththeDecember1994pesocrisis,cumulativelyhadasevereimpactonmanysectorsofthepopulation.Thecontinuingdeclineinlivingstandards,togetherwithfrustrationovertheapparentfailureofpoliticalreform,fosteredanunprecedentedlevelofpopularprotest,includingagrowingemphasisonenvironmentalissues.Atthesametime,thestructuraladjustmentrequiredbytheneoliberaltransitionreducedtheresourcesavailablefortheprotectionoftheenvironment.Thishasoccurredatatimewhentheenvironmentismostunderstressbecauseoftheimperativetobecomeeconomicallycompetitive.Modernizationhasbeenachievedathigheconomic,social,andenvironmentalcosts.Yet,publicpressuretoencourageeconomicdiversification,fostercivilempowerment,andpromoteresourcerenewabilityappearsto

beontherise(Barkin,1990;Barry,1995;GoldrichandCarruthers,1992;Simonian,1995).

TheEvolutionofEnvironmentalPolicy

ThearticulationofformalenvironmentalpolicyinMexicowaspromptedbythewidespreadinternationalconcernovertheimpactofindustrializationontheenvironmentthatemergedfromUnitedNationsinitiativesinthelate1960sandearly1970s(LópezPortilloyRamos,1982).In1971thefirstcomprehensiveenvironmentallegislationwasenactedinMexico.Itestablishedprinciplesfordecreasingcontaminationofair,water,andsoil,togetherwiththecorrespondingpenaltiesforcontraveningtheseprinciples.Unfortunately,thelawdidnotstipulatethenormsandstandardsnecessaryforimplementationandlackedeffectiveregulatoryauthority.Consequently,throughoutthe1970senvironmentalenforcementwasnegligible(Mumme,1992).

Amorefocusedenvironmentallawwasproclaimedin1982,promptedbygrowingpublicconcernsaboutrisinglevelsofsmoginMexicoCity,domesticnuclearpowerdevelopment,andtheimpactofoilexploitation.In1982incomingpresidentMigueldelaMadridestablishedMexico'sfirstcabinet-levelenvironmentalagency,theSecretaríadeDesarrolloUrbanoyEcología(MinistryofUrbanDevelopmentandEcology,orSEDUE).Inaddition,thepresidentencouragedtheformationofenvironmentalorganizationsthroughanextendednationalcampaigntopromotepublicawarenessoftheimpactofhumanactionsonthenaturalsurroundings.However,theonsetofthedebtcrisisandensuingfiscalrestraintsreducedSEDUE'sbudget.TheministrywascriticizedforitsfailuretoconfrontMexicoCity'sairpollution,itsresponsetothe1985earthquakeandotherenvironmentaldisasters,aswellasforgeneralizedcorruptionandpatronage(Mumme,1992,1994).ThedelaMadridgovernment'scommitmenttoenvironmentalprotectionremainedlargelysymbolicuntiltheendofitstermwhenanenvironmentallawwithmorejuridicalteethandgreaterregulatorycapacitywasenacted.

The1988LeyGeneraldeEquilibrioEcológicoyProtecciónalAmbiente(GeneralLawofEcologicalEquilibriumandEnvironmentalProtection)differsfromitspredecessorsinitsintegralecologicalapproachtothegoalofenvironmental"preservation,restorationandimprovement"(Mexico,SecretaríadeGobernación,1988:33).Thelawunderscorestheconnectionsbetweenrapideconomicmodernization,populationgrowth,andenvironmentaldeterioration,andthefallacyofassumingthatindustrializationandurbanizationautomaticallyimprovequalityoflife.However,thelaw'spreamblemaintainsthatthesolutiontoMexico'sen-

vironmentalproblemsisnottoabandonthepursuitofdevelopment,giventhecountry'spressingneedsforfood,employment,andhousingsecurity.Rather,theanswerliesincontinuingdevelopmentfromtheperspectiveofamoreenvironmentallyawareeconomicgrowthfollowingtheneoliberalpathtoprosperity"withoutinterruptingorinterferingexcessivelyinproductionprocesses"(Mexico,SecretaríadeGobernación,1988:15,author'stranslation).Inotherwords,thelawoptsforeconomicdevelopmentonasustainablebasis,rejectingthethesisimplicitinpriorlegislationthatMexicoshoulddevelopfirstandworryabouttheenvironmentlater.Onpaper,atleast,environmentalconcernshadattainedthesamelevelaseconomicconsiderations,butinpracticethegrowthimperativecontinuedtobeparamountinthehastetoembracefreemarketpolicies(Simonian,1995).

Thenextpresident,CarlosSalinasdeGortari(19881994),emphasizedarangeofenvironmentalprotectionissuesearlyinhistermofoffice.However,after1990,Salinas'senvironmentalpolicyfocusedonconcernsabouttheNAFTAraisedbyenvironmentalgroupsandotherinterestsintheUnitedStatesandCanadaandbydomesticcritics.InMay1992,SEDUEwasreplacedbytheSecretaríadeDesarrolloSocial(MinistryofSocialDevelopment,orSEDESOL)inanattempttoimprovepolicyimplementation.Factoryinspectionrates,finesandotherpenalties,andclosuresofsomeoftheworstsourcesofindustrialpollutionincreased,whilepublicrelationsexercisesdirectedattheappearanceofenvironmentalsensitivityproliferated(Mumme,1994).

OthersignificantactionsbytheSalinasregimetoimproveMexico'senvironmentalimageathomeandabroadincludedtheelaborationoftheIntegratedBorderEnvironmentalPlanincollaborationwithU.S.agencies,measurestoprotectendangeredspeciesandbiodiversity,andthecreationofavarietyofnationalparks,wildlifepreserves,heritagesites,andbiospherereserves.ThisconservationistthrustwasdueinparttoenergeticactionbyMexicanenvironmentalists,onoccasionincollaborationwithinternationalorganizationssuchastheWorldWildlifeFundandConservationInternational(Simonian,1995).However,atthesametime,landreformlegislationwasrevisedandnewnationalforestryandwaterlawsproclaimedinordertoopenuppreviouslyprotectedsectorstoprivateinvestment.Whiletheneoliberalclaimisthatsuchmeasureswillimprovemanagementefficiencyandeconomiccompetitiveness,criticsarguethelikelihoodofacceleratingresourcedepletionunderdiminishedstatestewardship(Barry,1995;Barkin,1994;ElFinancieroInternacional,January25,1993).

Overall,theseinitiativesconstituteanimpressiveconservationandprotectionpackage,atleastonpaper.Theyarepartofanongoing

preemptivereformstrategyaimedatbothincorporatingtherapidlygrowingenvironmentalmovementandsmoothingthepathofstructuraladjustment(Mumme,1992).ThisstrategyseemstohavebeensuccessfulinreassuringtheinternationalfinancialcommunitythatMexicois"modern"enoughtorespectenvironmentalconcernsintheprocessofopeningthecountrytofreetrade.Thegovernment'sroleinencouragingtheformationofenvironmentalinterestgroupsintheearly1980sviacampaignstopromotepublicawarenessofthenegativeimpactofhumanactionsontheirnaturalsurroundingsinitiallyfacilitatedthepoliticalmanipulationofsuchorganizationstolegitimizetheadministration'sactions(Barkin,1990;Barry,1992;Mumme,1992;Mumme,Bath,andAssetto,1988).Thisstrategymayhavebackfired,however,becauseanumberofthesegroupshavebrokenwiththeiroriginalsponsorsandactinsteadasindependentlobbyistsforenvironmentalpolicies,oftenindirectconflictwithgovernmentinterests(Barkin,1990;Mumme,1992).

EnvironmentalAttitudesinMexico

TheMexicanenvironmentalmovementislargelyurbanbasedandmainlyhasinvolvedtheintelligentsiaandmiddleclassesinthelargermetropolitanareas.Theenvironmentalinterestsofthesegroupsaresimilartothoseoftheircounterpartsinternationally.Neithertheseconcernsnorthoseofthegovernment,however,reflecttherangeofattitudestotheenvironmentwithinthepopulationoverallaconsequenceoftheextremeregionalandlocaldiversityofthe"manyMexicos"(Simpson,1941)whichhavebeenforgedbyaninterplayofgeographical,cultural,andhistoricalfactors.

Thetermelmedioambiente(environment;literally,ambientsurroundings)isalmostaneologisminMexico.Itwasusedonlyrarelyfifteenyearsagooutsideofscientificandtechnicalcirclesandstillhasnotgainedcurrencybeyondthemajorurbanareas.Similarly,universaltermsfor"pollution"or"environmentaldegradation"donotexist.Morecommonarecircumlocutionssuchasasaltosalanaturaleza(assaultsonnature).FormostMexicans,''nature"istheusualreferenceforthephysicalrealmthatenvelopshumanlives.Itissomethingthatcanbeprofanada(defiled)orinficionada(infected).

MexicanenvironmentalattitudesrelateinparttothecharacteroftheSpanishconquestoftheNewWorld.TheSpanishcametoLatinAmericanotonlytominegoldandsilver,extractvaluabletimber,andtoplantcashcrops,butalsotobe"planters"ofcities(WolfandHansen,1972).Thiscompulsionderived,inlargemeasure,fromthetraditionofurbanity

intheMediterraneanrealm,whereevenpeasantfarmerstendedtodwellinsmalltownsandvillages,focusedonthesymbolsofciviclifesuchasthecentralplazaandthesurroundingedificesofreligious,administrative,andmercantilepower.Inthesenucleatedsettlementslivedfarmerswho"goouttocultivatetheearth,butwhodonotloveit"(Pitt-Rivers,1961:47),asurbanlifewasesteemedandtheruraldenigrated.Thisobservationmaylooklikeanethnocentricovergeneralizationtothecontemporaryanthropologicalgaze.Nevertheless,itunderscoresthesharpdemarcationbetweenurbanandruralwhichwasreinforcedintheNewWorldbythecontrastbetweenthenewcitiesandthesurroundingsparselysettledhinterland,sometimespolarizedascivilizationandbarbarism.Thishinterlandwasnotwildernesstobetamedinthenameofprogress,however,asinthecaseofthesettlementoftheNorthAmericanfrontier.Rather,naturewastobeexploited,butnotdominated,respectedinitsownright,butkeptatadistance.

InMexico,environmentalattitudeshavebeenfurthersyncretizedthroughmestizajeracialandculturalmixingwithAmerindianpopulationsforwhomunitywithnaturewasadominanttheme.Forexample,contemporaryMayasacredcosmologyhasastrongpragmaticandpersonaldimensionlinkedtotheimperativeofagriculturalproductioninanuncertainnaturalorder.ThiscosmologyislacedwithSpanishCatholicsymbolsandconceptsbutisstructuredthroughcomplementarydualitiesratherthanWesterndichotomies(Faust,1988).Thus,thespiritualandtangibleaspectsofeverydaylifeareinterwovenratherthanmediated.Humans,asapartofnature,mustinterpretandappeasetherains,thewind,andthelanditselfifasuccessfulcornharvestistobeobtained.Agriculturalpracticesinthemselvesareimportantreligiousritualswithimmediatepracticalmeaning(Gates,1993).

Thisblendingandparallelismofcosmologieshasresultedofteninanapparentlackofcongruencebetweenenvironmentalattitudesandbehavior.Forexample,theMayaliveinanintimaterelationshipwithnatureintheiragriculturallives,butmostlyarecongregatedinsmalltowns,villages,andhamletsratherthandispersedinthefields;theurbanityofpre-ColumbianceremoniallifewasreinforcedbySpanishcolonialmanagementandthefederalagriculturalpolicyofthiscentury.Otherparadoxesabound.Largelandownersextolthevirtuesoftheruralambiencebutrarelyliveontheirestates,relyingonresidentmanagers.Urbanfamilieslovetospendthedayataremotebeachorinacountryrestaurant,butmakesuretobehomebeforedark.Theintelligentsiacrusadeforbiospherereservesbutshowlittleenthusiasmforwildlifeatclosequarters.Inotherwords,frequentlytheideaofnatureseemstobepreferabletothereality.

Thesecontradictionsalsoaffectthedesignandimplementationofofficialdevelopmentstrategiesfornaturalresourcesaswellaspublicresponsestothesemeasures.Theurbanlegacyofthecolonialerafavorsthepursuitof"cleanprofessions,"suchaslawandteaching.However,otherprofessions,likeagronomyandengineering,canbefollowedviaan"arm'slength"approach,whichemphasizesplansdesignedintheoffice.Governmentruraldevelopmentagenciesinparticularhavebeendominatedbyanengineeringmentality,whereintangibleprojectsliketheconstructionofdamsanddrainsarefavoredoverholisticecosystemicapproachestoresourcemanagement.Often,thisispartofaproyectismo(projectfever)syndrome,characterizedbyapreoccupationwithphysicalinfrastructureandexpressedinacompulsiontoproliferatecostlydevelopmentsthatserveprimarilyasamonumenttothedevelopers(GatesandGates,1976).Inthiscontext,opportunitiesforpersonalenrichmentareabundant.Althoughthebureaucracyhasbeenstreamlined,andahigh-profileanticorruptiondrivehasbeeninitiatedaspartoftheneoliberalreforms,theinstitutionalstructurestillrepresentsaconsiderableimpedimenttotheenforcementofenvironmentalregulations.Thisproblemiscompoundedbothbywidespreadpublicignoranceofthelegislationandlimitedrecognitionoftheproblemsitisintendedtosolve.

AfinalparadoxisthattheheritageofurbanityaswellastheinterventionistroleofthemodernMexicanstatehasreinforcedacleardistinctionbetweenthepublicandprivaterealms.Thisseemstopromoteabdicationofindividualresponsibilityforthecommons,suchthatpeopletendtorelyonthegovernmenttoprotecttheenvironmentifnecessary,withouthavingmuchconfidenceinitsabilitytodoso.However,theslowbutsteadygrowthinpublicenvironmentalconsciousness,widespreaddisaffectionovertheongoingeconomiccrisis,andthegradualdisintegrationofthepoliticalsystemthatheldswayformuchofthiscenturyisfosteringagroundswellofpopularsocialmovements,oftenwithatleastanindirectecologicalslant.Atthisjuncture,theremaybeawindowofopportunityforlocalcommunityactiontobridgeindividualandstateresponsibilityforthecommonwealth.

EnvironmentalProblems,Perceptions,andPracticesinCampeche

ThestateofCampecheislocatedinthetropicallowlandsofsoutheasternMexicoontheGulfsideoftheYucatánPeninsula.Aclassicexampleofthe"developmentofunderdevelopment"(Frank,1967),CampechehasbeendependentsincetheConquestontheexportofnaturalresourcesinaseriesofboom-and-bustcycles.Thecolonialextractionofdyewoodandtropicalhardwoodswasreplacedattheendofthenineteenthcenturyby

chicle(forchewinggum)andhenequen(fortwineandcordage),whichwereinturnsupplantedbyshrimp(after1960)andpetroleum(after1976).Agriculturewasneglecteduntil1970,whenabarrageofgovernment-sponsoredruraldevelopmentprojectswaslaunchedwiththegoalofmodernizingpeasantproductiononejidos,theuniquecorporatelandtenurecategorygeneratedbythe19101917Revolution.Theresultwastheinstitutionalizationofanindustriadesiniestros(industryofdisasters)inwhichcropfailure,corruption,andchronicindebtednessbecamethenorm.Withlittledynamismoutsidethesectorproducingthecurrentglobalboomcommodity(petroleum),Campechewasparticularlyhard-hitbythe1982debtcrisisandthesubsequentausterityandrestructuring(Gates,1993).

Today,outsideofthemajorexportenclaves,thebulkofthepopulationmakesalivingmuchasithassincetheSpanishconquest.Inthetownsandcities,Campechanosengageinprimary-productprocessingandsmallmanufacturingindustries,pettyretailanddistributionbusinesses,provisionofservices,employmentinthebureaucracy,andcasuallabor,particularlyinconstruction.Inthecountryside,thesparsepopulationreliesonsubsistenceagriculture,cottagehandicrafts,small-scaleexploitationofforestproducts,andextensivecattlerearing.ThemajorityoftheMayainhabitants,clusteredmainlyinthecenterandnorthofthestate,makeaprecariouslivingfromcultivationofmilpa,employingtoolsandtechniquesprobablylittledifferentfromthoseoftheirpre-Columbianancestors.Fishingandboat-buildinginvolvebothurbanandruraldwellers.In-migrationfrommoredenselypopulatedareasofMexicoandtheonsetofthedebtcrisisalsopromptedanexpansionoftheinformalandundergroundeconomies.Thisisevidencedbythegrowingnumbersofitinerantvendors,unregisteredbusinesses,drugdealers,purveyorsofcontraband,andtraffickersinhumanlivessuchasthepolleros(chicken-wranglers)whosmuggleCentralAmericansintothecountrythroughtheforestsofsouthernCampecheandQuintanaRoo.

Theabovesketchmayseemtopresentapictureofrelativelysmall-scaleandunobtrusivealterationofthephysicallandscape.However,fivehundredyearsofdependenceononeortwoexportsatanygiventimehavetakentheirenvironmentaltollandrecenteconomicdevelopmentstrategieshavebeenparticularlydestructive.Twenty-fiveyearsagoalmosttwo-thirdsofthestateofCampechewasforested(FIRA,1972).Atleasthalfamillionhectareshavebeenclearedintheinterimforfrontiercolonization,mechanizedagriculture,orpasture,ofteninthatsequence,withcattleastheendphaseinthecycleofdestructionnowtypicalofthetropicalforestsofCentralandSouthAmerica.Atthesametime,theabsenceofeffectiveandenforceableforestmanagementpracticeshasallowedmuchwastageofcommonspeciesanddecimatedtheprecioustropical

hardwoods.Salesofejidaltimberhavetakenplacewithoutpermits,oftenwithofficialcollusion.Meanwhile,fragilesoilshavebeenstrippedbytheuseofheavymachineryinclearingandcultivation,andmassiveapplicationsofagrochemicalshaveturnedtheearthintoanexhaustedwasteland.Clear-cuttinghascausedchangesinthemicroclimate,theextentofwhichisstillunknown.FurtherenvironmentaldegradationhasresultedfromtheoilboominsouthernCampeche,wherepollutionhasaffectedfruitandvegetablecropsandhascontributedtothedeclineoffisheriesintheGulfofCampeche.Meanwhile,thepopulationofCampeche'stwomajorcities,CampecheandCiudaddelCarmen,hasswelledinrecentyearsasaresultofbothin-migrationandrural-urbandriftwithinthestate,producinganexplosionofcolonias(shantytowns)andbarriospopulares(people'ssuburbs)alongwiththeattendantenvironmentalproblemsofurbanpoverty.

Today,Campecheisfarfrompossessingtheresourcepotentialitclaimedonlyafewdecadesago.Thedelicatenaturalequilibriaofdiverseandcomplextropicalecosystemshavebeendisturbed,insomecasesirreversibly.DoCampechanosagreewiththisassessment?Ifso,whatdotheyidentifyasenvironmentalproblemsandhowdotheythinkthesecanbesolved?Thesetopicswereaddressedthroughin-depth,open-endedinterviewsontheMexicanagricultural,debt,andenvironmentalcrisesconductedfrom1989to1990.3

Onehalfoftheurbanitesandalittleoveronequarteroftheruralpeasantsinterviewedacknowledgedtheexistenceofenvironmentaldegradation(seetable).However,two-thirdsoftheinformantsinbothcategoriesfeltthatthiswasmoreofaconcerninMexicoCitythaninCampeche'scities,withonlynineurbanandeightruralinformantsidentifyingdegradationintheCampechecountryside.Byandlargeenvironmentaldegradationwasseenasametropolitanphenomenonsomebodyelse'sproblem.Asoneejidatarioputit,"ThereisnocontaminationhereinCampeche.That'saconditiontheyhaveinMexico[City].It'stheirproblem.Here,everythingiscleanandquiet."

Thethirty-threeurbandwellerswhoacknowledgeddegradationoftheenvironmentinCampechecitieslistedarangeoflocalconcerns(seetable).ThemainproblemidentifiedinthecityofCampechewasairandwaterpollutionfromindustrialemissions,inparticularfromthestoragedepotofPetróleosMéxicanos(PEMEX,thestateoilmonopoly)andthediesel-runthermalelectricplantoftheComisiónFederaldeElectricidad(theFederalElectricityCommission,orCFE).Airpollutionfromautomobiles,trucks,andbusesalsoisseentobeincreasingasaconsequenceoftherapidpopulationgrowthandthedeterioratingqualityofvehiclesontheroadduetothecumulativeeffectsofpost-1982austerity.

PerceptionsofEnvironmentalProblems,Campeche,19891990NumberofResponses

Urban Rural TotalAcknowledgedEnvironmentalDegradation,General 50 32 82

InMexicoCity 48 23 71InCampechecities 33 20 53InruralCampeche 9 8 17EnvironmentalProblemsIdentifiedIndustrialemissions 28 4 32PEMEX 15 4 19Thermalelectricplant 13 13CityofCampechepublicmarket 25 3 28Sewage 22 2 24Campechemunicipaldumpandgarbageservices 17 17

Nondegradableconsumergoods 5 10 15Deforestation 9 5 14Agriculturalpractices 4 9 13Colonization 4 9 13Illegalresourceexploitation 9 3 12Coloniasandpublichealth 11 11Flora,fauna,andendangeredspecies 8 2 10Airpollutionvehicular 8 1 9Maritimeandfisheriescontamination 8 8Potablewater 7 1 8Fisheriespractices 7 7Noise 5 2 7Slaughterhouses 3 3 6Streetpeddlers 5 5Badodors 3 2 5Railroadwaste 4 4Highwayconstruction 3 3EnvironmentalActorsandActionsIdentifiedSEDUEandotherstateagencies 13 3 16Enforcementofenvironmentallaws 7 4 11Publichealth 10 1 11Biospherereservesandotherprotectedareas 5 3 8

Environmentalists 6 6

Archaeologicalandheritagesites 5 5Urbanparksandbeautification 5 5Environmentaleducation 4 4Recycling 3 3Reforestation 1 2 3Source:Fieldinterviews(seenote3)Totalinformants:215(100urban,115rural).

OthermajorenvironmentalproblemsidentifiedinthecityofCampecheincludedthepublicmarket,sewage,andgarbagedisposal.Themarketisanolderfacility.Inthishumidtropicalclimate,meatandfishspoilquicklyasfewbutchershaverefrigerationandlocalfishermenneithercleanfishpriortosalenoruseice.Complaintsaboutfoodcontaminationinthepublicmarkethaveincreasedsincethefirstsupermarketinthecityopenedtenyearsagoofferingmorehygienicconditions.Poorsanitationfacilitiesparticularlyinthenewmigrantcolonias,aswellassewersthatareopenorincapableofhandlingeffluentinheavyrainsareregardedashealthhazardsbymany.Themunicipaldumpalsoiscriticizedwidely.Althoughitclaimstobea"sanitarylandfill,"garbagenormallyisburned,envelopingneighboringsuburbsinnoxiousfumes.Meanwhile,domesticgarbage-disposalserviceiserratic,whileinpublicareaswastebarrelsarescarceandusuallyoverflowing.Instead,peopleareaccustomedtodumpingtheirtrashalongroadsidesontheoutskirtsofthecity.Indeed,manydonotidentifypublicwasteastrash.Asoneunskilledlaborerputit,"Whatgarbage?Thereisn'tanygarbagehere.Allthesethingswillhaveause,soonerorlater.Ifnot,youpitchitinthegully."

Withrespecttodegradationoftheruralenvironment,lessthan10percentoftheurbaninformantsidentifiedspecificproblemssuchasdeforestation,illegalresourceexploitation,agriculturalpractices,andcolonization.Slash-and-burncultivationpracticedbothbytheMayaandin-migrantstoCampeche'sfrontierfromotherregionsofMexicoreceivedmuchoftheblamefordeforestation,especiallythroughforestfires,whichareregardedbygovernmentagenciesasespeciallydestructive.Eightindividualsalsoexpressedconcernabouttheeffectsoffrontiersettlementonwildlife,althoughtraditionallythemajorthreathasbeenfromurbanhunters.

Solutionstotheseproblemsmainlywerebelievedtobetheresponsibilityofgovernmentagencies.However,itwasdoubtedthatenvironmentallawsandregulationswouldbeenforcedbecauseofcorruption,lackofresources,andwidespreadpoverty.Environmentalprotectioninitiativessuchasthecreationofthe723,185-hectareCalakmulBiosphereReserveinsouthernCampechebypresidentialdecreein1989werefelttobeunlikelytosucceedforthesereasons.Furthermore,thereserveissurroundedonthreesidesbyanactivesettlementfrontierwitha"WildWest"reputation.Inthiscontext,thedesignationofaprotectedcore,whereexploitativeeconomicactivitiesthatmaydisturbecosystemsareprohibited,andofasurroundingbufferzonewherelow-impactlanduseispermittedsubjecttostrictrules,isregardedbymanyasfutile.AsaCampechecivilservantnotedinJanuary1992,"thereserveisinthemiddleofthefron-

tier,farfromanywhere.Downthere,it'strulythelawofthejungle.Andhungrymenaredesperate.Whowouldbestupidenoughtodenytheirrighttomakealiving?Alltheregulationsintheworldwon'tstopthem."

Actionsproposedbyenvironmentalgroupssuchascommunityworkpartiesforstreetclean-up,reforestationdrives,andecotourismpromotionswerementionedonlybysixinformants,andwereregardedwithskepticismorirritationastheideasofecolocos(crazyecologists):"CanyouimagineplantingtreesinCampeche?Here,therearetoomany[expletive]trees.Ifyoudon'tattackthevegetationconstantly,iteatseverything.Andthisecotourism?Whowouldwanttospendtheirvacationintheforestwiththeanimals?Notnatives[Mexicans],that'sforsure.WelikeournatureontheDisneyChannel.¡Ecolocos!"(Professional,Campeche,November1989).

EnvironmentalistswerealsoaccusedoftryingtoimposeMexicoCitywaysontheprovincesinordertoshowtheir"modernity"ortoappeaseAmericaneconomicinterests,whilebeingoutoftouchwithlocalrealities:"OurmanagerisfromMexico[City]andisalwaysproposingcrazyideastoimpressthegringos,liketoputcansinaspecialbarrelforrecycling.Thereisn'tanyrecyclinghere,orrather,yes,wehaverecyclingthelittleboyswhospendtheirdayscollectingcanssupporttheirwholefamiliesfromthis.Andthegarbagecollectorsorthescavengershavetherightstoourcans.Thechiefdoesn'tunderstandthatgarbageisbigbusinesshere.Youdon'twanttointerfere"(Processingplantemployee,Campeche,January1992).

GarbagepickinginCampecheisnotamajorsemiundergroundindustryrunbypowerfulcaciquessponsoredbytherulingparty,thePartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional(InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty,orPRI),asitisinMexicoCitywheresomeseventeenthousandpeopleworkinthedumps(Guillermoprieto,1995).However,itishighlyorganizedinawebofpatron-clientrelations,whereinbothmunicipalemployeesandsanctionedscavengerspickthroughthegarbageateverystageofitscollectionsothatnothinggoestowaste.Inthiscontextofpovertyandinequality,Westernnotionsoftidyrecyclingbinsseemalienindeed.

Theruraldwellersinterviewedidentifiedfewerspecificproblemswithenvironmentaldegradation.Mainly,informantsdiscussedthedifferencesbetweenurbanandrurallifeingeneralterms,characterizingtheformerascrowded,noisy,dirty,andmorepronetocrimeandvice,whilethelatterwasseenasclean,tranquil,andsafeagoodplacetoraiseafamily.However,amajorproblemidentifiedwastheincreaseinnondegradableconsumergoods,packaging,andresiduum(seetable).Overthepasttwodecades,manyruralhouseholdshavebecomereliantonthecashincomeofatleastoneoccasionalwagelaborer,withanaccompanyingrise

inthepurchaseofconsumergoodsdespiteausterity.Accustomedtoconsumingvirtuallyeverythingtheyproduceoracquire,Campechepeasantsonlyrecentlyhavehadtodealwithpostconsumptiondetritussuchasplasticbottles,cans,deadbatteries,andbrokentelevisionsets.Thequantitiesofsuchlittersurroundingruralvillagesmayseeminsignificanttourbanites,buttotheMaya,whobelieveinlivinginharmonywithnatureineverydailyactivity,suchmonumentstowastearebothaneyesoreandareminderoftheassaultsontraditionallife."Inthebeginning,thecontainerswereadividend.Youconsumedtheproductandgottousethebottles,thejars,foryourhoneyoryourpreservestokeeportosell.Now,it'stoomuch.Youseeeverywheretheuselesswasteproductsoftheexpenditureofworkandmoney.It'sanaffronttonature,totheoldways"(Ejidatarío,Tinun,March1990).

Aswiththeurbaninformants,discussionofenvironmentalprotectionissuescenteredondeforestation,agriculturalpractices,andcolonization.Urbandwellersechoedtheattacksontraditionalagriculturemadebygovernmentagencies,whilethecampesinosnaturallydefendedtheirowncustoms.However,agriculturalpracticesandproblemsinthepeasantsectorarefarfromhomogeneous.TheMayaareparticularlyconcernedaboutdecliningmaizeyieldsunderthemilpasystem,particularlyinareaswhereincreasingpopulationpressureandtheincursionofgovernmentdevelopmentprojectshasshortenedthefallowperiod.Withreferencetoforestdestruction,theMayamakeanemphaticdistinctionbetweentheirconservationistapproachtoslash-and-burnagricultureandtheexploitativementalityoftheout-of-statemigrantstothesouthernfrontier:"Agriculturehastofollownature'srhythm,nature'ssignsorthelandwillbeoffendedandnotgive.Ifthecampesinodoesnotshowrespectaccordingtothecustoms,ifhedisturbsthebalancesbeyondhisneeds,thealuxes(pixie-likesacredbeingsofthemilpa)getangry.ThisisspecialtotheworldoftheMaya.It'slikeourpermissiontocultivatehere.Downthere,they[themigrants]consumeeverythingsothatthereisnothingleft,notastick.Theyhavenorespectforthenaturalorder,norforthosewhocomeafter"(Ejidatario,Ucum,February1992).

Amigrantconfirmsthisdifferenceinagriculturalphilosophy:"Whenwearrived,itwasallforesthere.Butwehavefelledallthetreesanditlooksnice,right?cleanandopenforourmaize.Andwhenthatisexhausted,wewillputinmorecattleandputmaizeovertherewherethelandisnew.Here,they[theMaya]don'tknowhowtocombatthevegetationthatpromotesdiseases"(Ejidatario,Silvituc,March1990).

BoththemigrantsandtheMayadosharetheconvictionthatthebulkofthedamagetotheruralenvironmentinCampechehasbeendonebythegovernmentinthecourseofthe"industryofdisasters,"whereina

successionofagriculturalmodernizationprojectsforpeasantshasresultedinoutrightfailuresinagriculturalproductionorsmallincreasesachievedathighinvestmentandopportunitycost.Inparticular,attemptstoturnCampeche'stropicallowlandsintoagranaryviathedirecttransferofagriculturaltechnologiesfromtemperatezoneshavedoneincalculableharmecologically:"After10yearsofrice,theyleftadesert,notevengoodformaize.Whentheysawthatagriculturewasfinishedhere,theyabandoneduswithnohelp,noprospects.Goodbye,boys!Thereisnolifeleftherenow.Whentheycleared,theyburnedthevaluabletimberandfriedthewildlife....Everythingthegovernmenttouchesturnstodust"(Ejidatario,Yohaltún,March1990).

Againstthisbackdrop,thereislittleconfidenceinthegovernment'sabilitytotakeeffectiveactiononenvironmentalprotection.Rather,thosecampesinoswhoidentifydeteriorationoftheruralenvironmentsuggestthatanimportantsteptowardasolutionwouldbeforthegovernmenttowithdrawcompletelyfrominterventioninpeasantagricultureandthenaturalresourcesector.ThedesignationoftheCalakmulBiosphereReservewasseen,bythethreecampesinoswhohadheardofit,asproofoftheincreasinglyanti-peasantpoliciesofthegovernment,contrarytotheagrarianpopulistrhetoricoftheRevolution:"Nowtheyputeventhebirdsaheadofthecampesinos.ItismoreimportantforthemtohaveagoodwayoflifethanforMexicancitizens.Theydon'tcareifweeatornot,ifweliveordie.It'stheultimateinjusticeofafailedrevolution"(Ejidatario,Ucum,February1992).

TheattitudesofCampechanostotheenvironmentvaryconsiderablybetweenandwithinthecategoriesofurbandwellersandruralinhabitants.Onthewhole,thoseurbaniteswhorecognizeenvironmentaldegradationinCampecheseemtoregardsuchproblemsasrelativelyminororremotefromtheirownimmediatelives,rankingthemwellbelowtheeconomicandpoliticalperturbationsthathaverackedMexicoinrecentyears.Manyruralpeople,ontheotherhand,seemtohaveamoreacuteandholisticsenseofthethresholdofecologicaldamagethathasbeenreachedandtheimplicationsfortheirwayoflifeinthefuture.ThisisparticularlythecasefortheCampecheMaya,whohavelongdemonstratedanintimateunderstandingoftheenvironmentandofecosystemicinterrelationships.

DevelopingSustainability

Perhapsmoresignificantthanthespecificissuesandactionsidentifiedinthisstudyisthatthemajorityoftheparticipantsdidnotacknowledgeenvironmentaldegradationatall,atleastnotin"Western"terms.Inthis

context,itseemsbothunrealisticandunethicaltoexpectenvironmentalbehaviortoconformtocurrent''international"(thatis,FirstWorld)standardsofacceptablepracticesforsustainabledevelopment.

Sustainabledevelopmenthasbecomeacoreconceptinenvironmentalismandabuzzphrasewithinthepoliticalandeconomicmainstream.However,thereislittleconsensusastowhatitinvolvesotherthanaconcernforresourcerenewabilityvia"...developmentthatmeetstheneedsofthepresentwithoutcompromisingtheabilityoffuturegenerationstomeettheirownneeds"(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment,1987:89).Noristhereagreementastohowsustainabledevelopmentcanbeachieved,norbywhom.

Forlargecorporations,sustainabledevelopmentislikelytomeansustainableprofitthroughexpedientstrategiesforapparentorminimalcompliancewithenvironmentalstandardsandtoassuagepublicconcerns.Forbureaucrats,sustainabledevelopmentoftenbecomesaplanningexercise,orjustanotherrollofredtape.Forneoliberalgovernments,itseemstobeusedasarationaleforcuttingsocialwelfareprovisionsorothersubsidiesforthoseonthemarginswhileclaimingaconcernforcontinuingeconomicgrowthinalessenvironmentallydestructivemanner(Nozick,1992).Forenvironmentalistsandalternativedevelopmenttheorists,theonlycommongroundappearstobetheimperativeofgrass-rootsparticipationinresolvinglocallyaswellasgloballydefinedproblemsthroughthepromotionofself-reliance,communityinitiative,andpoliticalempowerment.Forthesegroups,sustainabledevelopmentcannotbeimposedunilaterallyandhierarchicallyifitistohaveanychanceofenduringsuccess.Peopleneedtodefinetheirownproblemsandidentifytheirownsolutionsincongruencewiththeirlife-waysandaspirations.

ThedimensionsofMexico'senvironmentalcrisisattesttothefailuretodatetoimplementsensitivegrowthmanagementpractices,inlargepartasaresultoftheessentiallypreemptivenatureofreforms(Mumme,1992).AlthoughconservationseemstobegaininggroundonutilitarianisminMexicanenvironmentalpolicy,inpracticetheneoliberalfocusonprivatizationandforeigninvestment,togetherwiththeimmensescaleandscopeofenvironmentalproblemsandthechronicshortageofresourcesforcombatingthem,makesimplementationofthenewecologicallawaformidabletask.However,atthelocallevel,particularlyintheruralareas,thereisalongrecordofsuccessfulecologicaladaptations,especiallywhenunimpededbyexternalinterventionsinthenameofmodernization.

Theselocalhistoriesformthebasisforanotherapproachtosustainabledevelopmentcallingforaradicallydifferenteconomy,producingmuchlowerratesofgrowth,to

ensurefutureecologicalstabilitybyfullyrecognizingtheprocessesandlimitsofthebiosphere(Rees,1990).This

approach,withanadditionalemphasisontheimportanceofculturalaswellasbiologicaldiversity,therighttodemocracy,andthesatisfactionofbasichumanneeds,hasbeenembracedinMexicobyanumberofruralcommunities,citizens'groups,ecologicalorganizations,andsegmentsoftheintelligentsia(Barry,1995).Inthisview,sustainabledevelopmentbecomesmorethan"green"rhetoricoramaskfor"businessasusual."Instead,itconstitutesadirectchallengetoneoliberalism,analternativetodevelopment.

Akeyopportunitytopromotethiskindofsustainabilitymayarise,paradoxically,fromthecurrentcrisisintheMexicancountryside(Barkin,1990,1994;GoldrichandCarruthers,1992).Todate,developmentpolicieshavedegradedtheresourcebase,promotedinefficientlanduse,createdmassiveunemploymentandunderemployment,andpromotedongoingout-migration.Thesecrisisconditionscouldprovideastartingpointforsustainabledevelopmentviasmall-scale,diversifiedproductiontomeetbasicneedsandstimulatelocaleconomiesincombinationwithemploymentofthesurplusworkforceinenvironmentalreconstruction(Barkin,1990,1994;GoldrichandCarruthers,1992).Thisintermediatestrategycouldactasabridgebetweenthegovernment'scommitmenttoconfrontenvironmentalproblemsandspontaneous,bottom-upinitiatives,throughanemphasisontheprocessofdevelopingsustainabilityratherthantheelusiveconceptitself(CarleyandChristie,1993;M'GonigleandParfitt,1994).Suchanapproachislikelytoinvolvenewformsofpolicyandpractice,withprioritiesgiventocommunityinitiative,buildingknowledgeaboutecosystems,andholisticplanningandmanagement,emphasizingmediationofenvironmental,economic,andsocialgoalsatlocalandregionallevels.

ThistypeofpragmaticapproachmightbeparticularlyappropriateinregionssuchasCampeche,withitshistoryofresourceextractioninboom-and-bustcyclesandthecontinuingdepredationofitsnaturalrichestoday.ItcouldbearguedthatCampecheisonthepathtosustainabledevelopmentbydefault,assmall-scale,diversifiedproductionforalocalmarketisalreadyinplaceasaconcomitantofthedependenceonexports.Furthermore,thewidespreadmistrustofstateinitiativesseemsconducivetocivilempowerment,whichmaybeaninadvertentconcomitantoftheneoliberalthrust.Thenewdimensionwouldbetheemploymentofthesurplusworkforceinenvironmentalreconstructionandregeneration.Forexample,SEDESOLhasbeenexperimentingwithplantingrapid-growthmelinainregionsneartheCalakmulBiosphereReservefortheinternationalpulpmarket,withtheactiveinvolvementoflocalejidatarios.ThistypeofregenerationmodelappealstotheMayabecause,inessence,itiswhattheyalreadydotendingtheforestbutintheguise

ofresourceenhancementinsteadofslash-and-burnagriculture,whichiswidelyperceivedasdestructive.Itisattractiveeventothemigrantcolonists,despitetheirshort-term,exploitativevisionofthefrontier,fortheopportunitiesforpaidlaborintheplantations.

Sustainabledevelopmentasanecologicalwayoflifecannotbeplannedorlegislated,onlyfacilitated,andtodothis,diverseattitudestotheenvironmentmustfirstbeidentified.Thisscenariomaynotbeunrealistic,whetherornotfreetradepromotessignificanteconomicgrowthandincreasedemploymentinMexico,especiallyifthehemispherictradingpartnersseeacommoninterestinbreakingthelinkagesbetweeneconomicrestructuring,environmentaldegradation,poverty,andsocialunrest.TheJanuary1994Chiapasuprisingmayhaveprovidedsomeincentiveinthisdirection.TheDecember1994pesocrisisandsubsequentincreasedausterityunderscoretheimperativeofpromotinglocalenvironmentalsolutionsratherthanrelyingongovernmentactionsinatimeofextraordinaryeconomic,political,andsocialadjustment.

Notes

1.PabloGonzálezCasanovamaintainsthatcolonialismdoesnotonlyapplytorelationshipsbetweennations:"Italsopertainstorelationshipswithinanation,insofarasanationisethnicallyheterogeneousandcertainethnicgroupsbecomethedominantgroupsandclassesandothersbecomethedominated.Despitethelongyearsofrevolution,reform,industrialization,anddevelopment,inheritancesfromthepast--marginality,pluralsociety,andinternalcolonialism--persisttodayinMexicoinnewforms"(GonzálezCasanova,1970:72).TheoutbreakofanarmedrebellionofindigenouspeasantsinChiapasonthedaythattheNAFTAtookeffect(January1,1994)istestimonytoboththeenduringrelevanceofGonzálezCasanova'sstatementandtheerodingpublictoleranceforMexico'spursuitofmodernizationattheexpenseofthemarginalized.

2."Petrolization"ofaneconomyreferstoover-dependenceonoilexportswithconcomitantgrowthincapitalandluxuryimports,increasedforeignindebtednessasaresultoftheattractivenessofoilwealthtoforeignbankers,inflation,andaskewedincomedistribution(Grayson,1981).

3.Interviewswereconductedwith115malecampesinosinsevenejidosindiverseregionsofthestate.Inaddition,100urbanitesinthecityofCampeche,includingdevelopmentagents,politicians,businessmen,housewives,andworkers,wereinterviewedaboutbroaderaspectsofthecrisesandtheimplicationsofeconomicrestructuring(Gates,1993).Theseweresupplementedbyinterviewswith50campesinosintwoejidosand43urbandwellersinthecityofCampechein1992,withaspecificfocusonenvironmentalissues.

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10NeoliberalRecipes,EnvironmentalCooks:TheTransformationofAmazonianAgencyGustavoLinsRibeiroandPaulE.Little

Themetaphorofthe"shrinkingoftheworld"capturessomeoftheprofoundtendenciesunfoldingwithintheworldsystem.Thedevelopmentofthetransportation,communication,andinformationindustries,theglobalizationoffinancialmarkets,andthediffusionofsegmentsofproductiveprocessestodifferentareasoftheworldhaveprovidedforanunprecedentedincreaseinthecirculationofcapital,information,andpeople.Thisisaneraofflexibleaccumulation,ofpostfordistcapitalism,inwhichprofoundtransformationsinthelogicofcapitalismproducedifferingimpactsonnation-states,multilayeredagencies,privatecorporations,andotherpoliticalandeconomicactors(Harvey,1989).Therelativeweakeningofthenation-statewiththeunleashingoftransnationalforcesandactorsisoneexampleofthesetransformations.Theemergenceofglobal,fragmentedspaceproducesnewrelationshipsbetweendifferentlocalitiesandbetweentheselocalitiesandtheworldsystem.1Newcommunicationmedia,suchastheInternet,makepossible,undertheaegisofcomputerandelectroniccapitalism,theexistenceofavirtual-imaginedtransnationalcommunity(Ribeiro,1995).

Globalgovernabilitybecomesamatterofexplicitconcernwhenenvironmentalproblems,financial"earthquakes,"worldtrade,terrorism,drugtrafficking,andinternationalmigrationaremeasuredagainstanincreasinglyintegratedworld.Inthiscontext,transnationalcorporationsflourishandpromotevisionsofaworldwithoutfrontiers;multilateralagenciessuchastheWorldBank,theInternationalMonetaryFund,theUnitedNations,andothershavetheirregulatorypowerincreased;newsupranationalentities(forexample,theEuropeanUnion,theNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement,MercadoComúndelSur)reshapeeconomic

andpoliticalrelationshipsindifferentareas.Nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),inthemidstofacrisisofpowerandlegitimacyamongtraditionalpoliticalandeconomicactors(includingpoliticalparties,governmentagencies,andunions),appeartoberepresentativeofanewcivilsocietyoradifferentkindofpoliticalsubject.

Thegrowthofneoliberalismasanideologyoftheworldeliteneedstobeunderstoodwithinthecontextoftheunificationofworldmarkets,thetransnationalizationofthecapitalistpoliticaleconomy,andtheendofthebipolar,ColdWarworld,fosteringatriumphantviewofcapitalismasthesoleoptionforhumankind.Neoliberaldiscoursepontificatesupontheneedforamajorrestructuringofnationaleconomiesinordertoadapttothenewinternationaldivisionoflabor.Bytheearly1990stheneoliberal"recipe"cametobewidelyknowninLatinAmericancirclesasthe"WashingtonConsensus,"aseriesofpoliciesthatcalledformonetarystabilization(thatis,theendoframpantinflation)andstructuraladjustments(thatis,theendofastrong,interventioniststate).Albeitimplementedthroughstatesvigilantoftheirneoliberalmissions,thefreemarkethassofarmeanttheprivatizationofpubliccompaniesandservices,the''junking"ofthewelfarestate,andtheopeningofformerlyprotectednationalmarketstotransnationalcapitalism,thelatterrequiringstabilityandpredictabilitytooperateonaglobalscale.Thecontrolofinflationhasbeenachieved,atleastbyLatinAmericanstandards,againthroughtheactionsofstrongstatepolicies.

However,thepoliciesrootedintheWashingtonConsensusdonothavethesameimplicationsforallcountriesinLatinAmerica.Theyencounterpolitical,economic,andsocialsystemsthatarearesultofpreviousdevelopmentalcyclesandinsertionswithintheworldsystemandwhichmaintaindifferentiatedrelationshipsamongeachother.WithinBrazil,neoliberalperspectivesandpressureshavebeenfeltsincethe1980s.TheyexperiencedastrongsurgeduringFernandoCollordeMello'sadministrationintheearly1990s,andhavecontinuedtoexertastronginfluence.Althoughneoliberalpoliciesareincreasinglyhegemonic,thetensionsbetweenneoliberalpositionsanddefendersofBrazil'snationalmarketwithinBrazilianpoliticalandeconomicelitecannotbeoverlooked.Thesetensionswereexpressedinthenationalelectionsof1989and1994,whentheoppositionWorkers'Partyreceivedanimpressivenumberofvotes(almostwinningthe1989election).TheycanalsobeperceivedintherelativelyslowpaceoftheBrazilianprivatizationprogramand,duringFernandoHenriqueCardoso'sfirstyearaspresident,inthesomewhatcontradictoryopeningtotheglobaleconomy,inwhichpowerfulindustriallobbies,suchastheautomobilesector,havemanagedtointerferewiththespeedandintensityofimportflows.2

ThischapterexploresthecomplexityofglobalizationandneoliberalismbyfocusingontheBrazilianenvironmentalsector.Thisexaminationshowsthatpowerfulforcesofhomogeneity,suchasneoliberalformulae,arenotcreatedinconstraint-freeenvironments,nordotheyhaveuniformeffectsandoutcomes.Forexample,Brazil'senvironmentalsectorpresentsanapparentanomalyinacontextofoverallneoliberalpressures:stateresponsibilities,expenditures,andadministrativestructureshaveexpandedamidststringentstructuraladjustmentpoliciesinothersectors.ApowerstrugglewithinamajorBrazilianfederalenvironmentalprogramwillillustratethecomplexityofthispoliticalfield.Atthesametime,theinterfacesbetweenglobalandlocalforcesgeneratenewsocialactorsthatchangepowerrelationships.TheimportanceofAmazoniawithintheenvironmentalistdiscourseprovidesfornewtypesofagency,whichareusedtoempower,tovaryingdegrees,politicalsubjectswithintheenvironmentalsector,particularlyamonglocalpopulations.3ThispointisillustratedthroughthepowerstrugglesovertheenvironmentaldestinyoftheAmazonianregionofBrazil.

Whencopingwithglobalizationandtransnationalphenomenasuchasenvironmentalism,anthropologistsmustconsiderdifferenttextualandanalyticstrategies.Thisapproach,ontheonehand,tendstoblurthefrontiersbetweenanthropologyandotherdisciplinessuchassociology,politicalscience,andgeography.But,ontheother,itreinstatestherichnessofanthropologicalapproaches,whichcanpresentthevarietyofvoicesthatspanningfromlocal,regional,national,international,andtransnationallevelsarealwaysinvolvedincertaindramas.Intheend,pluralityandsensitivitytotheperspectivesof"others"differentfromthoserepresentativeofthehegemonic,expansiveWesternpowerswillremainasanthropology'smarkofdistinction.

ContemporaryEnvironmentalisminGlobalContext

Theinternationalriseoftheenvironmentalmovementduringthe1980sisanimportantfeatureofthechangingnatureofthecontemporarypoliticaleconomy.Thedestructivepower,locallyandglobally,ofindustrialdevelopmentplacedenvironmentalissuesontheagendaofpeoplesthroughouttheworld.Thelackofcorrespondencebetweentheboundariesofecologicalandpoliticalsystems,exemplifiedbysuchproblemsasacidrain,globalwarming,nuclearfallout,thedepletionoftheozonelayer,andthedestructionofbiodiversity,callsforpoliticalandeconomicarrangementsthatarenotcontainedbytheexistingnation-statestructure.Inaneraoftransnationalflexiblecapitalismmarkedbythegrowthof"cleaner"industriesandtheservicesector(forexample,electronics,

computers,communications,entertainment,tourism),thediffusionofanewmetanarrativeonnatureandsocietyhasgainedaddedimpetus.4

Thecrisisofalternativeideologiesandutopiasrootedinthenineteenthcentury,clearlyportrayedbythedeclineofMarxism,Leninism,and"reallyexistingsocialism,"openedupaspaceofuncertaintythatpowerfullyrearrangedmetanarrativesabouthumankind'sdestiny.Thefocusonhuman/naturerelationships,themainaxisofenvironmentalism'smasterdiscourse,actedasanefficientsubstituteforthepreviouslydominantemphasisonhuman/humanrelationships,typicalofalternativeformulations,andfavoredtheemergenceofwideralliances.Asaconsequence,thepoliticalspectrumoftheinternationalenvironmentalmovementshowsavariabilityofpositionsandlabelsthatincludesecofeminists,ecosocialists,ecoanarchists,andecofascists,amongothers.

Theenvironmentalmovementestablisheddiverserelationshipswithgovernmentandmultilateralagencyofficials,politicians,themedia,scientists,andtheacademiccommunitythatledtoitsentranceintothemainstreamofdevelopmentalpolicyandplanning.Thisprocessgainedmomentumwith"sustainabledevelopment,"anotionpopularizedamongstpublicpolicymakersbytheUnitedNations-sponsoredBrundtlandCommissionreportof1987.TheRio-92UnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopmentrepresentedtheclimaxofthistrendwhenmorethan100headsofstatepledgedtheircommitmenttoastyleofdevelopmentthatwouldnotendangertheneedsoffuturegenerations(Little,1995).TheEarthSummit,amegariteofpassagethroughwhichtheworldtransnationaleliteanticipatedandcelebratedthecomingofanewage,wasproperlyheldinBrazil,acountrythathadbeenformanyyearsinthecenterofhotlydebatedglobalenvironmentalproblemssuchastheburningoftropicalrainforestsandthelossofbiodiversity(Ribeiro,1994a).

TheBrazilianEnvironmentalSector

Brazil'senvironmentalsectorcanbecharacterizedasapoliticalandeconomicfieldcomposedofatleastfivesegmentsofdifferentiatedactorsthatmaintainunequalandcontradictoryrelationshipsovertime(Ribeiro,1994b).Thesesegments,whichoftenoverlap,includethestate,multilateralandbilateralfinancingagencies,nationalandinternationalNGOs,localpopulations,andmarket-orientedactors.

ThehistoryofBrazil'senvironmentalfederalinstitutionscanbeseenasformallystartingwiththecreation,intheearlyseventies,oftheEnvironmentSecretariat,establishedundertheinfluenceofthe1972U.N.conferenceinStockholmontheenvironment.Thissmallagencywould

playregulatoryrolesofminorincidenceinthestateadministrativestructureandinthedevelopmentalistandexpansionistpoliciesofthatdecade.ThegrowinginfluenceofenvironmentalismintheeightieswithinBrazil,togetherwiththeheighteningofworldwidecriticismoftheburningoftheAmazonjunglechanneledthroughforeigngovernments,multilateralagencies,andinternationalNGOs,promptedthefederalgovernmenttolaunchanambitiousprogramin1989.The"OurNatureProgram"restructuredenvironmentalstateapparatusesandpolicies,constitutedaMinistryoftheEnvironment,andformedanewfederalagencytheBrazilianInstitutefortheEnvironmentandRenewableResources(InstitutoBrasileirodeRecursosNaturaisRenovaveisedoMeis,orIBAMA)inordertofusefourpreviouslyexistingentities.Environmentalismwasbecominganimportantpoliticalforcecapableofformingheterodox,transnationalallianceswithpowerfuleconomicandpoliticalramifications.

AsecondmajorsegmentofBrazil'senvironmentalsectoriscomposedofmultilateralandbilateralfinancingagenciesandotherinternationalorganizations.Theseinstitutionsarelargelyresponsibleforthediffusionofenvironmentalmodelsandvariablesindevelopmentplanningatthegloballevel.WhilerecognizingtheimportanceoftheUnitedNations,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,officialforeignaidagencies,theEuropeanUnion,andsemi-formalizedpoliticalandeconomicgroupingssuchastheGroupofSeven(G-7),thischapterwillconcentrateonthekeyroleoftheWorldBankduetoitsfinancialandeconomicpowerasadevelopmentagencyinLatinAmericaandtherestoftheworld.5

BecausetheWorldBankhasawiderangeofgoals,fromeducationtoinfrastructureprojectsandenergydevelopment,itisthesinglemostimportantforeignagencytoexertdirectinfluenceonBrazilianenvironmentalissues.Theintroductionofenvironmentalconditionalitiesinprojectappraisalsfuelscontradictionsbetweencredit-hungrycountriesandworldcentersofpoliticalandeconomicpower.WhiletheBankisanotoriousinstrumentoftheWashingtonConsensus,italsoallowsforlocalpopulationandNGOparticipationinthedevelopmentprocess.

TherelationshipbetweenmultilaterallendingagenciesliketheWorldBankandNGOsischaracterizedbythemutualuseofoneanotherfortheirownspecificgoals.InternationallendingagenciesoftenseektochannelfundsthroughNGOsbecausetheyfeelthattheseoffergreaterguaranteesthatthemonieslentwillbespentondirectprogrammingandnotbelostingovernmentbureaucracies.Inthisarrangement,NGOsnotonlyprovideforamechanismtobypassgovernmentbureaucracy,butalsoserve(oftenunwittingly)topromoteneoliberalpoliciesdesignedtoweakenthepowerofthestatebyfindingviablesubstitutestoit.Fortheirpart,NGOsgainbotheconomiccloutandpoliticalbargaining

powerby

enteringintoadirectrelationshipwithmultilaterallendingagenciesandcanusethesetogainconcessionsfromthestate.

Theincreasedimportanceofcivilsocietywithintheinternationalarenaisadirectresultoftheworldwidestrengtheningoflocalorganizationsandsocialmovementsratherthanthecedingofpoliticalspacebydominantsocialactors.6Nongovernmentalorganizations,thethirdsegmentoftheenvironmentalsector,representakeyvehicleforarticulatingcivilsocietyinterests.BrazilianNGOscompriseafieldofpoliticalactorsthatishighlystructuredthroughinteractionsandpartnershipswithinternationalpoliticalforces,suchasmultilateralagencies,internationalNGOs,foundations,andotherorganizations.Inthe1980stheyexperiencedarapidgrowthinnumberandimportanceasadvocatesofdifferentsocialandpoliticalissues.WhilesomeofthelargestNGOsstartedoutperformingadvisoryandtechnicalassistancerolestosocialmovements,othersbeganbydirectlyaddressingenvironmentalissues.BrazilianNGOs,characteristicallystaffedbyhighlyeducatedmembersofthemiddleclass,nowstriveforincreasedprofessionalismintheirworkinordertosurviveinanunstablemilieuandhavegainedvaryingdegreesofautonomy.

Bythemid1990s,thenewdynamicsoftheworldsystemhadrearrangedtherelativepowersandconceptionsofthemajorplayerswithintheinternationalcooperationfield(Durão,1995).BrazilianNGOs,highlydependentoninternationalfunding,beganfacingharshbudgetarycutbacks,provokingamaturationcrisisinwhichcompetitionforresourcesoftenmeantthefusionorthedisappearanceofmanyNGOs.Nationalpoliciesofstructuraladjustmentworsenedthesituation.In1994anewsetofeconomicpoliciesknownasthePlanoRealinstalledanewcurrencyinBrazil,overvaluedvis-à-vistheU.S.dollar,andstoppedrunawayinflation.NGOsstartedtosufferwiththelossofsurplusprofitsgeneratedbythemaintenanceofforeigncurrencyaccountsandtheabilitytomanipulateexchangerates.Inspiteoftheseadjustments,NGOsexperiencedagrowthintheirrelativepoliticalpowerandenteredintoarelationshipoftensionwiththeBraziliangovernmentoverissuesofpublicpolicyandpoliticalrepresentation.

ThefourthmajorsegmentofBrazil'senvironmentalsector,thelocalpopulations,includesmanydiversegroups.Onesetoflocalgroupsreferstourbanpopulationsthataresubjecttoforcedresettlementorthatarestrugglingforhousing,basicsanitation,healthcare,andpollutioncontrol.However,ruralgroupsaremostoftenassociatedwiththeenvironmentalsectorinBrazil.Indigenouspeoples,rubbertappers,fishingcommunities,andmaroonsocieties(formerrunawayslavecommunities)havetheirownpoliticaldynamicsbasedonculturalnormsthatseldommatchthoseofcentralgovernments.7Eachofthesepopulationshaspar-

ticularrelationshipstoterritoriesandecosystemsthatplacethemdirectlywithintheenvironmentalsectorduetotherightstheyclaimovernaturalresourcesandtheculturalknowledgesystemstheypossess.

Thesegroupsoftenfindthemselvesinsubordinatedpositionsintheirencounterwithmultipleoutsideforces,asituationthathasfosteredtheappearanceofnumerousresistancemovementsandgrass-rootsleaders.TherubbertappersmovementthatemergedintheAmazonianstateofAcreillustratesthisprocess.Throughoutthe1970slocalrubbertappersorganizedempates(stand-offs)inwhichtheypreventedthefellingofthenativeforestbylargeranchinginterestsaspartofthedefenseoftheirhomelands.ChicoMendesemergedoutofthisstruggleasadynamicleaderwhowasinstrumentalinorganizingtherubbertappersintotheNationalRubberTappers'Council(ConselhoNacionaldosSeringueiros,orCNS),foundedin1985.TheCNSestablishedtherubbertappersasapoliticalforcethatpressuredthegovernmentintocreatingExtractiveReserves,anewenvironmentalpolicyinstrumentthatformalizedtheterritorialrightsofextractivistpopulations.

Ourfifthandlastsegmentiscomposedofmarket-orientedactorsthatrangefromlarge,capital-intensiveindustriesthatareadoptingcleanerandlessdestructivetechnologiestosmall-scalesustainableagriculturalcooperativestryingtocreateanichewithintheburgeoningnationalandinternational"green"market.AracruzCelulose,oneofthelargestpapercompaniesintheworld,isanexampleofamajorBraziliancorporationthatisbeing"modernized"bythediscourseofsustainabledevelopmentthroughtheintroductionofnewtechniquesofforestrymanagementandpollutioncontrol.However,thegrowingmarketforAmazonianforestproductssuchasBrazilnuts,vegetableoils,fruits,andnaturalrubberhasgeneratedalargenumberofcommercialinitiatives(sometimessubsidizedbyNGOs,thestate,andmultilateralagencies)thatexploittheir"environmental-friendliness''toincreasesales.RainforestCrunchicecream,bodyoilsderivedfromnutshand-pickedbyIndians,andAmazoniannutbarsandcerealsarebutafewoftheexamplesofthisnewtrendthatseekstofulfillthefantasiesofconsumersinshoppingmallsandsupermarketsthroughouttheworld.Thissegmentalsoincludesprivatecapitalandentrepreneurswhoarerequiredbylawtocommissionenvironmentalimpactassessmentspriortotheimplementationofdevelopmentprojects.Theseassessmentscreatedanentirelynewfieldofconsultingandengineeringfirmsthatoftenbenefitsfromenvironmentallyearmarkedcredit.

Actorswithinthefivesegmentsoftheenvironmentalsectormustfunctioninalargereconomicandpoliticalpowerfield.However,theyhavetheirownpoliticalagendathattheypromotethroughacomplexwebofpoliticalrelationshipsmarkedbytemporary

alliancesandconflicts.

Withineachsegmentofsocialactorsthereareinternalstrugglesoverrepresentation,controloffinancing,andpoliticalstatusthatdirectlyinfluencethewayexternalrelationshipsareconducted.

APowerStruggleWithintheBrazilianEnvironmentalSector

IntheyearsleadinguptotheEarthSummit,theGroupof77formedacommonnegotiatingstrategybasedupontherealizationthat"theNorth'sstatedenvironmentalconcernsmightbeusedtoextracteconomicconcessions"aspartofthemuchbroadercategoryof"developmentaid"(McCoyandMcCully,1993:81).8ThisstrategywassupportedbyinternationalNGOsandgeneratedapoliticalnegotiatingclimatefavorabletothefinancingofnewenvironmentalprogramsandpolicieswithinthedevelopmentaidnetwork.TheindustrializeddonorcountriespreferredtochanneltheirfundsthroughtheWorldBank,anagencyoverwhichtheyholdmajoritycontrol.In1991,forinstance,theGlobalEnvironmentalFacility(GEF)wasestablishedbytheWorldBankwithacleareyetowardbecomingthefundingbodyfornewfinancingtocomeoutoftheEarthSummit.InspiteofsustainedobjectionofmostNGOsandtheGroupof77attheEarthSummit,GEFwasselectedasthemechanismthroughwhichsustainabledevelopmentaidwouldbeadministered,thusmakingitoneofthe"defacto'winners'inthedebatesheldduringtheRioConference"(Little,1995:271).

TheWorldBankwasalsotheprincipallendingagencyfortheBrazilianNationalProgramfortheEnvironment(ProgramaNacionaldoMeioAmbiente,orPNMA)setupinAugustof1990as"thefirstlarge-scaleenvironmentalprograminBraziltobeco-financedbyaninternationallendingagency"(RosFilho,1994:89).TherelationshipsbetweenmultinationalfinancingagenciesandtheBraziliangovernmenthavebeenplaguedwithproblemsrootedintheincompatibilitybetweentwodifferentbureaucraticandfinancialsystemsthattendstospawnevenmorebureaucracyandfinancialinefficiency.Forexample,theproblemsencounteredduringthefirstthreeyearsofthePNMAprogramincludedchronicfailurestomeetdeadlines,depreciationofmonieslentduetoinflation,internaltransferproblemswithinthefederalandstatelevelsofgovernment,lackofanadequateadministrativestructurecapableofdealingwiththeprograminanintegratedway,andashortageoftrainedpersonnelneededfortheeffectiveimplementationoftheprogram.WhilethemultilaterallendingagenciesandtheBraziliangovernmentoftenblamedeachotherfortheseproblems,theendresultwasthatafterthreeyearstheprojectedperiodfortotalimplementationmostofthemoneyhadnotbeenspent.

In1993,whenthefailureofthePNMAprogramtospenditsallottedmoneywasevident,athree-yearextensionwasgrantedandtheProjectsofDecentralizedExecutionprogram(ProjetosdeExecuçaoDescentralizada,orPED)wascreatedasamechanismforbreakingthebureaucraticimpassethathadpreventedthegovernmentfromfinancinglocalprojects.Inthisnewfederalprogram,Brazilianmunicipalities,NGOs,socialmovements,andlocalorganizationsweretoparticipatedirectlyintheelaborationandimplementationofenvironmentalprojects.9During1994,statewidemeetingsthroughoutthecountryweresponsoredbythenationalPEDofficeinBrasíliatoexplaintolocalgroupstheprogram'snewdecentralizedguidelinesandprocedures.PreprojectproposalssubmittedbylocalgroupswerescreenedatastateandnationallevelandpredominantlycamefromNGOsandgrass-rootsorganizations.

InMay1995,whilethesegroupswereintheprocessofelaboratingtheirdefinitiveprojectstobesubmittedtoBrasíliaforfinalapprovalandfinancing,thenationaldirectorofthePEDprogramannouncedthatonlymunicipalgovernmentswouldbeeligibleforfunding,therebyeffectivelyeliminatingcivilsocietyrepresentativesfromtheentireprocessofdecentralization.SinceunderBrazilianlawprivateorganizationscouldnotreceivegovernmentfundstobuypermanentequipmentorbuildinfrastructure,NGOsandgrass-rootsorganizationswerenotlegallyqualifiedtoimplementtheseprojects.

Thelaw,however,doesnotprohibitprivateorganizationsfromreceivingandusingpublicmoniesandthedirector'srestrictedinterpretationwentagainstthegrainofthepartnershipsmadeoverthepreviousyearbetweenlocalorganizationsandmunicipalitiesthatwereallowedtobuyequipmentandbuildinfrastructurewithpublicfunds.Yet,becausePEDwasanewprogramwithoutclearlyestablishednorms,itbecameopenfortheplayofpowerconcerningwhoseinterpretationwouldprevail.Anorganizedresponsewasnexttoimpossible,giventhatlocalgroupswerescatteredthroughoutthecountryandtimewasrunningoutforthepresentationofthefinalprojects.Thus,duetowidespreadgovernmentalincompetence,onefederalgovernmentofficialwasabletousehispositionofpowertopreemptpreviouslynegotiatedagreementsandimposeaninterpretationthatmaintainedtotalgovernmentcontroloveraprogramostensiblydesignedtoinvolvecivilsociety.

TheEnvironmentalistAppropriationofAmazonia

Withintheworldwideenvironmentalmovement,Amazoniacametooccupyaprivilegedspaceduringthe1980sand1990s.Thespecificwaysinwhichworldenvironmentalismhasdiscursivelyandpractically

appropriatedAmazoniaareimportantforunderstandingtheprojects,programs,andpoliciesthathavebeenimplementedinitsname.First,environmentalgroups,particularlythoseofWesternEuropeandtheUnitedStates,seeAmazoniaastheworld'slargestremainingtropicalrainforest,whichmustbesavedforposterityfrompredatoryforces.AseconddimensionofthisappropriationisAmazoniaashometonumeroustraditionalpeopleswhoareconsideredalliesinthestruggletostopdeforestation.Athirddimensioninvolvesadiscoursethathighlightstheregion'sworld-recordlevelsofbiodiversity.

Theenvironmentalistappropriation,althoughcertainlyfoundeduponempiricalfacts,hidesfromviewandevendistortsotherrealitiesofAmazonia.InwritingabouttheeconomicimportanceofAmazoniatotheworld,LúcioFlávioPintoaffirmsthat"inspiteofallthediscussionaboutsustainabledevelopmentandabiologicaldiversitybank,inconcretetermstoday...Amazoniaisamining,metallurgy,andsiderurgyarea"(1994:114).Anotherneglectedfactisthatover60percentoftheBrazilianAmazonianpopulationisurbanandlivesinsuchcitiesasBelém,Manaus,Santarém,Macapá,andPortoVelho.Theresidentshaveahostofconcernscenteredaroundimprovedhousing,expandedsanitationservices,employment,betterschools,andpavedstreets,issueswhicharenotdirectlyrelatedtodeforestation.Infact,theworldenvironmentalmovementhasfewspecificproposalstodealwithgoldminers,agriculturalcolonists,ranchers,loggers,businessmen,andthehostofotherpeoplesthatmakeupthemajorityoftheovertenmillionpeoplewhocurrentlyliveintheregion.Thesepeoplearespurredbypowerfulmarketforceswhichprovideincentivesforinvasionsofnewareasforfarming,ranching,andtheextractionofeconomicallyvaluableresourcessuchasgoldandmahogany.

APowerStruggleoverAmazonia

A"mini-boom"ofinitiativesfortheentireAmazonianregionoccurredinthelate1980sandearly1990s,particularlyinBrazil,whichcontainsover60percentofthetotalareaofthisbiome(ecologicalcommunity).Theinitiativesweredesignedtoreducedeforestationrates,establishnewconservationareas,protectexistingbiodiversity,andpromoteindigenouspeoples'rightstoland.ThePilotProgramfortheProtectionoftheBrazilianTropicalForestisthelargestnewAmazonianenvironmentalundertakingandgrewoutofdiscussionsheldattheannualG-7meetinginHoustoninJuly1990,duringwhichtheleadersoftheindustrializednationsexpressedtheirconcernsoverthedestructionoftheworld'stropicalforests.UpontheinitiativeofHelmutKohl,theGermanchancellor,the

G-7leadersformallyagreedtofinanceanenvironmentalprogramthatwastoserveasareplicablemodel(hencethename"Pilot"Program)forinternationalprotection(Fatheuer,1994).Afteraseriesofnegotiationslastingnearlytwoyears,theG-7countriesagreedtoallocateU.S.$250millionforthePilotProgramtobedispersedoverathree-yearperiodamongfourseparatesubprograms,whileusingtheWorldBankasthemainfinancialadministrativeagency.

InJune1992,inconjunctionwiththeEarthSummit,thePilotProgramwasofficiallycreatedwithinBrazilandacoordinatingcommitteewasestablishedtooverseetheprogram,consistingofrepresentativesfromsixfederalministries,twoexecutivesecretariats,andthreeNGOrepresentatives.Inaddition,anInternationalAdvisoryGroupcomprisedoftwelveeminentscientistsandenvironmentalleaderswasestablishedtoprovidetechnicalguidancefortheprogram.AnotherkeyactorthatemergedduringthisperiodwastheAmazonianWorkingGroup(GrupodeTrabalhoAmazônico,orGTA),anetworkcomprisedofenvironmentalNGOs,indigenistgroups,anthropologicalinstitutions,andgrass-rootsorganizations.TheGTAgrewrapidlyinsizethroughtheincorporationofoverthreehundreddifferentgroupsandorganizationsandbecamethemajorrepresentativeofcivilsocietyinthePilotProgram.

ApowerstruggledevelopedwithinaGerman-fundedprojectofthePilotProgramoverthedemarcationofanumberofIndianlands.ThisisahighlypolemicalissuewithinBrazilthatpitspowerfulmining,logging,andranchinginterests,whoareeagertogainaccesstoresourceslocatedinindigenousterritories,againstindigenouspeoplesandtheirallies,whoseetheformaldemarcationofIndianlandsbythegovernmentasacrucialsteptowardguaranteeingindigenousrightsandprotectingtheAmazonrainforest.

In1994aunilateraldecisionbytheMinisterofJustice(whoinBrazilhasauthorityoverthegovernment-runNationalIndianFoundation[FundacãoNacionaldoIndio,orFUNAI])excludedthisprojectfromthePilotProgram,claimingthatitwasnotacurrentpriorityandthatthefederalgovernmentwascapableoffinancingthedemarcationofindigenouslandswithouttheaidofforeigngovernments.10Byrefusingtoacceptthissecurefundingsource,theministerwasvirtuallysuspendingthedemarcationeffort.Hisdecisionprovokedtheimmediateoutcryofindigenousorganizations,indigenistandenvironmentalNGOs,andFUNAIwithintheveryMinistryofJustice.Inseekingtoreversethissituation,thesegroupsappealedtoandgainedthesupportofdistinctsegmentsoftheenvironmentalsector.

TheInternationalAdvisoryGroup,setuptoprovideexpertcounseltothePilotProgram,wasmeetinginBrasíliaatthetimeandexpressedits

adamantopposition,claimingthattheprojectwasessentialtotheadequatefulfillmentoftheprogram'soverallgoals.Meanwhile,theGermangovernmentalsoopposedthedecisionand,asamajorfunderoftheG-7-sponsoredPilotProgram,wieldedconsiderablecloutwithinitsoveralldecision-makingstructure.Afterseveraltensenegotiatingmeetings,theMinisterofJusticereversedhisdecisionandtheprojectbegantobeimplemented.

LocalAgencyandGlobalForcesinAmazonia

Environmentalism,morethananyothermovement,hasstressedinitsprogramsthevalueoflocal/globalrelationshipsforpoliticalaction."Thinklocally,actglobally"isnowasloganthatsynthesizesthemindframenecessarytoallowactorstointerveneinthescenarioofrelationshipstypicalofaglobalizedworld.Atthesametime,thissloganalludestomanylevelsofcontradictionsthatcanhardlybeunderstoodbyallsocialactors.Thetransitfromlocaltogloballevelsrequiresamajorinvestmentofenergyandresourcesnotalwaysavailabletolocalsocialmovementsorinstitutions.Thisisoneofthereasonswhypoliticalnetworkscapableofarticulatingdifferentlevelsofaction,somethinghighlyvaluedbyNGOs,arebecomingincreasinglyeffective.

Therelationshipsbetweenlocalpopulationsandoutsidersaremediatedbybrokers.Brokerageoperateswithinafieldofitsownstimulatedbyexternalagentswithvariabledegreesofmembershipinthecommunitysuchaschurches,politicalparties,unions,andNGOswhichcanbecomehighlyinstitutionalized.Anidiomof"participation"developstoregulatethepowerimbalancescommontolocal/outsiderencounters.Thoughparticipationhasnowbecomeamandatorydemandofsocialmovements,localleadership,anddevelopmentagencies,itscontrolbyinstitutionsexternaltothecommunitiesalmostalwaysleadstoclientelismoradistortedformofdevelopmentpedagogy.Furthermore,theriskofco-optationofgrass-rootsleadersisever-present.

Anotherissueofcontentionisthevariegatedmeaningsthat"local"mayhaveforsocialactorssince,inmanysenses,lifealwaysunfoldsingivenlocalscenarios.Thus,socialactorsalwayshaveasenseofwhatislocal.Themainissueishowdifferentactorswithineachsegmentoftheenvironmentalsectorconceptualizethelocal,placeitwithinahierarchyofvalues,anduseitasameanstocopewiththemultitudeofotherinterlocutors.Forexample,inthePNMAandPilotProgramcases,thesocialactorsusedtheirstrategicpositionsandpowertomanageconflictsandformcoalitionsinordertopromotetheirendsandgaincontroloffinan-

cialresourcesthatweredestinedforlocalpopulations.Intheformercase,thetimelyimpositionofaunilateraldecisionbyagovernmentofficialregardingwhowastorepresentthelocal(NGOs,socialmovements,ormunicipalities)wasupheldwithinafieldofpoorlydefinedpolicyguidelinesandfragmentedpartnershipsandthusreinforcedstatepower.Inthelattercase,theadhocallianceofdiverseinternationalandnationalactorsstandinginforindigenouspeoples'interestswasabletoreverseadecisionmadebyaministerandforcedtheimmediateimplementationoftheproject.Inbothcases,thelocalsocialactorswhowerethesupposedbeneficiariesoftheseprogramswereunderrepresentedand,ineffect,tokensinthehandsofinstitutionalactorsandbrokersinwiderstrugglesoverresources.

theforgingoftheForestPeople'sAlliancepresentsadifferentsituation.PowerfulenvironmentalNGOsatagloballevelneededaunifiedfrontofAmazonianpopulations,particularlyindigenousgroupsandrubbertapperstheprivilegedactorsoftheenvironmentalistappropriationofAmazoniatoprovidethelocalfoundationforthelaunchingofinternationalcampaigns.ThoughtheForestPeoples'Alliancewascreatedin1989atthebehestofenvironmentalgroups,ithasnevertrulyfunctionedasadynamicentitycapableofrepresentingthecommoninterestsofindigenouspeoplesandrubbertappers.Historicaltensionsaccruingfromconflictoverlandsbetweenthesegroupsmadetheirjointcollaborationproblematic.Hereweseehowalocalpopulationwashomogenizedforglobalpurposes,onlytohaveitsunderlyingheterogeneityreemergeinthecourseoffurtherevents.

Stillotherexamplesshowhowactiveparticipationbylocalpopulationsinenvironmentalstrugglescanbeeffectiveinpromotingtheirinterests.AhistoricmeetingheldintheAmazoniantownofAltamirain1989gatheredinternationalandBrazilianNGOs,membersoftheworldpress,federalgovernmentofficials,high-levelmanagementofastate-ownedelectriccompany,andKayapóIndianstodiscusstheconstructionoftheKararaôHydroelectricDamthatwouldfloodextensiveareasoftherainforestinKayapóterritory.AdramaticconfrontationbetweentheIndiansandgovernmentofficialsunfoldedinfrontofworldcamerasatthemeeting.Inawell-orchestratedlocal/globalaction,simultaneousprotestsagainstthebuildingofthedamwereheldinEuropeanandU.S.cities.Theseinitiativesculminatedinthehaltingofthehydroelectricproject.

Thecaseoftherubbertappersexemplifieshowlocalgroupsappropriatedtheenvironmentalideologyfortheirownneedsandgoals.Therubbertappers'movement,whichgrewoutofatraditionoflabororganizing,onlyenteredintoastrongworkingrelationshipwithenvironmentalists

duringthe1980s,undertheleadershipofChicoMendes.The"environmentalization"ofalong-standingagrarianproblemgaverisetotheconceptofextractivereserves,anenvironmentalandterritorialpolicythatconsolidatedrubbertappers'interests.AfterMendes'stragicassassinationinDecember1988,riftsemergedbetweenthelaborandenvironmentalsidesofthiscoalitionover,amongotherissues,whoshouldreceiveandadministernewenvironmentallyearmarkedfunds.

TheidealizedappropriationofIndiansbyenvironmentalandindigenistgroupshasoftendiscursivelytransformedthemintoatypeof"hyperrealIndian,"acategoryusefultothegoalsofoutsidegroupsbutonethatrarelytakesintoaccounttheday-to-dayneedsandconflictsofindigenouspeoples(Ramos,1995).TheYanomamiIndianshavesufferedfromappropriationsthatcharacterizethemasa"fiercepeople"andthelastandlargestsurviving"primitivetribe"inAmazonia.However,newleaders,suchasDaviKopenawa,havemanagedtoappropriatetheenvironmentaldiscourse,fuseitwithYanomamicosmologyinacriticismofthedestructionoftheirhabitatbygoldminers,andopenupnewalliancesandchannelsthatstrengthenedtheirclaimswithinBraziliannationalsocietyandinternationalforums(Albert,1995).

TheagencyoflocalAmazoniangroupshasbeentransformedbytheenvironmentalizationofsocialconflictsandAmazonianpeoples.Thecasesjustmentionedexemplifyhowtheenvironmentaldiscourseisatwo-waystreetthatcannotbeviewedassimplyanexternalimpositionsinceitmayfosterinternalreappropriationsthatdifferentiallyempowerlocalgroups.Thepresenceofgrassrootsleaderscapablenotonlyofunderstandingglobalforces,butoftranslatingthemintoformscomprehensibletotheirpeoplesandchannelingcollectiveactionbasedonnewvisions,representsthefoundationuponwhichlocalactorsbecomeagentsintheirownright.Thisnewagencymodifieslocalgroups'specificrelationshipswiththeenvironmentalsectorandprovidesthemwithdiscursiveandpoliticalweaponsusefultotheirstruggles.Inordertocreateajustandequitablepowerdynamicwithintheenvironmentalsectorthatiscoherentwithitsprogrammaticprinciples,itisclearthatlocalpopulationsmustbeconsideredassubjectsandnotasrhetoricalpartners.

Conclusion

Tothedegreethattheenvironmentalistideologygainsforce,allowsfortheexpansionofstateapparatuses,andisenrichedbytheactiveparticipationoflocalgroups,itcounterbalancestheharshstructuraladjustmentpoliciesbeingimplementedthroughoutLatinAmericathatarealmost

exclusivelydesignedtopromotecapitalinvestments,deregulation,andeconomicgrowth.TheconsolidationofanewenvironmentalsectorinBrazilistiedtothebroaderprocessofglobalizationandhasproducedanentirelynewrealmofinteractionsatmultiplelevelsbetweenthefivemajorsegmentspreviouslyanalyzed.Intheprocessseveralcontradictionsofneoliberalismhavebecomeapparent.

Asthischapterhasshown,certainstatesectorsexpandinthemidstofmajorfiscalandgovernmentalcutbacks.WithintheBraziliangovernment,asecretariat,anewCabinetministry,andregulatoryagencieswerecreated,andthenenlarged,inordertoaccommodatenewfinancingandprogramsdealingwiththeenvironmentand,inparticular,theAmazonrainforest.Thisgrowthiscontradictoryinanothermannersinceitstrengthenscoalitionsthatopposehegemonicforcesofthestatelinkedtotraditionaldevelopmentalistinitiatives.ThisentireprocesswasfueledbyfinancingwhichoriginatedinlargepartfromoutsideBrazil.WhileinternationalNGOsprovidedsomeofthesenewfunds,thebulkofthemcamefromforeigngovernmentsorfrommultilaterallendingagencies.Inthiswaytheexpansionoftheenvironmentalsectorispartandparceloftheglobalizationprocessthathasgrowninstrengthandscopeduringthepasttwodecades.TheanalysisofBrazil'senvironmentalsectorunderlinestheneedtoplaceallworldwideprocessesinthiscase,neoliberalismandglobalizationwithinspecifichistoricalandethnographiccontexts.

Nongovernmentalorganizationsalsothrivedduringthepastdecadeandwereintegratedintotheinstitutionalstructuresofthenewenvironmentalprogramsasrepresentativesofthecivilsocietyanddepositoriesoftechnicalskillsandknowledge.Nonetheless,theirbrokeragefunctionsbasedinnetworkingplacedtheminambiguouspositionswherebytheycansimultaneouslyrepresentlocalpopulations,challengestatepolicies,performquasigovernmentalactivities,andreceivedirectfinancingandadministrativepowersfrommultilateralagenciestoimplementtheirprograms.

InthecaseofBrazilianAmazonia,thelocal/globaldynamicfoundedontwo-wayappropriationsofenvironmentalistideologieshasgivennewvisibilitytolocalpopulations,promotingtheirinterestsinnationalandinternationalforums.Thetransformationoflocalagencythatresultedfromtheseprocesseshasrecastthepoliticalforcesofthisregionandcreatednewopportunitiesfordefendingtheirinterestsagainstdominanteconomicinterestspromotedbysectorsofthestateanditsallies.ThestrategicuseofthesesituationsoffershopethatAmazonianpeoples,alongwithothersthroughoutLatinAmerica,willnotsimplybesubjectedtocrudeeconomiccalculationsofthe"bottomline,"butwillbeabletoemergeas

apowerfulsetofsocialactorscapableofshapingamorepromisingdestinywithintheconstraintsofashrinkingworld.

Notes

1.Inacontextofglobalizingforces,thephysicaldistancebetweenlocalitiesradicallydecreasesandthemediationofthenation-statesbecomeslessimportant.

2.OtherfactorsthatfurthercomplicatetheBraziliancasevis-à-visotherLatinAmericannationsaretheweightofBrazilintheglobaleconomy;thesizeofitsnationalmarket;ahighinstitutionalizationofthepublicsphere;aNationalCongressthat,thoughdominatedbyconservativepartiesandcoalitions,alsocontainssignificantforcesofopposition;ahighlevelofunionizationofindustrialworkersandpublicservants;andthegrowingvisibilityandinfluenceofmovementssuchasthelandlessruralworkerswhostruggleforagrarianreform.

3.Inhisdiscussiononagencyandpower,AnthonyGiddensstatesthat"tobeanagentistobeabletodeploy(chronically,intheflowofdailylife)arangeofcausalpowers,includingthatofinfluencingthosedeployedbyothers.Actiondependsuponthecapabilityoftheindividualto'makeadifference'toapreexistingstateofaffairsorcourseofevents.Anagentceasestobesuchifheorshelosesthecapabilityto'makeadifference,'thatis,toexercisesomesortofpower"(1984:14).

4.Metanarrativesaremasterdiscoursesthatguidethepoliticalandideologicalvisionsandgoalsofcitizens.Categoriessuchasprogress,freedom,anddemocracycanbeseentobemetanarrativesthatareanchoredintheEnlightenmentandthatareanessentialpartoftheWesternimagination.

5.TheG-7isapoliticalbodythatservestovoicetheconcernsoftheNorthandincludesCanada,France,Germany,GreatBritain,Italy,Japan,andtheUnitedStates.

6.Theterm"civilsociety"referstopoliticallyactiveorganizationsnotdirectlyapartofthestateapparatus,suchaschurches,laborunions,charities,NGOs,andsocialmovements.Althoughtheselasttwoentitiesshareasimilarpoliticalspace,socialmovementsareledbygrass-rootsleadersandunofficiallyrepresentlocalpopulationsinwiderpoliticalarenas.

7.WithintheBrazilianenvironmentalsector,thesepeopleshavecometobeknownastraditionalpeopleswhoseadaptivesystemdoesnotdependuponextensivedeforestation.

8.TheG-77isapoliticalbodymadeupoftheworld'spoorestnationsthatservestovoicetheconcernsoftheSouthandfunctionsasaninformalnegotiatinggroupwithinthe

UnitedNations.

9.Brazilisafederationbaseduponthreedistinctlevelsofgovernment:federal,state,andmunicipal.BrazilianmunicipalitiesroughlycorrespondtothecombinedfunctionsofcountyandcitygovernmentswithintheU.S.governmentalstructure.

10.Inmakingthisdecision,hewastacitlyenlistingthesupportofthenationalistelementwithintheBrazilianarmedforcesthatiscriticalofthecreationofindigenousterritoriesasapotentialthreattonationalsovereigntyandthatviewsforeignfinancingofindigenousorganizationsasaviolationofthissovereignty.

References

Albert,Bruce.''Oourocanibaleaquedadocéu:Umacríticaxamânicadaeconomiapolíticadanatureza."SérieAntropologia(Brasília:UniversidadedeBrasília),no.174(1995):1-29.

Durão,JorgeEduardoSaavedra."Perspectivasdeparceriacomacooperaçaointernacional."CadernosABONG,no.9.SãoPaulo,1995.

Fatheuer,ThomasW.NovoscaminhosparaaAmazônia?OProgramaPilotodoG-7:Amazônianocontextointernacional.RiodeJaneiro:FASE/SACTES,1994.

Giddens,Anthony.TheConstitutionofSociety:OutlineoftheTheoryofStructuration.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984.

Harvey,David.TheConditionofPostmodernity:AnEnquiryintotheOriginsofCulturalChange.Oxford,England:BasilBlackwell,1989.

Little,PaulE."Ritual,PowerandEthnographyattheRioEarthSummit."CritiqueofAnthropology15,no.3(September1995):265-88.

McCoy,Michael,andPatrickMcCully.TheRoadfromRio:AnNGOActionGuidetoEnvironmentandDevelopment.Amsterdam:WorldInformationServiceonEnergy,1993.

Pinto,LúcioFlávio."AAmazôniaentreestruturasdesfavoráveis."InAAmazôniaeacrisedamodernizaçao,editedbyM.A.D'IncaoandI.M.daSilveira,111-18.Belém:MuseuParaenseEmílioGoeldi,1994.

Ramos,AlcidaRita."OÍndiohiper-real."RevistaBrasileiradeCiênciasSociais10,no.28(June1995):5-14.

Ribeiro,GustavoLins."TheConditionofTransnationality."SérieAntropologia,no.173(1994a):1-13.

."Umaintroduçaoparapensarosetorambiental."InFinanciamentosparaomeioambiente,editedbyLuizCarlosRosFilho.Brasília:InstitutodeEstudosAmazônicoseAmbientais,1994b.

."Interneteaemergênciadacomunidadetransnacionalimaginada."RevistaSociedadeeEstado10,no.1(January-June1995):181-91.

RosFilho,LuizCarlos.Financiamentosparaomeioambiente.Brasília:InstitutodeEstudosAmazônicoseAmbientais,1994.

CONCLUSION:ANTHROPOLOGYINTHEAGEOFNEOLIBERALISMLynnePhillips

PerhapsoneofthemostimportantconclusionsthatcanbederivedfromtheseessaysisthatLatinAmericacannolongerbeviewedsimplyasthe"other"America.TheissueofproductionandconsumptionalonedemonstratesthatimportantcommonalitiesintimatelylinktheAmericastogether:RainforestCrunchicecream,Levijeans,freshfruitandvegetables,andevendrugsandviolence.1ThecurrentglobalchangesmentionedinthesepagesaffectNorthasmuchasSouthAmerica.Perhapsoneofthepositiveproductsofglobalizationisthatitbringsouttheseinterconnectionsandforcesustoseethat,ultimately,the"other"isalsous.

Anthropologyistypicallyknownforitsstudyofthe"other"andthe"local."Theessaysinthisvolumeattempttomovebeyondthelimitationsofthisfocusbydevelopingaglobalvisionwithinwhichtounderstandthecreation,differences,andsimilaritiesoflocalities.Indevelopingthisglobalvision,theauthorsshareacommonconcerntotranscenddichotomies(traditional/modern;them/us)andtoreconnectwiththelivedexperienceofpeople.Thechaptersdiscusspeoplewhoarenotreal(inthesensethatanthropologistsconstructthem),butwhoareafterall"reallythere."2

Theseessaysshowtherangeofwaysinwhichanthropologistsareattemptingtomaketheoreticalsenseofcurrentglobalchanges.Therelationshipbetweencultureandpoliticaleconomyhasalwaysbeenaproblematiconeforanthropology;aninterestinonealmostalwayshasmeantanunderemphasisoftheother.3Manyoftheauthorshereareconcernedwithshowingthenecessityofgrapplingwitheconomicandpoliticaltransformationswithoutsacrificingpeople'sunderstandingoftheworld.Thetoolkitfromwhichtheydrawinordertoconsiderbotharenasisnotalwaysthesame.Some,suchasBabbandRibeiroandLittle,drawontheinsightsofMichelFoucaulttolookattheeconomyandthingseconomicasdiscourse,dissectingeconomictermsfortheculturalmeaningsandintent.Others,suchasBeaucageandPainter,turntohistorytoseehoweconomiclabelsandpolicieshavechangedovertime.This

strategyhelpstouncoverthesocialandculturalfoundationsofthosephenomenaconsidered"natural."4Others,likeGill,attempttorethinkclass,toconsiderhowclassismadeandhowitorganizesgenderandethnicrelations.ClassenandHowesturntopostmodernismtocelebratetheculturalvitalityofmedical"traditions"despiteeconomicchanges.Green,Seligmann,andGatesconsidertheintersticesofcultureandeconomywiththeunderstandingthatcapitalismisnotanabstractmodelbutaprocessthattodayistakingadifferentformand,assuch,isreshapingnotionsoftimeandspace.5

NeoliberalismandtheSocialSciences

Thesecontributionsleadustoquestiontheplaceofthesocialsciencesinthecurrentglobaleconomicsituationandtoconsiderhowglobalizationshapestheknowledgeweproduceandwhatimplicationsthismighthaveforeffectingsocialchange.Thequestionofhowbesttochallengeneoliberalismassocialscientistsisathornyone.Giventhehegemoniccomponentofneoliberalism,itisnotsurprisingthatmuchofhowwethinktheoreticallyisinformedbyneoliberalviewsoftheworld.Perhapssocialscientistsdohavearesponsibilitytoparticipate,ascitizens,inthedebatessurroundingneoliberalpolicies,butitisarguedherethattheircriticaledgeassocialscientistswillultimatelydependontheirengagementwiththeconcernsofthosepeople,whetherinNorth,South,orCentralAmerica,whoaremaginalizedorexcludedbythosepolicies.

Thesocialscienceshavetwoparadigmsforcritiquingneoliberalism.Oneapproachdetailstheimpactandimplicationsoftheneoliberalprocess.Focusingonpooreconomicperformancesunderneoliberalpolicies,onthesocialcostsofneoliberalism,andontheextenttowhichthestatehasbeen(contrarytoneoliberalrhetoric)highlyinterventionistinimplementingneoliberalpolicies,theseempiricallybasedstudieshavebeenextremelyimportantfordocumentingthegapbetweenneoliberalrhetoricandneoliberalreality.

Theunderlyinggoalofthisapproachisthatbyprovidingconcreteproofthatneoliberalismhasanegativeimpactonpeople'slives,thepowerofneoliberalismmaybedismantled.Butdoesthisstrategy,initself,challengetheneoliberalworldview?Skepticismaboutitspotentialisbasedonanumberofobservations.First,thereareclearindicationsthattheproponentsofneoliberalismhavelittleinterestinengagingwiththedetailsofarguments;nordotheyfeelcompelledtoprovideempiricalproof(beyondGrossNationalProductincreases)fortheirbeliefthatneoliberalismisapositivecontributiontopeople'slives.Thecurrenteconomiccrisishascausedsometocallneoliberalismthe"lawofthejungle"(Peck

andTickell,1994).Assuch,logicalargumentsandempiricalstudiescanbeeasilydismissedinthenameofcrisismanagement.Itisinthiswaythattheproponentsofneoliberalismcanalsoarguethatthesocialcostsofpoliciesareinevitableorthatanalystsshouldspendmoretimedocumenting"thelong-termpaincausedbythefailureofmanyLatinAmericancountriestoembraceneoliberalism"(Lynch,1994:98).Withnoalternativedevelopmentstrategiesbeinggivenequalconsideration,itiseasyforneoliberalsupporterstorelyonthebasicclaimthatthisisthebestmodelwehaveforthefuture,irrespectiveofitsdocumented"faults."

Arelatedobservationisthatneoliberalassumptionsaboutsocietyareradicallydifferentfromthosegenerallysupportedbysocialscientists.Themostimportantdifferencetonoteisthatneoliberaladvocatesgenerallyviewthesocialassomethingthatshouldbereplacedratherthansupported.AsMargaretThatcherdeclaredin1987,"Thereisnosuchthingasthesocial;thereareonlyindividualsandfamilies"(citedinTaylor,1991).Theassumptionhereisthatthemarketwilltakecareofwhatwaspreviouslytheresponsibilityofgovernmentandsociety.Hence,itisnotdifficulttoseethatcriticizingneoliberalismforundercuttingthefabricofsocietyisratherbesidethepointfromtheneoliberalperspective.

Thisissueisallthemoreworrisomewhenwenotethatneoliberalismproposesitselftobegender,race,andclassneutral.Asfeministanthropologistshavepointedoutforotherapparentlyneutralparadigms,neutralityoftenmasksanimplicitdiscriminationthatpretendsthatallwomenandmenlivethesamelives,withthesameresponsibilitiesandopportunities.Itiscriticalsocialanalysisthatbestclarifiesthatsuchequalitydoesnotexist,ineitherNorthorSouthAmerica.Yet,byrejectingthesignificanceofthesocial,andofthesocialsciences,neoliberalismcaneasilysidestepaccusationsofsexism,classism,orracism.Thus,whilethedocumentationofthesocialandeconomicconsequencesofneoliberalismisnecessarywork,itisnotlikelytobesufficientforchallengingneoliberalismintoday'sglobalcontext.

Isthereanalternativestrategyinthesocialsciencesthatmightmoreeffectivelytakeonthistask?Itisworthconsideringwhetherpostmodernism,anincreasinglyimportantperspectiveinthesocialsciences,offersamoreeffectivecritiqueofneoliberalism.6Whileitisrecognizedthatpostmodernismisnotaunified,homogenousschoolofthought,itshouldbenotedthatsomevariantsofneoliberalismandpostmodernismshareastrikingnumberofsimilarities.Bothdelightinexperimentationsinvolvingthecollapseoftimeandspace,emphasizingthemetaphorofashrinkingworldwhereanythingispossible.Theseexperimentationspermitaplaywithrealitythatofferstheillusionofalevelplayingfieldwhereeveryonehasthefreedomtoexperiencemobilityand

"dislocation."

"Fixities"(socialcategoriessuchascommunityandclassandgender)become"unhelpfulgrids"foranalysis(Nederveen,1995).Bothneoliberalismandpostmodernismalsohaveacuriousamnesiaaboutthepast,muchofwhichbecomes"junkedhistory."Both"schools''shareamethodologicaldisinterestinempiricalstudies(Vieux,1995),andacceptthemarketasthefoundationofsociallife,particularlyemphasizingconsumptionasthemeansthroughwhichglobalizedindividualsmaysatisfytheirneeds.

StephenVieux(1994)hasarguedthatpostmodernismisnotuptothechallengeofcriticizingneoliberalism.Bynotingtheabovesimilarities,Isimplywanttopointoutthatpostmodernistapproachesmayhelptoprotectneoliberalismininsidiousways,amatterthatneedsfurtherinvestigation.Certainlythecombinedassumptionsofpostmodernismandneoliberalismdolittletoencouragetheviewthatitispossibleorevendesirabletoorganizeforalternativefutures.

Meanwhile,neoliberalismcontinuestoerodesocialandeconomicenvironmentsthroughouttheworldthatmightprovidealternativestothecurrentsituation.Moreover,anemphasisonapoliticsoftheaesthetic,afavoritestrategyofsomepostmodernists,almostappearsperverseinaworldwherethecontrastsinwealthhavebecomesostark.Vidal(1993)suggeststhatsomeChileansmayhavetakenonpostmodernismasanaspectofthepost-traumaticstressassociatedwiththeterroroflivingunderahighlyauthoritarianregime:theywanttoignoretherealityoftheeconomicandpoliticalviolence,makepeacewiththeenemy(theneoliberalmilitary),anddistancethemselvesfromformeralliances(movementsindefenseofhumanrights).

Yet,weliveinatimewhenweverymuchneedtolinkourtheorytoreallife.Acriticalsocialsciencecannotaffordtomoveawayfromempiricalstudies,notbecausetheyareessentialtochallengeneoliberalargumentsbutbecausetheyareessentialtothoseforwhomwedoresearch:marginalizedpeoplewhoareotherwisedeniedimportantinformationabouttheirlives(andthelivesofothers),butwhomustassumethecostsofhowsocialrelationsarecurrentlybeingorganized.7Criticalsocialsciencerequiresanengagementthatrecognizestheconnectionsbetweenresearchandpoliticsandthatactivelylistenstorepresentationsoftheworldthatvaryfromthosebeingofferedbythispoliticalprojectcalledneoliberalism.

TheValueofAnthropology

Whatspecificcontributionsmightanthropologyhaveforunderstandingthis"thirdwave"ofmodernizationinLatinAmerica?Aseditor,Iasked

thecontributorstothisvolumeinformallyaboutthevalueofanthropologyintheircurrentwork.Despitethevariouscritiquesthatthedisciplinehassustainedoverthelastdecade,eachofthememphasizedtheimportanceofanelementtheydefineas"anthropological"intheirperspectives.Mostfindthatthemicro-levelapproachthecornerstoneofclassicanthropologyisstillessentialforexposingthefallaciesofbureaucraticmodernization(Beaucage),examiningtheeverydaylivesoflow-incomepeople(Babb;Gill),andgivingpeopleavoicesothattheycanexpresstheirownlives(Buechlers).Furthermore,throughanthropologicalfieldwork,thatis,intensivequalitativeresearchthroughparticipantobservation,anthropologistsareconfrontedwithpoliticalcomplexitiesthatchallengetheirownsenseofwhatisimportant(Painter).Fieldwork,asMarilynGatesputsit,helpstokeepushonest.

Otherspointtoconceptssuchasagencyandlocal-globalrelationsasanthropology'smostvaluableasset.Anthropologyoffers"aviewofthenexuswherestructureandagencycometogether"(Seligmann)andisparticularlyaptfordealingwithmacro-levelprocessesbecausethepluralityofactorsinvolvedisalwaysconsidered(Green;LinsRibeiroandLittle).It"obligesonetotakeupapositiononthebordertheborderofone'sownandanotherculture,theborderoflocallivesandanthropologicaldiscourseandtokeeplookingbothways"(ClassenandHowes).

Inthisvolumewehaveseenhowanthropology,withitsvarioustheoreticalperspectivesandmethodologicalstrategies,cancontributealternativeinterpretationstotheapparentnaturalnessofneoliberalismasamodernizingprocessforLatinAmerica.Wehavealsoseenthatthekindsofargumentsweseedailyinthepressabouttheneedforlessstateinterventionandmarketflexibilityoftenhaveadevastatingimpactonpeople'sliveswhentheyaremadeintopolicy.Givenanthropology'smethodologicalandtheoreticalstrengths,itmaywellbethebest-placedsocialsciencetounderstandthe"awkward"relationshipthatLatinAmericanscurrentlyhavewithneoliberalism.Butanthropologyiswhatanthropologistsmakeit,andthefuturewilldependonwhetherornotanthropologistsarepreparedtorecognizethevalueofanengagedsocialsciencethatremainsattunedtopeople'slives.

Notes

1.Foraninterestingassessmentoftheconnectionsregardingtheconsumptionofhamburgers,seeMarkEdelman's"FromCostaRicanPasturetoNorthAmericanHamburger"(1987).

2.ThiscommentisplayingonanobservationbyGertrudeStein(1940).

3.AremarkableLatinAmericanethnographythatbreaksthroughthisage-old

anthropologicalproblemisNancyScheper-Hughes'sDeathWithoutWeeping(1992).

4.TheworkofEmilyMartin(1994),ananthropologist,isausefulresourceforunderstandinghowsomethingasapparentlynaturalasbiologyisculturallyconstructed.AlsoseeEvelynFoxKeller(1995).

5.ThisapproachbuildsontheworkofDavidHarvey(1989),whoarguesthatthisemergingperiodofflexibleaccumulationisanewformofcapitalismthatgoessomewaytowardexplainingthecurrentpopularityofpostmodernism.

6.ItisnoteworthythatintellectualsinLatinAmericaarealsoengaginginthepostmoderndebate(seethespecialissueofBoundary2[1993].

7.ThisargumentdrawsontheinsightsofSandraHarding(1996).

References

Edelman,Mark."FromCostaRicanPasturetoNorthAmericanHamburger."InFoodandEvolution,editedbyM.HarrisandE.Ross,541-61.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1987.

FoxKeller,Evelyn.RefiguringLife:MetaphorsofTwentiethCenturyBiology.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995.

Harding,Sandra."ScienceIs'GoodtoThinkWith.'"SocialText14,nos.1and2(Spring1996):15-26.

Harvey,David.TheConditionofPostmodernity:AnInquiryintotheOriginsofSocialChange.Oxford:Blackwell,1989.

Lynch,Edward."EcuadorunderLeónFébresCordero:TheFollyofHalfwayMeasures."InEconomicDevelopmentunderDemocraticRegimes,editedbyLowellGustafson,83-89.NewYork:PraegerPress,1994.

Martin,Emily.FlexibleBodies.Boston:Beacon,1994.

NederveenPieterse,Jan."GlobalizationasHybridization."InGlobalModernities,editedbyM.Featherstone,S.Lasch,andR.Robertson,45-68.London:SagePublications,1995.

Peck,Jamie,andAdamTickell."JungleLawBreaksOut:NeoliberalismandGlobal-LocalDisorder."Area26,no.4(December1994):317-26.

Scheper-Hughes,Nancy.DeathWithoutWeeping:TheViolenceofEverydayLife.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1992.

Stein,Gertrude.Paris,France.London:B.T.Batsford,1940.

Taylor,Ian."Introduction:TheConceptof"SocialCost'inFreeMarketTheoryandtheSocialEffectofFreeMarketPolicies."InTheSocialEffectsofFreeMarketPolicies:AnInternationalText,editedbyIanTaylor,1-26.NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1991.

Vidal,Hernan."Postmodernism,Postleftism,Neo-Avant-Gardism:TheCaseofChile'sRevistadeCriticaCultural."Boundary220,no.3(Fall1993):203-27.

Vieux,Steve."IntheShadowofNeo-liberalRacism."RaceandClass36,no.1(July-September1994):23-32.

ABOUTTHECONTRIBUTORSFLORENCEBABBisanassociateprofessorintheDepartmentsofAnthropologyandWomen'sStudiesattheUniversityofIowa.Sheiscurrentlyworkingonabookongender,economics,andculturalpoliticsinpost-SandinistaNicaragua.

PIERREBEAUCAGEteachesintheDepartmentofAnthropologyattheUniversityofMontrealinCanadaandhasbeeninvolvedinalong-termresearchprojectwiththeNahuaIndiansoftheSierraNortedePuebla.HeiscurrentlycarryingoutresearchonMexico'sIndianpoliticalmovements.

HANSBUECHLERisprofessorofanthropologyatSyracuseUniversity.HismostrecentbooksonBolivia,bothcoauthoredwithJudith-MariaBuechler,areTheWorldofSofiaVelasquez:TheAutobiographyofaBolivianMarketVendor(1996)andManufacturingAgainsttheOdds:Small-ScaleProducersinanAndeanCity(1992).

JUDITH-MARIABUECHLERisprofessorofanthropologyatHobartandWilliamSmithColleges.InadditiontothecoauthoredbooksTheWorldofSofiaVelasquezandManufacturingAgainsttheOdds,shehaspublishedseveralarticlesonruralandurbanmarketsinBoliviaandwithHansBuechlerhascoauthoredTheBolivianAymara(1971).

SIMONEBUECHLERiscurrentlyearningadoctorateinurbanplanningatColumbiaUniversity.ShehasworkedasaconsultantonmicrocreditfortheUNDevelopmentFundforWomen(UNIFEM)andWomen'sWorldBankingandhaswrittenonwomenandmicrocreditprograms.

STEPHANIEBUECHLERisadoctoralstudentinsociologyattheStateUniversityofNewYork,Binghamton,andplanstowriteherdissertationoneconomicstrategiesofwomenandchildreninruralMexico.ShehasundertakenastudyofwomenandcreditinBoliviaandisthedirectorofafilm,DonaAvelina,aBolivianArtisan:CreditandProduction,fortheInternationalCoalitionforWomenandCreditandBancoSol.

CONSTANCECLASSEN,awriterbasedinMontreal,Canada,isdoingresearchinAndeanstudiesandthehistoryofthesenses.HerbooksincludeIncaCosmologyandtheHumanBody(1993),WorldsofSense(1993),andAroma:TheCulturalHistoryofSmell(1994),thelastcoauthoredwithDavidHowesandAnthonySynnott.

MARILYNGATESisanassociateprofessorintheDepartmentofSociologyandAnthropologyatSimonFraserUniversity,BritishColumbia.She

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