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LYNN TILLoTsoN & PINKER, L.L.RATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
Christopherl. SchwegrnannDirect Dial (214) 981-3835
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Via U.S. CertifiedMail, RRRClerk ofCourtSeventhCourtof AppealsofTexas501 S. Fillmore, Suite2-AAmarillo, TX 79101-2449
April 18, 2005
Re: TracyYolandaWardv. StateofTexasandRhondaTulaneSmithv. StateofTexasConsolidatedAppealsNos. 07-04-00457-CR(Ward))and07-04-00490-CR(Smith)
DearClerk:
Hereis the original andfive copiesofa Brief ofAmicusCuriaein theabove-referenced
If you have any questions,pleaseassistancein this matter.
cc w/enclosure:
do not hesitateto contactme. Thank you for your
Verytruly yours,
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matter.
CJS/psEnclosures---- --~----~---~--- --~- ----- —---————- --
Clerk ofCourtApril 18, 2005Page2
bccw/enclosure:GregoryA. HorowitzPt~iaA.Seith -
IlyssaB. Sena
Of theFirmEdwardJasonDennis
136231
CONSOLIDATEDAPPEALSNOS.07-04-00457-CR(Ward)& 07-04-00490-CR(Smith)
iN THE SEVENTHCIRCUIT COURTOF APPEALS OFTEXAS
TRACY YOLANDA WARD, Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
RHONDA TULANE SMITH, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
THEON APPEALFROM THE 320T1T DISTRICT COURTHONORABLEDON R. EMERSON,JUDGEPRESIDING
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
LEAD COUNSEL: OF COUNSEL:
EdwardJasonDennis(No. 24045776) GregoryA. HorowitzLYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P. PatriciaA. Seith750North St. PaulStreet,Suite 1400 IlyssaB. SenaDallas,TX 75210 KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
& FRANKEL LLP1177Avenueof theAmericasNew York, NY 10036
Attorneysfor Amicus CuriaeAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion ofTexas
KL3;2409069-
CONSOLIDATEDAPPEALSNOS. 07-04-00457-CR(Ward)& 07-04-00490-CR(Smith)
LEAD COUNSEL:
EdwardJasonDennis(No. 24045776)LYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P.750North St. Paul Street,Suite 1400Dallas,TX 75210
Attorneysfor Amicus CuriaeAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion of Texas
OF COUNSEL:
GregoryA. HorowitzPatriciaA. SeithIlyssaB. SenaKRAMER LEVIN& FRANKEL LLP1177Avenueof theAmericasNew York,NY 10036
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURTOF APPEALSOF TEXAS
TRACY YOLANDA WARD, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
RHONDA TULANE SMITH, Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROMTHE 320TH DISTRICT COURTTHE HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON,JUDGEPRESIDING
BRIEFOF AMICUS CURIAE
NAFTALIS
KL12409069. I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . iii
STATEMENT INTERESTOF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1
ARGUMENT 3
THE DISTRICT AnORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACYUNDERTHE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION 3
A. Allowing theDistrict Attorneyto ProsecutePregnantWomenfor TakingControlledSubstancesWould OpenTheDoorToOppressiveRestrictionsOnPregnantWomen 4
B. WomenDo Not LosetheRightof PrivacyWhen TheyBecomePregnant 10
C. AppellantsHavea FundamentalLiberty Interestin TheirIndividual Autonomy 12
II. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESSUNDERTHE UNITED STATESCONSITUTION 15
A. Construing§ 481.122to ReachPrenatalConduct WouldRenderthe StatuteVoid for Vagueness 16
1. Nothingin § 481.122or thePenalCodeGivesReasonableNoticethata FetusWouldbeConsidereda “Child” forPurposesof thatCriminal Statute 17
2. Nothing in § 481.122ProvidesAdequateNoticethataPregnantWoman’sAct ofTaking aControlledSubstanceWouldConstitute“Delivery” to theFetus 21
B. TheProsecutor’sEnforcementof § 481.122AgainstAppellantsis Arbitrary 23
—1—KL3:2409069, I
III. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTSTO PRIVACY ANDDUE PROCESSUNDERTHE TEXAS CONSTITUTION 24
IV. IF § 481.122APPLIED TO PRENATAL CONDUCT,APPELLANTS’ CONVICTIONSWOULD VIOLATE THE EXPOSTFACTO CLAUSESOF THE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION,AS WELL AS OF THE TEXASCONSTITUTION 25
PRAYER 27
— 11 —
KL3:2409069-I
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
In reA.C.,
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) 9Arkansas Dep’t of HumanSvs. v. Collier,
95 S.W.3d772 (S.Ct. Ark. 2003) 10
BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559 (1996) 17 n.5
Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347(1964) 25
Carey v. Population Services Intern.,431 U.S. 678 (1977) 12 & n.4
City of Chicago v. Morales,527 U.S.41(1999) 16
City of Richmond v. IA. Croson Co.,498 U.S. 469(1989) 13
City of Sherman v. Henry,
928 S.W.2d464 (1996). .24
Clark v. Martinez,U.S. —, 125 S. Ct 716 (2005) 20
Clark v. State,665 S.W.2d476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) 25
Collins v. State,890 S.W.2d893 (Tex.App.— El Paso1994) 20
Collins v. Youngblood,497 U.S. 37 (1990) 25
DenverAreaEducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. F.C.C.,518 U.S. 727 (1996) 14
111 —
KL3:2409069I
Fergusonv. City ofCharleston,532U.S. 67 (2001) 1
In re FetusBrown,689 N.E.2d397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 9
Fogo v. State,830 S.W.2d592(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) 24
Grayne.d v. City of Rockford,408 U.S. 104 (1972) 16,23
In re GuardianshipofJ.D .5,864So.2d 534(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 7, 8, 9
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,499 U.S. 187 (1991) 11
Johnson v. State,602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992)
Johnson v. State,
829 S.W.2d836(Tex.App. —Dallas,1992) 22
Kolenderv. Lawson,461 U.S. 352(1983) 15
Peoplev. Hardy,469N.W.2d 50 (Mich. App. 1991) 23
PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri v. Danforth,428U.S. 52 (1976) 10
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,505 U.S. 833 (1992) 10, 11, 12 n.4
ExparteRobinson,792 S.W.2d109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 26
Rosev. Locke,423 U.S. 48 (1975) 27
- iV -
KU:2409069I
Shawv. Hunt,517 U.S. 899 (1996) 13
Spellingv. State,825 S.W.2d533(Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 1992) 26
Statev. Jackson,833 S.W.2d220(Tex. App. —Hous.1992) 23
Statev. Luster,419 S.E.2d32 (Ga.Ct. App. 1992) 23
Statev. Nelson,881 S.W.2d97 (Tex.App.—Hous. 1994) 22 n.7
Taft v. Taft,446 N.E.2d395 (Mass. 1983) 9
TexasStateEmployeesUnion v. TexasDep’t ofMentalHealth & MentalRetardation,746 S.W.2d203 (Tex. 1987) 24
In re theRetentionofTanyaP.,No. 530869/93slip op. (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Feb.24, 1995) 8
Thomasv. State,832 S.W.2d47(Tex.Crim.App.1992) 21
In re Unborn Child ofStar/cs,18 P.3d342(5. Ct Okla. 2001) 9-10
UnitedStatesv. Lanier,520 U.S. 259 (1997) 20
Vaughnv. Ruoff253 F.3d 1124 (8thCir. 2004) 12
VillageofHoffmanEstatesv. FlipsideHoffmanEstates,Inc.,455 U.S. 489 (1982) 16
Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distributors,Inc.,727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987) 18,20
KL3:24O9cI69.I
Women‘s Med. Ctr. OfNorthwestHoustonv. Bell,248 F.3d411 (SthCir. 2001) 16
STATUTES
SenateComm.on StateAffairs, Bill Analysis,Tex. S.B. 319, 78thLeg passim
Tex.Alco. Bev. Code§ 106.06 7
Tex. Const.art. I, § 16 26
Tex.Fam.Code§ 261.103(a) 4
Tex. Health& SafetyCode§ 16 1.082 7
Tex. Health& SafetyCode§ 48 1.002(8) 21
Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 481.104 7
TexasHealth& Safety Code§ 481.122 passim
TexasPenalCode§ 1.07(a)(26) 15, 20n.6
Tex.PenalCode§ 19.06 18
Tex.PenalCode~22.12 18
Tex.PenalCode§ 49.12 18
U.S.Const.art. 1, § 9 cI. 3 25
U.S.Const.art. 1, § 10 cI. 1 25
MISCELLANEOUS
AmericanCollegeof ObstetriciansandGynecologists,PlanningYourPregnancyandBirth, 100-01 (3ded. 2000) 5,7 n.2
CharlesLevendorsky,“Turning Womeninto Two-LeggedPetri Dishes,” Star-Tribune,Jan.21, 1990 8
- Vi -
KL~.24O9O69,I
CharlesLevendosky,“Using theLaw to MakeJusticethe Victim,” Star-Tribune,Feb4, 1990 8
Heidi Murkoff etal., WhatTo ExpectWhenYou’reExpecting,57-61(3d ed. 2002) 5, 6, 7 n.2
MichelleD. Mills, FetalAbuseProsecutions:“The TriumphofReactionOver
Reason”, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 989, 1022 (1998) 6 n.1
Nicholson Eastman, M.D., ExpectantMotherhood,78 (3d ed. 1957) 5
“Girl Detainedto ProtectFetus”, Wis. StateJ. Aug. 16, 1985 8
Op. Tex. Att’y Gen.No. GA-0291 (2005) 18 n.6
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KL3:2409069I
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICESOF THE COURT OFAPPEALS:
TheAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion (“ACLU”) andACLU ofTexas,by its
undersignedcounsel,andpursuantto theprovisionsoftheTexasRulesofAppellate
Procedure,file thisAmicus Curiaebrief
STATEMENT INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
TheAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionis anationwide,nonprofit, nonpartisan
organizationwith over400,000membersdedicatedto theconstitutionalprinciplesof
libertyandequality. TheACLU ofTexasis its stateaffiliate. This caseraisesimportant
questionsabouttheright ofpregnantwomento privacyanddueprocess.TheACLU has
fought for theserightsin numerouscontextsover the yearsincluding, amongothers,
appearingasamicuscuriaein Fergusonv. City ofCharleston,532U.S. 67 (2001)
(holdingthatwomencannotbesubjectto warrantless,suspicionlesssearchessimply
becausethey arepregnant),andascounselin Johnsonv. State,602 So .2d 1288, 1297
(Fla. 1992) (rejectingapplicationofdrugdeliverystatuteto pregnantwoman). The
properresolutionof this caseis thereforeamatterofsubstantialconcernto theACLU
andits members.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This caseis the resultofaprosecutor’sdecisionto put anovel, sweeping,
andimpermissibleconstructionon a statute. Lookingto SenateBill (“S.B.”) 319,which
amendedthedefinition of“individual” in thePenalCode,thePotterCountyDistrict
AttorneymaintainsthatTexasHealth& SafetyCode§ 481.122,thestatuteprohibiting
thedelivery ofacontrolledsubstanceto children,appliesto theconductofpregnant
1KL32409069 I
womentowardstheir fetuses. Butneitherthe statutenor thelegislativehistorycontains
anyhint of suchan intention. TheprosecutionoftheAppellantshereviolatestheUnited
StatesandTexasConstitutionsin at leastthreefundamentalways.
First, theprosecutionsat issueviolatetheright to privacy. If thefetus
constitutesa child for the purposeof Texasstatutes,thestatecould intrudein virtually
everyaspectofawoman’slife on thepretextof protectingthe fetus. Therewould be no
logical stoppingpoint to theintrusionson individual autonomy. But inherentlypersonal
decisionsrelatingto individual autonomyarc constitutionallyprotected,andwomendo
not losetheright to privacywhentheybecomepregnant.
Theprosecutionsat issuehereare theresultofasingleprosecutor’s
idiosyncraticnotionofwhatpublic policy shouldbe,not anylegislativedetermination
thatsomestateinterestshouldbeadvancedby subjectingpregnantwomento draconian
criminal sanctions.Protectingfetusesfrom maternaldrugusewasno partof the Texas
Legislature’sintent in enactingS .B. 319. Indeed,whentheLegislaturemodifiedthe
definition of“individual” underthePenalCodeto include fetusesit was careful to
excludeeveryform of potentialcriminal liability for pregnantwomen. TheLegislature
did so for goodreason. If womencanbecomefelonsfor usingdrugswhilepregnant,they
will be less likely to seekprenatalcare,shareinformationfreely with theirdoctors,or
carry their pregnancies to term. The State has vastly less intrusive and more effective
means at its disposal to further this interest.
Second, construing § 481.122 to reach a pregnant woman’s prenatal
conductwould violate theDueProcessclausesofthe UnitedStatesandTexas
2KL32409069I
Constitutions,which requirethat lawsbe sufficiently clearto providecitizensfair notice
as to whatconductis criminally prohibited. Among otherthings,thisguaranteeis
intendedto ensurethatlegislators,ratherthanlaw enforcementofficials, decidewhat
conductis subjectto prosecution.No citizenofordinaryintelligencecouldpossiblyhave
foreseenthe prosecutingattorney’sinterpretation,basedasit is on acontortedand
unfoundedreadingof thecode. And the statutepunishing“delivery” ofacontrolled
substance hasneverbeeninterpretedto applyto transactionsoccurringinsideone
person’s body. What is more, the very legislation on which the prosecutor relies excepts
pregnantwomenfrom its terms. The statute,asit is interpretedby theprosecutor,does
not satisfytheconstitutionalrequirementof fair notice.
Third, if § 481.122appliedto prenatalconducttowardsthefetus,
Appellants’ convictionswould violatethe expostfacto clauseoftheUnitedStates
Constitution,aswell asoftheTexasConstitution.Even if theCourtacceptsthe
prosecutor’sargument,given, amongotherthings,thenon-obviousnatureofthe
prosecutor’spositionandthefactthat apregnantwoman’sprenatalconductwasnot
previouslysubjectto criminal sanction,criminal penaltieson thatbasisshouldbe
imposedonly on futureconductandAppellants’ convictionsshouldbereversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE UNITEDSTATES CONSTITUTION
Prosecutingpregnant women on the grounds that their personal useof
controlled substancesconstitutes“delivery” of drugsto a child would openthe door to
31(1.3:24090691
prosecution of a pregnant womanfor any behavior that could be detrimental to her fetus,
from smoking and drinking to eating tuna fish. This is a road with no logical stopping
point. While encouraging proper prenatal careis undeniablya laudablegoal, it cannot be
usedto justify extraordinaryintrusionsinto thezoneofpersonaldecision-makingthatis
protectedby theright to privacyundertheUnitedStatesConstitution. In fact, theTexas
Legislature has not even tried to advancefetal healthby expandingHealth& SafetyCode
§ 481.122 to reach prenatal conduct by pregnant women, for good reason. Such an effort
would in fact undermine the very goal it sought to achieve. Prosecuting chemically-
dependant pregnant women under § 481.122 would only serve to make them avoid
medical treatment, be less candid with their physicians, or prompt them to terminate
pregnancies rather than face criminal prosecution. The Constitution does not
countenancesuchresults.
A. Allowing theDistrict Attorney to ProsecutePregnantWomenfor TakingControlledSubstancesWould OpenTheDoor To OppressiveRestrictionsOn PregnantWomen
If S.B. 319canbestretchedto readthata fetusis a “child” for purposesof
drug deliveryunder § 481.122,thenthereis nothingto stoptheprosecutorfrom
interpreting“child” underthe child abusestatutes,Tex. Fam.Code§ 261.103(a),to
includea fetus. Suchaconstruction— which flows from theprosecutor’sargument—
would criminalizeabroadrangeof conductandput mostpregnantwomenat riskof
prosecution.
4KL3:2409069. I
Forgenerations,pregnantwomenhavereceivedawide andfrequently
changing list of warnings about potential threats to their fetuses. In the middle of the last
century,apopularpregnancyguidetold womento limit theirsmokingto tencigarettesor
fewer per day — although if they had“beenusedto smokingconsiderablymorethan this
for several years” they should “by no means to try to give them up during pregnancy”
because that would be too upsetting. Nicholson Eastman, M.D., ExpectantMotherhood,
78 (3d ed. 1957). Baths during late pregnancy were forbidden because of the fear of
infection from bath water. Id. at 66, 71. “Under no circumstances” could pregnant
womenengage in sexual intercourse during the last month of pregnancy. Id. at 73.
Pregnant women were told to eat “no more and no less” than they had eaten before they
became pregnant, limit salt intake drastically, andgainbetween20 and24 pounds. Id. at
46, 65, 67.
Thebehavioralguidelinescurrentlyurgedon pregnantwomenareeven
more restrictive and all encompassing. They are told to stop smoking entirely and
immediately; avoid second-handsmoke;andabstainfrom alcohol consumptionalmost
altogether. Heidi Murkoff, et a!., WhatTo ExpectWhenYou’reExpecting,57-61 (3d ed.
2002); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Planning YourPregnancy
and Birth 100-01 (3d ed. 2000) (hereinafter “ACOG”). Changing cat litter, consuming
unpasteurized milk, or gardening without gloves is off limits because of the threat of
toxoplasmosis. Murkoff, supra,at 67-68. Numerous foods, such as swordfish and tuna,
are frowned upon. Id. at 148. Pregnant womenare warned not to stand in front of the
microwave oven when it is on and to check it for leaks; wear rubber gloves and avoid
5KL3:2409069I
inhaling when cleaning; limit exposure to potentially harmful chemicals; ensure that their
drinking water is free of lead; cut back on or give up caffeine; and stay away from or
limit drinking herbal tea. Id. at 63-65, 69, 7 1-72. Womenare now told that they should
gain no less than 25, and no more than 35, pounds during pregnancy, and that they should
engage in regular—but not too strenuous — exercise. ACOG,supra,at 71-8 1, 129;
Murkoff, supra, at 190-203. Even their sleep position is dictated: pregnant women
should sleep on their left side, not on their backs. ACOG,supra, at 82-83.
Thesedirectivestouchon virtually everyaspectof apregnantwoman’slife,
andevolveconstantlyasmedicalknowledgechanges.On thebasisofcurrentknowledge
(which couldeasily changein thefuture), all or most of thesemaybesensibleguidelines.
But thathardlymeansthat theyshouldbegiventheforce of law, with criminal penalties
for disobedience. If the state could punish a pregnant woman because her personal
behavior resulted in controlled substances reaching her fetus, it could just as easily police
theinnumerableotheraspectsof herlife thatcouldaffectthe fetus. Thestatecould, for
example, make it unlawful for a pregnant womanto enter a smoke-filled room, eat tuna
fish, or take a bath.’
In fact, thereasoningemployedby theprosecutionin this casecouldbe
deployed to prosecute a pregnant womanfor drinking a beer because it is unlawful to
This road could also lead the state to launch an investigation whenever a womanmiscarries, or gives birth to a child with birth defects, in order to determine whether thatdevastating event was somehow her fault. SeeMichelle D. Mills, FetalAbuseProsecutions:The TriumphofReactionOverReason,47 DePaulL. Rev.989, 1022(1998) (citing Lynn Paltrow, “FetalAbuse”: ShouldWeRecognizeitas a Crime?75 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 39).
6KL32409069.l
deliveralcohol to aminor, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code§ 106.06;or for smokinga cigarette,2
Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 161.082(criminalizingtheprovisionofcigaretteor tobacco
productto aminor); or for takingcertainprescriptiondrugsthathavebeenapprovedby
theUnited StatesFoodandDrug Administrationbut areincludedin thepenaltygroups
listed in § 481.122, see Tex.Health& SafetyCode§~481.104and48l.122
(criminalizing the delivery of certain prescriptiondmg~to achild).
Unfortunately, this is not a fanciful parade of horribles. There is ample
evidence of the willingness of state authoritiesto intrudeon pregnantwomen’srights in
the name of protecting fetal development. These measures are usually rescindedor
rejected by the courts, but often too late to prevent unwarranted suffering and deprivation
of the woman’s rights.
For example, in In re Guardiansh,~ofJ.D.S,864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004), a womanin a group home who suffered from severe mental retardation,
cerebral palsy, autism, and seizure disorder became pregnant as a result of rape. A
guardian was appointed for J.D.S., who recommendedthatshecontinuethepregnancy.
An individualsoughtto be appointedguardianfor the fetus,arguingthatanadvocatefor
thebestinterestsofthe womanwasnot enough. Theguardianargued,andonejudge
noted, that a guardian for the fetus could potentiallyexertcontroloversuchdecisionsas
“whether to obtain a sonogram, use of anaesthesia for medical procedures, the typeof
2 The reasoning employed by the prosecutor could even be applied to others
smoking in the presence of a pregnant woman, given that doing so might impact thehealth of the fetus. Murkoff supra, at 57-61; ACOG,supra, at 100-0 1.
71CL3:2409069.I
vitamins, choice of delivery,medicationsor otherprenatal‘dilemmas’ [thatwould] have
a profound impact on the well-being of the unborn child.” Id. at 547 (Pleus, J.
dissenting). These are, of course, the very kinds of decisions every womancarrying a
pregnancy makes. If a guardian could be appointed for J.D.S.’s fetus, there would be no
reason a guardian could not be appointed for the fetus in any other case.3
On counfless other occasions,stateauthoritieshaveseizedanddetained,or
threatenedto seizeanddetain,pregnantwomenin thenameofprotectingthefetus. For
example:
• In Wisconsin, officials held a pregnant sixteen-year-old in securedetention for the sake of fetal development because the young womantended “to be on the run” and “lack[ed] motivation or ability to seekmedical care.” “Girl Detained to Protect Fetus,” Wis. State J., Aug. 16,1985, at 3.2.
• Wyoming officials arrested a pregnant womanbecause of alcohol use andcharged her with felony child abuse. She spent time in jail before a judgedismissed the charge. SeeCharlesLevendosky,“Tuning WomenintoTwo-LeggedPetriDishes,”Star-Tribune,Jan.21, 1990, at A8; CharlesLevendosky,“UsingtheLaw to MakeJusticethe Victim,” Star-Tribune,Feb.4, 1990, atA8.
• NewYork state officials detained a pregnant womanin a mental hospitalagainst her will on the sole ground that, if released, she would resumedrug use and thereby pose a danger to her fetus. In re theRetentionofTanyaP., No. 530869/93, slip op. at 2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1995).The court ordered the womanreleased, and, in a subsequently issuedwritten decision, emphasizedthatthe “right to determineone’s medicaltreatment and to make reproductive choices is, and must be, superior toany interest which the state may have in an unborn fetus.” Id. at 6, 26.After her release, the womangave birth to a healthy and drug-free baby.Id. at 1 & 6 n. 3.
The court held that appointment of such a guardian was unauthorized.
8ICL~:24O9O69j
In othercases,stateauthoritieshavesoughtto compelpregnantwomento
submit to invasive surgery in the name of promoting fetal health:
• In Massachusetts,a lower court orderedapregnantwoman’scervix sewnup against her will to prevent a possible miscarriage. Taft v. Taft, 446N.E.2d 395, 396 (Mass. 1983). The womanwas ultimately spared fromundergoing the procedure by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, whichvacated the lower court’s order because the record did not show“circumstances so compelling as to justif~’ curtailing[her] constitutionalrights,” id. at 397.
• In the District of Columbia, one young pregnant woman, severely ill withcancer, several times mouthed the words “I don’t want it done” when toldthat a court had ordered her to undergo a caesarian. In reA.C., 573 A.2d1235, 1241 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). The baby died within a few hours ofthe surgery and the womandied two days later. Id. An en banc panel ofthe District of Columbia Court of Appeals later vacated the court orderand held that “in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is tobe decided by the patient — the pregnant woman— on behalf of herself andthe fetus.” Id. at 1237.
• In Illinois, a pregnant woman— who opposed on religious groundsundergoing a blood transfusion for the alleged benefit of her fetus —
appealed from an order appointingaguardianadlitem for herfetus. Thebloodtransfusionwent forwardagainstherwishes,but theappellatecourtlater held that this had been error. “Under the law of this State, however,we cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant woman to consent toan invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable fetus.” In reFetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
It thus takes no stretch of theimaginationto seethattheactionsof thelocal
prosecutor in this case could be the beginning of an onslaught of intervention whenever a
pregnant woman’s medical decisions might be consideredat oddswith theinterestsofthe
fetus. Allowing the state to manage and intervene in decisionsaboutapregnantwoman’s
prenatal care and her medical treatmentwould createa “universeoftroublingquestions.”
In re Guardianship of .JD.S,864 So. 2d at 540 (Orfinger, J., concurring); seealso In re
91CL324090691
Unborn Child of Star/cs, 18 P.3d342 (Okla. 2001)(holding trial courterredin providing
an avenue to take temporary emergency custody of appellant’s fetus); Arkansas Dep ‘t of
HumanSvs.v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772 (Ark. 2003) (holding lower court’s order placing
the fetus in custodyof the Departmentof HumanServicesto provideprenatalcare
exceeded statutory authority andconstitutedgrossabuseofdiscretion).TheConstitution
simply does not tolerate such state intrusion into the private realm of what a womandoes
with her body.
B. WomenDo Not Lose the Right of Privacy When They BecomePregnant
The days have long ago passed when courts would tolerate paternalistic
regulation of womenon the basis of their sex or in the name of protectingthe fetus. The
United States Supreme Court has held, for example, that the state cannot regulate a
woman’s pregnancy so as to respect her husband’s interest in the fetus, nor can it deny
her employ in the name of protectingthefetus.
In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992), the Court
struck down a Pennsylvania law that required a married womanto notify her husband
before having an abortion. See id. at 887-98; seealso PlannedParenthoodofCentral
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976). The Court recognizedthatahusbandhas
a “deep and proper concern and interest” in the fetus his wife is carrying, but ruled that
the husband’s interest did not “outweigh{] a wife’s liberty” and did not permit the state to
regulate her pregnancy to protect his interest. Casey. at 895 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 69), 898. As the Court reasoned:
10KL~:24O9O69.I
[I]f the husband’s interest in the fetus’ safety is asufficientpredicatefor state regulation, the State could reasonably conclude thatpregnant wives should notify their husbands before drinking alcoholor smoking. Perhaps married womenshould notify their husbandsbefore using contraceptivesorbeforeundergoingany typeof surgerythat mayhavecomplicationsaffecting thehusband’sinterestin hiswife’s reproductiveorgans.And if ahusband’sinterestjustifiesnotice in any of these cases,onemight reasonablyargnethat itjustifies exactly what the Danforth Courtheld it didnotjustify — arequirement of the husband’s consent as well.
Id. at 898. Following Casey’s reasoning,if it is impermissiblefor thestateto give a
husband this kind of dominion over his wife, then surely it is impermissiblefor the state
to assert such control.
On other occasions, too, the Court has held that women’s conduct, and in
particulartheirjob choices,cannotbe limited so asto protectthefetus. In Int’l Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), the SupremeCourtunanimouslyinvalidated
an employment policy that barred fertile womenfrom certain work in a battery plant
because of the risk of lead exposure. The Court noted that the bias inherent in the
challenged policy was “obvious” because “[fjertile men, but not fertile women” were
“given a choice as to whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductivehealthfor a
particular job.” Id. at 197. As theCourtheld, even“professedmoral andethical
concerns about the welfare of the next generationdo not suffice” tojustifij reducingthe
legal status of womento less than full adults. JohnsonControls,499 U.S. at 206; see
also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-98.
11KL3 2409069I
Theprosecutionsat issueseekto trumpwomen’sright to autonomy,bodily
integrity, and privacy with the state’s interest in the health of the fetus. This flies in the
face of Supreme Court precedent and cannot be sustained.
C. No State Interest Justifies the Prosecutions at Issue Here
Inherently personal decisions as to what one does with his or her own body,
including thoserelatedto awoman’sdecisionsduringpregnancy,areprotectedby the
fundamentalright to privacyandcanonly besubjectto stateregulationon thebasisofa
compelling state interest. SeeCareyv. PopulationServs.Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89
(1977) (applying strict scrutiny and rejecting a regulation limiting access of minors to
contraceptives “because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally
protectedright ofdecisionin mattersof childbearingthat is theunderlyingfoundationof
the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, andRoev. Wade.”); Vaughnv. Ruoff 253
F.3d 1124, 1128-29(8th Cir. 2004) (reasoningthatbecause“a personaldecisionrelating
to procreationor contraceptionis aprotectedliberty interest,” involuntarysterilizationis
constitutionalonly if “it is anarrowlytailoredmeansto achieveacompellinggovernment
interest”).”
Reasoning that “[a]bortion is a unique act,” the Supreme Court has departedfromthe compelling interest standard with respect to the right to abort a pregnancy, holdingthat state regulationsin connectionwith awoman’sright to terminateherpregnancyareevaluated to determinewhetherthoseregulationspresentan “undueburden”on thatright.SeeCasey,505 U.S. at 852, 876-79. As the cases cited in the text make clear, however,the strict scrutiny holding of Careyhas been reaffirmed as to other intrusions on personalautonomy relating to childbearing.
12KL3:2409069I
Underanyanalysis,intrusionson theright to privacycannotbebasedon an
individual prosecutor’snotionofappropriatepublic policy, which is all wehavehere. It
is crucial to recognize what we understand to be an indisputed fact: Protecting the fetus
from maternaldrugusewasnopart oftheTexasLegislature’sintent in enactingS.B.
319. SeeShawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (1996) (“To be a compelling interest, the
State must show that the alleged objective wa~the legislature’s ‘actual purpose.”) (citing
MississippiUniv. for Womenv. Hogan,458 U.S. 718, 730) (1982)); City ofRichmondv.
J. A. Croson Co., 498 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (looking to actual purpose of legislative action
in EqualProtectioncontextandapplyingstrict scrutinybecausethe “purposeofstrict
scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrantuse of a highly suspect tool”).
TheLegislatureneverevencontemplatedthepossibility thataprosecutor
would try to use the expanded definition of“individual” underthePenalCodeto
prosecute pregnant womanunder Health & Safety Code § 481.122. Indeed, the only
pertinent evidence in the record is an affidavit from the sponsor of S .B. 3 19
demonstrating that the Legislature,in expandingthedefinition of“individual” underthe
Penal Code to include fetuses, never intended to criminalize prenatal conduct. (Ward
CR. Vol. IV, p. 1120). Where the Legislature did recognize the potential for the
expandeddefinition of“individual” to beusedto prosecuteapregnantwomanfor actions
causing harm to her fetus, it expressly excludedthatpossibility. SeeSenateComm.on
State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. 5.13. 319,78
th Leg., R.S. (2003).
131CL3:2409069I
InsofarastheLegislaturenevercontemplatedagoalofprotectingthe fetus
from prenatal drugusein enactingS.B. 319,it follows that theLegislaturenever
consideredwhetherthatunrecognizedgoalcouldbeachievedthroughnarrowermeans.
“When applying strict scrutiny, we will not assume plausible alternatives will fail to
protect compelling interests; there must be some basis in the record, in legislative
findings or otherwise, establishingthelaw enactedastheleastrestrictivemeans.” See
DenverAreaEducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727,
807 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Sable
CommunicationsofCal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989)).
Threateningpregnantwomenwith lengthyprisonsentencescouldhardlybe
called the narrowest means to protect the fetus. To the contrary, the approach taken by
theprosecutorherewouldinevitably becounterproductivebecauseit gives the
chemically-dependent pregnant womanunfortunate incentives. She might not share vital
informationwith herhealthcareprovider,or forgo medicalcarealtogether,in orderto
avoid detection. She might even abort her fetus to avoid breaking the law. If she decides
to go forward with her pregnancy, putting her in prison for up to twenty years (the
sentence initially sought by the prosecutor here) would obviouslybe devastatingto the
well-being of the child that the fetus is to become. Any State interest in the fetus would
be far better served through other means, such as education, accessiblemedicalcare,and
drugtreatmentfacilities for pregnantwomen.
14KL3:240~O69i
II. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESSUNDERTHE UNITED STATES CONSITUTION
Neither the statutory language relied upon by the prosecutor, nor the
manner in which it has previously been enforced, provided Appellantswith anything
approachingthenoticerequiredby theDueProcessClauseof theUnitedStates
Constitution. No pregnant woman could reasonably have expected that the Texas Health
& Safety Code § 48 1.122, which prohibits “Delivery of Controlled Substance or
Marihuana to [a] Child,” would be applied to her own ingestion of a controlled substance
and its consequentindirect“delivery” to her fetus. Nor couldanypregnantwoman
reasonably have expected that § 481.122 would be stretched to such an end by virtue of
the Legislature’s amendment of the Penal Code to include a fetus within the definition of
“individual” under Texas Penal Code § 1 .07(a)(26). Nothing in either of these provisions
evidences any intentionto reachprenatalconduct. To thecontrary,astheprosecutor
admits, the Legislature took pains to ensure that the expanded definition of “individual”
could not be used to prosecutepregnantwomenfor actionsthatharmtheir fetus. See
Appellee’s Brief at 8.
Moreover, Appellants were prosecuted as a result of an arbitrary decision
by a single prosecutor,baseduponwhat couldcharitablybecalleda “unique” theoryof
statutory interpretation not shared by law enforcementofficials in anyotherdistrict of
this state. This is a separate and independently fatal due process violation. See Kolender
v. Lawson,461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
15KL3:2409069 I
A. Construing§ 481.122to ReachPrenatalConduct
Would RendertheStatuteVoid for Vagueness
For thereasonsably setforth in Appellants’Brief, thestatutorylanguageat
issuehereunambiguouslyprecludesprosecutionofpregnantwomenfor delivering
controlledsubstancesto their fetuses.But evenif the prosecutor’sconstructionofthe
statutesweretenable,theseprosecutionswouldrun afoul ofthedueprocessrequirements
oftheUnited StatesConstitution.As the SupremeCourthasnoted,“[n]o onemaybe
requiredat peril of life, libertyorpropertyto speculateasto themeaningofpenal
statutes.” City ofChicagov. Morales,527U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (quotingLanzettav. New
Jersey,306 U.S.451,453 (1939)). Moreover,vaguestatutesareconstitutionally
problematicbecausetheycourttherisk ofarbitraryenforcementby delegating“basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis.” Graynedv. City ofRockford,408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A statute will be
declaredunconstitutionallyvagneasappliedwhereit either(1) fails to providethose
targeted by the statute a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, or
(2) is so indefinite that it allows arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Women‘s
Med. Cit. ofNorthwestHoustonv. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 421(5th Cir. 2001) (collecting
cases); seealso VillageofHoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, HoffmanEstates,Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982) (noting that statute is vagne if it fails to “give the person of ordinary
intelligencea reasonableopportunityto know what is prohibited”).5
It is no answerto assert,as theprosecutordoes,that thedefendantcouldhaveknownher conduct was illegal in somerespect. To the contrary, the relevant inquiry iswhetherthedefendantsreceivedadequatenoticethattheirconductviolatedthespecjflc
161(12:2409069.1
1. Nothingin § 481.122orthePenalCodeGivesReasonableNoticethata FetusWould beConsidereda “Child” for Purposesofthat Criminal Statute
TheprosecutorcontendsthattheLegislaturecriminalizedapregnant
woman’s prenatal conduct impliedly, and silently, when it enactedS.B. 319 expanding
the Penal Code definition of “legal entity” to include fetuses. Whenthe state seeks to
plow new legal ground by criminalizing conduct not ordinarily within the scope of the
penal laws, fairness requires that it do so with clarity; impliedly and silently will not pass
muster.
The language of § 481 .122 cannot fairly be read to reach delivery of
controlled substances to a fetus. As an initial matter, theprosecutordoesnot eventry to
contend that § 481.122 reached such conduct before the Legislature enactedS.B. 319 in
2003. Rather,theprosecutorrelies entirelyon thenotionthatS.B. 319somehow
expanded§ 481.122to createanewcriminal offense. But S.B.319 did nottouch §
481.122;it merelymodifiedthemeaningofthe term“individual” for purposesofthe
PenalCode.
Section481.122of theHealth& SafetyCodedoesnot usetheword
“individual.” To thecontrary,it prohibitsthedeliveryof a controlled substance to a
“person. . . who is a child.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.122(a)(l) (2004). “Child”
is in turndefinedas it isgenerallyandcommonly used: as “a person younger than 18
penalstatutein question. See,e.g.,BMWofNorth America,Inc. v. Gore, 517U.S. 559,574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudencedictatethatapersonreceivefair noticenot only oftheconductthatwill subjecthim topunishment,but alsoof theseverityofthepenaltythata Statemay impose”).
17KL3:2409069.I
years of age.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 48 1.122(d). The Texas Supreme Court has
held that the term “child” should not be construed to include fetuses unless the
Legislature has specificallyso decreed.SeeWitty v. Am. Gen.CapitalDistributors,Inc.,
727 S.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Tex. 1987).6
Whenit enacted S.B. 319, the Legislaturewascareful to exclude harmto a
fetus resulting from an action by a pregnant woman. SeeSenateComm.on State Affairs,
Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (“S .B. 319 amends the Penal Code to
allow theprosecutionofapersonwho harmsor kills anunbornchild, unlessthedeathis.
the result of an action by the mother.”); seealso Tex. PenalCode§ 19.06 (“This
chapter [relating to homicide] does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the
conduct charged is. . . conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child); Tex. Penal
Code § 22.12 (“This chapter [relating to assaults] does not apply to conduct charged as
having been committed against an individual who is an unborn child if the conduct is
committed by the mother of the unborn child.”); Tex. Penal Code § 49.12 (“Sections
49.07 and 49.08 [intoxicated assault and intoxicated manslaughter] do not apply to injury
to or the death of an unborn child if the conduct charged is conduct committed by the
mother of the unborn child). Overriding the presumption established in Witty, as the
prosecutor attempts here, would thwart the declared intention of the Legislature that
pregnant womennot be prosecuted for their prenatal conduct. In fact, the bill’s House
6 The Attorney General has handed down an opinion employing similar reasoning
for theproposition that physicians are not required by the change to the definition of“individual” in § 1.07 to reportpregnantwomenwho takedrugs for engagingin theabuse of a “child.” See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen.No. GA-0291 (2005).
18KL2:2409069I
sponsor,Rep.RobertRaymondAllen, hasstatedin a swornaffidavit that it was “not the
intentoftheLegislatureto allow prosecutionofwomenfor conduct.. . that theycommit
against their unborn child.” (Ward CR. Vol. IV, p. 1120). It defies logic to think that
theLegislature,havingspecificallysoughtto precludeprosecutionofpregnantwomen
underS.B. 319, would,at the sametime, haveintendedto enablesuchprosecutionsunder
theHealth& SafetyCode.
Indeed,theprosecutor’sown argumentsevidencethe overreachinghereat
issue.Theprosecutorsaysthat§ 481.122 “provides that a person (any person) commits
an offense if she knowingly delivers a controlled substance to a person under the age of
18 years,” and notes that “person” is defined elsewhere as any “individual, corporation,
government, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,or any legal entity.”
Appellee’s Brief at 6 (underlining provided by the prosecutor).From thesepremises,the
prosecutorreasonsthat“a very strangeinterpretationoftheterm ‘legal entity’ would be
neededif it werenow construedsoasto excludeabeingthatmaysue,beprosecutedfor,
andis otherwiseaffordedall otherprotectionsof thelaws [sic: of] this State.” Id. at 7.
But considerwherethe prosecutor’sreasoningleads.If § 481.122criminalizesthe
delivery of a controlled substance to any “legal entity.. . underthe ageof 18 years”(as
the prosecutorexpresslyparsesthe statute,id.), then somebody could properly be arrested
for delivery of controlled substance to a child for finding a vial of crack cocaine and
turning it in to a local police department that has only been in existence for ten years.
(Recall that “person” is defined to include governments, as well as corporations,
19KL3:2409069.I
partnerships,andso on.) Theprosecutionofpregnantwomenbasedon thestatuteshere
is no less absurd.
Especiallyin light ofthe Wittypresumption,aswell astheLegislature’s
expressed intent not to impact pregnant women, the term “child” as used in § 481.122 can
only rationallybeconstruedto meanhumanbeingswho are born— not governments,not
corpbrations, not fetuses — undertheageof eighteen.SeeClark v. Martinez, -- U.S. --,
125 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2005) (noting that “when deciding which of two plausible statutory
constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequencesof its choice”
and that if “one of them would raise a multitude of other constitutional problems, the
other should prevail”); cf UnitedStatesv. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[A]s a sort
of ‘junior version of the vagueness doctrine,’ the canon of strict construction of criminal
statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal
statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.” (citation omitted)).
In 1994, the Court of Appeals, El Paso Division, considered an example of
prosecutorial overreaching strikingly similar to the present case: a womanwastriedand
convicted of “reckless endangermentof achild” for takingdrugswhile pregnant.Collins
v. State,890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.— El Paso 1994). The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the law wasunconstitutionallyvagueasappliedbecausethe defendanthad
not been afforded adequate notice that she could face criminalprosecutionfor such
conduct. Id. at 898. The court explicitly rejected the state’s contention that there was
“precedent in Texas for punishing prenatal conduct.” Id. at 897. In that regard, nothing
has changed since Collins was decided. There is no new authority for thepropositionthat
201(12:24090691
a pregnant womancan be punished for her prenatal conduct. Now, as then, the Penal
Codedoesnot confer criminal liability upon womenwho take drugs while pregnant for
harmto their fetus. Indeed,if anything,theexpresslanguageof S.B.319 makesthis fact
evenclearer.
2. Nothingin § 481.122ProvidesAdequateNotice thataPregnantWoman’sAct of Takinga ControlledSubstanceWouldConstitute“Delivery” to theFetus
Theprosecutor’stheory of statutoryconstructionwould furtherrequirethis
Courtto interprettheword “delivery” to includetheinvoluntaryandnonvolitional
transferof acontrolledsubstancefrom apregnantwoman’sbloodstreamto herfetus.
Such aninterpretationis at oddswith ordinarylanguageandjudicial precedent.
In craftingtheTexasHealth& SafetyCode,the Legislaturedefined
“delivery” as“to transfer.actually or constructively,to anotheracontrolledsubstance.”
Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 481.002(8)(emphasisadded).To deliver, therefore,is to
transfer,a termthat is not definedin thestatutebut whosemeaninghasbeenconsidered
at somelengthby theTexasCourtof Criminal Appeals:
Becausebothactualandconstructivetransfersrequire,by definition, the“transfer” ofacontrolledsubstancefrom thedefendantto anotherperson,we mustexaminethemeaningoftheword “transfer.” “Transfer” is definedin Webster’sNinth New CollegiateDictionary (1988)as“a conveyanceofright, title, or interestin real orpersonalpropertyfrom onepersontoanother.”Black’s Law Dictionary(6thed. 1990)definestransferas“[a]nactof theparties. . . by whichthetitle to property is conveyedfrom onepersonto another.”It is clearto us thattheterm“transfer” plainly requiresavoluntary relinquishment ofpossession in favor of another.
Thomasv. State,832 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (emphasis added).
21KL3:2409069I
This controllingprecedentconfirmswhatordinaryspeakersofthelanguage
already know, namely, that “delivery” or “transfer” is a volitional act: onemustwant to
give up possession of the property to somebody else. Seeid. A pregnantwomancould
only besaidto “deliver” acontrolledsubstanceto herfetus if relinquishingherown
possessionof thatsubstanceandsubsequentlygiving it to herfetus washer goal.
Manifestlyit was not. Whenanaddicttakesdrugs,hergoal is to getherself not
somebodyelse,high.
Moreover,a “delivery” or “transfer” couldonly takeplaceif thefetuscould
actuallytakepossessionofthe controlledsubstance.Of course,fetusesareincapableof
possessingproperty. SeeJohnsonv. State,829 S.W. 2d 836,837 (Tex.App. — Dallas,
1992) (notingthat,to “prove unlawful possessionof a controlledsubstance,the State
must show. . . that the accusedexercisedcare,control,andmanagementoverthe
substance”).At most,thefetuscouldhaveremnantsof controlledsubstancein its
bloodstream.As amatterof law, this doesnot constitute“possession.”“[Nb Texas
court has held that a person could be held in possession of narcotics because residual of
[sic] drugs found in his or herbody.” Statev. Jackson,833 S.W.2d220,223 (Tex. App.
—Hous. l992).~
TheprosecutorarguesthatAppellant’s relianceon Jacksonis misplaced, citingState v. Nelson, 881 S.W.2d97 (Tex.App.—Houston.1994). Appellee’sBrief at 9. Inattempting to distingnish Jackson from thecaseatbar, theprosecutor contends that therewas additionalevidencethat thedefendants“possessed”drugs,aboveandbeyondthemere fact that residue of such substances was present in their bloodstreams. Id. at 9-10.However, as to the question of whether a fetus could possess drugs, its response toAppellants is beside the point. Neither Nelson nor anyotherTexascaseestablishesthat
221(1.2:2409069
The Georgia Court of Appeals embraced this logic in an analogous case,
where it reversed the conviction of a womanwho had given birth to an infant whose
blood contained trace elements of cocaine under a statute making it “unlawful for any
person to deliver or distribute anycontrolled substance.” Statev. Luster,419 S.E.2d32,
33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (internalalterationsomitted). Thecourtheldthat the defendant
hadnot receivedtherequisite“fair warning” that shecould incur criminal liability under
the statute because the “ordinary, logical and commonmeanings of [deliver and
distribute] encompass only transfers that take place between one person and another
person, outside the bodies of the persons involved.” Id. at 34. This interpretation,the
courtnoted,was“in accordwith prior judicial construction,asreportedcasesof criminal
prosecution[underthestatute]haveall involvedthe transferofcontrolledsubstancesto
anotherperson.” Id.; cf Johnsonv. State,602 So.2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting
applicationofdeliverystatuteto pregnantwoman);Peoplev. Hardy, 469N.W.2d 50, 53
(Mich. App. 1991) (same).
B. TheProsecutor’sEnforcementof~481.122AgainstAppellantsisArbitrary
Vague statutes are particularly problematic because they risk arbitrary
enforcementby delegating“basicpolicy matters to police[], judges, and juries for
resolutionon anad hocandsubjectivebasis.” Graynedv. City ofRockford,408 U.S.
104, 108-09(1972). The casesbeforethisCourtdramaticallyillustratethis danger;to the
thepresenceof asubstancein thebloodstreamcan itself constitutepossessionofthatsubstance.
231CL3:2409069.I
bestofourknowledge,only asingleprosecutorin the entireStateofTexashasattempted
to prosecutepregnantwomenunder§ 481.122. The constructionput upon “delivery” by
theprosecutorherewould expandthetermbeyondanyrationalboundaryandwould
engendertherisk of furthersucharbitraryprosecutions.
III. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES ThEIR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND DUEPROCESSUNDER THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Texascourtshaveheldthat thereis a right to privacyundertheTexas
Constitution.SeeTexasStateEmployeesUnion v. TexasDep‘t of Mental Health &
MentalRetardation,746 S.W.2d203,205 (Tex. 1987);seealso City ofShermanv.
Henry,928 S.W.2d464,468 (1996). “[T]he TexasConstitutionprotectspersonalprivacy
from unreasonableintrusion. This right to privacyshouldyield only whenthe
governmentcan demonstratethatan intrusion is reasonablywarrantedfor the
achievementofacompellinggovernmentalobjectivethatcanbeachievedby no less
intrusive,morereasonablemeans.” TexasStateEmployeesUnion, 746 S.W.2dat 205.
Similarly, theDueProcessClauseoftheTexasConstitution,like its federal
analogue, “forbid[s] penal laws thatdo not give reasonablyclearnotice,to thepublic and
to law enforcementofficials, of whatbehavioris beingcriminalized.” Fogo v. State,830
S.W.2d592, 595 (Tex.Crim. App. 1992) (enbanc)(citing, inter alia, Kolenderv.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983);Bynumv. State,767S.W.2d769(Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
A criminal statutewill beheldunconstitutionallyvagueunderTexaslaw if either(1) “it
fails to give apersonof ordinaryintelligencefair noticeof theconductprohibited;” or (2)
24K13:2409069I
it is “so indefinitethat it encouragesarbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.”Clark v.
State, 665 S.W.2d476,482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
Therefore,for thereasonssetforth in SectionsI andII above,theState’s
prosecutionofAppellantsviolatestheirrights ofprivacyanddueprocessundertheTexas
Constitutionaswell.
IV. IF § 481.122APPLIED TO PRENATAL CONDUCT,APPELLANTS’CONVICTIONS WOULD VIOLATE THE EX POSTFACTOCLAUSESOFTHE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION,AS WELL AS OFTHETEXAS CONSTITUTION
TheUnited StatesConstitutionforbids ex postfactolaws. SeeU.S. Const.
art. 1, § § 9 cI. 3, 10 el. 1. “[T]he original understandingofthe [ex postfactoclauseis
that] legislaturesmaynot retroactivelyalter the definition of crimesor increasethe
punishmentfor criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood,497U.S.37,43 (1990). If a
judicial constructionof acriminal statuteis “unexpectedandindefensibleby referenceto
thelaw whichhadbeenexpressedprior to the conductin issue,”it mustnot begiven
retroactiveeffect. Bouiev. City ofColumbia,378U.S. 347,354(1964); Collins,497
U.S. at 42.
Theholdingproposedby theprosecutorcreatesanunforeseeablejudicial
enlargementof acriminal statute. Bouie,378 U.S. at 353;Rosev. Locke,423U.S. 48
(1975). It restson thecontentionthat theLegislaturecriminalizedapregnantmother’s
prenatal conduct by virtue ofthe interactionof statutesspanningseparatesectionsof the
Texaslegal code. Moreover,on informationandbelief no othercountyis prosecuting
pregnantwomenon thisbasis,andthe fact thatall but oneofthe statesto consider
251(0:2409069.I
whether pregnant womencan beprosecutedfor prenatalconducthaveresolvedthe issue
in the negative,seeAppellants’ Br. at 30-31. Accordingly, even if theCourt accepts the
prosecutor’sargumentthat S.B. 3 19 haspermissiblyexpanded§ 481.122to reachuseof
controlledsubstancesby pregnantwomen,criminal penaltieson thatbasisshouldbe
imposed only on future conduct, andAppellants’convictionsshouldbereversed.
Likewise,the TexasConstitutionalsoforbidsex postfactolaws. SeeTex.
Const. art. I, § 16. TheTexasCourt ofCriminal Appeals has adopted the Collins
standard in interpreting the term ex post facto in the Texas Constitution. Spellingv.
State, 825 S.W.2d533,536 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 1992);ExparteRobinson,792
S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore,Appellants’ convictionsviolatethe
ex postfactoclauseoftheTexasConstitutionaswell.
261(1.3:2409069.1
PRAYER
As amicuscuriae,werespectfullyrequestthat thisCourtgive consideration
to the issues discussed above and reverse the convictions of Tracy Yolanda Ward and
RhondaTulaneSmith, renderjudgmentsofacquittal,andprohibit the Statefrom further
prosecutionsofthis kind.
Dated:Amarillo, TexasApril 18, 2005
Respectfullysubmitted,
LYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P.
By:________E war asonDennis(No. 24045776)
750 North St. Paul Street,Suite 1400Dallas,TX 75210Phone: (214) 981-3800Fax: (214) 981-3839
KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS& FRANKEL,LLP
/By: ~ ~\
GregoryA. iSio<vitzPatriciaA. SeithIlyssaB. Sena
1177 Avenue of the AmericasNew York, NY 10036Phone: (212) 715-9100Fax: (212) 715-8000
Attorneysfor AmicusCuriaeAmericanCivil Liberties
Union andAmericanCivil Liberty Union ofTexas
* Pursuantto Rule 11 oftheTexasRulesofAppellateProcedure,theACLU, Lynn
Tillotson & Pinker,L.L.P. andKramerLevin Naftalis & Frankelcertify thatno feeswere
paidor will bepaid in connectionwith thepreparationof thisbriefof amicuscuriae.
—27—1(0:2406101.14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersignedherebycertifiesthat atrue and correctcopy ofthe aboveand foregoingdocument has been served asshownbelowon this the 18th dayofApril, 2005:
Via First ClassMailJoeMorganDawson801 S. Fillmore, Suite210Amarillo, Texas 79101Attorneysfor Appellants.
Via First ClassMailLarry CunninghamAssistantProfessorof Law &Director,TexasTechCriminal JusticeClinicTexasTechUniversitySchoolof Law1802HartfordAvenueLubbock,Texas79409-0004Attorneysfor Appellants
Via First ClassMailRichardMartindaleAssistantDistrict AttorneyDistrict Attorneyfor the
47th District
501 SouthFillmore,Suite5-AAmarillo, Texas79101Attorneysfor TheStateofTexas
Via First ClassMailJeffBlackburn1304TexasAvenueLubbock,Texas79401Attorneys for Amicus Curiae