Missing

18 Director of Lands v IAC Abdon

1. Collado v CA (online)

FACTS:Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan[footnoteRef:1], stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. About a year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined (petitioners). [1: Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands]

The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application.ISSUES:2. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-in-interest[footnoteRef:2] as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes. [2: Sesinando Leyva]

The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land application. It is also not within any government reservation.Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation.Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is part of the excluded town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and disposable.3. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had become final and executor and is no longer available because of res judicata. The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case, which involves private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction because the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.

Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not alienable and disposable.4. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:Petition is DENIED.1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141[footnoteRef:3] (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 1942[footnoteRef:4] and PD 1073[footnoteRef:5] (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State. [3: Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894.] [4: A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.] [5: Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.]

Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR coverage.The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collados application attached a technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties.The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.

5. Legarda v Saleeby

CONSUELO LEGARDA and MAURO PRIETO vs. N.M. SALEEBYG.R. No. L-8936 2 October 1915 Johnson

FACTS- Legarda and husband Prieto (plaintiffs-appellants) and Saleeby (defendant-appellee) occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila, between which is a stone wall.- 2 March 1906 the plaintiffs filed a petition for the registration of their lot with the Court of Land Registration (CLR), which eventually granted the same on 25 October 1906 and ordered the issuance of an original certificate of title (OCT) under the Torrens system. The said registration and certificate included the wall and the land it occupied.- Teus, the predecessor of the defendant, filed a petition for the registration of his lot with the CLR, and on 25 March 1912, the court decreed the said registration and issued an OCT under the Torrens system. Both also included the wall and the land it occupied. - 13 December 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall was included in the defendants OCT and immediately filed a petition in the CLR for the correction of the error.- The CLR denied the petition on the theory that during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.ISSUES(1) Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? - Plaintiffs(2) W/N the defendant could be considered an innocent purchaser protected by certain provisions of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) NoHELD/RATIO(1) The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it cannot be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens system is judicial. It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.- Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the Torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.- The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title, then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them.- The appellee was the first negligent in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.(2) Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses that the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties who are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." Persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.- Said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. The phrase "innocent purchaser should not be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in no sense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. Teus cannot even be regarded as the holder in good faith of that part of the land included in the certificate of the appellants. - The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.TRENT, dissenting:- Such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption of the so-called Torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.x x x one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the Torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered. x x x I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings.The judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.

6. FELDA ALBIENDA, petitioner, -versus- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELES SUMAGPAO and RUBEN SUMAGPAO, respondents.

Facts:

1. The spouses Ruben Sumampao and Angeles Sumampao, were applicants for a free patent over a piece of the land designated as Lot No. 1548, Pls-67, situated in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

2. Respondents instituted in the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur an action against Albienda for correction of the latter's certificate of title, TCT No. T-1718, and for recovery of possession of said portion of the land, with damages.

3. The complaint alleged that respondents acquired Lot 1548 under a deed of sale dated November 11, 1968 executed in their favor by Antonio Baldonase; that sometime in 1973, petitioner Albienda, claiming ownership over the adjoining land designated as Lot No. 1550, took possession not only of said Lot 1550, but also usurped a portion of eight [8] hectares of Lot 1548 belonging to respondents; and that despite repeated demands, refused to vacate said portion and to restore possession thereof to respondents.

4. Petitioner averred that Lot 1550, containing an area of 196,848 square meters, originally belonged to Enesaria Goma, in whose name the same was registered under the Torrens System on July 23, 1958; and later petitioner acquired the same for value in good faith; that upon registration of the deed of sale executed in favor of petitioner, the latter was issued TCT No. T-1718 covering Lot 1550 with an area of 196,848 square meters, which is the same area stated in the certificates of title of petitioner's aforenamed predecessors-in-interest.

5. Petitioner alleged that even granting arguendo that the technical description appearing in her certificate of title was erroneous, the action for correction thereof and for reconveyance of the disputed property was unavailable, as more than one year had elapsed since the issuance of the original certificate of title in 1958.

6. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents Sumampaos

Issue: Whether or not the description of a parcel of land in the petitioner's certificate of title may be corrected to conform with the technical description appearing in the "survey return" on file in the Bureau of Lands, notwithstanding the lapse of more than one (1) year since the issuance of said certificate of title.

Held:

3. No. Such is contrary to the settled principles aplicable to the Torrens System of land recording.

4. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title except claims which were noted in the certificate at the time of registration, or which may have arisen subsequent thereto.

5. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act: "Every decree of registration shag bind the land, and quiet title thereto ... it shall be conclusive upon and against all persons . . . whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citations, or included in the general description 'To All Whom It May Concern.' " When the decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, and such petition can prosper only if no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest in the land. Said Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration of the said term of one [1] year every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible."

6. The original certificate of title covering Lot 1550 was issued on July 23, 1958 in favor of Enesaria Goma. The fact that sometime in October 1958 Loida Baterbonia (one of the subsequent owners) had written the Director of Lands for a recomputation of the area set forth in the certificate of the said land is of no moment, for up until the sale of Lot 1550 to petitioner in 1972, no action had been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction to correct the error, if indeed there was such error.

7. The instant action to correct the certificate of title in question was filed 19 years after the issuance of said certificate of title. The period allowed by law for setting aside the decree of registration of a certificate of title-had long elapsed, the original certificate of title issued in the name of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest had become indefeasible. The Transfer Certificate of Title derived therefrom is likewise unassailable, for under Section 39 of Act 496, "every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same be free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate."

8. Every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige them to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

7. Capitol Subdivision v Province of Negros

FACTS:

Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued.

It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.

HELD:

The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Banks knowledge and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

8. Traders v CA

FACTS:

1. Maximo and Patria Capay executed a mortgage in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former.2. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the present dispute3. The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.4. A petition was filed before CFI of Rizal alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. This was initially granted5. On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays certificate of title.6. The injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the same day.7. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272,[2] was entered in the banks name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name of TRB.8. The Capayas filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the property with damages and attorneys fees.9. The CFI declared that the mortgage was void.10. This was appealed with the CA11. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774,[3] was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.12. The CA ruled in favor of Capayas13. For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court[6] was denied in a Resolution dated September 12,1983.

ISSUE: WoN the title of the nonbank respondent can be questioned? NO

HELD: When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title of their respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands. The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. SECOND: The foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the properties and inquired from the Register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the property they were purchasing-an exercise of diligence above that required by law. THIRD between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not annotated in TRBs title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the banks name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption.

9. Hermoso v CA

HERMOSO, vs. CAFACTS: The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots form part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia. Since 1978, petitioner, Laureno Hermoso and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On July 4, 1995, the DAR issued an order granting the petition. The DAR was directed to issue emancipation patents in their favour after a parcellary mapping has been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands over the subject landholdings.Banag filed before the DAR an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion. Respondents, Heirs of Francia, filed an MR. They claimed that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes in an Order dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land. On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Orderaffirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of Banag. The Office of the President denied respondents appeal.Respondents then filed with the CA. They maintained that P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as early as October 14, 1978.On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision which reversed the O.P.s decision putting the land under the coverage of P.D. No. 27.ISSUE: Whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.Petitioners argument: The S.C. decision, which has become final and executorY, declared him a tenant of the landholding in question, in effect, the subject lots are considered as agricultural lands and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Respondents argument: The lands were already declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.HELD: Lots are NOT covered by P.D. No. 27.RATIO:1. For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.2. the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. TheY were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. 4. The subject properties are strategically located in the urban center of the town of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing developed and occupied residential subdivisions and even low cost housing projects subsidized by funds from government financial institution. Likewise, there are also industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the National Planning Commissions report.5. Lands not devoted to agricultural activity and those that were previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the CARL. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."7. It is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.LTD NOTES:Section 3, Article XIIof the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types:primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.23Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988, explicitly provides:Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991states:SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned x x x

10. Chavez v NHA

Chavez v. NHA (2007)Doctrines: Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are owned by the State and they cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Facts:On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40 hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land to NHA.On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.Issues:. W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain (Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with PEA).. W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required (Chavez claims that they were not).. W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain (Chavez claims that there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable).. W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did not undergo public bidding but by negotiated contract.. W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain. Held/Ratio:1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that it has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact, EO 525 provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken by a national government agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land.There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation project:a. approval by the President;b. favorable recommendation of PEA; andc. undertaken by any of the ff:i. PEAii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEAiii. the National government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA.

Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3 requirements:a. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued Proclamations approving and implementing the reclamation of lands.b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase from PEA. This is shown in the fact that PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Project.c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency authorized to reclaim lands under its charter and other laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly mention reclamation in any of its listed powers, such power is implied since it is vital or incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land reform and housing program. 2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not and whether they should be classified as alienable and disposable.

In this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to implement the project), the required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification of the reclamation project.

3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and disposition of the NHA) and 465 (increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands to qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.

4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of their titles to the NHA, the latter can therefore legally transfer them to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer without any bidding. Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.

5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this case, RBI is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of its shares.

11. Republic v CA

April 10, 1989 | Melenchio-Herrera, J

FACTS:1. in 1941, the late Nicolas Felisilda was assigned a Farmlot and Homelot, both situated in Polomolok, South Cotabato; a Certificate of Permanent Assignment of said lots was issued to him 2. 1960, Nicolas Felisilda filed Free Patent Application for the Disputed Property with the Bureau of Lands1. It was only sometime in 1963, or after the death of Nicolas Felisilda, when Lands Inspector Cejas acted upon said application and processed it, after Felisilda's widow, Catalina sought his help 3. October 1963 a Notice of Application for Free Patent was released by the Bureau of Lands1. Inspector Cejas submitted a Certification to the Director of Lands that upon ocular inspection of the land, he found that the applicant had been in continuous occupation and cultivation thereof since 1941; that the applicant "is still living"; that it was free from claims and conflicts at the time of inspection; and recommending that patent be issued to the applicant 4. April 1967 Free Patent was issued to Nicolas Felisilda followed by the issuance of the corresponding OCT which was subsequently cancelled and TCT was issued in the name of the Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda 5. June 1972, Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda sold a portion to Manuel Serranillo, and 2 hectares to Francisco Laiz or the totality of the area covered by the Free Patent1. TCTs were issued to Serranillo and Laiz; Serranillo subdivided the area and was issued 307 TCTs6. If the Deeds of Sale of 14 June 1972 to Serranillo and Laiz are to be taken at their face value, the Disputed Property was sold beyond the prohibitory period of 5 years from the issuance of the Free Patent on 14 April 19671. RP: as early as 1970, the Heirs had already alienated portions of the land to Serranillo and Laiz except that the formal contracts were not executed until 19722. even on September 1970 and April 1971, Serranillo had executed acts of ownership by entering into notarized contracts to sell portions 7. November 1972, a Protest entitled"Sta. Cruz Homeowners Association Inc., Occupant-Claimant-Protestant, vs. Heirs of the late Nicolas Felisilda"was filed with the Bureau of Lands 1. protestants were the actual occupants of the controverted land2. Free Patent Application had been falsified, the patentee having died in 19623. land in question had been sold to other parties before the expiration of 5 years8. Director of Lands ordered the investigation of the Protest1. As recommended by Land Inspector del Rosario, Director of Lands declared the Free Patent granted to Nicolas Felisilda was null and void as it had been fraudulently issued9. the widow, Catalina and Land Inspector Cejas were jointly indicted for Falsification of Public Document; both were absolved10. 1980, the Republic, as petitioner, filed a Complaint for cancellation of Free Patent, the OCT and TCTs with the CFI General Santos City 1. Application for Free Patent and the Notice of Application for Free Patent were accomplished after the death of the applicant Nicolas Felisilda, in violation of Section 91 of the Public Land Law; and that the land was sold within the prohibitory period of 5years contrary to Section 118 of the same law11. defendants denied the commission of any fraud stating that the application had been flied by Nicolas Felisilda during his lifetime but was acted on officially only after his death1. majority of the protestants were mere lessees while the rest had entered the land later as plain squatters12. CFI dismissed the Complaint

ISSUE: WoN the free patent and OCT issued to Felisilda and the derivative TCTs be cancelled (YES) --WoN there was falsification (NO)--WoN the lands were disposed of during the prohibitory period of 5 years (YES)

HELD: CA reversed, cancel the Free Patent, and OCT issued to Nicolas Felisilda, TCT together with all the 307 derivative titles issued in favor of Serranillo and the TCT issued in favor of Franscisco Laiz; lands ordered reverted to the mass of the public domain

The Issue of FalsificationOSG: although Nicolas Felisilda died on 10 October 1962, the Application for Free Patent was filed on 11 October 1963 and somebody appeared before the Lands Inspector attesting to the truth of the fact that notices regarding his filing of an application had been posted at the required places

SC: not persuaded that falsification attended the filing of the Application for Free Patent in a Second Indorsement of the District Land Office, dated 11 July 1973, its Officer, it stated that the lot was applied for by Nicolas Felisilda under Free Patent, on 11 October 1960 that was during his lifetime. The Application was not acted on, however, until much later. While inefficiency was apparent, it cannot be equated with irregularity for, pursuant to Section 105 of the Public Land Law,the heirs of an applicant are entitled to have the Patent issued to them if they show compliance with requirements. They are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of their predecessor-in-interest who, in this case, had perfected his rights as a settler prior to his death

Authority of Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands. The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public Land Act prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such his investigation despite the existence of a Torrens title

Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of title under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a title issued on the basis of a Free Patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. That indefeasibility, however, is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title. And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the Goverment is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State (Article 1108, Civil Code)

Barter and sale of the land in 1970 Section 118 of the Public Land Actprovides that lands acquired under Free Patent shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent. barely 3 years after its issuance, or in 1970, Catalina had bartered a portion thereof with Serranillo, as she herself had declared in the investigation proceedings after respondent Serranillo had acquired the property, he caused the same to be subdivided into small lots; September and November 1970, he sold some portions. Felisilda's widow had disposed of the land within the prohibitory period because as she herself stated she needed money to finance her medical expenses The purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is to preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the public land which the State has gratuitously given to them. Deeds of Sale on June. 1972 in favor of Serranillo and Laiz cannot overcome the fact that as early as 1970, Serranillo was already exercising acts of ownership over the land. They were evidently merely confirmatory documents designed to circumvent the prohibition.

Reversion AllowedPublic Land Act, Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections 118, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvement to the State.

12. Bureau of Forestry v CAFACTS:In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years. The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands, with an area of approximately 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland Block.

In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title. Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the PFC.

In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland Block, petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands.

ISSUE:WON the classification of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court. NO

HELD:Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and certified as such by the Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain but the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

13. Heirs of Amunategui v Director of Forestry

Facts

There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of the private person.

Held:

The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.

14. Averia v Caguioa

G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986

FACTS:1. petitioner opposed the registration of a deed of sale on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. But he refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Sec. 112 of Act 496, the "Land Registration Act." 2. The respondent court then held the hearingex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein.3. In the oppositors petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under LRA Sec. 112.The petitioner citesFojas as v. Grey, where the SC declared that:In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under LRA Sec. 112. it has been held that summary relief under LRA Sec. 112. can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs.

Issue: whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.

HELD: YES but still a new trial should be conducted at which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity to be heard because the lower court arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.

Ratio: Fojas vs. Grey was a correct interpretation of Sec. 112, however, it is not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979. In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:SEC. 2.Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." Consequently, the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

15. Malabanan v Republic

Facts:1. Mario Malabanan applied for the registration of 71,324 sq. meters of land.2. He claims that he bought the land from Eduardo Velazco who also claims that his great grandfather owned the land3. Malabanan submitted a certification from DENR CENRO stating that the land is alienable and disposable in 19824. The prosecutor did not oppose the registration.5. RTC granted Malabanans request for registration. 6. Republic interposed an appeal claiming that Malabanan did not adhere to the requirement of time required by the law and the he failed to prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land. 7. CA ruled in favor of the republic reasoning that the possession of the land before it is declared alienable and disposable cannot be included in the computation of possession of the land, thus Malabanan did not adhere to the period requirement of the law.

Issue/Held:1. Can the heirs of Malabanan register the land? NO

ARGUMENTS: Petitioner: 1) 14(1): With respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of alienable property as disposable may be counted in computing the period of possession. (Naguit Doctrine)

2) 14(2): possession of the land for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, regardless of its classification. So long as during the time of application, it is classified alienable and disposable.

OSG: 1) The land should have been declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945. (Herbieto Doctrine)

2) 14(2): 14(2) speakes of private lands. The Court has yet to decide a case that presented 14(2) as a ground for application. Assuming that the 30 year period can run against public land, the period only runs after the land has been declared alienable and diposable.

COURT:

1) 14(1): 14(1) of CA 141 is virtually the same as 48(b) of PD 1529. 48(b) is more descriptive in nature of the right enjoyed by a possessor. 14(1) seems to presume the pre-existence of a right. If the position of OSG is to be followed that the land has to be declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945, then all lands not classified as alienable and disposable AFTER June 12, 1945 cannot be registered. As explained in Naguit, it is sufficient that the land is declared alienable and disposable at the time that it is registered. Hebierto Doctrine is indeed obiter dictum.

2) 14(2): 14(2) provides the registration of land whose possession is after June 12, 1945. It involves application of those who acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of the existing law.

The law mentioned in the provision refers to the Civil Code. Under the CC, prescriptive acquisition may be ordinary or extra ordinary. It is therefore proper to refer to CC on the provisions of property.

Artcle 422 is controlling in the conversion of the land of public dominion to patrimonial property. It is only when a land becomes patrimonial that it becomes susceptible to prescription. There must be an express declaration by the State that an alienable and disposable land is no longer intended for public service. It is only after such express declaration that the period may begin to run.

CONCLUSION: 14(2) applies to the case at bar. Possesion of the land is traced back to 1948. Since the land in question has no express declaration of being patrimonial, Malabanan failed to adhere to the period as required by law.

16. Republic v Rizalvo REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,

FACTS:

Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed with MTC of Bauang, La Union (as a land registration court), an application for the registration of a lot in Bauang, La Union RIZALVOs allegations: hes the owner in fee simple he obtained title over the land via a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962 he is currently in possession of the land. He presented: Tax Declaration No. 222066-1994 in his name Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application OSG filed an Opposition: neither Rizalvo nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition There was no private oppositor so MTC: issued Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines and entered the same in the records of the case. At the trial, Rizalvo testified that He acquired the subject property by purchase from his mother, Bibiana (Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962). He was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property No one was questioning his ownership over the land He was the one paying the real property tax (bundle of ORs covering the period of 1953 to 2000) He was the one who had the property surveyed( no one opposed the survey and they placed concrete markers on the boundaries of the property during such He was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mothers ownership and possession of the subject property Bibiana testified that: She bought the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, (Absolute Deed of Sale of July 8, 1952) Before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner of the subject property and was in possession thereof, without anyone questioning her status as owner. She was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she even installed improvements on the subject property After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report w/c certified that lot was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the Rizalvo was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land. In contrast, OSG did not present any evidence. MTC: approved the application and ordered the adjudication and registration of the land to Rizalvo CA: Affirmed MTC

ISSUE: W/N Rizalvo and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the manner and length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title? NOOOO.

HELD:

Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of PD 152918 or the Property Registration Decree. SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.x x x xApplicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish the ff:FIRST, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain: (SATISFIED)

CENRO certification and report states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone since January 21, 1987----- a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the classification of the land described, in the absence of contradictory evidence. Both constitute a positive government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. (The classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government)

SECOND, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same (SATISFIED)

There was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon absent any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts

THIRD, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (FAILED)

Rizalvos oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 (1948 Deed, 1948 Tax Declarations and the Real property tax receipts from 1952) are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession BUT, they lack proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

QUESTION: will possession of the subject land since 1948, entitle Rizalvo to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529? NOOOOO.

An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. (Civil Code and jurisprudence)PRESCRIPTION is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.

SO: Rizalvo would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. HOWEVER: based on JURISPRUDENCE, thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)32, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. period of acquisitive prescription can only begin to run from such declaration (be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law)

CENRO certification and report is not enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). No evidence indicates any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. SO: no basis for the application of the 30 year prescriptive period.

Even if the CENRO certi was considered as an express declaration required, Rizalvos still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere 13 years after and far short of the required 30.

States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice is still constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law.

Dispositive: REVERSED CA AND TC. Denied application for registration.

16. Republic v Metro Index Realty and Development Co. (Reyes, J, 2012)

Doctrine: Lands declared alienable and disposable are not necessarily patrimonial properties and only patrimonial properties may be subject of a claim of imperfect title by prescription.

Action: judicial confirmation of title.Land: 3 parcels of land in Brgy Alulod/Mataas na Lupa, Indang Cavite with a total area of 39,490 sqm.Applicant: Metro Index Corp.

Metro index presented two witnesses. Enrico Dimayuga (Metro's Project Documentation Officer) and Herminia Sicap-Fojas.

Enrico testified that Metro bought the land from Herminia, Melinda, and Hernando Sicap, the lands have been declared for taxation in Metro's name since 2006, the DENR certified that the lands are disposable and alienable. there are no adverse claims to Metro's application that Metro and the Sicaps have possessed the properties for more than 50 years

Herminia testified that she and her siblings inherited the land from their parents their parents possessed the land since 1956 (shown by taxdec) they had cultivated the land since they inherited it and paid taxes thereon lands are planted with cocount, banana, santol, palay, and corn

RTC granted the application because land was alienable and disposable and not w/in any military or naval reservation, and possession had been open, continuous, notorious and adverse to the whole world.

CA denied Republic's appeal saying trees and taxdecs substantiate the claim of possession.

ISSUE: WON Metro is entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under PD 1529.

HELD: NO.

Metro likely basis its imperfect title and its application on Section 14(2) of PD 1529.

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

But properties under public dominion are not susceptible to prescription. Only properties of the State that are no longer earmarked for public use, otherwise known as patrimonial, may be acquired by prescription. For properties not declared as patrimonial, prescription does not run against the State.

The SC finds no evidence of such official declaration and for such reason alone, the application should have been dismissed outright.

The premise of the lower courts that public land, once declared alienable and disposable, can be acquired by prescription is erroneous. These lands are not necessarily patrimonial.

Plus, tax declarations merely infer possession. The CA should not have settled with them as proof of possession, it should have required further proof of possession and cultivation. Too few trees are planted; there was only casual cultivation which does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.

17. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v Ebio

Paranaque vs Ebio

Villarama Jr., J.

Facts:

Mario Ebio and his heirs claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land in Batangay Vitalez, Paranaque which was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. They assert that the original owner of the land was Jose Vitalez who gave it to his son Pedro way back in 1930. Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot

Pedro had a daughter who married Mario Ebio. Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. In 1964 and in 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits for the construction of their house within the property.

In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek, traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.

Several conferences were held between the Barangay and the affected residents but no agreement was reached. The respondents received a letter ordering them to vacate the area. Respondents went to the RTC and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction.

RTC: denied, Respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.

CA: reversed RTC, the subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants.

Petitioners argument: since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain.

Respondents argument: They have been in possession of the land since 1930 and have acquired title through acquisitive prescription.

Issue: 1.)Whether the subject lot is available for acquisitive prescription YES.2.)Whether the respondents have acquired title through acquisitive prescription. YES.

Held.Issue #1 the lot is available or acquisitive prescription.

The subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

It is explicit from the provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

Issue #2 Respondents have acquired title through acquisitive prescription.

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. Respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

18. Director of Lands v Abairo

Makasiar, 1979.

FACTS:

1. On March 1, 1971, respondent Lilia Abairo filed an application for registration under the Land Registration Act of a parcel of land containing an area of about 573 square meters situated in Centro, Cauayan, Isabela, alleging open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owner by herself and through her predecessors-in- interest since time immemorial up to the present. 2. On the initial hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the petition for registration except the assitant provincial fiscal who entered his opposition in behalf of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry. However, the Asst Prov Fiscal but who subsequently withdrew his opposition on the ground that there was a new law extending the period for filing registration petitions up to 1976. The fiscal also submitted a report of the Director of Lands to the effect thathe is withdrawing his opposition.The fiscal likewise submitted a letter from the Bureau of Forestry showing that it hasno opposition to the application for registration of title. 3. The CFI confirmed the ownership of Abairo over the said parcels of land. 4. The Solicitor General filed an MR against the decision, on the ground that respondent Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of title as it was filed on March 1, 1971, after December 31, 1968, the date set by R.A. No. 2061 as the time limit for the judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles like that of applicant, and before the effectivity on June 19, 1971, of R.A. No. 6236 extending the time limit for such purpose.5. The CFI denied the MR, which denial is now the subject of this case before the SC.

Issue: WON Abairo has filed the peititon for registrtion within the period set by RA 2061 as amended by RA 6236? YES.

RATIO:

4. R.A. No. 6236, enacted on June 19, 1971, further amended Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 (which was previously amended by R.A. No. 2061) by extending to December 31, 1976 the time limit for the filing of applications for the judical confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.5. It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their titles atany time prior to the cutoff date of December 31, 1976(as provided for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even if such application were filed during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971, like the application of respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1, 1971.6. Moreover, the application which private respondent filed on March 1, 1971, could be considered as re-filed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6236 on June 19, 1971, less than four months thereafter.7. Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing such applications time and time again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the citizenry.

19. Director of Land v DanoJ. Melencio-Herrera | February 21, 1980

DOCTRINE(S): Time limitation for filing a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title as stated in CA 141 must be raised in an MTD or an answer at the first instance. It is not a jurisdictional issue and is subject to waiver if not pleaded in an answer or MTD. The intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway as possible to applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident from the statutory history of section 47 of the Public Land Act.

FACTS: Ida Dano, representing the heirs of Francisco Dano, filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land in Misamis Occidental, praying in case the land may not be registered as private land, she requests that her imperfect or incomplete title to the property may be confirmed in favor of the heirs of Francisco Dano. Petitioner opposed the application because the land sought to be registered is foreshore land which is part of the public domain and hence cannot be the subject of private ownership. The lower court decided in favor of Dano on the basis of open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and notorious possession dating back to more than 30 years.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue that respondent filed her application for registration beyond the time prescribed in Sec. 45 and 47 in of CA 141, which said the application was not to extend beyond December 31, 1968 (she filed the application January 8, 1969). The Misamis CFI denied the MR on the basis of Rule 9.2 of the ROC (defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Motion to Dismiss or the Answer are deemed waived) and the doctrine in Vicente v. Lucas (where the defendants never pleaded the statute of limitations they are deemed to have waived it and it is error for the lower court to dismiss the proceeding on that ground).

Petitioner filed a second MR arguing the issue is jurisdictional and can henceforth be raised at any stage in the proceeding, though this 2nd MR was denied. The CFI held the date prescribed in Secs. 45 and 47 of CA 141 is not jurisdictional but a limitation to file an application. It upheld its earlier decision.

ISSUE(S):Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for registration of land past the deadline set in CA 141 (YES, because the period indicated in Sec. 47 is a time limitation petitioner did not aver in his answer, and because the intent of the law was to give as much leeway as possible to applicants of judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.)

1. The period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act CA 141, as amended, is not jurisdictional but is more of a time limitation. It is a defense or objection which should have been set up either in a Motion to Dismiss or in an Answer. Since petitioner had never pleaded the statue of limitations, he is deemed to have waived the same.2. The defense of prescription cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal. Petitioner raised that issue for the first time only in his MR.3. Even bearing in mind that prescription does not run against the State (Art 1108 (4), Civil Code) and the rights of the State may not be waived by mistakes of officers entrusted with the exercise of such rights, the intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway as possible to applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident from the statutory history of section 47 of the Public Land Act. a. In the original text, the time limitation was not to extend beyond December 31, 1938. b. An amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act 292, section 2, approved on June 9, 1938, extended the expiry date to December 31, 1941. c. Subsequently, section 1 of Republic Act No. 1011, approved on June 2, 1947, further extended the time limit to December 31, 1957. Republic Act No. 2061, approved on June 13, 1958, again prolonged the period to December 31, 1968. d. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6236, appr