World War II: Normandy

Lesson 26

ID & SIG:

• airborne forces, amphibious forces, coalition warfare, Cobra, Eisenhower, mass, Montgomery, objective, Rommel, Runstedt, surprise

Early Planning• In Sept 1941, British Prime

Minister Churchill ordered his planners to, “prepare for the invasion of Europe… You must devise and design the appliances, the landing craft, and the technique… The whole of the South Coast of England is a bastion of defense against the invasion of Hitler; you’ve got to turn it into the springboard for your attack.”

• The British drafted a proposal, code named Roundup, for an attack across the English Channel

Early Planning• The Americans developed a

proposal, code named Bolero, for the establishment in Britain of a million man force trained and equipped for an invasion tentatively scheduled for 1943

• In the meantime however, both the Americans and British agreed that the Allies should concentrate on wearing down Germany’s resistance through air attacks, operations along the North African coast, and assistance to the Soviet Union

Winston Churchill observed, “Sometimes I think the whole war depends on some damned thing called an LST.”

Early Planning• At a series of conferences–

Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, and Tehran– the Allies honed their strategy

• It soon became apparent however that there was a difference of opinion about this idea of wearing down German resistance– The British favored a

peripheral strategy while the Americans thought the proper course was a direct assault that would mass the Allied resources

Some Reasons for the Differences• Americans

– Had vast resources available

– Had suffered relatively few casualties in World War I

– Had not suffered the disaster at Dunkirk in World War II

• British– Had lost an entire

generation in World War I– Had conducted amphibious

peripheral operations, albeit unsuccessfully, at Gallipoli in World War I

– Had already borne heavy losses in World War II, including at Dieppe

– Churchill cautioned that, if conducted prematurely, the channel would be “choked with the bodies of the flower of American and British manhood”

Result

• Although the British agreed in principle to the cross-channel invasion they nonetheless shifted resources away from the project; first to North Africa and then to Italy

• Without the necessary landing craft, ships, and planes for a cross-channel attack, the Americans had no choice but to go along

• Pressure from Stalin to open up a second front gave the Americans additional leverage

Eisenhower• One of the tangible ways to

show Stalin progress was being made on the invasion planning was to appoint a supreme commander

• By this point in the war, the American contribution had surpassed the British one, so the post would go to an American

• George Marshall was strongly considered but Roosevelt felt Marshall’s presence in Washington to be critical so Dwight Eisenhower got the job

As Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was credited by Churchill as being the “organizer of victory”

Unity of Command

• To accommodate British sensitivities, Eisenhower selected his principal commanders from the British– Tedder (British)

• Deputy– Ramsey (British)

• Naval – Leigh-Mallory (British)

• Air – Bradley (US) and

Montgomery (British)• Ground

Unity of Command: German Defenses

• Debate between Rundstedt and Rommel over whether to deny the initial landing on the beaches or to destroy them with strong, mobile counter attack forces

RommelRundstedt

German Defenses: Rommel’s Plan

• Rommel was appointed commander of Army Group B in 1943– Began to reinforce

the Atlantic Wall in order to immediately and absolutely defeat any Allied landings

Weakness of Rommel’s Plan

• Atlantic Wall had no true depth to its defenses

• An enemy force that breached the thin Atlantic Wall would face no further fortified positions of significance

German Defenses

German Defenses: Rundstedt’s Plan

• Rundstedt, the overall commander in the west, placed great reliance on mechanized reserves that could respond quickly and flexibly to an enemy penetration – He stationed a newly created

armored command, Panzer Group West, near Paris

– From there, the force could move toward the site of an enemy assault in either Pas de Calais or Normandy

Weakness of Rundstedt’s Plan

• Rundstedt lacked the authority he needed– Hitler exercised direct control over

Rundstedt’s forces– The navy commanded most of the

coastal artillery that would be called upon to repel an Allied attack.

– The air force controlled the bulk of the antiaircraft and parachute units stationed in the region.

– Some armor units also came under the administrative supervision of the SS which answered first to Hitler and Berlin rather than to its supposed commanders in the field.

Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair” Headquarters in Gierłoż

German Defenses: Compromise

• Rundstedt and Rommel couldn’t settle their disagreement over which defensive strategy was best so they compromised and combined the two plans

• This resulted in the worst of both– Beach defenses not strong

enough to stop landing; reserves not strong enough to destroy the beachhead

Rommel inspecting the beach defenses

Operation Overlord

• At the Trident Conference the Allies had agreed to plan for a cross-channel invasion in May 1944

• The planners rejected Pas de Calais as being too obvious a choice and instead selected Normandy

• However they would mount a significant deception campaign to convince the Germans Pas de Calais was the intended landing site

Surprise• “… it is more effective to find out what the

enemy is predisposed to believe and to reinforce those beliefs while at the same time altering your plans to take advantage of these reinforced false beliefs.” (John Chomeau) – Fictitious army– Inflatable tanks– Targets– Ultra– Weather

Surprise: Fictitious Army• By spurious radio transmissions,

the Allies created an entire phantom army, “based” in southeast England (opposite Pas de Calais) and alleged to be commanded by Patton. – In addition, on the night of the

invasion itself, airborne radar deception presented to German radar stations a “phantom” picture of an invasion fleet crossing the Channel narrows, while a radar blackout disguised the real transit to Normandy.

Inflatable Tanks

Surprise: Ultra

• At the same time, through the top-secret Ultra operation, the Allies were able to decode encrypted German transmissions, thus providing the Overlord forces with a clear picture of where the German counterattack forces were deployed.

Surprise: Targets

• The air campaign was designed not only to disrupt German anti-invasion preparations but also to serve as a deception operation. – Two-thirds of the bombs were dropped outside

the invasion area, in an attempt to persuade the enemy that the landings would be made northeast of the Seine, particularly in the Pas de Calais area, rather than in Normandy.

Surprise: Weather

• Germans had a false sense of security about the weather

• Rommel was visiting his wife on D-Day– “There is not going to

be an invasion. And if there is, then they won’t even get off the beaches!”

Allied Plan

• The Allied plan would involve amphibious landings on the Normandy beaches supported by airborne assaults behind the beaches to block German counterattacks

Airborne Forces• The American 82nd and

101st Airborne Divisions jumped over the Cotentin Peninsula to secure the exits from the westernmost American Beach of Utah

• The British 6th Airborne Division dropped on the eastern flank to capture the crossings over the River Orne and the Canal de Caen

Pegasus Bridge and Point du Hoc

• A special glider force from the 6th Airborne captured the crucial Pegasus Bridge over the canal and the Orne

• American Rangers secured the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc where there was expected to be a massive German coastal battery Major John Howard led the

British glider unit that secured Pegasus Bridge

Caen• The capture of Pegasus

Bridge was designed to block German counterattacks and give the British an exit into the open country to the east of Caen

• The Operation Overlord plan called for the British to capture Caen, about ten miles inland, on D-Day

• Instead the attack stalled

German Defense

• Although Rommel had been unable to prevent the Allies from establishing a beachhead like he had hoped, he continued his strategy of a static defense to hold them to their initial landing area

• On June 11 Hitler issued an order forbidding any withdrawals

• The stiff German resistance inland caught the Allies by surprise

Breakout: Planning• Allied planners had

assumed the Germans would withdraw toward the Seine River and fight a delay along the river’s lines

• Consequently, the planning had focused on the challenges of getting ashore rather than subsequent operations

• The Allies were also unprepared for the challenges presented by the bocage country

Bocage: Result

• The restrictive nature of the bocage required an average of five Americans to displace one German– The normal planning

figure was three to one

Breakout: Ingenuity

Breakout: Allied Friction• In addition to the terrain and determined

German resistance, Allied breakout efforts were hindered by:– A lack of a sense of urgency on Montgomery’s part– A terrible storm which hit the English Channel June

19-21 and temporarily damaged the logistics build-up

• Two distinct battles soon developed in Normandy with the British and Canadians fighting in the east and the Americans in the west

Limited Gains

• By July the Allies had a beachhead 70 miles wide, but except for Cherbourg, their lodgment was in no place more than 25 miles deep and in most areas was little more than five miles

Breakout: Carpet Bombing• The narrow Allied beachhead

and the slower than expected advance inland bread fears of a stalemate

• One attempt to breakout was Operation Charnwood

• On July 7 the RAF Bomber Command dropped 2,300 tons of bombs on the northern outskirts of Caen

• This technique of carpet bombing relied on mass rather than precision

Breakout: Carpet Bombing• The bombing caused

huge German casualties but also missed many German defensive positions and heavily damaged Caen’s infrastructure

• By July 9 the Allies controlled Caen north of the River Orne, but could go no further

• Nonetheless the initiative was shifting to the Allies

British soldiers amid the wreckage in Caen

Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra

• On July 18 the British attempted a large breakout in their sector called Operation Goodwood

• The Americans planned to launch their own breakout, Operation Cobra, the next day, but it would be delayed by bad weather

• Montgomery’s intentions for the exact relationship between these two operations is the subject of some conjecture, but the end result was that it worked

Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra

• Operation Goodwood began with a two hour aerial bombardment

• Montgomery seemed overly reliant on air power• Montgomery’s slow pace greatly frustrated

Eisenhower who complained that by July 20 Montgomery had advanced just seven miles at the rate of a thousand tons of bombs a mile

• Still Goodwood drew reinforcements to the British sector which facilitated the American attack

Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra

• The British now had three armored, ten infantry, and one airborne division facing seven armored and six infantry divisions

• The Americans had four armored and thirteen infantry divisions facing two armored, one mechanized, three infantry, one airlanding, and two parachute divisions

Breakout: Mass• The Allies were able to effect a

massive build up of forces after the initial landing

• The logistical operation was made possible by Mulberry artificial harbors and Whale floating piers

Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra

• After several weather delays Operation Cobra began on July 25 with a massive bombing campaign

• Several bombs fell short, causing much fratricide including the death of Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, the highest ranking Allied officer killed in Europe

• Unlike the British attack the Americans had sufficient ground forces to follow through after the air bombardment

As commander of the Army Ground Forces, McNair was responsible for the organization, training and preparation of the Army for overseas service

Breakout: Operations Goodwood and Cobra

• The breakthrough began on July 27

• On Aug 1, Patton’s Third Army officially became operational and within 24 hours Patton passed four divisions through Avranches, out of the bocage, and on to the roads to France

The Breakout

• http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/campaign.html

The Allied Soldier

The Allied SoldierAt low tide, the assaulting troops had to cross more than 300 meters of completely exposed beach to gain entrance to the Vierville draw.

506th PIR Drop Dispersal

The Allied Soldier• The Germans launched

no tactical counteroffensives against the American airborne assault.

• American paratroopers gathered in ad hoc small groups and executed operations in accordance with the commander’s intent. – SLA Marshall

The German Soldier

• “… the performance of the Wehrmacht’s high command, middle-ranking soldiers, and junior officers was just pathetic. The cause is simply put: they were afraid to take the initiative. They allowed themselves to be paralyzed by stupid orders coming from far away that bore no relation to the situation on the battlefield. Tank commanders who knew where the enemy was and how and when he should be attacked sat in their headquarters through the day, waiting for the high command in Berchtesgaden to tell them what to do.”

• Stephen Ambrose

How it Ends• July 25: Beginning of

Operation Cobra• Aug 15: Operational Anvil

landings in southern France• Sept 17: Operational Market

Garden• Dec 16: Beginning of the Battle

of the Bulge• Apr 20, 1945: Russians take

Berlin• Apr 25: Americans and

Russians meet at the Elbe River

• Apr 30: Hitler commits suicide

Surrender of Germany

Next

• World War II: Pacific and Beginnings of the Cold War