lsd1502 - defeating jamming with the power of silence

7/17/2019 LSD1502 - Defeating Jamming With the Power of Silence

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Defeating Jamming With the Power of Silence

Defeating Jamming With the Power of Silence: A Game-

Theoretic Analysis

ABSTRACT:

The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is

encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel has

been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by an

energy- constrained malicious node. In fact, while a jammer is able to disrupt the

information contained in the attacked packets, timing information cannot be

jammed, and therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver information tothe receiver even on a jammed channel. ince the nodes under attack and the

jammer have conflicting interests, their interactions can be modeled by means of

game theory. !ccordingly, in this paper, a game-theoretic model of the interactions

between nodes exploiting the timing channel to achieve resilience to jamming

attacks and a jammer is derived and analy"ed. #ore specifically, the $ash

e%uilibrium is studied in terms of existence, uni%ueness, and convergence under

best response dynamics. &urthermore, the case in which the communication nodes

set their strategy and the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analy"ed as a

tackelberg game, by considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the

jammer's utility function. (xtensive numerical results are presented, showing the

impact of network parameters on the system performance.

E!ST!"G S#STE$:

Contact: %&%-&%'(&)&*+ ,**.,&',.

Email i/: academicliveprojects)gmail.com, www.logicsystems.org.in

http://www.logicsystems.org.in/





Recently, use of timing channels has been proposed in the wireless domain

to support low rate, energy efficient communications as well as covert and

resilient communications.

In existing system methodologies to detect jamming attacks are illustrated* itis also shown that it is possible to identify which kind of jamming attack is

ongoing by looking at the signal strength and other relevant network

parameters, such as bit and packet errors.

everal solutions against reactive jamming have been proposed that exploit

different techni%ues, such as fre%uency hopping, power control and

unjammed bits.

D!SAD0A"TAGES 12 E!ST!"G S#STE$:

+ontinuous jamming is very costly in terms of energy consumption for the

jammer

(xisting solutions usually rely on users' cooperation and coordination,

which might not be guaranteed in a jammed environment. In fact, the

reactive jammer can totally disrupt each transmitted packet and,

conse%uently, no information can be decoded and then used to this purpose.

PR1P1SED S#STE$:

In this paper we focus on the resilience of timing channels to jamming

attacks. In general, these attacks can completely disrupt communications

when the jammer continuously emits a high power disturbing signal, i.e.,

when continuous jamming is performed. In this paper we analy"e the interactions between the jammer and the node

whose transmissions are under attack, which we call target node.

Contact: %&%-&%'(&)&*+ ,**.,&',.







pecifically, we assume that the target node wants to maximi"e the amount

of information that can be transmitted per unit of time by means of the

timing channel, whereas, the jammer wants to minimi"e such amount of

information while reducing the energy expenditure. !s the target node and the jammer have conflicting interests, we develop a

game theoretical framework that models their interactions. e investigate

both the case in which these two adversaries play their strategies

simultaneously, and the situation when the target node the leader

anticipates the actions of the jammer the follower. To this purpose, we

study both the $ash (%uilibria $(s and tackelberg (%uilibria (s of

our proposed games.

AD0A"TAGES 12 PR1P1SED S#STE$:

e model the interactions between a jammer and a target node as a jamming

game

e prove the existence, uni%ueness and convergence to the $ash

e%uilibrium $( under best response dynamics

e prove the existence and uni%ueness of the e%uilibrium of the tackelberg

game where the target node plays as a leader and the jammer reacts

conse%uently

e investigate in this latter tackelberg scenario the impact on the

achievable performance of imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility

function*

e conduct an extensive numerical analysis which shows that our proposed

models well capture the main factors behind the utili"ation of timing

Contact: %&%-&%'(&)&*+ ,**.,&',.







channels, thus representing a promising framework for the design and

understanding of such systems.

S#STE$ ARC3!TECT4RE:

S#STE$ RE54!RE$E"TS:

3ARDWARE RE54!RE$E"TS:

ystem / 0entium I1 2.3 45".

5ard 6isk / 37 48.

&loppy 6rive / 9.33 #b.

#onitor / 9: 14! +olour.

#ouse / ;ogitech.

Ram / :92 #b.

Contact: %&%-&%'(&)&*+ ,**.,&',.







S12TWARE RE54!RE$E"TS:

<perating system / indows =0>?.

+oding ;anguage / [email protected]

Tool / 1isual tudio 2797

6atabase / A; (R1(R 277B

RE2ERE"CE:

alvatore 6'<ro, Student Member, IEEE , ;aura 4alluccio, Member, IEEE , iacomo

#orabito, ergio 0ala""o, Senior Member, IEEE , ;in +hen, Member, IEEE , and

&abio #artignon, Member, IEEE , C6efeating Damming ith the 0ower of ilence/

! 4ame-Theoretic !nalysisE, !EEE TRA"SACT!1"S 1" W!RE6ESS

C1$$4"!CAT!1"S+ 0167 8&+ "17 + $A# '%87

Contact: %&%-&%'(&)&*+ ,**.,&',.




lsd1502 - defeating jamming with the power of silence

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