lopes 2003_the aesthetics of photographic transparency

Mind Association

The Aesthetics of Photographic TransparencyAuthor(s): Dominic McIver LopesSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 112, No. 447 (Jul., 2003), pp. 433-448Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3489189 .

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The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES

When we look at photographs we literally see the objects that they are of. But seeing photographs as photographs engages aesthetic interests that are not engaged by seeing the objects that they are of. These claims appear incompatible. Sceptics about photography as an art form have endorsed the first claim in order to show that there is no photographic aesthetic. Proponents of photography as an art form have in- sisted that seeing things in photographs is quite unlike seeing things face-to-face. This paper argues that the claims are compatible. While seeing things in photographs is quite unlike seeing things face-to-face, nevertheless seeing things in photographs is one way of seeing things. The differences between seeing things by means of photographs and by means of the naked eye provide the elements of an account of the aesthetic interests photographs engage.

Anybody interested in the aesthetic value of art must now wonder how an encounter with a work of art (for example, Andy Warhol's Brillo Boxes) can engage any aesthetic interest not also engaged by a very similar non-art object (for example, Brillo boxes). Thoughtful persons may go on to ask what has changed in our thinking about art so as to pro- voke this puzzle, given that mimesis was for many philosophers down the centuries a reason to value art. Much has been said about such mat- ters in relation to Brillo Boxes, Fountain, and 4'33 ", but the puzzle and the question about its origins also arise in relation to photography. Tacit recognition of this fact evidently motivates a widespread strategy in theorizing about photographs. It is thought that to find the aesthetic value of photographs, one should identify the differences between experiences of objects in the flesh and experiences of photographs of those objects. I hold the following two claims: (1) when looking at photographs, we literally see the objects they are of, and (2) seeing photographs as photographs engages aesthetic interests that are not engaged by seeing the objects they are of. I assume the truth of (1) and argue for (2). In addition, since they appear incompatible, I also argue that (1) and (2) are consistent. The argument for this depends on the argument for (2) together with a correct interpretation of (1).

Mind,Vol. 112 . 447 . July2003 t Lopes 2003



434 Dominic McIver Lopes

1. The sceptic's challenge Roger Scruton (1983) has famously mounted a sceptical challenge to (2). The challenge comprises arguments for an equivalence thesis which asserts that any interest we take in photographs, when we view them as photographs, is wholly an interest in the actual objects that were photographed and not an interest in the photographs themselves. Scruton offers two arguments for the equivalence thesis. The arguments share a common core, an argument for the claim that there is no photographic representation.

Representations, according to Scruton) stand in an intentional relation to what they represent. That a drawing, for instance, represents an object does not entail that the object exists drawings are fictionally competent. The explanation of this is that representations are essen- tially tokens in communicative action; they bear Gricean non-natural meaning. It follows that understanding a successful representation as a representation taking into account that it is a representation requires recognizing a thought that is embodied in the representation. (This account of representation is obviously heterodox. States of ther- mometers, speedometers, RAM chips, perception? and belief are usually counted as representations, yet none of them bear Gricean non-natural meaning and some of them do entail the existence of their objects. However, we should concede Scruton's narrow usage of'representation'. A charge of heterodoxy is not an argument. Moreover) it is possible that Scruton's arguments may be refitted so as to allow that photographs are representations in a broader sense of the notion.)

Scruton also holds that since photographs stand in a causal relation to objects photographed, understanding a photograph as a photograph involves knowing) first, that it is a copy of the appearance of some object and, second, that it is a causal trace of that object. Its being a causal trace of an object means that the object exists and appears as it does in the photograph. A representation can misrepresent its object, but there is a sense in which a photograph is necessarily accurate. Cases in which we might be inclined to say that a photograph is inaccurate- as when we say that a wide angle lens exaggerates the size of the sitter's nose are cases in which we have misread a perfectly accurate photograph by misunderstanding the working of the photographic mechanism. In understanding a photograph as a photograph) we know that we are seeing the transmitted appearance of something that actually occurred.

Thus Scruton arrives at a contrast between representations and photographs. Understanding a representation involves grasping a thought



The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency 435

because representations figure in the communication of thoughts. Understanding a photograph involves knowledge of the appearance of the photograph's cause because photography is a mechanism for cap- turing appearances. Scruton concludes that photographs are not representations.

This argument does not show that photography has nothing whatever to do with representation. One may photograph a representation, including a fiction. A photograph of Ariadne's epiphany is a photograph of a staged representation: the objects of the photograph are actors who represent Ariadne and Dionysius. That some photographs of representations generate the illusion that they are representations may explain why we erroneously believe that photographs are representations. But no photograph can derive fictional competence or the power to misrepresent from having a representation as its object; it remains a photograph of actors and props. Representations shown by means of photographs are not photographic representations.

Scruton gives two arguments intended to build upon the core argument and establish the equivalence thesis. Both assume that an aesthetic interest in an image is an interest in seeing the image as the kind of thing it is.

This assumption when taken in conjunction with the core argument demonstrates that aesthetic interest in a representation is an interest in the thought it embodies, as that thought is communicated in the medium, by way of composition, brush strokes, and the like. Scruton writes that 'the creation of an appearance is important mainly as the expression of a thought' (1983, pp. 109-10). Photographs, however, do not represent but record objects' appearances. Therefore any interest we take in a photograph that is grounded in an understanding of it as a photograph must be an interest in the photographed object and its appearance. When this interest involves the exercise of aesthetic concepts, the concepts apply to features of the object photographed, not to features of the photograph itself. Scruton writes that 'if one finds a photograph beautifil it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject' (1983, p. 114). Photographs may serve as conduits for aesthetic interest, but they cannot be objects of aesthetic interest in their own right, as long as they are seen as photographs. Call this the 'object argument'.

The object argument does not show that a photograph cannot attract aesthetic interest of any kind whatsoever. It may have formal properties that are worth attending to, comprising a very pretty shade of green or ingeniously balanced masses. Nevertheless, to esteem a photograph's formal virtues or to revile its formal vices is not to engage with the pho-




tograph as a photograph. Such engagement involves seeing the photograph as transmitting the appearance of the photographed object, not as a mere arrangement of lines, shapes, and colours. One might, of course, appreciate the formal properties of the photographed object, but that, again, is to use the photograph as a conduit for aesthetic interest, not to make it an object of aesthetic interest qua photograph.

There are two kinds of mistake we can make about candidate art forms. On the one hand, we may believe that a medium is not an art form when it is. This is an easy mistake to make, since it is caused by a failure to notice what is worth attention and it is frequently rather difficult to tell what is worth attention. On the other hand, we may believe that a medium is an art form when it is not. This should be a difficult mistake to make, since our finding anything to be worthwhile is a good reason to think that it is worthwhile. Of course, there is the possibility that we are subject to an illusion and perceive value where none exists, but in that case we are obliged to provide an error theory which diag- noses the source of the illusion. The object argument does precisely this: it locates the source of our misapprehension that photographs excite genuine aesthetic interest to our confusion of properties of photographs with properties of objects photographed. It is in the nature of photography to solicit this confusion.

Scruton's second argument, the 'style argument', assumes that an aesthetic interest in a representation, qua representation, is an interest in a thought as it is expressed in a representational medium in a way that is subject to the artist's control. An interest in a photograph, viewed as a photograph and so as a mechanically caused copy of an object's appearance can only be an interest in the photographed object's appearance. But this is something over which the photographer can exercise scant control. So no photograph can capture the appearance of the photographed object in a way that betrays the photographer's style. But aesthetic interest is always an interest in an object viewed as an artefact.l Therefore, photographs cannot be objects of aesthetic interest, qua photographs.

A walk around any group photography exhibition provides ample evidence that photographs have perceptible stylistic properties that tie them to their makers; aficionados of photography can readily recognize an Arbus, a Weston, or a Levine. The style argument is surely unsound and Scruton's critics have made it their primary target.2 They rightly

i Scruton accepts the implication that natural scenes cannot be proper objects of aesthetic ap- . .

preclatlon.

2 The principal critics are Wicks 1989, King 1992, Warburton 1996, and Gaut 2002.




emphasize that the argument requires us to underestimate badly the degree of control photographers exercise over the appearance of their photographs. This control is not limited to the appearance of the photograph's surface and formal properties; it extends to the properties the photographed object is seen to have. A photograph records a moment in time and the photographer selects which moment is recorded. Emul- sion, focal length, depth of field, exposure, grain, filtering, and contrast fall within the photographer's control and determine what features of a scene come through in a photograph and with what degree of visual salience. The photographer also controls how the photographed object is seen simply by selecting which image to print and display of the many that were taken. Image-selection is an important photographic technique, one at which some photographers are better than others, and one the exercise of which can result in the expression of an individual style.

Whatever doubt these points cast on the style argument, they do not by themselves impeach the sceptic's total case for the equivalence thesis. The object argument is independent of the style argument and must be addressed independently. Scruton's critics frequently miss this fact and thus fail to respond adequately to his challenge.

Having argued that 'attention to detail in a photograph isn't necessarily attention to the subject as such. On the contrary, it may be attention to a manner of representing the subject', William King (1992, p. 264) concludes that the equivalence thesis is false. This does not follow. The failure of the style argument shows that what properties the photographed object is shown as having are partially subject to the photographer's control sufficiently so for individual style to be dis- cernible. But this provides no reason to deny that the photographed object, with the properties it is shown as having, is the object of our attention when we see a photograph and understand it as a photograph, even when we notice features of the photographed object, as it is photographed, that betray the photographer's style. Were Map- plethorpe the only person to photograph calla lilies, a photograph of a calla lily would be readily recognized as a Mapplethorpe by any suitably informed viewer, even when this viewer's aesthetic interest is entirely consumed with the calla lily.

Nigel Warburton acknowledges the independence of the style and object arguments but then adds that since photographs express individual styles, 'photography's alleged lack of representational potential appears simply beside the point' (1996, pp. 395-6). This is also a mistake. Supposing that some photographs engage aesthetic interest




because they express individual style, it does not follow that the interest lies in the photographs rather than their objects. The equivalence thesis is consistent with the possibility that we perceive photographic styles and that our perception of them evokes aesthetic interest, provided that the interest so evoked is not an interest in photographs seen as photographs. Stylistic properties of photographs may be appreciated in the way that their formal properties are appreciated. To show that aesthetic interest in photographic styles is an interest in photographs as photographs, it is necessary to address the object argument for the equivalence thesis.

2. Photographic transparency

It is hard to see how to answer the sceptic's challenge head-on. Photo- graphs stand} by definition, in a causal relation to objects photographed. Moreover, it seems plausible to suppose that understanding a photograph as a photograph necessarily involves knowing that it is the product of a causal process originating in the photographed object. Perhaps we should interrogate the assumption that is common to the object and style arguments-namely, that an aesthetic interest in an object is an interest in the object understood as the kind of thing it is? After all, we may have as much motivation to reject the common assumption as we have to accept the equivalence thesis. Anyone who is convinced that the equivalence thesis is false may dismiss arguments for it as a reductio of the common assumption. They may assert that we can take an aesthetic interest in a photograph qua photograph without understanding it to be the product of a causal process originating in the photographed object. This is not the only available strategy, however. An alternative strategy concedes that photographs are not representations in Scruton's sense by assuming) as Kendall Walton has argued, that photographs are transparent.3

To say that photographs are transparent is to say that we see through them. A person seeing a photograph of a lily, literally sees a lily. She does not see a lily face-to-face, for there is no lily in front of her; nor is the photograph a lily it is an image of a lily. Rather, her seeing a lily through a photograph of a lily is like her seeing a lily in a mirror, through binoculars, or on a closed-circuit television system. As in all these cases, seeing a lily through a photograph is indirect seeing in the sense that the lily is seen by seeing the image; even so, indirect seeing is

3 The original arguments are in Walton 1984. For criticisms see Warburton 1988, Currie 1995, and Friday 1996; Walton replies in Walton 1997.




seeing. Walton remarks that (the invention of the camera gave us not just a new method of making pictures and not just pictures of a new kind: it gave us a new way of seeing' (1984) p. 251).

Seeing through photographs is one species of generic seeing, where to see something is to have an experience that is caused) in the right way, by the thing seen. There is ample disagreement about how to char- acterize the experience and the causal relation required for seeing. Wal- ton replaces causation with belief-independent counterfactual dependence, such that seeing requires an experience whose content is counterfactually dependent on visible properties of what is seen and independent of the perceiver's beliefs. One sees a tomato, for example, only if a difference in the visible properties of the tomato would have made a difference in the content of the perceiver's experience of it. (This account requires some qualifications but they are not germane to the question whether we see through photographs.) Photographs preserve the belief-independent counterfactual dependence required for seeing. Above a threshold of acuity, any visible difference in a tomato would have made a difference in the visible properties of a photograph of the tomato and thereby in the content of the experience of seeing the photograph. Meeting this condition is not, however, sufficient for seeing through. A visual experience of the text of a description of a tomato generated by a computerized tomato-surveillance system may be counterfactually dependent in the required way on the tomato's visible properties and yet we do not see the tomato through the text. Walton proposes that there must be a relation of similarity between the scene and an image when we see through the image to the scene and he offers an account of the similarity relation that he has in mind. While alternative proposals have been made, nothing hinges for present purposes on which proposal is correct their purpose is to rule out seeing through some representations (for example, computer-generated texts), not to rule in seeing through photographs.

Transparency is sometimes confused with illusion. There are two main conceptions of perceptual illusion. According to one, illusion entails delusion the illusion of seeing a pool of water makes for the belief that there is a pool of water before oneas eyes. According to the second, when one is subject to an illusion, one has an experience whose content is not veridical although one may not be led to believe falsely that the world is as the experience represents it. The experience is illu- sory not because it engenders a false belief but because there are possible circumstances in which it would engender a false belief. In the Muller-Lyer illusion the lines appear to differ in length and there are




possible circumstances in which one would thereby come to believe that they do differ in length, but one might believe otherwise, having measured the lines. At any rate, that photographs are transparent does not mean that they delude. One may see a lily through a photograph without thereby coming to believe that there is a lily before one's eyes, just as one may see a lily in a mirror without coming to believe that there is a lily there, in the direction of gaze. Moreover, seeing a lily through a photograph does not engender a false belief that one is seeing a lily; the transparency thesis entails that this belief is true. Neither does the transparency of photographs entail that photographs issue in non- delusive illusions. For some photographs, there are no circumstances in which seeing through them could engender the false belief that what one sees is before one's eyes. In normal circumstances, seeing through a photograph happens simultaneously with seeing the photographic surface itself and is consistent with the belief that what is before one's eyes is a photograph, not the photographed object. Photographic transparency is not photographic invisibility.

Nor should the claim that photographs are transparent be confused with a claim about their accuracy. A photograph is necessarily accurate in the sense that it carries information by means of a causal process. In another sense, a photograph is inaccurate, since it may cause or dispose one to have false beliefs about the objects photographed. A colour photograph of a red apple carries information about the apple's redness, though it may carry the information by having a colour indistinguisha- ble from that of an orange seen in ordinary light, with the result that we are liable to believe falsely that the apple is orange in colour.

A final mistake is to think that photographic transparency rules out either intervention on the part of the photographer or the role of photographic conventions in the photographic process. That photographs are transparent is perfectly consistent with their being a human accom- plishment. As Walton notes, 'people often show me things and in other ways induce me to look this way or that. They affect what I can see or how I see it by turning the lights on or off, by blowing smoke in my eyes, by constructing and making available eyeglasses, mirrors, and tel- escopes' (1984, p. 261). If seeing survives human interventions of these types, as it surely must, so does seeing through photographs. A similar point can be made with regard to conventions. Conventions governing seeing, such as the convention that convex mirrors be used on cars, do not blind us. Photographic conventions, such as the convention to 'correct' the convergence of vertical parallels (for example, in photographs of tall buildings), need not render photographs opaque.




When one sees a photograph as a photograph one literally sees the photographed object. It is worth considering the logical relationship between this claim and Scruton's claim that photographs do not represent. Some think, wrongly, that non-representation entails transparency. Thus Gregory Currie holds that photographs represent since they are not transparent. It is) he argues) a condition upon seeing that it provide information about the location of objects in egocentric space and photographs fail to provide this kind of information, so we do not see through photographs (1995, pp. 72-5). Grarlting that this argument is sound, it does not follow that photographs represent. According to the sceptic, photographs fail to represent because understanding a photograph involves knowing that its appearance is the result of a causal process. The sceptic may concede that photographs are opaque for the reason Currie gives and yet insist that they are not representations because they are caused appearances. The truth, contrary to Currie, is that if photographs are transparent, then they do not represent in Scru- ton's sense. (They do represent in the wider sense that is now current.)

3. The value of seeing through The claim that photographs are transparent looks to be consistent with the equivalence thesis. Indeed, it seems to provide a stronger substitute for the core) no-representation argument for the equivalence thesis. Denying the conclusion of the core argument, that photographs do not represent, means denying that photographs are transparent. Moreover, if seeing a photograph just is one way of seeing the photographed object, any interest in seeing the former is merely an interest in seeing the latter. The transparency claim appears to abet scepticism about the aesthetic interest of photographs as photographs! In this case, however, appearances are misleading. When properly construed, the transparency claim shows what is wrong with the object argument and also provides the materials for an account of the aesthetic interest of photographs that confutes the equivalence thesis.

Seeing an object through a photograph is not identical to seeing it face-to-face. The transparency claim shows only that the interest one may properly take in seeing a photograph as a photograph is necessarily identical to the interest one may properly take in seeing the photographed object through the photograph. It does not show that interest to be necessarily identical to any interest one may have in seeing the object face-to-face. The sceptical challenge may be stated thus: if seeing a photograph is seeing the object photographed then any aesthetic interest




taken in seeing the photograph as a photograph is an interest in seeing the photographed object, but if there is a photographic aesthetics then aesthetic interest in seeing a photograph as a photograph cannot be identical to interest in seeing the photographed object, so photographs cannot attract aesthetic interest qsa photographs. Encouraged by acknowledgement of the transparency of photographs, this argument equivocates on 'seeing the photographed object'. Removing the equivo- cation, the argument is invalid: if seeing a photograph is seeing the object photographed then any aesthetic interest taken in seeing the photograph as a photograph is an interest in seeing the photographed object through the photograph, but if there is a photographic aesthetics then aesthetic interest in seeing a photograph as a photograph cannot be identical to interest in seeing the photographed object face-to-face, so photographs cannot attract aesthetic interest qua photographs.

The interest to be taken in seeing a photograph as a photograph is necessarily identical to the interest one may properly take in seeing the photographed object through the photograph. This is consistent with taking an aesthetic interest in seeing the photographic surface and its formal properties. Seeing through the surface does not block seeing the surface itself: photographic transparency is not photographic invisibility. But to take an interest merely in the photographic surface, without thereby taking an interest in seeing the photographed object through the surface, is not to see the photograph as a photograph. The assumption, shared with the Scrutonian sceptic, is that proper appreciation of a photograph is appreciation of the photograph for what it is. The transparency thesis divulges what photographs are, namely instru- ments for seeing through.

A photographic aesthetics grounded in transparency is viable if seeing something through a photograph may arouse an interest not satisfied by seeing the same object face-to-face opens up. Photographs animate objects that we would barely notice when we see them face-to- face. The puzzle is how the claim that we see things through photographs can illuminate this phenomenon. In solving this puzzle two questions to ask are: do we ever have any interest in seeing a photograph specifically because it is transparent? and is this interest an aesthetic interest?

Several factors mark seeing an object through a photograph apart from seeing the object face-to-face. To make a start, here are five (the list is by no means exhaustive).

First, it is often remarked that photographs capture their objects fixed at a moment in time. This means we see photographed objects as having




properties that are not normally revealed when we see the same objects in the flesh. Rudolf Arnheim writes that in photographs 'the rapid course of events is found to contain hidden moments which, when iso- lated and fixed, reveal new and different meanings' (1986, p. 118).

Second, photographic seeing through normally obtains in the absence of the object seen, whereas face-to-face seeing obtains only when the object seen lies before the eyes. Put another way, photographic seeing through bridges distances, either spatial or temporal. This fact about photographs explains many of the uses to which they are put. Walton notes, for instance, that through photographs 'we can see our loved ones again, and that is important to us' (1984, p. 253). Obviously, nostalgia for an object cannot be evoked by seeing it face-to-face.

A third, connected, feature of photographic seeing through is that it isolates the photographed object from the context it would normally be seen to inhabit. With change of context comes a change in the properties the object itself may be seen to have. A corollary of the injunction to place things in context so as to see them more fully is that decontextual- izing can be revelatory. Seeing through photographs decontextualizes.

At the same time, however, the presence of a camera is an essential part of the context in which we see an object photographically what we see through a photograph is always before a camera. Moreover, the camera soinetimes intrudes upon or disturbs what it photographs, especially when it is a person, thereby showing it in a way inaccessible to the naked eye. This is a fourth feature distinctive of photographic seeing through.

Finally, seeing photographs is typically twofold in the sense that it melds seeing the photographed object and its properties with seeing the photograph itself and its properties. This does not mean that the photographed object is seen to have all the properties of the photograph or vice versa: we do not see the EiXel Tower as a few centimetres in height when we see it through a postcard, nor do we see the postcard as a Paris- ian tourist attraction. Photographic seeing through is always simultane- ous with plain vanilla seeing of a photograph. In this respect seeing an object through a photograph differs from seeing it in the flesh.

If this list contains no surprises, that is what we should expect. All five features undoubtedly form the core of our ordinary, theoretically innocent experiences of photographs as photographs that is, our seeing them in the context of knowledge of what they are. Since the sceptic contends that photographs can excite no aesthetic interest when we see them as photographs, a rebuttal of his argument best sneaks nothing exotic or unfamiliar into what counts as seeing a photograph as a pho-




tograph. It is a virtue of this list that it contains nothing of which ordinary spectators of photographs are unaware.

Granting that an interest in seeing things through photographs may not be satisfied by seeing the same objects face-to-face, the case has not yet been made for a photographic aesthetics: it remains to be shown that the interest is an aesthetic interest. Assume that an interest is aesthetic only if its satisfaction requires possession of an aesthetic concept (perhaps the interest is satisfied by having a certain representational mental state that includes an aesthetic concept as a component). This is a relatively strong conception of aesthetic interest and assuming it sets the bar high. Nevertheless, the challenge can be met. (Clearing the bar still leaves room for tolerating a great deal of scepticism about photographs. That some interest satisfied in seeing things through photographs is an aesthetic interest is consistent with the complaint that many other interests we have in seeing through photographs are just the same interests we have in seeing objects face-to-face. We may find a photograph worth seeing just because it shows us a beautiful face, where this is equally a reason to see the face without photographic aids. Clearing the bar is difficult yet commits us to little.)

How we see an object, where this is cashed out by listing the properties we see the object as having, is sometimes aesthetically significant. We may therefore have an aesthetic interest in seeing things through photographs. At least two clusters of aesthetic concepts modify photographic seeing through and apply in virtue of its five distinctive features.

Photographs can promote clear seeing, foregrounding features of objects that are difficult to discern face-to-face. In some cases they are able to do this because they show objects removed from their temporal and environmental contexts, when these contexts make some properties of objects difficult to discern. In other cases, the absence of the object is crucial: for example, we might notice features of a very dan- gerous or disturbing object that we could not notice in the presence of danger or disturbance. Finally, features of the photographic surface can be used to highlight features of the photographed object. The luminos- ity gradients of a black and white photograph can bring out surface tex- ture in the object photographed. Clarity of seeing belongs to a network of related concepts, most notably authenticity, accuracy, and truthfulness, all of which are regularly deployed in giving reasons to look at some photographs and not to look at others.

In addition, photographs afford revelatory, transformative, defamiliarizing, or confessional seeing when they show us objects as having properties that they could not be seen to have face-to-face. Here the




capacity of the photographic process to record its own disturbing effect on objects in a scene, especially persons, comes first to mind. But there are photographs whose transformative vision capitalizes upon other features of seeing through.4 We not uncommonly defend the value of seeing photographs by referring to their power to reveal otherwise invisible facets of the world and this justification entails no false views about the nature of photography.

What may be called a documentary aesthetics has two dimensions. One measures the authenticity, accuracy, or truthfulness of a photograph; the other measures its promotion of revelatory, transformative, or defamiliarizing seeing. Throughout this space the interest of photography is tied to its nature.

The language of documentary aesthetics clearly figures in actual photographic criticism, but the sceptic may retort that the expressions of the language name not aesthetic concepts but rather concepts of cognitive evaluation. While there is reason to think that some concepts of cognitive evaluation are also concepts of aesthetic evaluation, it suffices to note that the sceptic's retort far outruns his plan to deflate the aesthetic aspirations of photography. That is, the sceptic never denies that aesthetic evaluation encompasses cognitive evaluation. He never denies that seeing photographs is sometimes revelatory and therefore worthwhile. All he denies is that photographs are revelatory as photographs, and this challenge only has purchase because it seems that when seeing a photograph is revelatory, the source and object of the revelation is the object photographed, not the photograph itself. We have seen that the source and object of the revelation is sometimes the object as it is seen through the photograph and it is in cases such as this that some of photography's aesthetic aspirations are realized.

An aesthetic interest in a photograph is properly an interest in the photograph itself, not some other object. Since photographs are transparent, an interest in a photograph as a photograph is an interest in it as a vehicle for seeing through it to the photographed scene. This is not an interest limited to the scene itself; it is an interest in the scene as it is seen through the photograph. Thus our aesthetic interest in a photograph, on the present account, is an interest in the photograph as it enables seeing through. It is an interest that photographs can foster and satisfy and face-to-face seeing cannot. As in the case of all artworks, we are engaged by what may be described as the way the artistic materials are handled in order to evoke and sustain an experience. The materials

4 Several examples are given extended discussion in Savedoff 2000.




of photography are the world itself. They are handled by determining the content of seeing through.

The failure of the object argument invites us to revisit the style argument and provides an additional reply to those who doubt that any interest satisfied by seeing through photographs is an aesthetic interest) for if style concepts are aesthetic concepts) the perception of photographic style satisfies an aesthetic interest. It is not enough to reply to the style argument by observing that photographs are reliably classified by aficionados according to their authorship-after all, perceptible stylistic features may not be features of the photograph seen as a photograph. But when a photograph's style is expressed in exactly what we see through it} seeing its style is part of seeing it as a photograph. A photograph can embody style in two ways) then. The photographer may employ effects that control the appearance of the photograph without controlling what we see through it. The sceptic is right to com- plain that noticing these effects is not part of seeing a photograph as a photograph Alternatively) the photographer may control what we see through her photograph in a way that betrays its style. Noticing these symptoms of style is part of seeing a photograph as a photograph. Thus many of the variables photographers control so as to make their photographs identifiably theirs determine what we see through their photographs (for example staging> timing of shots5 selection of negatives, choice of emulsion, focal length, depth of field, exposuret grain, filtering, and contrast). The original objections to the style argument are vindicated when placed within a conception of the aesthetics of photographic transparency.

Photographic seeing through may foster and satisfy aesthetic interests that face-to-face seeing cannot foster or satisfy. The equivalence thesis is false. It is fair to conclude, modestly) that photographs engage genuine aesthetic interest when seen as photographs.

More ambitiously, one might seek a distinctive aesthetics of photographs} as against hand-made pictures. If photography is the only transparent art mediumt this ambitlon has also been realized: what is achieved by seeing an object through a photograph is only achieved by seeing it through the photograph. However) some authors hold that we see through at least some paintings, prints) and drawings as well as through photographs (for exampleX Lopes lgg63. If these authors are rightX we have only made a start towards the realization of the ambitious enterprise. The next step would be to show that photographic seeing through satisfies some aesthetic interests not satisfied by seeing through any other kind of picture. Yet nothing encourages us to dis-




colmt the possibility that the ambitious enterprise is doomed to failure because seeing through some hand-made picture will do as well as seeing through any photograph.

That photographs are transparent has been assumed here without argument. But the bare outlines of a new argument for the transparency of photographs now come into view. Unless Scrutonesque scepticism is well-founded, an explanation is needed of how photographs seen as photographs, can be objects of some aesthetic interest. If the hypothesis that photographs are transparent delivers the best explanation of their value, even redeeming the available replies to the sceptic, then we have good reason to conclude that photographs are transparent. The challenge is to show that any other replies to the sceptic are inferior because they do not fully explain the aesthetic interest photographs rightly generate.

A correct conception of the value of photography as an art form depends on accepting that photographs are transparent. Since few accept this, it follows that many including many of those who believe it to be an art form of profound value-misapprehend the value of photography. Is this aI1 objection to the account on offer? Perhaps it is. But then again, the account explains a curious fact about discussions of photography, namely that more than a century afcer its invention there continue disagreements about its status as an art form. Even among those who agree that some photographs belong in the art galleries, there is remarkably little consensus about why they do. That we should disagree for so long about the value of photography suggests that we have failed to comprehend its nature.5

Department of Philosophy DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES

University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC V6T lZI Canada

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5 For helpful comments and criticisms, I am grateful to Jonathan Cohen, David Davies, Sherri Irvin, Mohan Matthen, Bradley Murray, Patrick Rysiew, James Shelley, Scott Walden, and Kendall Walton, as well as to audiences at Simon Fraser University, the University of British Columbia, the 2002 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, and the Light Symposium.




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