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Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg Univeristy ai.stanford.edu/ ~ epacuit June 25, 2010 Eric Pacuit

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Page 1: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Logics of Rational AgencyLecture 5

Eric Pacuit

Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg Univeristy

ai.stanford.edu/~epacuit

June 25, 2010

Eric Pacuit

Page 2: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 3: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Two Methodologies

ETL methodology: when describing a social situation, first writedown all possible sequences of events, then at each moment writedown the agents’ uncertainty, from that infer how the agents’knowledge changes from one moment to the next.

Alternative methodology: describe an initial situations, provide amethod for how events change a model that can be described inthe formal language, then construct the event tree as needed.

Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 4: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the Example: DEL

Eric Pacuit

Page 5: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the Example: DEL

(M⊗ E1)⊗ E2

The initial model (Annand Bob are ignorantabout P2PM).

Private announcementto Ann about the talk.

Eric Pacuit

Page 6: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the Example: DEL

(M⊗ E1)⊗ E2

The initial model (Annand Bob are ignorantabout P2PM).

Private announcementto Ann about the talk.

Eric Pacuit

Page 7: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Abstract Description of the Event

Recall the Ann and Bob example: Charles tells Bob that the talk isat 2PM.

Eric Pacuit

Page 8: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Abstract Description of the Event

Recall the Ann and Bob example: Charles tells Bob that the talk isat 2PM.

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

Ann knows which event took place.

Eric Pacuit

Page 9: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Abstract Description of the Event

Recall the Ann and Bob example: Charles tells Bob that the talk isat 2PM.

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

Ann knows which event took place.

Eric Pacuit

Page 10: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Abstract Description of the Event

Recall the Ann and Bob example: Charles tells Bob that the talk isat 2PM.

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

Bob thinks a different event took place.

Eric Pacuit

Page 11: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Abstract Description of the Event

Recall the Ann and Bob example: Charles tells Bob that the talk isat 2PM.

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

That is, Bob learns the time of the talk, but Ann learns nothing.

Eric Pacuit

Page 12: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

Eric Pacuit

Page 13: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

M⊗ E1

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

E2

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

Eric Pacuit

Page 14: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

Eric Pacuit

Page 15: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

Eric Pacuit

Page 16: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

(s, e1) |= ¬KBKAKBP P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

Eric Pacuit

Page 17: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

(s, e1) |= ¬KBKAKBP P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

B

Eric Pacuit

Page 18: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BA, B

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

(s, e1) |= ¬KBKAKBP P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

B

A

Eric Pacuit

Page 19: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update

P

s

¬P

t

B

A, BB

Pe1 P e2

>e3

B

BA

A

A, B

(s, e1) |= ¬KBKAKBP P(s, e1) P (s, e2)

¬P (t, e3)P(s, e3)

B

A

B

Eric Pacuit

Page 20: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 21: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 22: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)

I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 23: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 24: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 25: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Product Update Details

Let M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 be a Kripke model.

An event model is a tuple A = 〈A, S ,Pre〉, where S ⊆ A× A andPre : L → ℘(A).

The update model M⊗ A = 〈W ′,R ′,V ′〉 where

I W ′ = (w , a) | w |= Pre(a)I (w , a)R ′(w ′, a′) iff wRw ′ and aSa′

I (w , a) ∈ V (p) iff w ∈ V (p)

M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff M,w |= Pre(a) implies M⊗ A, (w , a) |= ϕ.

Eric Pacuit

Page 26: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Literarture

A. Baltag and L. Moss. Logics for Epistemic Programs. 2004.

W. van der Hoek, H. van Ditmarsch and B. Kooi. Dynamic Episetmic Logic.2007.

Eric Pacuit

Page 27: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

DEL and ETL

Observation: By repeatedly updating an epistemic model withevent models, the machinery of DEL creates ETL models.

Let M be an epistemic model, and P a DEL protocol (tree of eventmodels). The ETL model generated by M and P, forest(M,P),represents all possible evolutions of the system obtained byupdating M with sequences from P.

Eric Pacuit

Page 28: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

DEL and ETL

Observation: By repeatedly updating an epistemic model withevent models, the machinery of DEL creates ETL models.

Let M be an epistemic model, and P a DEL protocol (tree of eventmodels). The ETL model generated by M and P, forest(M,P),represents all possible evolutions of the system obtained byupdating M with sequences from P.

Eric Pacuit

Page 29: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example: Initial Model and Protocol

P,Qs

P,Q,Rt P,R u

Q,R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

Eric Pacuit

Page 30: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 31: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 32: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 33: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 34: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 35: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 36: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 37: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

Eric Pacuit

Page 38: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Example

P, Qs

P, Q, Rt P, R u

Q, R vi

i

i

j

j

j

!P

!Q !R

(s, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !Q) (t, !P, !R) (u, !P, !R)

(s, !P)

(s) (t)

(t, !P)

(u)

(u, !P)

(v)

!P

!Q

!P

!Q !R

!P

!R

(t) |= R ∧ ¬〈!R〉>

Eric Pacuit

Page 39: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

F(X) = Forest(M,P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X.

I Can we characterize the class of ETL models F(X)?

I Can we axiomatize interesting classes of DEL-generated ETLmodels?

J. van Benthem, J. Gerbrandy, T. Hoshi, EP. Merging Frameworks for Interaction.JPL, 2009.

Eric Pacuit

Page 40: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Characterization Theorem

Let Σ be a finite set of events and suppose XuniDEL is the class of

uniform DEL protocols (with a finiteness condition).

Characterization Theorem A model is in F(XuniDEL) iff it satisfies

propositional stability, synchronicity, perfect recall, local nomiracles, and local bisimulation invariance.

Eric Pacuit

Page 41: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Constrained Public Announcement

1. A→ 〈A〉> vs. 〈A〉> → A

2. 〈A〉KiP ↔ A ∧ Ki 〈A〉P

3. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (A→ 〈A〉P)

4. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (〈A〉> → 〈A〉P)

Eric Pacuit

Page 42: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Constrained Public Announcement

1. A→ 〈A〉> vs. 〈A〉> → A

2. 〈A〉KiP ↔ A ∧ Ki 〈A〉P

3. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (A→ 〈A〉P)

4. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (〈A〉> → 〈A〉P)

Eric Pacuit

Page 43: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Constrained Public Announcement

1. A→ 〈A〉> vs. 〈A〉> → A

2. 〈A〉KiP ↔ A ∧ Ki 〈A〉P

3. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (A→ 〈A〉P)

4. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (〈A〉> → 〈A〉P)

Eric Pacuit

Page 44: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Constrained Public Announcement

1. A→ 〈A〉> vs. 〈A〉> → A

2. 〈A〉KiP ↔ A ∧ Ki 〈A〉P

3. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (A→ 〈A〉P)

4. 〈A〉KiP ↔ 〈A〉> ∧ Ki (〈A〉> → 〈A〉P)

Eric Pacuit

Page 45: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Questions

1. A public announcement is one specific type of event model,can we axiomatize classes of ETL models generated by othertypes of event models?

2. Which formal languages are best suited to describe these DELgenerated ETL models?

Eric Pacuit

Page 46: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

F(X) = Forest(M,P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X.

Examples: F(PAL), F(DEL), F(XPAL), F(XDEL), F(XSPriv ), . . .

Theorems. Sound and complete axiomatizations(Plaza, Gerbrandy, BMS, van Benthem et al., Hoshi & EP,Balibiani et al., Hoshi, . . .)

The logical playground: Decidability of MSO over trees (Rabin);combinations of PDL and S5; high undecidability just around thecorner (Halpern & Vardi, Miller & Moss)

J. van Benthem and EP. The Tree of Knowledge in Action. AiML 2006.

Eric Pacuit

Page 47: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

F(X) = Forest(M,P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X.

Examples: F(PAL), F(DEL), F(XPAL), F(XDEL), F(XSPriv ), . . .

Theorems. Sound and complete axiomatizations(Plaza, Gerbrandy, BMS, van Benthem et al., Hoshi & EP,Balibiani et al., Hoshi, . . .)

The logical playground: Decidability of MSO over trees (Rabin);combinations of PDL and S5; high undecidability just around thecorner (Halpern & Vardi, Miller & Moss)

J. van Benthem and EP. The Tree of Knowledge in Action. AiML 2006.

Eric Pacuit

Page 48: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

F(X) = Forest(M,P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X.

Examples: F(PAL), F(DEL), F(XPAL), F(XDEL), F(XSPriv ), . . .

Theorems. Sound and complete axiomatizations(Plaza, Gerbrandy, BMS, van Benthem et al., Hoshi & EP,Balibiani et al., Hoshi, . . .)

The logical playground: Decidability of MSO over trees (Rabin);combinations of PDL and S5; high undecidability just around thecorner (Halpern & Vardi, Miller & Moss)

J. van Benthem and EP. The Tree of Knowledge in Action. AiML 2006.

Eric Pacuit

Page 49: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

F(X) = Forest(M,P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X.

Examples: F(PAL), F(DEL), F(XPAL), F(XDEL), F(XSPriv ), . . .

Theorems. Sound and complete axiomatizations(Plaza, Gerbrandy, BMS, van Benthem et al., Hoshi & EP,Balibiani et al., Hoshi, . . .)

The logical playground: Decidability of MSO over trees (Rabin);combinations of PDL and S5; high undecidability just around thecorner (Halpern & Vardi, Miller & Moss)

J. van Benthem and EP. The Tree of Knowledge in Action. AiML 2006.

Eric Pacuit

Page 50: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the original questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 51: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the original questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 52: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the original questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 53: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the original questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 54: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Returning to the original questions

How should we represent and reason about the underlying protocol(or plans) that governs the agents’ interactions in a particularsocial situation?

1. What do agents “know” about the protocol, or plans?

2. Which dynamic operations change the protocol or plans overtime?

3. Logical issues: language design, axiomatization issues

Eric Pacuit

Page 55: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is a Protocol?

Given the full tree T of events, a protocol is any subtree of T .

I A protocol is the set of histories compatible with someprocess, i.e., it is the “unwinding” of a (multi-agent) statetransition system.

I A protocol is the set of histories satisfying some property:

• Physical properties: every message is eventually answered, nomessage is received before it is sent

• Agent types: agent i is the type of agent who always lies,agent j is the type who always tells the truth

I A protocol is the set of histories of an extensive gameconsistent with a (partial) strategy profile.

Eric Pacuit

Page 56: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is a Protocol?

Given the full tree T of events, a protocol is any subtree of T .

I A protocol is the set of histories compatible with someprocess, i.e., it is the “unwinding” of a (multi-agent) statetransition system.

I A protocol is the set of histories satisfying some property:

• Physical properties: every message is eventually answered, nomessage is received before it is sent

• Agent types: agent i is the type of agent who always lies,agent j is the type who always tells the truth

I A protocol is the set of histories of an extensive gameconsistent with a (partial) strategy profile.

Eric Pacuit

Page 57: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is a Protocol?

Given the full tree T of events, a protocol is any subtree of T .

I A protocol is the set of histories compatible with someprocess, i.e., it is the “unwinding” of a (multi-agent) statetransition system.

I A protocol is the set of histories satisfying some property:

• Physical properties: every message is eventually answered, nomessage is received before it is sent

• Agent types: agent i is the type of agent who always lies,agent j is the type who always tells the truth

I A protocol is the set of histories of an extensive gameconsistent with a (partial) strategy profile.

Eric Pacuit

Page 58: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is a Protocol?

Given the full tree T of events, a protocol is any subtree of T .

I A protocol is the set of histories compatible with someprocess, i.e., it is the “unwinding” of a (multi-agent) statetransition system.

I A protocol is the set of histories satisfying some property:

• Physical properties: every message is eventually answered, nomessage is received before it is sent

• Agent types: agent i is the type of agent who always lies,agent j is the type who always tells the truth

I A protocol is the set of histories of an extensive gameconsistent with a (partial) strategy profile.

Eric Pacuit

Page 59: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about protocols, or plans

When can an agent agree to follow a protocol or plan?

What does the agent need to know about the protocol beforeagreeing to follow it?

EP and Sunil Simon. Reasoning with Protocols under Imperfect Information.manuscript.

Eric Pacuit

Page 60: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about protocols, or plans

When can an agent agree to follow a protocol or plan?

What does the agent need to know about the protocol beforeagreeing to follow it?

EP and Sunil Simon. Reasoning with Protocols under Imperfect Information.manuscript.

Eric Pacuit

Page 61: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Arena

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4 s5

a b

c d c d

Eric Pacuit

Page 62: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Protocol or PlanA protocol is a finite tree.

At s0, the agent agrees to either choose c or choose d :(a ∪ b); c ∪ (a ∪ b); d

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4 s5

a b

c d c d

Key idea: of course, PDL action expressions can encode any finitetree, but we want PDL over trees

Eric Pacuit

Page 63: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Protocol or PlanA protocol is a finite tree.

At s0, the agent agrees to either choose c or choose d :(a ∪ b); c ∪ (a ∪ b); d

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4

a b

c c

-or-

s0

s1 s2

s4 s5

a b

d d

Key idea: of course, PDL action expressions can encode any finitetree, but we want PDL over trees

Eric Pacuit

Page 64: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Protocol or Plan

A protocol is a finite tree.

At s0, the agent agrees to either choose c or choose d :(a ∪ b); c ∪ (a ∪ b); d

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4

a b

c c

-or-

s0

s1 s2

s4 s5

a b

d d

J. van Benthem. Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction. CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010.

Eric Pacuit

Page 65: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Protocol or PlanA protocol is a finite tree.

At s0, the agent agrees to either choose c or choose d :(a ∪ b); c ∪ (a ∪ b); d

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4

a b

c c

-or-

s0

s1 s2

s4 s5

a b

d d

Key idea: of course, PDL action expressions can encode any finitetree, but we want PDL over trees

Eric Pacuit

Page 66: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Imperfect Information

The protocol is enabled:

s0

s1 s2

s3

a b

c d

a b

c d

Eric Pacuit

Page 67: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Imperfect Information

The protocol is not enabled:

s0

s1 s2

s3

a b

c d

a b

c d

Eric Pacuit

Page 68: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Protocols or Plans

A protocol is a finite tree T .

A complex protocol is generated by the following grammar:

T | π1;π2 | π1 ∪ π2 | π∗

Eric Pacuit

Page 69: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Arena with Imperfect Information

An arena with imperfect information is a structureG I = (W , ⇒aa ∈ Σ, ) where ⊆W ×W .

For each position u in an arena, let I(u) = w | u w be theagent’s “point-of-view”.

For each u, let A(u) = v | ∃a ∈ Σ,w ⇒a v

Eric Pacuit

Page 70: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Arena with Imperfect Information

I No Miracles: for all a ∈ Σ and all w , v ,w ′, v ′ ∈W , ifw v , w

a→w ′, and va→v ′, then w ′ v ′.

I Success: If w v then A(v) ⊆ A(w)

I Awareness: If w v then A(w) ⊆ A(v)

I Certainty of available actions: If w v and w v ′ thenA(v) = A(v ′)

Eric Pacuit

Page 71: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Enabled

A protocol T is objectively enabled if T at u in an arena if Tcan be embedded in the unwinding of u.

A protocol T is subjectively enabled at a position u in an arenawith imperfect information if

1. the agent is certain that T is enabled (for all v ∈ I(u), T isenabled at v), and

2. the agent will be certain that she is in fact following theprotocol at every stage of the protocol.

Eric Pacuit

Page 72: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Enabled

A protocol T is objectively enabled if T at u in an arena if Tcan be embedded in the unwinding of u.

A protocol T is subjectively enabled at a position u in an arenawith imperfect information if

1. the agent is certain that T is enabled (for all v ∈ I(u), T isenabled at v), and

2. the agent will be certain that she is in fact following theprotocol at every stage of the protocol.

Eric Pacuit

Page 73: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Subjectively Enabled: The Idea

s0

s1 s2

s3 s4

a b

d c

s5

s6 s7

s9 s10s8

a b

d dc c

s11

s12 s13

c d

Eric Pacuit

Page 74: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Adopting a Protocol

I Committing to a basic protocol T restricts the choicesavailable to the agent, but there is a trade-off: it alsoincreases the ability of the agent to guarantee that certainpropositions are true.

I Formally, each basic protocol (which is a finite tree) isassociated with a set of states X that the agent can “force”the situation to end up in by making choices consistent withthe protocol.

Eric Pacuit

Page 75: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Adopting a Protocol

I Committing to a basic protocol T restricts the choicesavailable to the agent, but there is a trade-off: it alsoincreases the ability of the agent to guarantee that certainpropositions are true.

I Formally, each basic protocol (which is a finite tree) isassociated with a set of states X that the agent can “force”the situation to end up in by making choices consistent withthe protocol.

Eric Pacuit

Page 76: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Adopting a Protocol

I There are a number of ways to make precise what it means foran agent to “guarantee” that some proposition is true becauseshe adopts the protocols T .

I Given a complex protocol π, the agent must first decide bothhow to go about adopting π then make her choices“in themoment” consistent with this plan. (Consider committing toT1 ∪ T2).

Eric Pacuit

Page 77: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Adopting a Protocol

I There are a number of ways to make precise what it means foran agent to “guarantee” that some proposition is true becauseshe adopts the protocols T .

I Given a complex protocol π, the agent must first decide bothhow to go about adopting π then make her choices“in themoment” consistent with this plan. (Consider committing toT1 ∪ T2).

Eric Pacuit

Page 78: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about Abilities under Imperfect InformationKnowledge/belief:

I ϕ: “the agent has the information that ϕ is true”

Abilities:

I 〈π〉∀α: By adopting the protocol π, α is guaranteed to betrue.

I 〈π〉∃α: By adopting the protocol π, the agent can dosomething consistent with the protocol that will make α true.

“Epistemized” versions of the above operators:

I 〈π〉α: By agreeing to adopt the protocol π, the agent iscertain that α is guaranteed to be true.

I 〈π〉♦α: By agreeing to adopt the protocol π, the agent is can“knowingly” do something consistent with the protocol thatwill make α true.

Eric Pacuit

Page 79: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about Abilities under Imperfect InformationKnowledge/belief:

I M,w |= ϕ iff for all v , if w v then M, v |= ϕ.

Abilities:

I M, u |= 〈π〉∃α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∃π , ∃w ∈ X such that M,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉∀α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∀π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

“Epistemized” versions of the above operators:

I M, u |= 〈π〉α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ Rπ such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉♦α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R♦π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

Eric Pacuit

Page 80: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about Abilities under Imperfect InformationKnowledge/belief:

I M,w |= ϕ iff for all v , if w v then M, v |= ϕ.

Abilities:

I M, u |= 〈π〉∃α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∃π , ∃w ∈ X such that M,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉∀α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∀π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

“Epistemized” versions of the above operators:

I M, u |= 〈π〉α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ Rπ such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉♦α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R♦π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

Eric Pacuit

Page 81: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about Abilities under Imperfect InformationKnowledge/belief:

I M,w |= ϕ iff for all v , if w v then M, v |= ϕ.

Abilities:

I M, u |= 〈π〉∃α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∃π , ∃w ∈ X such that M,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉∀α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R∀π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

“Epistemized” versions of the above operators:

I M, u |= 〈π〉α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ Rπ such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

I M, u |= 〈π〉♦α iff ∃(u,X ) ∈ R♦π such that ∀w ∈ X we haveM,w |= α.

Eric Pacuit

Page 82: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Reasoning about Abilities under Imperfect Information

I RFt = (u,X ) | enabled(Tt , u) and frontier(Tu |\ Tt)) = X

(for F ∈ ∃,∀).

I Rt = (u,X ) | s-enabled(Tt , u) and frontier((G, u) |\s Tt)) =X.

I R♦t = (u,X ) | s-enabled(Tt , u) and ∃ρ ∈Paths(Tt) with S(ρ, u) = Z0Z1 . . .Zk and X = last(Zk).

Eric Pacuit

Page 83: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Logics of Information and Abilities

I Combining PDL with epistemic/doxastic logics

R. Schmidt and D. Tishkovsky. On combinations of propositional dynamic logicand doxastic modal logics. JOLLI, 2008.

I Knowing how to execute a plan/win a game

A. Herzig and N. Troquard. Knowing how to play: uniform choices in logics ofagency. Proceedings of AAMAS 2006, pgs. 209 - 216.

Y. Lesperance, H. Levesque, F. Lin and R. Scherl. Ability and Knowing How inthe Situation Calculus. Studia Logica 65, pgs. 165 - 186, 2000.

EP and S. Simon. Reasoning about protocols under imperfect information.manuscript, 2010.

Eric Pacuit

Page 84: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Logics of Information and Abilities

I Combining PDL with epistemic/doxastic logics

R. Schmidt and D. Tishkovsky. On combinations of propositional dynamic logicand doxastic modal logics. JOLLI, 2008.

I Knowing how to execute a plan/win a game

A. Herzig and N. Troquard. Knowing how to play: uniform choices in logics ofagency. Proceedings of AAMAS 2006, pgs. 209 - 216.

Y. Lesperance, H. Levesque, F. Lin and R. Scherl. Ability and Knowing How inthe Situation Calculus. Studia Logica 65, pgs. 165 - 186, 2000.

EP and S. Simon. Reasoning about protocols under imperfect information.manuscript, 2010.

Eric Pacuit

Page 85: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Merging Logics of Rational Agency

X Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences

X Reasoning with protocols

X “Epistemizing” Logics of Action and Ability: knowing how toachieve ϕ vs. knowing that you can achieve ϕ

I Plans Change (dynamic BDI - belief desire intention - logics)

Eric Pacuit

Page 86: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 87: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 88: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 89: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 90: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 91: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

B ∗ ϕ = B′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula, other belief sets

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 92: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

State ∗ Input = State ′

What about other aspects of rational agency?

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula, other belief sets

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 93: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Revising Mental Attitudes

X Preference change

T. Grune-Yanoff and S. Ove Hansen (eds.). Preference Change. Vol. 42, Theoryand Decision Library (2009).

X General model of “attitude” change

C. List and F. Dietrich. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards ageneral theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (forthcoming).

X Goal dynamics

C. Castelgranchi and F. Paglieri. The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: Prole-gomena to a constructive theory of intentions. Synthese 155: 237 - 263 (2007).

Today: Intention dynamics

Eric Pacuit

Page 94: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Revising Mental Attitudes

X Preference change

T. Grune-Yanoff and S. Ove Hansen (eds.). Preference Change. Vol. 42, Theoryand Decision Library (2009).

X General model of “attitude” change

C. List and F. Dietrich. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards ageneral theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (forthcoming).

X Goal dynamics

C. Castelgranchi and F. Paglieri. The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: Prole-gomena to a constructive theory of intentions. Synthese 155: 237 - 263 (2007).

Today: Intention dynamics

Eric Pacuit

Page 95: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Revising Mental Attitudes

X Preference change

T. Grune-Yanoff and S. Ove Hansen (eds.). Preference Change. Vol. 42, Theoryand Decision Library (2009).

X General model of “attitude” change

C. List and F. Dietrich. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards ageneral theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (forthcoming).

X Goal dynamics

C. Castelgranchi and F. Paglieri. The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: Prole-gomena to a constructive theory of intentions. Synthese 155: 237 - 263 (2007).

Today: Intention dynamics

Eric Pacuit

Page 96: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Revising Mental Attitudes

X Preference change

T. Grune-Yanoff and S. Ove Hansen (eds.). Preference Change. Vol. 42, Theoryand Decision Library (2009).

X General model of “attitude” change

C. List and F. Dietrich. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards ageneral theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (forthcoming).

X Goal dynamics

C. Castelgranchi and F. Paglieri. The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: Prole-gomena to a constructive theory of intentions. Synthese 155: 237 - 263 (2007).

Today: Intention dynamics

Eric Pacuit

Page 97: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts

2. (Present-directed) Intentional action

3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

Unifying account of intentions

“Where we are tempted to speak of ‘different senses’ of aword which is clearly not equivocal, we may infer that we arepretty much in the dark about the character of the conceptwhich it represents”- G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, pg. 1

Eric Pacuit

Page 98: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts

2. (Present-directed) Intentional action

3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

I Unifying account of intentions

“Where we are tempted to speak of ‘different senses’ of aword which is clearly not equivocal, we may infer that we arepretty much in the dark about the character of the conceptwhich it represents”- G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, pg. 1

Eric Pacuit

Page 99: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts

2. (Present-directed) Intentional action

3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

I Unifying account of intentions

I Intention as a mental state

pro-attitude (vs. informational attitude), world-to-minddirection of fit, conduct-controlling

Eric Pacuit

Page 100: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts2. (Present-directed) Intentional action3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

I Unifying account of intentionsI Intention as a mental stateI Intentions are (always) directed towards actions

“Although we sometimes report intention as a propositionalattitude — ‘I intend that p’ — such reports can always berecast as ‘intending to ....’ as when I intend to bring aboutthat p. By contrast, it is difficult to rephrase such mundaneexpressions as ‘I intend to walk home’ in propositional terms”

Eric Pacuit

Page 101: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts

2. (Present-directed) Intentional action

3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

I Unifying account of intentions

I Intention as a mental state

I Intentions are (always) directed towards actions

An extensive literature:

K. Setiya. Intention. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010).

Eric Pacuit

Page 102: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Background: Intentions

Important distinctions:

1. (Present-directed) The intention with which someone acts

2. (Present-directed) Intentional action

3. (Future-directed) Intending to do some action

Some issues:

I Unifying account of intentions

I Intention as a mental state

I Intentions are (always) directed towards actions

An extensive literature:

K. Setiya. Intention. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010).

Eric Pacuit

Page 103: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

“intention is a distinctive practical attitude marked by its pivotalrole in planning for the future.

Intention involves desire, but evenpredominant desire is insufficient for intention, since it need notinvolve a commitment to act: intentions are conduct-controllingpro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain withoutreconsideration, and which play a significant role as inputs to[means-end] reasoning” (pg. 20)

Eric Pacuit

Page 104: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

“intention is a distinctive practical attitude marked by its pivotalrole in planning for the future. Intention involves desire, but evenpredominant desire is insufficient for intention, since it need notinvolve a commitment to act:

intentions are conduct-controllingpro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain withoutreconsideration, and which play a significant role as inputs to[means-end] reasoning” (pg. 20)

Eric Pacuit

Page 105: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

“intention is a distinctive practical attitude marked by its pivotalrole in planning for the future. Intention involves desire, but evenpredominant desire is insufficient for intention, since it need notinvolve a commitment to act: intentions are conduct-controllingpro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain withoutreconsideration, and which play a significant role as inputs to[means-end] reasoning” (pg. 20)

Eric Pacuit

Page 106: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

Committing to an action in advance is crucial for

1. our capacity to make rational decisions (as a bounded agent)

2. our capacity to engage in complex, temporally extendedprojects

3. our capacity to coordinate with others

Of course, this commitment is defeasible...

Eric Pacuit

Page 107: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

Committing to an action in advance is crucial for

1. our capacity to make rational decisions (as a bounded agent)

2. our capacity to engage in complex, temporally extendedprojects

3. our capacity to coordinate with others

Of course, this commitment is defeasible...

Eric Pacuit

Page 108: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

Committing to an action in advance is crucial for

1. our capacity to make rational decisions (as a bounded agent)

2. our capacity to engage in complex, temporally extendedprojects

3. our capacity to coordinate with others

Of course, this commitment is defeasible...

Eric Pacuit

Page 109: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

Committing to an action in advance is crucial for

1. our capacity to make rational decisions (as a bounded agent)

2. our capacity to engage in complex, temporally extendedprojects

3. our capacity to coordinate with others

Of course, this commitment is defeasible...

Eric Pacuit

Page 110: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Functional Description of IntentionsM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

Committing to an action in advance is crucial for

1. our capacity to make rational decisions (as a bounded agent)

2. our capacity to engage in complex, temporally extendedprojects

3. our capacity to coordinate with others

Of course, this commitment is defeasible...

Eric Pacuit

Page 111: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Stability of PlansM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

plans normally resist reconsideration:

“an agent’s habits anddispositions concerning the reconsideration or nonreconsiderationof a prior intention or plan determine the stability of that intentionor plan”. .... “The stability of [the agent’s] plans will generally notbe an isolated feature of those plans but will be linked to otherfeatures of [the agent’s] psychology” (pg. 65)

What happens in “abnormal” or “surprising” situations? Thispoints to a theory of (rational) intention/plan revision...

Eric Pacuit

Page 112: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Stability of PlansM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

plans normally resist reconsideration: “an agent’s habits anddispositions concerning the reconsideration or nonreconsiderationof a prior intention or plan determine the stability of that intentionor plan”.

.... “The stability of [the agent’s] plans will generally notbe an isolated feature of those plans but will be linked to otherfeatures of [the agent’s] psychology” (pg. 65)

What happens in “abnormal” or “surprising” situations? Thispoints to a theory of (rational) intention/plan revision...

Eric Pacuit

Page 113: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Stability of PlansM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

plans normally resist reconsideration: “an agent’s habits anddispositions concerning the reconsideration or nonreconsiderationof a prior intention or plan determine the stability of that intentionor plan”. .... “The stability of [the agent’s] plans will generally notbe an isolated feature of those plans but will be linked to otherfeatures of [the agent’s] psychology” (pg. 65)

What happens in “abnormal” or “surprising” situations? Thispoints to a theory of (rational) intention/plan revision...

Eric Pacuit

Page 114: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Stability of PlansM. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press(1987).

plans normally resist reconsideration: “an agent’s habits anddispositions concerning the reconsideration or nonreconsiderationof a prior intention or plan determine the stability of that intentionor plan”. .... “The stability of [the agent’s] plans will generally notbe an isolated feature of those plans but will be linked to otherfeatures of [the agent’s] psychology” (pg. 65)

What happens in “abnormal” or “surprising” situations? Thispoints to a theory of (rational) intention/plan revision...

Eric Pacuit

Page 115: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: intentions and beliefs are entangled

Intending to act just is a special kind of belief that one will;

Intending to act involves a belief that one will so act;

Intending to act involve a belief that it is possible that onewill so act.

Eric Pacuit

Page 116: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: intentions and beliefs are entangled

1. Intending to act just is a special kind of belief that one will;

Intending to act involves a belief that one will so act;

Intending to act involve a belief that it is possible that onewill so act.

Eric Pacuit

Page 117: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: intentions and beliefs are entangled

1. Intending to act just is a special kind of belief that one will;

2. Intending to act involves a belief that one will so act;

Intending to act involve a belief that it is possible that onewill so act.

Eric Pacuit

Page 118: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: intentions and beliefs are entangled

1. Intending to act just is a special kind of belief that one will;

2. Intending to act involves a belief that one will so act;

3. Intending to act involves a belief that it is possible that onewill so act.

Eric Pacuit

Page 119: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: intentions and beliefs are entangled

1. Intending to act just is a special kind of belief that one will;

2. Intending to act involves a belief that one will so act;

3. Intending to act involves a belief that it is possible that onewill so act.

Eric Pacuit

Page 120: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: rationality constraints on intentions

1. Consistency: “one’s intentions, taken together with one’sbeliefs fit together into a consistent model of one’s future”

2. Means-ends consistency: “it is irrational that one intends E ,believes that E requires that one intend means M and yet notintend M”

3. Agglomeration: “Intending A and Intending B impliesIntending (A and B)”

M. Bratman. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. in Spheres of Reason(2009).

Eric Pacuit

Page 121: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: rationality constraints on intentions

1. Consistency: “one’s intentions, taken together with one’sbeliefs fit together into a consistent model of one’s future”

2. Means-ends consistency: “it is irrational that one intends E ,believes that E requires that one intend means M and yet notintend M”

3. Agglomeration: “Intending A and Intending B impliesIntending (A and B)”

M. Bratman. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. in Spheres of Reason(2009).

Eric Pacuit

Page 122: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: rationality constraints on intentions

1. Consistency: “one’s intentions, taken together with one’sbeliefs fit together into a consistent model of one’s future”

2. Means-ends consistency: “it is irrational that one intends E ,believes that E requires that one intend means M and yet notintend M”

3. Agglomeration: “Intending A and Intending B impliesIntending (A and B)”

M. Bratman. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. in Spheres of Reason(2009).

Eric Pacuit

Page 123: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conceptual Issue: rationality constraints on intentions

1. Consistency: “one’s intentions, taken together with one’sbeliefs fit together into a consistent model of one’s future”

2. Means-ends consistency: “it is irrational that one intends E ,believes that E requires that one intend means M and yet notintend M”

3. Agglomeration: “Intending A and Intending B impliesIntending (A and B)”

M. Bratman. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. in Spheres of Reason(2009).

Eric Pacuit

Page 124: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Intention Dynamics

1. Intentional Action Execution: precise characterizationunder which an agent’s intention transforms into an action.(trying, attempting)

2. Intention Generation: model appropriate principles ofintention generation (practical or instrumental reasoning)

3. Intention Persistence: intentions normally resistreconsideration (bounded agents)

E. Lorini and A. Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese 163, pp. 45- 77 (2008).

Eric Pacuit

Page 125: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Intention Dynamics

1. Intentional Action Execution: precise characterizationunder which an agent’s intention transforms into an action.(trying, attempting)

2. Intention Generation: model appropriate principles ofintention generation (practical or instrumental reasoning)

3. Intention Persistence: intentions normally resistreconsideration (bounded agents)

E. Lorini and A. Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese 163, pp. 45- 77 (2008).

Eric Pacuit

Page 126: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Intention Dynamics

1. Intentional Action Execution: precise characterizationunder which an agent’s intention transforms into an action.(trying, attempting)

2. Intention Generation: model appropriate principles ofintention generation (practical or instrumental reasoning)

3. Intention Persistence: intentions normally resistreconsideration (bounded agents)

E. Lorini and A. Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese 163, pp. 45- 77 (2008).

Eric Pacuit

Page 127: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Intention Dynamics

1. Intentional Action Execution: precise characterizationunder which an agent’s intention transforms into an action.(trying, attempting)

2. Intention Generation: model appropriate principles ofintention generation (practical or instrumental reasoning)

3. Intention Persistence: intentions normally resistreconsideration (bounded agents)

E. Lorini and A. Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese 163, pp. 45- 77 (2008).

Eric Pacuit

Page 128: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Intention Dynamics

1. Intentional Action Execution: precise characterizationunder which an agent’s intention transforms into an action.(trying, attempting)

2. Intention Generation: model appropriate principles ofintention generation (practical or instrumental reasoning)

3. Intention Persistence: intentions normally resistreconsideration (bounded agents)

E. Lorini and A. Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese 163, pp. 45- 77 (2008).

Eric Pacuit

Page 129: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 130: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change.

When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 131: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 132: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems:

Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 133: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 134: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined:

This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 135: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. Strong analogy between the problem of plan/intention changeand belief change. When an agent learns that his plans are nolonger viable, he must change them so that they account forthe new information.

2. There are important differences between the two problems: Ifthe agent has committed to doing action a at time i (perhapson condition ϕ), there is always a specific reason for thiscommitment. In contrast, standard models of belief change donot record specific reasons for each belief.

3. Finally, the two problems are intertwined: This is because wemust not only maintain that the agent’s beliefs and plans areindividually consistent, but also that they are jointly coherent.

Eric Pacuit

Page 136: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 137: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief and Intention Revision

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Propositional formulas

2. What is a coherent description?A belief state is a consistent and deductively closed set ofpropositional formulas

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 138: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Goal: Find a logic where consistency represents

1. the agent’s beliefs are consistent,

2. the agent’s future plans are consistent and

3. the beliefs and intentions together form a coherent picture ofwhat may happen (and how the agent’s own actions will playa role in what may happen).

Eric Pacuit

Page 139: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Goal: Find a logic where consistency represents

1. the agent’s beliefs are consistent,

2. the agent’s future plans are consistent and

3. the beliefs and intentions together form a coherent picture ofwhat may happen (and how the agent’s own actions will playa role in what may happen).

Eric Pacuit

Page 140: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Goal: Find a logic where consistency represents

1. the agent’s beliefs are consistent,

2. the agent’s future plans are consistent and

3. the beliefs and intentions together form a coherent picture ofwhat may happen (and how the agent’s own actions will playa role in what may happen).

Eric Pacuit

Page 141: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Goal: Find a logic where consistency represents

1. the agent’s beliefs are consistent,

2. the agent’s future plans are consistent and

3. the beliefs and intentions together form a coherent picture ofwhat may happen (and how the agent’s own actions will playa role in what may happen).

Eric Pacuit

Page 142: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Background: BDI Logics

Stemming from Bratman’s planning theory of intention a numberof logics of rational agency have been developed:

I Cohen and Levesque Example ; Rao and Georgeff (BDI); Meyerand van der Hoek (KARO); and many others.

Some common features

I Underlying temporal model

I Belief, Desire, Intention, Plans, Actions are defined withcorresponding operators in a language

J.-J. Meyer and F. Veltman. Intelligent Agents and Common Sense Reasoning.Handbook of Modal Logic, 2007.

Eric Pacuit

Page 143: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Background: BDI Logics

Stemming from Bratman’s planning theory of intention a numberof logics of rational agency have been developed:

I Cohen and Levesque Example ; Rao and Georgeff (BDI); Meyerand van der Hoek (KARO); and many others.

Some common features

I Underlying temporal model

I Belief, Desire, Intention, Plans, Actions are defined withcorresponding operators in a language

J.-J. Meyer and F. Veltman. Intelligent Agents and Common Sense Reasoning.Handbook of Modal Logic, 2007.

Eric Pacuit

Page 144: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Methodological Issue

What are we formalizing? How will the logical framework be used?

Two Extremes:

1. Formalizing a (philosophical) theory of rational agency:philosophers as intuition pumps generating “problems” for thelogical frameworks (eg., the “side-effect problem”).

2. Reasoning about multiagent systems: Three main applicationsof BDI logics: 1. a specification language for a MAS, 2. aprogramming language, and 3. verification language.

W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational agency. LogicJournal of the IGPL 11 (2), 2003.

Eric Pacuit

Page 145: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Methodological Issue

What are we formalizing? How will the logical framework be used?

Two Extremes:

1. Formalizing a (philosophical) theory of rational agency:

philosophers as intuition pumps generating “problems” for thelogical frameworks (eg., the “side-effect problem”).

2. Reasoning about multiagent systems: Three main applicationsof BDI logics: 1. a specification language for a MAS, 2. aprogramming language, and 3. verification language.

W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational agency. LogicJournal of the IGPL 11 (2), 2003.

Eric Pacuit

Page 146: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Methodological Issue

What are we formalizing? How will the logical framework be used?

Two Extremes:

1. Formalizing a (philosophical) theory of rational agency:philosophers as intuition pumps generating “problems” for thelogical frameworks (eg., the “side-effect problem”).

2. Reasoning about multiagent systems: Three main applicationsof BDI logics: 1. a specification language for a MAS, 2. aprogramming language, and 3. verification language.

W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational agency. LogicJournal of the IGPL 11 (2), 2003.

Eric Pacuit

Page 147: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Methodological Issue

What are we formalizing? How will the logical framework be used?

Two Extremes:

1. Formalizing a (philosophical) theory of rational agency:philosophers as intuition pumps generating “problems” for thelogical frameworks (eg., the “side-effect problem”).

2. Reasoning about multiagent systems:

Three main applicationsof BDI logics: 1. a specification language for a MAS, 2. aprogramming language, and 3. verification language.

W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational agency. LogicJournal of the IGPL 11 (2), 2003.

Eric Pacuit

Page 148: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

A Methodological Issue

What are we formalizing? How will the logical framework be used?

Two Extremes:

1. Formalizing a (philosophical) theory of rational agency:philosophers as intuition pumps generating “problems” for thelogical frameworks (eg., the “side-effect problem”).

2. Reasoning about multiagent systems: Three main applicationsof BDI logics: 1. a specification language for a MAS, 2. aprogramming language, and 3. verification language.

W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational agency. LogicJournal of the IGPL 11 (2), 2003.

Eric Pacuit

Page 149: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,¶〉

1. B: beliefs

2. D: desires

3. 〈I,A〉: intentions and active plans

4. ¶: practical reasoning rules (“know how”)

Eric Pacuit

Page 150: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,¶〉

1. B: beliefs

2. D: desires

3. 〈I,A〉: intentions and active plans

4. ¶: practical reasoning rules (“know how”)

Eric Pacuit

Page 151: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,¶〉

1. B: beliefs

2. D: desires

3. 〈I,A〉: intentions and active plans

4. ¶: practical reasoning rules (“know how”)

Eric Pacuit

Page 152: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,¶〉

1. B: beliefs

2. D: desires

3. 〈I,A〉: intentions and active plans

4. ¶: practical reasoning rules (“know how”)

Eric Pacuit

Page 153: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,¶〉

1. B: beliefs

2. D: desires

3. 〈I,A〉: intentions and active plans

4. ¶: practical reasoning rules (“know how”)

Eric Pacuit

Page 154: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,P〉

I Beliefs are sets of Linear Temporal Logic formulas (eg., ©ϕ)

I Desires are (possibly inconsistent) sets of Linear TemporalLogic formulas

I Practical reasoning rules: α← α1, α2, . . . , αn (“if Tα is anintention then T (α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn) is a possible fulfillment...”)

I Intentions are derived from the agents current active plans(trees of practical reasoning rules)

Eric Pacuit

Page 155: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,P〉

I Beliefs are sets of Linear Temporal Logic formulas (eg., ©ϕ)

I Desires are (possibly inconsistent) sets of Linear TemporalLogic formulas

I Practical reasoning rules: α← α1, α2, . . . , αn (“if Tα is anintention then T (α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn) is a possible fulfillment...”)

I Intentions are derived from the agents current active plans(trees of practical reasoning rules)

Eric Pacuit

Page 156: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,P〉

I Beliefs are sets of Linear Temporal Logic formulas (eg., ©ϕ)

I Desires are (possibly inconsistent) sets of Linear TemporalLogic formulas

I Practical reasoning rules: α← α1, α2, . . . , αn (“if Tα is anintention then T (α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn) is a possible fulfillment...”)

I Intentions are derived from the agents current active plans(trees of practical reasoning rules)

Eric Pacuit

Page 157: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Describing the Mental StateW. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga and M. Wooldridge. Towards a theory of intentionrevision. Synthese 155, pgs. 265 - 290 (2007).

Γ = 〈B,D, 〈I,A〉,P〉

I Beliefs are sets of Linear Temporal Logic formulas (eg., ©ϕ)

I Desires are (possibly inconsistent) sets of Linear TemporalLogic formulas

I Practical reasoning rules: α← α1, α2, . . . , αn (“if Tα is anintention then T (α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn) is a possible fulfillment...”)

I Intentions are derived from the agents current active plans(trees of practical reasoning rules)

Eric Pacuit

Page 158: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 159: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 160: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 161: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 162: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 163: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 164: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

What is the appropriate underlying logic?

Many proposals, but no clear consensus...

I KD45 for B?

I Bϕ→ Goalϕ?

I Goalϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ?

I Goalϕ→ BGoalϕ?

I Temporal logic, action logic, doxastic logic, combinations,etc., etc.

Eric Pacuit

Page 165: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Focusing the Discussion

Start from an explicit description of what is being modeled: eg., a“planner” using a “database” to maintain its current set of beliefsand plans.

Y. Shoham. Logic of Intention and the Database Perspective. JPL 2009.

How should we describe the “mental state”?What type of entries are in the database?

1. Beliefs (about future states, which actions are available pluswhat the agent might do)

2. Current instructions from the planner

Eric Pacuit

Page 166: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Focusing the Discussion

Start from an explicit description of what is being modeled: eg., a“planner” using a “database” to maintain its current set of beliefsand plans.

Y. Shoham. Logic of Intention and the Database Perspective. JPL 2009.

How should we describe the “mental state”?What type of entries are in the database?

1. Beliefs (about future states, which actions are available pluswhat the agent might do)

2. Current instructions from the planner

Eric Pacuit

Page 167: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Focusing the Discussion

Start from an explicit description of what is being modeled: eg., a“planner” using a “database” to maintain its current set of beliefsand plans.

Y. Shoham. Logic of Intention and the Database Perspective. JPL 2009.

How should we describe the “mental state”?What type of entries are in the database?

1. Beliefs (about future states, which actions are available pluswhat the agent might do)

2. Current instructions from the planner

Eric Pacuit

Page 168: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

Post-conditions of intended actions are justifiably believed by themere fact that the agent has committed to bringing them about.

On the other hand, pre-conditions may still pose a practicalproblem yet to be solved.

Eric Pacuit

Page 169: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

Post-conditions of intended actions are justifiably believed by themere fact that the agent has committed to bringing them about.

On the other hand, pre-conditions may still pose a practicalproblem yet to be solved.

Eric Pacuit

Page 170: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

“My belief that I will be at Tanner Library this afternoon is basedon my knowledge that I intend to go there.

If I reconsider thisintention, I must bracket the support it provides for this belief andothers. I must take care not to keep assuming I will be at Tanner,even while reconsidering my intention to go there....Keeping trackof the ways in which one’s beliefs depend on intentions beingreconsidered may become a fairly complex matter, especially asone reconsiders more extensive elements in one’s prior plans. Butthis should not be taken to show that one may rationally proceedwithout adjusting one’s beliefs as one reconsiders. Rather, it showsjust how complicated — and so, costly — reconsideration of priorintentions can be.”

[Bratman, pg. 63, my emphasis]

Eric Pacuit

Page 171: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

“My belief that I will be at Tanner Library this afternoon is basedon my knowledge that I intend to go there. If I reconsider thisintention, I must bracket the support it provides for this belief andothers. I must take care not to keep assuming I will be at Tanner,even while reconsidering my intention to go there....

Keeping trackof the ways in which one’s beliefs depend on intentions beingreconsidered may become a fairly complex matter, especially asone reconsiders more extensive elements in one’s prior plans. Butthis should not be taken to show that one may rationally proceedwithout adjusting one’s beliefs as one reconsiders. Rather, it showsjust how complicated — and so, costly — reconsideration of priorintentions can be.”

[Bratman, pg. 63, my emphasis]

Eric Pacuit

Page 172: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

“My belief that I will be at Tanner Library this afternoon is basedon my knowledge that I intend to go there. If I reconsider thisintention, I must bracket the support it provides for this belief andothers. I must take care not to keep assuming I will be at Tanner,even while reconsidering my intention to go there....Keeping trackof the ways in which one’s beliefs depend on intentions beingreconsidered may become a fairly complex matter, especially asone reconsiders more extensive elements in one’s prior plans.

Butthis should not be taken to show that one may rationally proceedwithout adjusting one’s beliefs as one reconsiders. Rather, it showsjust how complicated — and so, costly — reconsideration of priorintentions can be.”

[Bratman, pg. 63, my emphasis]

Eric Pacuit

Page 173: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

“My belief that I will be at Tanner Library this afternoon is basedon my knowledge that I intend to go there. If I reconsider thisintention, I must bracket the support it provides for this belief andothers. I must take care not to keep assuming I will be at Tanner,even while reconsidering my intention to go there....Keeping trackof the ways in which one’s beliefs depend on intentions beingreconsidered may become a fairly complex matter, especially asone reconsiders more extensive elements in one’s prior plans. Butthis should not be taken to show that one may rationally proceedwithout adjusting one’s beliefs as one reconsiders.

Rather, it showsjust how complicated — and so, costly — reconsideration of priorintentions can be.”

[Bratman, pg. 63, my emphasis]

Eric Pacuit

Page 174: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Contingent vs. Non-contingent Beliefs

“My belief that I will be at Tanner Library this afternoon is basedon my knowledge that I intend to go there. If I reconsider thisintention, I must bracket the support it provides for this belief andothers. I must take care not to keep assuming I will be at Tanner,even while reconsidering my intention to go there....Keeping trackof the ways in which one’s beliefs depend on intentions beingreconsidered may become a fairly complex matter, especially asone reconsiders more extensive elements in one’s prior plans. Butthis should not be taken to show that one may rationally proceedwithout adjusting one’s beliefs as one reconsiders. Rather, it showsjust how complicated — and so, costly — reconsideration of priorintentions can be.”

[Bratman, pg. 63, my emphasis]

Eric Pacuit

Page 175: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Beliefs

ϕ := pt | pre(a)t | post(a)t | Do(a)t | ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ

p ∈ At, a ∈ Act, t ∈ Z+

I pt means p is true at time t

I For every a and time t associate pre(a)t , post(a)t+1, whichwe treat as distinguished propositional variables

I Do(a)t mean the agent does a at t units from now

I is historic necessity

Eric Pacuit

Page 176: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Beliefs

Beliefs are consistent and deductively closed sets of formulas:

1. Propositional Tautologies;

2. S5 axiom schemes for : ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ→ ψ,ϕ→ ϕ, ϕ→ ϕ,♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ, Necessitation);

3.∨

a∈Act Do(a)t ;

4. Do(a)t →∧

b 6=a ¬Do(b)t ;

5. Do(a)t → post(a)t+1;

6. pre(a)t → ♦Do(a)t ;

7. Modus Ponens

Eric Pacuit

Page 177: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Beliefs

Beliefs are consistent and deductively closed sets of formulas:

1. Propositional Tautologies;

2. S5 axiom schemes for : ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ→ ψ,ϕ→ ϕ, ϕ→ ϕ,♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ, Necessitation);

3.∨

a∈Act Do(a)t ;

4. Do(a)t →∧

b 6=a ¬Do(b)t ;

5. Do(a)t → post(a)t+1;

6. pre(a)t → ♦Do(a)t ;

7. Modus Ponens

Eric Pacuit

Page 178: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

P = P(Prop ∪ pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act)

Path: π : Z→ (P × Act)

Eric Pacuit

Page 179: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

Eric Pacuit

Page 180: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

Eric Pacuit

Page 181: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

a

(π1(t), π(t)2)

Eric Pacuit

Page 182: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

π1(t)a

Eric Pacuit

Page 183: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

P = P(Prop ∪ pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act)

Path: π : Z→ (P × Act)

Historic necessity: π ∼t π′ iff for all t ′ ≤ t, π(t ′) = π′(t ′)

Appropriate path:

I If π(t)2 = a then post(a) ∈ π(t + 1)1

I If pre(a) ∈ π(t)1 then there is some π′ ∼t π such thatπ′(t)2 = a.

Eric Pacuit

Page 184: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

P = P(Prop ∪ pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act)

Path: π : Z→ (P × Act)

Historic necessity: π ∼t π′ iff for all t ′ ≤ t, π(t ′) = π′(t ′)

Appropriate path:

I If π(t)2 = a then post(a) ∈ π(t + 1)1

I If pre(a) ∈ π(t)1 then there is some π′ ∼t π such thatπ′(t)2 = a.

Eric Pacuit

Page 185: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

P = P(Prop ∪ pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act)

Path: π : Z→ (P × Act)

Historic necessity: π ∼t π′ iff for all t ′ ≤ t, π(t ′) = π′(t ′)

Appropriate path:

I If π(t)2 = a then post(a) ∈ π(t + 1)1

I If pre(a) ∈ π(t)1 then there is some π′ ∼t π such thatπ′(t)2 = a.

Eric Pacuit

Page 186: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

π1(t)a

Eric Pacuit

Page 187: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

π

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

p, q, . . .

pre(c), pre(c ′), . . .

post(a), post(d ′), . . .

π1(t)a

π1(t + 1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 188: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

π1(t)a

a′

Eric Pacuit

Page 189: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

p, q, . . .

pre(a), pre(a′), . . .

post(b), post(b′), . . .

cπ1(t)a

a′

Eric Pacuit

Page 190: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

Truth:

I π, t |= αt′ iff α ∈ π(t ′)1 for α = p, pre(a), post(a)

I π, t |= Do(a)t′ iff π(t ′)2 = a

I π, t |= ϕ iff for all π′ ∼t π, π′, t |= ϕ

I ....

Completeness Theorem. The logic given earlier is sound andcomplete with respect to the class of all appropriate paths.

Proof. Standard modal reasoning.

Eric Pacuit

Page 191: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Semantics

Truth:

I π, t |= αt′ iff α ∈ π(t ′)1 for α = p, pre(a), post(a)

I π, t |= Do(a)t′ iff π(t ′)2 = a

I π, t |= ϕ iff for all π′ ∼t π, π′, t |= ϕ

I ....

Completeness Theorem. The logic given earlier is sound andcomplete with respect to the class of all appropriate paths.

Proof. Standard modal reasoning.

Eric Pacuit

Page 192: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 193: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 194: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 195: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 196: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 197: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 198: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention States: Instructions

There are “instructions” from the Planner about future choicesthat the agent agrees (promises, commits) to follow (if he can).

These instructions may

1. be a complete plan: for each (future) moment specify asingle action a ∈ Act the agent will perform.

2. be a partial plan: finite set of pairs (a, t) with a ∈ Act, t ∈ N.

3. be a conditional plan: do a at time t provided ϕ is true.

4. restrict available choices (rather than instructing the agent tofollow a specific plan), i.e., disjunctive plans.

5. be a more complicated structure (subplans, goals, etc.)

Eric Pacuit

Page 199: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention Base: Coherence

A belief-intention base is a pair (B, I ) where 1. B is a set ofbeliefs and 2. I is a finite set of pairs (a, t)

Coherence: CohereI := ♦∧

(a,t)∈I pre(a)t

I (B, I ) is coherent if ¬CohereI 6∈ B.

I (Π, I ) is coherent if there is some π ∈ Π such thatπ, 0 |= CohereI .

Eric Pacuit

Page 200: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Belief-Intention Base: Coherence

A belief-intention base is a pair (B, I ) where 1. B is a set ofbeliefs and 2. I is a finite set of pairs (a, t)

Coherence: CohereI := ♦∧

(a,t)∈I pre(a)t

I (B, I ) is coherent if ¬CohereI 6∈ B.

I (Π, I ) is coherent if there is some π ∈ Π such thatπ, 0 |= CohereI .

Eric Pacuit

Page 201: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Sufficiently rich structure/(modal) language

2. What is a coherent description?What properties/logic characterize a rational balance?

3. What are the inputs?Consistent propositional formula

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 202: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Sources of Dynamics

1. Nature can reveal (true) facts about the current choicesituation (eg., facts that are true, choices that areavailable/not available in the future).

2. The agent can decide to perform an action (which in turnforces Nature to reveal certain information such as whichactions become available).

3. The Planner can amend the agent’s current set of instructions.

Typically only doing an action moves “time” forward. However, allthree may change the agent’s beliefs and current instructions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 203: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Sources of Dynamics

1. Nature can reveal (true) facts about the current choicesituation (eg., facts that are true, choices that areavailable/not available in the future).

2. The agent can decide to perform an action (which in turnforces Nature to reveal certain information such as whichactions become available).

3. The Planner can amend the agent’s current set of instructions.

Typically only doing an action moves “time” forward. However, allthree may change the agent’s beliefs and current instructions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 204: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Sources of Dynamics

1. Nature can reveal (true) facts about the current choicesituation (eg., facts that are true, choices that areavailable/not available in the future).

2. The agent can decide to perform an action (which in turnforces Nature to reveal certain information such as whichactions become available).

3. The Planner can amend the agent’s current set of instructions.

Typically only doing an action moves “time” forward. However, allthree may change the agent’s beliefs and current instructions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 205: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Sources of Dynamics

1. Nature can reveal (true) facts about the current choicesituation (eg., facts that are true, choices that areavailable/not available in the future).

2. The agent can decide to perform an action (which in turnforces Nature to reveal certain information such as whichactions become available).

3. The Planner can amend the agent’s current set of instructions.

Typically only doing an action moves “time” forward. However, allthree may change the agent’s beliefs and current instructions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 206: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Sources of Dynamics

1. Nature can reveal (true) facts about the current choicesituation (eg., facts that are true, choices that areavailable/not available in the future).

2. The agent can decide to perform an action (which in turnforces Nature to reveal certain information such as whichactions become available).

3. The Planner can amend the agent’s current set of instructions.

Typically only doing an action moves “time” forward. However, allthree may change the agent’s beliefs and current instructions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 207: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Sufficiently rich structure/(modal) language

2. What is a coherent description?What properties/logic characterize a rational balance?

3. What are the inputs?Formulas and new plans

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?AGM postulates, Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Eric Pacuit

Page 208: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

y

x

a

a

a′

b

a′

b

b′

b′

d

d ′

f

f

f

Eric Pacuit

Page 209: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

y

x

a

a

a′

b

a′

b

b′

b′

d

d ′

f

f

f

I = (a, t), (b, t +1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 210: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

y

x

a

a

a′

b

a′

b

b′

b′

d

d ′

f

f

f

I = (a, t), (b, t +1)

add Do(f )t+2

Eric Pacuit

Page 211: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

−1 0 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3

[π]t

π′

π′′

y

x

a

a

a′

b

a′

b

b′

b′

d

d ′

f

f

f

I = (a, t), (b, t +1)

add Do(f )t+2

Eric Pacuit

Page 212: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

Let (B, I ) be a coherent belief-intention base.

In general, afterrevising by ϕ, the constraint of coherence may force a choicebetween any subset of I (including ∅).

Which element of P(I ) “should” be the new plan? Depends onmany features of the plan not represented in the currentframework: subplan structure, goals, costs, etc.

Intention revision: what is the difference between “add Do(a)t”and “add (a, t) to I ”?

Eric Pacuit

Page 213: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

Let (B, I ) be a coherent belief-intention base. In general, afterrevising by ϕ, the constraint of coherence may force a choicebetween any subset of I (including ∅).

Which element of P(I ) “should” be the new plan? Depends onmany features of the plan not represented in the currentframework: subplan structure, goals, costs, etc.

Intention revision: what is the difference between “add Do(a)t”and “add (a, t) to I ”?

Eric Pacuit

Page 214: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

Let (B, I ) be a coherent belief-intention base. In general, afterrevising by ϕ, the constraint of coherence may force a choicebetween any subset of I (including ∅).

Which element of P(I ) “should” be the new plan?

Depends onmany features of the plan not represented in the currentframework: subplan structure, goals, costs, etc.

Intention revision: what is the difference between “add Do(a)t”and “add (a, t) to I ”?

Eric Pacuit

Page 215: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

Let (B, I ) be a coherent belief-intention base. In general, afterrevising by ϕ, the constraint of coherence may force a choicebetween any subset of I (including ∅).

Which element of P(I ) “should” be the new plan? Depends onmany features of the plan not represented in the currentframework: subplan structure, goals, costs, etc.

Intention revision: what is the difference between “add Do(a)t”and “add (a, t) to I ”?

Eric Pacuit

Page 216: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

Let (B, I ) be a coherent belief-intention base. In general, afterrevising by ϕ, the constraint of coherence may force a choicebetween any subset of I (including ∅).

Which element of P(I ) “should” be the new plan? Depends onmany features of the plan not represented in the currentframework: subplan structure, goals, costs, etc.

Intention revision: what is the difference between “add Do(a)t”and “add (a, t) to I ”?

Eric Pacuit

Page 217: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 218: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 219: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 220: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 221: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 222: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

The Revision Problem

(B , I ) ? x = (B ′, I ′)Coherent Coherent

(a, t) ϕ

AGM Revision: ∗ Intention Revision: a

Eric Pacuit

Page 223: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Postulates: Adding an Intention

Suppose (B, I ) is coherent and (a, t) and action/time pair.

Intention Revision Operator: (B, I ) (a, t) = (B ′, I ′) where

1. (B ′, I ′) is coherent

2. If (B, (a, t)) is coherent then (a, t) ∈ I ′

3. If (B, I ∪ (a, t)) is coherent then I ∪ (a, t) ⊆ I ′

4. B ′ = B

Eric Pacuit

Page 224: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Postulates: Adding an Intention

Suppose (B, I ) is coherent and (a, t) and action/time pair.

Intention Revision Operator: (B, I ) (a, t) = (B ′, I ′) where

1. (B ′, I ′) is coherent

2. If (B, (a, t)) is coherent then (a, t) ∈ I ′

3. If (B, I ∪ (a, t)) is coherent then I ∪ (a, t) ⊆ I ′

4. B ′ = B

Eric Pacuit

Page 225: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Postulates: AGM Revision

Suppose (B, I ) is coherent and ϕ a consistent formula.

Let (B, I ) ? ϕ = (B ′, I ′) where

1. (B ′, I ′) = (B ′, I ) ε where satisfies the earlier postulates

2. ϕ ∈ B ′

3. If ¬ϕ 6∈ B then Cl(B ∪ ϕ) = B ′

4. If ϕ and ψ are equivalent and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) thenB ′ = B ′′

5. B ′ = Cl(B ′)

6. If ¬ψ 6∈ B ′ and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) then Cl(B ′ ∪ ψ) ⊆ B ′′

7. If (B, I ′′) ∗ ϕ = (B ′′, I ′′′) then B ′ = B ′′.

Eric Pacuit

Page 226: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Postulates: AGM Revision

Suppose (B, I ) is coherent and ϕ a consistent formula.Let (B, I ) ? ϕ = (B ′, I ′) where

1. (B ′, I ′) = (B ′, I ) ε where satisfies the earlier postulates

2. ϕ ∈ B ′

3. If ¬ϕ 6∈ B then Cl(B ∪ ϕ) = B ′

4. If ϕ and ψ are equivalent and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) thenB ′ = B ′′

5. B ′ = Cl(B ′)

6. If ¬ψ 6∈ B ′ and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) then Cl(B ′ ∪ ψ) ⊆ B ′′

7. If (B, I ′′) ∗ ϕ = (B ′′, I ′′′) then B ′ = B ′′.

Eric Pacuit

Page 227: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Postulates: AGM Revision

Suppose (B, I ) is coherent and ϕ a consistent formula.Let (B, I ) ? ϕ = (B ′, I ′) where

1. (B ′, I ′) = (B ′, I ) ε where satisfies the earlier postulates

2. ϕ ∈ B ′

3. If ¬ϕ 6∈ B then Cl(B ∪ ϕ) = B ′

4. If ϕ and ψ are equivalent and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) thenB ′ = B ′′

5. B ′ = Cl(B ′)

6. If ¬ψ 6∈ B ′ and (B, I ) ∗ ψ = (B ′′, I ′′) then Cl(B ′ ∪ ψ) ⊆ B ′′

7. If (B, I ′′) ∗ ϕ = (B ′′, I ′′′) then B ′ = B ′′.

Eric Pacuit

Page 228: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Modeling Revision

(Π, I ,≤, γ) is a belief intention model where

I Π is an appropriate set of paths

I ≤ is a total preorder on Π

I (min≤(Π), I ) is coherent

I γ is a selection function mapping triples (Π′, I ′, (a, t)) to Jwhere

• (Π′, J) is coherent• If (Π′, (a, t)) is coherent then (a, t) ∈ J• If (Π′, I ′ ∪ (a, t)) is coherent then J = I ′ ∪ (a, t)• J ⊆ I ′ ∪ (a, t)

Eric Pacuit

Page 229: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Modeling Revision

(Π, I ,≤, γ) is a belief intention model where

Adding an intention: (Π, I ,≤, γ) (a, t) = (Π, I ′,≤, γ′) whereγ = γ′ and I ′ = γ(min(Π), I , (a, t))

Adding a belief: (Π, I ,≤, γ) ∗ ϕ = (Π, I ′,≤′, γ′) where γ = γ′, ≤′is the lexicographic re-ordering of ≤ by ϕ andI ′ = γ(min≤′(Π), I , ε).

Eric Pacuit

Page 230: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Modeling Revision

(Π, I ,≤, γ) is a belief intention model where

Adding an intention: (Π, I ,≤, γ) (a, t) = (Π, I ′,≤, γ′) whereγ = γ′ and I ′ = γ(min(Π), I , (a, t))

Adding a belief: (Π, I ,≤, γ) ∗ ϕ = (Π, I ′,≤′, γ′) where γ = γ′, ≤′is the lexicographic re-ordering of ≤ by ϕ andI ′ = γ(min≤′(Π), I , ε).

Eric Pacuit

Page 231: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Modeling Revision

(Π, I ,≤, γ) is a belief intention model where

Adding an intention: (Π, I ,≤, γ) (a, t) = (Π, I ′,≤, γ′) whereγ = γ′ and I ′ = γ(min(Π), I , (a, t))

Adding a belief: (Π, I ,≤, γ) ∗ ϕ = (Π, I ′,≤′, γ′) where γ = γ′, ≤′is the lexicographic re-ordering of ≤ by ϕ andI ′ = γ(min≤′(Π), I , ε).

Eric Pacuit

Page 232: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

1. How should we describe the “mental state”?Sufficiently rich structure/(modal) language

2. What is a coherent description?What properties/logic characterize a rational balance?

3. What are the inputs?Formulas and new plans

4. How should we characterize the revision operator?general postulates, dynamic modal operators

Eric Pacuit

Page 233: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

I Contingent beliefs: B I = Cl(B ∪ Do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I). Wecan read off postulates.

I What is the precise relationship with existing BDI logics (eg.,DEL-style dynamics)? Example

I Complex plans (eg., conditional, disjunctive plans): what isthe appropriate notion of coherence?

I Iterated revision...

I Other mental attitudes...

Eric Pacuit

Page 234: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

I Contingent beliefs: B I = Cl(B ∪ Do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I). Wecan read off postulates.

I What is the precise relationship with existing BDI logics (eg.,DEL-style dynamics)? Example

I Complex plans (eg., conditional, disjunctive plans): what isthe appropriate notion of coherence?

I Iterated revision...

I Other mental attitudes...

Eric Pacuit

Page 235: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

I Contingent beliefs: B I = Cl(B ∪ Do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I). Wecan read off postulates.

I What is the precise relationship with existing BDI logics (eg.,DEL-style dynamics)? Example

I Complex plans (eg., conditional, disjunctive plans): what isthe appropriate notion of coherence?

I Iterated revision...

I Other mental attitudes...

Eric Pacuit

Page 236: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

I Contingent beliefs: B I = Cl(B ∪ Do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I). Wecan read off postulates.

I What is the precise relationship with existing BDI logics (eg.,DEL-style dynamics)? Example

I Complex plans (eg., conditional, disjunctive plans): what isthe appropriate notion of coherence?

I Iterated revision...

I Other mental attitudes...

Eric Pacuit

Page 237: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Conclusions

I Contingent beliefs: B I = Cl(B ∪ Do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I). Wecan read off postulates.

I What is the precise relationship with existing BDI logics (eg.,DEL-style dynamics)? Example

I Complex plans (eg., conditional, disjunctive plans): what isthe appropriate notion of coherence?

I Iterated revision...

I Other mental attitudes...

Eric Pacuit

Page 238: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 239: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 240: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 241: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 242: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 243: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

ConclusionsWe are interested in reasoning about rational agents interacting insocial situations.

What do the logical frameworks contribute to the discussion onrational agency?

I Normative vs. Descriptive

I refine and test our intuitions: provide many answers to thequestion what is a rational agent?

I (epistemic) foundations of game theoryLogic and Game Theory, not Logic in place of Game Theory.

I Social Software: Verify properties of social procedures

• Refine existing social procedures or suggest new ones

R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132 (2002).

Eric Pacuit

Page 244: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Logics of Rational Agency: Conclusions

I Special issue of JOLLI: Temporal Logics of Agency (eds. J.van Benthem and EP)

I Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Rationality andInteraction. Logic and Intelligent Interaction, Volume 169,Number 2 / July, 2009(eds. T. Agotnes, J. van Benthem and EP)

I New subarea of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on logicand rational agency(eds. J. van Benthem, EP, and O. Roy)

Eric Pacuit

Page 245: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Thank You!

Eric Pacuit

Page 246: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Dynamic Operator

[Recall a BDI state: Γ0 = 〈B0,D0, 〈I0,A0〉,P0〉Γ1 = 〈B1,D1, 〈I1,A1〉,P1〉]

Let Ω be a finite set of observations (ground or temporal formulas).

Γ0 −→Ω Γ1 iff:

1. B1 = B0 ∗AGM∧ω∈Ω ω (and not inconsistent)

2. A1 = activePlans(cleanup(B1,A0,D,P),B1,D,P)

3. I1 = Int(A1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 247: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Dynamic Operator

[Recall a BDI state: Γ0 = 〈B0,D0, 〈I0,A0〉,P0〉Γ1 = 〈B1,D1, 〈I1,A1〉,P1〉]

Let Ω be a finite set of observations (ground or temporal formulas).

Γ0 −→Ω Γ1 iff:

1. B1 = B0 ∗AGM∧ω∈Ω ω (and not inconsistent)

2. A1 = activePlans(cleanup(B1,A0,D,P),B1,D,P)

3. I1 = Int(A1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 248: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Dynamic Operator

[Recall a BDI state: Γ0 = 〈B0,D0, 〈I0,A0〉,P0〉Γ1 = 〈B1,D1, 〈I1,A1〉,P1〉]

Let Ω be a finite set of observations (ground or temporal formulas).

Γ0 −→Ω Γ1 iff:

1. B1 = B0 ∗AGM∧ω∈Ω ω (and not inconsistent)

2. A1 = activePlans(cleanup(B1,A0,D,P),B1,D,P)

3. I1 = Int(A1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 249: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Dynamic Operator

[Recall a BDI state: Γ0 = 〈B0,D0, 〈I0,A0〉,P0〉Γ1 = 〈B1,D1, 〈I1,A1〉,P1〉]

Let Ω be a finite set of observations (ground or temporal formulas).

Γ0 −→Ω Γ1 iff:

1. B1 = B0 ∗AGM∧ω∈Ω ω (and not inconsistent)

2. A1 = activePlans(cleanup(B1,A0,D,P),B1,D,P)

3. I1 = Int(A1)

Eric Pacuit

Page 250: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Derived Properties

I Versions of AGM postulates for beliefs: eg., [Ω]∧

w∈Ω Bω

I [Ω]Bϕ→ [Ω]¬Iϕ

I I∧ω∈Ω ω → ¬[Ω]⊥

I (Dϕ ∧ Iϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]Bϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]B¬ϕ)→ [Ω]Iϕ

Back to conclusions

Eric Pacuit

Page 251: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Derived Properties

I Versions of AGM postulates for beliefs: eg., [Ω]∧

w∈Ω Bω

I [Ω]Bϕ→ [Ω]¬Iϕ

I I∧ω∈Ω ω → ¬[Ω]⊥

I (Dϕ ∧ Iϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]Bϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]B¬ϕ)→ [Ω]Iϕ

Back to conclusions

Eric Pacuit

Page 252: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Derived Properties

I Versions of AGM postulates for beliefs: eg., [Ω]∧

w∈Ω Bω

I [Ω]Bϕ→ [Ω]¬Iϕ

I I∧ω∈Ω ω → ¬[Ω]⊥

I (Dϕ ∧ Iϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]Bϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]B¬ϕ)→ [Ω]Iϕ

Back to conclusions

Eric Pacuit

Page 253: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

Derived Properties

I Versions of AGM postulates for beliefs: eg., [Ω]∧

w∈Ω Bω

I [Ω]Bϕ→ [Ω]¬Iϕ

I I∧ω∈Ω ω → ¬[Ω]⊥

I (Dϕ ∧ Iϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]Bϕ ∧ ¬[Ω]B¬ϕ)→ [Ω]Iϕ

Back to conclusions

Eric Pacuit

Page 254: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

C & L Logic of Intention

1. Intentions normally pose problems for the agent; the agentneeds to determine a way to achieve them.

2. Intentions provide a “screen of admissibility” for adoptingother intentions.

3. Agents “track” the success of their attempts to achieve theirintentions.

4. If an agent intends to achieve p, then

4.1 The agent believes p is possible4.2 The agent does not believe he will not bring abut p4.3 Under certain conditions, the agent believes he will bring about

p4.4 Agents need not intend all the expected side-effects of their

intentions.

Eric Pacuit

Page 255: Logics of Rational Agencyepacuit/lograt/nasslli2010/lograt-lec5a… · Logics of Rational Agency Lecture 5 Eric Pacuit Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg

C & L Logic of Intention

(PGOALip) := (GOALi (LATERp)) ∧(BELi¬p)∧[BEFORE((BELip) ∨ (BELi¬p))¬(GOALi (LATERp))]

(INTENDia) := (PGOALi [DONEi (BELi (HAPPENSa))?; a])

Back

Eric Pacuit