local level governance and schooling in decentralizing indonesia vivi alatas (easpr) and deon filmer...
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Local level governance and schooling in decentralizing Indonesia
Vivi Alatas (EASPR)
and
Deon Filmer (DECRG)
Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization
February 2004
Status of study / focus of presentation
Preliminary and incomplete study: What has been the impact of decentralization on
education outcomes? But
– Limited time that decentralization been implemented in Indonesia;
– Lags involved in the realization of impacts;– Lags in measurement of impacts.
This paper and presentation are a description of the assessment strategy and a discussion of some preliminary findings
BackgroundDecentralization in Indonesia
In 2000: Big-bang decentralization to district (Kabupaten) level
In addition to the overall changes, the education sector was particularly affected:
– Junior Secondary schooling was previously administered by central authorities (through their deconcentrated structures) and is now administered through the local government office along with Primary schooling.
– Funding for Basic Education now comes from the Local Government budget, and is therefore determined by the local political process.
BackgroundDecentralization in Indonesia
Simultaneously, a general move to increased school-based management
All this against the backdrop of the East Asian financial crisis which was particularly harsh in Indonesia
BackgroundOpportunities and risks of decentralization
Potential benefits– Reflect demands of local population– Potential efficiency gains– Innovation– Local-level ownership
Risks– Local allocations to education less than (nationally) socially optimal– Local elite capture– Lack of experience of the local administration– Increase in inequality
Literature points to potential importance of autonomy and accountability at the local level
Research strategy
“Big-bang” rules out any simple counter-factual … “what would have happened without decentralization?”
The approach used is to exploit the fact that decentralization will lead to increased variability in factors that affect outcomes
Documenting this variability, and relating it to changes in outcomes, is how we propose to assess the impact of decentralization on outcomes
WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?
Students/Parents
Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Voice
Client power
Compact and management
WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?
Students/Parents
Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Voice
Client power
Compact and management
Building accountability into the systemVoice
Ah, there he is again! How time flies! It’s time for the general election already!
By R. K. Laxman
WDR2004: A framework for how decentralization might affect outcomes?
Students/Parents
Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Voice
Client power
Compact and management
Building accountability into the systemClient Power
I can’t understand these people. Not a soul here knows how to read or write and yet they want a school
By R. K. Laxman
Decentralization: increased variability of accountability relationships
Students/Parents
Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Students/Parents
Local Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Students/Parents
Local Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Students/Parents
Local Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Students/Parents
Local Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Students/Parents
Policymakers
Schools/teachers
Research strategy
Identify district and school level indicators of – Voice– Compact– Management– Client power
And exploit how those have changed over time in order to assess the impact of decentralization
Current paper
Use baseline data to describe patterns and relationships between the indicators and outcomes
Data
Governance and Decentralization Survey– 177 Districts– Conducted in early 2002– Instruments to:
local administration officers (including the Dinas office) as well to school head teachers
School census from MONE– All schools– Includes data on revenues; expenditure, school characteristics,
teacher background, – And, our outcome of interest, school average results on national
standardized tests (NEM)
Data
District budget data– Development (investment) and routine (operational)
data for 1994-1999 period
Household survey data from SUSENAS– District average household per capita expenditures
(and its standard deviation)
Combining data—the “matched” and “unmatched” samples
The limited number of schools in the GDS means that if school level indicators derived from the GDS are used, the sample size shrinks dramatically (about 140 JS schools).
So much so that it is hard to identify any statistically significant results in the data analysis.
Combining data—the matched an unmatched samples
Using district average indicators derived from the GDS allows the analysis to include all schools in the school census (e.g. about 3300 JS schools)
Focus (for the moment) on Secondary schools
Empirical model
Dependent variable = test scores Independent variables =
– Measures of voice, compact, management, client power– Control variables– One specification includes school-level education inputs
“Cross-sectional” data combining school (and other) data from 1999 with GDS data data from early 2002
OLS regression
Results
Voice– More NGO involvement as measured by
the number of meetings between NGOs and local government; and NGOs as channels for complaints about education services
is associated with higher test scores– The
Frequency of media publicity about problems in education
is associated with lower test scores (reverse causality?)
Results
Compact– Clarity of the schools objectives as measured by
head teacher’s involvement in setting the school’s vision and mission
is associated with higher test scores– The
number meetings between local government education administrators and head teachers
is not associated with test scores (quality of the meetings?)
Results
Management– Greater
head teacher involvement in teacher recruitment
and in school based management
is consistently associated with better test scores– But
involvement in curriculum, budget allocation,
and decisions regarding teacher discipline
are negatively associated with test scores (reverse causation?)
Results
Client power– Appears to be a weak force, although
involvement of Parent Teacher Associations in teaching tools procurement
and in curriculum
are associated with higher test scores (JS level)– But involvement in none of the other areas, e.g.
teacher discipline, school based management, textbooks
are associated with outcomes.
Looking forward
Decentralization is expected to affect indicators that appear associated with learning outcomes
Assessing the “impact” of decentralization will be made even harder:
– Centralized data collection efforts are weakening– National standards are falling by the way (e.g. NEM)– Ensuring sufficient sample sizes to measure effects is difficult.
Hope that new rounds of GDS can overcome some of these constraints, as will working with counterparts to ensure complete and timely data collection