local level climate justice? adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction

Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

G Model

JGEC-1148; No. of Pages 11

Local level climate justice? Adaptation finance and vulnerabilityreduction

Sam Barrett *

Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 14 September 2012

Received in revised form 12 July 2013

Accepted 20 July 2013

Keywords:

Adaptation finance

Climate justice

Vulnerability

Malawi

A B S T R A C T

Climate change creates a double inequality through the inverse distribution of risk and responsibility.

Developed states are responsible, but are forecast to confront only moderate adverse effects; least

developed states are not culpable and yet experience significant threats to livelihoods, assets and

security. Adaptation finance addresses inequity by developed states facilitating/funding behaviour

adjustments necessary for exposed communities to lessen climate risk. This article investigates the

ground-level effectiveness of adaptation finance in climate vulnerable villages across Malawi, while

controlling for disparities in vulnerability. Malawi and selected districts are both climate vulnerable and

significant recipients of adaptation finance. This concludes a larger top–down multi-scalar analysis of

climate justice, which applies the distribution and effectiveness of adaptation finance as a proxy. The

study avails of participatory assessments to compare actions of villages receiving adaptation finance

with those engaging in autonomous and informal adaptations. Adaptation finance villages: (a) address

more climate related risks; and (b) enhance agency, security and sustainably lessen climate

vulnerability. Conversely, informal practice villages attend to a lower proportion of climate risks and

often develop short-term strategies with less enduring vulnerability reduction. Vulnerable communities

receiving adaptation finance do change behaviours to reduce climate risk and thus secure local level

climate justice.

� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Environmental Change

jo ur n al h o mep ag e: www .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate /g lo envc h a

1. Introduction

Climate justice research identifies climate change as the sourceof a double inequality with an inverse distribution of risk andresponsibility (Adger et al., 2006; Fussel, 2010; Roberts and Parks,2007). The majority of least-developed states have accumulatedless than 115 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per capita since1960, relative to 1.6–2.7 k tonnes in many developed states (WorldBank, 2013). Conversely, least-developed states experience dis-proportionate adverse consequences (Maplecroft, 2011; Busbyet al., 2013a, 2013b). Marginal environments contend with climatevariability and are prone to physical hazards, such as flooding(Lopez-Marrero, 2010; Mustafa, 1998), drought (Eriksen and Lind,2009; Stringer et al., 2009) and storms (Fazlul and Nobuo, 2008).Exposure and sensitivity to physical events is driven bymanifestations of poverty and underdevelopment (Wisner et al.,2004), whereby poor education, health infrastructure and gover-nance structures magnify adverse consequences (Mearns andNorton, 2010).

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +353 85 7102433.

E-mail address: [email protected]

Please cite this article in press as: Barrett, S., Local level climate justiceChange (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.07.015

0959-3780/$ – see front matter � 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.07.015

Climate justice research is often located on the internationalscale, focusing on justice principles (Albin, 2001; Paterson, 2001),allocation criteria (Fermann, 1997; Baer et al., 2009), carbonmarkets (Caney, 2010; Page, 2012) and funding architectures(Grasso, 2010a, 2010b). A limited scholarship reaches below toobserve subnational justice implications of domestic policy(Thomas and Twyman, 2005) and planning for adaptation (Huqand Khan, 2006; Paavola, 2006). International and subnationalresearch is appropriate for questions of policy processes, framingand design, but these are not the scales where vulnerability isexperienced. Rather, climate variability and change is encounteredat the local level by communities and requires analysis andresponse at lower scales (Cash and Moser, 2000) through practicessuch as Community-Based Adaptation (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009;Ayers and Huq, 2013). Research needs to reach down further andassess climate risk reduction strategies of poor, marginalized andvulnerable communities as the primary and defining actors inclimate justice analysis (Barrett, 2013). Further, adaptation financeprovides a means to analyze how actions of developed statesaddress climate inequity, through lessening impacts for local levelactors (Paavola and Adger, 2006).

Yet recent justice and equity debates do not focus on vulnerablecommunities at the local level. For example, empirical research

? Adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction. Global Environ.


mailto:[email protected]


http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09593780


S. Barrett / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx2

G Model


investigates the international distribution of the Adaptation Fund(Stadelmann et al., 2013) and the justice implications of specificclimate policies (Beyer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Mercer et al.,2012). This article is thus the final stage in a multi-scalar climatejustice analysis, following adaptation finance from inter-statedistribution to local level implementation, and focusing on selectat risk communities in Africa. Two prior quantitative analysesinvestigate the international and subnational distribution ofadaptation finance: the international stage tests whether themost climate vulnerable states are receiving a disproportionateshare of funds (Barrett, 2013a); the subnational stage findswhether the most climate vulnerable districts in Malawi arereceiving most intra-state allocations (Barrett, 2013b). Theseanswer questions of whether policy is putting the most vulnerable

first (Adger and Paavola, 2006, p. 604), allocating to the mostvulnerable urban stakeholders (Ayers, 2009) and adhering toequity principles regarding financial assistance of the Convention(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992,2010). This study improves understanding of adaptation financeonce it reaches vulnerable communities and determines itseffectiveness, offering a substantive justice approach based onjust outcomes of funding efforts to accompany distributive andprocedural aspects (Heywood, 2004, p. 176).

Climate finance, and adaptation finance more specifically, hasdeveloped into one of the main outputs of international climatenegotiations. Recent promises (Conference of the Parties 15 and16) related to new and additional climate finance, balancedbetween adaptation and mitigation, and demarcated from existingfunding flows (United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange, 2009, 2010). Nevertheless, accounting is ambiguouswithout universal definitions to determine new and additional

funds (Stadelmann et al., 2011) and complicated by inadequatetransparency across donors (Ciplet et al., 2012; Stadelmann et al.,2012). Further, bilateral and multilateral donors are widelyrecognized as integrating adaptation measures into developmentassistance (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011). This study provides asolution by availing of information from key players in local levelimplementation. Adaptation finance interventions are categorizedbased on data provided by District Council Representatives on aimsand objectives and evaluated in terms of effectiveness in climaterisk reduction.

Adaptation finance effectiveness is understood relative to, and interms of, informal actions. This study refers to adaptation financevillages as those in receipt of formalized adaptation interventions,and compares these with villages that receive no monies, but engagein autonomous adaptations and coping strategies. Informal adapta-tions are on-going processes of human adaptation, occurringindependently of external assistance, ranging from small adjust-ments in daily routines to significant changes in circumstancethrough particular disaster events (Birkmann et al., 2010). Informalactions are shown to facilitate coping and adaptation to climatechange (Nelson et al., 2007), but the focus here is to compare theireffectiveness with formal and externally funded efforts to adapt. Thefollowing questions direct the analysis:

(1) Does adaptation finance address what climate vulnerablecommunities perceive as their climate risk?

(2) Does adaptation finance enable communities to attend to moreclimate risks than informal measures alone?

(3) Does adaptation finance secure greater agency, security andmore sustainable vulnerability reduction than informal mea-sures?

This article provides answers using data collected across 18villages in southern and eastern Malawi. Malawi has a history offlooding, drought, land degradation, poverty and food insecurity


(Devereux, 2007; Davies et al., 2010; Mijoni and Izadkhah, 2009;Phiri and Saka, 2008). Malawi is highly climate vulnerable and asignificant recipient of adaptation finance transfers (Barrett,2013a); likewise, within Malawi, Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salimadistricts are highly climate vulnerable and significant recipients ofintra-state adaptation finance distribution (Barrett, 2013b);villages in these district are selected based on a matchingtechnique that maximizes parity in socio-economic drivers ofclimate vulnerability. Finally, survey data is collected acrossvillages using the participatory vulnerability assessment as anappropriate method for climate justice analysis.

Adaptation finance does improve adaptive actions relative toinformal practices alone: (a) enabling villages to address a greaternumber of climate risks; and (b) enhancing agency and security ofvillagers, and sustainably lessening climate vulnerability. Informalpractice villages adopt more short-term coping behaviours thatoften compromise future security and agency and show littleenduring vulnerability reduction. Evidence of effectiveness sug-gests climate justice as a multi-scalar process is being done acrossselect villages of Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima districts.

Four sections as follows: Section 2 situates the study within theprior literature and develops a framework to analyze adaptationfinance effectiveness; Section 3 outlines the village matching anddata collection methodology; Section 4 presents the results ofgroup discussions; Section 5 discusses implications of the research.

2. Assessing adaptation finance effectiveness

This section outlines the literatures used to construct aframework to study local level adaptation finance effectiveness.The effectiveness literature indicates the need for a framework toempirically assess local level adaptation interventions, due toresearch being hitherto international and national level. Theframework is guided by the vulnerability literature, which has theconceptual tools to analyze community level climate risk as ajustice issue.

2.1. Climate finance effectiveness, formal and informal adaptation

The climate finance effectiveness literature is primarily apolicy-based discussion concerning how international and nation-al funding architectures shape outcomes. Effectiveness is under-stood in terms of adherence to principles and characteristics,described as meeting societal needs (Calland and Reddy, 2013);ease of implementation, legitimacy, coherence, transparency (Birdet al., 2013); and climate returns (Chaum et al., 2012). For example,the Adaptation Fund (Canales Trujillo and Nakhooda, 2013),Amazon Fund (Forstater et al., 2013), and generic flows (Nakhooda,2013) are evaluated for multi-scalar support, strengtheningprocedures, innovative design and national ownership. This leavescommunity level implementation largely absent. Local levelassessments of adaptation finance provide insight into localitieswhere vulnerability is experienced and offer the effectivenessliterature a means to empirically evaluate the outcome ofvulnerability reduction.

A growing literature documents funded adaptation and broadlyseparates formal/funded as planned longer-term adaptation andinformal/unfunded actions more as on-going short-term copingstrategies. For instance, Ayers and Forsyth (2009) investigatecommunity level actions designed to protect assets and livelihoodsin flood prone Bangladesh. Sovacool (2012) describe localadaptation intervention objectives across Asia. In Malawi, researchshows strategies of Shire Valley farmers adapting to extremeweather conditions (Phiri and Saka, 2008), and efforts relating tothe United Nations environmental conventions as facilitating themanagement of climate change, drought and desertification



S. Barrett / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3

G Model


(Stringer et al., 2009). This literature generally reports the positiveeffects of financed interventions, such as livelihood protection/diversification, disaster mitigation and community resilience. Bycontrast, informal adaptations are regarded more as on-goingresponses of short-term coping in marginal environments. Theliterature explores autonomous behavioural changes induced bydisasters (Birkmann et al., 2010), the types of responses (Jabeenet al., 2010), the role of forests as a facilitator (Fisher et al., 2010), aswell as institutions for managing climate risks (Rodima-Taylor,2012) and their cross-scale dynamics (Osbahr et al., 2008).

The trend suggests external assistance facilitates, secures andimproves the process of climate risk reduction. This is to besystematically tested by comparing the effectiveness of formaladaptations relative to informal coping strategies in reducing ofclimate vulnerability and risk. Local vulnerability assessmentsbetween the two groups of villages are the primary means to makethis determination.

2.2. Vulnerability assessment

Vulnerability assessments can compare climate risk betweenformal and informal actions. The vulnerability assessment discus-sion offers various methods to measure local level vulnerability.Therefore, this immediately connects vulnerability and climatejustice discussions as both are searching for empirical evidence.

Indicator approaches to vulnerability assessment take socio-economic and physical parameters as values to compare exposure,sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climate change (Adger, 1999;Hahn et al., 2009; Sullivan and Meigh, 2005; Deressa et al., 2008).However, Vincent (2007) emphasises uncertainty when linkingspecific indicators and climate vulnerability; Fussel and Klein(2006) judge indicators as static in the sense of providing littlemeans to identify feedback mechanisms between impacts andexacerbated climate sensitivity.

Multiple stressor vulnerability assessments identify how stress-ors, with climate change being just one, shape long-termvulnerability (Casale et al., 2010; O’Brien et al., 2004; Patt, 2009).This approach recognizes multiple stressors threatening a system,instead of focusing on the multiple effects of a single stress factor(Fussel and Klein, 2006), accommodating a more dynamic andevolving reality through incorporation of internal and externalaspects of vulnerability (Casale et al., 2010). In short, stressors createoutcomes that conceive/fortify new stressors. This research isempirically underdeveloped for several reasons: (a) stressors differacross environments; (b) the weighting of stressors is ambiguous andstressors will not interact similarly across environments; and (c)case study research requires understanding how single andcompounded stressors affect individuals and systems.

Participatory approaches to vulnerability assessment includecommunities in determining their own sensitivities and exposures(Chiwaka and Yates, 2012; Care, 2009; Pelling, 2007; Van Aalstet al., 2008; Fazey et al., 2010; Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties, 2010). In this approach, researchers do not presume toknow the pertinent exposure and sensitivities within thecommunity (Smit and Wandel, 2006) and reflexive engagementwith local knowledge is the methodological strength. This createspractical bottom-up assessments with communities as activeparticipants (Chambers, 1990, 1994; Van Aalst et al., 2008). Thishas been applied to compare vulnerability in locations such as theUnited States, Mexico (Vasquez-Leon et al., 2003) and Samoa(Sutherland et al., 2005).

2.3. Integrating indicator and participatory approaches

Indicator and participatory approaches serve as complements bydividing analysis for case selection and vulnerability assessment. To


analyze the effectiveness of adaptation finance at the local levelrequires: (a) minimizing disparities in climate vulnerabilitybetween adaptation finance and informal practice villages forunbiased assessments of adaptation finance effectiveness; and (b)locating the impact of adaptation finance on a village’s climate risk,relative to informal practices, but in a way conducive to climatejustice as a subject. Indicators are utilized when matchingadaptation finance and informal practice villages to maximizeparity between villages on the main drivers of vulnerability. Theseinclude poverty, education, medical access, water access, electricityaccess and livestock ownership for optimal village matches.Conversely, indicator vulnerability assessments display academictranscendence not appropriate for climate justice research, asindicator increases may not transfer into a meaningful lessening ofclimate risk. Rather, participatory approaches incorporate commu-nities as primary actors in shaping and evaluating their assessment.The extent to which those exposed identify lessening climate riskdetermines the degree of climate justice.

3. Methods and data

Selecting cases and assessing climate risk reduction involvesthree stages: first, country and district selections are madeaccording to high climate vulnerability and adaptation finance;second, parity in climate vulnerability drivers is maximized acrosspaired cases of adaptation finance and informal practice villages;third, village surveys identify effectiveness of adaptation financerelative to informal practices in reducing climate risk.

3.1. Country and district selection

Malawi is chosen based on framework requirements of highclimate vulnerability and inter-state adaptation finance transfers(Barrett, 2013). Malawi is the most climate vulnerable mainlandcountry in Africa (6.89 mean composite localized score, relative tothe African continental mean of 5.11) (Maplecroft, 2011). Second,adaptation finance transfers are extracted from AidData 2.0, whichdefines development finance as loans or grants from governments,official government aid agencies, and inter-governmental orga-nizations intended to promote economic development and welfareof developing countries (Tierney et al., 2011, p. 1892). Malawireceived per-capita adaptation funding (2000–2010) of $39.82 and$0.92 for broad (addressing vulnerability reduction) and narrow(explicitly climate adaptation related) classifications respectively,relative to the African mean of $6.38 and $0.46 (see Appendix A fordefinitions).

Within Malawi, Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima districts arechosen based on framework requirements of high climatevulnerability and adaptation finance activities (Barrett, 2013).Adaptation finance data is provided by the Climate Change andAfrican Political Stability Program who partner with AidData andthe Ministry of Finance in Malawi to locate the destinations of allaid activities from 2000 to 2010 (Peratsakis et al., 2012; Weaveret al., 2012). Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima receive high adaptationfinance activities (36, 26 and 26 respectively, compared to thenational mean of 17.5), which represent the geo-coded subnationalcomponents of larger national level projects (Strandow et al.,2011). Further, these districts are highly climate vulnerable withmean composite vulnerability scores of 7.9 (Nsanje), 7.9 (Chik-wawa) and 7.27 (Salima), compared to the national mean of 6.89(Maplecroft, 2011; Government of Malawi, 2006).

Climate models and observational data show communitieswithin Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima are experiencing, andprojected to experience further, climate change (see Fig. 1). Thisis illustrated through a simulation of climate change for the period1981–2000 compared to mid 21st century projections for Malawi



Fig. 1. Climate change in Malawi.


G Model


(2041–2060). The latter is based on Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change mid-line carbon dioxide emissions scenario of 536parts per million by volume.

Climate observations and projections are sourced from aregional climate model maintained at the National Center forAtmospheric Research/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration, and developed for applications over Africa byresearchers from the Climate Change and African PoliticalStability Program (Vizy and Cook, 2012; Cook and Vizy, 2012).In the maps above, four indicators – dry days, wet days, heat wavesand low elevation coastal zones – were normalized into quintilesand aggregated to represent climate hazard exposure for Malawibetween 1980–2000 and 2041–2060 (Busby et al., 2013a, 2013b).The original model has continent wide coverage for Africa, andshows central and southern Malawi confronting increasingphysical exposure. For the purposes of this study, data arereclassified and spatially analyzed into quintiles to comparevariation in physical exposure within Malawi (from the leastexposed 20% to the most exposed 20%). Fig. 1 shows 20th century(top-left) versus 21st century (bottom-left) projected climateconditions and illustrates the change (right). Northern Malawi iswitnessing lower or unchanging physical exposure, but centraland southern districts are forecast to endure greater climatechange. In particular, the districts of Nsanje and Chikwawa aresome of the worst affected. The physical hazards these communi-ties are forced to address are related to climate change. Therefore,any observed adaptive actions in central and southern Malawi areresponding to long-term increases in climate risk, as well as short-term variability.


3.2. Village matching

Villages are the units of analysis, categorized and matched aseither treatments that receive adaptation finance, or controls, thatdo not receive finance but conduct informal actions. Matchingmaximizes probabilistic equivalence (Rubin, 1973), and mini-mizes imbalance and thus bias between covariates (Blackwellet al., 2012; Burnham, 2008; Nielsen, 2011), allowing for acomparative estimation of climate risk reduction. Creatingmatches between controls and treatments requires maximizingparity on several village characteristics (Stuart, 2011) andselecting villages with similar covariate distributions and valueson climate vulnerability indicators (Busby et al., 2013a, 2013b;Maplecroft, 2011). Additional vulnerability indicators fromMalawi’s Demographic and Health Survey (2010) providemeasures of poverty, education, livestock ownership, medical,water, and electricity access. External assistance is measuredthrough Official Development Assistance activity point data fromthe Climate Change and African Political Stability program(Peratsakis et al., 2012; Weaver et al., 2012).

Data are aggregated to Enumerations Areas, which are thesmallest administrative boundaries within the Malawian state. Ashapefile of Enumeration Areas is created by the NationalStatistical Office of Malawi. Mean vulnerability indicator aggrega-tions are created for each Area and village vulnerability means arederived from these scores.

Fixed effects control for further heterogeneity across matchedvillages. Issues of municipal administration, livelihoods, ethnicity,language, electoral constituency and government affiliation are




G Model


often geographically specific. Hence, a trade-off exists betweenmaximizing similar village characteristics and minimizing varia-tion in spatially defined differences: optimal matches requiregreater geographical distance, yet space introduces confoundingfactors (e.g. different livelihoods or political constituencies) thatdisturb balance between villages. Indeed, microfinance researchfinds fixed effects necessary for rigorous case selection (Coleman,1999; Tedeschi, 2008; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Therefore, care istaken to maximize variable matches and key fixed effects.

A scalar issue persists when locating matches within Malawidistricts: the Group Village led by a Group Village Headman [seeDionne (2013) and references therein] is the main local governancescale. Group Village boundaries often include multiple Enumera-tion Areas that are considered distinct by the National StatisticalOffice. In practice, adaptation finance is distributed to GroupVillage Headmen and not Enumeration Areas.

A brief elaboration of the political and administrative bureau-cracies is required to highlight the complexities of trackingadaptation finance down to local level implementation; followingthis is a discussion on selecting matched village pairs from thesame Group Village. Malawi is divided into 28 districts. Eachdistrict is composed of numerous Traditional Authority areas,further subdivided into a number of Group Village Headman areas,which are a collection of villages (typically between 7 and 15).However, Malawi officially recognizes another separate adminis-trative area below the Traditional Authority level; this area isknown as an Enumeration Area and is used by the NationalStatistics Office to collect data. The Enumeration Areas and GroupVillage Headman areas are fundamentally separate administrativezones and boundaries do not correspond. Finally, individualMalawian villages represent the smallest political and adminis-trative unit. These scale distinctions are crucial as the data used inthis matching analysis are collected at Enumeration Area level, asonly these are officially mapped. However, adaptation finance ischannelled through Group Villages.

As both financed and unfinanced villages can exist within thesame Group Village, District Council representatives and villagersstress the need to select adaptation finance and informal practicevillages from different Group Village Headman administrations.

Table 2Variable matching results.

Adaptation finance Poverty Education Medical Water Elec

Mbenje X X

Mpisamanja X X X

Chapinga X X X

Kan dodo X X

Moses Chimphepo X X

Nyamphota X X

M’Manga X X

Chizuwi X

Mtika X X

Table 1Data for variable matches.

Indicator Source

Poverty Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Education Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Medical Access Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Water Access Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Electricity Access Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Livestock Ownership Malawi Demo. and Health Survey

Official Development Assistance Climate Change and African Political

Stability Program

Climate Vulnerability Maplecroft Climate Vulnerability Index


This limits the effects of funded village activities spilling over intoproximate locations and biasing results.

To summarize, village selection took the following course: first,locations of adaptation finance villages are provided by DistrictCouncil representatives; second, informal practice villages arefound that offer maximum variable matches using EnumerationArea Geographical Information Systems data; third, locations arechecked by District Council representatives and villagers to ensurematching pairs occupy different Group Village Headman admin-istrations; finally, to maximize fixed effects, matched village pairsmust be located within the same Traditional Authority, a largerpolitical unit (Table 1).

For matching results see Table 2, and for correspondinglocations, see Fig. 2. In addition to variable matches on Table 2,village selection secured pairs with the same livelihood, ethnicity,language and electoral constituency to incorporate fixed effects.Some notable heterogeneity exists across villages related to issuesof access to medical treatment, electricity, and to a lesser extent,water. Significant disparities in access to public goods provisionexist across Traditional Authorities, but due to selecting villages inpairs, there is no reason to think this systematically biases results.Finally, village populations were difficult to measure, which canpotentially influence results. Smaller or larger populations mayhave abilities to address climate risks never uncovered throughfocus groups.

3.3. Adaptation finance interventions

Adaptation finance community level interventions includeirrigation, drought cropping, flood protection, early warningsystems, tree planting, conservation farming and fertilizerdistribution. Each intervention addresses at least one factorcontributing to climate risk, such as drought, flooding, stormsand land degradation. The study selects adaptation finance villagesbased on either the presence of a project at the time fieldwork wasconducted, or its recent implementation (within the last fiveyears). Working closely with District Development Officers ensuresinterventions met either narrow or broad definitions of adaptationfinance (prior categorizations efforts include Roberts and Per-

tricity Livestock Vulnerability Assistance Informal practice

X X X Kanyanya

X X Sabola

X X X Kalonga

X X X Chatacha

X X X Tiimbenawa

X X X Mafale

X X Mikute

X X X Bushiri

X X Saidi

Description

Proportion of households in poverty

Proportion of adult men with no education

Proportion of household heads receiving free healthcare

Proportion of households with water access

Proportion of households that have electricity

Proportion of households that have livestock, herds of farm animals

Whether Enumeration Areas receives Official Development Assistance

activities

Average composite vulnerability score within Enumeration Areas



Fig. 2. Matched study villages in Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima.


G Model


atsakis, 2011; Weaver et al., 2012). Narrow adaptation finance isadaptation in direct association with climate change; broadadaptation finance aims at vulnerability reduction in terms of thedirect and indirect effects of climate change as understood by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001). Those effectsinclude drought, desertification, land degradation, floods, hurri-canes and temperature increases.

Subnational tracking of adaptation finance, especially to thepoint of ground level interventions, is a complex process. Examplesof programs designed to track the distribution of monies includeThe Nepal Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviewthat tracks ministry level adaptation spending (Jones et al., 2012)and the Climate Change and African Political Stability Program,through the development of a replicable methodology first appliedto project activities in Malawi (Weaver et al., 2012). Using variousforms of information on finance distribution, fieldwork across theGreat Lakes region has shown how governments and bilateraldonors lose control over the type of interventions taking place oncethe funds drop below the district level. In Malawi, a complex localadministrative system receives funds and dictates final distribu-tion: the committee system, implementing agencies, traditionalleaders and District Development Officers determine the destina-tions and exact character of community-level interventions.Hence, information provided by the local District DevelopmentOfficers is the best means available by which to categorize evaluateassistance as adaptation finance.

3.4. Survey data collection

Survey data are collected through discussion groups usingparticipatory vulnerability assessments. District Council repre-sentatives, the village head, senior figures within the village, and


both male and female adult members were present. Groups rangedbetween ten to forty participants with a tendency for more menthan women. All discussions were held in Chichewa and translatedinto English by at least two translators. Questions related tospecific vulnerabilities, type and frequency of biophysical hazards,adaptation finance projects and on-going informal practices andfell into the following categories: identification of generalvulnerabilities, climate vulnerability, biophysical hazards, infor-mal adaptive practices and adaptation finance projects/interven-tions.

Village heads and senior figures answered the majority ofquestions, either on their own, or based on input from villagers.One possible methodological shortcoming was the consistentpresence of Village Development Committee representatives.These individuals have an incentive to speak positively aboutadaptation finance interventions, especially in the presence ofDistrict Council representatives who arranged our meetings. Theallocation of adaptation finance and other assistance monies aremade through District Executive Committees, where DistrictCouncil representatives are influential in providing informationto other deciding members. Nevertheless, despite their presence,Village Development Committee representatives were rarelyprominent in the discussion groups, as these individuals werenot village heads and often not senior village members.

4. Results

This section analyzes village group discussions in Nsanje,Chikwawa and Salima. Part one investigates village exposure toclimate risk factors and biophysical hazards; part two investigateswhether villages address these factors and hazards and comparesacross adaptation finance and informal practice villages; and part




G Model


three determines the quality of adaptations through the frame-work of positive and negative adaptation based on which villagessecure sustainable and agency enhancing adaptations.

4.1. Climate risk and biophysical hazards

All village respondents express hunger and poverty as a primaryconcern that is becoming more severe in recent years. Reliance onincreasingly lower-yielding subsistence agriculture results in amulti-faceted deterioration in their economic and social situation.Villagers consistently indicate links between climate and theirworsening predicament by recognizing that numerous andcompounded climate risks are exacerbating pre-existing adversesocial and livelihood consequences.

Villagers across Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima identify them-selves as highly climate vulnerable, regardless of whether fundedinterventions are present or not. Biophysical hazards and theirsocial consequences are evenly distributed across the twocategories. Villagers are exposed to five hazards: flooding, erraticrainfall, drought, strong winds and temperature extremes.

Flooding is a primary concern. Sixteen of 18 villages identifyflooding, and increases in flooding frequency, as a hazardattributable to village proximity to rivers, tributaries, or LakeMalawi. Further, villages are typically situated on flat areas causingriver flooding to spread significant distances during seasonal rains.Erratic rainfall is a perpetual challenge. Fifteen of 18 villages statethat in years past rains enabled planting in November. Morerecently, later and shorter rains inhibit planting until lateDecember to January. This depiction was consistent across affectedvillages. Further, drought is a significant hazard for many, affecting13 of 18 villages with longer and ever-more consistent periods oflittle or no rain. Strong winds concerned 6 of 18 villages, and inparticular, those in Salima district (5 out of the 6 villages). Salima isproximate to Lake Malawi, and therefore fewer surrounding treesoffer protection. Finally, temperature increases are a hazard fortwo Salima villages.

The negative social consequences of physical effects arenumerous and often occur simultaneously: flooding, drought,erratic rains and strong winds results in land degradation,temporary relocation, loss of assets, damage to houses, physicalinjury, lower crop yields, poverty exacerbation, hunger and diseaseoutbreak. Exposure to one or more hazards in turn weakens theposition of communities to withstand any that follow.

4.2. Actions addressing climate risk factors

Both formal and informal actions address climate risks, andpractices vary between villages. Table 3 sets out the proportion ofadaptation finance or informal actions attending to self-identifiedclimate risk.

Table 3Identified climate risk factors/action taken.

Climate risk factor Adaptation finance

villages

Informal practice

villages

Risk Action Risk Action

Flood 9/9 7/9 7/9 2/9

Drought 8/9 8/9 5/9 2/9

Dry spells 4/9 2/9 3/9 2/9

Erratic rains 4/9 4/9 4/9 2/9

Disease outbreak 3/9 0/9 1/9 0/9

Strong winds 3/9 1/9 3/9 1/9

Land degradation 4/9 4/9 4/9 0/9

Pest attack 1/9 0/9 0/9 0/9

Temperature rise 1/9 0/9 2/9 0/9

Storms 0/9 0/9 1/9 1/9


Adaptation finance villages address twice as many climate risksas villages without interventions: adaptation finance villages offerat least one action towards 26 of the 37 (0.70) identified riskfactors; compared to 10 of 30 (0.33) for informal practice villages.This is a consistent trend across cases. Further, some informalpractice villages fail to undertake any informal actions. Tiimbe-nawa, Mafale and Bushiri all either took no informal actions, oractions were not directed towards risk factors. Conversely,adaptation finance villages took at least one action. Floodingand drought are the most common adaptation finance interven-tions with 7 and 8 villages engaging in flood and droughtmitigation respectively.

4.3. Qualitative differences between formal and informal actions

To evaluate village actions, the livelihood literature offers aconceptual framework to distinguish positive from negative

adaptation. Davies and Hossain (1997) states:Positive adaptation is of choice and can be reversed if fortunes

change and usually leads to increased security and sometimeswealth. It is concerned with risk reduction and is likely to involvean intensification of existing livelihood strategies or diversificationinto neighbouring livelihood systems. . .. Negative adaptation is ofnecessity, tends to be irreversible and frequently fails to contributeto a lasting reduction in vulnerability. It occurs when the poor areforced to adapt their livelihoods because they can no longer copewith short-term shocks and need to alter fundamentally the waysin which they subsist (p. 5)

What follows identifies, discusses and compares the qualities ofadaptation finance and informal practice actions–classified asnegative adaptation and positive adaptation (see Table 4). Theoptimal scenario is when actions increase agency and security forvillagers, intensify existing livelihoods and offering an enduringand sustainable climate vulnerability reduction strategy.

Several examples underscore how adaptation finance inter-ventions elicit positive adaptation over informal practices:adaptation finance provides 7 of the 8 flood defences in the formof riverbed excavation and riverbank reinforcement. Theseactivities raise, or at least fortify, the threshold for when watersbreak to become floods, increasing security and facilitating lastingclimate vulnerability reduction. Contrast these actions withinformal practices of temporary relocation to higher ground as aflooding adaptation: immediate physical security is assured, butthis endangers remaining and immobile assets. As such, relocationoffers no medium to long term lessening of climate vulnerability.Further, slow withdrawing floodwater forces villagers to transformtheir lives and temporarily re-establish livelihoods elsewhere,further eroding assets and compromising future agency andsecurity.

One financed intervention develops an early warning system,which applies the proliferation of mobile phone technology toorganize highland villagers to alert lowlanders of impendingfloods. Such an intervention fails to stop flooding, but providesvillagers with more time to organize family and moveable assets toa place of safety. This intervention increases the agency of villagers,relative to the more reactive informal relocation strategy, to betterprotect assets and contribute to future agency and security.

Adaptation finance provides 8 of the 11 irrigation activities thatoffer the greatest protection from erratic rains and drought. Thisintensifies existing livelihoods, enhances food security and offerscorresponding reductions in climate vulnerability. Naturally,variation exists in the scale and capacity of irrigation interventions.Treadle pumps that transfer water to planting areas are common.However, villagers’ complain about the low carrying capacity ofpumps and the inability to replace broken parts. Conversely, anirrigation intervention in Chizuwi (Salima) best demonstrates the



Table 4Adaptation finance and informal practices categorized into positive and negative adaptation.

Positive adaptation Villages Negative adaptation Villages

Adaptation finance Informal practice Adaptation finance Informal practice

Irrigation 8/9 3/9 Less preferred food 2/9 3/9

Drought crops 2/9 2/9 Winter cropping 4/9 3/9

Flood protection 7/9 1/9 Temporary labour 3/9 4/9

Tree planting 3/9 4/9 Firewood selling 4/9 2/9

Conservation farming 2/9 0/9 Selling grass/bananas 1/9 2/9

Technical training 2/9 0/9 Selling livestock 1/9 2/9

Early warning 1/9 0/9 Brewing alcohol 1/9 0/9

Fertilizer/compost 2/9 1/9 Temporary relocation 0/9 1/9

Mosquito nets 1/9 0/9 Food aid 2/9 0/9

Seeds 2/9 0/9 Riverbank cultivation 2/9 1/9


G Model


capacity to secure all aspects of positive adaptation. Theintervention involved raised water tanks fed through a solarpump, and waters a maize field where all village participants areallotted two rows. One villager estimated each participant receivesmore than 300 kilograms of maize each year from their allotment.

Informal actions include cultivating drought resistant cropssuch as sorghum, millet, cassava and drought resistant maize.Drought resistant cropping is a positive adaptation practicethrough increasing food security and wealth and with correspond-ing lessening of climate vulnerability. Nevertheless, droughtresistant cropping has benefits in an absolute sense, but is inferiorrelative to financed irrigation interventions. Comprehensive watermanagement circumvents drought as a biophysical hazard andleaves farmers with greater choice regarding which crops to growand land management in general.

Three adaptation finance villages and four informal practicevillages engage in tree planting. These actions offer lasting climatevulnerability reduction by directly mitigating the effects of highwinds on the physical security of villagers and their property.However, considerable variation exists in the degree of protectionoffered between the two categories of village. In adaptationfinance villages, tree planting occurred many years before; treeswere, therefore, more established, greater in height and breadth,and thus offered greater protection. This was consistent acrosscases and suggested informal practice villages learn fromintervention policy, but with a considerable time lag. Further,villagers in informal villages did not avail of technical advice fromimplementing agencies. For instance, informal tree planting inMafale (Chikwawa) failed due to insufficient rainfall and poorground fertility.

Adaptation finance villages had the capacity to combinenegative and positive adaptations depending on circumstancesand timelines. Conversely, informal action villages engagepredominantly, and in some cases exclusively (Chatacha andKanyanya in Nsanje district), in negative adaptations that fail toreduce climate vulnerability. These involve winter cropping,riverbank cultivation, consuming inferior foodstuffs, receivingfood aid and farm-labouring – termed ganyu. Winter croppingpractices are reported as a cause of land degradation through over-use. Riverbank cultivation provides accessible water, but whenseasonal rains arrive, crops are the first assets washed away. Thesepractices constrain future agency by compromising productivecapacity, wealth, and consequentially, increases climate vulnera-bility. Harvesting less preferred foods (such as dried water-lilyroots termed nyika) established new physical dangers in terms offrequent crocodile attacks. In addition, substituting nyika forcultivated foodstuffs compromises food security and representsan act of necessity. Finally, ganyu is recognized as a highlyexploitative practice within Malawi (see Bryceson and Fonseca(2006) for a focus on this claim) that alters the way villagers subsistand offers no sustainable climate vulnerability reduction.


Food aid represents the only adaptation finance interventionwith negative medium to long-term climate vulnerability implica-tions. Food aid establishes dependency amongst recipients byfailing to develop forward-looking and immanent solutions tohunger in times of low crop yields. Some researchers reportadverse consequences due to the stifling of market mechanisms(Middleton and O’Keefe, 1998). Such interventions possiblyweaken security and reduce long-term wealth.

Numerous informal livelihood diversification strategies -firewood collection and selling, banana selling, selling of livestockand brewing alcohol – intuitively contribute to intensifyingexisting livelihoods. Nevertheless, several issues question theagency-enhancing and sustainable character of actions. Collectingand selling firewood can result in deforestation and theestablishment of new flood plains. Alcohol brewing has negativephysical and social consequences that offset benefits associatedwith diversifying livelihoods. Livestock selling is inherentlyunsustainable and a positive action only when acting throughchoice. Only the sale of bananas can be considered positiveadaptation, as it simultaneously intensifies and diversifies existinglivelihood strategies; but this assumes the bananas sold are surplusfoodstuffs and thus an action of choice rather than necessity.

In summation, relative to informal practices, adaptation financeactions consistently increase the agency of villagers, intensifyexisting livelihoods and offer sustainable vulnerability reductionstrategies. This is clearest with regard to approaches addressingthe primary hazards/risk factors of flooding and drought. The trendcontinues, but issues become more nuanced, when tree planting,livelihood diversification and the weakest negative adaptations areinvestigated. For instance, both adaptation finance and informalpractice villages plant trees for physical protection, but the formerhave more success planting trees and secure a greater protectionfor villagers. Though many adaptation finance villages engage innegative adaptation, they combine negative and positive adapta-tion actions to develop an array of options to address climate riskfactors. Conversely, informal practice villages are predominantlyreliant on negative adaptation strategies that erode future agency,wealth and offer little sustainable climate vulnerability reduction.

5. Discussion

Findings indicate that adaptation finance is a relatively effectivemeans to address climate risk. Results show a tangible impact ofadaptation finance relative to informal practice across southernand eastern regions of Malawi. Further, adaptation finance villagesaddress more climate risks and consistently elicit greater agency,security, and a more sustainable lessening of climate vulnerability.There are exceptions: some adaptation finance villages fail toaddress many climate risks identified by villagers and many stilladapt in short-term and reactive ways. A small proportion ofinformal practice villages address all climate risks, and of these




G Model


actions, many are providing security and lasting vulnerabilityreduction. However, the trend signifies adaptation finance isassisting climate vulnerable communities.

Developing a method for measuring and analyzing adaptationfinance effectiveness has implications for academic and develop-ment assistance communities. The method is transferable to othercontexts and has several strengths: first, incorporating indicatorsto broadly assess and compare vulnerable locations based on localfactors, develops Geographical Information Systems based match-ing village pairs for a quasi-experiment setting; second, participa-tory surveys assess how villagers understand and deal withlocalized climate risks and adaptation. Finally, the assessment istransferable to determine the strengths and weaknesses ofdifferent adaptation and coping practices in other contexts. Allis made possible due to the considerable data and transparencyefforts underway in Malawi and illustrates the benefit of similarendeavours for other developing states. All combined, this processdelivers the means to measure effectiveness for adaptation financeand thus provides an empirical contribution to burgeoningacademic and policy debates.

Second, this study speaks to academic debates followingcommodity flows across scales, and another concerning the localrealities of global interventions. The former primarily focuses onNorth–South multi-scalar commodity flows, while the latter isinvestigated within the context of, for example, AIDS/HIVinterventions. Yet few offer empirical evidence from data-drivenmulti-scalar investigations following material processes as theypass through and across scales. Following adaptation financeprovides a means to understand funding distribution throughmultiple bureaucratic administrations and reveals the microreality of international funding efforts for local level actors theseactions are designed to assist: on the international scale, it revealshow funding flows are directed by donor-recipient trade andpolitical linkages, governance factors and not by climate vulnera-bility; on the subnational scale, economically productive districtsreceive disproportionately large amounts of funding activities,while climate vulnerable districts collect the least; finally, localimplementation has positive implications for vulnerable commu-nities in terms of climate risk reduction. If the most eligible receivefunds, there is a discernable impact.

Third, the findings are of consequence to those engaged in theprominent climate finance debate within the United Nationsclimate regime. Academic and policy research has long beenconcerned with problems of accounting for new and additionalfunds and the reclassification of development assistance asadaptation. An alternative solution is to access local levelinformation on the aims and objectives of funds, identifying asample as adaptation finance, and then evaluating their effective-ness in terms of climate risk reduction. To account for effective-ness, local level studies should be privileged, as well as localactors. Working with local level implementers’ of funds, such asDistrict Council representatives, offer unparalleled primarysources about the precise characteristics of funds, the benefici-aries and outcomes. The study thus navigates around the stasis ofaccounting for climate finance and instead offers a solutionconcentrating on the outcome of funds. Implied within thisperspective is that increased amounts spent by developed states isirrelevant if funds arrive in the least vulnerable locations, andonce there, make little impact on the lives of poor andmarginalized households and communities.

Fourth, the study offers local level empirical research to theclimate justice discussion. Often debates focus on the higher scalesof climate change governance, or deliberate on ideal principles.Tracking adaptation finance explores the social, political andeconomic reality of vulnerable communities and their interactionswith climate related hazards. Further, the finding that adaptation


finance reduces climate risk of these actors is encouraging for thosecampaigning for greater funding flows to least developed states.This suggests that individuals and groups lobbying to secure fundsare positively influencing the predicament for the poor andmarginalized in the developing world. Funding does change thelives of people exposed to climate change, and when directedtowards the most vulnerable, provides a means of addressingclimate variability and change impacts as a justice issue.

Nevertheless, several negative procedural justice dynamicsuncovered across villages may directly impact the experience ofadaptation finance implementation. These are primarily due topower relations at the community level and reveal furtherbarriers to delivering funds for the most vulnerable. Householdinterviews within villages consistently found many familieseither not participating or excluded from availing of certaininterventions. For instance, Village Headmen sometimes controlcassava gardens themselves; many villagers’ never had theopportunity to avail of public works programs such as flooddefences; in some villages it was clear that the most productiveand functional households where the main recipients of funds.These incidences suggest that gender, household functionality,and affiliation with Traditional Leaders, determines access toadaptation funds.

The final implication resides with the long discussed presentand historical responsibilities of developed states and theirproclamations to address equity within the United Nations climateregime. The finding suggests some actions of developed states areworking to ameliorate the double inequality of risk andresponsibility. Within the context of adaptation, climate justiceis being addressed through finance from those responsible, butonly in the at risk communities where adaptation finance arrives.

Funding

This research was funded by the Irish Research Council forHumanities and Social Sciences, the Department of Geography inTrinity College and the Climate Change and African PoliticalStability Project at University of Texas – Austin.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Anna Davies, Mesfin Bekalo, Stern Kita,Fyawupi Mwafongo, Josh Busby and Ashley Moran who allsupported the project at various stages. In addition, I am gratefulto the District Council Representatives, the Traditional Leaders andDistrict Commissioners of Nsanje, Chikwawa and Salima for theirconsent and efforts in conducting this research.

Appendix A

All adaptation finance transfers are selected through humancoding of the available descriptions. Narrow adaptation financerefers to any financial transfers with the explicit objective offacilitating adaptation or strengthening adaptive capacity toclimate change – the imperative is that funds have a statedreference to adaptation or resilience and that the purpose is toaddress climate change; broad adaptation finance transfers werelocated by whether these monies sought climate vulnerability

reduction in terms of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange’s understanding of the direct and indirect effects of climatechange–chronic and sudden-onset disasters brought about bydrought, desertification, land degradation, floods, hurricanes,temperature increases and sea-level rise. If descriptions claim toaddress any of these issues, then they were classified as broadadaptation finance and included in the sample.




G Model


References

Adger, W.N., 1999. Social vulnerability to climate change and extremes in coastalVietnam. World Development 27, 249–269.

Adger, W.N., Paavola, J., Huq, S., Mace, M., 2006. Fairness in Adaptation to ClimateChange. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Albin, C., 2001. Justice and Fairness in International Negotiations. CambridgeStudies of International Relations, Cambridge.

Ayers, J., 2009. International funding to support urban adaptation to climate change.Environment and Urbanization 21, 225–240.

Ayers, J., Forsyth, T., 2009. Community-based adaptation to climate change:strengthening resilience through development. Environment 51, 22–31.

Ayers, J., Huq, S., 2013. Adaptation, development and the community. In: JeanPalutikof, Sarah, L., Boulter, Andrew, J., Ash, Mark Stafford Smith, MartinParry, Marie Waschka, Daniela Guitart, (Eds.), Climate Adaptation Futures.John Wiley and Sons, Oxford.

Baer, P., Kartha, S., Athanasiou, T., Kemp-Benedict, E., 2009. The greenhousedevelopment rights framework: drawing attention to inequality within nationsin the global climate policy debate. Development and Change 40, 1121–1138.

Barrett, S., 2013. The necessity of a multi-scalar analysis of climate justice. Progressin Human Geography 37, 215–233.

Barrett, S., 2013a. International climate justice? Adaptation finance distribution andclimate vulnerability. International Studies Quarterly (Submitted for publication).

Barrett, S., 2013b. Subnational climate justice? Adaptation finance distribution andclimate vulnerability. World Development (Submitted for publication).

Beyer-Farris, B., Bassett, J., 2012. The REDD menace: resurgent protectionism inTanzania’s mangrove forests. Global Environmental Change 22, 332–341.

Bird, N., Tilley, H., Canales Trujillo, N., Tumushabe, G., Welham, B., Yanda, P., 2013.Measuring the Effectiveness of Public Climate Finance Delivery at the NationalLevel. Overseas Development Institute, London.

Birkmann, J., Buckle, P., Jaeger, J., Pelling, M., Setiadi, N., Garschagen, M., Fernando,N., Kropp, J., 2010. Extreme events and disasters: a window of opportunity forchange? Analysis of organizational, institutional and political changes, formaland informal responses after mega-disasters. Natural Hazards 55, 637–655.

Blackwell, M., Icaus, S., King, G., Porro, G., 2012. Coarsened exact matching in Stata.The Stata Journal 9, 524–546.

Bryceson, F., Fonseca, J., 2006. Risking death for survival: peasant responses tohunger and HIV/AIDS in Malawi. World Development 34, 1654–1666.

Burnham, P., 2008. Research Methods in Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.Busby, J., Cook, K., Vizy, E., Smith, T., 2013a. Identifying Hot Spots of Security

Vulnerability Associated with Climate Change in Africa. Climate Change andAfrican Political Stability Working Paper. , pp. 1–24.

Busby, J., Smith, T., White, K., Strange, S., 2013b. Climate change and insecurity:mapping vulnerability in Africa. International Security 37, 132–172.

Calland, R., Reddy, T., 2013. Towards a framework for national climate changegovernance in Africa, Climate Finance Governance Africa. Heinrich Boll Stiftung,Cape Town.

Canales Trujillo, N., Nakhooda, S., 2013. The Effectiveness of Climate Finance: AReview of the Adaptation Fund, Working Paper 373, Overseas DevelopmentInstitute, London..

Caney, S., 2010. Markets, morality and climate change: what, if anything, is wrongwith emissions trading? New Political Economy 15, 197–224.

Care International, 2009. Climate vulnerability and capacity analysis. In: Daze,A., Ambrose, K., Ehrhart, C. (Eds.), Handbook for Care International. CareInternational, Geneva.

Casale, M., Drimie, S., Quinlan, T., Ziervogel, G., 2010. Understanding vulnerability insouthern Africa: comparative findings using a multiple-stressor approach inSouth Africa and Malawi. Regional Environmental Change 10, 157–168.

Cash, D., Moser, S., 2000. Linking global and local scales: designing dynamic assess-ment and management processes. Global Environmental Change 10, 109–120.

Chambers, R., 1990. Rapid and participatory rural appraisal. Appropriate Technolo-gy 16, 14–16.

Chambers, R., 1994. Participatory rural appraisal: analysis of experience. WorldDevelopment 22, 1253–1268.

Chaum, M., Faris, C., Wagner, G., Buchner, B., Falconer, A., Trabacchi, C., Brown, J.,Sierra, K., 2012. Improving the Effectiveness of Climate Finance: Key Lessons.Climate Policy Initiative, Venice.

Chiwaka, E., Yates, R., 2012. Participatory Vulnerability Analysis: A Step-by-StepGuide to Field Staff. Action Aid International, Dorset.

Ciplet, D., Fields, S., Madden, K., Khan, M., Roberts, T., 2012. The Eight UnmetPromises of Fast-Start Climate Finance. IIED Policy Brief, International Institutefor Environment and Development, London.

Coleman, B., 1999. The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand. Journal ofDevelopment Economics 60, 105–141.

Cook, K.H., Vizy, E.K., 2012. Impacts of climate change on mid 21st century growingseasons in Africa. Climate Dynamics 39, 2937–2955.

Davies, S., Hossain, N., 1997. Livelihood Adaptation, Public Action and Civil Society:A Review of the Literature. IDS Working Paper 57. Institute of DevelopmentStudies, Sussex.

Davies, M., Pollard, L., Mwenda, D., 2010. Perceptions of land-degradation, forestrestoration and fire management: a case study from Malawi. Land Degradationand Development 21, 546–556.

Demographic and Health Survey, 2010. Malawi Demographic and Health Survey..Deressa, T., Hassan, R., Ringler, C., 2008. Measuring Ethiopian Farmers’ Vulnerability

to Climate Change Across Regional States. IFPRI Discussion Paper. InternationalFood Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.


Devereux, S., 2007. The impact of droughts and floods on food security and policyoptions to alleviate negative effects. Agricultural Economics 37, 47–58.

Dionne, K., 2013. Seeing Like A Village: Village Headmen’s Policy Priorities Duringthe AIDS Epidemic. Smith College (Unpublished manuscript).

Eriksen, S., Lind, J., 2009. Adaptation as a political process: adjusting to drought andconflict in Kenya’s drylands. Environmental Management 43, 817–835.

Fankhauser, S., Burton, I., 2011. Spending adaptation wisely. Climate Policy 11,1037–1049.

Fazey, I., Kesby, M., Evely, A., Latham, I., Wagatora, D., Hagasua, J., Reed, M.S.,Christie, M., 2010. A three-tiered approach to participatory vulnerability as-sessment in the Solomon Islands. Global Environmental Change 20, 713–728.

Fermann, G., 1997. The requirement of political legitimacy: burden-sharing criteriaand competing conceptions of responsibility. In: International Politics of Cli-mate Change: Key Issues and Critical Actors [International Relations]. Scandi-navian University Press, Oslo.

Fisher, M., Chaudury, M., McCusker, B., 2010. Do forests help rural households adaptto climate variability? Evidence from Southern Malawi. World Development38, 1241–1250.

Forstater, M., Nakhooda, S., Watson, C., 2013. Understanding the Effectiveness ofClimate Finance: The Amazon Fund. Working Paper 372. Overseas DevelopmentInstitute, London.

Fussel, H., 2010. How inequitable is the global distribution of responsibility,capability, and vulnerability to climate change: a comprehensive indicator-based assessment. Global Environmental Change 20, 597–611.

Fussel, H., Klein, R., 2006. Climate change vulnerability assessments: an evolution ofconceptual thinking. Climatic Change 75, 301–329.

Government of Malawi, 2006. Malawi: National Adaptation Plan of Action. Depart-ment of Environmental Affairs, Lilongwe.

Grasso, M., 2010a. An ethical approach to climate adaptation finance. GlobalEnvironmental Change 20, 74–81.

Grasso, M., 2010b. The role of justice in the North-South conflict in climate change:the case of negotiations on the Adaptation Fund. International EnvironmentalAgreements 10, 361–377.

Hahn, M., Riederer, A., Foster, S., 2009. The livelihood vulnerability index: apragmatic approach to assessing risks from climate variability and change-Acase study in Mozambique. Global Environmental Change 19, 74–88.

Heywood,A., 2004.PoliticalTheory:AnIntroduction. PalgraveMacmillan,Basingstoke.Huq, S., Khan, M., 2006. Equity in the national adaptation programs of action

(NAPAs): the case of Bangladesh. In: Neil, A., Jouni, P., Salemmul, H., Mace,M. (Eds.), Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001. Climate Change 2001: SynthesisReport. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Jabeen, H., Johnson, C., Allen, A., 2010. Built-in resilience: learning from grassrootscoping strategies for climate variability. Environment and Urbanization 22,415–431.

Jones, L., Mitchell, T., Villaneuva, P.S., Standley, S., 2012. Coding and TrackingAdaptation Finance: Lessons and Opportunities for Monitoring AdaptationFinance Across International and National Scales. ODI Research Brief. OverseasDevelopment Institute, London.

Lopez-Marrero, T., 2010. An integrative approach to study and promote naturalhazards adaptive capacity: a case study of two flood-prone communities inPuerto Rico. Geographical Journal 176, 150–163.

Maplecroft, 2011. Climate Change Vulnerability Index. Bath: United Kingdom. .Mearns, R., Norton, A., 2010. Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and

Vulnerability in a Warming World. World Bank, Washington, DC.Mercer, K., Perales, H., Wainwright, J., 2012. Climate change and the transgenic

adaptation strategy: smallholder livelihoods, climate justice, and maize land-races in Mexico. Global Environmental Change 22, 495–504.

Middleton, N., O’Keefe, P., 1998. Disaster and Development: The Politics of Human-itarian Aid. London, Pluto Press.

Mijoni, L., Izadkhah, O., 2009. Management of floods in Malawi: case study of theLower Shire River Valley. Disaster Prevention and Management 18, 490–503.

Mustafa, D., 1998. Structural causes of vulnerability to flood hazard in Pakistan.Economic Geography 74, 289–305.

Nakhooda, S., 2013. The effectiveness of international climate finance. In: ODIWorking Paper. Overseas Development Institution, London, pp. 371.

Nelson, R., Adger, W.N., Brown, K., 2007. Adaptation to environmental change:contributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review of Environment andResources 32, 395–419.

Osbahr, H., Twyman, C., Adger, W.N., Thomas, G., 2008. Effective livelihood adapta-tion to climate change disturbance: Scale dimensions of practice in Mozambi-que. Geoforum 39, 1951–1964.

Paavola, J., Adger, W.N., 2006. Fair adaptation to climate change. Ecological Eco-nomics 56.

Paavola, J., 2006. Justice in adaptation to climate change in Tanzania. In: Neil, A., Jouni,P., Salemmul, H., Mace, M. (Eds.), Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. MITPress, Cambridge.

Page, E., 2012. The hidden costs of carbon commodification: emissions trading,political legitimacy and procedural justice. Democratization 19, 932–950.

Paterson, M., 2001. Principles of justice in the context of global climate change. In:Urs, L., Detlef, S. (Eds.), International Relations and Global Climate Change. MITPress, Cambridge.

Patt, A., 2009. Assessing Vulnerability to Global Environmental Change: MakingResearch Useful for Adaptation Decision Making and Policy. Earthscan, London.

Pelling, M., 2007. Learning from others: the scope and challenges for participatorydisaster risk assessment. Disasters 31, 373–385.


http://refhub.elsevier.com/S0959-3780(13)00121-0/sbref0005














































































































































































































G Model


Phiri, I., Saka, A., 2008. The impact of changing environmental conditions onvulnerable communities in the shire valley, Southern Malawi. Future of Dry-lands 545–559.

Pitt, M., Khandker, S., 1998. The impact of group-based credit programs on poorhouseholds in Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter? Journal ofPolitical Economy 106, 958–996.

Red Cross Crescent Societies, 2010. How Can Climate Change be Considered inVulnerability and Capacity Assessments? Considering Climate Change in Vul-nerability Capacity Assessments. Red Cross and Red Crescent Climate Centre,Amsterdam.

Roberts, T., Parks, B., 2007. A Climate of Injustice. MIT Press, Cambridge.Roberts, T., Peratsakis, C., 2011. Measuring ODA for Climate Change: Comparing 19

Categorizations of DFID’s 2,226 FY2008-2009 Projects, Draft Manuscript. BrownUniversity, Rhode Island.

Rodima-Taylor, D., 2012. Social innovation and climate adaptation: local collectiveaction in diversifying Tanzania. Applied Geography 33, 128–134.

Rubin, D., 1973. Matching to remove bias in observational studies. Biometrics 29,159–183.

Smit, B., Wandel, J., 2006. Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. GlobalEnvironmental Change 16, 282–292.

Sovacool, B., 2012. Expert views of climate change adaptation in the Maldives.Climatic Change 114, 295–300.

Stadelmann, M., Brown, J., Hornlein, L., 2012. Fast start finance: scattered gover-nance, information and programmes. In: Axel, M. (Ed.), Carbon Markets orClimate Finance? Low Carbon and Adaptation Investment Choices for theDeveloping World. Routledge, New York.

Stadelmann, M., Persson, A., Ratajczak-Juszko, I., Michaelowa, A., 2013. Equityand cost-effectiveness of multilateral adaptation finance – are they friends orfoe? International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics1, 1–20.

Stadelmann, M., Roberts, T., Michaelowa, A., 2011. New and additional to what?Assessing options for baselines to assess climate finance pledges. Climate andDevelopment 3, 175–192.

Strandow, D., Findley, M., Nielson, D., Powell, J., 2011. The UCDP and AidDataCodebook on Georeferencing Aid Version 1.1. UCDP Paper. Uppsala University,Uppsala.

Stringer, L.C., Dyer, J.C., Reed, M.S., Dougill, A.J., Twyman, C., Mkwambisi, D.,2009. Adaptations to climate change, drought and desertification: local


insights to enhance policy in southern Africa. Environmental Science andPolicy 12, 748–765.

Stuart, E., 2011. Matching Methods for Causal Inference: A Review and LookForward. Working Paper. John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Sullivan, C., Meigh, J., 2005. Targeting attention on local vulnerabilities using anintegrated index approach: the example of the climate vulnerability index.Water Science and Technology 51, 69–78.

Sutherland, K., Smit, B., Wulf, V., Nakalevu, T., 2005. Vulnerability in Somoa. Tiempo54, 11–17.

Tedeschi, G., 2008. Overcoming selection bias in microcredit impact assessments: acase study in Peru. Journal of Development Studies 44, 504–518.

Thomas, D.S.G., Twyman, C., 2005. Equity and justice in climate change adaptationamongst natural-resource-dependent societies. Global Environmental Change15, 115–124.

Tierney, M., Nielson, D., Hawkins, D., Roberts, T., Findley, M., Powers, R., Parks, B.,Wilson, S., Hicks, 2011. More dollars than sense: refining our knowledge ofdevelopment finance using Aiddata. World Development 39, 1891–1906.

United Nations, 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.UNFCCC International.

United Nations, 2009. The Copenhagen Accord. UNFCCC International, Denmark.United Nations, 2010. The Kyoto Protocol. UNFCCC International, Japan.Van Aalst, M., Cannon, T., Burton, I., 2008. Community level adaptation to climate

change: the potential role of participatory community risk assessment. GlobalEnvironmental Change 18, 165–179.

Vasquez-Leon, M., West, C., Finan, T., 2003. A comparative assessment of climatevulnerability: agriculture and ranching on both sides of the US-Mexico border.Global Environmental Change 13, 159–173.

Vincent, K., 2007. Uncertainty in adaptive capacity and the importance of scale.Global Environmental Change 17, 12–24.

Vizy, E.K., Cook, K.H., 2012. Mid 21st century changes in extreme weather eventsover northern and tropical Africa. Journal of Climate 5748–5767.

Weaver, C., Baker, J., Peratsakis, C., 2012. Tracking Climate Adaptation Aid: Meth-odology, Research Brief No. 5. The Robert Strauss Center for InternationalSecurity and Law, Austin.

Wisner, B., Cannon, T., Davies, I., Blaikie, P., 2004. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’sVulnerability and Disasters. Routledge, London.

World Bank, 2013. World Development Indicators CO2 Emissions Data. The WorldBank Group, Washington, DC.















































































local level climate justice? adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction

Documents