Proceedings of the

International Colloquium

on

THE PORTUGUESE ANDTHE PACIFIC

University of California, Santa BarbaraOctober 1993

edited byFrancis A. Dutra

andJoão Camilo dos Santos

Center for Portuguese StudiesUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

1995

Contents

João Camilo dos Santos, Foreword í"Francis A. Dutra, Introduction 3Martin Torodash, Magellan Historiography: Some Twenty

Years Later 11Alfredo Pinheiro Marques, New Light on the Problem of

Cabrillo's Origin 17Anthony Disney, Contrasting Models of "Empire": The Estado

da Índia in South Asia and East Asia in the Sixteenth andEarly Seventeenth Centuries 26

Manuel Lobato, The Moluccan Archipelago and East Indonesiain the Second Half of the 16th Century in the Lightof Portuguese and Spanish Accounts 38

Maria da Conceição Flores, Portuguese Relationships with Siamin the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 64

Maria Ana Marques Guedes, D. Martini, an Arakanese Prince atthe Service of the Estado da índia and Portugal's Designs

Jacques Népote, The Portuguese, Cambodia and the MekongValley: The Logic of Discovery 113

Leonard Y. Andaya, The Portuguese Tribe in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth andEighteenth Centuries 129

Roderich Ptak, Asian Trade in Cloves circa 1500: Quantitiesand Trade Routes—A Synopsis of Portuguese and OtherSources 149

George Winius, Embassies from Malacca and the "ShadowEmpire" t7fl

R.J. Barendse, Kraton and Castello: European Trade and AsianInfluences in the Indonesian Archipelago 1500-1650 179

Kenneth McPherson, Enemies or Friends* the Portuguese,the British and the Survival of Portuguese Commerce inthe Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia from the LateSeventeenth to the Late Nineteenth Century 211

Bill M. Donovan, Rio de Janeiro and Portugal's Trans OceanicEmpire, 1700-1750 ' 238

Teotonio R. de Souza, The Portuguese Discovery and lhe Jesuit"Conquest" of Japan 250

Elsa Macedo de Lima Penalva, The Letters of the Jesuits: TheEconomy of the Jesuit Missions in Japan (1614-1639) 261

Eugênio Lisboa, Triunfo, Medo e Silêncio 272lohn Kelly, The Impact of the Portuguexe on Japan as Reflected

in the Japanese Art of the 16th and 17th Centuries 279

Francis A. Dutra, The Order of Santiago and the Estadoda índia, 1498-1750 287

Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves, The First Decade ofSino-Portugaese Diplomatic Relations Following theFounding of Macau 305

W.A.R. Richardson, A Cartographical Nightmare—ManuelGodinho de Eiedia's Search for índia Meridional 314

Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Role in Charting the Pacific 349Haraprasad Ray, The Eastern Ocean and the Western Ocean—

Chinese Involvement in the Geopolitics of the Pacificand the Indian Ocean Region Prior to the Advent ofPortuguese Power 364

Ng Chin-keong, Trade, the Sea Prohibition and the"Fo-lang-chi", 1513-1550 381

Deng Kaisong and Yang Renfei, The Historical Role Playedby the Portuguese in China Before the Middle of theNineteenth Century 425

The Moluccan Archipelago andEastern Indonesia in the Second Halfof the 16th Century in the Light ofPortuguese and Spanish Accounts1

Manuel LobatoInstituto as, Investigação Cientifica Tropical,

Lisbon

From about 1580, Portugal and Spain began to coordinate tbeiroverseas policies under King Philip II. Portuguese settlements inTidore and Ambon (Central Maluku) began to be supported bySpanish authorities in Manila against attacks from the Sultan ofTernate. Between 1581 and 1606, the Portuguese and the Spanishwere compelled to fight the Ternatian "empire" from the Phil-ippines, in the north, to the Lesser Sunda Islands, in the south. TheIberian condominium over the Spice Islands ended by 1607, whenthe Dutch, settled in the region, engaged with Ternate in the clovetrade on friendly terms.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the Portuguese andSpanish involvement in the Moluccan archipelago, focusing on thepolitical history of the Temate Sultanate in the second half of the16th century, based on accounts written by Iberian crown representa-tives. Fortunately, many of these European accounts about theMoluccan archipelago are available. Permanent wars and a large num-ber of Christian missions attracted the attention of many contem-porary writers. Among them, one can find letters from governors, thevoluminous Jesuit correspondence and a few narratives from 16th and17th century chroniclers, such as the Portuguese Diogo do Couto,Friar Paulo da Trindade and Father Francisco de Sousa, on the onehand, and the Spanish Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Dr. Antóniode Morga, Diego Aduane and Gaspar de San Agustín. Some accountsconcerning military expeditions sent from Manila and Melaka—respectively the Spanish and Portuguese capitals in Southeast Asia—against the Dutch and the eastern Indonesian kingdoms, are alsoavailable.

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 39

The decline of the Portuguese influence in Maluku

The Portuguese had settled in the island of Ternate by 1522, theyear in which they built a fortress there. Two decades after itsfoundation, their domination over Maluku was considerable. Fromthe very beginning they tried to create a sort of protectorate over theTernate Sultanate, which they considered to be a very faithful ally.Meanwhile, rivalry between the Portuguese and the Castilians fes-tered until a diplomatic solution was found in 1529, when the Treatyof Saragossa was signed. Even then, the Portuguese continued to dis-pute control over the Spice Islands with the Spaniards. The Spaniardswere allied to the Tidore Sultanate, a traditional rival of Ternate. In1542, Rui Lopez Villalobos, chief of a Spanish expedition, founded afew Castilian settlements in Jailolo, Morotai and Tidore islands.However, the Portuguese took advantage of the Castilian failure tomake theii way back to America on this occasion, and of. their lack oiaccess to Indian textiles for the trade in cloves in Maluku.z

Once the Spaniards withdrew from the region, the TernateSultanate tried to counter the Portuguese hegemony. This attitude,when added to some internal disputes among the Portuguese, createda highly ambiguous relationship between Asians and Europeans in theregion.

The period dealt with in this paper begins around the late 1530s,the second part of the interrupted reign of Sultan Hairun. In the earlyperiod, the Portuguese had successfully reinforced their protectoratein Ternate. They thought they could control events through thedevice of a puppet ruler, as they had done formerly with other kings.They assured the new Sultan an uncontested power over his subjects,as well as a comfortable hegemony for the Ternate Sultanate over theother Maluku kingdoms. Hairun played their game, taking advantageof the situation as opportunities came his way. During the Castilianoffensive in the 1540s, Sultan Hairun did not commit himself in theconflict, nor did he fight the local allies of the Spaniards, who, theo-retically, were also his enemies.3 Tematians showed a great ability tomoderate the Portuguese hegemony. After the definitive rupturebetween Tematian and Portuguese authorities, in 1570, a similar pol-icy was followed by Tidore's rulers to secure the balance of power.

To consolidate Hairun on the throne, António Galvão, thePortuguese governor, promoted a marriage between Hairun and adaughter of the Sultan of Tidore. Initially, Hairun seemed to be recep-tive to the proselytising proposals of the Portuguese. He divorced hisChristian wife according to the Jesuit design to separate Christiansfrom Muslims. Hairun also promised that his son would receive

40 MANUEL LOBATO

baptism on the condition that he should be enthroned by thePortuguese as the king of all Christian people of Maluku.4 In this way,the Sultan tried to circumvent the Portuguese strategy of the 1540sand 1550s, which consisted in the creation of two blocs in Maluku:one composed of all the Christian communities, the other made up ofMuslims. This new Christian state would have its centre at Moro, afertile region tha: included Morotai island and Morotia in northernHalmahera island. In this particular region, animist and Christianpeople, converted by Prancis Xavier, outnumbered the Muslims. Inthis way, the Portuguese tried to ensure that they had a solid basis forthe control of Maluku, since Moro was the main supplier of foodstuffsto the other regions which specialized in clove production. On theother hand, Hairun made a great effort to preserve his influence inMoro.s He appointed Christian members of his own family to ruleChristian zones in Moro, but at the same time, he made war on themin order to extinguish Christian influence.6

In the 17th century, Father Francisco de Sousa disputed the pro-file of Hairun drawn by Gabriel Rebelo, a Portuguese settler atMaluku and a friend of the Sultan.7 Sousa criticised the two-faced pol-icy of Hairun: the Sultan invoked his lack of authority over his sub-jects who were carrying out anti-Portuguese activities, hut, he argued,the king himself was its major instigator.8 Thus, the situation evolvedfrom a limited influence of Hairun over the course of events to a com-plete manipulation by him of the Portuguese alliance. As a conse-quence, the Sultan increased his power and independence in thewhole Maluku area. The Portuguese, or at least some of them, hadrealised the waste of their efforts in dismissing kings and promotingnew ones, because local elites could always choose among a largenumber of candidates for king. Where the Temate Sultanate was con-cerned, constitutional dispositions acted as a tool used by Tcrnatianelites to prevent their king from becoming a puppet in the hands ofthe Portuguese authorities. Although the Portuguese failed to manip-ulate the succession system, the anti-Portuguese faction succeeded inthis task after 1570.

However, it was not until the 1550s that the increasing power ofthe Sultan became a threat to the Portuguese.9 The Sultanate nolonger cooperated with Christian proselytism. The era of Muslim tol-erance was over as Temate strengthened its links with Japara, theJavanese kingdom allied to Aceh. Thenceforth, Portuguese decline inMaluku also became apparent.

By 1557, the king of Bacan accepted baptism. Like Jailolo, Tidoreand Temate, Bacan belonged to the group of four legendary "pillar"kingdoms of Maluku, failolo disappeared as an independent kingdom

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 41

in 1550, when the Castilians and their allies were defeated.10

Thereafter, Hairun reinforced his position against the Christian faithby sending a few military expeditions to attack Christian villages inMoro and Eacan. Sultan Hairun and the Javanese community settledat Ambon also inspired a Muslim rebellion against the local Christianpeople. In reaction, the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun, butsome Portuguese casados from Temate set him free to avoid a generalrevolt in all the Maluku islands. From now on, Hairun proved to be askilful strategist. He did not permit his influence to be weakened byChristian expansion. At the same time, he made an effort to pleasethe Portuguese authorities, above all the viceroy at Goa, for fear ofmajor military interference from Goa or Melaka. In 1562, in a solemnbut largely symbolic act, he granted his kingdom to the Portuguesecrown. In 1563, he pre-empted a Jesuit mission in northern Sulawesiand the Syao islands, by forcing local rulers, still animists, to embraceIslam, avoiding in this way the expansion of Portuguese influenceinto the western and northwestern regions. He showed the samedetermination concerning the eastward regions. "The king of thePapua people, Emperor of Banggai", sent his son and heir as ambas-sador to Ternate to choose between Islam and Christianity. Theambassadors chose the Christian faith but Hairun, the most presti-gious ruler of the region, changed their minds by promising to marry adaughter of the Papuan king.11

The Goa authorities, taking cognisance of the growing reli-gious conflict in Maluku, decided to reinforce their military presence.The Portuguese plan included the promotion of Christian communi-ties in both number and strength to secure Portuguese rule in theislands.12 The lower classes' reluctance to change their ancestralbeliefs for the Muslim faith encouraged early missionaries and gavethem excessive hope. In fact, initiatives of Christian proselytismoften provoked Hainan's reaction. As a consequence, the animistcommunities of the most distant islands were forced to choosebetween the Christian and Islamic faiths. Some rulers and chieftain-cies of the eastern Archipelago accepted the Christian religion to flat-ter the Portuguese and obtain advantages from them, but the kingsdepended on traditional and Islamic conceptions to legitimise andkeep effective power.13

Expeditions to Maluku (1563-1569)The Muslim revolt inspired by Ternate and the Javanese, in the

later 1550s, encouraged a Portuguese project to establish clearsuzerainty over Maluku. In 1562, the viceroy D. Francisco Coutinho

42 MANUEL LOBATO

ordered António Pais to build a new fort at Rocanive, on Ambonisland. The Portuguese authorities also wished to prevent theJavanese trade in spices. This plan failed due to the obstruction ofHairun. António Pais's expedition to Ambon, in 1563-64, could notforce southern Maluku to submit. Pais tried to obtain support fromsome independent chieftaincies, but Hairun pre-empted him by mak-ing some raids on Ambon, and attacking Christian people and localcommunities who were supporting the Portuguese. The latter, at thecommand of Henrique de Sá, governor of Ternate, withdrew fromAmbon."

Once news of this defeat was known in Goa, the new viceroy D.Antão de Noronha ordered a stronger expedition. The fleet led byGonçalo Pereira Marramaque left Goa around April 1566. Marra-maque was charged with a large number of tasks in the Malay-Indonesian seas.15 He was ordered to relieve Melaka from a possiblesiege by Aceh; resolve conflicts between the Portuguese governors ofTernate and Sultan Hairun; and force the surrender of Ambon, where,besides the Javanese traffic in cloves, the Muslim authorities encour-aged by the Ternatian representatives continued a sanguinary repres-sion of Christian communities.1* However, from the beginning, theplan did not succeed. Aceh did not besiege Melaka that year. Thefleet, sailing along the northern coast of Borneo, had to come to termswith the recent Spanish settlement in the Philippines. Miguel Lopezde Legazpi had fortified himself in Cebu, with the Portuguese beingimpotent to expel the Spaniards. So, Marramaque had to quit thePhilippines, arriving at Maluku in 1567.

Meanwhile, Portuguese settlers from Ternate had begun to fightthe Castilian presence in the Philippines, disturbing trade in Bohol andother islands. Marramaque's expedition was the most powerful fleetthat had been sent by the Portuguese to Maluku in many years. It wasmade up of three galleons, two galleys, six foists and some five hun-dred soldiers, reinforced by the usual galleon of trade (gaíeão da car-reira). However, the expedition was depleted in terms of personnel andvessels as a result of battles with the Castilians in Cebú. As we havenoted, Marramaque intended to force the East-Central Archipelago tosubmit. A fort was to be built in Ambon, the strategic port of call inthe sea route followed by galleons to and from Maluku. Marramaquecarried out a few military campaigns against the Javanese and theirallies at Ambon and other neighbouring islands in south-centralMaluku. The Javanese left Ambon after a fleet sent from Japara to therescue of Hitu, the Muslim headquarters at Ambon, was defeated. Theambitious project, which included, besides the new fort, the provision-ing of a fleet to secure the coasts of Maluku, failed after a few years.i7

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 43

The murder of the Sultan and the fall of Ternate fortThe Portuguese community in Maluku was concentrated at

Ternate, It was composed of some 40 to 50 settlers (vizinhas] living ina separate compound next to the fort.18 They were not a harmoniouscommunity united in the same political and economic aims. Most ofthem were not on good terms with the natives. However, a few ofthem, rich and influential people, were linked by kinship ties to localelites, hi fact, by the late 1560s, a group of powerful casados acted ascounsellors of Sultan Hainan, while most of the Portuguese settlerswere persecuted by the Muslim authorities throughout the islands.19

To the first group belonged, for instance, Paulo de Lima, probably ahalf-caste "headman" married to a Christianised niece of the Sultanof Tidore. Because of this marriage, Paulo de Lima became landlord ofa few villages in Motiel island and a relative of Hairun.20 These richcasados were second-generation settlers of European origin. The firstgeneration had been settled by governor António Galvão in earlytimes. They played a decisive role in supporting Hairun. In otherwords, the usual alliances, through marriage, between regional elitesand Maluku rulers, was enlarged to include the Portuguese communi-ty. To the first generation of casados belonged Henrique de Lima andManuel da Silva, to whom M. A. Lima Cruz adds Gonçalo FernandesBravo and Baltazar Veloso, both married Hairun's sisters, and AntónioRibeiro and Lopo Ribaldo, also linked by kinship ties to the Sultan ofTernate.21

By 1575, the Portuguese withdrew from Ternate, after a longconflict with the local Sultanate. Contemporary writers condemnedthe governor Diogo Lopes de Mesquita for his tactlessness, because heordered the murder of Sultan Hairun in 1570, despite his being a"trusted ally" of the Portuguese. But, in fact, the Sultan was far frombeing a faithful vassal of the Portuguese crown, and followed anambiguous policy vis-a-vis the Portuguese. This attitude becomemore marked in his latter years. Mutual relations worsened afterHairun increased his persecution of Christian communities in Moro.This region includes, as we have said, Morotai, in northwesternHalmahera, the Morotia island, located northwards, and a few smallislands, of which the most important was Rau. Christian communi-ties in these islands included some eighty thousand souls and twenty-nine villages. Moro was the main exporter of rice and sago. The fertil-ity of its soil, especially in Morotai, is the result of its being a plain,while most of the other neighbouring islands were mountainous. Forseveral centuries, Moro had been coveted by all the kings of Maluku.Its possession conferred the right and the power to demand foodstuffs

44 MANUEL LOBATO

and to impose tributes. Continuous disputes and wars led natives toseek the protection of missionaries and the Portuguese, who couldalso gain access to provisions in Moro. In early times, the [esuit mis-sion in Moro and local Christian people were persecuted by the Sultanof Jailolo, ruler of Central Halmahera, immediately south oí Moro.Defeated by the Portuguese in 1550-51, Jailolo responded by attackingMoro in 1558 with the support of Hairun. From 1562 to 1566 therewere some signs of appeasement, so that missionary work could goforward. But in 1566 the Sultan of Ternate ordered unprecedented vio-lent persecutions, which became quite regular from 1569- Somethingsimilar had already been practised in Ambon. Perhaps the Sultansought, by these means, to balance the influence achieved by GonçaloPereira Marramaque in south-central Maluku.22

The strategy oi Hairun against the Portuguese was finally under-stood by Marramaque. After some hesitation, he decided to arrest theSultan and thus recover the influence that the Portuguese had lost.Some casados, relatives of the Sultan, tipped him off, so that he couldeasily elude Marramaque's design." In 1570, Hairun was alsoinformed about another plan for his murder, presented by the gover-nor of Ternate, Diogo Lopes de Mesquita. This secret affair was leakedout from the council by some of the most prominent Portuguese resi-dents. In that meeting, Francisco de Sousa attributes to the governor aspeech, pronounced before his compatriots, summarising all Hairun'streacheries.24 Despite complicities and kinship ties between the Portu-guese community and the Sultan, he was killed by order of the gover-nor. Because of Hairun's murder, the Sultanate of Ternate, earlier thechief "vassal" and "ally" of the Portuguese, became their most power-ful enemy.25 Local authorities fought the Portuguese for five years,finally expelling them from the island. The late P. R. Abdurachmanhas argued that the jihad or holy war against the Portuguese wasdeclared just after the death of Hairun.26 However, a different versionis given by Argensola. According to him it was not until 1572 that aconfederation of all kings and sengaji of Maluku was built up againstthe Portuguese, the leadership of which none of Hairun's sons had thecourage to take over, but which was accepted by Baab Ullah, the newSultan of Ternate,27 On the other hand, the Portuguese and mission-ary sources refer to a rebellion all over the Eastern Archipelago,putting an end to the internecine disputes. A similar event hadoccurred in 1557, when the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun.z*Some cultural and ideological explanations have been found to justifythese social and political reactions. Firstly, the kings of Ternate andTidore claimed to be of divine origin.29 Secondly, Ternate island was apart—the chief one, because it was said to be the centre—of a much

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 45

•wider sacred area, extending beyond Maluku itself. The Portugueseinsisted on the geopolitical division of the region, ignoring mythicalties between kingdoms. They only knew the intricate kinship linksamong royal families that offered them an inconsistent political pat-tern.30 Regicide perpetrated by foreigners was a violation of the idea,deeply rooted in tradition, that the Sultan of Ternate was the king ofkings of Maluku and that his person was sacred and inviolable.

On the other hand, Spanish writers, namely Gaspar de SanAgustín, clearly note that the killing of Hairun was invoked by theTematians as a pretext to turn things against the Portuguese. Insidethe royal family itself, there was a faction inclined to a stronger resis-tance against the Portuguese. The Sultan's murder was very conve-nient to this political faction which gained power and encroached onthe legitimate royal lineage. This fact partially influenced the subse-quent Portuguese policy.31

From that time on, the old faction which had lost its powermoved into "opposition", clustered around the legitimate lineage.This group agreed to make some concessions to the Portuguese,including, after 1575, to give them back the fortress, in exchange forsupport to recover the crown. This domestic opposition in Ternatealso conspired with Tidorian authorities. According to Couto, theSultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, ordered the killing of the presumptiveheir who was also his own brother. The governor of Maluku, DuartePereira, now resident at Tidore, found this the propitious moment torecover Ternate, hatching a scheme with Kachil Tulo, "Regent of theKingdom", and brother of the Sultan. Pereira appealed to the right ofsuccession of Kachil Tulo, taking advantage of the general indignationin Maluku caused by the prince's murder ordered by the Sultan.32

Argensola presents a different version. According to him, after thedeath of Hairun, the new governor, Nuno Pereira de Lacerda, offeredthe throne of Ternate to Kachil Guarate, the eldest son of Hairun.33

Meanwhile, after the Marramaque expedition had withdrawnfrom Maluku, Asians achieved naval supremacy over the seas of theEastern Archipelago. In Ternate, the Portuguese depended on theacquiescence of the Sultan to gain access to foodstuffs from Moro. TheSultan, for his part, often disrupted the supply lines.34 The fortress hadnot fallen earlier because the king of Tidore, breaking his alliance withTernate, discreetly supplied the Portuguese encircled behind thewalls.35 During the siege, both sides kept alive negotiations for peace.Finally, when the garrison was surrendered, Sultan Baab Ullah keptthe fortress in the name of the king of Portugal, an unprecedented andsurprising event.36 Reinforcement troops sent from Goa arrived toolate and were of insufficient strength to recover it.37

46 MANUEL LOBATO

Goa abandoned Maluku to its fate, just as governors neglectedthe defence of a "conquest" that was also a place for exiled and con-victed people.^ On the other hand, at the same time, Portuguese pos-sessions in India suffered several attacks—sieges of Goa, Chaul andChaliyam—that inhibited adequate aid from the viceroys.39 A fleetcomposed of four vessels left Goa in 1574, bui arrived at Ternate justafter the fortress surrendered.40 Altogether, three rescue expeditionswere sent to Maluku in a seven-year period, without any positiveresults." Though the Portuguese showed some interest in recoveringtheir influence in Maluku,42 one may conclude that the Portugueseshowed relatively little inclination towards conquest, giving priorityto commerce over military enterprises. This was in contrast to theSpaniards: "The first thing the Castilians do when they conquer [aland] is to kill prominent people and to convert to the Christian faiththe other people, unlike us [for] the first thing we pursue is the clovetrade and [only] secondly Christianity."43 For the Jesuit priests, afterthe fall of the Ternate fortress, Maluku lost its value as a missionarea. So they turned their eyes more and more to Japan."

In 1574, just before the fall of Ternate, the Portuguese also expe-rienced some troubles in the Banda islands. Their loss of prestige gavethe Bandanese courage enough to escape their influence and attackthem.45 In Maluku the Portuguese had a royal factory and a fortress,but their presence in Banda presented a different pattern. Here, thePortuguese presence was reduced to a seasonal visit by the Crown'sagents and private traders, though there were some resident traders atNeira island, A similar pattern could also be found in the Solorislands in the early days.46 In the mid-1570s two political blocsemerged in the Archipelago: the first one led by Temate, the otherone combining Tidore and Banda. However, though some members ofthe royal family of Tidore were convinced they should help Banda tofight the Portuguese, the Sultan had a different opinion. BecauseTidore's policy was an ambiguous one, Banda moved eventually toTernate's side, especially after the Portuguese built a fort at Tidorewith the Sultan's permission. Thenceforth, the Portuguese presencein Banda depended on the surrender of Ternate: "If this Maluku sur-renders, so will Banda."47

After 1575, Ternate's authorities multiplied fortifications ontheir own island, as well in their overseas possessions. The Sultanatereceived supplies, including artillery, from Johor, which was alsoallied to Banda.4» This means that the difficulties experienced by thePortuguese in Maluku were not isolated from the conflicts they hadin the western Malay world. In some sense, such problems at Ternatewere an extension of the war between the Portuguese and rival

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 47

Sultanates. These events brought to light the existence of an anti-Portuguese coalition linking Muslim power throughout the IndianOcean. Aceh was the connection to the Western Indian Ocean, whileJohor was the link of a Muslim chain to Java and the EasternArchipelago.49

Expelled from Ternate, the Portuguese found themselves in avery we^k position, despite their new bases at Ambon and Tidore.The foundation of a fort at Tidore was due to the fears of the localSultan regarding Ternate's hegemony. The Sultan of Tidore personal-ly rendered tribute to the Portuguese governor of Ambon, reviving anold lost practice. Until then, neither party went back on the alliancesand mutual attitudes that had been in place for some ten years or evenmore .so Besides this ambiguous alliance with Tidore, the coalition ledby Temate left to the Portuguese a few villages of little significance.The Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, intended to banish the Portuguesepresence without harming the commercial links. Thus he continuedto secure supplies of cloves for ships coming from India and Melaka.This policy on the part of Ternate remained unchanged until theDutch arrival at Maluku at the end of the century.51

The Portuguese in Ambon:War and Islamization and Christianity

From 1501, Ternate claimed political suzerainty over Ambon.According to local sources, the Pati of Hitu made a defensive agree-ment with Sultan Zainal Abidin from Ternate. Hitu was a town or, tobe exact, a confederation of some thirty Muslim villages, and thestrongest political formation on the northern coast of Ambon.52

P. Abdurachman, who extracted this information from a late Hituanchronicle named Nadah, thinks the agreement served Ternate'sclaims for political paramountcy over Bum, Ceram, Ambon, Leaseand Banda islands. The Hitu authorities adopted the Islamic faith inthe late 15th or early 16th century, but most common peopleremained attached to animism till the next century.53

By 1525, a Portuguese settlement was created at Hitu. As inMaluku, the governor António Galvão also introduced Christianity inAmbon about 1538. To protect Christian people and to prevent theclove trade to Java, the governor Jordão de Freitas built, around 1544,a stockade at Ative, then the most important Christian centre. From1557, the Muslim authorities from Ambon, supported by Hainan andJapara, fought the Christian influence. In the early 1560s, several re-bellions arose against Christian communities and Jesuit missionaries,

48 MANUEL LOBATO

followed by persecutions.54 This period set off an increasingly fierceoffensive in Hitu. According to missionary figures, Christian commu-nities in the Ambon, Lease, Ceram and Bum islands, amounted tosome seventy thousand souls by 1565. The persecutions of whichthey had been victims were a reason for Goa to send the Marramaqueexpedition, as we have seen. He was ordered to built a new fort atAmbon, but the Portuguese settlers did not wait for him and theywere forced to withdraw from the island as soon as 1565.55 This par-ticular year saw the rise of a new geopolitical framework in theregion: the Portuguese left Ambon, abandoning local Christians totheir fate,- in the southeastern extremity of the Archipelago, thePortuguese settlement on Solor island was ravaged by a Javanese fleetinitially directed against Portuguese positions in Ambon; and finally achange in the structure of alliances oi Hitu occurred. This micro-stateset up close relations with Gresik, in Java. However, Japara, passingthrough an obscure phase, continued to support Hitu until a new kingascended the throne in Java.56 Marramaque forced Hitu—where hebuilt a new stockade—as well as other populous centres in neighbour-ing islands to submit. Sancho de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese com-mander, of the fort, moved it tram Hitu, on ^he northern coast, toGelala, on the southern shore, and, afterwards, to Batumerah. In1576 it was rebuilt in stone and lime at the place where Ambon towntoday stands, deep inside the bay formed by the Hitu and Lcitimurpeninsulas.57

When the Portuguese, expelled from Ternate, returned to theirold settlement in Ambon island, they found a large and influentialJavanese community there, whose members were mostly, from [aparaand Tuban. The Javanese contributed in good measure to Hituanresistance against the Portuguese conquerors. These efforts werebased on an anti-Portuguese agreement for the defence of Hitu, ally-ing Japara and, probably, Tuban. It had been celebrated in the early1570s after the Javanese, expelled from Ambon by the Marramaqueexpedition, moved into Saparua. This island was ruled by a Tematiangovernor who was also a close relative of Sultan Baab Ullah. Junksfrom Java usually came there for cloves. Despite their limited forces,Portuguese continued to patiol the seas and to attack small Javaneseships in the Spice Islands.58

The Portuguese had been settled in Ambon for a long time. Infact, some of them married women from Ative, a native groupinhabiting the neighbourhood of the port where the galleons win-tered, awaiting the monsoon, on their way to Maluku or back toIndia.59 The Portuguese survived at Ambon, after 1575, taking advan-tage of the internal conflict between Ulilima—the union of five

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

Muslim villages—and the Ulisiwa, the union of nine villages whosemembers weii; animist people, resistant to Islam and favourablyinclined to the Portuguese. The Siwa also were considered to be a"foreign" people according to mythical and sacred geography.60 Theconflict at Ambon, due to the increasing religious proselytism, tookthe appearance of a war between Christian and Muslim people. Theadvent of new political forces and new religions exacerbated the ritualnature of regional antagonisms, which emhodied opposed forces, eachone allied to a foreign people who were also political-religious repre-sentatives. So, the Siwa from Leitimur peninsula, on the southernshore of Ambon, were allied to the Christians—first to thePortuguese, and later on, to the Dutch. On the other hand, the Lima,from northern Hitu peninsula, adopted Islam and sought an alliancewith Ternate.61 Defeated by the Portuguese, the Hituan people tookrefuge in the mountainous hinterland of the island, earlier a desertedarea.''2

Before 1580 the Portuguese had directed their attacks at targetsin Ambon and its neighbouring islands, all areas rich in cloves. At thesame time, Christian communities from distant islands, such asnortheastern Sulawesi, Syao, Moro or Bacan, were waiting forPortuguese help to revolt against Ternatian rule.63 In the 1580s,Ternatian military operations in the Ambon archipelago were con-ducted by Rubuhongi, a member of the royal family of Ternate. Thisprestigious warrior besieged Ambon on at least one occasion in thatdecade. Later on, the same situation occurred twice, in 1593 and 1598.The last attack counted on the support of a Javanese fleet,64 TheSultan of Ternate, informed of the weakness of the Portuguese settle-ment on Ambon, tried to make use of a cunning strategy. He soughtout an alliance with the Saparua island authorities and, at the sametime, he made a peaceful and commercial agreement with thePortuguese from Ambon fort in prejudice of the Javanese settled atSaparua.fi5 In the very late 16th century, Hitu was no longer the maintrading centre in southern Maluku. Its role was transferred to theHoamal (or Veranula) peninsula in southern Ceram, in which Luhu,Kambelo and Lisidi ports were sheltered from Portuguese raids.66

The Jesuit priests at Maluku soon TcaLised the need ÍGÍ militaiyefforts to stop Islamization and to give some chance to their mission-ary project. Often, they felt the obligation to finance military struc-tures and to pay salaries to soldiers and even to governors, ashappened with Nuno Pereira de Lacerda.*7 New converts were recruit-ed among opponents to Ternatian expansionism. Argensola statesthat many communities accepted the Christian faith to escapeTernatian suzerainty. Religious motives played little or no role in

50 MANUEL LOBATO

their decisions.68 When the arrival of a strong fleet was expected,many opponents of Ternate moved to the Portuguese side. The king ofSyao, an old enemy of Ternate, became Christian and preserved hisautonomy through military means. But the Christian king of Bacanwas forced to embrace Islam. The single exception to this trendoccurred in Bum island, where two Christian factions, fighting eachother, were supported one by the Portuguese and the other byTemate. In fact, the adoption of a new faith was not enough to doaway with old and deep-rooted political rivalries.''*

Extra-cultural reasons also influenced the rejection of theChristian faith. Often, Christianity interfered with the internal struc-ture of insular communities, provoking authority crises or conflicts.We can observe this at Maluku, Ambon and Solor, Local rulers,becoming Christians, fell under the jurisdiction of Portuguese orecclesiastical authorities. Their Asian subjects, previously judgedaccording to traditional procedures, often were punished by Europeanauthorities. Thus, the prerogatives of native authorities tended to dis-appear.70

Retraction in local Christian adherence was due, above all, tothe Portuguese loss of political influence. This fact led to the defec-tion of a large number of their followers.71 Until 1575, importantChristian communities were to be found at Ternate, Bacan, Jailoloand Moro. But in Maluku, as everywhere in Southeast Asia, powerand wealth consisted in controlling people, not land. Thus, thedepopulation of Christian areas, not their conquest, was a Ternatianstrategy. Massacres and dispersion of Christian communities becamevery common at Bacan. According to missionary accounts, about1588, after three decades of continuous war and persecution, the pop-ulation of Bacan was reduced to twenty percent of what it hadbeen.71 In Ternate, people converted to the Christian faith were fugi-tive slaves of the sultan, freed by the Jesuits. They were forbidden tofollow the Portuguese when they left the island, in 1575, and weretaken back into slavery as oarsmen in the war fleet.73 However, agreat number of them could run away to Tidore and, later on, toAmbon where they formed an important community. ThePortuguese, in their turn, made iew slaves in the Maluku wars. Theypreferred to attract slaves from thç enemy, thus avoiding raids, theusual method in the Eastern Archipelago. This policy failed when thePortuguese, losing their influence, were no longer in a position tosustain and give protection to a great number of dependent people.

As the Portuguese and, with them, Christianity declined,Temate increased Islamization through a coordinated policy. Thesons of the most important rulers, especially if they were Christians

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 51

or rebels, were compelled to learn Arabic and study to becomeulama.74 By forcing young men of royal blood to quit their lands, theSultan made them hostages and used religious faith as an imperialis-tic ideology to reinforce his power and to consolidate people from dif-ferent origins, hi the early 17th century, there were more than fortyChristian communities spread throughout the Ambon archipelago,inhabiting, for defensive reasons, gunnong or fortified hillocks.7*

The Spanish period

The Portuguese inability to gain control over Maluku led themto fear a Spanish offensive in the archipelago. A plan to conquerMaluku was put into effect by the latter, using as their pretext itsabandonment by the Portuguese/6 Later on, the Spaniards believedthat Iberian influence in Maluku was lost because their presence inPhilippines was not consolidated in the early period.77 Just before theDutch arrival at Maluku, they wrote, the Portuguese had fallen inabsolute discredit among Asian people.78

In 1578, before the Union of Crowns, the Spaniards, helped bythe people of Luzon, dominated Brunei—a Sultanate politically andeconomically influential in the Maluku area—and Mindanao, anIslamized political formation allied to Ternate. The Spaniards werewell positioned to take over Portuguese commercial interests atMaluku, after 1580. However, Spain had no access to Indian cloth,needed for trade, nor to Asian markets where cloves were in demand.But during the northern monsoon, the distance between thePhilippines and Maluku could be sailed in 15-20 days. Due to Spanishinterference in Maluku it became possible to guarantee Iberian influ-ence till the end of the century: in ten years, the Portuguese settle-ment in Tidore saw the number of casados increase to some sixtyfamilies under the protection of a Spanish garrison.79 According toSan Agustin, King Philip II decided to conquer Maluku during hisjourney to Portugal for his coronation. At Lisbon he received anembassy from Ternate. Sultan Baab Ullah realised that the Iberianunion was a threat to him due to reinforcements from the Philippines,and hence sent KacViil Naik as ambassaòoi to Lisbon. Naik took theBorneo route, sojourning there and at the Bintan (Johor) and AcehSultanates, trying to bring their rulers to orchestrate an action againstthe Spaniards and the Portuguese.80

Official contacts between the Philippines and the Portugueseauthorities at Maluku began in 1581. It was a very difficult momentfor the Portuguese. By 1582, no galleon from India had arrived in thelast three years. They felt totally powerless to "stop the war against

52 MANUEL LOBATO

the King of Ternate, together with that of Tidore, because they can-not sustain it any more".81 Argensola states that the Philippinesbrought financial losses to the Spanish crown, because of the contin-uous silver flow into Chinese hands. This was a reason why theCrown seriously considered the possibility of abandoning it and con-centrating its efforts on the conquest and maintenance of the Malu-ku archipelago. However, private interests already consolidated inthe Philippines—which dealt with trade as well with native en-comiendas—insisted on its preservation. This policy, aiming at ship-ping a great volume of valuable Asian goods to Europe through thePhilippines, was prejudicial to the Portuguese East-West searoute.82

Meanwhile, in 1580, Francis Drake, the famous English corsair,visited Maluku and Banda, gaining friendship and protection fromthe Sultan of Ternate.83 According to Spanish sources, initiallyDrake was not welcomed because he purchased a certain amount ofcloves without tke. Sultan's permission. However the Englishmanappeased him by offers and promises of military support against thePortuguese.84 Thus, after the intra-Iberian struggle for Maluku inthe first half of the 16th century, the larger European rivalry reachedthe political and commercial scene of the Malay-IndonesianArchipelago.

The decline of Portuguese influence in Maluku is often attrib-uted to the arduous and lengthy Melaka-Maluku searoute. However,by 1526, Jorge de Meneses discovered a shorter way along the north-ern coast of Borneo. Sailing from Melaka, it was possible to reachMaluku after two months of navigation. Only Portuguese sailorsmade use of the northern Borneo route in the 16th century. They didit in a single direction, from Melaka to Maluku. On their way back,they needed to call at Ambon and Java. Thus, Maluku could be rapid-ly reached from Melaka, although the political will to do so was notstrong enough. Like Malay and Gujarati merchants, the Portuguesedid not use the Borneo route in general. Instead, they gave preferenceto the Java searoute due to the very profitable trade of the Javaneseports of call.85 On the other hand, the private interests of some Crownrepresentatives were among the motives behind the lack of supportgiven by the Melaka authorities to the Portuguese settlements in theEastern Archipelago. Just as Goa provided soldiers, ships and suppliesto Melaka, Maluku, in turn, had to be supported from Melaka. To thatend, royal orders were often sent from Lisbon. However, as the royalmonopoly in cloves came to an end, Javanese traders brought increas-ing amounts of Indonesian spices to Melaka. Therefore, Melaka's gov-ernors often neglected human, material and financial supplies to theTidore and Ambon fortresses, since most of the spices brought to

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 53

Melaka by Asian merchants came into the governor's hands at verycheap prices anyway.86

Since the Philippines lay not far from Maluku, contacts betweenthese archipelagos were suddenly increased.87 Just after the Iberiancrowns' unification, the Spanish committed themselves to theretrieval of Ternate and to the establishment of a joint Hispanicdominion over Maluku. They never completely succeeded. Reasonsfor this must be found in the skilful policy of Ternate, and in theimpossibility of locally supporting large fleets during the lengthy timerequired for military operations. The islands had suffered the effectsof continuous wars, which had led to the abandonment of a largenumber of villages. Some native rulers lost their own wealth andbecame resourceless. In a situation of general scarcity, logistical sup-port to the war fleets was reduced to assistance brought from thePhilippines. From 1582 to 1585, the Spanish sent three expeditions torecovei the ioitiess of Ternate.88 On the other hand, Maluku and thePhilippines remained two separate administrative areas to avoid com-merce in cloves to Europe through Manila and America. Thus, naviga-tion between the two never became a regular feature, contributing tothe failure of the Spanish efforts to gain paramountcy over Maluku inthe 1580s. Military expeditions did not promote colonisation or realadministrative structures. As no solid trace remained after each expe-dition, their role was self-defeating, leading to discredit for theSpanish and the Portuguese. Passing over their own responsibility inthe matter, later Portuguese texts insist that firearms supplied by theDutch to the Asians rulers, namely to the Sultan of Ternate and hisallies, were mainly responsible. In contrast, Spanish sources blamethe Portuguese for flooding Maluku with all kinds of firearms. Thisparticular fact sheds some Light on the attitude of Ternate and Tidoreto the Portuguese during these decades. Such arms provided the Asianrulers the means to spread influence and consolidate power, as well asthe means and a motive to resist the Portuguese and the Spanishoffensives.89

Among the causes for the Iberian military failure, one can alsopoint to dissensions among the Portuguese,90 as well as the rivalrybetween them and the Spaniards for the hegemony over the SpiceIslands.91 By 1583, the inclusion of Maluku in the jurisdiction of thePhilippines was being advocated. This was the answer to the threatcreated by an unprecedentedly strong alliance, including Ternate andTidore, plus several Javanese eities, against the Portuguese fort inMaluku. The Javanese contributed the major war effort. The Iberianattack on Ternate, in 1585-86, was successfully repelled by threethousand Javanese soldiers, most of them supplied with guns. The

54 MANUEL LOBATO

Portuguese tried to solve the conflict—centered, in their minds, onthe retrieval of Ternate fort—by diplomatic means. An embassy sentfrom Lisbon was, however, a complete failure. The war intensifiedand the Portuguese remained dependent on the assistance comingfrom the Philippines. As a result of unsuccessful campaigns, theSpanish reputation emerged seriously damaged.9* Temate enlarged itspower and area of influence, threatening even the Philippines, wherethe Spanish presence was not yet consolidated.9*

In the wake of the Spanish interference, the conflict opposingthe Portuguese and the Muslim people of Maluku tended to spreadout to the Philippines. From the 1580s, as the Spanish enlarged theirsphere of influence in the Philippines, the seas of this archipelagobegan to be infested by Javanese and Japanese piracy."4 On the eve ofthe entry of the Northern European nations, a general conflict, even ifa latent one, existed all over Southeast Asia, opposing the Portugueseand the Spaniards to Islam. By 1590, the whole of South and CentralMaluku, including Ceram and Buru, joined the war against thePortuguese. This spread the conflict southwards. The Banda islandswere chosen to lead the Muslim confederation and to coordinate theholy war. This Asian choice, not a very obvious one, was possibly dueto the missionary and Portuguese presence at Solor and, generally, inthe Lesser Sunda Islands. Probably the Bandanese leadership of theIslamic confederation was due to the need to attract new forces to thecommon cause. The grant of nominal leadership to a small and decen-tralised potentate would appease disputes for pre-eminence inside thealliance. The decision to opt for this form of weak leadership reflectsthe geopolitical realities in the Eastern Archipelago, with Saparuaisland being the strongest supporter of Ternatian power in Centraland Southern Maluku. The union around the rising Islamic ideal wasnot enough to solve differences among the Sultanates. On the otherhand, Banda lay in a peripheral area where the Portuguese had littleinfluence.95

About 1592, the Muslim confederation had brought together alarge fleet to carry on the holy war. From 1591, the Sultan SaidBerkatof Ternate and his allies were decided on the expulsion of thePortuguese from the positions they held- At the same time, with thearrival of a new governor in Ambon, António Pereira Pinto, the localcasados increased in number and strength.96 Spanish assistance inMaluku reassured Portuguese authorities in Goa, while Ambon didnot cause great concern to Lisbon or Goa.97 In 1593, the Spanish failedin the last 16th century attempt to conquer Ternate, when theChinese oarsmen from a powerful fleet revolted against the governoroi the Philippines and killed him.98 Thus, Ambon became a major

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 55

source of trouble for the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, after Aceh,while the Tidore settlement was abandoned to the sphere of influenceof the Philippines." In 1596, a great fleet from Ternate, on its way tohelp several kingdoms that had revolted against Spanish rule, wasdefeated by Juan de Ronquillo in the seas of the Philippines, hi 1597Ambon was besieged by a powerful "Javanese and Moorish" fleet.100

Dutch interference and the new balance of power

The already weak position of the Portuguese in the EasternArchipelago worsened with the arrival of the Dutch. They were deter-mined to expel the Portuguese and the Spaniards from the SpiceIslands and to sign monopolistic agreements with local rulers. TheDutch soon acquired a very accurate political and commercial per-spective on the Indonesian Archipelago. By 1599, Wijbrand vanWarwijk and Jacob van Heemskerck had signed treaties with thenative rulers of Ambon and Banda, later on confirmed by the SultanSaid Berkat of Ternate. The Muslims of Maluku and the Javanesejoined the Dutch to attack Ambon fortress. Ternate was ready toexchange its Portuguese trade-partnership for one with the Dutch, inexchange for help against the Portuguese from Ambon. But vanWarwijk and van Heemskerck decided not to face the Portuguese andtheir allies from Tidore, despite the insistence of Said Berkat and hisallies. The commercial agreements of the Dutch with Ternate and theEastern Javanese cities placed in jeopardy the acquisition of cloves bythe Portuguese.101 The Dutch built factories at Banda and Temate.102

Next year van Neck and Steven van der Hagen unsuccessfullyattacked Tidore and Ambon forts.IQ3 The Dutch brought to theirAsian allies a great advance in access to firearms and the Javaneseincreased their activities in Central Maluku.104

At Ambon, where no Spanish military presence existed, thePortuguese found themselves in a desperate situation. The Goaauthorities gave priority to the rescue of Ambon by sending threegalleons there in 1600. However they did not appeal to the Spaniardsfor fear of losing jurisdiction over Maluku.105 In 1602, another fleetcommanded by the general André Furtado de Mendonça, failing toconquer the Javanese port of Banten, sailed for Ambon. Mendonçaforced all the Muslim potentates in the area that recognised Ternatianparamountcy to submit. Several populous and important trading cen-tres were ravaged, including Hitu, where the Dutch held a fortifiedfactory. Mendonça also attacked Veranula in western Ceram, wherean English factory lay.106 The authorities from Veranula sent anembassy to Banten asking for Dutch help, promising to give them

56 MANUEL LOBATO

exclusive rights in the clove trade.107 Hiemao, on the northern shoresof Saparua, remained the single Muslim centre free from Portugueseraids.10*

After Central Maluku temporarily submitted, the generalFurtado de Mendonça was petitioned by Sultan Mole Madjimoe ofTidore and the local Portuguese settlers to defend the island againstthe Dutch and retrieve the old Portuguese fortress in Ternate. SultanMole had become king in 1599 with the help of the governor RuiGonçalves de Sequeira. After the arrival of the Dutch, who werefriendly with Ternate, Tidore approached the Portuguese and theSpanish.109 In spite of the Ambon settlers being more interested in acampaign against Banda where the Dutch had a major influence,Mendonça decided to attack their positions in northern Maluku.110 In1603, his forces, together with an expedition from the Philippines,were not enough to defeat Ternate. The Portuguese attributed thisfailure to the lack of reinforcements from Melaka. The Spanishsources emphasised the incompetence of the Portuguese general andhis officers, the lack of military discipline and experience of their sol-diers, and the leakage of information through the casados of Tidore tothe Sultan of Ternate. In 1603, Mendonça's decision to leave forMelaka was followed by the usual syndrome of military expeditionsin Maluku. As Ternatian strength was reinvigorated, Sultan SaidBerkat became lord of Maluku and all Portuguese and missionarydreams were brought back to earth.111

hi 1605, both Ambon and Tidore forts fell into the hands of theDutch. The Sultan of Tidore was forced to accept a Dutch factory in hiscapital and to sign a Treaty of Protection with them, as a result ofwhich they came to dominate the trade in cloves. Next year, theSpaniards, under the command of the governor of Philippines, Pedro deAcuna, came back and regained all their lost positions, as well as thefortress and island of Ternate. Sultan Said and his presumptive heirfled. Persecuted by the Sultan of Tidore, Said presented himself beforethe governor Pedro de Acuna who took him to the Philippines.112 As aresult of these events, the Iberian presence at Maluku came entirelyinto the military and administrative sphere of the Philippines. ASpanish governor was appointed at Maluku—the first one being [uan deEsquivei—under the command of the governor of the Philippines.During the next decade, the Spanish resisted the Dutch militarysupremacy with the aid of many of the local rulers and inhabitants.113

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 57

ConclusionIt is not easy to follow the twists and turns in the political tra-

jectories of the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore on the basis ofEuropean sources alone. The changes in the states of the region thatappear from a first reading of these sources reflect the particularvision that Europeans in the epoch had of these courts and rulers. Fortheir part, the foundation myths of the inhabitants of the archipelago,which speak of their discovery and the establishment of the primor-dial hero in these islands, appear to have influenced the manner inwhich the Moluccans viewed the arrival of these foreigners. Theywere for the most part hardly seen as intruders. On the contrary, rela-tions between the rulers of Maluku and the Portuguese and Castilianssoon came to acquire a supernatural dimension: the very strength ofthe European presence was seen as a catalyst, pre-destined to favourthe expansionist tendencies of the people of the archipelago. This for-mulation helps us understand the conduct of the Ternatians andTidorians in the epoch, since they sought to profit from the Iberianpresence in order to extract from it the greatest possible commercialand political gains for themselves.

Even if the Portuguese were convinced that they were the princi-pal obstacle to Ternatian expansionism, in fact the Portuguese pres-ence, rather than damping the emerging power of the Sultanate,forced Temate to seek links with other Islamic states to the west, tobuild a solid military basis for its power, and to view in a rather differ-ent manner its relations with its neighbours, since Ternate took uponitself the role of the principal defender of an Islam threatened byChristianity in the region. By successfully resisting the Portugueseand Spaniards, Ternate attracted to its orbit a large number of princi-palities which were spread far beyond the rather limited ambit of theMoluccan archipelago.

The most significant feature, as elsewhere in the whole of theIndonesian archipelago, is that the areas dominated by Ternate andTidore were discontinuous and hardly well-defined in geographicalterms; rather, they appear to be interpenetrating networks of posses-sions, creating a strategic web which on the one hand generated con-stant conflicts and military instability, but on the other created a geo-strategic context that was far more stable than might be supposed.During the period of Portuguese hegemony in the Moluccas, bothTemate and Tidore expanded their insular possessions, but the formerkingdom did so in greater measure than the latter, and in part man-aged to do so by expanding into regions over which Tidore had earlierestablished its ascendancy.

58 MANUEL LOBATO

The Castilian presence in the region after 1580 in fact permitted,under the cloak of & radicalisation in the terms of the conflictbetween Temate and the Portuguese, the fine-tuning of the centralis-ing machinery oi the Sultanate, which came to impose its stamp littleby little over the whole eastern archipelago. During the latter half ofthe sixteenth century, the Sultan of Temate came to be less and lessdependent on the traditional links of kinship, and managed to acquiresufficient personal power and authority to be able to define and imple-ment fairly independent and personalised policies. The turning pointhere appears to have been the assassination in 1570 of Hairun, Underhis son and successor, Baab Ullah, these tendencies culminated in aform of strong personal dominance asserted by the Sultan.

As for the Portuguese, it may be inferred from the entire discus-sion above, that save for the clove trade that was conducted on theroute that ran from the Moluccas to Melaka, and thence to Goa, theywere unable to exploit regional conflicts to their own advantage, evenif this was the stated policy as defined by the Portuguese Crown.114

NOTES

I.I am grateful to Professor Sanjay Subrahmanyam for helping in the revision of this text forpublication.

2. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, 4 Vols. Editorial Presença, 21

ed., Lisboa, 1982, m, pp. 142-44.

3. M. Augusta Lima Cruz, "O assassínio do rei de Maluco, lícabcrtura de um processo",Artur Teodoio de Matos and Luís Filipe P. Reis Thomaz (cds.|, As relações entre a índiaPortuguesa, a ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. AiXas dt> V! Seminário Internacional deHistória Indo-Portuguesa (Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de!991), Mauau-Lisboa, 1993, p. S18

4. Id., ib., pp. 515, 518 and p. 521.

5. John Villiers, "Lãs Yslas de Esperar en Dios: The Jesuit Mission in Moro 1546-1571",Modera Asiun Studies, 22,3 (1988), p. 500.

6. Francisco de Sousa, Oriente Conquistado a íesus Crista, M. Lopes de Almeida |ed.), Lello& irmão, Porto, 197íi,p, 1101.

7. Cf. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassínio do rei de Maluco", pp. S14-16.

8. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1050.

9. Hubert Jacobs, S.J., "The Portuguese town of Ambon, 1567-1605", // SeminárioInternacional de Historia Fndn-pnrtagassa, HCT, Lisboa, 1985, p. 604.

10. Leonardo Y. Andaya, "Los primeros contactos de los espanoles con el mundo de IasMolucas en Ias Islãs de Ias Espécies", Revista Espnnola dei Pacifico. H, 2 [1992), p. 82.

11. Sousa, Orients Canqaixtadu, pp. 1043,1059,1115 e 420-21.12. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassínio do rei de Maluco", pp. 526-27.13. John Villiers, "The Cash-crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in theFifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", J. Kathmthamhy-Wells S. John Villiers |eds.), TheSoutheast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore,1930, p. 96.

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 59

14. Francisco de Sousa casts suspicion on Henrique de Sá, who may have been bribed bySultan Hairun [Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1045-571.15. Manamaque's departure from Goa is dated by Francisco de Sousa to 1567 contradicting1566 as staled by Diogo do Couto (id., ibid., p. 1058).16. It was not known in India that, meanwhile, the Portuguese had withdrawn from Ambon(Artur Basflio de Sá, (ed], Documentação para a História das Missões do PadioadoPnrtugues do Oriente - Insulinilia, E, Lisboa, 1955. p. 435-44, henceforth DHMPPO|.17. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1066; DHMPPO-lnsuIindia, IV, p. 174, Caspar dc SanAgustín, O.S.A., Conquistas de, las Isias Filipinas (1565-1615), Manuel Merino, O.S.A. (ed.|,C.S.I.C., Madrid. 1975, Liv. I, Cap. XXI, pp. 156-57; DHMPPO-Insuiindia, IV, pp. 457 e 472.On Gonçalo Pereira Marrarnaque, see M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonçalo PereiraMarraraaque do Minho às Molucss ou ns itinerários da fidalguia portuguesa no Oriente",Slvdia, 49 (1989), pp. 333-36.18. Hubert Jacobs, S.f., Documenta Malucencia, II, Roma, 1980, p. 79, henceforth DM.19. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, W, p. igs.20. Id., pp. 548-19; San Agustíu, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 596. The Lima family was tKe mostinfluential Portuguese family in Maluku. Their members were half-caste people married towomen of royal blood. This did not inhibit the crown from recognising their aristocraticrank and appointing them to command fortresses and ships. Probably, they were the finlyPortuguese married into the nobility and permanently resident in those islands. Paulo de

[Bartolomé Leonardo de Aigensola, Conquista de las Mas Malucas, Madrid, 1609,pp. 167-69).21. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassínio do rei de Maluco", pp. 515, 518 and 522.11. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1072 and ss.; L. Y. Andaya,'Los primeroa contactos deIds espanoles", p. 82; J. Villiera, "Las Yslas dc Esperar cn Dios", pp. 594-604.23. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conçalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335; idem, "O assas-sínio do rei de Maluco", p. 517. The author emphasizes the Portuguese inability to deal withthis problem. See Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1065.

24. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1075-79, Argcnsola, Conquistei, p. 73.25. H. Jacobs, SJ., "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.26. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi, Portuguese Settlementsarid Christian Communities in Solor and Flores (15.Í6-16.10)", Masyarakat Indonesia, X, 111983], p. 98.27. Conquista, pp. 78-80.

28. Hairun was charged with involvement in Muslim activities at Amboa against localChristian communities, in close co-ordination with Japara. He was also charged with pro-moting clove smuggling from that island to Japara. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassínio dorei de Maluco", pp. 525-26.29. Argensoía, Conquista, p. 2.

30. L. Andaya, "Cultural State Formation in Eastern Indonesia", Paper submitted to theInternationa! Conference on Southeast Asia in lSth-18th Centuries, Lisbon, 4-7 Dec.1989,pp. 10-16.31. San Agustín, Liv. II, Cap. XXV, pp. 527-28, Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1114.32. San Agustín, Liv. in. Cap. IV, pp. 598-99; DÍORO do Couto, Da Ásia, Lisboa, 1788, Dec.X, Pte. 2>, Liv. VIU, Cap. IV, pp. 289-^1, Liv. IX, Cap. X1U, pp. 511-15.33. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 78-80.

60 MANUlL LOBATO

34. P. R. Abdurachman, "Niichile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queea", ModernAsian Studies, 22, 3 (1988), pp. 5S6-H7.35. The King of Tidonr was afraid of a PoitUguese reaction against his alliance with theSultan of Ternate. For this reason he sent small vessels to the shores of Borneo looking forPortuguese ships coming from India (Aigensola, Conquista, p. 89].36. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1091-92.37. DHMPPO-InsuIfndia, IV, pp. 215 e 252; P.P. Mendes da Luz (ed.), Livio das Cidades e,

gos, que nelas ha, e da importância delles, ed. facsimilada do Ms. da Biblioteca Nacional deMadrid (cod. 3Z17), published in Stvdia, 6 \\96Q], fl.67.38. DHMPPO-Insulíndia, IV, pp. 313 e 382.39. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conçalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335.40. Ajgensola, Couquisía, p. S3.41. DHMPPQ-Insullnáia, IV, p. 473. Such limited reinforcements led Spanish sources lo saythat the Temate fortress did not receive any help from India during the six year siege (DM,II, p. 223).42. In 1586, five galleons were used in military and trade operations in the Maluku area |J.H.Cunha Rivaia \e&.\, Aiehivo Poitaguez-Oriental, I1 ei., Nova-Goa, W&l-lWH, fl\, pt. \ pp.156-57, henceforth APO).43. DM, E, pp. 32-33.44. Letter from Father Duarte de Sande, Goa, 1579-11-07, ANTY, Armário Jesuítico, n° 28,fl.119.45. DHMPPO-Insulíndia, IV, p. 254.46. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Eeanomia Mundial, 01, p, 146.47. DM, n, p. 40; DUMPPO-Insuh'ndia, IV, pp. 255-56.48. Aigensola, Conquista, p. 9ó; DHMPPO-insulínáia, IV, p. 160; A. da Silva Rego |ed.|,Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa, I, Lisboa, 1960, p. 15.49. According to H. Jacobs, Temate was mainly visited by Javanese from fapara, Tuban,Sidayu and Cresik, for trade and military support (DM, II, p. 36, n,10|. The tole of Aceh incommerce with the westwards Islamic netwof k, âK well as the role of Johor eastwards, havebeen emphasized by Kenneth R. Hall, "The Opening of the Malay World to European Tradein the Sixteenth Century", Journal of the Malay*'an Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,LVCI, 2 [Dec. 1985], p. S9.50. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p, 1101.51. DM, H, p. 438; DHMPPO-Insalindia, [V, p. 236, Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VTI,pp. 55-56.52. Concerning Hitu, in the context of the power structures in Eastern Indonesia, see H.Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604, and also John VUliers, "The Cash-cropEconomy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and SixteenthCenturies", J. Kathirithamhy-Wells & John Villiers |eds.|, The Southeast Asian Foil andPolity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1390, p. 92.53. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Niachile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queen",Modern Asian Studies, 22,3 11988], p. 575.54. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European influence in the IndonesianArchipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, 1962, p. 160, H. Jacobs, "ThePortuguese town of Ambon", p. 612, Luís Filipe Thomaz, "Maluco c Malaca", A. Teiieira daMota (ed.), A viagern de Fetaao tie MagaMes e a Questão das Molucas. Actas do IIColóquio Luso-espanhol de História Ultramarina, Lisbon, 1975, p. 38, M. A. Lima Cruz, "o

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 61

assassínio do rei de Maluco", p. 525; id., "A viagem de Gonçalo Pereira", p. 333.55. DHMPPO-Insulindia, p. 140. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassínio do rei de Maluco", pp.526-27.56. P. R. Abdurachmart, "Atakiwan, Casados aad Tupassi", p. 98. Information from anHituan, Malay language chronicle, tile Hikayat Tanah Hitu. The Portuguese sources saynothing about the role of Cresik in their departure from Ambon in 1565.57. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonçalo Pereira", p. ,114; H. Jacobs, "The Portuguesetown of Ambon", p. 604.58. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV, pp. 192-99, 229, 262, 368 and 458.59. Id., ibid., pp. 196; R Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.60. The two groups may be distinguished on account of the alimentary taboo on pork thatthe Ulilima strictly observed {DHMPPO-Insulittdia, p. 195).61. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604; P. R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan,Casados and Tupassi", p. 107.62. DHMPPO-Insulindia, pp. 200-03.63. Id., ibid., p. 247; DM, II, pp. 39^0. In 1582, a secret agent sent by the governor of thePhilippines "found at Ternate many crypto Christian people and many other nations that,when the time will come, would not refuse to fight side by side with the Castilians" [SanAgustin, Liv, II, Cap. XXXVUT, p. 548).64. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611.65. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV p. 327.66. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604.67. DM, n, pp. 1-5.68 Conquista, p. 72.69. San Agustfn, Liv. D, Cap. XXXVIH, p. 548; DAÍ, H, pp. 39-40, 55-56 and p. 79, Mendes daLuz, Livro, fl.70, DM, n, p.l 14.70. P. R., "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi", p.108; Manuel Lobato, "Os Portugueses emTimor", Coral, \ (Dec.1991], pp. 8-14.71. Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.73v.72. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, V, p. 103.73. Wars involving different ethnic groups, rival lineages, such as Christian and Muslimpeople, were the main source for slavery in Maluku and, generally, in Southeast Asia|A.Rcid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries",Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XI, 2 [Sept.1980], Sing. Univ. Press, p. 248].74. DM, H, p. 102.75. Femão Guerreiro, Relação anua! das coisas que fizeram os Padies da Companhia de/e.íus nas suas missões [...j nos anos de 1600 a 1609, l, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade,1930, pp. 273-74.76. San Agustin, Liv. n, Cap. XXXIH, pp. 505-10 and pp. 520-21, DM, II, pp. 32-A1).77. DM, II, p. 223. Obviously it was mainly due to the lack of institutional collaborationbetween the Iberian kingdoms which, even after their unification, continued to be the case.78. DM, II, p. 363j Guerreiro, Relação anual, I, p. 269.79. DHMPPO-Insulindia, V, p. 116, DM, D, pp. 32-33 and p 169- San Agustín Liv U CapXXXm, pp. 509-11, Cap. XXXIV, pp. 520-21 and Cap. XXXV, pp. 527-2S.SO. San Agustín presents an incorrect chronology. \id., ibid., pp. 527-28]. On chc Ternatian

62 MANUEL LOBATO

81. Couto, Dec. X, Pee. l», Liv. m, Cap. VI, pp. 307 e 312; San Agustío, Liv. D, Cap. XXXV, p.528; DHMPPQ-!ns\slindía. IV, p.! 13.82. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 84-86.S3. DM, H, p. 93.84. San Agustin, Liv. D, Cap. XXXIII, p. 508. Similar in Argensola, Conquista, p. 107.85. See Roderich Ptak, "The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South ChinaSea-Sulu Zone-North Moluccas, (14th to early 16th century)", Aichipel, 43 (1992), pp.27-55, passim.Hfi. "The Bishop of Melaka to the king", Melaka, 1588-12-31, A. G. Simancas, Sec. Ptov.,cod.1551, fl.275v, quoted hy Artur Teodoro de Matos, O Extado da índia nos anos de1581-1588. Estrutura administrativa e económica. Alguns elementos pata o seu estudo,Universidade dos Aeores, Ponta Delgada, 1982, p. 39.87. DHMPPO-Insalíndia, V, p. 10R.88. DM, D, pp. 123, 165, n. 32 and p. i 79. The Spanish expedition led by Juan de Morón orMorones arrived at Tidore around March 1585, It was the third expedition sent from thePhilippines to Maluku in four years: the first one in 1581 was commanded hy Juan deRonquillo, a second one by Pedro Sarmiento in 15S4. See San Agustin, Liv. II Cap. XXXVTO,Liv. Ill, Cap. II and Cap. IV; Couto, Dec. X, Fee. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VI and Cap. VII, p. 49 andCaps.VIII and IX. For the 1580s Boxer refers to only two Spanish expeditions, both with aPortuguese contribution ("Portuguese and Spanish projects for the Conquest of SoutheastAsia", /oufflfll of Asian History, III (1969), p. 126].89. Argenaola, Conquista, p. 10.90. Couto, Dec. X, Ptc. 2», Liv. VI, Cap. VII, pp. 46-49, Liv. VIII, Cap. IV, pp. 285-86.91. DM, n, pp. 170 and 393; APO, in, 1« pt., pp. 156-57.92. DM, D, pp. 134, 207 and 393; APO, HI, Ia pt., pp. 34, 80 and p. 278; DHMPPQ-lasulindia,V, p. 27; San Agustin, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 597.93. DM, II, pp. 190-91 and 222-24. A conspiracy by the people of Brunei and Luzon to takeManila hy force was discovered in 15S7 (San Agustin, Liv. HI, Cap. IV, p. 601).94. Id., ibid,-, Jacques de Coiitre, Aadanzas Asiáticos, Eddy Stols, B.Teensman andJ.We/berckmoesieds.), Madrid, 1991, p. 146.95. DM, E, p. 306.96. DM, D, pp. 331, 359 and p. 369.97. C" régia a Peio Lopes de Sousa, Lisboa, 1590-03-06, AHU, Cons. Via., cod.281, Í1.H6.98. According to Proi. Roxer, the figure of a thousand Spanish soldiers, under the governor'scommand, is not reliable ("Portuguese and Spanish projects", p. 1,14].99. Regimento do vice-rei Conde da Vidigiieim, Lisboa, 1596-01-05, AHU, Cons, lllti.,cod.lBl,fU66.100. DM, II, pp. 389, 445^6 and 456,- Coutre, Andanzas Asiáticas, p, 149; APO, in, 1" pt., p.481, 2' pt., p. 580; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Mas Filipinas, J. S. Cummins (ed.|,liakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 9.V94.101. DM, n, pp. 470, 490 and p. 505.102 William Foster, "Introduction", Tlie Voyage of Sir Heaiy Middleton to the Moluccas.16M-1606, Hakluyt Society, 1943, Klaus Reprint, Millwood, New York, 1990, p. XXIV;DM, II, pp. 470 and p. 474.103. Id., ibid., p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 495-96. See also H.Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of

104. DM, D, pp. 520-21.105. Francisco Pyrard de Laval, Viagem [1601-11], transi, and annot. by Cunha Uivara, II,

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO 63

Liv. Civilização, Potto, 1944, p.158; Carta de Toma de Sousa Couuniio do více-rei, Goa,1000-04-07, ANTT, MMCCiaça, Cx.6, t.n E, p. 349; C" de Luis da Goma. Secretário doEftado. ao vice-rci, Goa, 1600-04-07, ANTT, MMCGzaça, Cx. 6,1.11 E, p. 273, Couto, Déc.Xn, Pte. última. Liv. V, Cap. Vffl, p. 512.106. Hoamoal is another name for this peninsula. See Htihert Jacobs, 5.T., "Un règlement decomptes entre Portugais et Javanais dans les mers de Indonésie en 1580", Archipel, 18[1979), p. 170.107. The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton..., p. 20.11)8. C. R. Boxer & Frazão de Vasconcelos, André Furtado de Mendonça, Lisboa, 1955(reimp. 1989), pp. 40-45.1(19. Argensola, Conijiiistii, pp. 155-5S. Argensola seems to use iuformatiun about Malukuni)t available in the Portuguese and missionary reports,1 ID. Roxer, André Furtado, p. 47.111. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611. Magalhães Godinho clearly notesthe failure of André Furtado at Ambon and Ceram. See Os Descobrimentos e a EconumiuMundial III, p. 162. The Spanish sources alsn suggest it. The Portuguese sources, withoutaii evident reason, repeatedly glorify the achievement of Fuitado de Mendonça. Boxer,Afldré Fartado, pp. 46-54, Argensola, Conquista, pp. 288-307.112. Morsa, SiieiMiM, p. 233; Fernão Gueneiio, Relação armai, U, pp. 131-32 e 306-1L113. V,M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, m, p. 163; António deMorga, Sucesos, p. 239; "A discourse of the present state of the Moluccos, anexed to the for-mer Journall Voyage of George Spitsbergen, extracted out of Apollonius Schot ofMiddleboiough' [1617], Pinchas Mis Pilgrimes, II, p. 227.114. After completing this essay, 1 had an opportunity to read the work of Leonard Y.Andaya, The World of Maluku. Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modem Period, University ofHawaii Press, Honolulu, 1993, which may be consulted for another approach to the historyof this period.