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Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Peace Operations Estimate –

AMISOM/UNSOM

African Union Mission in Somalia and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (updated 1 April 2017)

Executive Summary Despite the recent election of a new president, Somalia remains one of the most fragile states in the world. It is vulnerable to terrorism and criminal entities, activities, and enterprises as well as crippling food insecurity and displaced persons. Major considerations include:

Due in large part to AMISOM forces in support of local Somali police, the polling was generally peaceful, despite alleged attacks by al-Shabaab.Yet Somalia’s Independent Electoral Disputes Resolution Mechanism (IEDRM) reports over one thousand complaints against the electoral process were filed, including accounts of intimidation of voters and candidates and "vote buying". These are issues that must be addressed for the next round of elections.

While the UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition until May 2017, with expectations to reconfigure the structure to support the next phase of Somali state-building, the AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces no later than 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. However, most analysts believe the Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2020 and that a premature drawdown will give al-Shabaab the opportunity to regain ground as it remains capable of waging terrorist acts and asymmetric warfare. Some attacks have even occurred in north Somalia and directly against AMISOM troops. Where TCCs already commenced reductions, such as those areas formerly controlled by Ethiopian forces, the fears of al-Shabaab—or other non-state armed groups—re/emergence appear legitimate. Even the presidential compound cameunder attack in early April.

While the 2016 salary dispute between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) (particularly over the payment process for Burundi-specific AMISOM participants) appears

Link to CIA World Fact Book (Somalia)

Link to AMISOM Website

Link to UNSOM Website

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resolved, there remains challenges of adequate and timely payment of AMISOM troops in general, contributing to some dissatisfaction among the various contingents.

Although piracy off the Somali coast appears to be on the decline, in mid-March 2017, pirates hijacked a commercial vessel for the first time in over five years. Therefore, piracy remains a major issue for trade as well as humanitarian aid delivery. A UN mandate remains in effect that reiterates the obligation and expectation of the Somali government to address piracy. However, some observers suggest the relationship between the government and pirates is more complex, in that local authorities are often engaged with or supported by pirates.

Mission Overview

1. Background. The UN—and the US by extension—has an inconsistent history in Somalia. Somalia collapsed into anarchy after the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. By 1992, the UN formed United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) [UNSCR 751(1992)] to provide humanitarian assistance. The United States (US) sent food aid—Operation Provide Comfort—in August 1992. When the feuding clans compromised the delivery of the food, the US authorized Operation Restore Hope, with US forces dispatched to assist with the famine relief and as part of the UN’s United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF transitioned to UNOSOM II in March 1993. After the events of October 3, 1993 (the deaths of 18 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis), the US removed its troops. The UN withdrew from Somalia in March 1995. For the next 15 years, Somalia underwent frequent humanitarian crises, a short-lived Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mission (called IGADSOM), an invasion by Ethiopia, and the eventual ascendancy of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, which seized Mogadishu in 2006. AMISOM was created by the African Union Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and approved by the United Nations Security Council a month later. In 2010, AMISOM was able to assume the offensive against al-Shabaab. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established in 2012. In 2013, the UN established UNSOM [UNSCR 2102(2013)], a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) field mission. 2. Mandate(s). The political mission, UNSOM, was extended in UNSCR 2275(2016) and was valid until 31 March 2017. However, in March, the UN Security Council authorized a short-term extension of the mandate to 16 June 2017, in part due to the “drought-induced humanitarian crisis…engulfing Somalia with an imminent risk of famine.” The additional time is needed “to build a functional and inclusive federal State to tackle the socioeconomic, structural and political issues that made millions of Somalis vulnerable to drought and insecurity.” UNSOM also has a specific policing mission. On 7 July 2016, the Security Council reauthorized AMISOM in UNSCR 2297(2016) with a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017. AMISOM remains mandated to perform the following tasks, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, with newly prioritized tasks:

Reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.

Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilization efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia.

The EU is a major sponsor of the AMISOM. In March 2016, the EU reduced its overall financial contribution to AMISOM by 20 per cent. In the summer 2016, after the Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza refused to step down, the EU decided to convey Burundi troops’ payments directly to them, rather than through the Burundi government. AMISOM rejected that decision, stating the new process "would lower their morale."

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Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces.

To continue to conduct offensive operations against al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.

To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces.

To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement.

To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the UN and AU.

To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS.

To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilization by the UN Country Team and other actors.

To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure.

To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council.

To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the UN. In early November 2016, UNSCR 2316 (2016) renewed authorization for international naval forces to combat piracy off Somali coast for another year. The Security Council reaffirmed:

…the authorizations renewed in the resolution applied only with respect to the situation in Somalia and did not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of Member States under international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Acknowledging a steady decline in attacks since 2011, the Council commended the contributions of the European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community, as well as individual States for naval counter-piracy missions and protecting ships transiting through the region.

UNSCR 2317 (2016) extended the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 November 2017, while reaffirming that country’s sovereignty over its natural resources. It also extended the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 15 December 2017. 3. Deployment. AMISOM’s has four components: the military, the police, a civilian section, and a small maritime group. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel stands now at 22,126. This includes both troops and police. By far, the largest of the components includes Uganda (6,223) and Burundi (5,432).

Note: Protection of Civilians is not a specified task for AMISOM in this revised mandate. However, the mandate charges FGS to: “… (have) respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, by all actors in Somalia.”

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Ethiopia (4,395) and Kenya (3,664) are the next largest components; with Sierra Leone (850) and Djibouti (1000) the smallest density. The current Force Headquarters staff is 81.

The military component is deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. There is limited AMISOM presence or engagement in the northern semi-autonomous Somalian states.

Troop Contributing Countries:

The police component includes Professionals/Senior Leadership (SLT), Formed Police Unit (FPU) and Individual Police Officers (IPO’s) (103 total). The IPO’s are from Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe and are deployed in all the sectors. The FPU’s from Nigeria and Uganda each comprise of 140 officers and were the first to be deployed by the AU.

Police Contributing Countries:

AMISOM TCCs are to begin reduction of all forces in 2018, with complete withdrawal by 2020. Ethiopian forces already began to leave Somalia, with a corresponding decrement in Somali security. Yet, in November 2016, and again in January 2017, the TCC defense leaders asked for UN and international community support of 4,000 additional troops for six months to conduct offensive operations. In February 2017, the AMISOM commander also requested a surge in troops, indicating the SNA was not yet capable to secure areas wrested from al-Shabaab. He did not specify a number for the “surge” but indicated "It's time we made it known that AMISOM is not going to stay forever." His comments coincided with similar statements from the US’ Africa Command (AFRICOM) to the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington. AFRICOM is said to be seeking more authority in Somalia counter-terrorism operations, citing “fatigue” among AMISOM forces after ten years of deployment. Meanwhile, in March 2017, the US sponsored a classroom-based training exercise, Justified Accord 2017, “focused on Somalia’s troubled transition from reliance on African Union troops to a leadership role for local forces.” The exercise

included 100 participants

from African and European militaries. In addition, AMISOM and SNA personnel both received training in recent months for “gender focal” positions, in order to ensure those forces understand and adhere to the UN standards on human rights and gender equality. Since 2007, the US has provided more than half a billion dollars to train and equip AMISOM troops battling al-Shabaab.

AMISOM Deployment Status

(as of July 2015)

Justified Accord was initiated by the US and Kenya in 1998. It is a multinational exercise to bring together US, African and other international organizations to promote collaboration for peacekeeping operations in East Africa.” The recent exercise was in Ethiopia and included participants from the host country, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

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UNSOM has elements predominately in the south and central regions in Somalia, with none (or negligible) presence in northern regions/states.

4. Casualties. AMISOM may have suffered over 3000 fatalities since 2007. Some observers suggest the mission is deadliest peacekeeping operation ever anywhere in the world. However, it is difficult to determine AMISOM casualties because, unlike most UN-managed missions, AMISOM does not publically acknowledge casualties. In addition, its record-keeping is inexact and family compensation is irregular. The number of lives lost by Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian and Burundian components of AMISOM may be a deliberate “secret.” Most AMISOM casualty figures estimates are determined by extrapolation from media reports. The most recent reports of casualties may—or may not--include these from 2015 or early 2016: an attack on a Burundian base that killed 54 soldiers; another loss of 19 Ugandan soldiers in a base attack; Kenya’s losses in January, killing about 180 soldiers in a base attack; and the attack of an Ethiopian convoy in February; and another three Ethiopian soldiers killed in a remotely detonated land mine attack in November 2016. A January 2017 report of 57 Kenyan AMISOM deaths, however, was called “completely false” by Kenyan authorities. Other-than-AMISOM casualties may include those personnel who died during Kenya’s unilateral Operation Linda Nchi (2011-12), or during the unilateral operations conducted by the Ethiopian armed forces and Liyu police inside Somalia between late 2011 and January 2014, before Ethiopia officially became an AMISOM TCC. Situation

5. Drivers of Conflict. The country‘s colonial legacy (specifically the artificial boundaries), the need for access to resources and economic viability, competition for power and state representation of clan families, are all issues that must be taken into consideration in order to clearly address the agenda of peace-building in Somalia. Continued political discord within FGS institutions is impeding progress in political, security, economic and humanitarian spheres. Debilitated governance structures and lack of security and services are impeding stabilization efforts in areas wrested from al-Shabaab, allowing the group to remain active. Somaliland secession and its territory dispute with Puntland detracts from regional stability. Rival clans also continue to vie for power and resources. Additionally, al-Shabaab terror tactics continue to impact FGS ability to deliver humanitarian aid. 6. Significant Events. a. Recent Events.

23 March 2017. The AU held “High Level Consultation” on the future of AMISOM and Somalia’s security sector institutions and reform.

23 March 2017. The UN Security Council extended UNSOM until 16 June 2017.

6 March 2017. AMISOM acknowledged its ten year anniversary.

8 February 2017. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, a former prime minister, was elected president, after a long clan-based electoral process that had been widely criticized as corrupt even by Somali politicians who participated in it.

27 January 2017. Al-Shabaab militants allegedly attacked a Kenyan military base, killing over 50 troops. Kenyan authorities declared the story “false.”

Ethiopia continues to deploy additional troops and police inside Somalia but outside of AMISOM, apparently under a bilateral agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

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November 2016. UNSCR 2316 (2016) and UNSCR 2317 (2016) extends authorization for international naval forces to join in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia and the arms embargo, respectively. The AMISOM TCC defense leaders requested an additional 4,000 troops for a six months offensive operation. A ceasefire, monitored by an IGAD team, was established between Galmudug state and Puntland state.

October 2016. Somalia’s 2016 electoral process began with elections for the newly created Upper House of the federal parliament.

September 2016. Somalia’s National Leadership Forum (NLF), comprised of the principal leaders of the federal institutions as well as the emerging and existing federal states, discussed the joint establishment of a new security commission.

August 2016. Ethiopia began redeploying troops, abandoning military bases in strategic locations in Hiraan and Bakool regions.

10 July 2016. AU summit (until 18 July) to determine the funding and mandate for AMISOM (which announced on 6 July it would begin a staged withdrawal from 2018 to 2020).

7 July 2016. UNSCR 2297 (2016) extends AMISOM’s authorization until 31 May 2017 with no major changes.

May 2016. The “S6” group is formed, which includes the main donors to Somalia’s security sector: Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, European Union, United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations, with the purpose to develop “consensus on a common approach” for Somalia security.

24 March 2016. UNSCR 2275 (2016) adopted, extending the mandate of UNSOM.

March 2016. EU reduces funding for AMISOM, prompting a call by AMISOM to request transition to a UN mission status.

b. Upcoming Events.

15 April 2017. AMISOM due for reassessment towards next phase in Somalia state-building.

31 May 2017. AMISOM mandate set to expire.

16 June 2017. UNSOM mandate due for renewal or expiration.

15 November 2017. Piracy (UNSCR 2316) and embargo (UNSCR 2317) due for renewal or expiration.

15 December 2017. Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group due for renewal or expiration.

2018. AMISOM begins official withdrawal of troops. Operational Environment (GPMESII)

7. Geographic. Somalia is almost five times the size of Alabama; slightly smaller than Texas and is situated in a strategic location along the Gulf of Aden that connects to the Red Sea, which leads to the Suez Canal—which is the route for the most commercial shipping to and from Africa. Moreover, having the second longest coastline on the African continent, Somalia is bordered to the east by the Indian Ocean, Ethiopia to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the north, Kenya to the southwest, and Djibouti to the northwest.

Somalia has a climate ranging from arid to semiarid, with a maritime semi-desert plain to the north which slopes up to the high

cliffs of the KarKaar Mountain range. The south contains two prominent rivers – the Juba and the Shebelle – and some woodlands and plateaus.

The northeast monsoon season is December to February, and the southwest monsoon is from May to October. The hot and humid periods (tangambili) is between monsoons. From October to December

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2015, flash flooding generated by the heavy deyr rains across parts of northern and south-central Somalia affected more than 145,000 people and temporarily displaced approximately 60,000 people.

8. Political. In August 2012, Somalia adopted a new (interim) Constitution, and inaugurated the Federal Parliament and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The vast web of clans and kinship which continues to resist a centralized system, challenge the FGS’ political legitimacy and effectiveness. The September 2013 Brussels New Deal Conference launched the Somalia Compact which provides an essential framework for the reconstruction of Somalia. It allows for coordinated support to Somali authorities for the promotion of an inclusive political process, security, the rule of law and socio-economic development. It is the keystone of Somalia's partnership with the international community. Somalia has not had a one-person, one-vote democratic election since 1969. The most recent electoral process began in October 2016 with elections for the 54-member Upper House of the federal parliament. Elections in Somalia is a unique process. Rather than direct elections (one person, one vote), each of the six clan-based state presidents designated each of the 54-member seats of the Upper House to a sub-clan with two to four individuals elected as alternates. For the Lower House (or ‘House of the People’), each of 135 traditional leaders nominated 51 clan members to elect each parliamentarian of the first chamber of 275 seats. The combined members of the two chambers (329 altogether) elected the new president in February 2017 in two rounds of voting. While the 30% women quota appeared problematic to some viewpoints, a few Somali religious scholars defended the goal, assuring their followers that is it within a woman’s purview to participate in the political arena. In the recent election, women were indeed elected in 30% of the Parliament seats.

In March 2017, Somalia’s 275-member parliament passed the proposed list of cabinet ministers. The ministers were sworn in immediately by the Supreme Court. The prime minister’s own appointment by the president was controversial, because UN sanctions experts had previously accused him of paying Somalia’s oil ministry nearly $600,000 to protect a 2013 exploration contract.

Meanwhile, regional and local governing bodies continue to exist and control various areas of the country, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia and the semi-autonomous

Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed is a dual-citizen of Somalia and the United States. His nickname is "Farmajo” (meaning “cheese”) and he was considered both the “most popular” and “the least corrupt” of the presidential candidates. He was born in Mogadishu in 1962 to activist- parents affiliated with the Somali Youth League (SYL), Somalia's first political party. During the 1970s, his father worked as a civil servant in the national government.

After his primary and secondary schooling in Somalia, he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia until 1991 and the ensuing civil war. Arriving in the United States, he completed a Bachelor's degree in History from the State University of New York at Buffalo in Buffalo, New York in the early 1990s, then worked in the local government of Buffalo, New York, the State of New York at Buffalo, and Erie County. He also taught leadership skills and conflict resolution at Erie Community College during this same period. In 2009, he earned his Master's degree in Political Science (American Studies) from the University at Buffalo. (His thesis was titled: "U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia: From the Cold War Era to the War on Terror.")

Returning to Somalia, he was appointed Prime Minister in November 2010 as part of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Charter. He served until June 2011, resigning as part of the Kampala Accord, a controversial measure that was enacted to resolve political disputes within the TFG. His resignation was marked by civil protest, but he did not encourage further response on his behalf. Instead, he returned to Buffalo and his New York state employment. In 2012, he founded the Tayo (“Quality”) Political Party and returned to Somalia to announce his candidacy for president. He was eliminated in the first round of elections that year. He campaigned again in 2016 for the 2017 elections, where he was the “surprise” victor.

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states of Puntland and Galmudug in northeastern Somalia. These last two areas have a history of clashes with the latest fighting occurring in 2016 over a building plans dispute in Galkayo, a city that is divided between the two sides. More than 80,000 people were displaced, and almost 100 people died or were injured. An estimated 60 per cent of the displaced are internally displaced populations (IDPs) facing secondary displacement. UNSOM brokered an agreement to extend a ceasefire and establish a two-kilometer-wide buffer zone between their respective security forces. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) provided an observer team (supported by the United Nations, UN). 9. Military/Security. Despite some successes, the security situation in Somalia remains tenuous, due largely to lack of a cohesive Federal Government, the limited capability of Somalia’s National Army and Police Force, and the resulting inability to provide liberated areas with reliable security. Thus far, international assistance efforts have focused on developing a Mogadishu-based centralized armed and police forces. Some observe, however, that these forces are:

…widely perceived to be lacking a genuinely national character, skewed in favor of certain clans, and lacking either discipline or cohesion. As a result, in many areas the population places greater confidence in local forces, and some communities that feel aggrieved or politically marginalized enter marriages of convenience with al-Shabaab…Weaving together Somalia’s disparate armed forces and militias in a coherent, capable, and trusted security establishment clearly cannot be achieved by the current formula of central fiat, wishful thinking, and donor largesse.

a. State Armed Groups.

Somalia National Army (SNA), the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), and Somalia Police Force (SPF). The new president is very popular with the SNA and other federal security forces: “The moment his victory was announced, celebratory gunfire rang out in Mogadishu as soldiers across the city sprayed bullets into the sky.” SNA is increasingly operating in concert with AMISOM forces to dislodge al-Shabaab from safe havens. It is infantry-heavy but support and logistics-light. It is a clan-based, lightly armed, agile militia and will need to evolve into an organization with ordered, structured battalions with essential prerequisites of combat support, logistics support, transport, communications and medical and finance organizations to replace AMISOM. Despite deficiencies, the SNA became engaged in military action against al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups in the spring 2014, with Operation Eagle, a joint military operation between the SNA and AMISOM. These operations continued through 2015 and into 2016 as Operation Indian Ocean and Operation Jubba Corridor. However, these operations appear to have dwindled in the early months of 2017. The exact numbers of either the SNA (or the SNSF) are unclear. In 2015, the UN Security Council reported a total of 16,780 members of the SNA as “registered” but other sources suggest less than 10,000—and may be as low as 5,000. It appears that senior commanders enlarge the numbers in order to ensure proper payment and equipping for the active members. Many soldiers allegedly sell their

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equipment and/or defect to clan-based armed groups or even to al-Shabaab. Some have turned to crime (e.g. extortion at illegal checkpoints, armed robberies, etc.). The long-term goal is to grow the SNA to 28,000-strong national army and the police force to 12,000. The armed forces also have an immature navy and air force. 18 is the minimum age for military service. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) conducts training for the SNA, with ambiguous results. Some reports indicate that the SNA still lack the basic military skill and professional knowledge expected of them. They are too often poorly uniformed and equipped and have unexplained absences, due to conflicting duties or lack of pay. (The expected funding reduction from the EU for the upcoming years will have great impact on the ability to pay SNA forces, as well.) The US has also provided tens of millions of dollars towards equipment, training, and education of Somalian military and police, an “investment” that may “have not translated directly into sustainable gains,” according to the US deputy UN ambassador Michele Sison recently.

The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) leads the counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, albeit with troubling issues with human rights and Rule of Law. The Alpha Group (Gaashaan) is another force of 600 security personnel based in Mogadishu. It was allegedly trained and equipped by the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Other government-funded forces include the following: Somaliland’s forces; Puntland’s forces; Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA); and Jubbaland forces. They are aligned with specific states or semi-autonomous regions in Somalia and are not available for operations within other Somalia regions—except when arrayed against each other, such as the recent violence between Galmudug and Puntland. b. Non-State Armed Groups. The distinction between state and non-state armed groups is problematic.

Non-state armed groups — especially clan paramilitaries — have successfully adapted to the re-establishment of the formal security sector by colonizing it. The multiple hatting of armed men in Mogadishu, as soldiers or police, private security guards, and members of clan paramilitaries is a good business model as long as external actors are willing to underwrite the formal security sector. But it makes for a weak and unreliable security sector that is not autonomous from more powerful communal groups.

While there are many small armed groups, generally for local or clan self-defense, the major non-state armed groups are:

Al-Shabaab. Considered by many as “the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia,” al- Shabaab emerged as the youth wing of Somalia's previous Union of Islamic Courts. Considered affiliated with al-Qaeda, the US declares it as a terrorist group with between 7,000 and 9,000 members. Al-Shabaab has had recent reverses, including the death of a leader in a September 2014 in a US-launched drone strike, but remains capable of targeting AMISOM, Somali security forces, and government officials with ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and small-level attacks throughout much of the country, including Mogadishu. Currently led by Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah aka Ahmed Diriye, al-Shabaab also conducts terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya. Al-Shabaab is considered difficult to defeat completely, has proven

On or about July 13, 2016, SNA forces allegedly vacated a city/region because they had not been paid—which allowed for al-Shabaab forces to move into the area. Later the same month, they dislodged Al Shabaab again with the support of AMISOM. In March 2017, following the presidential election, SNA elements occupied key Mogadishu districts to protest their missing salaries. Some security forces report more consistent payment schedules, but they appear derived from local sources, not the federal government.

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highly adaptable, and can dissipate into small, remote sanctuaries where it can capitalize on enduring clan-based rivalries and political grievances. The group has recruited—or abducted—over 5,000 child soldiers, according to the UN. Many of them have voluntarily joined al-Shabaab for their own physical security and welfare. Perhaps the most significant distinction of al-Shabaab compared to the Federal government is this:

Al-Shabaab remains a viable local actor for the provision of basic services and, in particular, security and justice. To date, national security forces have focused on force alone and have neglected building political consensus and legitimacy within communities they serve. They are thus yet to demonstrate their comparative value to al-Shabaab in many areas. At present, al-Shabaab presents itself as providing Somalia’s only effective justice system.

In more recent weeks, al-Shabaab has launched a humanitarian aid offensive, securing food supplies for the drought-affected Somalian people. Therefore, it is imperative that the newly installed president and his government provide alternative relief programs as soon as able.

Daesh. Heavily-armed Somali Islamic State (IS) fighters operate in Somalia’s Puntland federal state overlooking the Gulf of Aden. Their leader, Sheikh Abdulqadir Mu’min defected from Al-Shabaab. Mu’min’s video-taped pledge of allegiance (bay’a) to Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi failed to split al-Shabaab, but it did challenge its “ideological cohesion” and allegiances within the Somali clans. In addition, since this pledge, a miscellaneous and varied groups or individual former al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia have also defected to Daesh. It is alleged that Mu’min recruits through kidnapping of children. In recent months, Daesh elements have largely moved away from the urban areas of Puntland and into the mountains.

Clan Militias: Perhaps the most complicated challenge for the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) is Somalia’s multitude of militias, many of which are “clan-based self-protection forces,” who put clan loyalty above federal government loyalty.

Organized Criminal Elements (Domestic and Transnational): Organized crime in Somalia exists at all levels of society. Local collaborators include a complex and dynamic mix of legitimate business people; Islamist extremists, terrorists, and kidnappers; police and army officers; militia groups; and local politicians. Crime exists in many forms, the most prevalent being piracy.

c. Other International Actors. Under the previous president’s leadership, Somalia gradually began reintegrating into the international community, establishing and developing ties with the United States and European Union among others.

Regional Neighbors. Burundi. Some observe that the Burundian contingent is the weakest element of AMISOM. However, it is also the second largest. The political turmoil in Burundi is dangerous to Somalia for at least two reasons: 1) the “spill over” of instability (due to refugees and other related discord) continues to have significant regional impact in general, and 2) the Burundi government may choose to withdraw its forces from AMISOM earlier than currently planned.

Mu’min, a British citizen, fled the UK for

Somalia, his native country, when he was

sought for questioning regarding his role in

radicalizing local Muslim youth. He is from

the Ali Salebaan sub-clan of the

Darod/Marjeteen, whose members inhabit

the Bari region. In August 2016, the US

State Department declared Mu’min a

“specially designated global terrorist” and

placed him under financial sanctions.

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Ethiopia. Ethiopia has generations of influence and conflict with Somalia. In the more recent decades, Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia has been “invited” by Somalian authorities or as a participant in AMISOM. However, many in Somalia regard the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia’s security affairs with great suspicion as a strategic ploy to annex more Somali land. Ethiopia recently began an early withdrawal of their troops from AMISOM, allowing the militant groups to claim significant areas without opposition. While many experts believe the force reduction is due to unrest in Ethiopia, the government cites the “financial burden” and “lack of support” as the influential factors.

Kenya. Kenya has a significant number of Somalia minority in its population. It also has a long history of intervening or sending its security forces in Somalia. In more recent years, Kenya launched an offensive operation against al-Shabaab in Somalia codenamed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Protect the Nation) in October 2011. While it was given as a reaction to a series of kidnappings, the scale of the operation indicates that plans for such an offensive had been underway for some time. In more recent years, Kenya’s security agents in the northeastern country of Mandera began working with the Somalia administration in Bula Hawo to help curb cross-border incursions by the Islamist militants. In October 2016, the Kenyan government indicated its commitment for completion of a 30-kilometer security wall by January 2017 “to ward off infiltration by Al-Shabaab militants.”

In 2017, Kenya holds its next presidential elections which are already provoking violent activities within the country.

Other Countries. Turkey is the second largest donor of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Since 2011, Turkey has provided approximately USD$121.9 million, benefitting the Mogadishu airport, water projects, hospitals, schools and mosques. In addition, Turkey recently built its largest overseas military training camp in Somalia for training SNA. This construction, coupled with the humanitarian aid programs, are part of Turkey’s 2005 African initiative, intended “to establish closer ties…in the continent...because the continent has vast natural resources, entrepreneurial spirit, and a young and vibrant population.” According to one report, “Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are explicitly competing with each other in the country.” When Turkey announced its plans for its military base in Somalia, the UAE persuaded the state government of Somaliland to permit a military base at the port of Berbera.

China spends a great deal of money in Somalia, between AMISOM contributions and business agreements (notably, a separate agreement with Puntland to conduct oil and gas exploration, both inland and off-coast. Some reports also suggest Russian interests in Somalia or its semi-autonomous states, but there is no clear evidence of any specific arrangements at this time. International Organizations. There are many other international agencies and forces operating in Somalia, beyond those of the UN and the AU. The largest of the remaining security-type forces is from the European Union (EU). The EU supports AMISOM through the African Peace Facility, runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development, and peace-building initiatives. There is a large anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia with three separate (EU, NATO and UN-coordinated) international naval operations. The EU, which along with the

The Ethiopian government essentially consists of Tigrayan ethnic minority members. Recent protests revolve

around perceptions of partiality in the job market and public policy. The government has allegedly detained some

25,000 people and killed several hundred. It imposed an effective blackout of media and social networks and a

State of Emergency that remains in effect.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently in proceedings against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice

President William Ruto for instigating the ethnic violence surrounding the 2007 election.

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UN is the main donor to AMISOM, indicated a reduction of its contribution by 20% which was expected to result in a salary cut for AU soldiers. (The support receives €1.1 billion covering allowances for the 22,000 troops, pay for the police component, international and local civilian staff as well as operational costs of the mission's civilian office in Nairobi.) The situation was apparently resolved to the AU’s satisfaction. In the next year or so, refugees’ programs management, EU member-state contraction, and general funding reductions will challenge the EU’s ability to focus any energy on Somalia. Another significant international group in Somalia is the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), which supports a Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program (DRSLP) Somalia component. This component is a 5-year project to be implemented in Puntland, Somaliland and South Central regions of Somalia, supported by a grant of UA 15 Million from the African Development Bank equivalent to USD 22.5 million (at the time of appraisal). 10. Economic. Somalia, despite the lack of a functional central government since 1991, has been able to maintain a robust informal economy where the private sector enterprises albeit small, have had notable successes. The Somali economy is generally based on agriculture and livestock production, forestry, fisheries, money transfers and telecommunications, which contributes significantly to Somalia‘s gross domestic product (GDP). Recent studies on the Somali economy have demonstrated that remittances from overseas based Somalis have been accounting for a significant source of revenue for Somalia, as these add approximately US$1 billion per annum to the country‘s US$2.37 billion GDP, according to Somalia‘s financial reports in 2010. From this high level of remittance flow from abroad, it is overwhelmingly recognized that the support of Somali Diaspora to their families in Somalia is the main backbone that maintains the Somali economy. However, even though the unregulated economic progress was a success for Somalia, the stateless condition contributed to endemic corruption and criminal operations. Over half of the population are employed in the livestock industry. The current drought is killing their animals as well as the people. The deaths not only impact short-term but also long-term economic viability for families and the country. Piracy was once a significant component to the local economy, but atrophied under the weight of international efforts to eliminate it. However, just this year a small band of Somali pirates hijacked a commercial tanker for ransom. According to one observer, the hijacking was a desperate way to address issues of illegal fishing in the same waters, which impinge on the Somali’s livelihoods. Somalia cannot qualify for debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries initiative because it has longstanding arrears. In July 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) carried out its first economic consultation with Somalia since 1989. It said the economy, driven by agriculture – including livestock exports, construction and telecommunications – grew by 3.7% in 2014. The IMF forecast growth of 2.7% for last year. 11. Social. Somalia is a clan-based society. Some of the most common clans include Darood, Dir, and Hawiye. Forty-two percent of the population is under 14. Somali and Arabic are the main languages. Ten million people live in Somalia, 2 million of whom live in Mogadishu. Due to the high conflict in the region, 10 % of the population are IDPs. An estimated 1 million Somali refugees live in camps in neighboring countries, mainly Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Tanzania and Uganda. Somalia also ranks worst in the world in under-five mortality and approximately 1.7 million school-age children are still out of school.

a. Rule of Law. Respect for the Rule of Law at a national level remains tenuous at best in Somalia. As part of US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilizations (TIS) in Somalia, facilitators:

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“…helped regional Somali governments build meaningful relationships with local leaders in communities where the formal justice system has previously not been utilized. For example, in Somaliland, the Councils of Elders (Nabaddoon) have long served as the unquestioned authorities presiding over disputes. The ‘xeer’ traditional legal system has served as a conflict resolution mechanism in the absence of a strong judicial system. With the emergence of a regional democratic government in Hargeisa, cultural and legal friction arose between clan elders who have played this critical role for generations and the Ministry of Interior that has the legal mandate to provide national security and reconcile disputes among clans.”

Despite several of these USAID-facilitated peace forums, the judicial and detention systems remain broken and corrupt, with justice still served at local institutional levels only. However, only recently there was a recent landmark ruling in Somalia’s Puntland state, which saw five men sentenced to prison terms for gang raping a teenage girl and badly beating up another. It is precedent-setting in a country of sexual violence, most of which is never documented. b. Human Rights. The nascent national government, has, thus far, failed to protect the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people residing in the country’s capital from serious abuses, including sexual violence, and did not adhere to its own new displacement policies by forcibly – and at times violently – evicting displaced people from informal settlements. The UN reported that more than 116,000 people were forcibly evicted in the first eight months of 2015, and this has not abated. IDPs include nearly 8,067 returnees from Kenya since December 2014, and over 109,378 evictions in Mogadishu alone since January 2015. In addition, there are over 30,728 arrivals from Yemen since March 2015.

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In Somaliland region, the authorities on occasion arbitrarily arrested journalists and critics of the government. They also failed to sufficiently protect people with psychosocial disabilities from involuntary confinement and medication, chaining, and beatings in public and private institutions.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. The humanitarian assistance space in Somali is extremely dense, with much need unmet. A recent food security and nutrition assessment considers Somalia’s current situation as alarming and expected to get worse:

Somalia’s current drought is threatening half of the country’s population, or about 6 million people, according to the United Nations. Aid agencies have scaled up efforts but say more support is urgently needed…The crisis has once again uprooted hundreds of thousands of people across Somalia, which already has a sprawling diaspora of 2 million people after a quarter-century of conflict. Drought-stricken families are on the move, trying to reach points where international aid agencies are distributing food. The agencies cannot distribute food in areas under the control of al-Shabab, Somalia’s homegrown Islamic extremist rebels who are affiliated to al-Qaida. Somalia’s fragile central government struggles to assert itself beyond the capital and other limited areas. Between November and the end of February, around 257,000 people in this Horn of Africa nation have been internally displaced because of the drought, according to the U.N. refugee agency. Some are moving to urban areas, others into neighboring countries.

More than 6 million Somalis are in need of humanitarian assistance. The Famine Prevention Operational Plan sought $825 million to reach 5.5 million people by June 2017, but more resources are needed to help affected people before it was too late. In addition, 2.8 million require access to water. IDPs make up more than two thirds, or 68 per cent, of acutely food insecure people.

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12. Information: The public telecommunications system was almost completely destroyed or dismantled during the civil war and few private companies offer limited local fixed-line service. However, private wireless companies offer service in most major cities, while charging the lowest international rates on the continent and approximately 50% of the population has cell phones. There are only two private TV stations and almost as many government stations. Radio stations are the most effective means to reach large segments of the population, although the country has less than ten radio stations with one (Radio Mogadishu) controlled by the government. Several radio stations exist from time to time in the heartland. Internet use is low (less than 2% of the population). 13. Infrastructure: Somalia’s infrastructure remains in shambles after years of war hindering AMISOM operations and humanitarian efforts. There are 6 airports with paved runways, two main seaports and 2500km of paved roads. The European Union Delegation to Somalia and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) donated an assortment of equipment to the Somalia Police Force to help them in areas of bomb disposal and maritime and inland security which will assist the police in better performing their work and generally help to improve security. Peace Operations Functions

14. Command and Control.

AMISOM leadership is as follows:

Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission: Ambassador Francisco Caetano Jose Madeira (Mozambique)

Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission: Honorable Lydia Wanyoto Mutende (Uganda)

Force Commander: Lieutenant General Jonathan Kipkemoi Rono (Kenya)

Police Commissioner: Brigadier General Anand Pillay (South Africa)

Since January 2016, UNSOM leadership includes the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), Michael Keating (UK) and supported by two Deputy Special Representatives: Raisedon Zenenga and Peter de Clerq who is also the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia. 15. Intelligence. A secure tactical radio network, signal intelligence and reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) have enabled a relatively lightly armed infantry force to gain the upper hand over Al-Shabaab. In many cases, bilateral partners have provided such capabilities, together with the necessary training. Police and intelligence services, still developing their capabilities, must effectively engage in communities recently liberated from al-Shabaab control. AMISOM relies on Somali Army forces for local, human intelligence, although the reliability and quality of this intelligence is poor. AMISOM has also benefited from an UN-supported information campaign that has contributed to reversing a defeatist international and regional media narrative about Somalia. There are reports of a US intelligence apparatus deployed in Somalia in support of AMISOM.

16. Operations. Within the operational direction of the Force Commander, contingent and battalion

commanders have had a high degree of autonomy to pursue tactical objectives in their respective areas

of operations. In addition, AMISOM operations on the ground have had minimal micro-management from

AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. However, AMISOM and government forces have limited capacity to

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conduct stability operations threatening sustainment of security gains in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. In

addition, the lack of infrastructure significantly impacts operations.

17. Protection.

a. Mission Protection. UN agencies and other aid groups are under constant risk of attack, as are AMISOM or other forces that attempt to provide them protection. It is difficult to ascertain how much of the AMISOM forces are dedicated to mission protection. b. Protection of Civilians. Civilians, including humanitarian workers, are frequent casualties due to direct attacks, inter-clan fighting, revenge, kidnapping, terrorist attacks, or as collateral damage from military operations. Human rights abuses are widespread, although the Somali government with UNSOM support has begun initiatives to improve the situation. There were clashes over the creation of federal states by the government (with the backing of the international partners) that led to forcibly displaced populations. Sexual violence is widespread, and a recent report from Human Rights Watch accused AMISOM soldiers of perpetrating many of these crimes. With over 3 million Somalis requiring humanitarian aid, protecting civilians is a monumental task. Drought is forcing many families to move and cluster in areas that they believe may provide water and other sustenance.

18. Sustainment. In general, AMISOM is funded

through a combination of donations, voluntary contributions, (to the UN-managed Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM) and the UN logistical support package. In late 2015, the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) was established through a UNSCR 2245(2015) to “provide critical support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.” UNSOS support is financed through voluntary contribution to the SNA Trust Fund which so far has received total contributions of $13.55 million from the UK, US, Italy and New Zealand.

UNSOS is a successor operation to the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which was established in 2009 to provide logistical field support to AMISOM. It is led by Hubert Price (US).

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Logistical operations are critical to sustain AMISOM units in remote locations and to support humanitarian assistance. Although the UNSCR 2036 authorized AMISOM an aviation component, none of the helicopters were provided by the offering countries. Through UN support, AMISOM acquired access to a small yet still insufficient number of outsourced helicopters for medical evacuation and transport functions, an increasingly important feature as troops are dispersed over a wide area. Recently, both Kenya and Ethiopia pledged additional helicopters to the mission.

The AU also appealed to the UN Security Council to authorize an expanded marine component in order

to help bring security to the coastline of Somalia and deny the al-Shabaab or Daesh the opportunity to

benefit from piracy and illegal maritime trade. However, thus far the UN has not responded with such a

provision.

Issues and Considerations

19. Issues. The major issues confronting AMISOM in Somalia are summarized as follows:

A conundrum exists for African leaders in that they do not want their population to believe themselves dependent on the West (former colonizers) for security support, yet they are—especially given the need for funding and technical equipment, such as intelligence and airlift capabilities.

AMISOM exit strategy depends on capabilities of Somali Army and government ability to cover ungoverned spaces.

The Somali population is antagonistic toward AMISOM, in part due to historic enmities with the neighboring countries that contribute troops to AMISOM and in part to the perception that AMISOM is strictly an arm of the Somali government (although a popular president may mitigate that resentment).

AMISOM’s internal organization, which allows for sector autonomy amongst contributing troops, challenges operational coordination and discipline. In addition, the lack of an AMISOM rapid-response force and military air assets under the force commander’s control limits the effectiveness of defense or counter-attack.

20. Considerations. a. US. While the recent election offers some “hope” and there is much improvement in the Somali space and with AMISOM, there is still significant opportunity for “back sliding” into greater chaos. This is due to the food insecurity and the still-viable Al-Shabaab network. The US government should support the any request from the UN to extend the AMISOM mandate and extend it to task for Protection of Civilians. The US government should continue its direct support to Somalia through its USAID programs, among many. Instead, it appears that the US will truncate foreign aid to a significant extent or to engage in state building. The resulting loss of funding will exacerbate the crisis and may hinder any positive developments. In particular, "a very narrow (US) counterterrorism policy…caused much damage in Somalia over many years and often contributed to deeper and lasting instability in the country.” For the US military, specifically, the US government should sustain US exchanges and training with major TCCs, such as that conducted by Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, and offer to synchronize pre-deployment training amongst the multiple donor nations working with African TCCs in order to gain efficiencies. A senior US military commander also reported that the US is “prepared to assist aid agencies in relief efforts but has not yet been asked to do so.” Meanwhile, the Somalia narrative regarding the new “air strike” targeting policy and procedures in country is problematic, in that it appears the US will care little regarding civilian casualties.

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b. UN. The UN and its international and multinational organizational partners have the continued challenge to reinforce the successes of AMISOM and the other developmental efforts in Somalia while reviewing and reenergizing as appropriate those efforts that have had less success. The efforts to review and reinforce/reenergize range from local to international policies and programs. Recommendations specific to AMISOM include the following:

Build the command mechanisms necessary to conduct more effective joint operations across the mission’s sector boundaries.

Designate a single country to lead the effort of assisting Somalia in building its professional Somali security forces, in order to reduce confusion and friction of differing approaches.

Demand troops training on counterinsurgency, stability operations, cordon and search operations, route security, the protection of civilians (despite its absence from the mandate), civilian casualty mitigation, support for humanitarian assistance, battalion and higher operations, civil-military operations, security sector reform, standards of conduct, human rights, law of war, force protection, and counter-IEDs.

Generate the mission’s missing enablers so it can successfully degrade al-Shabaab’s key combat capabilities and adequately defend its own bases and supply routes.

Ensure the policies and activities of Somalia’s neighbors, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, align with AMISOM’s mandate in order to reduce the negative perceptions which fuel insurgency.

Swiftly and accurately report AMISOM casualties to counter Al-Shabaab propaganda and to meet the moral contract with AMISOM troops.

More general recommendations for the UN and its international/multinational partners include:

Begin the work to transition from emergency relief to development funding for sustainment.

Continue the efforts for disarmament through establishment of schools, community centers, and rehabilitation centers.

However, the most urgent task may be to keep Somalia in the world’s view and to not believe Somalia to “be done” too early. c. Somalia. The single most issue in front of Somali authorities is to provide for the delivery of basic services and governance mechanisms in the towns recovered from al-Shabaab and to develop an agreed national security strategy in order to establish an inclusive and professional set of national security forces. More generally, authorities should take more concrete steps to fight corruption, build competent institutions and promote reconciliation. Doing otherwise provides fuel for al-Shabaab’s propaganda. In addition, Somalia’s political leaders – in the Federal Government and in the regions – should focus on securing an inclusive, durable and legitimate solution to Somalia’s fundamental governance issues. One means to address legitimate solutions may be to adopt people-to-people and leader-to-leader regional reconciliation as a process and mandate regional institutions, such as IGAD and the EAC, to function as the infrastructure or mechanisms for regional reconciliation. Resources 21. Key Documents and On-Line References.

African Union Mission in Somalia--AMISOM

African Union, Peace and Security Council Communique, February 2016

AU High Level Consultation Future of AMISOM and Support Security Sector (March 2017)

Brookings, Saving Somalia Again, June 2015

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CIA, The World Fact Book--Somalia

Council on African Security and Development (CASADE), Report re UN and AU Partnership in Peacekeeping Challenges and Opportunities, Feb 2016

Council on Foreign Relations--Al Shabaab

Department of State, US Mission Somalia, Department of State Office of Historian (Somalia) and USAID, Somalia

Every Congressional Research Service Report_The African Union (AU)_Key Issues and US-AU Relations

The Global Observatory. Special Report re AMISOM Casualties, Sep 2015 The Global Observatory_Al-Shabaab-Amisom (March 2017) The Global Observatory Amisom-African-Union-Peacekeeping-Financing (January 2017)

Global Research_US Covert Operations in Somalia (2001-2016)

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016

Institute for Peace in Partnership, An Overview of UN and AU Cooperation, February 2016

Life and Peace Institute_January-February 2017

National Counter Terrorism Center, Al Shabaab

UNSCR 2245; UNSCR 2232; UNSCR 1744

UNSCR 2316 (2016) (Somalia Piracy)

UNSCR 2317 (2016) Arms Embargo

UN Documents, Somalia

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs_Humanitarian Response Plan (2017)

UNSOM Fact Sheet Somalia 2016 Electoral Process

Relief Web Somalia