limiting transfers of enrichment and reprocessing

8/6/2019 Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing

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By Fred McGoldrick

Tis policy brie is based on Limiting ransers oEnrichment and Reprocessing echnology: Issues,Constraints, Options , a report o the Project onManaging the Atom.

For several years, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)has been unable to reach a consensus on the adop-

tion o revised guidelines or its members. Te mostcontentious issue is how to strengthen restraints onthe transer o enrichment and reprocessing (E&R)technologies in a manner that would be acceptable toall NSG members, and credible to the major export-ing states and the nuclear industry. Tis issue will beback on the agenda this month when the NSG meetsin plenary session.

At present, only a handul o states possess enrich-ment or reprocessing acilities, and very ew countries

BOTTOM LINES

Moderatetherhetoriconlimitingenrichmentandreprocessingtransfers. It makes more sense orthe U.S. and others to oer attractive alternatives to new nuclear states than to propose arrangementsthat seek to deny what countries consider their sovereign rights.

Strengthen nonproliferation measures within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). he NSGshould adopt new guidelines that oer greater speciicity in the rules governing transers o enrich-ment and reprocessing. Members should also register their commitments to promote access to nu-clear energy to those states that are in compliance with their NP obligations.

StrengtheninternationalcooperationbeyondtheNSGtodealwiththemostseriousproliferation

risks.Bolstering uel assurances, oering cradle to grave nuclear services to states with modestnuclear programs, encouraging multilateral controls on enrichment and reprocessing, and puttingpressure on those who would transer sensitive nuclear technology to NP scolawsall these stepsrequire that states work together to be eective.

Recommendations for Limiting Transfers ofEnrichment and Reprocessing Technologies

The Project on Managing the Atom

that do not already possess them have declared plansor intentions to acquire such capabilities or their civinuclear programs in the near uture. Tereore, ini-tiatives to discourage the spread o enrichment andreprocessing acilities have a limited, albeit impor-tant, target audience.

Since ew states have a rm stake in acquiring E&R a-cilities, it may prove an opportune time to win broad

agreement on strengthened international norms todiscourage the spread o these technologies. Still, iwill be challenging, and indeed may ultimately proveimpossible, to reconcile the idea o restricting enrich-ment and reprocessing technologies with the viewso many non-nuclear-weapon states and developingcountries on what they regard as their inalienablerights to peaceul nuclear technology, including E&R

Given the above considerations, governments shouldtake the ollowing steps.

Policy Brief June 2011
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21010/


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TONE IT DOWN

Moderate the rhetoric on limiting E&R transfersin large international fora and stress the ArticleIVrights of NPT parties and assistance to devel-oping countries. Given the sharp divisions in the

global community on this issue, a broad internationalconsensus that would be universally credible to NPparties, national parliaments, and private industry ismost likely not an achievable goal. Te most prag-matic strategy would be to tone down the rhetoric,emphasize the rights o NP parties to the peaceuluses o nuclear energy as long as they are in compli-ance with their nonprolieration objectives, and in-crease assistance to developing countries in buildingthe inrastructure or peaceul nuclear programs thatdo not necessarily require them to build their own

E&R acilities. In other words, it makes more senseto oer attractive incentives and opportunities as analternative to national enrichment and reprocessingthan to propose arrangements that openly seek todeny what countries consider their sovereign rights.

STRENGTHEN RESTRAINTS WITHIN THENUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

Concentrate on reaching agreement on the cleantextonE&RtransfersintheNSG.Te NSG has come

very close to reaching agreement on the so-calledclean text language or restraining E&R transers.Abandoning the eort at this point would representa major ailure. Since there are no transers o E&Rcontemplated in the oreseeable uture, there is stillample time to try to obtain consensus on the cleantext. With sufcient diplomatic eort, this could verywell be achievable. Te G-8 should continue to adoptthe clean text either on an annual or more permanentbasis.

Ifagreementonthecurrentcleantextprovesimpos-

sible,adopttheobjectivecriteriainthecleantext.aking this step would at least rule out E&R trans-ers to states that are not party to the NP or that arenot adhering to their nonprolieration commitments.Tis option would retain the existing NSG guidelineson E&R transers, including the requirements to exer-cise restraint and to encourage multinational or sup-plier involvement in transerred E&R acilities.

June 2011

For more from Managing the Atom, please visit: http://belfercenter.org/atom

Adopt new language in the NSG guidelines that

wouldarmArticleIVrightsandregistercommit -ments to promote international cooperation withstatesaslongastheyareinconformitywiththeob-ligationsofNPT. I the NSG adopts the clean text oronly the objective criteria, the group should take stepsto mute criticisms o discrimination and denial oNP rights and to help reute charges that the NSG isa cartel o nuclear haves seeking to deprive have-notso the ull benets o peaceul nuclear technology. TeNSG should thereore adopt, along with strengthenedcontrols on E&R, new ormulations in its publishedguidelines that would afrm the inalienable right oall NP Parties to the peaceul uses o nuclear energyNSG members should register their commitment tothe exchange o equipment, materials and scientic

and technological inormation or the peaceul uses onuclear energy, in particular or developing countriesas long as they are in conormity with the obligationso NP.

Strengthen NSG eorts on eective implementa-tionoftheexistingguidelines. Tese guidelines haveworked well to date, and the real problem has beenthe work o clandestine supply networks by roguesuppliers and countries seeking nuclear weapons. TeNSG should commit to greater cooperation in shar-

ing inormation on the techniques and methods thatrogue supplier states and nuclear weapons aspirantsemploy to obtain exports illegally. Tis should includea greater willingness to share intelligence inorma-tion among exporting states, both NSG members andnon-NSG members.

STRENGTHEN OTHERNONPROLIFERATION MEASURES

Promotefuelassurances. A strategy o oering im-

proved uel assurances is likely to have positive butlimited benets in discouraging the spread o enrich-ment and reprocessing; this approach is likely to ap-peal only to small states that may be concerned aboutsecurity o supply. In any event, the U.S. and Rus-sian LEU stockpiles plus the IAEA uel bank and theUK enrichment bond scheme ought to constitute su-cient uel supply backup mechanisms without dis-rupting the global market.


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June 2011

For more from Managing the Atom, please visit: http://belfercenter.org/atom

Give serious consideration toplacing enrichment

and reprocessing facilities under some formof multinational auspices or control. Even itechnology holders do not make an eort to makethe multinational model a global norm, multinationalenrichment ventures o one kind or another seem tohave emerged as common practice among technologyholders, with AREVA, URENCO, Angarsk, Silex andnow USEC all involving some orm o multinationalparticipation. At a minimum this trend should beencouraged.

RecognizethelimitedapplicationoftheU.S.-UAEmodel of discouraging the spread of E&R. Temodel o nuclear cooperation that the United Stateshas put into place with the United Arab Emirates willace considerable obstacles in winning acceptance byother states both in the region and elsewhere. More-over, other suppliers are highly unlikely to ollow thismodel. Tus the utility o this approach to prevent-ing the spread o E&R may be limited to a very ewcountries; the prospects o it serving as a more generalmodel are dim.

Seriouslyexplore thefeasibilityofcradle-to-gravefuel cycleoptions,particularly for countrieswithsmallnuclearprograms.Suppliers will generally aceormidable public acceptance obstacles in trying tooer cradle-to-grave uel cycle services, especially ona broad basis, since they would require some coun-tries accepting spent uel or nuclear waste rom othercountries. However, suppliers may nd it possibleto overcome political opposition i they limit theiroers to assume responsibility or managing othercountries spent uel to those nations that have smallnuclear programs and/or are in regions o political in-stability or prolieration concern.

Give priority to development and deployment of

improvedsafeguardstechniques,includinguniver-

saladoptionoftheAdditionalProtocolaswellasphysicalprotectionforenrichmentandreprocess-ingplants.

Continuefurtherresearch,development,anddem-onstrationofmoreproliferation-resistantfuelcycletechnologies.Tese eorts must be accompanied bystrengthened international saeguards, export con-

trols, institutional checks, and other non-technicameasures.

Applythemaximumdiplomaticpressuretostatethatseektotransfersensitivenucleartechnologytocountriesthatareinviolationoftheirnonprolifera-

tioncommitments,arelocatedinunstableregionsorpresentunacceptableproliferationrisks. Diplo-matic interventions and interdictions have been themost eective means o stopping the spread o E&R(e.g. the United States with proposed German andFrench transers o reprocessing to South Korea, ai-wan, and Pakistan in the 1970s, the U.S. diplomaticinitiatives with proposed Russian transers o en-richment technology to Iran, and the interdiction oPakistani transers o sensitive nuclear technology toLibya).

Statements and views expressed in this policy brie aresolely those o the author and do not imply endorsemenby Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, or theBeler Center or Science and International Afairs.


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ABOUT THE BELFER CENTER

Te Beler Center is the hub o the Harvard KennedySchools research, teaching, and training in interna-tional security aairs, environmental and resource is-

sues, and science and technology policy.Te Center has a dual mission: (1) to provide lead-ership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge aboutthe most important challenges o international securi-ty and other critical issues where science, technology,environmental policy, and international aairs inter-sect; and (2) to prepare uture generations o leadersor these arenas. Center researchers not only conductscholarly research, but also develop prescriptionsor policy reorm. Faculty and ellows analyze global

challenges rom nuclear prolieration and terrorism toclimate change and energy policy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FredMcGoldrickis an Associate o the Managing theAtom Project with extensive experience in nuclearnon-prolieration and international nuclear policy

elds. He held senior positions in the U.S. Departmento Energy and the U.S. Department o State, wherehe negotiated U.S. peaceul nuclear cooperationagreements and helped shape U.S. policy to prevent thespread o nuclear weapons. He also served in the U.SMission to the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in Vienna. Since his retirement rom the StateDepartment, he has been a partner in BengelsdorMcGoldrick and Associates, LLC., an internationaconsulting rm.

ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM

Te Project on Managing the Atom (MA) is the Harvard Kennedy Schools principal research group on nuclearpolicy issues. Established in 1996, the purpose o the MA project is to advance policy-relevant ideas and analysisor reducing the risks rom nuclear and radiological terrorism; stopping nuclear prolieration and reducing nucleararsenals; lowering the barriers to sae, secure, and peaceul nuclear-energy use; and addressing the connectionsamong these problems. Trough its pre- and post-doctoral ellows program, the MA project also helps to preparethe next generation o leaders or work on nuclear policy problems. Te MA project provides its analyses to

policy makers, scholars, journalists, and the public.

June 2011

FOR ACADEMIC CITATION:

McGoldrick, Fred. Recommendations or Limiting ransers o Enrichment and Reprocessing echnologies.Policy Brie, Beler Center or Science and International Aairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011.

limiting transfers of enrichment and reprocessing

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