licensing basis event selection case study: the molten ... · licensing basis event selection case...

LicensingBasisEventSelectionCaseStudy:TheMoltenSalt

ReactorExperiment

BrandonChisholm&SteveKrahnVanderbiltUniversity(VU)

1ORNL MSR Workshop 2017

October 3-4, 2017 (Oak Ridge, TN)

Outline

• Introduction• RadionuclideSources andBarrierstoRelease• ReactorSpecificSafetyFunctions• PreliminaryInitiatingEventGrouping• MSREEventSequences• LBEIdentificationandEvaluation• Conclusions

2

IntroductionMotivationandBackground

3

LicensingModernizationProject

4

• DOE-Industrycost-sharedprojecttoprovidedend-userperspectiveonlicensingtechnicalrequirements

• TechnologyInclusive,Risk-Informed,Performance-Basedguidancefornon-LWRswithanintenttomodernize:• SelectionofLicensingBasisEvents(e.g.AnticipatedOperatingOccurrences,DesignBasisEvents,BeyondDesignBasisEvents)

• System,Subsystem,andComponent(SSC)classification• DefenseinDepth

• 4discretewhitepaperstobeissuedandreviewedbyindustryandNRC

• FinalRIPBguidancetobesubmittedforNRCendorsementwillbecompilationofthesewhitepaperswithrevisionsfromongoingdiscussionsincorporated

TheMoltenSaltReactorExperiment

5

LMPLBESelectionProcess• ARisk-Informedtechnology-

neutralframeworkforidentifyingLicensingBasisEvents(i.e.AOOs,DBEs,BDBEs)hasbeensuggestedbyLMP

• ExamplescanbefoundintheLBESelectionwhitepaperregardingapplicationtoHTGRandSFR

• ProjectObjective:InvestigateapplicabilityofsuggestedprocesstowardsMSRsusingMSREliterature,especially:§ PreliminaryHazardsReport§ SafetyAnalysisReport§ OtherDesignand

OperationsReports

6

10-week Project Scope

PreliminaryMSREPRADevelopment

7

Plantfunctionalanalysis

MSREDesignandOperationsReports

MSREPreliminary

HazardsReport,SafetyAnalysis

Report

MSRESafetyAnalysisReport

MSREDesignandOperationsReports

• TheapproachtodevelopingapreliminaryPRAisdiscussedinaseparateLMPwhitepaper

• ThesystemsengineeringinputswereidentifiedfromtheORNLdatabaseofMSREliteratureandanalyzed/documentedtoprovideinsightateachstep

RadionuclideSourcesintheMSREAndBarrierstotheirRelease

8

MSRESourceTermIdentification

9

Off-gas System Fuel Salt System Salt Processing and Handling

MajorMSRESourceTerms1. FuelSaltSystem

• 10-30millioncuries• Saltseekers(e.g.Sr,Y,Zr,I,Cs,Ba,Ce)– 59wt%,soluble• Noblemetals(e.g.Nb,Mo,Ru,Sb,Te)– 24wt%,migratetovarioussurfaces

2. Off-gasSystem• ~280curies/sec frompumpbowlintooff-gasline• Noblegases(KrandXe)– 17wt%,slightlysolublegases• Someiodine• Decaydaughtersofnoblegases

3. FuelProcessingandHandlingEquipment• Fuelsaltisnotprocesseduntilxenonhasdecayed(~1millioncuriesintotal)

• FluorinationvolatilizesH,He,Se,Br,Kr,Nb,Mo,Tc,Ru,Te,I,Xe,U,Npanddepositsthesedownstreamoffuelstoragetank

10

FuelSaltSystemBarriers

11Second Barrier: Seal welded containment structure

First Barrier: Fuel salt piping, shell side of PHX, fuel salt drain tanks, fuel salt pump

FuelProcessingandHandlingBarriers

12

Second Barrier: Seal welded containment structure, cubicle. Maintained at negative differential pressure during processing

Off-gasandOtherBarriers• Thesecondbarriertoreleasefortheoff-gassystemiscomposedofdifferentstructuresindifferentlocationsaroundtheMSREbuilding• Off-gaslinestartsinreactorcell• Passesthroughcoolantsaltareasencasedin¾-inchpipe• Passesthroughvalvesinpressuretightinstrumentboxinventhouse

• Reachescharcoalbedcellviaundergroundshieldedduct• Note: inthecaseofhighradiationlevelsatoutletofcharcoalbedcell,valvesinlineareonlybarrierbeforestack

• Otherbarrierstorelease• VaporcondensingsystemtoreducemaximumpressureinreactorcellduringMaximumCredibleAccident

• Containmentventilationsystemmitigatesreleaseofsolidfissionproducts

13

MSRESpecificSafetyFunctionsAndtheSSCs/DesignFeaturessupportingtheSafetyFunctions

14

DefiningMSRESpecificSafetyFunctions

15

Plant functional analysis approach similar to that conducted for MHTGR [DOE 1987]

MSRESpecificSafetyFunctionsIncludingthe3fundamentalfunctions accordingtoIAEA[IAEA2012]:1. Controlreactivity– Reducefissionheatgenerationrate

quicklyenoughtomatchheatremovalcapability2. Controlchemicalbehavior– Reduceandmaintainthe

rateofanyundesiredchemicalreactions(mayweakencontainmentorproduceheat)belowacceptablerate

3. Controlheatremovalandaddition– Provideenoughcoolingtopreventdamagetoprimarycontainmentinlong-termwithoutovercoolingfuelsalt

4. Controlradionuclideswithinfirstbarrier– maintainstructuralintegrityofboundary

5. Confineradionuclides– Nomorethan1%leakage(1cm3 ofsalt)fromsecondarycontainerperday

16

ExamplesofSSCsandDesignFeaturesSupportingtheSafetyFunctions

17

SSC/DesignFeatureSupporting “ControlReactivity”SafetyFunction

Active/Passive/DesignFeature

ApplicableSourceTerm(s)

Negativetemperaturecoefficient(highsaltthermalexpansion)

Passive(A) ☒ FuelSalt☐ FuelProcessing☐ Off-gas

Draintankgeometry:aconcentrationincreaseoffourfoldisrequiredforcriticalityindraintanks(saltfreezingincreasesconcentrationbyonlythreefold),floodingdraintankcelldoesnotproducecriticality

DesignFeature ☒ FuelSalt☐ FuelProcessing☐ Off-gas

Gradualstoppageofpumpandexponentialdecayofneutronprecursorslimitsreactivityeffectincoreduetolossoffuelsaltflow

Passive(C) ☒ FuelSalt☐ FuelProcessing☐ Off-gas

BecauseMSREoperatesinthermalspectrum,additionalreflectionisneededforcriticalityoutsideofthecore

DesignFeature ☒ FuelSalt☒ FuelProcessing☐ Off-gas

Automaticinsertionofpoisonbycontrolsystemuponhighneutronflux

Active ☒ FuelSalt☐ FuelProcessing☐ Off-gas

Total set of SCCs/Design Features for all Safety Functions amounts to 5 pages

IdentificationofInitiatingEventsAndPreliminaryGrouping

18

HazardsandInitiatingEventsDiscussedinMSRELiterature• IEsconsideredforthisworkarethosethatoccurduringmorecommonoperatingstates(e.g.Operate-RunorOff,notduringfillingprocedures)

• MajorityofdiscussioninMSREliteraturefocusesoneventsthatoccurinfuelsaltloop

• Examples:• Fuelsaltpumpfailure• Coolantsaltpumpfailure• Uncontrolledrodwithdrawal• Concentrationoffuelsaltincoreduetoprecipitation• Leakagefromfreezevalveorfreezeflange 19

MSREPreliminaryInitiatingEventGroups4. Reactivityandpowerdistribution

anomalies• Unexpectedcriticalityduringstartup• Fuelseparation• Collectionofseparatedfuelmaterialin

reactorcore• Coldsluguponpumpstart• Uncontrolledrodwithdrawal

5. Leakageofsubstancethroughthefirstbarrier• Heatexchangerleak• Heatexchangertuberupture• Leakofdraintankheatremovalsystem

6. Decreaseinfuelsaltinventoryforagivenvolume• Inadvertentmeltingoffreezevalve

7. Radioactivereleasefromasubsystemorcomponent• Leakingoffreezevalve• Leaking/failureoffreezeflange• Ignitionofcharcoalbedsinoff-gassystem

20

ListbasedonreviewofIAEALevel1PSAGuidance[IAEA2010],PRISMandMHTGRexamples,andFHRLBEworkshop[Berkley2013]1. Increaseinheatremovalby

coolantsystem• Inadvertentraisingofradiator

door• Radiatorbloweroverspeed

2. Decreaseinheatremovalfromfuelsalt(orincreasedelectricalheataddition)• Coolantsaltpumpfailure• Pluggingincoolantsaltloop• Pluggeddrainline• Failureofdraintankafterheat

removalsystem• Externalheatersover-temperature• Inadvertentloadscram

3. Decreaseinfuelsaltflowrate• Fuelpumpfailure• Plugginginfuelsaltloop

LBEIdentificationAndEvaluationofConsequences

21

MSREEventTreeAnalysis• Atotalofthreeinitiatingeventswereselected:

• ComponentCoolingPump(CCPfailure)leadingtoinadvertentmeltingoffreezevalvebetweenreactorvesselanddraintank

• UncontrolledRodWithdrawal• Leakinoff-gaslinefromfuelsaltpump

• Eventtreesandfaulttreesconstructedandevaluatedinoff-the-shelfcommercialsoftware

• ConsequencesestimatedfromanalysisinMSREsafetyanalysisreport

22

MSREFaultTreeAnalysis• Faulttreesconstructedtoestimateprobabilityforeventtreegates• Componentreliabilityestimatedfromreadilyavailableengineeringreports§ InitiatedcompilationofMSRcomponentreliabilitydatabase

• HumanreliabilityestimatedbasedonorderofmagnitudeindicationinNRChandbook

23

The safety system doesnot drain the reactor

NO-FS-DRAIN

3.76E-06

The cooling air to FV-103is not stopped

GT32

1.44E-06

HCV-919-A1 fails to shut

EV76

1.20E-03

HCV-919-B1 fails to shut

EV77

1.20E-03

The drain tank ventvalves are not opened

GT33

2.88E-06

HCV-544-A1 fails to stayopen

EV74

1.20E-03

HCV-573-A1 fails to open

EV75

1.20E-03

The pressure is notequalized between drain

tank and fuel salt loop

GT34

3.76E-06

PCV-517-A1 fails to stayshut

EV72

1.05E-03


EV73

8.40E-04

LBESelectionResultsSequence Frequency(year-1) Consequence

AOO-1 0.115 Negligible– norelease

AOO-2 1.78E-02 Negligible– norelease

DBE-1 1.18E-03 Negligible– norelease

DBE-2 9.97E-03 Minimal

BDBE-1 2.39E-05 ~5remmaxdoseatEAB

BDBE-2 1.56E-06 Negligible– norelease

BDBE-3 3.47E-06 Minimal

BDBE-4 2.22E-05 ~100remmaxdoseatEABpossible*

24

*Note: ThedoseattheEABduetoanunmitigatedleakintheoff-gassystemdependsontheleakrateanddurationandwouldlikelybelessthan100rem.Adoseof100remattheEABrepresentswhatwasbelievedbytheMSREsafetyanalysistobeaboundingscenario,butfurtheranalysisisrequiredtomoreaccuratelyestimatethisdose.

ConclusionsLBESelectionforMSRs

25

ObservationsfromMSREPRADevelopment

26

Possible future work:Perform industry standard PHA (e.g. HAZOP, FMEA) for MSRE to facilitate development of exhaustive list of IEs

Possible Future Work:Development of a surrogate to allow for comparison of a broader range of event sequences

MajorConclusions• 2of8totaleventsequenceshavegreaterthan“minimal”consequences• NotconsideredtobearepresentativesampleofentiresetofMSREevents

• Designinsights• Systematicreviewofauxiliarysystemsrevealedsinglebarrier• Designchangetoavoidcorrosionhazard(indraintankafterheatremovalsystem)addedoperationalrisk

• IEsinauxiliarysystemscanberisk-significantforMSRs• Sourcetermcharacterization(andchemistry)importantfordeterminingreleasesinMSReventsequences• MSREwasnotabletocloseiodinebalance(1/4to1/3ofIinventory“unaccountedfor”

• ComprehensivePHA(HAZOP)necessaryforMSRE• Configurationmanagementofhistoricaldataanissue

27

Acknowledgements

28

SupplementalSlides&References

29

MSREEventTrees

30

MSREFaultTrees

31

Fuel salt transfer failure(DT1 to DT2)

NO-TX-DT1-DT2

2.16E-02

Freeze valveconfiguration failure

GT35

1.61E-02

Freeze valve coolingfailure

GT37

1.37E-02

HCV-910 fails to open(FV-105)

EV86

8.40E-04

HCV-909 fails to open(FV-106)

EV87

8.40E-04

HCV-911 fails to remain inposition (FV-107)

EV90

1.05E-03

HCV-969 fails to remain inposition (FV-110)

EV92

1.05E-03

Cooling air is notavailable

EV93

1.00E-02

Freeze valve thawingfailure

GT38

2.41E-03

HCV-912 fails to shut(FV-108)

EV88

1.20E-03

HCV-913 fails to shut(FV-109)

EV89

1.20E-03

Drain tank pressurecontrol failure

GT36

5.63E-03

HCV-575-A1 fails toremain open

EV78

8.40E-04


EV79

1.20E-03


EV80

1.20E-03


EV81

1.20E-03


EV82

1.20E-03

MSREFaultTrees[2]

32

Failure to isolate cellevacuation line (high rad

level)

565-ISO-FAIL

2.22E-03

HCV-565-A1 demandfailure

GT10

4.74E-05

Reactor safety systemfailure to demand closing

of HCV-565-A1

EV41

3.24E-03

RSS failure in channel B

GT44

5.70E-02

RM-565-B fails to function

EV44

5.26E-02

RSS-365-B1 fails tofunction

EV45

4.64E-03

RSS failure in channel C

GT45

5.70E-02

RM-565-C fails to function

EV46

5.26E-02

RSS-365-C1 fails tofunction

EV47

4.64E-03

Operator failure todemand closing of

HCV-565-A1

GT11

1.02E-03

Radiation alarmmalfunction

GT42

4.41E-05

RE-S1-A fails to function

EV58

5.26E-02

RE-S1-B fails to function

EV59

5.26E-02

RE-S1-C fails to function

EV60

5.26E-02

RM-565-B fails to function

EV44

5.26E-02

RM-565-C fails to function

EV46

5.26E-02

Operator error

EV43

1.00E-03

HCV-565-A1 fails to close

EV40

2.20E-03

MSREFaultTrees[3]

33

Reactor safety system failsto scram (spurious CR

withdrawal)

NO-SCRAM-CR-F

9.10E-06

Reactor scram initiationfailure

GT30

9.07E-06

Failure of 2 out of 3 highflux trips

GT18

2 7.48E-03

Degraded performance ofchannel A

GT21

5.08E-02

Degraded performance ofchannel B

GT22

5.08E-02

Degraded performance ofchannel C

GT23

5.08E-02

Failure of 2 out of 3 highoutlet temperature trips

GT19

2 1.02E-02

Degraded performance ofchannel A

GT24

5.96E-02

Degraded performance ofchannel B

GT25

5.96E-02

Degraded performance ofchannel C

GT26

5.96E-02

Manual scram failure

EV71

1.00E-01

Failure of control rods toscram

GT31

2 9.10E-06

Control rod 1 fails to scram

EV68

1.00E-04


EV69

1.00E-04


EV70

1.00E-04

MSREFaultTrees[4]

34

Failure of afterheatremoval system in DT-2

(no SS input)

DT2-AHRS-FAIL

1.35E-03

Feedwater supply failure

GT39

9.85E-07

Administrative controlfailure

EV94

3.00E-03

Feedwater tank leak

EV95

9.85E-07

Steam drum feedwatersupply failure

GT41

1.54E-05

ESV-807A does not open

GT47

1.38E-03

Control relay 259A notdeenergized

GT49

3.79E-04

Failure in channel 19

GT50

1.95E-02

Fail to function byTS-FD2-19B (switch)

EV103

4.64E-03

Fail to function byTE-FD2-19B (sensor)

EV104

1.49E-02


GT51

1.95E-02

Fail to function byTS-FD2-20B

EV105

4.64E-03

Fail to function byTE-FD2-20B

EV106

1.49E-02

ESV-807A fails to open

EV100

1.00E-03

LCV-807A is not opened

GT48

1.01E-02

Operator error (recognizehigh drain tank temp,open incorrect valve)

EV101

1.00E-02

Manual valve LCV-807-Afails to function

EV102

7.00E-05

Failure to isolate steamdrum drain lines

GT42A

1.00E-03

Operator error

EV96

1.00E-03

Neither block valve indrain line closes

GT43

6.44E-06

ESV-807-2A fails to close

EV97

1.70E-03

ESV-807-2B fails to close

EV98

1.70E-03

Condenser cooling watersupply failure

GT3

3.45E-04

Tower coooling waterfailure

EV116

4.72E-02

Alternate water supplyfailure

EV117

7.19E-03

HCV-882-C1 demandfailure

EV119

8.31E-06

Pressure switch PS-851-B1fails to function

GT54

1.75E-03

Operator demand failure

EV122

1.03E-03

HS-882-C fails to function

EV125

3.00E-05

Operator error

EV126

1.00E-03

Emergency water supplyfailure

GT120

5.01E-03

Process water failure

EV120

5.00E-02

Water truck is not hookedup to supply water

EV121

1.00E-01

HCV-882-C1 fails tochange position

EV127

2.20E-03

MSREFaultTrees[5]

35


(hi rad in cellatmosphere)

DT2-AHRS-F-HI-RAD

3.56E-04

Feedwater supply failure

GT39

9.85E-07


EV94

3.00E-03

Feedwater tank leak

EV95

9.85E-07


GT41

1.54E-05

ESV-807A does not open

GT47

1.38E-03

Control relay 259A notdeenergized

GT49

3.79E-04


GT50

1.95E-02


EV103

4.64E-03


EV104

1.49E-02


GT51

1.95E-02

Fail to function byTS-FD2-20B

EV105

4.64E-03

Fail to function byTE-FD2-20B

EV106

1.49E-02

ESV-807A fails to open

EV100

1.00E-03

LCV-807A is not opened

GT48

1.01E-02


EV101

1.00E-02


EV102

7.00E-05

Neither block valve indrain line closes

GT43

6.44E-06


EV97

1.70E-03


EV98

1.70E-03


GT3

3.45E-04


EV116

4.72E-02


EV117

7.19E-03


EV119

8.31E-06


GT54

1.75E-03


EV122

1.03E-03


EV125

3.00E-05

Operator error

EV126

1.00E-03


EV127

2.20E-03


GT120

5.01E-03


EV120

5.00E-02


EV121

1.00E-01

MSREFaultTrees[6]

36


(no SS input)

DT1-AHRS-FAIL

1.35E-03

Feedwater tank does notcontain sufficient amount

of water

GT2

9.85E-07


EV10

3.00E-03

Feedwater tank leak

EV16

9.85E-07


GT3

3.45E-04


EV116

4.72E-02


EV117

7.19E-03


EV119

8.31E-06


GT54

1.75E-03


EV122

1.03E-03


EV125

3.00E-05

Operator error

EV126

1.00E-03


GT120

5.01E-03


EV120

5.00E-02


EV121

1.00E-01


EV127

2.20E-03


GT4

2.22E-05

ESV-806-A does not open

EV11

1.39E-03

LCV-806-A is not opened

EV13

3.86E-04


EV20

1.95E-02


EV61

4.64E-03


EV62

1.49E-02


EV21

1.95E-02


EV63

4.64E-03

Fail to function byTS-FD1-20B (sensor)

EV64

1.49E-02

ESV-806-A fails to open

EV14

1.00E-03


EV12

1.01E-02


EV18

1.00E-02


EV19

7.00E-05

Dain line isolation failure

GT5

1.01E-03

Operator error (initiatingclosing of drain line

valves)

EV7

1.00E-03

Neither block valve closes

EV8

2.61E-05


EV26

1.70E-03


EV27

1.70E-03

MSREFaultTrees[7]

37


(hi rad in cellatmosphere)

DT1-AHRS-F-HI-RAD

3.48E-04

Feedwater tank does notcontain sufficient amount

of water

GT2

9.85E-07


EV10

3.00E-03

Feedwater tank leak

EV16

9.85E-07


GT3

3.45E-04


EV116

4.72E-02


EV117

7.19E-03


EV119

8.31E-06


GT54

1.75E-03


EV122

1.03E-03


EV125

3.00E-05

Operator error

EV126

1.00E-03


GT120

5.01E-03


EV120

5.00E-02


EV121

1.00E-01


EV127

2.20E-03


GT4

2.22E-05

ESV-806-A does not open

EV11

1.39E-03


EV13

3.86E-04


EV20

1.95E-02


EV61

4.64E-03


EV62

1.49E-02


EV21

1.95E-02


EV63

4.64E-03

Fail to function byTS-FD1-20B (sensor)

EV64

1.49E-02

ESV-806-A fails to open

EV14

1.00E-03


EV12

1.01E-02


EV18

1.00E-02


EV19

7.00E-05

Neither block valve closes

EV8

2.61E-05


EV26

1.70E-03


EV27

1.70E-03

MSREFaultTrees[8]

38

Building ventilationfailure

NO-VENT

2.94E-03

Stack fan 1 failure

GT12

5.26E-02

Stack fan 2 failure

GT13

5.58E-02

Stack fan 2 fails to start

EV50

3.30E-04

Stack fan 2 initiationfailure

EV51

1.41E-04

Stack fan 2 automaticinitiation failure

GT14

3.50E-03

PS-927-A1 fails tofunction

EV54

1.75E-03

PS-927-A2 fails tofunction

EV55

1.75E-03

Stack fan 2 manualinitiation failure

GT15

4.04E-02

FS-S1-A or FA-S1-A failsto function

EV56

3.94E-02

Operator error

EV57

1.00E-03

Damper FCO-926A fails toopen

EV52

3.00E-03

Stack fan 2 isolated formaintenance

EV53

5.26E-02

MSREFaultTrees[9]

39

Reactor is madesupercritical by control rod

withdrawal

CR-WITHDRAW

2 1.18E-03

Spurious withdrawal ofcontrol rod 1

EV65

2.00E-02


EV66

2.00E-02


EV67

2.00E-02

Leak develops in off-gasline (in reactor cell)

RX-CELL-OFF-GAS-LEAK

1.00E-02

Failure of l ine 522

EV110

1.00E-02

Failure to successfuullystart CCP-2

CCP-2-NO-START

1.34E-01

Operator error

EV3

1.00E-03

CCP-2 secured formaintenance

EV4

2.19E-02

CCP-2 does not start ondemand

GT1

1.14E-01

CCP-2 fails to start

EV5

2.08E-04

CCP-2 lube oil supplysystem failure

EV6

1.14E-01

Failure of CCP-1

CCP-1-FAIL

1.33E-01

CCP-1 fails (all modes)

EV1

2.19E-02

Failure of CCP-1 lube oilsupply system

EV2

1.14E-01

References

40

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