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lIBeRAlISM In RUSSIA: SoMe hIStoRIc

BAckgRoUnd

S hortly after the collapse of the USSR, liberalism, in thought as well as in practice, seemed to have a promising future in Russia, the hopes born of the Yeltsin years quickly gave way to disillusion and even bitterness, to the point that today liberalism is nearly absent from Russian politics. To explain the failure of liberalism in Russia, political experts and

economists have often blamed, and continue to blame, the absence of any liberal praxis, resulting in the perceived Russian ‘taste’ for an authoritarian government. In reality, in the 18th century, liberal thought was well alive in the Empire, embraced both by those proximal to power and by those who opposed it. Throughout the 19th century, it continued to develop and gain an audience right up to the February 1917 Revolution, which marked its apogee. Very quickly, intrinsic difficulties precipitated the failure of liberal ideas in Russia and it was not until the very end of the 20th century that a new form of liberalism emerged. This article attempts to understand why liberalism, despite its relatively early appearance, has failed, over time, to establish itself as an ideology and credible political practice that is not without consequence in Russia’s current political condition. To this end, we will first examine the dawn of liberalism and liberal thought in the mid-18th century through its progress into the last third of the 20th century. We will then come to the maturation of liberalism, which runs from the last third of the 19th century to the February 1917 Revolution. Finally, the third part of this essay will address the virtual disappearance of liberalism during the Soviet years, and its rapid renaissance at the end of the Gorbachev era and during the Yeltsin presidency.

Marie-Pierre Rey, Professor, University of Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, member of the Scientific Committee of the Observatoire franco-russe.

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the oRIgInS oF lIBeRAlISM In RUSSIA

If we define liberalism as a movement that, politically, aspires to guarantee civil and individual liberties, establishes a state under rule of law founded by a representative government and economically promotes free enterprise and private property, it is clear that liberalism had made its way into Russian political culture in the 18th century 1. Of course, since the beginning of the 16th century, liberal overtures were heard in Russia. The letters of Andrey Kurbsky, denouncing the omnipotence of Ivan the Terrible, the cruelty of his regime and his disdain for human liberties can be considered the first liberal manifesto to appear in the country. But it was during the reign of Peter the Great that liberalism appeared as a political concept imported by scholars, diplomats and scientists who traveled to Western Europe and shared early translations of English philosophers, starting with Locke 2. The liberalism that won over the most educated levels of the Russian nobility’s elite had two defining characteristics: it fit an essentially political logic, (without attacking serfdom, which framed the socio-economic system) and accompanied a marked Anglophilia. “Why wasn’t I born English? How I adore the liberty and spirit of this nation!” This is what Princess Ekaterina Dashkova, first president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, went so far as to write, expressing all her passion for the British parliamentary system. At the end of the 18th century, under the influence of the Enlightenment philosophers, Montesquieu in particular, Russian liberalism diversified its references, honoring French thought and gaining a broader audience with the social elite, from the wealthiest nobility, to secondary nobles and commoners alike. For example the printer/publisher Nikolay Novikov or Alexander Radishchev, who would be the first in Russia to consider liberalism beyond politics – like Novikov, Radishchev was passionately involved in defending Enlightenment values and individual liberties – but also in economic terms by calling for the abolition of serfdom.

Nascent liberalism influenced even the highest circles in Russia. In 1767, Catherine II, “M. de Montesquieu pillaging” as she herself admitted, drafted a

1. For an overview see Victor Léontovitch, Histoire du libéralisme en Russie, Fayard, Paris, 1986. 2. For the exchanges between Russia and Europe, see Marie-Pierre Rey, Le Dilemme russe, la Russie et l’Europe d’Ivan le

Terrible à Boris Eltsine, Flammarion, Paris, 2002.

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Nakaz (Instruction), addressed to the commissioner responsible for developing a new legislative code. In it, she declared herself in favor of a state, built upon law that would guarantee individuals the same liberties as the nobility and bour-geois elite. At the same time, in the economic realm, the empress promoted free enterprise and private property. However, the French Revolution, 1791 – 1793, replaced the liberal ideas of 1789 with even more radical ideas of democratic inspiration; this scared her and she quickly reversed course. This struck a serious blow to individual liberties, as evidenced by the arrest of Novikov and then of Radishchev, reaffirming the autocratic nature of her power and solidifying the socio-economic condition founded on serfdom.

However, liberal ideas did not disappear completely. During the reign of Alexander I, Russia published (in Russian) works by Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith, and the freedom and individual rights of the nobles and bourgeois were confirmed. It was at the request of the emperor himself, that in 1808-1809 Mikhail Speransky led a group inquiry in support of an imperial power governed by law. A few years later, Nikolay Novosiltsev would draft a constitutional charter completed in 1820. At the same time, agrarian reform projects emerged resonant with liberalism, and in 1801 came projects by Platon Zubov and Admiral Nikolay Mordvinov, both devout Anglophiles, in favor of developing privatization in Russia and the eventual abolition of serfdom. In any case, this enthusiasm led only to reforms of limited scope. In particular, as no political representation was put into place, giving rise to the emergence of secret societies at the end of Alexander I’s reign. Some, such as the Society of the South, were of a radical, Jacobin persuasion; others defended programs of liberal inspiration, as was the case of the Society of the North, which, under the influence of Sergey Muravev, came out in favor of a representative and federalist 3 government. But following an attempt on the emperor’s life and a plot against his autocratic regime, in December 1825, oppression took over and subsequently the reign of Nicholas I was characterized by a fierce policy against liberal ideas.

3. On liberalism and the Society of the North, see Julie Grandhaye, La République interdite, le moment décembriste et ses enjeux, xviii-xxie siècles, Champ Vallon, Paris, 2012.

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PoRtRAIt oF coUnt MIkhAIl SPeRAnSkY (1772-1839)

Source: oil on canvas by Alexander Yarnek, 1824, State Art Museum, Irkutsk.

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The “Gendarme of Europe” relentlessly tracked menacing liberals within the Empire (born of his intransigence toward the liberal-inspired Polish insur-rection in 1830-1831) as well as outside the Empire, including the participation of the Russian Army in repressing the Hungarian uprising at the request of the Habsburgs in 1849. Nonetheless, the long reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) was a period of growth during which liberal ideas, particularly under the influence of the historian Timofey Granovsky, continued to gain an audience. Moreover, it should be noted that it was by order of Nicholas I that Mikhail Speransky advanced legislation guaranteeing a number of inalienable rights to individuals.

At his death in 1855, Nicholas I was succeeded by his son Alexander  II. Educated in a liberal spirit by his tutor, the poet Vasily Zhukovsky, and influenced by Ivan Turgenev’s A Sportsman’s Sketches, using the catastrophic Crimean War to illustrate the extent of archaisms the country suffered, it was without great difficulty that Alexander II launched a massive campaign for liberal reforms. In March 1861, serfdom was abolished and individual freedom was given to the serfs; three years later the first local elections attended by all social classes, the Zemstvos, were established and the same year reform of the judicial system separated justice from the administration, demonstrating great progress within a few short years. However, Alexander II would not provide his subjects with a constitution. Though the emperor had this under advisement, and was the victim of a terrorist attack in March 1881 by the splinter group Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will), his successors, retrenched in their autocratic prerogatives, no longer wanted a constitution. It was this refusal of further development that inspired a new wave of liberal ideas in Russia that fused with the fight for rights and freedom taking shape in the last third of the 19th century.

FRoM the BIRth oF lIBeRAl PARtIeS to the FeBRUARY 1917 RevolUtIon: A MISSed oPPoRtUnItY

During the years 1880-1890, Russian liberalism underwent a double muta-tion. It became the prerogative of legal scholars, lawyers and professors to make law the political weapon of choice. Boris Chicherin, professor of law at Moscow University, in his Course on State Science and History of Political Theories, advises a gradual transition for Russia toward a constitutional state.

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Meanwhile, liberalism was now embedded in common systems, namely the Zemstvos which, at the time of Alexander III and Nicholas II, refused to make any concessions and would become a setting for political apprenticeship, even if what was debated were local concerns regarding health, education, roads, etc. However, by focusing on legislation and strictly political issues, liberals in the late 19th century tended to neglect agrarian concerns even as they became an issue of vital importance. Indeed, Alexander II’s reform may have freed the peasants from serfdom, but did not provide them with access to land or a way out of their misery. Protest campaigns of malcontent swept the nation in favor of more radical and revolutionary movements, such as the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR), than those of the liberals.

Born of the Russo-Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, suddenly forced the emperor to concede. With the October Manifesto, Nicholas II was pressed to grant inalienable rights (including freedom of conscience) and an assembly, the state Duma, was created. A semblance of political life emerged and two liberal parties appeared, the Octobrist Party and the Constitutional Democratic Party (or Cadet Party) led by Prince Lvov and Pavel Milyukov. In favor of constitutional and parliamentary progress based on a Western model, both parties rose through the ranks to represent liberal professionals and the emerging business class.

Meanwhile, in 1906, Minister Stolypin launched an agricultural reform whose objective was to promote capitalization for small agri-business and entre-preneurship: indeed, the time for political and economic liberalism seemed to have come.

But the hopes of the 1905 Revolution were quickly dashed. Firstly, land reforms benefited only a minority of farmers. Secondly, in 1906, Nicholas II reversed his position toward true parliamentarianism. This unyielding refusal, together with the disastrous defeats suffered during World War I and the economic crisis, seriously affected life behind the lines and precipitated the fall of the regime in February 1917, which led to the formation of a provisional government.

Comprised of a majority of liberals in favor of setting up a constitutional monarchy or liberal republic, led by Prince Lvov (president of the government), Pavel Milyukov (minister of foreign affairs) and Alexander Kerensky (responsible for military affairs), the new government quickly adopted strong measures

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regarding rights and liberties. In the wake of the Declaration of March 19 proclaiming civil liberties and equal rights, it abolished the death penalty, recognized freedom of conscience and announced the future convening of a constituent assembly. On the national level, they declared autonomy for the states and recognized Poland’s right to independence. Socially, under pressure from the popular Petrograd Soviet, which was spontaneously established in February, it reduced the workday to eight hours in the capital. However, on two fundamental points the provisional government did not adopt the measures expected: they decided to continue the war, in order to honor international agreements signed by the czarist regime, while the people, exhausted by an unpopular war, wanted peace. To the great displeasure of the peasants who were looking forward to it, they did not offer any new agrarian reform, preferring to rely on the work of the future Constituant Assembly, for the sake of respecting the law.

These two unresolved issues would cost the provisional government dearly. New defeats suffered by a Russian Army weakened by desertions and mutinies, dwindling resources weighing heavily on the rear and, finally, the explosion of nationalist movements that led to the secession of some regions – in June, the Ukraine adopted a national parliament, the Rada, and was leaning toward inde-pendence. All these factors led to a continued weakening of the government, which in the summer of 1917 found itself opposed on its left by the Bolshevik Party and on its right by movements nostalgic for the lost monarchy. A victim of its own legalism and procrastination, the provisional government was in its turn swept away during the October 1917 Revolution, bringing the Bolshevik Party to power and the end of liberal ideas in Russia for a long time.

FRoM the octoBeR RevolUtIon to todAY, vIcISSItUdeS oF the lIBeRAl IdeA

The Soviet regime effectively buried a liberal idea that the failure of February 1917 had already helped discredit. Authoritarian use of force, denying human rights and repeated violations of civil liberties served to suppress any further reference to liberalism in the country. And it was only tentatively, since the 1960s, in the wake of the first dissidents, that these references have reappeared. Here we must acknowledge the key role of Andrey Sakharov. With his essay

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entitled Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom, self-published (samizdat) in 1968, he revives the liberal movement making respect of individual rights the platform of his political campaign. In 1976, a committee for compliance with the Helsinki Accords was formed by a group close to the physicist Yuri Orlov, who helped to advance public policy and civil rights. However, the swift dismissal of Andrey Sakharov and his condemnation to internal exile in Gorky in 1980 struck a further blow to these ideas and it wasn’t until Perestroika and the substantial political changes that accompanied it for liberal values to be rediscovered in Russia.

Political and economic freedom were seen as values and tools to facilitate the return of Russia to the status of Western powers founded on law and to enable both modernization of the economy and its adaptation to new international realities. From this position, Gorbachev’s Perestroika regime ended the single party regime, organized the first multiparty elections and reintroduced private property in 1987 after 70 years of a state-run economy and, in 1990, signed the charter for a new Europe, emphasizing its commitment to a state under rule of law. Afterward, under President Boris Yeltsin, Russians experienced political life founded on free elections and, in November 1991, an ambitious program of mass privatization was launched under the leadership of young liberal econo-mists. Yegor Gaidar became head of the Russian government and Anatoly Chubais’ mission was to complete the process of privatization that, organized in phases, continued until 1998.

Very quickly, however, cruel disappointments began to emerge, starting with Boris Yeltsin’s armed overthrow of the Parliament in 1993. It seems the new Russian state had not renounced the authoritarian and repressive practices inherited from its predecessors, while in years to follow, the struggle against terrorism was readily used as a pretext for repeated breaches of human rights. As for privatization, their principles and practices were diverted for the benefit of a predatory oligarchy. If the privatization of real estate, services and small busi-nesses benefited the entire population, the major industrial privatizations were carried out to profit a minority of oligarchs who shared, with the complicity of the state and to the disdain of liberal competition dogma, whole segments of the national economy. Colossal fortunes appeared in only a few years, while the state, nearly bankrupt, turned out to be incapable of ensuring essential functions such as health, education and the security of people and property.

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Very far from initial aspirations, these results quickly provoked, among a population terribly impoverished and brutalized by the economic crisis, a deep rejection of the liberal idea whose effects are still felt now. The Yabloko Party, which more that any other, embodied the liberal élan, faded away in just a few years; its outstanding leaders were marginalized, in an ever more difficult situa-tion, by the new electoral laws adopted in 2004 and 2005. While for the most part economic liberalism continued to structure the Russian economy, it also suffered serious blows as evidenced by the breakup of Yukos and the official or unofficial re-nationalization of other key economic sectors and enterprises, to the general indifference of the population.

Nevertheless, if the liberal parties now seem nonexistent or incapable of embodying a coherent opposition force, it can be seen that their ideas have not disappeared entirely, that they still run through Russian society and nourish the opposition we see now. Whether by the blogger Alexey Navalny denouncing with vehemence and constancy the corruption of the Russian state and its breaches of individual liberties, by Boris Akunin, a writer demanding the installa-tion of a state under the rule of law and respectful of civil liberties, or by Mikhail Prokhorov, a businessman insisting on the necessity of guaranteeing entrepre-neurial freedom, all of them, in spite of the diversity of their backgrounds, are in favor of individual and civil liberties and agree to the same rejection of state authoritarianism. The response they get, especially among the urban and educated middle classes of big cities, shows that liberal ideas are still anchored in some segments of the population without, however, becoming a force for political struggle, and that is the paradox, if not the tragedy, of Russian liberalism today.

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