LIABILITIES

Republic Act No. 6713

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND

EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,

GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED

ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

• Commitment to public interest – all government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly, and economically particularly to avoid wastage in public funds.

• Professionalism – Perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty.

• Justness and sincerity – Must remain true to the people at all time and respect the rights of others.

• Political Neutrality – Shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation.

• Responsiveness to the public – Shall extend prompt, courteous and adequate services to the public.

• Nationalism and Patriotism – Must be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage pride for the country.

• Commitment to democracy – Commit themselves to the democratic way of life.

• Simple Living – They shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income.

Under RA 6713, public officials and employees, except who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their:

• Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth; and

• Disclosure of their spouses and unmarried children under 18 living in their households.

General Rule on Liability • A public officer is not liable for injuries sustained by

another as a consequence of official acts done within the scope of his official authority, except as otherwise provided by law.

• Not civilly liable for acts done in official capacity UNLESS bad faith, malice, negligence

• Liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to morals, law, public policy, and good customs EVEN if he acted under instructions of his superiors.

• Local governments are not exempt from liabilities for DEATH or INJURY to persons or DAMAGE to property.

Statutory Liability

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a

periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without

due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or

societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition

the Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any

form;(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief.

Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

• Liability on Contracts - Personally - entered without or exceeded his authority.

• Liability for Tort – Personally - beyond the scope of his authority or exceeds power conferred upon him; ultra vires or where there is bad faith.

Civil Liability of Public Officers

A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

Absent any showing of bad faith or malice, every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith as well as regularity in the performance or discharge of official duties.

*Head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omission of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinates, UNLESS he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct. The negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the absence of the latter’s own negligence.

Liability of Ministerial Officers

• Nonfeasance – neglect or refusal to perform an act which is the officer’s legal obligation

• Misfeasance – failure to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence in the performance of official duty

• Malfeasance – doing, through ignorance, inattention or malice of an act which he had no legal right to perform.

Presidential Immunity from Suit • During tenure of the President • After his tenure, he cannot invoke

immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him, while he was president which were not performed in the exercise of his official duties.

Threefold Liability Rule

• A fundamental principle in the law on public officers (administrative liability is separate from and independent of civil and criminal liability).

• Wrongs acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.

• Action for each can proceed independently • Dismissal of one does not foreclose action for

others (difference in quantum of evidence).

Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung

Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission,

et al.,

G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012

“We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.  It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act.  Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.

Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no moment.  It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge.  Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the absolution of petitioner from the administrative charges.”

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE

and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties. We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken into account.

DEMETRIO R. TECSON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 123045, November 16, 1999

res judicata

First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.  Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.  This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing.  Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party.  If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally.  Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions.  This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.  Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

*We conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP 90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.

double jeopardy

Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.

JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and

MAXIMO ECLIPSE, respondents.

G.R. No.114683, January 18, 2000

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G.

MEJICA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),

OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

G.R. No. 125498, February 18, 1999

“The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution.”

“It bears stressing that the exoneration of petitioners in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds. Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners' motions before the auditor.”

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO,

and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.

G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

What’s controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.