LEVERAGING UICC WITH OPEN MOBILE API FOR SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES

Ran Zhou

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04/21/23

Motivation

Smartphones become the handheld computer and the personal assistant

Growing market has attracted hackers to make the potential for serious security threats on smartphones a reality

UICC serves as the security anchor in mobile networks

GSM Association: the UICC is the strategically best alternative as a secure element for mobile devices [Sma09]

Interface is required to fill the gap between UICC applets and mobile applications

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Solution Idea

SIMAlliance Open Mobile API: the communication channel

Dual Application Architecture: the basic architecture

An example: Smart OpenID

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Agenda

Motivation and Solution Idea Basic Technologies State of the Art Smart OpenID Implementation Summary and Future Work

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Universal Integrated Circuit Card: UICC

The bearer of the subscriber’s identity in cellular networks

Secure element

secure storage, cryptographic functions Secure channel

transmission between the UICC and the server with authenticity, integrity, confidentiality

Wireless PKI

mobile network operator owns root certificate: becomes a certificate authority

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Open Mobile API

Open Mobile API is established by SIMalliance as an open API between secure element and the mobile applications

• Crypto• Authentication• Secure Storage• PKCS#15• …

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Open Mobile API

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Open Mobile API7

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Agenda

Motivation and Solution Idea Basic Technologies State of the Art Smart OpenID Implementation Summary and Future Work

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State of the Art

Financial applications

online-banking, contactless payment, tickets apps

Enterprise applications

secure Email, ERP, Software as a Service Content protection applications

digital rights management, secure document Authentication applications

generic bootstrapping architecture, public key infrastructure

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State of the Art

Malwarevirus, Trojan horse, Spyware

Eavesdroppingtraffic (password) on the network

Man-in-the-middleattacker manipulates the transmitted data

Replay attacksa valid data is maliciously repeated or delayed

Phishingacquires data by masquerading as a trustworthy entity

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State of the Art

Private information is the main aim of the attacker, e.g., password, credit card number etc.

Anti-Malware, secure storage, digital certificate, transport layer security, authentication etc.

Some countermeasures are unusual on smartphone

Existed protocols are vulnerable to different attacks

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Agenda

Motivation and Solution Idea Basic Technologies State of the Art Smart OpenID Implementation Summary and Future Work

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OpenID ProviderOpenID Provider

Relying Party

Relying Party

UserUser DeviceDevice

Relying PartiesRelying Parties

Subm

it Ope

nID Association session:

a shared symmetric key +association handle

User authentication

Authentication response: signed with the shared key

OpenID13

Threats to OpenID

Malwarevirus, Trojan horse, Spyware

Eavesdroppingpassword on the network

Man-in-the-middleattacker captures the transmitted password, authentication assertion, optionally alters it

Replay attacksa valid authentication assertion is maliciously repeated

Phishingacquire password by masquerading as an OP

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Smart OpenID: Concept

Authentication factor something the user knows: password something the user has: smart card something the user is: finger print Using UICC as credential shares a long-term secret (LTS) with the

server derives a key from the LTS and an one-

time password PIN verification to activate the function

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Network OpenID Provider

Network OpenID Provider

Relying Party

Relying Party

UserUser Local OP Provider =

Mobile Application + UICC Applet

Local OP Provider =

Mobile Application + UICC Applet

Relying PartiesRelying Parties

Association

Signed assertion(with same derivated key)

Smart OpenID

Trust (long-term secret)

Local authentication (with PIN)

Association handle

+ derived key (symmetric)Submit OpenID

Associa

tion Han

dle

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Smart OpenID

Long-term secret: 64 bytes Association handle: less than 255 bytes Key derivation functions: PBKDF2

use HMAC-SHA-1/HMAC-SHA-256 (hash-based message authentication code) as underlying algorithm

configurable iteration count and derived key length

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Security Analysis

Smart OpenID Authentication Compromise

UCUser credential

compromise

THTheft of the UICC

PH1Plaintext

Credential phishing

PH3DK Phishing by malicious RP (Type 1)

PH2DK Phishing by mobile

application

PH4DK Phishing by malicious RP (Type 2)

SNSniffing

CRDerived key phishing and cryptanalysis

PCPIN

compromise with Brute-force attack

MMMan-in-the-

middle attack

UKUse of known authentication

response

RPReplay attack

SWSession

swapping attack

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Security Analysis : Phishing19

UICC App Mobile App Malicious RPBrowser

Local OP = UICC App + Mobile App

Net OP

Auth Request (identifier)

Discovery and Association

Association (S, AH)

Derived Key S = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1(LTS, AH, 64, 64)

Agenda

Motivation and Solution Idea Basic Technologies State of the Art Smart OpenID Implementation Summary and Future Work

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Implementation

Platform

Android 2.3.5

Java Card UICC 2.2.1 Algorithms

key derivation function: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1

signature: HMAC-SHA-1

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Demo

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Performance

Iteration : 64 rounds

AH: 240 bytes

Derived key length: 64 bytes

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Performance

Derived key length: 64 bytes

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Agenda

Motivation and Solution Idea Basic Technologies State of the Art Smart OpenID Implementation Summary and Future Work

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Summary

UICC as secure element on smartphones Dual Application Architecture with Open

Mobile API Improve existed protocols with the UICC Other usages:

Digital certificate Wireless PKI NFC payment …

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Future Work

Smart OpenID with HMAC-SHA-256 Implementation of other applications

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Thank you!

Questions?

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Bibliographie

[Sma09] SmartTrust. The role of SIM OTA and the mobile operator in the NFC environment, 4 2009.

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Smartphone

Mobile phone

voice communication and messaging Feature phone

digital camera, gaming, music and video streaming

Smartphone

modern operating system, high speed connectivity, third-party applications ...

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Access Control Module31

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Security Analysis : Phishing

UICC App Mobile App RPBrowser

Local OP = UICC App + Mobile App

NetOPMalicious App

Auth Request (assoc_handle)

Auth Response (signed assertion)

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Security Analysis : Phishing

UICC App Mobile App Malicious RPBrowser

Local OP = UICC App + Mobile App

Net OP

Auth Request (identifier)

Redirect to LocalOP (AH)

Auth Request (AH)

Auth Request (AH)

Auth Response (signed assertion)

Auth Request (sa)

Auth Request (sa)

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