letter — an endnote

Upload: j-patrick-simpson

Post on 07-Apr-2018

216 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/6/2019 LETTER an endnote.

    1/3

    February 22, 2011

    5892 Shoreland Trail

    Orlando, Florida 32807

    Re: The PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE of Article IV, 2, cl. 1.

    To All Concerned:

    Fundamental rights are synonymous with civil liberties. WOLF v.

    COLORADO, 338 U.S. 25, 26-27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949)

    (For purposes of ascertaining the restrictions which the Due Process Clause

    [of the Fourteenth Amendment] imposed upon the States in the

    enforcement of their criminal law, we adhere to the views expressed in

    PALKO v. CONNECTICUT, supra, 302 U.S. 319. That decision speaks to us

    particularly in matters ofcivil liberty, . . . . [338 U.S. 25 , 27]

    Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow

    requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which

    the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. . . .

    Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within

    a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or

    the essentials of fundamental rights. (Emphasis mine)), overruled by

    MAPP v. OHIO, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961),

    on other grounds; and, our civil liberties are really immunities, orrestraints on government. SOWERS v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS

    COMMISSION, 20 Ohio Misc. 115, 252 N.E.2d 463, 475 (1969) (Civil

    rights then, within the meaning of [the Ohio statutory code] . . . are

    economic rights functioning as legally enforceable claims which are

    structured in legislation. On the other hand civil liberties are natural

    rights which appertain originally and essentially to each person as a human

    being and are inherent in his nature; such rights, which are constitutionally

    protected, are not actually rights but are immunities, or restraints on

    government. (Emphasis mine)); for state citizens, they emanate from thePrivileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 2, cl. 1.

    The United States Supreme Court has held that to construe said Privileges

    and Immunities Clause, it must be construed in conjunction with the Tenth

    Amendment. TOOMER V. WITSELL, 334 U.S. 385, 407, 68 S.Ct. 1156,

    92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) ([T]he Privileges-and-Immunities Clause, like the

  • 8/6/2019 LETTER an endnote.

    2/3

    Contract Clause, must be put in its proper perspective in our constitutional

    framework. EAST NEW YORK SAV. BANK v. HAHN, 326 U.S. 230, 232, 90

    L.Ed. 34, 36, 66 S.Ct. 69, 160 ALR 1279.

    Like other provisions of the Constitution, the Clause whereby The Citizens

    of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in

    the several States must be read in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment

    to the Constitution.) (Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice

    JACKSON joins, concurring.); the two are related for the same reason

    that the Tenth Amendment cannot be fully construed except in light of state

    citizenship. PARKER v. DISTRICT of COLUMBIA, 478 F.3d 370, 397,

    375 U.S.App.D.C. 140 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (Our dissenting colleaguein

    order to give a meaning to the people in the Second Amendment

    consistent with her interpretationanalogizes to the people in the Tenth

    Amendment. Dissent at 403 n. 5. Contrary to her suggestion, however, theTenth Amendment does not limit the people to state citizens.); but,

    federal citizenship did not exist at the creation of the Tenth Amendment, and

    federal citizenship is a creature of the federal government in

    contradistinction to state citizenship which is a pre-existing status in that

    English subjectship was converted according to state intents and purposes;

    PARKER v. DISTRICT of COLUMBIA, 478 F.3d 370, 403 n.5, 375

    U.S.App.D.C. 140 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit

    Judge, dissenting) (I have not overlooked the language in UNITED

    STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108L.Ed.2d 222 (1990), to the effect that the people as used in various of

    the first Ten Amendments refers to a class of persons who are part of a

    national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection

    with this country to be considered part of that community. But just as the

    Tenth Amendment ties the rights reserved thereunder to the people of the

    individual States, thereby excluding the people of the District, cf. LEE v.

    FLINTKOTE CO., 593 F.2d 1275, 1278 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1979) ([T]he District,

    unlike the states, has no reserved power to be guaranteed by the Tenth

    Amendment.), the Second Amendment similarly limits the people tothose of the States, cf. ADAMS v. CLINTON, 90 F.Supp.2d 35, 45

    (D.D.C.2000) ("Although standing alone the phrase people of the several

    States [in Article I, 2, cl.1] could be read as meaning all the people of

    the United States and not simply those who are citizens of individual

    states, [Article 1's] subsequent and repeated references to state[s] . . .

    make clear that the former was not intended.); see also VERDUGO-

  • 8/6/2019 LETTER an endnote.

    3/3

    URQUIDEZ, 494 U.S. at 265, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (citing U.S. Const. Art. I, 2,

    cl. 1).);The powers not delegated to the United States by the

    Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

    respectively, or to the people. 10th Amendment to the Constitution for

    the United States of America, and power to be exercised in the peoplescollective capacity is done so via the United States or the Stateas in the

    State of Florida; so to construe the meaning of to the people in the 10th

    Amendment with collective connotation would be redundant and

    superfluous; its meaning lies in state citizens individually.

    Very Truly Yours,

    J. Patrick Simpson