lessons of fukushima-daiichi npp's accidents for ...2005/08/02 · fukushima daiichi fukushima...
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2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 1
Dr. Tadashi NARABAYASHI Nuclear and Environmental Systems
Hokkaido University
January 9, 2012 (Hyatt Regency Pier)
Lessons of FukushimaLessons of Fukushima--DaiichiDaiichiNPP'sNPP's Accidents for AchievementAccidents for Achievementof the 1st Class Safety in the Worldof the 1st Class Safety in the World
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUMFukushima Severe Accident Dose Management &Fukushima Severe Accident Dose Management &
Global Lessons Learned in Occupational Dose ReductionGlobal Lessons Learned in Occupational Dose Reduction
Optimization of Nuclear Safety RegulationOptimization of Nuclear Safety RegulationJSME Power and Energy System DivisionJSME Power and Energy System Division
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 2
TsuTsunnaammii Flooding Area in each NPPFlooding Area in each NPPFukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daini
Onagawa Tohkai Daini
Flood Flood
FloodFlood
Rushed
Rushed
Rushed
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 3
TsuTsunnaammii Flooding Area in each NPPFlooding Area in each NPPFukushima Daiichi
Fukushima Daini
Tsunami Height#1~#4
#5, #6
Grand Level
#1~#6
#5,#6 Grand Level
#2~#4 No Flooding
#1 Flooding through hatches and air intake for EDG
Flooding through hatches and air intake for EDG
Large DoorHatch
M/C, P/C
R/B
R/B
T/B
Air intakefor EDG
Hatch
M/C,P/C
Hatch
R/BDoor
Tsunami HeightO.P.+7m
Dike
Dike
SeaWaterPump
Basement
M/C,P/C
EDG
EDG
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 4
SBO in Fukushima Daiichi NPPsSBO in Fukushima Daiichi NPPs#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
DGA:NGB:NG
(T/B B1)
A:NG(B1)
B:OK(FP/B 1F)
A:NGB:NG
(T/B B1)
A:NG(T/B B1)
B:OK(FP/B 1F)
A:OK->NGB:OK->NG
(T/B B1)Water
Cooling
A:OK->NG(R/B B1)
Water CoolingB:OK
(DG/B 1F)
Metal-Crad
Swich
NG(T/B B1)
NG(T/B B1)
NG(T/B B1)
NG(T/B B1)
NG(T/B B1)
Barely(R/B B2F)
PowerCenter
NG(T/B B1)
Barely(T/B B1)
NG(T/B B1)
Barely(T/B 1F)
Barely(T/B 2F)
Barely(R/B B2F)
DCButtery
NG(C/B B1)
NG(C/B B1)
OK(T/B BM1)
NG(C/B B1)
OK(T/B BM1)
OK(T/B BM1)
ECCS
RCIC
HPCI:NG
IC:OK(FC)
NG
RCIC:OK
HPCI:OK
RCIC:OK
(No Fuels in RPV)
HPCS:OK(R/B B1)
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 5
SBO in Fukushima Daiichi SBO in Fukushima Daiichi NPPsNPPsTsunami
DC P/C AC P/C EDG RHRS
AC Power Lost
Battery Lost
DC Power Lost
EDG Trip
Loss of UHS
SolenoidValveLost
AOValve
Failure
MOValve
Failure
MotorFailure
AirLost
Flood
ProcessMeasurement
Failure
IC,RCIC,HPCI ControlFailure
MS-SRVActuator Failure
HVAC,SGTSFailure
PCVVENT
Faliure
Water Makeup Pump Failure
Heat Removal, ECCS Failure
Engine PumpFailure
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 6
ICs in unit #1 were tripped by FCICs in unit #1 were tripped by FC� Loss of battery power for main control room caused the fail-close action to
MO isolation valves to stop the IC. It was a fail-dangerous system.� If the IC continue to operate, the accident would be terminated soon.
IC ControlValve
Fire Pool
Water Tank
SteamBlowout
IsolationCondenser
� RCIC steam turbine also stopped by loss of battery power in Unit #2 and #3.
� S/P temperature and pressure were so high that AM water injection took a lot of times.RPV
S/P
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 7
CV Pressure Trend in unit #1CV Pressure Trend in unit #1� After loss of ECCS and IC core cooling, CV pressure increased.� Water level drifted by vaporizing water in reference leg.� Radiation level increased at T/B.� Hydrogen explosion occurred after S/C wet venting.
Water level drifted
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 8
Pressure and Water Level in #1Pressure and Water Level in #1 RPVRPV� Analysis results show the RPV depressurization started before RPV bottom
failure. It might be caused through melted TIP tubes in the core.� Water level measurement was drifted by the loss of water in a reference leg
by high-temperature superheated core.
RP
V P
ress
ure
(MP
a)
RPV Bottom Failure
RP
V W
ater
Lev
el (m
)
TAF Level (3hr)
BAF Level (3hr)
Water Injectionl (15hr)
Water Level datadrifted more than 4m
IC cooling
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 9
CV Pressure Trend in unit #2CV Pressure Trend in unit #2� After loss of RCIC water injection, DW pressure increased.� Water level was decreased after RCIC tripped.� RPV pressure was too high to water injection by Fire pump.� Explosion sound occurred near S/C.
RPV Pressure was too high to water injection
Water level in RPV
RP
V (M
Pa)
?
DW Pressure
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 10
Failure of prompt water injection in #2Failure of prompt water injection in #2� Failure of prompt water injection after RCIC stopped in unit #2 caused the
core damage and H2 generation started.� High-pressure discharge pump driven by diesel engine should be used.
RP
V P
ress
ure
(MP
a)
H2
prod
uctio
n (k
g)
Unit #2 RPV Pressure Trend
RCIC Started RCIC StoppedSRV Opened
RPV Bottom Failure
Melt Core relocation to Low plenum
Core Damaged
Lost of Battery
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 11
Radiation level increased after CV raptureRadiation level increased after CV rapture
3/11 3/12 3/13 3/14 3/15 3/16 3/17 3/18Nikkei Science, July 2011
H2 detonation were occurred after vent operation (#1, #3, #4)Radiation level increased soon after #2 CV rapture
1F Monitoring Trend
14000
12000
10000
Rad
iatio
n Le
vel (�S
v/h) #1 Vent started
#1 Detonation
#3 1st Vent
#3 Detonation
#3 2nd Vent
#4 Detonation
#1 Vent #3 1st Vent #3 2nd Vent #2 2nd Vent
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 12
Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daiichi Sevier AccidentSevier Accidentss
Unit #1
Unit #4
Unit #3
Unit #2
3/123/11 3/13 3/14 3/15
CoreMelt
CoreMelt
ICTrip V
ent
CoreMelt
HPCI, RCIC(Steam turbine driven) V
ent
H2Leak
RCIC(Steam turbine driven) V
ent
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 13
H2 Leak Path from CVH2 Leak Path from CV�CV top flange and hatches might be leak pass
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 14
Cause of HCause of H22 Detonation in #4 R/BDetonation in #4 R/B�#4 was in outage. No fuels in the core�Hydrogen from #3 flowed into #4 via SGTS
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 15
##44's SGTS Filters were contaminated's SGTS Filters were contaminatedFukushima Daiichi Unit #4
Aug. 25, 2011TEPCO
�Filters in SGTS showed that H2 and FP supplied from #3flowed into #4 R/B
SGTS valves and contamination check results
SGTSFilters
OpenOpenOpen
Open
Open
OpenClose
CloseS/P
Vent Line
Stuck
Open
Open
R/B
Fan
Fan
Open
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 16
#3's SGTS Filters were contaminated#3's SGTS Filters were contaminatedFukushima Daiichi Unit #3
Dec. 26, 2011TEPCO
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Close
Close
Close
Close
Close
SGTS valves and contamination check results
Vent Line
R/B
S/P
Vent Line
Stuck
Stuck
GravityDumper
Fan
Fanc
SGTSFilters
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 17
Vent was a cause Vent was a cause ofof suicide bombing ?suicide bombing ?Fail-Open valve in SGTS supplied H2 and FP into R/B
SGTS Filter
SGTS Filter
PCV Open
OpenOpen
Open
Open
Top FlangeLeak
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 18
Hydrogen Detonation and CV RaptureHydrogen Detonation and CV Rapture
#1#2#3#4
CV RaptureDetonation
Air Photo Service Co.
Detonation Detonation
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 19
Zeolite
Condenser
WaterRecoveryTank5MW
Decay�Heat� MWOn�the�decrease
Clean�up
CoolingTower
(2)ContaminatedWater Shieldalong Seashore
� We proposed water recycle system for core cooling on March 28
Sea
FeedWaterTank
(1) Water Recycle for Core Cooling, Shield, Remove debris
Boilingvolume�reduction
Salt
FP�recovery�Tank
H2 Venting
SaltPlant
Water Recycle System for Core CoolingWater Recycle System for Core Cooling
RadiationShieldConcreteSteel Panel
Spent Fuel Pooleolight
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 20
TMI-2:Large Egg in core Chernobyl: Elephant's Leg
Large Egg and Elephant's LegLarge Egg and Elephant's Leg
Egg
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 21
Comparison between Chernobyl and FukushimaComparison between Chernobyl and Fukushima
UkraineKiev
30km Zone Size
Minsk
Belarus
Fukushima
Russia
1/501Total
1/131Cs,I
Fuku-shima
Cher-nobyl
Released FP
~0.011001
Fuku-shima
Cher-nobyl
TMI-2
Core thermal output
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 22
Reactor
SpentFuel Pool
Pool
Mist Separator
Lessons of Chernobyl NPP Accidents promoted the installation of FilteredVent System to protect radioactive materials exhaust.French, German, Switzerland, Finland, Norway
DF 1/100-1/1000I2 CsI etc.
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 23
(1)Preventing C/V rapture(2)Preventing Radioactive material exhaust
Fukushima Daiichi NPP#1 C/V 7bar + Vent + H2 Explosion ~1day#2 C/V 7bar + No Vent + C/V rapture ~3.5days#3 C/V 6bar + Vent + H2 Explosion ~3days
Prevent over-pressure C/V rapture + Exhaust of RI and H2� Filtered Containment Venting System (FCVS)
Prevent over-temperature C/V rapture + H2 leakage� Special Emergency Heat Removal System (SEHR)
JSME visit Leibstadt NPP, Swiss, on Nov.11,2011
Objectives of Filtered Vent SystemObjectives of Filtered Vent System
Feed and Bleed under Long SBO & LUHSBackfitted on 1992 for (mitigation of Sever Accident)
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 24
VisitVisit ChoozChooz NPP, EDF FranceNPP, EDF France
Filtered Vent
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 25
VisitVisit LeibstadtLeibstadt NPP, KKL, SwitzerlandNPP, KKL, Switzerland
Filtered Vent
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 26
FCVS (FCVSFCVS::FilteredFiltered Containment Venting SystemContainment Venting System
DF> 1000 Aerosol> 100 I2
Fuel rod
Steam
NaOH
MOVNormalClose
MOVNormalOpen
Rapture Disk (~3bar)
Stuck
Solubility pH10Solubility pH7 ~50
Backfitted on 1992 for (mitigation of Sever Accident)
�Vent valve will be open by manual shaft when SBO
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 27
Suppression Pool
Fuel rod
Steam
�After the TMI-2 accidents, KKL back-fitted the DiD3 (additional C/V cooling)and DiD4 (mitigation of Sever Accident).
DiD: Defense in Depth
HeatExchanger
UndergroundDwells
D/G D/G
Two D/G for SEHR
SEHR ( )SEHR:SpecialSEHR:Special Emergency Heat Removal SystemEmergency Heat Removal System
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 28
Special Power Generator on HeightSpecial Power Generator on Height� 4000kVA mobile gas-turbine generator at 31m parking Hepco
Gas-turbine generator will be installed at 25m Chubu Electric)
TP+85m
TP+25m
Gas-Turbine Generetor4000kVA, 3.2MW3.3kV-6.6KVStart within 40sec
R/B
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 29
Countermeasure 2. Heat Removal SystemCountermeasure 2. Heat Removal SystemDecay�heat: %�1000MWe:�30MW
CoolingTower
PCV
S/P
PLR Pump
Feed Water Pump
RPV
Sea Water Pump
Main Condenser
Turbine Generator
PowerTransmissionMain
Transformer
Steam
Water
Sea
RCIC
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 30
Heat Sink by Sea Water NetworkHeat Sink by Sea Water NetworkChubu ElectricHamaoka NPP
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 31
Power Source in German 2010(Total 6.2x1011kWh, Tentative)Sustainable Energy Statics
Sustainable Energy in German: Only Sustainable Energy in German: Only 1.9%1.9% SolarSolar
Nuclear
Coal
SustainableEnergy
Oil
Others
WindBiomass
Solar
Hydraulic Wastes
Breakdown of Sustainable Energy
CapacityFactor
Nuclear: 20.3 TWSolar: 17.0 TW
Broun Coal
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 32
The death toll in France, Killer heat Total 50,000 died in 2003 and 2006
18
Elbe River, Dresden, German, July 2006
�Global Warming brings heat waves�CO2 may be much danger than radioactivities
Killer Heat Wave in EuropeKiller Heat Wave in Europe
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 33
Fossil Energy Estimation in FutureFossil Energy Estimation in FutureHuman being will exhaust all Human being will exhaust all fossilefossile fuelsfuels
2570
DemandDemand
4242
6060
133133
100100
Present
Coal
Natural Gas
OilOil Natural Gas Coal Uranium
Utilization of Plutonium
in FBR
Equ
ival
ent O
il E
nerg
y (1
08t)
Year
Y
Y
Y
Y
2570Y
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 34
Nuclear Education for Saudi ArabiaNuclear Education for Saudi Arabia
President Saeki,Hokkaido Univ.
�King Abdulaziz University asked to Hokkaido University for Nuclear Education
Oil in Saudi Arabia would be empty within 60 years if they wouldn't use nuclear
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 35
Progress in Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaProgress in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 36
Nuclear Education in MalaysiaNuclear Education in Malaysia
Tsunami-Proof NPP
2012 INTERNATIONAL ISOE ALARA SYMPOSIUM Prof. Narabayashi, Hokkaido Univ. 37
ConclusionConclusion�Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident would be terminated,
if sufficient examination lead to install countermeasuresfor tsunami, such as water proof door, mobile power, etc.
�In Europe, it had already installed the Heat RemovalSystem and Filtered Venting System from the lessonsof TMI and Chernobyl Accidents.
�Vent line should be independent from SGTS/HVAC line.�From the Lessons of Fukushima-Daiichi Accidents,
we should achieve the 1st class Nuclear safety in theworld NPPs.
�Solar and sustainable enegy will not sufficient to replacethe nuclear energy. Both the energy should be used infuture.
�Nuclear education is very important to maintain the Nuclearsafety technology and safety culture in the world.