lessons from emerging markets: how applicable is the regulatory framework for emerging debt markets...
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Lessons from emerging Lessons from emerging markets: how applicable is the markets: how applicable is the
regulatory framework for regulatory framework for emerging debt marketsemerging debt markets
Washington, June 2nd 2003
Clemente Del Valle
Chairman Securities Commission, Colombia
Lessons from developed markets
Colombian debt market: ongoing reforms
AGENDAAGENDA
Colombian debt market experience: an illustrative case of its achievements and mistakes
Final remarks
Derivative market
Money market
Government bond market
Private sector bond market
Well-developed capital markets provide benefits for the entire
economy…
Well-developed capital markets provide benefits for the entire
economy…
Provides liquidity
Supports the building of the short-term yield curve
Reduces the cost of GS
Provides short-term bonds and standardized issues for the money market
Provides the market benchmark yield curve
Supports the development of capital markets infrastructure
Expands investors’ options
Leads to a more balanced domestic financial architecture
Better financial management practices
Leads to low interest rates
…and are an essential tool for
growth
Level of development of the financial sector
Basic legal framework and infrastructure
Issuer Investor
Intermediaries
Macroeconomic policy
Money market
Primary market
Secondary market
SOURCE: Developing Government Bond Markets Handbook, World Bank – IMF, 2.001
Fair, efficient and transparent market
Objectives of regulatoryframework
Principles of the legal frameworkPrinciples of the legal framework
Minimization of systemic risk
Protection for investors and
consumers of financial services
Prevent improper market conduct (market manipulation & insider trading)
Intermediaries with minimum capital requirements
Internal control procedures
Transparent information disclosure
Reliable systems for settlement of cash and securities transactions
“Fit and proper” rules for management in securities firms
A well-developed debt market implies:A well-developed debt market implies:
High levels of professional standards, self-discipline, ethics and size of the intermediaries ( a “professional market”)
A well functioning money-markets
Good enforcement capacity of the legal and regulatory framework (e.g. ordinary justice, SEC capacity)
And /or effective self-regulatory schemes
However a major hurdle in many emerging markets going forward is that
those pre-requisites have not been properly assess or have been taken for
granted
Macroeconomic
Stability
Financial
Stability
Bankruptcy
Law
Debt Policy• Debt strategy
•Market oriented funding strategy
•Auction procedures
•Transparency
•Gov. Bond standardization
•Short-term yield curve
Money Markets
(repos market)
Competition
Infrastructure andRegulation
Debt Policy• Strength government debt teams
•Use of primary dealers
•Risk management
•Extend bonds maturities
Infrastructure andRegulation upgrade
Secondary Gov. Bondmarket liquidity
Secondary intermediaries
Credit RatingSystem
Disclosure System
ExpandInvestor base
TIME
Measures in the short and medium term
Measures in the short and medium term
Lessons from the developed markets
Colombian debt market: ongoing reforms
AGENDAAGENDA
Colombian debt market experience: an illustrative case of its achievements and mistakes
Final remarks
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance.SOURCE: Ministry of Finance.
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Sep-02
Bill
ions o
f U
SD
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
GD
P %
Local Debt Local Debt (%GDP)
The domestic sovereign debt has experienced a major development in the
last decade…
The domestic sovereign debt has experienced a major development in the
last decade…
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
% G
DP
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Transactions of TES
Outstanding balance of TES
…It has deepened the capital market…It has deepened the capital market
SOURCESOURCE: Ministry of Finance.: Ministry of Finance.
0,8
11,3
3,0
12,9
3,8
11,7
5,4
12,5
6,8
11,5
0
4
8
12
16
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dematerialized securities Securities under custody
Most of the fixed income securities are dematerialized
Most of the fixed income securities are dematerialized
Evolution of securities under custody and and dematerialized securities - DECEVALBillions of dollars
SOURCESOURCE: DECEVAL.: DECEVAL.
Daily Average 1997 - 2003
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
1.800
jun-
97ag
o-97
oct-9
7di
c-97
feb-
98ab
r-98
jun-
98ag
o-98
oct-9
8di
c-98
feb-
99ab
r-99
jun-
99ag
o-99
oct-9
9di
c-99
feb-
00ab
r-00
jun-
00ag
o-00
oct-0
0di
c-00
feb-
01ab
r-01
jun-
01ag
o-01
oct-0
1di
c-01
feb-
02ab
r-02
jun-
02ag
o-02
oct-0
2di
c-02
feb-
03
Mill
ions
of
dolla
rs
Source: BVC and Banco de la República
Private DebtPublic Debt
Main electronic transactional systems have deepened the market
Main electronic transactional systems have deepened the market
0,0313,88
28,00
141,00
253,40
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
SEN Transactions
Millions of dollars
SENSEN
Daily Average 1998 - 2002
MECMEC
0,0%
50,0%
100,0%
150,0%
200,0%
250,0%
300,0%
350,0%
400,0%
450,0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Pro
po
rció
n d
el P
IB
MEC INVERLACE with out REPOS REPOS Inverlace SEN Equity market
Repos inverlace
SEN
INVERLACE without ReposMEC
EQUITY
Developing the secondary marketDeveloping the secondary market
SOURCESOURCE: Superintendence of Securities.: Superintendence of Securities.
SOURCESOURCE: Superintendence of Securities.: Superintendence of Securities.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EXTERNAL BONDS PUBLIC BONDS TESCDT PRIVATE BONDS REPO OPERATIONSOTHERS
However, showing a high concentration of TES …
However, showing a high concentration of TES …
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
TES CDT Private Bonds T.P. Others
Stock MarketStock MarketThe TES market has increased its The TES market has increased its
participation in the stock market from participation in the stock market from 6% in 1.993 to 40% as of December 6% in 1.993 to 40% as of December
2.002.2.002.
TESTES
TESTES
Debt portfolio profile has been extended
Debt portfolio profile has been extended
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
Bill
one
s d
e p
eso
s
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Dec-97Dec-02
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Año
s
Duration
Average Term
SOURCE: Ministry of FinanceSOURCE: Ministry of Finance
The strategy used has improved the portfolio structure, increasing
duration conditions, and average term.
TES PORTFOLIO PROFILE
TES PORTFOLIO PROFILE
Likewise the yield-curve has been extended
Likewise the yield-curve has been extended
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, April 2003SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, April 2003
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Millio
ns U
S$
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
F.C.O. Pensiones y cesantías Fondos Valores
Seguros Patrimonio Ecopetrol
Fondos Comunes Ordinarios, Fondos de Pensiones y Cesantías, Fondos de Valores, Compañías de Seguros y
Patrimonio Autónomo ECOPETROL
In the same way, Institutional Investors have grown
In the same way, Institutional Investors have grown
SOURCE: SOURCE: Superintendence of Securities and Superintendence of BanksSuperintendence of Securities and Superintendence of Banks
Investor Base StructureInvestor Base Structure
Others13%
Financial Corporations
1%
Insurance Companies
2%
Central Bank3%
Retail Investors9%
Others2%
Depositories4%Trustee Entities
12%
Pension Funds9%
Commercial Banks15%
Treasury Division
9%
Public Sector34%
2.0022.002
SOURCE: Ministry of FinanceSOURCE: Ministry of Finance
0
10.000.000
20.000.000
30.000.000
40.000.000
50.000.000
60.000.000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Collective Investment Scheme Stock Fix Income + TES
Financial System Total Loans
SOURCE: SOURCE: Superintendence of Securities and Superintendence of BanksSuperintendence of Securities and Superintendence of Banks
The size of securities market has consistently increased during the last
years…
The size of securities market has consistently increased during the last
years…
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
DIVISAS UTILIDAD VALORACION INVERSIONES
DERIVADOS INGRESOS VENTA, DIVIDENDOS INVERSIONES
SERVICIOS FINANCIEROS LEASING (SIN AJUSTES POR INFLACION)
PROPRIETARY
TRADING
INCOME STRUCTURE (CREDIT ENTITIES)
Likewise, development of proprietary trading in banks has brought increased sophistication of
the market
Likewise, development of proprietary trading in banks has brought increased sophistication of
the market
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002COMISION ADMON. FONDOS DE VALORES
CUENTA PROPIA OTROS INGRESOS OPERACIONALES
PROPRIETARY TRADING
COMMISSION
As well as in the brokerage firms…
As well as in the brokerage firms…
SOURCE: Asobancaria and SOURCE: Asobancaria and Superintendence of SecuritiesSuperintendence of Securities
Industry standards:
• Low professional standards of the market intermediaries
• Absence of market integrity
Improper use of securities and public resources
Distortion of the financial operations and statements
Absence of proper Chinese-walls
• Shortage of capital adequacy and proprietary trading rules
• Inadequate risk management skills (prudential issues)
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation in
recent years ………
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation in
recent years ………
Deficient supervisory capacity
• Imbalance between supervision and regulatory capability
• Weak enforcement and surveillance
• More focus on equity markets and brokerage activity (instead of fixed income market)
• Scarce budgetary autonomy
Lack of a self-regulation scheme:
• A Weak SRO system in place ( stock exchange)
• There is not enough independence between the SRO role and the commercial and association roles
• Weak oversight capacity of the supervisor
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Limited development of the money markets:
• Unclear legal definition of the Repo contract: guarantee loan or temporary buy-sell back guarantees
• Regulatory arbitrage given lack of coordination between Superintendence of Banks and SEC (terms, discount, operation limits)
• Unsecure and inefficient settlement system for securities lending and repos (not assume counterparty risk)
• Inappropriate haircuts and margin calls
• Inadequate transparency for creditors
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Price formation distortions (Mark to market):
• Regulatory arbitrage. Two different regimes between Superintendence of banks and the SEC
• Inflexible accounting structure impedes an update to international standards
• Numerous mark to market methodologies that do not reflect market conditions
• Absence of a pricing system
• Mark to market methodology completely outdated with respect to the international trend
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Nevertheless, some problems have put the market in a risky situation
Lessons from the developed markets
Colombian debt market: ongoing reforms
AGENDAAGENDA
Final remarks
Colombian debt market experience: an illustrative case of its achievements and mistakes
Mark-to-market valuation• SV and SB already issued identical rules to value securities (to avoid
regulatory arbitrage) - September 2002
• SV has approved the methodology developed by BVC to act as a price vendor for TES - January 2003
• Development of a methodology to provide market prices needed to apply the valuation rules
• Establishment of a private sector advisory committee - May 2003
Proprietary position• Rules of capital adequacy have been issued with industries’ approval (March
2003 - August 2003)
• Standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets and market risk
• Based on IOSCO principles and the new Basel Capital Accord
Priority given to issuance of prudent regulation
Priority given to issuance of prudent regulation
Coordination with State entitites: Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Superintendence of Banks and Superintendence of Securities to align regulation with respect to:• Limits• Participating agents • Collateral• Risk factors
Work orientated towards development of Repos market, as base for other markets.
... And to develop the money-market
... And to develop the money-market
Identify the risky areas within the industry activities
Establish the standards for the participants that would diminish those risks (e.g. brokers, dealers, clearinghouses, rating agencies, advisors)
Discourage and sanction improper trading and practices
Separate treatment and management of intermediary and client assets
Brokers, asset managers and advisors must acquire licenses to operate ( professional exams)
Increase the professionalism standards of the industry
Increase the professionalism standards of the industry
Strengthen the governance of BVC
• Clear mandate for the independent directors
• Auditing committee
Detach self-regulation arm from BVC administration
Diversify the composition of the independent members
Spin off their association activity
Governance of the Colombian Stock Exchange - BVC
Governance of the Colombian Stock Exchange - BVC
Securities Law
• Adoption of IOSCO principles
• Regulation based on “activities” and not on “entities”
• Adoption of standards applicable to the market participants
• Adoption of new sanctioning procedures
Strengthening of the supervision capability introducing international accounting standards and improving oversight of the auditing industry
Modernize the regulatory frameworkModernize the regulatory framework
Internal function specialization.
• Reassignment of functions such as surveillance, enforcement and authorizations.
Creation of the Collective Investment Schemes division
Reducing red tape.• Avoiding duplicity.• Abolishing some previous authorizations.
Developing an automated system for the surveillance function
Strengthening the oversight capacity over the BVC.
Strengthening of the Superintendence of Securities (SV)
Strengthening of the Superintendence of Securities (SV)
Lessons from the developed markets
Colombian debt market: ongoing reforms
AGENDAAGENDA
Final remarks
Colombian debt market experience: an illustrative case of its achievements and mistakes
Primary emphasis should be focused on a sound legal and regulatory framework to develop an adequate debt market
Building that framework and a professional market takes time and requires a strong commitment of the industry and the regulator
The Ministries of Finance as issuers should involve early in the process the securities regulatory agency
Regulatory agencies should reassess the relative priority in terms of supervision (equity market vs. debt market), given the reality of their market.
The regulatory framework should take into account the enforcement capability of the supervisor
There is a need to strengthen the SRO scheme given the lack of resources of the supervisor (administrative restrictions and budgetary capability).
Final remarksFinal remarks