LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Maxine Burkett

Depending on the scale and distance o f migration, a variety of challenges face both those moving because of climate impacts and the communities receiving these migrants. The lessons drawn from resettlements and planned relocations thus fa r— most notably in the Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea— underscore the importance of adequate

funding, careful planning, restoring traditional livelihoods, and ensuring voluntary com­munity participation throughout the entire process. Critical hurdles persist, however, particularly for the most vulnerable communities within nation-states. This article explores the importance of adequate funding and identifies the dangerous and nagging impediments present, even as climate-induced migration advances in the adaptation discourse. W ith a focus on the Carteret Islanders’ ongoing relocation and resettlement to the island of Bougainville, this article argues that communities may face economic devel­opment and political gaps. Economic development gaps inhibit communities’ abilities to address redevelopment needs that elude appropriate classification for funding because they are neither strictly “climate” nor “development” categories. Additionally, political gaps exacerbate the challenges of accessing existing funding for local communities that are at odds with the national governments that purportedly represent their interests. These gaps compound the general lack of adequate funding for climate change mitiga­tion and adaptation. Considering models for a new framework, this article explores the applicability o f existing community-oriented funding regimes to address the political and economic development challenges that climate migrants face.

A politically contentious issue, climate change-related migration suffers from ambivalent recognition in many forums, including in legal, political, and

international negotiations. The existence of the climate change migration phe­nomenon, however, at least for the kinds of relocation typical of small island atoll communities in the Pacific, is credible and verifiable. 1 Indeed, a number of com­munities are already well into the process of relocation—and for each, durable solutions are critical. 2

Maxine Burkett is an associate professor at the University o f Hawaii at Manoa’s William S. Richardson School of Law, where she teaches climate change law and policy, torts, environmental law, international environmental law, and international development. Email: burkettm&jhawaii.edu.

Journal o f International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2015, Vol. 68, No. 2. © The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

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This article focuses on the relocation difficulties facing communities that are currently moving as a result of climate forces, specifically in Papua New Guinea (PNG). A review of their plight reveals that two important gaps in assistance com­pound the inherent challenges of relocation and cause the nagging lack of funding for climate change action, generally, and adaptation, specifically. These gaps are either economic development gaps—in which communities cannot address redevel­

opment needs that, because they are neither strictly “climate” nor “development,” elude appropriate classification for funding—and political gaps—in which existing funding is inaccessible for local communities that are at odds with the national governments charged with representing their interests.

This article first provides a brief back­ground on the contested phenomenon of climate-induced migration and then looks at the specific instances of planned reloca­tion in the South Pacific. Extrapolating

from concerns of the Carteret Islanders of PNG, this article later explores the gaps in research and management that hamper relocation and may adversely affect suc­cessful, long-term resettlement. In the final part, it considers the perils and pos­sibilities of current funding regimes and explores possible amendments to improve the odds of success for relocating communities. Considering sound models for a new framework, this article explores the applicability of existing, though smaller, community-oriented funding regimes and community-based adaptation generally as a paradigmatic framework to address the political and economic development challenges that climate migrants face.

There exists significant controversy regarding the ability to attribute the decision of indi­viduals to leave their homes permanently and relocate due to climate change.

MIGRATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFICWhile the movement of peoples as a result of climate change-induced pressures

may be difficult to predict and clearly identify, certain types of movement are more straightforward than others. Because of the generally multi-causal nature of migra­tion, there exists significant controversy regarding the ability to attribute the deci­sion of individuals to leave their homes permanently and relocate due to climate change. 3 The uncertainties regarding the extent and magnitude of the changing climate, the elusiveness of a credible and consistent number of possible migrants, and the absence of a clear legal status and framework for those who might move— particularly across borders—compound the attribution uncertainties. The migra­tion of small islanders due to sea-level rise, coupled with more devastating storm

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surges and king tides, however, is more certain.4 Accordingly, researchers and climate migration skeptics have largely excluded this category of migrants from the more general and contentious debates surrounding the relationship between climate and migration or dislocation.5

Throughout the Pacific, efforts to relocate communities are currently underway that highlight the need for effective management and funding. Recognizing the existential threat to its territory and people, Kiribati has been developing a reloca­tion policy it calls “migration with dignity.”6 The president of Kiribati has recently purchased arable land in Fiji to assist with food production, which is currently compromised in Kiribati by climate-related saltwater intrusion.7 That land will also serve as a place to relocate some, if not all, of its citizens when it becomes necessary.8 In the Solomon Islands, Choiseul—a township of about 1,000 people on Taro Island—lies less than two meters above sea level and is the first provincial capital in the Pacific to orchestrate a relocation with all of its services and facili­ties to be moved.9 Threatened by storm surges and rising seas, and eager to move swiftly, the community consulted a team of engineers, scientists, and planners, and decided that, while implementing disaster prevention measures in the near term, it would concurrently construct a new town on an adjacent mainland and move communities in stages.10

While many hail the Choiseul relocation as a model for other provinces across the nation and the Pacific, there are remaining funding and management needs for a successful transition." For this township and similarly situated communities, a variety of challenges face both those moving and the communities receiving them. The most common risks associated with displacement and resettlement processes include: landlessness, unemployment, homelessness, marginalization, food insecu­rity, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.

The lessons drawn from resettlements and planned relocations thus far—most notably in the Carteret Islands of PNG—might help to ensure the most successful resettlement for communities that must relocate. Some 2,000 Carteret Islanders are in the midst of permanently resettling from their tiny islets in the Carteret Atoll to mainland Bougainville. Separated by a three-hour boat ride, the move to the mainland marks a significant departure for the islanders and an unprecedented challenge for the national and international infrastructure that must now fund and manage this kind of move.12 In addition to coping with the devastation of the atoll due to rising seas, saltwater intrusion in freshwater wells and taro fields, an unprec­edented occurrence and intensity of king tides, and accompanying erosion of culture for the “taro people,” islanders have suffered from their own government’s resistance to act and a lack of assistance from the international community.13 In response, the Council of Elders initiated a plan for resettlement. Coordinating

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the move since 2006, Ursula Rakova is leading the permanent resettlement to Bougainville and, most importantly, attempting to ensure that the islanders will be self-reliant in their new home.14

The move toward self-reliance has been contingent not only on the removal of obstacles presented by various layers of government, including the national government, but also on the delivery of an adequate and more expansive view

encumbered poorly endowed community-based efforts and stymied swift and effective strategies to relocate.17 According to Rakova, donors objected to the first set of homes built, arguing for cheaper, less resilient houses. Furthermore, tens of

PNG could not be used for house construction, as it did not conform to prescribed categories for climate aid.18

The Carteret Islanders’ experience vis-a-vis funding is not unusual, yet ade­quate funding is absolutely essential to address the challenges of climate-induced relocation.19 It not only facilitates the necessary studies for proper planning, but also supports participatory processes critical for community engagement and, hopefully, a successful resettlement process with dignity and long-term self-reli­ance at its core.

ADAPTATION, FUNDING, AND MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW

The Funding Landscape and Its C urrent Shortfalls

A concerted effort to place climate-induced migration firmly in the adaptation infrastructure has gained traction. Framing relocation as an adaptation strategy

The bureaucracy and complexity of process have encumbered

based efforts and

endowedcommunity-

effective strategies to relocate.

of climate-related funding. To craft their eighteen- step process—including community profiling and assessment, which resulted in the islanders owning land, initiating home building, and exploring sus­tainable economic development—Rakova relied on small amounts of seed money from the New Zealand Fligh Commission in PNG and the nonprofit, Global Greengrants Fund.15 Additional funds for critical items such as “education of the younger people, health facilities, economic opportunities for the islanders, and trauma counseling for the families that [we are] moving, as well as the host community” was not forthcoming from larger donors or PNG.16 The bureaucracy and complexity of the process, for both international donors and the PNG government, have

thousands of dollars earmarked for climate adaptation for the islands and atolls of

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rather than a “last resort” is important for a number of reasons. Notably, this framing may allow communities to access existing and ostensibly growing resources earmarked for adaptation. " Indeed, “[a] major obstacle to moving forward on the issue of guidance on planned relocations in the light of climate change is the lack of information on adaptation funding and the extent to which it might be available to support work on human mobility in general and planned relocations in par­ticular. A critical funding shortfall remains, however, particularly for the most vulnerable communities within nation-states. It is widely acknowledged that miti­gation and resilience-building require significant and diverse financial investments, from both public and private and domestic and international sources. Climate finance, therefore, will have twin mandates to provide high-quality funding to aid in limiting global temperature increases to 2° Celsius and to assist vulnerable com­munities through adaptation and, perhaps over time, mitigating loss and damage.22

All funds appear woefully undercapitalized, with potentially devastating impacts to both decarbonization and preparedness. Estimates for investments necessary to keep average global temperatures below 2° Celsius range from $0.6 trillion per year by 2020 to $1.5 trillion per year.23 For climate change adapta­tion not necessarily including migration and loss and damage monies—annual investment estimates range from $49 billion to $171 billion.24 These estimates far exceed the aspirational goals of the international community to disburse $100 billion per year for both mitigation and adaptation by 2020.25 Current estimates of climate finance range from $340 billion to $650 billion per year.26 This short­fall is more consequential for those who are climate displaced, like the Carteret Islanders. The funding gap occurs because “displaced persons and their home countries lack guaranteed financial and material assistance for resettlement.”27 As noted previously by several researchers, absent international financing, “It seems unlikely that governments in many affected developing countries will have the necessary resources to plan and implement resettlement plans that uphold the rights of communities,” especially because it is “precisely those governments that are likely to experience increased financial pressure on other fronts as a result of climate change (e.g., decline in tourism or fishing industries, lower tax revenues, and perhaps increased political turmoil).”28

C onceptual Shortfalls in C limate Finance H indering A daptation and M igration

The failings of climate finance management and disbursement exacerbate continued undercapitalization. At present, adaptation does not receive a sufficient share of the limited funds, and migration receives even less recognition and much less funding within the extant adaptation frameworks.29 In 2010, an additional

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funding source for climate adaptation was established in the form of the Green Climate Fund, supplementing existing institutional arrangements that disburse adaptation finance consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).30 It was also the 2010 UNFCCC meetings in Cancun at which the international negotiations produced text acknowledging migration and the need for a management framework to address the phenomenon.31 There is,

however, no widely recognized and agreed upon esti­mate for the potential costs associated with climate migration, save for the discrete migration estimates of small island communities such as Choiseul and the Carterets.32

That this kind of migration occurs internally, rather than across international borders, will con­tinue to confound the management and finance infrastructure that might respond to the necessary relocations. Such migrations are also highly likely to be expensive—stretched into the hundreds of mil­lions, as estimated by the government of the Solomon Islands.33 Further, and perhaps most relevant to the present discussion, while most resilience-based efforts occur at the local level, there is an absence of com­

mitment and accompanying infrastructure at the international level to channel adaptation finance to local communities.34 The community level is the capacity at which contributions of women, indigenous peoples, and other especially vulnerable populations are most able to construct a plan for resilience and relocation that is consonant with their own conceptions of well-being and cultural survival.35

To accelerate their relocation and establish a viable engine of economic development for well-being and self-reliance the Carteret Islanders, for example, founded Bougainville Cocoa Net Limited. The company grows and exports organic cocoa, sustaining family incomes and promising the eventual hope of suspending the pursuit of donor funds permanently.36 This kind of economic development is critical to the sound resettlement of communities, yet this can often be the hardest investment for which to find funding.37 To achieve durable solutions, however, “the availability of livelihoods and development oriented recovery activities” appear critical.38

In sum, it is unknown if or how migration needs are factored into estimates of the cost of sound climate change adaptation. The fact that no single financial vehicle covers all climate-induced migration scenarios makes this all the more challenging.39 Though there are several existing finance mechanisms, the level of

There is an absence of commitment and accompanying infrastructure at the international level to channel adaptation finance to local communities.

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funding is not sufficient for current and future scenarios.40 Some scholars have argued for the creation of a new comprehensive, global funding mechanism to aid resettlement efforts, which would allocate countries’ contributions based on common but differentiated responsibilities, taking into account each country’s contribution to climate change and its capacity to pay.41 Others argue that targeted regional responses, based on negotiations between states in the same region, may be more appropriate than a global response.42 Given the general lack of funding for resettlement, one scholar has contended that it may be better to strengthen existing adaptation funds rather than create an entirely new mechanism, which may end up reducing countries’ contributions and even diluting the total assistance that developing countries receive.43 Whichever framework prevails, in order to work most effectively, financial institutions should seek to minimize bureaucracy and “avoid cumbersome rules of procedure that make it difficult to reach those who need help.”44

Furthermore, if the most vulnerable are going to benefit directly from funding, it is essential that funding directives appropriately align with national, as well as local, communities’ needs—namely sustainable economic development for long­term self-sufficiency.

Much more is needed beyond the individual and ad hoc management for relo­cation of affected communities, which are all currently underfunded. Indeed, the lack of capital makes it more important that the funds are used efficiently to build resilience at the local, national, and regional levels. The politics of climate finance and policymaking may, however, confound these efforts.

Political O pportunism in C limate R esponses

The friction between the Carteret Islanders and provincial and national gov­ernments described above is not unique. In fact, the politicized nature of climate policy and finance and related fields—including urban planning and control, donor expenditures, and population consolidation plans, among others—reveal the existing and growing potential for indifference and, worse yet, malfeasance at the administrative level. Even absent malfeasance, insufficient information at the national level inhibits optimal resilience-building at the local level, all further militating in favor of funding for locally devised adaptation and relocation plans.45

International climate finance has predominantly been funneled through national financial management systems.46 This top-down model ignores historical antagonisms between marginalized groups and governments and facilitates further marginalization through the execution of facially progressive climate policy.47

Some scholars and researchers have identified instances in which the state allows climate-related risks to exist as part of larger, politically charged land use plan-

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ning.48 Others recount the role of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) in facilitating state-sponsored dispossession of ancestral lands to access financial incentives for developing countries that reduce carbon emissions through forest conservation efforts.49 Still others note that annual environmental funding runs close to $300 billion, but it remains unclear “how the money is spent.”50 What appears evident, however, is that a bulk of available funding goes to governments as well as large corporations, and only a small portion

ously unpopular resettlement and migration policies.”53 The government of the Maldives, at times an important voice for the ethical implications of climate- induced migration, had earlier proposed, for ease of administration, the consolida­tion of populations dispersed over 200 islands onto ten to fifteen islands. When introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s, the relocation proposal was widely unpopular, meeting “overwhelming resistance.”54 Invoking an “environmental dis­course,” the Maldivian government has reintroduced these resettlement policies, buttressed by the “universal acceptance” of sea level rise. Environmental exigencies now fuel a plan that was once a strategy based on economic and political pressures. At best, mistrust of the government’s current motives sullies the consolidation plans, with uncertain results.55

Allusions to safety risks—supported by the complexity of climate science, in the purview of expert knowledge rather than purportedly less sophisticated local peoples—has served to advance political goals. This is just one of many instances in which government planning and local well-being can be misaligned, if not

Thus far, this article has attempted to identify two significant gaps in the current funding infrastructure. In addition to the crippling underfunding of climate mitigation, particularly that of adaptation efforts, there is a constrained

Mistrust of the government’s

of it reaches the most vulnerable communities it is meant to serve.51

consolidation with uncertain results.

current motives sullies the current

Particularly relevant to migration due to climate change, some relocation policies demonstrate the ways in which top-down policies can obscure, if not completely contravene, the wishes of the local com­munities.52 Looking closely at the Maldives, scholar Uma Kothari examines the “political imperatives that are influencing discussions of climate change and migration, and specifically how environmental discourses are being mobilized to reintroduce previ-

whollv at odds.

ADDRESSING GAPS THROUGH EXISTING FUNDS

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interpretation of what qualifies as credible and relevant adaptation responses, which severely impacts relocating communities. This is the “funding gap” that omits funds for sound resettlement through economic development. There is also an absence of sizeable and consistent funds for community-level adaptation to local entities. This is the “political gap” that favors a top-down, national govern­ment-oriented response over the more appropriate bottom-up, community-based, and community-responsive approach. There are possibilities to address these gaps in existing infrastructure, if appropriate attention is given to identifying these gaps and bridging them in a rigorous fashion.

The next two sections look at the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund for possible resolutions.55 The last section con­siders the role of alternative funding sources that might work in harmony with the above global funds.

A mending the G reen C limate Fund

Given its stated ambition and that it is still in the development phase, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) provides a unique opportunity to address the above challenges through directed and purposeful policy. Established at the Cancun Climate Change Conference in 2010 as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC, the parties to the FJNFCCC intend for the GCF to serve as the centerpiece of efforts to raise $100 billion a year by 2020.57 The GCF board recently agreed on how it will operate, who can distribute money from the fund, and how much control countries will have over funded projects. The fund’s mandate is to play a key role “in channeling new, additional, adequate, and predictable financial resources to developing countries and will catalyze climate finance, both public and private, and at the international and national levels.”58 It is the “epicenter” of twenty-first century climate finance that will determine “the direction of both public and private investment over the next decades,” according to the executive secretary of the UNFCCC.59

The GCF, as currently conceived, includes some promising elements from the vantage point of the climate displaced. The board determined that, over time, half of GCF funds will go to adaptation and half will go to mitigation, with half of the adaptation funds allocated to the most vulnerable nations.60 This rebalancing of funds allocation is significant, as adaptation efforts have been “structurally underfunded.”61 Further, the GCF announced that it is working to increase access to funding for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the coming months through its readiness and preparatory support program. Thus far, SIDS’ requests for readiness support have ranged from helping to create strategic frameworks for engagement with the fund to program development and meeting accreditation

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requirements for national implementing entities.62 Finally, and in an important nod to assisting historically vulnerable populations who have been less involved in decisionmaking, the GCF will assess social and economic co-benefits, as well as the gender-sensitivity of its investments. In general, and at least in stated intention, GCF investments have lofty and potentially game-changing aspirations.63

Country ownership is of particular importance in GCF administration. Mandated to be a central determinant of finance decisionmaking, the principle of country ownership is progressive in stated intention, but may have deleterious effects when considered alongside the political exigencies of migration and reloca­tion. The principle reflects an important departure from the extant yet hidden system of climate finance in which donor governments dictate the terms for accessing funds.64 GCF affirmatively seeks to “promote and strengthen engage­ment at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders.”65 National Designating Authorities, or another agreed-upon country-level focal point, will determine modes of access and prioritize alloca­tions of funds consistent with goals set at the national level. This is a welcomed departure from the paternalism that has characterized many international finance arrangements. It is also, however, a method that might further entrench existing indifference or antagonisms toward vulnerable, community-level populations on the part of national authorities, exemplified by the unexpected conflicts in the Maldives and the hurdles faced by the Carteret Islanders.

With a clear eye on the perils and possibilities of the GCF, a number of policy approaches might buffer against the political gaps that country ownership exacer­bates and provide appropriate responses to the funding gap in an overall deficient funding landscape. With respect to country ownership, avenues that further enhance direct access to small, local, community-based NGOs could ease access to the GCF’s financial support. As discussed further below, there is an existing infrastructure of grassroots grant-making organizations that can partner with and leverage GCF funding in a cost-effective manner. The GCF is also contemplating attracting other forms of finance, namely through the philanthropic sector.66 This vehicle may be the best way for consistent and increasing funding to reach effective and credible organizations led by and for the benefit of women, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable communities, including those forced to relocate.

Best P ractices from the A daptation Fund and the G lobal Environment Facility

Community-based adaptation can address the concerns regarding locally responsive and supportive adaptation, and migration and relocation needs, and ensure the most impactful and expansive application of funds for greater resil-

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ience. There are important examples of this kind of funding that already exist. This section briefly outlines and introduces the most relevant elements of the Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility.67 The latter is the most promising and instructive with respect to community-level support through its small grants programming.68

Relevant to the present discussion, the Adaptation Fund has the specific mandate to finance adaptation with special atten­tion promised to the most vulnerable communities.This mandate closely aligns the fund with the goals of more community-oriented approaches, at least in principle.69 It is financed by sales of certified emission reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism to governments, the private sector, and individuals. Over the past three years, the fund has dedicated more than $232 million to increase climate resilience in forty countries. It is still unclear whether migration will be a recognized adaptation strategy for purposes of funding. Notwithstanding that uncertainty, other concerns arise. Its “innovative” country ownership orienta­tion makes it more susceptible to increasing the distance between local communi­ties that may be at odds with their governments and still need funding. Indeed, direct access has operated via National Implementing Entities that reflect national- level priorities through devolved management powers.70 Again, this is a notable and innovative increase in state-level ownership of adaptation projects and programs, as accredited national entities supplant multilateral intermediaries.71 This is progress, to be sure. Without further refinement, it may also come with significant, nega­tive effects and, at best, evade opportunities to redefine certain categories related to adaptation that will assist in-country communities that must relocate and seek economic development and self-sufficiency as they craft their resettlement.

For greater community-level, direct access that can better elicit diverse and responsive measures for relocation, the Global Environmental Facility’s Small Grants Programme (GEF SPG) provides a promising template. The GEF became an official financial mechanism for the UNFCCC at the second Conference of the Parties (COP).7- The GEF manages two separate adaptation-focused funds under the UNFCCC—the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). Despite its mandate not to support adaptation projects, the GEF’s SGP is most relevant as it has “emerged as a highly effective [funding] mechanism for delivering Community-Based Adaption (CBA) projects.”73 Elements that make the GEF SGP a model for decentralized and community-driven funding

It is still unclear whether or not migration will

be a recognized adaptation strategy

for purposes of funding.

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include: the creation of national steering committees that comprised a majority of civil society organizations, government, the United Nations Development Programme, academia, and the private sector; development of a national strategy for achieving CBA objectives “based on local context and circumstances;” and, technical support for capacity building, among other things.74 Further, the GEF SGP has an established infrastructure to reach remote communities through sub­regional mechanisms in addition to the National Steering Committee.75 Finally, as Fenton et al. note, the GEF SGP distributes initial grants of $5,000 for planning CBA projects, which “reduces the risks posed by immediately disbursing relatively large sums while improving the ability of communities to convene, discuss, and plan remedial actions and measures which can provide community-owned and implemented solutions.”76 Indeed, this mirrors the exact kind of funding that was so consequential for the Carteret Islanders.

The P romise of A lternative Funding Sources

While a number of proposed and often innovative funding sources exist, the potential transformative role of the philanthropic sector is important to note here.77 As introduced above, there is a significant opportunity to partner with and leverage existing philanthropic infrastructure, particularly for the provision of small grants. Independent charitable organizations can assist in ensuring efficient and impactful funding, with low transaction costs. The current network of organi­zations operates in at least 100 countries, with direct grantmaking and a parallel emphasis on local capacity building.'8

A partnered approach is consistent with the GCF’s own investment criteria, which includes decisions based on “the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed intervention, including its ability to leverage additional funding.”79 The leveraging may be limited to the case of mitigation initially, but for optimal adaptation and relocation at the community level, an expansion of leveraging opportunities would be advantageous for the fund and those it seeks to aid.80

CONCLUSIONThe Carteret Islanders will continue to chart their multi-year transition in the

current funding landscape. This journey will occur at the same historical moment as the international community assembles its greatest climate finance structure to date and debates that structure’s bedrock principles. The climate finance regime— public or private—can benefit from observing and incorporating the lessons and experiences of the Carteret Islanders. Those facing relocation, a likely expanding number, clearly benefit from this purposeful observation.

The preeminent emerging climate finance vehicle has conflicting mandates.

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Lessons from Contemporary Resettlement in the South Pacific

The GCF must respect country ownership and a country-driven approach to climate finance. It must also remain sensitive to the most vulnerable. Crafting funding vehicles that engage the most remote communities could introduce trans­formative policy across other remote, ocean-based communities and economies across the globe, cfc?

NOTES

Walter Kalin, former Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, provided five general scenarios that might entail climate-induced migration, including “iii) So-called ‘sinking’ small island states.” Walter Kalin, “Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in C/imate Change and Displacement: Mu/tidiseip/inary Perspectives, ed. Jane McAdam (Hart Publishing, 2010), 81. While not nation-states, a number of Pacific island com­munities are experiencing dislocation because of diminishing inhabitability of their islands. Regarding the terms used to describe those displaced, there is no universally agreed-upon definition for each. “Climate refugees” has been the most widely used term in popular discourse. From a law and policy standpoint, however, the term “refugee" is not an accurate reflection of the current legal status of these kinds of migrants. In fact, those dislocated due to impacts reasonably related to climate change have no legal status at all. As a result, scholars, researchers, and some political voices employ proxy terms such as “climate migrants” or “the climate displaced.”

Generally speaking, durable solutions have been achieved: “a) when internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home, integrated locally in their places of refugej,] or settled elsewhere in the country in way that is lasting and sustainablej;] b) when they no longer have specific assistance and protection needs linked to their displacement^] and c) when they can exercise their human rights without discrimination. Jose Riera and Marine Franck, “Migration, displacement and planned relocation as facets of adaptation to climate change" (unpublished report, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva: Fall 2014), 5.

3 Maxine Burkett, “Climate-Induced Migration: Is there a there there?,” Climate Law 3, (2012).

4 Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ: On climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era,” Climate Law2 (2011), 345-374. This is not without its difficulties. See Riera and Frank, 10 (explaining that “Accurately tracking displacement resulting from slower-onset crises like rising sea levels is expected to prove difficult, largely because it is hard to judge when voluntary movement from a problem zone becomes forced flight.”). The research on attribution, however, is pro­viding greater clarity as to what triggers permanent migration. See Pratikshya Bohra-Mishra, Michael Oppenheimer, and Solomon M. Hsiang, “Nonlinear permanent migration response to climatic varia­tions but minimal response to disasters,” Proceedings o f the National Academy o f Sciences o f the United States of America (PNAS) (27 May 2014), (finding that “permanent migration is influenced by climatic variations [particularly heat], whereas episodic disasters tend to have much smaller or no impact on such migration” and that “a rise in temperature is related to an increase in outmigration, potentially through its impact on economic conditions.”).

See e.g., Calum 1. Nicholson, ‘Climate Change and the politics of causal reasoning: the case of climate change and migration,” Geographical/ourna/180, no. 2 (June 2014), 151-160; Jane McAdam, C/imate Change, Farced Migration, and Internationa/ Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)i 119-158. To challenge the neatness of a causal link between climate change and migration from atoll states, McAdam identifies the non-climate-related challenges to adaptation for Kiribati and Tuvalu that also operate. The challenges she identifies, however, are not exclusive to these island states and do not themselves undercut the unique and disproportionate impact of sea level rise on their livelihoods as compared to, say, states with higher ground.

6 There are other resettlements and planned relocations that are instructive, including scenarios in Montserrat, Ethiopia, and China. Elizabeth Ferris, “Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change” (report, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR.2012), 17, http://www.unhcr.org/5024d5 169.html.

Relocation, Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati, http://www.cIimate.gov.ki/categorv/ action/relocation.

'S Laurence Caramel, “Besieged by the rising tides of climate change, Kiribati buys land in Fiji,”

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Guardian, 30 June 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/20I4/jul/01/ldribati-climate- change-fiji-vanua-levu.

9 Megan Rowling, “Solomons town first in Pacific to relocate due to climate change,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, 15 August 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/15/us-foundation-climat- echange-solomons-idUSKBN0GFlAB20140815.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.13 Thin Lei Win, “Intrepid PNG woman leads relocation of island community hit by climate change,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, 8 August 2014, http://www.trust.org/item/20I408Q7164800- 6o7xb?view=print. See also, Marissa S. Knodel, “Wet Feet Marching: Climate Justice and Sustainable Development for Climate Displaced Nations in the South Pacific,” Vermont/our/iaiof Environmental Law 14, no. 127 (2012), 173-174.

14 Win.

15 Ibid. The author is a member of the board of the Global Greengrants Fund.

16 Ibid.17 Win; Ursula Rakova, (Executive Director, Tulele Peisa), in discussion with the author, August 2014.

18 Ibid.19 Kiribati’s experience is another striking, small island example. “Kiribati minister says Pacific nations pushed aside in race for funds,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, 26 May 2014. (“They promise a lot of funding, but the criteria to access them are so complicated, and we lack the capacity.”) See also, Liz Gallager and Amal-Lee Amin, “Aligning Finance to Deliver Climate Ambition and Climate Resilience in a 2015 Agreement" (working paper, Agreement for Climate Transformation 2015 (ACT 2015), Washington, DC: November 2014), 5, http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/ act-2015/publications. (“The ecosystem of climate finance is currently fragmented and complex. Coherence between different providers of public climate finance is required to simplify and increase transparency of the highly fragmented eco- system of climate finance.”); Dennis Tirpak, Louise Brown, and Athena Ronquillo-Ballesteros, “Monitoring Climate Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Next Steps” (working paper, World Resources Institute, March 2014), 2, http://www. wri.org/publication/monitoring-climate-finance-developing-countries-challenges-and-next-steps.

20 Adequate funding is absolutely essential to address the challenges described below—it not only facilitates the necessary studies for proper planning, but also supports participatory processes critical for community engagement, and hopefully a successful resettlement process. The Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted during the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference (COP16) negotiations was the first mention of migration, displacement, and planned relocation in an internationally negotiated piece of climate policy. See, e.g., Koko Warner et al„ “Changing Climate, Moving People: Framing Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation” (policy brief no. 8, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013), 33-34, http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/ read/changing-climate-moving-people-framing-migration-displacement.

21 Elizabeth Ferris, “Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (2012), 32, http://www. unhcr.org/5024d5169.html.22 Adding to the complexity of the global climate-funding infrastructure is the lack of a clear definition for climate finance. See UNFCCC, “Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows,” 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (2014), 5. For this article, I will borrow the UNFCCC’s framing: “Climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts.” See also, Maxine Burkett, “Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States,” Santa ClamJournal’of'InternationalLaw 13 (2015), 81-124.23 Elizabeth Douglass, “The Climate-Change Finance Gap at a Glance,” Inside Climate News, 28 November 2014, http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20141128/climate-change-finance-gap-glance (citing estimates of the Stockholm Environment Institute); see also Gallagher and Amin, 2; ICSU,

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Climate Finance - Road to Paris (2014), http://roadtoparis.info/top-list/10-climate-change-controver- sies-now-that-cause-settled/climate-finance/ (citing an aggregation by the South Centre, a developing country think tank).

24 “Empowering vulnerable communities to address climate change adaptation” (report, The GEF Small Grants Programme, UNDP: 2011), 1, https://sgp.undp.org/index.php?option=com_ docman&task=doc_download&.gid=267.

See e.g., Liane Schalatek et al.,“The Green Climate Fund,” Climate Funds Update, December 2014, 6; Kasper Jon Larsen, “Out of the Shadows: How the Green Climate Fund is being capitalized,” C/imateDev, 25 November 2014, http://www.climatedev.com/climate/2014-ll-25-out-of-the-shadows- how-the-green-climate-fund-is-being-capitalized (describing the shortcomings of “fast-start finance”).

26 UNFCCC, “Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance,” 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows. See also Gallagher and Amin, 2. Again, the lack of a clear and agreed-upon definition of climate finance affects the accuracy and consistency of these numbers. Ibid. This is also true for adaptation finance. Monitoring the flow of adaptation finance is difficult for several reasons, including: there is no common definition for “adaptation finance” at the country level; very few recipient countries have systems in place that report on the delivery of adaptation finance at the local level; and that project-oriented tracking rarely provides a complete picture of finance flows. Pieter Terpstra, “Where is Climate Adaptation Funding Going? A New Projects Aims to Find Out,” World Resources Institute Blog, 8 January 2013, http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/01/where-climate- adaptation-funding-going-new-project-aims-find-out. The recently launched Adaptation Finance Accountability Initiative aims to help civil society organizations find out where adaptation funding is really going. UNFCCC, “Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance,” 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, (2014).

27 Sheila C. McAnaney, “Sinking Islands? Formulating a Realistic Solution to Climate Change Displacement, New York University Law Review 87, 1182, http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/ files/pdf/NYULawReview-87-4-McAnaney.pdf. See also Katrina Miriam Wyman, “Responses to Climate Migration,” Harvard£/ivinmrfte/ila/ Laiv Review37 (2013): 167.

28 Warner et ah, 35. Greater discussion of the Green Climate Fund is below, in Part III.

29 Gallagher and Amin, 8. Explaining that “Adaptation finance has been consistently and signifi­cantly under-funded compared with mitigation finance—only 6 percent of total climate flows or 18 percent of Fast Start Finance was directed at adaptation.”

30 This includes the GEF and the Adaptation Fund. For further discussion on the role of these in pos­sible solutions, see following footnotes. For a general discussion of how these funding sources engage community-based adaptation, see Adrian Fenton, et ah, “Up-scaling finance for community-based adaptation,” Climate and Development 6, no. 4 (7 November 2014), 388-397, http://dx.doi.ore/10 10 80/17565529.2014.953902.

!l Agreement, 14(f). “Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and cir­cumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following... (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordi­nation, and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional, and international levels.” Only a small number of countries have incorporated planned relocation into their national plans for adaptation. Rowling. Colombia is the first South American nation to include migration in its national climate change policy and Fiji is finalizing guidelines for planned relocation.32 Wyman.

33 Rowling, “Vulnerable nations urged to craft climate migration policy.”34 Fenton, et ah, 388.

35 Fenton, et ah, 388-397. (“Without such a commitment [at the local level], there is a risk that climate finance will continue to support top-down, centralized activities that may struggle to address the needs of vulnerable communities.”); Teresa Odendahl, “Women on climate change frontline make big impact on small grants, Guardian, 28 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-devel- opment/poverty-matters/2014/nov/28/cop21-women-climate-change-frontline-small-grants-mama-ale-ta-baun-west-timor, (arguing that, “Despite leading some of the boldest and most successful climate projects, however, they receive little attention and scant backing from typical funders and climate

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Maxine Burkett

finance programmes.”)

36 Win.

37 Fenton, et al., 389, (explaining in the context of CBA that “a lack of clear distinction between CBA and development has perhaps contributed to the difficulty of financing CBA with official climate finance, which cannot be used to fund adaptation deficits.”).

38 Riera and Frank, 8. See also, “Report summary: Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific,” UK Climate Change & Migration Coalition, 13 April 2012, http://climate-migration.org.uk/report-summary-addressing-climate-change-and-migration-in-asia-and-the-pacific/, (“Migration in the context of climate change should be seen as a development issue. Many of the solutions lie in economic development policies such as job creation, disaster risk management, urban infrastructure planning[,] and insurance”). Others have highlighted the need to bridge climate adap­tation and development funds. Gallagher and Amin, 8. (“The potential to create synergies between adaptation and development is widely recognised, but proposals to mainstream and integrate funding for climate resilience-building and adaptation with development programmes have often been viewed with scepticism or even suspicion. Yet creating rigid distinctions between adaptation funding and broader development funding runs the risk of missing opportunities to expand the pool of financing that addresses needs and outcomes in both areas.”)

39 “Financial Mechanisms for Climate-Induced Migration: Policy dialogue on climate migration in Asia and the Pacific,” Asian Development Bank, 17 June 2011.

40 McAnaney, 1200.

41 Ibid., 1184-1185.

42 Ibid., 1185

43 Ibid., 1200-1201.

44 Ibid., 1200.

45 Fenton, et al., 389; Riera and Frank, 7.

46 Fenton, et al.47 For a general discussion of the way in which governments mobilize climate change politics to “close down forms of contestation and de-politicise key issues,” see, Kothari, 130-140.

48 Fenton, et al., 389.49 Amantha Perera, “Carbon funds bypass Asian indigenous peoples,” AsiaTimes/Inter Press Service News Agency, 22 September 2014. Citing instances in Indonesia, India, and the Philippines.

50 Ibid., quoting Liane Schalatek, associate director at the Heinrich Boll Foundation of North America, which aims to promote democracy, civil rights, and environmental sustainability.

51 Ibid.52 Previous discussions of this dynamic include Farbotko and Lazarus, who argue “that ‘even if the interests of climate vulnerable populations are ostensibly at the heart of the crisis discourse’ their voices are ‘effectively marginalised by the imposition of alien conceptual frameworks?’” Kothari, 132.

53 Kothari, 130-140.

54 Ibid., 130.

55 Ibid., 137.56 Others have looked at the potential of existing development assistance, disaster relief, migration, and climate change adaptation funds to bridge the current funding gap vis-a-vis climate migration. See generally, Wyman.57 Article 11 of the UNFCCC calls on the Parties to create a mechanism that allows developed coun­tries to financially support developing countries in implementing the Convention. Laura Drummond, “UNFCCC Green Climate Fund Created,” Si/stninnMe Dere/epme/it Law andPo/igr 11, no. 2 (Winter 2011).

58 “Background,” Green Climate Fund, http://www.gcfund.org/about/the-fund.html.

59 Larsen.

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60 Background,’ Green Climate Fund; Alex Morales, “Green Climate Fund Chief Seeks as Much as $15 Billion," Bloomberg, 4 June 2014, http://www.bloomberg.eom/news/2014-06-04/green-dimate-fund- chief-seeks-as-much-as-15-billion.html. The GCF identifies general adaptation focus areas, including increased resilience of health, food, and water systems; infrastructure; ecosystems; and enhanced livelihoods of vulnerable people, communities, and regions. Liane Schalatek et a!., makes no specific mention of migration.

61 Liane Schalatek et al., 2.

62 “Technical Update; Green Climate Fund Prioritises Climate Finance for Small Island Developing States,” Green Climate Fund, 1 September 2014, http://www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/docu- ments/Readiness/2014-9-l_Update_GCF_towards_SIDS_Conference.pdf.

fii Three of the six agreed investment criteria are notably progressive: paradigm shift potential; sustainable development potential; and, needs of the recipient countries and populations. Schalatek et al., 3.

64 Larsen.

65 “Background," Green Climate Fund.

66 Schalatek et al., 4.

bl There are a number of other institutions that might provide relevant funding for relocation, and could be amended to meet the particular challenges this article identifies. Other potential funding sources may include: (a) national government spending; (b) private sector spending; (c) foreign direct investment; (d) international loans; and (e) official development assistance. See e.g., Wyman. “Partnerships and Financing Overview,” Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, http://www.sprep.org/Partnership-and-Climate-Change-financing/overview (accessed 3 September 2014). Examples of national funds include Germany’s International Climate Initiative (http://www. international-climate-initiative.com/en/) and the UK’s International Climate Fund (https://www. gov.uk/government/policies/taking-international-action-to-mitigate-climate-change/supporting-pages/ international-climate-fund-icf). Some migration/refugee organizations might provide assistance in important and expanding ways.

68 See generally, Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 “Partnerships and Financing Overview,” Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, http://www.sprep.org/Partnership-and-Climate-Change-financing/overview (accessed 3 September 2014).

' 3 “Empowering vulnerable communities to address climate change adaptation,” SGP, The GEF Small Grants Programme, UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2011; Fenton, et al., 390.74 UNDP, 2011.

75 Fenton, et al., 391.

76 Ibid.

77 Wyman. Vehicles such as Overseas Development Assistance is also worth mentioning. See e.g., Gallager and Amin, 3. For innovative proposals, see e.g., Rosemary Lyster, “A fossil-fuel funded Climate Disaster Response Fund under the UNFCCC loss and damage mechanism,” Legal Studies Research Paper, no. 13/77 (29 October 2013).

78 See Odendahl.

79 Schalatek et al.

80 Ibid., 4.

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