les balkwell final report published with foreword feb 1

8/3/2019 Les Balkwell Final Report Published With Foreword Feb 1

1/147

IPCC Reference: 2008/000068

Independent InvestigationFinal Report

STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 9AM

MONDAY 30 JANUARY 2012

Mr Lee Balkwell (Deceased)IPCC Investigation into complaints of Leslie Balkwellregarding Essex Police investigations into the death ofLee Balkwell.

PROTECTIVE MARKING


2/147

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

IPCC Final Report Leslie Balkwell Complaints

Version 1.0 Page 2 of 147NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

FOREWORD

On 18 July 2002 Lee Balkwell was found dead at a farm in Upminster, Essex with

his head and shoulders wedged between the drum and chassis of a cement mixer.His family was understandably devastated at their loss and expected Essex Policeto thoroughly investigate the incident.

At an early stage, Lee Balkwells father, Mr. Leslie Balkwell was dissatisfied withthe police investigation and made a number of formal complaints. As a result, areview of the police investigation commenced in March 2003. Mr. Balkwellremained unhappy and made further complaints, which led to another review beingundertaken by Essex Police Professional Standards Department between July2006 and December 2009.

Early in 2008 the inquest into Lee Balkwells death took place and a verdict ofunlawful killing through gross negligence / manslaughter was reached. The matterwas referred back to Essex Police to continue any appropriate investigation.

Mr Balkwell continued to be extremely dissatisfied with the original investigationinto his sons death and the subsequent reviews undertaken by the force and hewrote to the IPCC in December 2007. Essex Police referred his complaints to us inFebruary 2008 and it was decided that an independent IPCC investigation would

be undertaken.

Mr Balkwell has campaigned tirelessly to find the truth, whilst also enduring thetrauma and grief associated with the loss of a son. His persistence anddetermination have been admirable, but have undoubtedly taken a massive toll onhim and his family.

Although he has made many complaints, in essence what Mr. Balkwell has beenseeking is to:

know how and why his son died

have anyone responsible for the death brought to justice

have any police officers responsible for failing to properly investigate this case tobe held to account

These demands are unquestionably reasonable and no more than anyone whohas lost a loved one in such terrible circumstances should be able to expect. Thefirst issues are not a matter for the IPCC and are beyond the scope of anyinvestigation we could undertake. For this reason, after the initial stages of ourenquiries I recommended that Essex Police bring in another force to reinvestigateLee Balkwells death. The Chief Constable considered this recommendation and


3/147




decided he wanted an external force to review the earlier investigations prior tomaking any decision in relation to re opening the case. West Midlands Policeundertook this review and made more than 90 recommendations about furtheraction that should be undertaken. Essex Police accepted all theserecommendations and commissioned Kent and Essex Serious Crime Directorate tocarry out this work. The criminal investigation into Lee Balkwells death is stillongoing.

Our investigation has looked at allegations relating to:

Failure to carry out thorough investigations

Interviews of witnesses and suspects

Delays/failure in obtaining relevant statements

Lack of forensic investigation

Issues regarding how the cement mixer was examined and dealt with includingcomplaints that it was deliberately tampered with by officers

Issues around CCTV examination

Production of inaccurate computer generated images

Alleged corrupt practices within Essex Police

Failure to consider re-investigation by an outside force

Interaction between Essex Police and Mr Balkwell

We have found that Mr. Balkwells belief that the original investigation into LeeBalkwells death was inadequate was well founded. In our view it was seriouslyflawed. From the outset it was mired in assumption that what had happened to LeeBalkwell was a tragic industrial accident. Officers failed to secure potentialevidence, failed to interview potential witnesses and failed to treat the death withan open mind. Reviews and further investigative work have been undertaken butthe all important first hours of this investigation, where vital evidence must bepreserved, had been lost. The failure of the investigation at that early stage has left

evidential gaps which may never be filled.

As a result Mr Balkwell lost all faith in the police service he had a right to rely on togive him the answers he sought. As a consequence he has developed his owntheories about how his son died and developed a view there was a conspiracy bythe police to cover up the circumstances of his sons death. The IPCC has soughtto find some answers for Mr Balkwell about how the police handled his case. Hecame to us with more than 130 complaints, making this a complex and difficultinvestigation to handle, especially given the length of time since Lee Balkwellsdeath.


4/147




Mr Balkwell made complaints about many police officers, some had already retiredby the time the complaints were made, 18 were served with notices, and six haveretired during our investigation. The IPCC investigation can be broken into stagesand this also helps show the chronology of events:

Initial investigation

Suspect interviews

Forensic examination

Quality and standard of Investigations

Corruption/Impartiality

Communication and quality of service

The investigation has found that many of the substantive and serious allegationshave been upheld. It is these key failures that have led to the raft of follow-upcomplaints, the speculation and the complete breakdown in communicationbetween Mr. Balkwell and Essex Police. Of the remaining complaints some arepartially substantiated and some unsubstantiated. Whilst our investigation hasprovided evidence of poor police work, we have found no evidence to support anyallegations of corruption or a conspiracy theory.

However in the light of Essex Polices prolonged failure to fully address hisconcerns, it is perhaps understandable how and why Mr. Balkwell reached suchconclusions himself.

Since the death of his son, Mr. Balkwell, with the full support of his family, hasdedicated much of his life to his campaign to find the truth about what happened. Iam deeply impressed by both Mr. Balkwells passion and commitment - which fewcould have sustained and deeply saddened that he has had to go to such lengthsto get his valid demands properly addressed. I would like to pay tribute to hisendurance and tenacity, but I am also very aware of the cost to him and his family.

This situation should never have been allowed to develop to this stage and aninevitable consequence has been that it has prolonged his agony and made itimpossible for him to even begin to come to terms with his loss. Tragically Mr.Balkwell may never get the answers to all of his questions, but I very much hopethat the IPCC investigation, together with the ongoing criminal investigation beingundertaken by the Kent and Essex Serious Crime Directorate, will provide at leastsome of the answers Mr. Balkwell is seeking. It is a testament to his dedicationthat finally the full circumstances surrounding the death of Lee Balkwell are beingexamined.

Rachel Cerfontyne

IPCC Commissioner


5/147




SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Initial response to incidentMr Balkwell claimed Essex Police had failed to carry out an effective initial

investigation at the scene, including a failure to conduct thorough and independent

interviews, identify potential witnesses or seize evidence in a timely way.

The IPCC concluded that Mr Balkwells complaints were substantiated.

The investigation determined that, although Officer A, who was the initial officer on

the scene, had complied with Essex Polices policy in relation to unnatural deaths,

he had failed to seize evidence promptly and secure it.

Further, the investigation found Officer D, who was asked to lead the investigation

and arrived on the scene at 8.52am, failed to take statements from potential

witnesses. In fact the officer was only present on the scene for 38 minutes,

although he did return later in the day when Lee Balkwells body was removed from

the cement mixer.

Two senior officers Officer C and Officer B were in supervisory roles. Officer C

did not attend the scene while Officer B attended for 10 minutes. Neither officer

considered the identification of further witnesses or directed others to do so.

In addition Officer E failed to ensure all potential witnesses that may have assisted

the investigation were identified and appropriate statements taken when he took

over the investigation.

Suspect interviews

Officer D, who was in charge of the investigation, conducted an interview on 6

August with Simon Bromley, who attended on a voluntary basis under criminal

caution. However Officer D made it clear from the outset of that interview that he

regarded the matter as a tragic accident. The interview lasted 41 minutes.

The IPCC investigation concluded the interview contained no challenging

questions and the officer led Simon Bromley in his answers and made assumptionswhen incomplete or vague answers were given.


6/147




The interview was deemed below the standard expected and lacking in both depth

and clarity. The IPCC investigation cited this as the officer not approaching the

matter with an open mind.

This error was compounded according to the IPCC investigation by a failure to re-

interview the suspect or other potential witnesses during further investigation by

Officer E and reviews of the investigation by Officer F.

Mr Balkwells complaints in this area were substantiated.

Forensic Examination

Mr Balkwell made complaints in relation to failures he perceived in Essex Polices

forensic examination of evidence. These concerned a pair of trainers, grey top and

knife from the cement mixer, the preservation of Lee Balkwells clothing and the

failure to examine Lee Balkwells belt and the tacograph from the cement mixer.

The IPCC investigation concluded photographs taken on 18 July 2002 showed a

pair of adidas trainers in the cab of the cement mixer. It is unclear whether these

belonged to Lee Balkwell, although Leslie Balkwell believes they did. There is no

evidence these trainers were seized and secured by Officer E on 18 July 2002.

Therefore this complaint is substantiated.

In fact the trainers, grey top and knife were not recovered from the cement mixer

until 4 September 2003, more than a year after the incident. However there is no

evidence that Officer E or Officer F considered these items of evidential value or

suitable for forensic analysis.

Officer G did give consideration to forensic analysis of the items during a review in

2007. At this time a decision was taken not to submit the items due to issues with

continuity. Officer G kept this matter under review.

The complaint in relation to the forensic analysis is substantiated against Officers E

and F, but unsubstantiated against Officer G.

In addition Mr Balkwell complained that he was not informed about the existence of

the trainers by Officer F and that the officer and Officer G misinformed him aboutforensic tests being conducted. The IPCC found the complaints unsubstantiated


7/147




against Officer F. This was because it has never been established whether the

trainers belonged to Lee or what evidential value they could be. Therefore there

was no obvious reason to advise Mr Balkwell about them.

However Officer G did admit he had misinformed Mr Balkwell that a forensic test

had taken place. This complaint is substantiated, although it is acknowledged this

was a genuine mistake on behalf of the officer.

The IPCC investigation found that Lee Balkwells clothing had been destroyed on

the instructions of Officer E. Evidence has been found that Lee Balkwells partner

agreed to the destruction of the clothing and that Leslie Balkwell was notified.

Therefore this complaint is unsubstantiated.

Equally a complaint that Lees belt was not forensically examined has been

unsubstantiated. The investigation recognises that Mr Balkwell has developed a

theory over time about the importance of the belt, but as the initial investigating

officers were not looking at the potential for foul play there would have been no

reason to conduct the examination. Lees partner requested the return of the belt

and this was facilitated by Officer E.

The tacograph in the cement mixer was seized by Essex Police on 18 July 2002.

However there is no evidence that Officer E undertook any examination of this

during his investigation. The IPCC believes this may have been a useful line of

enquiry. This complaint is substantiated.

Quality and Standard of investigations and reviews

Mr Balkwell made a number of complaints regarding the initial investigation

conducted by Officer E, the review conducted by Officer F and the further

investigative work conducted by Officer G.

These complaints centred on allegations that officers had failed to investigate the

alleged criminal background of some of the witnesses to the incident, that there

was a failure to consider the incident may be foul play rather than an accident, a

failure to interview or obtain statements from individuals at the scene and that

evidence was withheld from the Crown Prosecution Service.


8/147




In relation to an allegation that Officers E, F and H failed to conduct adequate

background checks on witness, the IPCC investigation concluded the complaint

was substantiated against Officer E.

In relation to allegations that Officers E, F and H failed to analyse statements fully

and failed to revisit the crime scene when conducting a review, the investigation

found the complaints unsubstantiated.

The IPCC investigation also found that an allegation that Officer E failed to

consider the possibility of foul play substantiated. It was evident the officer had not

conducted key investigative actions or followed all lines of enquiry.

Mr Balkwell complained also that Officer E in his initial investigation, and Officers F

and I in their review, failed to investigate the positioning of the kango drills which

had been used in the gunning out process. The investigation found there was no

evidence that the position of the drills was considered or whether the position was

consistent with the account of the witness. The complaint has been substantiated

against Officers E and F.

Mr Balkwell complained that phone records had not been seized as part the initial

investigation. The IPCC investigation concluded that it should have been a routine

part of the inquiry to apply for the seizure of telephone records to help support or

refute accounts given, establish timings or to identify other lines of enquiry. For that

reason the complaint against Officer E is substantiated. The complaint was

unsubstantiated against Officers F and G as there is evidence they applied for

records as part of their reviews.

Complaints were also made about how witness evidence from the ambulance and

fire service personnel who attended the incident was dealt with. The investigation

concluded the complaint that Officer E had failed to take witness statements from

ambulance staff was substantiated.

The investigation also substantiated complaints against Officer E in relation to how

he dealt with CCTV evidence and his failure to investigate the maintenance of the

cement mixer.


9/147




Allegations of Corruption

Mr Balkwell made a number of complaints that related to allegations of corruption

or corrupt behaviour by Essex Police officers. All of these complaints wereunsubstantiated.

With several complaints Mr Balkwell was unable to provide any evidence to

support his allegations. With others either the IPCC investigation found no

evidence to support the allegation or there was evidence to explain why officers

had taken the decisions they had.

It is evident the allegations in this section were the result of the lack of trust that Mr

Balkwell had developed in Essex Police due to their failures at the initial stage of

the investigation.

Communication and Quality of Service

Again, this section was made up of allegations which were evidently made as a

result of the breakdown in communications between Essex Police and the lack of

trust Mr Balkwell had in them. All of the allegations in this section have been

unsubstantiated.


10/147




Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11Terms of Reference ........................................................................................................ 13Subjects of Investigation ............................................................................................... 14Chronology of Essex Police response 18 July 2002 ................................................... 16Initial response to the incident ..................................................................................... 17

Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 19Policies and Procedures .............................................................................................. 24IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 25

Suspect Interviews ......................................................................................................... 29Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 30Policies and Procedures .............................................................................................. 34IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 35

Forensic Examination of Evidence ............................................................................... 39Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 42Policies and Procedures .............................................................................................. 45IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 46

Quality and Standard of Investigations and Reviews conducted by Essex Police .. 51Lines of Enquiry ........................................................................................................... 53Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 58Policy and Procedures ................................................................................................. 62IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 63Witnesses .................................................................................................................... 71Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 74Policies and Procedures .............................................................................................. 76IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 76CCTV ........................................................................................................................... 81Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 83IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 85Cement Mixer .............................................................................................................. 91Officer Responses ....................................................................................................... 93IPCC Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................. 96

Allegations of Corruption ............................................................................................ 102Communication and Quality of Service ...................................................................... 129

Table of contents


11/147




Introduction

1. This report concerns the complaints made by Mr Leslie Balkwell following

the death of his son, Lee Balkwell on 18 July 2002. The circumstances of

the death of Lee Balkwell were the subject of investigation by Essex

Police.

2. Lee Balkwell worked for Simon Bromley at Upminster Concrete based at

Baldwins Farm in Upminster, Essex. On 17 July 2002 Lee Balkwell was

driving a cement mixer, when a fault occurred causing the concrete that

had been in the drum to set and become solid. In order to clear out the

drum a process known as gunning out was used. This involved Lee

Balkwell and Simon Bromley entering the drum of the cement mixer and

used kango drills to break up the hardened concrete. Simon Bromley

alleged that this work started during the evening of 17 July and continued

into the early hours of the 18 July 2002.

3. At 1.03am on 18 July 2002 a 999 call was made by David Bromley,

Simons father, to request an ambulance to attend Upminster Farm. He

advised that Lee Balkwell was trapped in the drum of the lorry and was

dead. London Ambulance Service arrived and discovered Lee Balkwell

trapped between the drum and the chassis of the cement mixer. Lee

Balkwell was pronounced dead at 1.23am. Essex Police were contacted

at 1.26am and requested to attend the scene. Essex Fire Service was

also requested to attend the scene to assist with the removal of Lees

body.

4. Officer B was the on call Senior Investigating Officer during the early

hours of 18 July 2002 and he maintained responsibility for this case until it

was transferred later the same day to ex Officer E. Officer A was sent out

to the scene at 1.50am on the 18 July, he attended with PC Oldfield. They

spoke to Simon Bromley and obtained his initial account of the incident.

5. On the 19 July 2002 a post mortem examination was carried out by Dr


12/147




Michael Heath who stated that Lee Balkwells death was due to multiple

injuries consistent with him being drawn into the moving parts of a cement

mixer.

6. On the 6 August 2002, Simon Bromley was interviewed under criminal

caution. A file was submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service the same

day. A decision of no further action due to insufficient evidence was

received from the CPS on 23 August 2002.

7. Following a number of complaints made by Mr Balkwell, a review of the

initial investigation began on the 18 March 2003. Whilst this review was

still being conducted, intelligence was received in August 2004 as part of

a covert investigation which suggested that Lee Balkwell had been

murdered by Simon Bromley and a motive was provided. An investigation

into the further information, codenamed Operation Guthrie began in

January 2005. Both the review and Operation Guthrie were conducted by

Officer F.

8. Further complaints were made by Mr Balkwell and following a review of

these it was agreed by Assistant Chief Constable Brigginshaw that there

would be an investigation into the issues raised by Mr Balkwell. This

investigation was conducted by Officer G between July 2006 and

December 2009.

9. The inquest into Lee Balkwells death took place between 22 January and

5 February 2008. A verdict of unlawful killing through gross negligence /

manslaughter was reached. The matter was referred back to Essex Police

to continue any appropriate investigation.

10. Mr Balkwell wrote to the IPCC in December 2007, a referral was made by

Essex Police in February 2008 and it was decided that an Independent

investigation would be undertaken.

11. In June 2009, IPCC Senior Investigator Amanda Rowe submitted an

investigation update report following limited initial consideration of the

complaints made by Mr Balkwell. The IPCC Commissioner, Rachel

Cerfontyne made a recommendation that Essex Police should consider


13/147




appointing an external independent force to re-investigate Lee Balkwells

death.

12. Essex Police considered this recommendation and appointed Mr DavidMirfield of West Midlands Police to conduct a review of the Essex Police

investigations to identify any good or bad practice and any gaps in the

previous investigation which included whether:

It conformed to nationally approved standards

It had been thorough

It had been conducted with integrity and objectivity

No investigative opportunities had been overlooked

13. The review was completed in May 2010. A number of recommendations

were made as a result of this review.

14. In July 2010 Essex Police appointed Detective Chief Superintendent Lee

Catling of the Kent and Essex Serious Crime Directorate to address the

recommendations made by West Midlands Police. This investigation is

not yet concluded.

Terms of Reference

15. To fully investigate the police response following the death of Lee Balkwell

in line with the complaints as outlined in the matrix.

16. To consider and report on whether any criminal or disciplinary offence

may have been committed by any police officer or member of police staff

involved, and whether there was compliance with relevant local and

national policies/ guidelines.

17. To consider and report on whether there is:

Learning for any police officer or member of police staff; or

Organisational learning for the police service including;


14/147




Any change in police policy or practice that would help to prevent a

recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated.

Any good practice that should be disseminated.

Subjects of Investigation

18. All serving officers subject of complaint were served with Regulation 9

notices by the IPCC in accordance with the Police [Conduct] Regulations

2004. These regulations have now been superseded by the Police(Complaints and Misconduct) Amendments Regulations 2008.

19. Some officers subject of complaint had retired before the complaints were

made or during the IPCC investigation and were therefore no longer

subject to the regulations. For ease of reference, officers who have retired

will be referred to using the rank they held at the time and any officers

who have changed rank will also be referred to using the rank they held at

the time of the incident to which the complaint relates to.

20. Former Officer R was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December

2008 in relation to complaints regarding decision making and alleged

failure to respond to correspondence.

21. Officer T was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to alleged failures to respond to correspondence.

22. Officer S was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 7 July 2009 in relation

to a complaint regarding decision making.

23. Former Officer E was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December

2008 in relation to a number of complaints regarding the investigation he

conducted into Lee Balkwells death.

24. Officer F was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 5 December 2008 in

relation to a number of complaints regarding his management of the

review of the initial investigation into Lee Balkwells death and other


15/147




investigative work he conducted.

25. Officer G was served with Regulation 9 notices on 5 December 2008, 2

July 2009 and 25 May 2011 in relation to his management of the reviewand further investigative work he conducted into Lee Balkwells death.

26. Officer M was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to complaints regarding communication with Mr Balkwell and

supervision of investigations into Lee Balkwells death.

27. Officer B was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 2 July 2009 in relation

to his oversight of the initial Essex Police response to the incident on 18

July 2002.

28. Officer H was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to his involvement in the review conducted into the initial

investigation.

29. Officer C was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 21 January 2009 in

relation to his involvement in the initial Essex Police response to the

incident on 18 July 2002.

30. Officer K was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to the conduct of a prison visit in 2005 linked to the investigation

into Lee Balkwells death.

31. Officer D was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 3 December 2008 in

relation to his involvement in the initial investigation into Lee Balkwells

death and his conduct at the inquest.

32. Officer A was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 21 July 2009 in relation

to his involvement in the initial Essex Police response to the incident on

18 July 2002.

33. Officer O was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to the production of computer images in preparation for the

inquest into Lee Balkwells death.

34. Officer L was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 19 December 2008 in


16/147




relation to his involvement in the review into the initial investigation into

Lee Balkwells death and the conduct of a prison visit conducted in 2005.

35. Officer U was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 inrelation to the alleged inadequate review of CCTV footage.

36. Officer V was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to the alleged inadequate review of CCTV footage.

37. Officer P was served with a Regulation 9 notice on 4 December 2008 in

relation to his involvement in the initial investigation into Lee Balkwells

death.

Chronology of Essex Police response 18 July200238. Simon Bromley stated that due to a malfunction of the cement mixer he

and Lee Balkwell had to remove hardened concrete from the drum

commencing in the evening of 17th

July. He stated that this continued

throughout the evening and resumed after a break for food at

approximately 11.30pm.

39. At 1.03am an emergency call was made to request an ambulance. This

call was made by David Bromley but Simon Bromley also provided

information during the call. An ambulance was dispatched arriving at

Baldwins Farm at 1.20am.

40. Essex Police received a call at 1.26am reporting the incident. The Essex

Police incident log, scene log and statements from attending officers detail

subsequent events as follows:

1.43am Officer A was made aware of the incident.

1.44am - Duty Inspector Croft was informed of the incident.

1.50am Officer A and PC Oldfield attended the scene to make initial

enquiries.

02.05am Offcer A informed the Control Room that initial indications


17/147




were that the incident was an industrial accident. A request was made

for the attendance of a Scenes of Crime Officer [SOCO] and the

Health and Safety Executive.

02.10am - Duty Inspector Croft attended the scene of the incident

02.35am Officer A took possession of the CCTV footage from the

security system from Simon Bromleys premises at Baldwins Farm.

02.40am Officer A contacted ex Officer C and advised him of the

incident.

03.20am Ex Officer C provided further instructions to Officer A

regarding preservation of the scene.

03.40am Ex Officer C advised the on call Senior Investigating Officer,

Officer B of the incident and sought further clarification. Officer B took

overall responsibility for the investigation of the incident at this point

and made a number of policy decisions.

04.48am Coroners Officer, Phillip Sitch arrived at the scene.

05.10am Dr Sadheura arrived at the scene.

05.15am death of Lee Balkwell certified by Dr Sadheura

07.52am Scene of Crime Officer Wojcik attended the scene to take

photographs and video footage.

07.54am Officer P attended the scene

08.52am Officer D attended the scene

09.20am Officer B attended the scene

12.00pm Following a briefing at Grays Police Station Senior

Investigating Officer responsibility transfers from Officer B to former

Officer E.

1.00pm Officer D was appointed as officer in the case.

2.27pm Lee Balkwells body was removed from the cement mixer by

Essex Fire and Rescue team.

Initial response to the incident41. Mr Balkwell made a number of complaints in relation to the initial Essex


18/147




Police response to the incident as follows:

Complaint 133: That Officer A failed to promptly seize Simon

Bromleys t-shirt after seeing blood on it, giving Simon Bromleytime to change or attempt to change his clothing.

Complaint 56: That Officer B and ex Officer C failed to interview

witnesses present at Baldwins Farm or direct other officers to do

so. This complaint is also part of the general complaint against

ex Officer E that he failed to conduct a thorough and

comprehensive investigation.

Complaint 91: That Officer B and Officer D failed to carry out aneffective initial investigation when attending the scene on the 18th

July 2002.

42. Mr Balkwell alleged that Officer A arrived at the scene at 1.50am and did

not seize Simon Bromleys clothing until 3.20am. He believed that Officer

A failed to promptly seize the clothing after seeing what may have been

blood on it and that this allowed Simon Bromley the opportunity to change

or attempt to change his clothing.

43. Mr Balkwell alleged that all potential witnesses present at Baldwins Farm

at the time of the incident were not identified and interviewed either during

the initial attendance at the scene or subsequently during the investigation

conducted by ex Officer E. He complained that Officer B and Officer C

should have ensured that this important action was carried out promptly,

either by themselves or by directing other officers to do so whilst the initialinvestigation was under their control. The complaint of failing to identify

and take statements from appropriate witnesses was also part of the

general complaint against ex Officer E that he failed to conduct a thorough

and comprehensive investigation.

44. He further alleged that Officer D under the direction of Officer B did not

carry out an effective initial investigation when attending the scene on the

18 July 2002 and this included the failure to identify and interview all


19/147




potential witnesses.

Officer Responses

45. Officer A provided a written response which was received on 3 May 2011.

He confirmed that he was the duty Sergeant on 18 July 2002. He stated

there were a number of priorities facing him on arrival at the scene and

the need to quickly address these created conflicting demands on the time

and resources available to him. He advised it was not possible to conduct

all tasks simultaneously with equal urgency and that time was required to

collate, assess and consult before acting on any decisions made either by

him or senior officers.

46. Officer A went on to detail 14 tasks that required his attention.

47. He stated that it was clear from his original notes that whilst he was talking

to Simon Bromley he saw what he believed to be a smear of blood on the

t-shirt Simon Bromley was wearing. He said that relevance of this

apparent blood was still unclear whilst enquiries and tasks aimed at

establishing the facts were still taking place.

48. Officer A stated that after some of the enquiries were progressed he was

able to consult with the duty Inspector and on call Detective Inspector. A

number of fast track actions were identified including the seizure of the

clothing Simon Bromley had been wearing at the time of the incident.

49. He confirmed that Simon Bromley did change his clothing after his arrival

at the farm but gave no grounds to suspect he intended to interfere with or

dispose of the clothing. He stated that Simon Bromley was not underarrest and he did not therefore have the power to restrict his movements

or actions.

50. Officer A did not believe he failed to promptly seize Simon Bromleys

clothing. He stated that the clothing was seized and packaged correctly in

a timely fashion, prior to it being washed or when any significant

deterioration in forensic evidence could reasonably be expected to have

occurred. In addition, he believed the clothing was seized in a manner


20/147




designed to secure any forensic or trace evidence; including consideration

to appropriate packaging, continuity and secure storage. He considered

his actions to be appropriate given the circumstances known at that time

and stated his actions did not result in a loss of significant evidence.

51. Officer B was the on call Senior Investigating Officer on 18 July 2002. He

provided a written response dated 27July 2011.

52. In relation to the allegation that he failed to interview witnesses present at

Baldwins Farm, Officer B stated that he secured an initial account from

Simon Bromley. He then established whether or not Mr Bromley

appeared to have consumed alcohol and secured and preserved his

clothing.

53. He stated that house to house enquiries took place on his orders along

the track leading up to and beyond Baldwins Farm.

54. Officer B also advised that statements were taken from ambulance and

fire crews, although not at the scene as he maintained that they had

duties to perform and it would not have been appropriate to take

statements at that time. He said that approaches for statements from

emergency staff should be made to the appropriate management of those

services so as not to interfere with their duties.

55. He went on to state that had the witnesses been civilians for example a

passer by, he would have secured a statement at the scene as he

recognised a witness may prove difficult to find or unwilling to assist.

56. Officer B focused on the fire and emergency crews in his written responseand advised that he had no concern that they would not readily assist the

investigation. He does not mention the other potential witnesses who lived

at Baldwins Farm such as Simon Bromleys parents David and Linda

Bromley, his brother Scott Bromley and his partner Susan Lawrence.

57. In response to the allegation that he failed to conduct an effective initial

investigation when attending the scene on 18 July 2002, Officer B

maintained that he acted properly and expeditiously with the standard of


21/147




skill and care expected of an officer of his rank and experience.

58. He stated that he made a decision at 3.45am on 18 July 2002 to treat the

matter as a homicide as he considered there were gross negligencemanslaughter issues to examine.

59. He contended that the scene was properly secured, photographed and

video recorded. He referred to his policy decisions, which he said

demonstrated that he was fully aware of what needed to be done to

conduct an effective initial investigation.

60. Officer B said that he made a decision not to arrest Simon Bromley at the

scene and he did not believe that this prejudiced the subsequent

investigation. He also stated that Simon Bromleys clothing was seized

and further enquiries were considered appropriate. He stated that he set

out fast track actions in a rough book which he believed was handed to

Officer D but had now been lost.

61. Ex Officer C provided a written response dated 4 April 2011. He stated

that he was the on call Detective Inspector for the Thurrock Division on 18

July 2002. He stated he was first contacted at 2.50am and was performing

this role from home. He did not attend the scene at any point.

62. He advised that he was told by Officer A that there were two potential

witnesses: Simon Bromley and his father David Bromley. He stated that

Officer A told him that David Bromley had stated he was asleep at the

time of the incident. Ex Officer C therefore concluded that taking a

witness statement from David Bromley was not an immediate priority and

that it could be taken during the course of the investigation as is normal

practice.

63. Ex Officer C stated that he was advised that Simon Bromley had provided

an initial account to Officer A. He considered whether Simon Bromley

should be arrested and stated he discussed this with Officer B. He stated

that they agreed that the most appropriate course of action was to

preserve the scene with the body in situ to enable a full forensic

examination in the morning. They agreed Simon Bromley should not be


22/147




arrested at the time but would be interviewed, most probably under

caution, when the investigation had established the facts. He therefore

stated it was not appropriate to seek any further witness testimony from

Simon Bromley.

64. Ex Officer C stated that his involvement in the incident ended at 4.50am

on 18 July 2002.

65. Ex Officer E provided a written response on 19 August 2011. In response

to the general allegation he failed to conduct a thorough and

comprehensive investigation he stated that he kept an open mind and

conducted a search for the truth. He stated that this allegation had

already been investigated as part of an Essex Police investigation under

the Police Complaints Authority, there were no findings against him and

no further action was taken.

66. Officer D was posted to the CID team based at Grays Police Station. He

stated in his written response that he was made aware of the incident at

Baldwins Farm during a telephone call from ex Officer C who was his

immediate line manager at the time. He was informed that there had been

an incident involving a male who had been crushed in a cement mixer

lorry and told that he would be responsible for dealing with the

investigation. He stated he was also informed that it appeared, on first

impression, to be an industrial accident. He was further briefed that

Officer A had attended overnight and that CCTV had been seized.

67. Officer D stated that he arrived at Baldwins Farm sometime on the

morning of the 18 July 2002 where he saw a cement mixer which had

been cordoned off by police tape. There was also a pile of what he

thought was loose and broken cement with kango drills situated either

side of the cement lorry. He was aware of the position of Lee Balkwells

body but this was screened from his view at the time.

68. Officer D spoke to Simon Bromley, who he was aware had been with Lee

Balkwell prior to his death. He formed the opinion that Simon Bromley

was distressed and appeared tired. He explained that he would be


23/147




investigating the circumstances as to what had happened the previous

evening.

69. He stated he had no information or any suspicion that the death was as aresult of any criminal activity and stated had that been the case a Major

Incident Team would have been assigned from the start. He asserted that

he maintained an open mind as to what may have taken place and

assessed Simon Bromleys behaviour and reaction to questions.

70. Officer D obtained a brief account of the circumstances of the incident

from Simon Bromley. He also asked him about the CCTV system at the

farm, and asked to see the camera views on the monitor. He stated that

this appeared consistent with Simon Bromleys account.

71. He explained to Simon Bromley that he would more than likely be

expected to attend a formal interview. He advised that the seized CCTV

footage would be examined. He also explained that there would need to

be a forensic examination of the vehicle, a subsequent examination to

assess its mechanical state, and that a post mortem would take place.

72. Officer D stated that Simon Bromley did not give him any cause for

concern or suspicion that he was either lying or involved in any

premeditated crime against Lee Balkwell. However he was also aware

that there would be further enquiries required which may assist.

73. Officer D considered that there were potential grounds for suspecting that

the death was due to dangerous and negligent practices whilst cleaning

out the cement mixer drum and that he should seek advice from the

Health and Safety Executive as soon as possible.

74. Officer D also spoke to David Bromley whilst at the farm who confirmed

that he had not witnessed the incident and he confirmed that there was no

one else present at the time. Officer D stated that he did not consider it

lawful or appropriate to search the address and had no grounds for

arresting Simon Bromley. He advised if he had any such suspicions he

would have discussed with ex Officer C and decisions would have been


24/147




made at management level as to the appropriate course of action.

Policies and Procedures

75. This incident concerned a homicide or an unnatural death and should

therefore have been investigated in line with the Essex Police policy in

relation to homicides and unnatural deaths, supplemented by the Murder

Investigation Manual 2000 guidance.

76. Essex Police policy in relation to homicides and unnatural deaths stated A

uniformed Inspector will attend the scene of all unnatural deaths. It is the

Inspectors responsibility to consider how the person may have met

his/her death. The Inspector must consider what police action should be

taken. If homicide or corporate manslaughter is suspected a Detective

Inspector or Detective Chief Inspector from the Division must attend.

77. The actions that should take place during the initial police response to the

report of an unnatural death were contained in the Essex Police policy

above. These were to:

Make every effort to save life if it is considered possible the personmay still be alive.

Ensure the scene is preserved.

Call Essex Ambulance Service to certify death.

Provide support and comfort to the deceased family

Obtain details of what any witnesses can say and if appropriate

obtain statements.

Inform Coroners Officer.

78. Recovery of physical evidence during attendance at a scene is an

absolutely vital part of the investigation process. The Murder Manual

2000 stated at Chapter 5.3.7 that fast track actions in relation to scene

forensics are vital to the success of the investigation. A detailed, planned,

professional approach will ensure a greater chance of success: THINK

recovery of physical evidence. THINK interpretation of physical evidence.


25/147




THINK forensic strategies.

79. The identification of potential witnesses was also a fast track action

contained within the Murder Manual 2000 at Chapter 4.1.3 which stated amost important source of evidence will be the identification of witnesses.

Focused questioning at the crime scene affords an opportunity to

establish the identity of witnesses and secure evidential material and at

Chapter5.5 which stated The identification and interviewing of potential

witnesses is crucial to establishing and securing key facts early in the

investigation.

IPCC Findings and Conclusions

80. Although the circumstances of the death were not known at the time of the

initial response by Essex Police, it could already be concluded that it was

an unnatural death.

81. Officer A complied with Essex Police policy in relation to unnatural deaths

in carrying out the actions detailed as part of the initial police response.

82. He arrived at the scene at 1.50am and was faced with a number of tasks.

He sought advice from the on call duty Inspector and ex Officer C.

83. Officer A made a series of contemporaneous trigger notes on a piece of

paper when he attended the scene. A copy of these notes has been

examined by the IPCC investigation team. Below an entry timed at

1.57am are the words [Blood on back t shirt]. It is more likely than not

that these words were written at the time the entry was made.

84. Simon Bromleys clothing was seized at 03.20am, an hour and thirty

minutes after Officer As arrival. Although it is accepted that Officer A and

his colleague PC Oldfield had a number of other tasks to consider,

preservation of physical evidence should be considered a priority. Simon

Bromley subsequently had time to change his clothing and although there

is no evidence to suggest that the correct clothing was not secured,

prompt seizure of the clothing would have negated any risk. Officer A was


26/147




entitled to request the clothing whether Mr Bromley was a witness or a

suspect. Consideration of arrest to enable the seizure would only have

been necessary if Simon Bromley refused to comply with a request from

Officer A. Evidence shows that the clothing was seized shortly after

consultation with ex Officer C. It was appropriate and necessary to seize

the clothing and this should have taken place as soon as Officer A was

aware of the potential evidence, which on the balance of probabilities was

more likely than not to have been at the time he made his notes at

1.57am.

85. The complaint against Officer Ain relation to the failure to promptly

seize clothing is therefore substantiated.

86. The majority of actions detailed as part of the Essex Police policy initial

response to unnatural deaths had been carried out by the officers who

initially attended the scene, under the direction of ex Officer C and Officer

B. However, the identification of all potential witnesses had not taken

place by the time Officer B and Officer D attended the scene.

87. Officer D stated at the inquest into Lee Balkwells death that his role as

the Investigating Officer in the case was To deal with the incident, to

establish what happened and to decide whether there is any criminal

issues that need to be presented to the CPS

88. Officer D arrived at the scene at 8.52am on 18 July 2002 and left at

9.30am. He stated in his written response that he spoke to Simon Bromley

and David Bromley. There is no evidence that he took a witness statement

from David Bromley or any other person present at Baldwins Farm at the

time of the incident including Simon Bromleys mother, brother and

partner. Although, on the facts of what was known at the time, Simon

Bromley appeared to be the only eye witness to the incident, other

witnesses could have provided important information that may have

assisted the investigation. This included an account of Simon Bromleys

first report of the incident to them, background information about his and

Lee Balkwells relationship and information regarding movements during


27/147




the day and evening of 17/18 July 2002.

89. Officer B and ex Officer C performed supervisory roles because they were

on call, and provided advice and guidance by telephone contact withofficers. Ex Officer C did not attend the scene and would not have been

expected to take statements from potential witnesses himself. Officer B

did attend the scene but as the Senior Investigating Officer he would not

have been expected to interview potential witnesses himself. However

both ex Officer C and Officer B should have directed officers to identify all

potential witnesses as part of the normal initial response to a homicide or

unnatural death as per the Essex Police policy and Murder Manual

guidance.

90. Ex Officer C was advised by Officer A that there were two potential

witnesses and he did not consider the interview of David Bromley to be a

priority at the time of the initial response, expecting the interview to take

place subsequently during the investigation. There is no evidence that he

considered the identification of any further potential witnesses.

91. Examination of Officer Bs policy book in relation to the decisions he made

on 18 July 2002 made reference to notes made in a rough book and

states that initial fast track actions are outlined in my rough book. This

rough book was not made available to the IPCC investigation. Notes of an

interview on 29 September 2003 between Officer F and Officer B during a

review of the initial investigation refer to this rough book and state that it

could not be found following enquiries at Grays police station. It is

therefore unknown what fast track actions were identified.

92. Officer B made an initial policy decision at 3.45am that a homicide

investigation should be carried out and detailed his rationale as it is

apparent there are elements to this investigation that indicate the

possibility of gross negligence manslaughter that will need to be

examined. Presumably this was based on other officers initial

assessment of the incident as Officer B did not attend the scene at this

time.


28/147




93. A decision was also made at 3.45am that Simon Bromley was not to be

arrested. The rationale for this decision stated that Simon Bromleys

clothing had been seized and there was no suggestion he had been

drinking and therefore the necessary evidence had been secured.

94. The scene log showed that Officer B entered the scene at 9.20am and

exited at 9.30am. He stated in the interview with Officer F on 29

September 2003 that he attended the scene but did not speak to Simon

Bromley or any other members of the Bromley family. There is no

evidence that Officer B considered the identification of any further

potential witnesses or directed others to do so.

95. The IPCC has found no evidence that witness statements from the

Bromley family were subsequently taken during ex Officer Es

investigation. There is no evidence of a witness strategy detailed in his

policy book or of any policy decision in relation to the identification of

further witnesses. The file sent to CPS for consideration of charges

against Simon Bromley contained only five statements. No statements

were present from the following:

David, Linda or Scott Bromley who were all present on the night of the

incident.

Susan Lawrence [partner of Simon Bromley]

Lorraine Mitchinson [partner of Lee Balkwell]

Other officers who attended the scene on the night of the incident

Ambulance/paramedic staff

Fire Brigade staff involved in extracting Lee Balkwells body

Pathologist who conducted the post mortem

Any representative at the examination of the vehicle on 24 th July 2002

or expert on the mechanics of the vehicle

96. Evidence from these witnesses may have been important to the

investigation and statements should have been taken during any thorough

and comprehensive investigation as per the Murder Manual guidance.

97. This complaint is therefore substantiated in relation to Officer B, ex


29/147




Officer C and ex Officer E failing to ensure that all potential

witnesses that may have assisted the investigation were identified

and appropriate statements taken.

98. Officer D initially attended at the scene for 38 minutes although he

returned later that day when Lee Balkwells body was removed from the

cement mixer. He clearly took Simon Bromleys account of being the only

person present at face value and does not appear to have considered the

identification of other potential witnesses who may have proved or

disproved Simon Bromleys initial account or provided other

supplementary evidence to assist the investigation. This had a

detrimental effect on the subsequent investigation under ex Officer Es

supervision as there is no evidence that witness statements from other

members of the Bromley family were taken or submitted to CPS for

consideration.

99. This complaint is therefore substantiated in relation to Officer D

failing to indentify all potential witnesses when he initially attended

the scene on 18 July 2002.

Suspect Interviews100. In relation to the suspect interview with Simon Bromley conducted during

the Essex Police investigation and consideration of suspect interviews

generally Mr Balkwell alleged :

Complaint 53: That Officer D failed to conduct a thorough,

independent interview of Simon Bromley on 6 August 2002.

Complaint 52: That ex Officer E and Officer F failed to re-interview

Simon Bromley despite further evidence coming to light following

his initial interview.

Complaint 70: That ex Officer E, Officer F and ex Officer G failed

to interview David and Scott Bromley under caution.

101. Mr Balkwell contended that Officer D conducted a weak interview as he

said at the outset that his view was that he was dealing with a tragic


30/147




accident. He complained that Officer D used leading questions and

assisted Simon Bromley by suggesting answers to difficult questions.

102. Mr Balkwell complained that ex Officer E and Officer F did not re-interviewSimon Bromley despite further evidence coming to light. He stated that

the initial account given by Simon Bromley in the interview on 6 August

2002 should have been challenged and this would have assisted the

investigations and possibly identified further lines of enquiry.

103. Mr Balkwell alleged that all three Senior Investigating Officers deliberately

failed to interview David Bromley or Scott Bromley under caution during

their investigations when he felt there was sufficient evidence to do so.

He felt that there were inconsistencies in the witness statements from

members of the Bromley family and the evidence they gave at the inquest.

Mr Balkwell also stated that he was aware of previous criminal convictions

in relation to David and Scott Bromley and believed that this should have

been taken into consideration when making decisions regarding suspect

interviews.

Officer Responses

104. Simon Bromley was interviewed by Officer D and Detective Constable

Andrew Jose on 6 August 2002. The interview was conducted on a

voluntary basis under criminal caution and lasted 41 minutes.

105. In his written response received 4 April 2011, Officer D stated that he

made arrangements for Simon Bromley to be interviewed on a date prior

to 6 August 2002, however his solicitor had been unable to attend. Officer

D stated it had been his intention to interview Simon Bromley on a

voluntary basis but under caution and that this was compliant with the

Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the codes of practice at the time.

106. He stated that there were grounds to interview Mr Bromley but no

justification to arrest him as there had been no direct evidence of any

criminal intent on his part. Officer D suspected that there were issues in

relation to safe practices in relation to the gunning out technique.


31/147




Information had been obtained from the Health and Safety Executive

representative that this practice was an unsuitable and dangerous method

of removing cement from the drum.

107. Officer D stated that the interview was compliant with the PEACE model,

the recognised model for conversational management during interviews.

He stated it was his intention to create a rapport with Mr Bromley at an

early stage to promote the best opportunity to obtain an account from him.

He felt that using a heavy handed approach would have raised issues with

Simon Bromleys solicitor and may not have facilitated an account from Mr

Bromley. Officer D accepted that the interview may have been perceived

by a layman as being too friendly but stated that this was how police

interviews should be conducted to ensure: the best opportunity to obtain

an account; the integrity of the of the process at any subsequent court

hearing; best evidence is obtained from the interview process.

108. Officer D stated that there had been no evidence at the time to indicate

that the incident was anything other than a tragic accident, although there

were issues surrounding the safe working practices adopted by SimonBromley. Officer D believed that Mr Balkwell held the same view at the

time. He therefore believed that it was appropriate to mention this to

Simon Bromley in interview in order to promote rapport and facilitate an

account.

109. It was Officer Ds intention to obtain a first account that covered the events

at Baldwins Farm. He explained that as there was no evidence of any

criminal intent or foul play, he could not challenge Simon Bromley andthere was no evidence that contradicted Simon Bromleys account in

respect of the operating of the vehicle hydraulic system and drum. It was

his intention to submit a file to the CPS to seek their views regarding the

potential for a prosecution for manslaughter by gross negligence and what

further evidence would be required to support that course of action.

110. Officer D stated that there was no contradictory CCTV footage that

required any challenging questions to be put during the interview. He


32/147




stated that he was not ill prepared as he had waited for the results of the

vehicle examination and the post mortem before undertaking the

interview.

111. Officer D stated he was aware of the legal rights of suspects and rights

under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. He contended that offering

Simon Bromley support during the interview was appropriate and that he

may have been criticised for being oppressive if his manner was heavy

handed and accusatory. He did not consider that this showed a lack of

impartiality or independence.

112. He also did not consider that the interview was short in length given the

topic material and lack of contradictory evidence for a clarification and

challenge phase. He stated that the question that required addressing

was whether the practice of gunning out amounted to gross negligence in

conjunction with the condition of the lorry when examined and what safety

procedures Simon Bromley had in place in relation to working practices.

113. He reiterated that if he or his line management suspected that it was a

suspicious death then the investigation would have been dealt with by

another team to investigate the suspected homicide. This was not the

case as there was no information, evidence or any other source

information to indicate that the death was as the result of foul play.

In relation to the complaint against ex Officer E and Officer F regarding

the alleged failure to re interview Simon Bromley, Ex Officer E provided a

written response on 19 August 2011. He stated that as far as he could

recall no new information came to light before Mr Balkwell made

allegations about him that led him to conclude his position as Senior

Investigating Officer was untenable. He subsequently referred the case to

Essex Police Professional Standards and Officer F.

114. Officer F provided a written response which was received on 9 May 2011.

He stated that the strategic approach of his review and Operation Guthrie

was that all intelligence and evidence was to be gathered before re-

interviewing Mr Bromley, this involved both covert and overt policing


33/147




methods.

115. A date had been arranged where Mr Bromley was to be re-interviewed,

however Officer F alleged Mr Balkwell had disclosed some information tothe media resulting in Simon Bromleys refusal to be interviewed. It is not

clear if Officer F considered the arrest of Simon Bromley in order to obtain

evidence by way of interview.

116. Officer F contended that Simon Bromley had been interviewed formally as

part of the initial investigation under ex Officer E. He subsequently made

a witness statement and gave evidence at the inquest into Lee Balkwells

death.

117. In relation to the complaint regarding the alleged failure to interview David

or Scott Bromley under caution made against ex Officer E, Officer F and

ex Officer G, the following responses have been received:

118. Ex Officer E stated in his written response that there were no reasonable

grounds to suspect their involvement in a crime during his investigation.

He said that as far as he could recall accounts had been given by David

and Scott Bromley before he took over the investigation from Officer B.

He further stated that as far as he could remember witness statements

were taken from them during the investigation.

119. Officer F stated in his written response that it was his view, at the

commencement of his review, that there was no prima facie evidence to

indicate that there had been any act of deliberate homicide.

120. He stated that the strategy adopted was to pursue enquiries leading up tothe interview of any persons suspected of a criminal offence. The

enquiries were undertaken and there was no evidence concerning any

member of the Bromley family that supported a contention that deliberate

homicide was committed.

121. Officer F stated that during Operation Guthrie, witness accounts were

taken from David and Scott Bromley.

122. Officer G made a written response on 26 August 2011. He stated that


34/147




both David and Scott Bromley had been interviewed under caution and

provided a witness statement together with giving evidence at the inquest.

He therefore did not consider it necessary to undertake a further interview.

He went on to state that David Bromley was spoken to by officers at his

direction during his investigation but he maintained the information in his

earlier statement and did not make an additional statement.

Policies and Procedures

123. Officer D referred to the PEACE model in his written response which is

the nationally accepted model applied to investigative interviewing.

PEACE is a mnemonic for the process of interviewing which should

include:

Preparation and planning

Engage and explain

Account, clarification and challenge

Closure

Evaluation

124. The Murder Manual 2000 refers to the interviews of suspects and

witnesses at Chapter 5.5 Interviews should be as accurate and detailed

as possible and to this end interviews with witnesses and suspects should

follow the PEACE model endorsed by the ACPO Steering Group on

Investigative interviewing.

125. At Chapter 7.5 guidance is given regarding interview strategy and it

states: The SIO must play an active role and should be influential indeveloping an interview strategy. This chapter also gives advice about

raising actions to check alibis or accounts given in interview, debriefing

interviews and consideration of obtaining specialist advice prior to and

during interviews.

126. The ACPO Steering Group on Investigative Interviewing gave direction in

the Home Office Circular 22/1992 in relation to the seven fundamental

principles of investigative interviewing as follows


35/147




The role of investigative interviewing is to obtain accurate and reliable

information from suspects, witnesses or victims in order to discover the

truth about matters under investigation

Investigative interviewing should be approached with an open mind.

Information obtained from a person who is being interviewed should

always be tested against what the interviewing officer already knows or

what can reasonably be established.

When questioning anyone, a police officer must act fairly in the

circumstances of each individual case.

A police officer is not bound to accept the first answer given.

Questioning is not unfair merely because it is persistent.

Even when the right of silence is exercised by a suspect, police will

have the right to put questions.

When conducting an interview, police officers are free to ask questions

in order to establish the truth, except for interviews with child victims of

sexual or violent abuse which are to be used in criminal proceedings.

They are not constrained by the rules applied to lawyers at Court.

Vulnerable people, whether victims or suspects, must be treated with

particular consideration at all times.

IPCC Findings and Conclusions

127. The interview with Simon Bromley was opened by Officer D who informed

Mr Bromley that he was being investigated for an offence of involuntary

manslaughter, but then went on to say that I prefer to say that we are

investigating what I consider to be a tragic accident on the 18 July. This

comment does not demonstrate an open mind. The comment is evidence

that although Simon Bromley is being interviewed in relation to a very

serious offence, Officer D has already decided that the matter was an

accident. Officer D refers to the incident as an accident throughout the

interview.

128. The offence of involuntary manslaughter includes manslaughter by gross


36/147




negligence and is a complex offence with a number of elements that need

to be proven:

That the defendant owed a duty to the deceased to take care;

That the defendant breached this duty;

That the breach caused the death of the deceased; and

That the defendants negligence was gross, that is, it showed such a

disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime and

deserve punishment.

129. These elements should have been covered during any interview so that

evidence in relation to the potential offence could be assessed by the

Crown Prosecution Service. The IPCC has found little evidence of

consideration of these elements beyond superficial questioning regarding

the appropriate working environment and suitability of equipment.

130. Officer D stated that he followed the PEACE model. Although the

interview followed the basic structure of the model there is no evidence of

a challenge phase. At times Simon Bromley is led in his answers and

assumptions are made about what he means when giving incomplete or

vague answers.

131. Examination of the transcript of the interview demonstrates that Officer D

lacked sufficient knowledge of the mechanics of a cement mixer, normal

working practices and the gunning out procedure to probe or challenge

Simon Bromleys answers. When asking about the gunning out

procedure Officer D said Its just this is something that people may ask at

a later date that Ive got no knowledge of.

132. Evaluation of the information provided during the interview should take

place either during breaks in the interview or at the conclusion to ensure

that all points have been addressed. There was no break in the interview

in order to evaluate the evidence provided.

133. The IPCC have found no evidence of consultation with the Health and

Safety Executive in relation to the information provided. Despite Officer


37/147




Ds lack of knowledge of the mechanics of a cement mixer or the gunning

out procedure there is also no evidence of consultation with an expert

familiar with the operation of cement mixers either prior to or following the

interview.

134. Simon Bromley is offered Victim Support Services during the interview.

Although it is acknowledged that he should be dealt with fairly and in

accordance to his legal rights, this service is normally offered to victims of

crime or witnesses to a crime rather than suspects. This is further

evidence of lack of independence.

135. Officer D did not conduct a thorough interview. The interview fell below

the standard expected and lacked both depth and clarity. The IPCC has

found that there is evidence that Officer D did not approach the matter

with an open mind and it therefore also lacked independence.

136. The complaint against Officer D in relation to the conduct of the

interview is substantiated.

137. In relation to the allegation that he failed to re interview Simon Bromley,

Officer E stated that no new information came to light whilst he remained

Senior Investigating Officer on the case.

138. He made a policy decision on 24 July 2002 that there would not be a joint

interview conducted by police and the Health and Safety Executive. The

IPCC can find no recorded rationale for this decision. It may have

benefited the investigation to conduct a joint interview as Health and

Safety Executive staff would be presumably be more familiar with Health

and Safety law and working practices than Officer D appeared to be.

139. New information was obviously provided during the interview of Simon

Bromley on 6 August 2002. It concluded at 3.43pm and a policy decision

was made by ex Officer E at 5.00pm to submit the advice file to the Crown

Prosecution Service as the enquiry has no information to suggest that the

deceased died in circumstances other than as reported/described by

suspect. This demonstrated little or no evaluation of the answers given in

interview or any testing of the account against other available evidence


38/147




before making a decision just over an hour after the interview concluded.

There is no evidence of any further lines of enquiry being identified from

the account given by Simon Bromley.

140. Consideration of the re-interview of Simon Bromley should have been

made by ex Officer E following evaluation of Simon Bromleys account,

testing against other evidence and possibly seeking expert advice from an

appropriate witness familiar with the mechanics of a cement mixer and

general working practices.

141. Officer F refers to Simon Bromley refusing to be interviewed due to an

alleged disclosure by Mr Balkwell. He does not state if Mr Bromley was to

be interviewed as a suspect or a witness or when this happened.

142. On 16 June 2004 a witness statement was taken from Simon Bromley.

This was during the period of the review undertaken by Officer F.

143. However, Officer F made a policy decision on 23 February 2005 that

Simon Bromley was a suspect in the Operation Guthrie investigation.

There is no evidence of any further policy decision regarding any deviation

from that position. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to the

contrary, a further interview of Simon Bromley would have been

appropriate. The IPCC has found no evidence that this took place or that

Officer F considered the arrest of Simon Bromley when he refused to be

interviewed.

144. The complaint that ex Officer E and Officer F failed to re interview

Simon Bromley is therefore substantiated.

145. In relation to the allegation that David and Scott Bromley should have

been interviewed under caution by ex Officer E, Officer F and ex Officer

G:

146. Ex Officer E is mistaken in his assertion that accounts were taken from

David and Scott Bromley before he took over the investigation from Officer

B. There is no evidence that statements were taken from them during his

investigation.


39/147




147. Witness statements were taken from David Bromley on 26 July 2004 and

from Scott Bromley on 9 November 2004 during the investigation under

Officer Fs supervision.

148. Ex Officer G is mistaken when he stated that both David and Scott

Bromley had been interviewed under caution although he is correct that

they both gave witness statements and gave evidence at inquest.

149. Mr Balkwells complaint is in relation to David and Scott Bromley being

interviewed under caution as suspects. In order to interview individuals as

a suspect under caution there must be reasonable grounds to suspect

they have committed an offence. Previous criminal records do not

constitute reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed

another criminal offence.

150. The IPCC has found no evidence to suspect David or Scott Bromley had

committed an offence in relation to this incident and therefore it was not

appropriate for them to be interviewed under criminal caution as suspects.

151. This complaint is therefore unsubstantiated.

Forensic Examination of Evidence152. In relation to the forensic examination of evidence by Essex Police Mr

Balkwell alleged:

Complaint 36: That ex Officer E failed to recover a pair of trainers

from the cement mixer.

Complaint 108: That ex Officer E, Officer F and ex Officer G all

failed to forensically examine the trainers, a grey top and a knife

which were present in the cab of the cement mixer at the time of

the incident and recovered from the cement mixer at a later date.

Complaint 132: That ex Officer E failed to preserve Lee Balkwells


40/147




clothing, allowed it to be destroyed.

Complaint 119: That ex Officer E failed to have Lee Balkwells belt

forensically examined.

Complaint 121: That ex Officer E failed to have the tachograph

from the cement mixer forensically examined.

153. In addition to his allegations regarding forensic examinations Mr Balkwell

also made allegations in relation to how information regarding the trainers

was communicated to him. He alleged :

Complaint 81: That Offic

les balkwell final report published with foreword feb 1

Documents