leonardo and the future
TRANSCRIPT
Leonardo
Leonardo and the FutureAuthor(s): Albert GarrettSource: Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter, 1983), p. 79Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575088 .
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Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 79-80, 1983 Printed in Great Britain Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 79-80, 1983 Printed in Great Britain Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 79-80, 1983 Printed in Great Britain Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 79-80, 1983 Printed in Great Britain
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0024-094X/83/010079-02$03.00/0 Pergamon Press Ltd.
0024-094X/83/010079-02$03.00/0 Pergamon Press Ltd.
0024-094X/83/010079-02$03.00/0 Pergamon Press Ltd.
LETTERS LETTERS LETTERS LETTERS
Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English. Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English. Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English. Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English.
LEONARDO AND THE FUTURE
I am very pleased indeed to hear about Leonardo's continuation. In my life as an artist and writer Leonardo is the great publishing event. At the Polytechnic of North London we have all the issues bound permanently for reference. Such is its importance;Leonardo's future should now be of even greater importance with 15 years of the younger generation waiting for you to give them guidance, facts and analyses-of the subject for what it is: art, science and technology. At the Polytechnic Leonardo has been to all intents and purposes a younger generation "United Nations"-please keep it as international as is possible within your means. I shall support this concept as long as I am able.
Albert Garrett 10 Sunningdale Ave. Eastcote, Ruislip
Middlesex HA4 9SR, England
ON THE IDEA OF ORDER IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE VISUAL ARTS
Giorgio Careri tells us (Leonardo 15, 19 (1982)) that 'to understand means to produce a kind of order'; and that 'to think means to establish order'; and that the construction of what he calls 'signs' (i.e. 'a mark or a collection of marks that signifies some thing either by resemblance or by convention') is the means by which order is both made and, under favourable conditions, the means by which 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society'.
So far so good. The recognition of order and communication about order are (to put it crudely) epistemic activities of representation. How, then, shall order in art and in science be distinguished? Professor Careri seems to me to make two subtly related and mistaken sorties in the direction of an answer.
1. He tells us that there is an aesthetic order detectable in (at least some) art works. But if this is so, doesn't it follow that if this order is to be significantly apprehended (recognized as aesthetically orderly) it must in its turn be represented by a 'sign'? And why should not these representational apprehensions ('signs') themselves have aesthetic order? If so, how shall this be recognized? And so on, infinitely....
2. Professor Careri tells us that 'In art one deals with a personal collection of nonverbal data, the price to be paid for confronting alone the complexities of reality that can only offer subjective impressions.' His suggestion seems to be that the aesthetically orderly 'signs' generated by artists are not of a kind such that even under the most favourable conditions 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society' about their use. But if the artist cannot in principle expect to share the meaningful use of a 'sign' with any other person, how can he expect to share it even with himself, on another occasion? What sort of 'sign' can it be that has no regular communicative potential whatsoever?
The two ideas, that art is essentially aesthetic and that it is essentially subjective, are not new and have not been fruitful. Had we not better abandon them and interpret art, like science, epistemically-as a search for new and better models of the world? It will by no means in that case prove impossible to distinguish art from science, in ways such as I have myself attempted in my article Order in Art and Science (Leonardo 15, 208 (1982)).
Donald Brook Professor of Visual Arts
Flinders University of South Australia Bedford Park 5042
Australia
LEONARDO AND THE FUTURE
I am very pleased indeed to hear about Leonardo's continuation. In my life as an artist and writer Leonardo is the great publishing event. At the Polytechnic of North London we have all the issues bound permanently for reference. Such is its importance;Leonardo's future should now be of even greater importance with 15 years of the younger generation waiting for you to give them guidance, facts and analyses-of the subject for what it is: art, science and technology. At the Polytechnic Leonardo has been to all intents and purposes a younger generation "United Nations"-please keep it as international as is possible within your means. I shall support this concept as long as I am able.
Albert Garrett 10 Sunningdale Ave. Eastcote, Ruislip
Middlesex HA4 9SR, England
ON THE IDEA OF ORDER IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE VISUAL ARTS
Giorgio Careri tells us (Leonardo 15, 19 (1982)) that 'to understand means to produce a kind of order'; and that 'to think means to establish order'; and that the construction of what he calls 'signs' (i.e. 'a mark or a collection of marks that signifies some thing either by resemblance or by convention') is the means by which order is both made and, under favourable conditions, the means by which 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society'.
So far so good. The recognition of order and communication about order are (to put it crudely) epistemic activities of representation. How, then, shall order in art and in science be distinguished? Professor Careri seems to me to make two subtly related and mistaken sorties in the direction of an answer.
1. He tells us that there is an aesthetic order detectable in (at least some) art works. But if this is so, doesn't it follow that if this order is to be significantly apprehended (recognized as aesthetically orderly) it must in its turn be represented by a 'sign'? And why should not these representational apprehensions ('signs') themselves have aesthetic order? If so, how shall this be recognized? And so on, infinitely....
2. Professor Careri tells us that 'In art one deals with a personal collection of nonverbal data, the price to be paid for confronting alone the complexities of reality that can only offer subjective impressions.' His suggestion seems to be that the aesthetically orderly 'signs' generated by artists are not of a kind such that even under the most favourable conditions 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society' about their use. But if the artist cannot in principle expect to share the meaningful use of a 'sign' with any other person, how can he expect to share it even with himself, on another occasion? What sort of 'sign' can it be that has no regular communicative potential whatsoever?
The two ideas, that art is essentially aesthetic and that it is essentially subjective, are not new and have not been fruitful. Had we not better abandon them and interpret art, like science, epistemically-as a search for new and better models of the world? It will by no means in that case prove impossible to distinguish art from science, in ways such as I have myself attempted in my article Order in Art and Science (Leonardo 15, 208 (1982)).
Donald Brook Professor of Visual Arts
Flinders University of South Australia Bedford Park 5042
Australia
LEONARDO AND THE FUTURE
I am very pleased indeed to hear about Leonardo's continuation. In my life as an artist and writer Leonardo is the great publishing event. At the Polytechnic of North London we have all the issues bound permanently for reference. Such is its importance;Leonardo's future should now be of even greater importance with 15 years of the younger generation waiting for you to give them guidance, facts and analyses-of the subject for what it is: art, science and technology. At the Polytechnic Leonardo has been to all intents and purposes a younger generation "United Nations"-please keep it as international as is possible within your means. I shall support this concept as long as I am able.
Albert Garrett 10 Sunningdale Ave. Eastcote, Ruislip
Middlesex HA4 9SR, England
ON THE IDEA OF ORDER IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE VISUAL ARTS
Giorgio Careri tells us (Leonardo 15, 19 (1982)) that 'to understand means to produce a kind of order'; and that 'to think means to establish order'; and that the construction of what he calls 'signs' (i.e. 'a mark or a collection of marks that signifies some thing either by resemblance or by convention') is the means by which order is both made and, under favourable conditions, the means by which 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society'.
So far so good. The recognition of order and communication about order are (to put it crudely) epistemic activities of representation. How, then, shall order in art and in science be distinguished? Professor Careri seems to me to make two subtly related and mistaken sorties in the direction of an answer.
1. He tells us that there is an aesthetic order detectable in (at least some) art works. But if this is so, doesn't it follow that if this order is to be significantly apprehended (recognized as aesthetically orderly) it must in its turn be represented by a 'sign'? And why should not these representational apprehensions ('signs') themselves have aesthetic order? If so, how shall this be recognized? And so on, infinitely....
2. Professor Careri tells us that 'In art one deals with a personal collection of nonverbal data, the price to be paid for confronting alone the complexities of reality that can only offer subjective impressions.' His suggestion seems to be that the aesthetically orderly 'signs' generated by artists are not of a kind such that even under the most favourable conditions 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society' about their use. But if the artist cannot in principle expect to share the meaningful use of a 'sign' with any other person, how can he expect to share it even with himself, on another occasion? What sort of 'sign' can it be that has no regular communicative potential whatsoever?
The two ideas, that art is essentially aesthetic and that it is essentially subjective, are not new and have not been fruitful. Had we not better abandon them and interpret art, like science, epistemically-as a search for new and better models of the world? It will by no means in that case prove impossible to distinguish art from science, in ways such as I have myself attempted in my article Order in Art and Science (Leonardo 15, 208 (1982)).
Donald Brook Professor of Visual Arts
Flinders University of South Australia Bedford Park 5042
Australia
LEONARDO AND THE FUTURE
I am very pleased indeed to hear about Leonardo's continuation. In my life as an artist and writer Leonardo is the great publishing event. At the Polytechnic of North London we have all the issues bound permanently for reference. Such is its importance;Leonardo's future should now be of even greater importance with 15 years of the younger generation waiting for you to give them guidance, facts and analyses-of the subject for what it is: art, science and technology. At the Polytechnic Leonardo has been to all intents and purposes a younger generation "United Nations"-please keep it as international as is possible within your means. I shall support this concept as long as I am able.
Albert Garrett 10 Sunningdale Ave. Eastcote, Ruislip
Middlesex HA4 9SR, England
ON THE IDEA OF ORDER IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE VISUAL ARTS
Giorgio Careri tells us (Leonardo 15, 19 (1982)) that 'to understand means to produce a kind of order'; and that 'to think means to establish order'; and that the construction of what he calls 'signs' (i.e. 'a mark or a collection of marks that signifies some thing either by resemblance or by convention') is the means by which order is both made and, under favourable conditions, the means by which 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society'.
So far so good. The recognition of order and communication about order are (to put it crudely) epistemic activities of representation. How, then, shall order in art and in science be distinguished? Professor Careri seems to me to make two subtly related and mistaken sorties in the direction of an answer.
1. He tells us that there is an aesthetic order detectable in (at least some) art works. But if this is so, doesn't it follow that if this order is to be significantly apprehended (recognized as aesthetically orderly) it must in its turn be represented by a 'sign'? And why should not these representational apprehensions ('signs') themselves have aesthetic order? If so, how shall this be recognized? And so on, infinitely....
2. Professor Careri tells us that 'In art one deals with a personal collection of nonverbal data, the price to be paid for confronting alone the complexities of reality that can only offer subjective impressions.' His suggestion seems to be that the aesthetically orderly 'signs' generated by artists are not of a kind such that even under the most favourable conditions 'one can reach a consensus about the order among members of a society' about their use. But if the artist cannot in principle expect to share the meaningful use of a 'sign' with any other person, how can he expect to share it even with himself, on another occasion? What sort of 'sign' can it be that has no regular communicative potential whatsoever?
The two ideas, that art is essentially aesthetic and that it is essentially subjective, are not new and have not been fruitful. Had we not better abandon them and interpret art, like science, epistemically-as a search for new and better models of the world? It will by no means in that case prove impossible to distinguish art from science, in ways such as I have myself attempted in my article Order in Art and Science (Leonardo 15, 208 (1982)).
Donald Brook Professor of Visual Arts
Flinders University of South Australia Bedford Park 5042
Australia
SIZE CONSTANCY, TERRY POPE'S GLASSES, AND THE MOON ILLUSION
David W. Brisson's description of the effect of the mirrored glasses designed by Terry Pope is highly interesting (Leonardo 15, 205 (1982)). However, I can see no basis for his conclusion that 'it is ... clear from the effect of Pope's glasses that our sense of metric space is learned'. If our sense of space were learned, how could glasses produce a new, coherent sense of space spontaneously? The design of glasses presents the wearer with the view that he would receive if the separation between his eyes were greatly increased (as it would be if his head increased enormously in size). But this view is presented with the light rerouted by mirrors so that it is seen directly in front of the viewer's eyes, which are unchanged in their experienced separation. Thus, the perceived position of each eye relative to the exterior scene, as defined by the incoming light, requires a separation, measured in terms of the exterior space, that is greater than the distance between the viewer's eyes. The simplest way to resolve this disparity is to see the world as shrunk to the point where the distance between the eyes as judged by their position in perceived exterior space corresponds to proprioceptive information for separation. The perceived diminution of the world in Pope's glasses seens explained by the Gestalt simplicity principle, just as does the perceived scale of the unreflected world.
Moreover, the explanation of the moon illusion reviewed by Brisson is needlessly complicated by the outmoded idea that it is based on recollections of learned spatial structure: 'The subjective distance of the vault of the sky is learned from the experience of looking through our lifetime at cloud layers in perspective' and 'the specific references [to spatial structure] ... are immediately absent... except in one's memory' (Brisson's italics). The moon, when it is close to the horizon, illuminates all terrestrial forms from behind. The viewer may thus determine that it is further away than anything in the landscape. Since clouds (except cumulo-nimbus clouds) tend to arrange themselves in strata, there is little information for continuous spatial extension overhead comparable to that which is provided by the continuous ground plane that we live on, and overhead distance, beyond a certain point, becomes indeterminate. The moon should therefore look further away when it is low in the sky than it does overhead (and therefore larger) simply because there is more information available to determine its distant position. There is no need to assume that one makes judgments based on a remembered spatial structure of the 'vault of the sky' to perceive a size difference.
John L. Ward Dept. of Art
302c AFA Complex University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611, U.S.A.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE STATUE
I was pleased to read The Development of a Concrete Statue by Paul F.Miller, Jr. (Leonardo 15, 224 (1982)) as it draws attention to the still unexplored potentials of using cement as a direct medium. Miller indicates some advantages of working directly with cement instead of using it as an indirect casting medium. He mentions being able to use less water to obtain more durable sculptures and points to the importance of designing in the same material instead of designing in one material and then casting in another. Also important is that adequate steel reinforcement cannot be placed inside a mold but it is easily included when working directly.
SIZE CONSTANCY, TERRY POPE'S GLASSES, AND THE MOON ILLUSION
David W. Brisson's description of the effect of the mirrored glasses designed by Terry Pope is highly interesting (Leonardo 15, 205 (1982)). However, I can see no basis for his conclusion that 'it is ... clear from the effect of Pope's glasses that our sense of metric space is learned'. If our sense of space were learned, how could glasses produce a new, coherent sense of space spontaneously? The design of glasses presents the wearer with the view that he would receive if the separation between his eyes were greatly increased (as it would be if his head increased enormously in size). But this view is presented with the light rerouted by mirrors so that it is seen directly in front of the viewer's eyes, which are unchanged in their experienced separation. Thus, the perceived position of each eye relative to the exterior scene, as defined by the incoming light, requires a separation, measured in terms of the exterior space, that is greater than the distance between the viewer's eyes. The simplest way to resolve this disparity is to see the world as shrunk to the point where the distance between the eyes as judged by their position in perceived exterior space corresponds to proprioceptive information for separation. The perceived diminution of the world in Pope's glasses seens explained by the Gestalt simplicity principle, just as does the perceived scale of the unreflected world.
Moreover, the explanation of the moon illusion reviewed by Brisson is needlessly complicated by the outmoded idea that it is based on recollections of learned spatial structure: 'The subjective distance of the vault of the sky is learned from the experience of looking through our lifetime at cloud layers in perspective' and 'the specific references [to spatial structure] ... are immediately absent... except in one's memory' (Brisson's italics). The moon, when it is close to the horizon, illuminates all terrestrial forms from behind. The viewer may thus determine that it is further away than anything in the landscape. Since clouds (except cumulo-nimbus clouds) tend to arrange themselves in strata, there is little information for continuous spatial extension overhead comparable to that which is provided by the continuous ground plane that we live on, and overhead distance, beyond a certain point, becomes indeterminate. The moon should therefore look further away when it is low in the sky than it does overhead (and therefore larger) simply because there is more information available to determine its distant position. There is no need to assume that one makes judgments based on a remembered spatial structure of the 'vault of the sky' to perceive a size difference.
John L. Ward Dept. of Art
302c AFA Complex University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611, U.S.A.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE STATUE
I was pleased to read The Development of a Concrete Statue by Paul F.Miller, Jr. (Leonardo 15, 224 (1982)) as it draws attention to the still unexplored potentials of using cement as a direct medium. Miller indicates some advantages of working directly with cement instead of using it as an indirect casting medium. He mentions being able to use less water to obtain more durable sculptures and points to the importance of designing in the same material instead of designing in one material and then casting in another. Also important is that adequate steel reinforcement cannot be placed inside a mold but it is easily included when working directly.
SIZE CONSTANCY, TERRY POPE'S GLASSES, AND THE MOON ILLUSION
David W. Brisson's description of the effect of the mirrored glasses designed by Terry Pope is highly interesting (Leonardo 15, 205 (1982)). However, I can see no basis for his conclusion that 'it is ... clear from the effect of Pope's glasses that our sense of metric space is learned'. If our sense of space were learned, how could glasses produce a new, coherent sense of space spontaneously? The design of glasses presents the wearer with the view that he would receive if the separation between his eyes were greatly increased (as it would be if his head increased enormously in size). But this view is presented with the light rerouted by mirrors so that it is seen directly in front of the viewer's eyes, which are unchanged in their experienced separation. Thus, the perceived position of each eye relative to the exterior scene, as defined by the incoming light, requires a separation, measured in terms of the exterior space, that is greater than the distance between the viewer's eyes. The simplest way to resolve this disparity is to see the world as shrunk to the point where the distance between the eyes as judged by their position in perceived exterior space corresponds to proprioceptive information for separation. The perceived diminution of the world in Pope's glasses seens explained by the Gestalt simplicity principle, just as does the perceived scale of the unreflected world.
Moreover, the explanation of the moon illusion reviewed by Brisson is needlessly complicated by the outmoded idea that it is based on recollections of learned spatial structure: 'The subjective distance of the vault of the sky is learned from the experience of looking through our lifetime at cloud layers in perspective' and 'the specific references [to spatial structure] ... are immediately absent... except in one's memory' (Brisson's italics). The moon, when it is close to the horizon, illuminates all terrestrial forms from behind. The viewer may thus determine that it is further away than anything in the landscape. Since clouds (except cumulo-nimbus clouds) tend to arrange themselves in strata, there is little information for continuous spatial extension overhead comparable to that which is provided by the continuous ground plane that we live on, and overhead distance, beyond a certain point, becomes indeterminate. The moon should therefore look further away when it is low in the sky than it does overhead (and therefore larger) simply because there is more information available to determine its distant position. There is no need to assume that one makes judgments based on a remembered spatial structure of the 'vault of the sky' to perceive a size difference.
John L. Ward Dept. of Art
302c AFA Complex University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611, U.S.A.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE STATUE
I was pleased to read The Development of a Concrete Statue by Paul F.Miller, Jr. (Leonardo 15, 224 (1982)) as it draws attention to the still unexplored potentials of using cement as a direct medium. Miller indicates some advantages of working directly with cement instead of using it as an indirect casting medium. He mentions being able to use less water to obtain more durable sculptures and points to the importance of designing in the same material instead of designing in one material and then casting in another. Also important is that adequate steel reinforcement cannot be placed inside a mold but it is easily included when working directly.
SIZE CONSTANCY, TERRY POPE'S GLASSES, AND THE MOON ILLUSION
David W. Brisson's description of the effect of the mirrored glasses designed by Terry Pope is highly interesting (Leonardo 15, 205 (1982)). However, I can see no basis for his conclusion that 'it is ... clear from the effect of Pope's glasses that our sense of metric space is learned'. If our sense of space were learned, how could glasses produce a new, coherent sense of space spontaneously? The design of glasses presents the wearer with the view that he would receive if the separation between his eyes were greatly increased (as it would be if his head increased enormously in size). But this view is presented with the light rerouted by mirrors so that it is seen directly in front of the viewer's eyes, which are unchanged in their experienced separation. Thus, the perceived position of each eye relative to the exterior scene, as defined by the incoming light, requires a separation, measured in terms of the exterior space, that is greater than the distance between the viewer's eyes. The simplest way to resolve this disparity is to see the world as shrunk to the point where the distance between the eyes as judged by their position in perceived exterior space corresponds to proprioceptive information for separation. The perceived diminution of the world in Pope's glasses seens explained by the Gestalt simplicity principle, just as does the perceived scale of the unreflected world.
Moreover, the explanation of the moon illusion reviewed by Brisson is needlessly complicated by the outmoded idea that it is based on recollections of learned spatial structure: 'The subjective distance of the vault of the sky is learned from the experience of looking through our lifetime at cloud layers in perspective' and 'the specific references [to spatial structure] ... are immediately absent... except in one's memory' (Brisson's italics). The moon, when it is close to the horizon, illuminates all terrestrial forms from behind. The viewer may thus determine that it is further away than anything in the landscape. Since clouds (except cumulo-nimbus clouds) tend to arrange themselves in strata, there is little information for continuous spatial extension overhead comparable to that which is provided by the continuous ground plane that we live on, and overhead distance, beyond a certain point, becomes indeterminate. The moon should therefore look further away when it is low in the sky than it does overhead (and therefore larger) simply because there is more information available to determine its distant position. There is no need to assume that one makes judgments based on a remembered spatial structure of the 'vault of the sky' to perceive a size difference.
John L. Ward Dept. of Art
302c AFA Complex University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611, U.S.A.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE STATUE
I was pleased to read The Development of a Concrete Statue by Paul F.Miller, Jr. (Leonardo 15, 224 (1982)) as it draws attention to the still unexplored potentials of using cement as a direct medium. Miller indicates some advantages of working directly with cement instead of using it as an indirect casting medium. He mentions being able to use less water to obtain more durable sculptures and points to the importance of designing in the same material instead of designing in one material and then casting in another. Also important is that adequate steel reinforcement cannot be placed inside a mold but it is easily included when working directly.
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This content downloaded from 195.34.79.223 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 22:45:32 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions