UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK************************************************LEON R. KOZIOL, individually and as natural parent ofChild “A” and Child “B”,

Plaintiff,-against-

KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE, Case No.JOHN LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONEJR, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH, LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAMMcCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN JR,individually and as members of the NEW YORK SUPREMECOURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT;MONICA DUFFY, individually and as Chairperson of theCOMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS; PETERTORNCELLO and STEVEN ZAYAS, individually and as agentsof the COMMITTEE; MICHAEL DALEY, individually and asNew York judge; WILLIAM KOSLOSKY and CITY OF UTICA,

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EXIGENT RELIEF

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Dated: May 17, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

OFFICES OF LEON R. KOZIOL1518 Genesee StreetUtica, New York 13502(315) 796-4000

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is an application for exigent relief prepared by a civil rights advocate and parent of

two minor daughters against persons acting under color of law to impair a full range of activity

protected under the United States Constitution. Until the time of his public statements and court

filings critical of unethical practices in New York’s domestic relations courts, this advocate was

a successful civil rights attorney. For over two decades, he produced settlements, verdicts and

judgments in difficult cases on behalf of numerous victims of race, gender, religious and other

status based discrimination. His actions were featured in the news, and they included free speech

retaliation, false arrest, malicious prosecution and police brutality.

The defendants named in these numerous cases were as diverse as they were influential.

Their reactions were wholly predictable. Retribution for the public humiliation caused by this

lawyer’s steadfast commitment to human rights would be exacted in discreet and subtle ways

until the menace could be removed. When the criticisms turned to civil rights violations of the

judicial branch of state government, removal was easily achieved through actors cloaked with

diverse immunities expanded to incorporate persons purporting to be engaged in legitimate

conduct. This led ultimately to the condition of plaintiff in this action.

During the weeks leading up to the current filing, the United States government sent its

secretary of state and top diplomats to the communist nation of China to address human rights

violations inflicted upon a blind Chinese lawyer. This victim was committed to house arrest,

license suspension and family deprivations by local government operatives not unlike

predecessor lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, as a consequence of civil rights advocacy on behalf of

domestic relations victims. Chen Guangcheng was subjected to diverse cruelties for purposes of

setting an example for others who would dare to challenge the party elite.

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Included with this application under exhibit A is the formal complaint filed in this court

which in all material respects is comparable to the petitions for relief at the American Embassy

in China. Here the victim is challenging a multi-billion dollar profit center known as Family

Court in which children are exploited between parents to produce lucrative controversy for the

benefit of lawyers and the court system. The collective impact needlessly destroys a cooperative

family structure in America to produce overburdened courts incapable of delivering due process

for juvenile, criminal and civil litigants.

Clearly a problem exists in the treatment applied to the plaintiff. None of it can be

rationalized in the name of public or child interests. The only sensible conclusion is that it is

directed to suppress long overdue reform efforts spearheaded by an aggressive civil rights

plaintiff. However, no recourse is possible while immunities, jurisdictional issues and deference

practices continue to be exploited to protect the violators. The American Constitution remains

little more than a piece of parchment for posterity purposes.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is related to civil rights actions filed on February 26, 2009 and November 10,

2010 in the United States District Court. Pleadings and briefs addressing the misconduct of

pertinent judges and lawyers are in the possession of counsel acting on behalf of Third

Department defendants named in those actions. They are now the subject an appeal perfected

before the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in New York City.

Federal alternatives were necessitated, in part, by an order suspending plaintiff’s law

license on September 23, 2010. That order contained wholesale confirmations of patently false

findings. These have not been remedied in the state system due to flagrant bias and retribution

for the exercise of protected activities. The collective content of interrelated proceedings is

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voluminous and will not be repeated here. This background is necessarily provided to avoid

waiver of rights properly asserted in a separate forum.

To summarize what has occurred since the “member case” was filed on November 10,

2010, an innocent man, knowingly convicted of ethics violations based on manufactured

“discrepancies” and events, has been deprived of his livelihood, law license and meaningful

contact with his children. He has been made subject to a reinstatement process by Third

Department defendants which has additionally infringed upon the jurisdiction of this court

system with investigations upon protected free speech and federal pleadings.

It is a process abused well beyond any geographic and subject matter jurisdiction

conferred upon these state actors. It has had the extraordinary effect of resurrecting all of the

subject matter embraced by the earlier actions through inquiries and investigations of a full range

of activity undertaken by plaintiff over the past several years. These include a controversial civil

rights forum sponsored prior to the first license suspension order.

In the factual component of plaintiff’s appended complaint, a series of events have

occurred which further impair plaintiff’s exercise of protected activity. They will not be repeated

here, but for purposes of this memorandum, it will be emphasized that they feature distinct and

more egregious civil rights violations than prior ones due to further empowerments created by

the May 24, 2011 district court ruling. Because that ruling dismissed the earlier consolidated

case, heightened retributions have followed.

In an unprecedented move, the defendants here have now taken aim at the filings

themselves to chill all rights of access to our federal courts. In the process, they have scrutinized

plaintiff’s activities to the inordinate point of requiring admissions to newly concocted facts

which produce yet another catch-22 predicament for their victim. This situation must be

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evaluated in the abnormal context of civil rights violations exemplified in the pleading.

Appended to this memorandum is a copy of follow-up correspondence to the Chief Attorney’s

Inquiry received after completion of these motion papers which threatens issuance of subpoenas

and additional ethics prosecutions in the event plaintiff fails to cooperate (as predicted earlier).

Any response will cause plaintiff to commit the ethical violation of communicating with a

represented party in ongoing federal litigation.

ARGUMENT

This is a retaliation case filed against persons acting under color of law to suppress

plaintiff’s exercise of protected activities, 42 USC section 1983, Monroe v Pape, 465 US 167

(1961); Monnell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978); Ex Parte Young, 209 US

123 (1908); Beechwood Restorative Care Center v Leeds, 436 F.3d 147 (CA 2, 2006). It is

premised upon conduct in excess of jurisdiction, scope of authority and judicial function, Stump

v Sparkman, 453 US 349 (1978); Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union, 446 US 349

(1980); Maestri v Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50 (CA 2, 1988).

I. There are no immunities or defenses to preclude the relief sought by this application.

The extraordinary facts presented by the complaint and motion papers show that this case

will survive any immunities, deference practices and jurisdictional defenses which might be

raised by named defendants in both their official and individual capacities, Gibson v Berryhill,

411 US 564 (1973)(institutional bias dispensing with Younger abstention argument); Exxon

Mobile v Saudi Basic Industries, 544 US 280 (2005)(Rooker-Feldman cases abused by lower

courts beyond intended application); Marshall v Marshall, 547 US 293 (2006)(domestic relations

exception, similarly abused, gave no warrant to Ninth Circuit to ignore civil rights challenge);

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Koziol v Hanna, 107 F. Supp.2d 170 (NDNY 2000)(qualified immunity not available to

government officials impairing established rights of free speech); Patterson v City of Utica, 370

F.3d 322 (CA 2, 2004)(stigmatizing activity designed to harm career liberty interests established

by circumstantial chain of events); Oneida Indian Nation v Oneida County, 132 F. Supp.2d 71

(NDNY 2000)(parallel state and federal court actions do not impair federalism or equity

principles). All remaining garden variety defenses await the progress of this case.

II. The four prong test for exigent relief established by the Second Circuit is satisfied here

The test established by the Second Circuit for securing pendent lite relief on appeal is

essentially the same in district courts when an exigency is raised. In Mohammed v Reno, 309 F.

3d 95, 101 (2002), four elements were re-emphasized. The movant must show:

(1) the likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) irreparable injury if a stay (injunction) is denied;

(3) substantial injury to the party opposing relief, and

(4) the public interest.

Where the balancing of equities favors the relief in question, the first element can be

satisfied by showing that the case features overriding questions of constitutional importance.

This mitigation of an otherwise heightened burden is justified by the inherent difficulty of

assessing potentially meritorious claims at the threshold stage of a case. The Second Circuit

reaffirmed the substitute method recently notwithstanding indications of a contrary position by

the Supreme Court in Citigroup Global Markets v VCG Special Master, 598 F. 3d 30 (2010).

The current application before this court is directed to the narrow context of an open

ended investigation of plaintiff designed to impair clearly protected activities of free speech,

childrearing and employment freedoms, among others. There is no pending litigation in the state

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court system to trigger any abstention policy, and the subject suspension order of September 23,

2010 has taken its course through a one year period completed nearly eight months ago. No

appeal or petition lies under state law to implicate a Rooker-Feldman issue, and the extraordinary

events described in the pleadings finish off any remaining defenses which might be raised.

A conspiracy to violate federal rights is shown through a proximate relationship between

protected activity and retaliatory events. Agreeing with principles long established in federal

court, i.e. Beechwood Restorative, Monroe and Patterson, supra, the high court of New York

emphasized that “one intent on discriminating cannot be expected to declare or announce his

purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are

devious, by methods subtle and elusive”, Imperial Diner, Inc. v State Human Rights Appeal

Board, 52 NY2d 72, 77 (1984).

The discriminatory practices here are far more devious and elusive because they are

being carried out by persons of sophistication and unfettered power. Due to his criticisms of New

York’s bench and bar practices, plaintiff has been uniquely injured in his career and childrearing

interests by named defendants exercising supreme control over both subjects. Among the

conditions and authority ignored by the courts to date is the consequential treatment of plaintiff

as a “class of one” victim for equal protection purposes, see Analytical Diagnostic v Kusel, 626

F.3d 135 (CA 2, 2010). The invidious applications of ethics codes and diverse processes

establish this case as a precedent setting one for civil rights purposes.

Related to the foregoing, a major aspect of this case is devoted to institutional bias and

discrimination. Factual precedent for this is provided in both the pleading and moving papers.

For example, judges of New York’s court system were admonished by a state judicial conduct

commission in 2009 to desist from a scheme to disqualify themselves from all legislator cases in

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retaliation for pay raise deprivations. Similarly, and more egregiously, the former top judge of

the same court system directed taxpayer financed court staff to investigate a New Jersey lawyer

to prevent his licensure in New York as part of a criminal enterprise for which he (Sol Wachtler)

was ultimately convicted in the federal system.

On point is the case of Gibson v Berryhill, supra, where the Supreme Court found

institutional bias among colleagues evaluating ethical misconduct in the optometry profession.

The court emphasized that a demonstration of actual bias was unnecessary to overcome Younger

abstention applications. It was sufficient that the decision makers possessed a likely bias in their

professional relationships with the victim raising First Amendment advertising claims, see also

Supreme Court of Virginia, supra, regarding similar issues and fear of disciplinary retributions

by lawyers in a civil rights suit against a state’s high court. Institutional bias is reflected in the

numerous instances of systemic retributions occurring to plaintiff with each background

summary made necessary in all personal petitions brought before the New York court system. A

further discussion of pertinent First Amendment cases is now in order.

III. Plaintiff is vindicating important federal rights in this application for exigent relief.

Public criticism of our courts is a protected act even if exercised by a lawyer during a

given case, Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964)(prosecutor convicted of judicial defamation

protected by First Amendment); Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982)(fundamental liberty

deprivations subject to uniform “clear and convincing” standard) and Professor Tarkington, The

Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech and Judicial Reputation, Georgetown

Law Journal, vol. 97, pg. 1567 (2009). In this case the protections afforded under our

Constitution are heightened because the defendants continue to merge distinct activity of the

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plaintiff in his pro se and representation capacities. They have gone so far as to suppress public

forums of the plaintiff in which no ethics issue can be discerned from the face of inquiries.

However, much more is at stake because in the latter context, the independence of our

civil rights bar from the bench on subjects related to judicial misconduct is crucial for the

vindication of constitutionally protected rights. This is such as case. The power to issue and

revoke licenses by government authorities is a profound one. It is an effective vehicle for

controlling human behavior and liberty. It has been abused to suppress advertising in the legal

profession, Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union, 446 US 719 (1980) free expression

in the literary profession, City of Lakewood v Plain Dealer Publishing, 486 US 750 (1988);

Bantam Books, Inc. v Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963) and the filing of complaints critical of a

regulatory authority in the health profession, Beechwood, supra, 436 F. 3d 147 (CA 2, 2006).

In the Westboro Baptist Church case handed down by the Supreme Court one year ago,

Chief Justice Roberts defended the rights of church protesters at the funeral of a fallen soldier by

concluding that “debate on public issues should be robust, uninhibited and wide open...(it)

occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”, see also New York

Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). In a similar vein, criticisms of the judiciary and access to

our courts for the purpose of appealing domestic relations orders should be unfettered. It

occupies a similar rung in the same Amendment pursuant to the least cited final clause, see i.e.

Beechwood, supra; Friedl v New York, 210 F. 3d 79 (CA 2, 2000).

In this case, the debate at issue was directed squarely at the judicial branch of state

government and its child control practices. Retaliation is established in the same manner as

disciplinary cases are litigated on behalf prisoner clients convicted of heinous crimes, Friedl,

supra; Franco v Kelly, 855 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1988). New York courts cannot exceed their

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authority under our Constitution using a rule of necessity in pay raise litigation any more than

they can to suppress plaintiff in his criticisms of that litigation through contemporaneous

disciplinary action, Maron v Silver, 871 NYS2d 404 (3d Dept 2008).

The father-attorney here was singled out not only because of his critical statements to the

media and public gatherings regarding parenting rights but more insidiously in discreet reactions

to offensive material discovered in appeal filings. Unlike the bar of the State of Virginia which

sought refuge behind a consumers group in the vindication of First Amendment lawyer

advertising protections, this victim placed himself personally under fire in the vindication of

rights far more precious to the People under the same Constitution, see Supreme Court of

Virginia, supra.

The latter case has particular application here because the Supreme Court has made it

clear that Virginia’s courts possessed authority to initiate disciplinary complaints against those

who violated advertising prohibitions. In this capacity, they enjoyed no absolute immunity

particularly when acting outside of any rational scope of inquiries and regulation. In New York,

the same authority is found in 22 NYCRR 100.3B(3)(courts generally) and 22 NYCRR

1022.19(b)(1)(Fourth Department grievance referrals).

In Konigsberg v State Bar of California, 353 US 252, 273 (1957), the Supreme Court

emphasized the importance “both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated- free

to think, speak and act as members of an independent bar”. In New York, this freedom is subject

to purposely vague regulations that can be made to encompass offensive criticisms of the

profession in fee generating industries such as domestic relations. The one challenged in

plaintiff’s first cause of action is particularly insidious and greatly abused.

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These rules can easily be exploited to punish or expel members of the bar who deviate

from an unwritten norm, i.e. In re Snyder, 472 US 634, 645 (1985)(“As officers of the court,

members of the bar may appropriately express criticisms” on a fee documentation requirement

despite rude letter or lack of professional courtesy, invalidating a six month suspension).

The overbroad rules referenced in the complaint and supporting papers are key examples.

They were employed against plaintiff to bolster other duplicative charges much like a lesser

included offense. In this way, defendants were able to secure a disproportionately excessive

punishment. Virtually any conduct can come within the reach of these code provisions, thereby

making them little different than the harassment and disorderly conduct laws found to be

unconstitutional in Gooden v Wilson, 405 US 518 (1972) and City of Houston v Hill, 482 US

451 (1987), see also United States v Wunsch, 84 F. 3d 1110, 1117-1119 (CA 9, 1999)(declaring

unconstitutional a professional conduct provision which required attorneys to “abstain from an

offensive personality”).

In this sense, attorney codes are enforced contrary to an express purpose for protecting

the public, In re Singer, 738 NYS2d 38, 40 (AD 1, 2002). It is this public commitment which

enables disciplinary authorities to circumvent due process protections normally accorded to

comparable prosecutions, Id. However, when the public purpose is subsumed by an ulterior

motive, a double impact is visited upon an unsuspecting practitioner. He or she is suppressed in

protected activity and simultaneously impaired by the dilution of procedural safeguards, Koziol v

Hanna, 107 F. Supp. 2d 170 (NDNY 2000).

First Amendment rights do not incur a disappearing act on the steps of a state courthouse

simply because an aspect of judicial power and lawyer ethics is being challenged in matters of

parent-child relations. Its doors are there to be opened to petitions and expressions which do not

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usurp the conduct of proceedings. In this case, there was no contempt implications or warnings

associated with the father-attorney’s divorce filings, public comment or his disciplinary defense

(counter-report). The May 24, 2011 district court ruling was indistinguishable from countless

other cases being disposed of each day in the federal system.

Moreover, there was no rush to judgment. The retaliation claimed against the Appellate

Division Justices became increasingly plain as disciplinary processes took on a bizarre

countenance that yielded no other rational explanation. A relevant excerpt from the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511, 516 (1967) is on point here:

The threat of disbarment or the loss of professional standing, professionalreputation and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyerrelinquish (a constitutionally protected) privilege. That threat is indeed aspowerful an instrument of compulsion as ‘the use of legal process to force fromthe lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him...’, UnitedStates v White, 322 US 694, 698; Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 461. Lawyersare not excepted from the word ‘person’ as found in the Constitution. “Like theschool teacher in Slochower v Bd of Education, 350 US 551 and the policeman inGarrity v New Jersey, 385 US 493, lawyers also enjoy first class citizenship”.

In the disciplinary processes at issue here, a series of defects rendered the dual

suspension of plaintiff’s law license unconstitutional. The current reinstatement process has now

expanded these defects without rational scope to satisfy both exceptions to judicial immunity

established by higher court precedent. It is beyond any conferred subject matter jurisdiction and

it cannot be characterized as a judicial function, see respectively Maestri v Jutkofsky and Stump

v Sparkman, supra. Regardless which is applied here, both procedural and substantive analyses

are at play throughout this case. The process was inherently flawed at the onset by the combined

nature of prosecution, judge and jury. They were all directly controlled by a single entity, In re

Murchison, 349 US 133 (1955). It is this condition which harms the conscientious civil rights

lawyer more than any other because it defies the very purpose for his existence.

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CONCLUSION

By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff, Leon Koziol, respectfully requests an order

restraining further enforcement of defendants’ license suspension orders and processes and an

order reinstating him to the practice of law.

May 17, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

Leon R. Koziol, J.D.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK************************************************LEON R. KOZIOL, individually and as natural parent ofChild “A” and Child “B”,

Plaintiff,-against- COMPLAINT

KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE,JOHN LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONEJR, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH, LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAM Jury Trial DemandMcCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN JR,individually and as members of the NEW YORK SUPREMECOURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT;MONICA DUFFY, individually and as Chairperson of theCOMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS; PETER Case No.TORNCELLO and STEVEN ZAYAS, individually and as agentsof the COMMITTEE; MICHAEL DALEY, individually and asNew York judge; WILLIAM KOSLOSKY and CITY OF UTICA,

Defendants.************************************************

Plaintiff, as and for a Complaint against the above-named defendants, sets forth the

following:Parties

(1) Plaintiff, LEON R. KOZIOL is the natural parent of Child “A” and Child “B” with a

residence in Oneida County, New York. Until the time of his public criticisms and court filings

in connection with unethical practices in New York’s domestic relations courts, he possessed an

unblemished 23 year professional career as a civil rights attorney, parental advocate and public

office holder where he derived income for childrearing purposes.

(2) Defendants KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE, JOHN

LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONE Jr, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH,

LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAM McCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN Jr, are

2

residents of New York State. Together, they comprise the New York State Supreme Court,

Appellate Division, Third Department located in Albany, New York. As relevant here, they

failed to properly train or supervise ethics lawyers assigned to investigate plaintiff, ratifying civil

rights abuses and institutional bias, and otherwise failing to define a rational scope of activity.

(3) Defendant, MONICA DUFFY, is a resident of New York State and Chairperson of

the Third Department Committee on Professional Standards with a principal place of business at

40 Steuben Street; Suite 502; Albany, New York. She has directed unlawful investigations of

plaintiff involving a residence and protected activity outside Departmental jurisdiction.

(4) Defendant, PETER TORNCELLO, is a resident of the State of New York conferred

with apparent authority by above named defendants to investigate plaintiff. As relevant here, he

sought to hold plaintiff accountable for nonexistent ethical violations on subject matter

completely outside the scope of his authority for purposes of suppressing protected activity.

(5) Defendant, STEVEN ZAYAS, is a resident of the State of New York conferred with

apparent authority by above named defendants to investigate plaintiff. As relevant here, he

sought to hold plaintiff accountable for nonexistent ethical violations on subject matter

completely outside the scope of his authority for purposes of suppressing protected activity.

(6) Defendant, MICHAEL DALEY, has a residence in Herkimer County, New York. As

relevant to this action, he exceeded his scope as a former judge of the New York Unified Court

System through non-judicial directives and influences upon third parties in order to orchestrate

violations of plaintiff’s liberty rights and prevent his reinstatement to the practice of law.

(7) Defendant, WILLIAM KOSLOSKY, is a resident of Herkimer County, New York

with a principal place of business at 2635 Genesee Street; Utica, New York.

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(8) Defendant, CITY OF UTICA, is a municipal corporation duly organized under the

laws of the State of New York with a principal place of business located at One Kennedy Plaza;

Utica, New York. As relevant here, it has engaged itself in a policy, custom or practice of

suppressing plaintiff’s protected activities as a civil rights advocate and local business owner.

Jurisdiction and Venue

(9) This action is brought, in part, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the First,

Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to

redress the deprivation of rights secured to the plaintiff. Jurisdiction exists by virtue of 28

U.S.C. sections 1331, 1367(a), 2201 and 2202. Declaratory relief is not otherwise available.

(10) Venue is proper in the city of Albany, New York based upon a series of

disqualification orders by New York’s Appellate Division, Fourth Department and transfers to

the Third Department involving plaintiff since his motion for such relief was first granted on

April 28, 2010 on consent of the respective presiding justices.

Factual Background

(11) On January 19, 2010, plaintiff sponsored a civil rights forum in a hotel ballroom in

Utica, New York for purposes of receiving complaints from diverse victims in the community to

be compiled in a report to the Justice Department. It featured presentations from African-

American victims of racist city practices, including a decorated veteran who was tackled and

handcuffed by members of said department on a domestic incident call notwithstanding the fact

that he was the victim shot in the hand by a woman who possessed the only firearm on the scene.

(12) As a further subject of civil rights, the abuse of VAWA (Violence Against Women

Act) and Title IV-D (child support) funding was emphasized because it created a dangerous

imbalance and official prejudice in race relations with law enforcement agencies. Plaintiff cited

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diverse misconduct of lawyers and judges in state domestic relations courts which was causing

needless violence among families for revenue purposes of the state and its unified court system.

(13) Plaintiff had been engaged in various ongoing test cases which formed a major

subject of discourse at this public forum and others sponsored by him in recent years. These

cases were filed to promote civil recourse in lieu of violence and self help remedies for victims

of domestic relations abuses. Defendants jointly engaged in retributions to suppress such

protected activity and are now preventing plaintiff’s reinstatement to the practice of law.

(14) Plaintiff was a victim himself of discriminatory practices in an uncontested and

private divorce which was upended, publicized and complicated through widespread ethical

misconduct of the lawyer for his ex-spouse. By the time she fired him, the process had become

hopelessly tortured for the exclusive benefit of the lawyer, the state and its agents.

(15) Accordingly, the divorce lawyer’s misconduct became the cause and necessary

subject of four consolidated appeals of domestic relations orders. It was cited in support of relief

before an appellate entity which possessed simultaneous authority to regulate and discipline

lawyers in the same district where plaintiff was licensed to practice law. Unknown at the time,

the divorce lawyer had been recently appointed by the same court to the local ethics committee.

(16) On the same day as arguments on that appeal, a first time disciplinary process was

commenced by this same committee not against the divorce lawyer but against the self

represented plaintiff exercising his rights. It was thereafter adjourned to scrutinize plaintiff’s

critical response to a haphazard report assembled by a court appointed ethics lawyer in order to

fish out any discrepancies that could elevate a confidential admonition to formal charges.

(17) Over time, disciplinary and domestic processes involving plaintiff were invidiously

merged and exploited with each public statement or court filing designed to remedy what

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plaintiff described as a “custodial institution of childrearing” and “lucrative multi-billion dollar

industry” that was “fleecing mainstream parents and families of their hard earned assets”. Such

depictions appeared in plaintiff’s news conferences, parenting convocations and public website.

(18) Another subject of public discourse was a June, 2008 state court action in Albany,

New York filed against the state and its court system on behalf of several fathers, a non-custodial

mother and the National League of Fathers, Inc. It was a test case critical of bench and bar

practices in domestic relations courts. This was followed by speaking engagements in New York

City, Washington D.C. and elsewhere which were reported nationwide on various internet sites.

(19) This test case was suppressed later the same year when formal charges were filed

and precipitated by three concocted discrepancies derived from a comparison of plaintiff’s

hastily prepared response report and isolated responses to neglected grievances made years

earlier. It was hasty because unlike the three month adjournment granted to an ethics lawyer to

scrutinize this report, a similar request by plaintiff to facilitate its preparation was denied based

on false statements that it was never made, contrary to official transmittals that were days apart.

(20) As a consequence, the Albany test case was abandoned. To address growing

misconduct by an “unethical ethics committee”, as it was called, plaintiff filed a pre-hearing

motion before the same appeals court in its disciplinary capacity. Relief was sought under the

United States Constitution, including dismissal on misconduct grounds, transfer to an unbiased

court and discovery needed to show First Amendment retaliation. This was denied on May 22,

2009 consistent with opposition papers stating the lack of any authority for such relief.

(21) On May 26, 2009, plaintiff was noticed for a first appearance before defendant

Michael Daley, a former state judge. Motions were confirmed that day to address threshold

issues of subject matter jurisdiction, bias and transcript production. Plaintiff was two hours away,

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and his appearance was accordingly satisfied by teleconference with his intern in court due to a

discovered suspension of driver’s license for alleged support arrears without official notice.

(22) An adjournment was ordered to confirm jurisdiction when the requisite transfer

order could not be found in the court’s file, a transcript had yet to be produced, and recusal

arguments were promised on the record for a hearing to be set by defendant Daley. Bias issues

emerged from earlier recusals of the same judge involving client cases handled by plaintiff.

(23) One cited in particular involved a city administrator falsely charged with felonies in

a six count indictment. It was politically motivated and defendant Daley sought to coerce a guilty

plea which instead resulted in a volatile exchange with plaintiff. Despite abusive cross

examination and public humiliation staged before a select news reporter and lawyer in the

courtroom, plaintiff refused to back down from his motion for Daley’s recusal based on

prejudicial conduct to the client observed in conformity with Daley’s former prosecutorial role.

(24) Defendant Daley ultimately recused himself and proceedings on the motion were

concluded, but not before an on-record commitment by Daley to share his adverse opinions of

plaintiff with a fellow Herkimer County judge specially predicted to replace him on the same

case. Before anyone could exit the courtroom, defendant Daley summoned to his bench the

client’s boyfriend, a complete stranger, to engage him in banter as part of an ongoing scheme to

cause plaintiff’s discharge and a predictable ethics complaint.

(25) The scheme failed and a jury trial was rescheduled before a different (senior) judge

in Oneida County Courthouse where the recusal motion was properly heard. That judge then

dismissed the entire indictment, thereby saving the client’s career and facilitating a civil action

against the city employer who filed the false charges. Relevant complaints before the state’s

judicial conduct commission were subsequently lodged and featured on plaintiff’s website.

7

(26) The threshold hearing committed by Daley on May 26, 2009 was neither scheduled

nor conducted over an 18 month period in order to avoid a re-visitation of the embarrassing

events of the preceding paragraphs which were logically contained in plaintiff’s written motion

for judge recusal. On the transcript, Daley conceded that he had yet to digest the papers. During

this same period, a recommended jail term for support arrears was held over plaintiff’s head.

(27) On October 1, 2009, defendant Daley proceeded directly to the merits of plaintiff’s

support proceeding by issuing a summary violation order without reference to the threshold

motion or his on-record commitments. It predictably resulted in a statutory suspension of

plaintiff’s law license before the same appeals court on February 5, 2010. Constitutional issues

and Daley’s misconduct were refused and excluded from consideration based on the language of

the state’s Judiciary Law, and any record for appeal purposes was insulated from review by

another state statute and the lower court Judge Daley as its final arbiter.

(28) On the same transcript, defendant Daley noted a client case scheduled for the same

morning. The intern present in the courtroom was thereafter admonished to keep plaintiff keenly

aware of developments in that case given the same judge’s erratic history as demonstrated by the

preceding paragraphs. Over the course of the next six months, not a single disclosure was made

or court date placed on plaintiff’s office calendar involving this particular client. His case was

therefore dismissed due to non-appearance of plaintiff discovered after the intern’s discharge.

(29) A motion to reopen the case based on meritorious grounds of judge and intern

misconduct was thereafter frustrated by the said suspension of plaintiff’s law license, Daley’s

continued misconduct, and substitute counsel’s lack of success before the same judge in July,

2011. On information and belief, this was orchestrated by conduct outside of any legitimate

8

judicial process in complete excess of Daley’s authority. It directly caused an ethics grievance

which is now being exploited to prevent plaintiff’s reinstatement to his law practice.

(30) Plaintiff was uniquely absent from all post-telephone discourse between defendant

Daley and the intern on May 26, 2009. Unlike the earlier described felony case recusal, plaintiff

could therefore not monitor events after closure of formal proceedings. Within one hour of same,

plaintiff’s girlfriend, now fiancée, received a cell call from her business partner to the effect that

defendant Daley had directed Herkimer County sheriff deputies to investigate her whereabouts.

(31) None of this appeared on the record of any Family Court case limited by Article VI,

section 26(k) of the New York Constitution. The business was located in the same county, and

the directive was made for no logical reason other than extrajudicial intimidation. This woman

was not a party, Daley had no jurisdiction order in his file, and plaintiff relied upon her for

mutual support. After this date, court security and local law enforcement began monitoring

plaintiff, his fiancée and their vehicles. She eventually moved her business outside of the county.

(32) Prior to the foregoing, a federal court action was filed on February 26, 2009 based

upon an escalating level of retribution for plaintiff’s exercise of protected activities and the lack

of opportunity to raise constitutional claims. Three months later, the action was amended to

include defendant Koslosky, and in September, 2009, it was again amended by order of the court

to include defendant Daley. The case was sealed under fictitious names and titled, John Parent v

State of New York principally to protect the privacy interests of plaintiff’s children.

(33) However the jurisdiction and privacy arrangements asserted over the subject matter

were frustrated by public announcement of the license suspension of February 5, 2010 and a one

year suspension issued by the Third Department on September 23, 2010. Both were featured on

front page news, radio and television to upstage any resolution potentials as the retributions

9

escalated. After plaintiff’s automobiles were seized from his home on October 19, 2010 without

proper warrant and contrary to an August 23, 2010 stipulation order, a second action was

necessarily filed on November 10, 2010 without need for a sealed record or fictitious parties.

(34) Events occurring since that time require further recourse. Plaintiff is now being

victimized by select law enforcement practices and orchestrated grounds for ethics violations

outside of any legitimate judicial or official function in retribution for the above referenced

federal court filings and public criticisms. It persists in order to prevent plaintiff’s reinstatement

to the practice of civil rights law and to otherwise discredit his reform efforts in the public eye.

(35) The illegitimate nature of defendants’ activities is further shown by a sampling of

letter inquiries being exploited to prevent reinstatement. These include grievances withdrawn or

dismissed due to extortionist behavior, demands for fees already refunded, and exploitation of

convicted criminals. In many instances, their sources can be traced to certain defendants or their

agents who are the targets of criticism. Others have been used strictly to delay processes.

(36) For example, one grievance exploited to enter the second suspension order involved

another federal court action in which plaintiff filed a proper ethical motion to be discharged from

a client’s race discrimination case in 2003. It was granted and based upon the client’s unlawful

commitments to disclose confidential IAD files of the Syracuse police department to media

outlets in violation of court order for purposes of coercing higher settlement figures. The

convicted criminal, Curtis Brown, responded with multiple ethics charges. To this day, there has

been no action taken to those lodged against plaintiff in the federal system.

(37) In stark contrast, New York’s counterpart found grounds to proceed five years later

based on manufactured claims by the same client and substitute counsel, including IAD files

allegedly held back by plaintiff as a means for excusing their lapsed deadlines and case

10

dismissal. In June, 2009, the presiding federal judge entered an order referencing plaintiff’s 2003

motion and the litigant’s continued violations of the same order with false claims and improper

complicity of substitute counsel. Both were admonished after contempt proceedings and the ten

year case was dismissed, as affirmed in March, 2012, after continued lapses in court deadlines.

(38) Defendants’ select enforcement and retributions have caused plaintiff to require

signed receipts for all former client file retrievals containing an acknowledgment of every minor

paper so as to avert a Brown type grievance. As evaluated here, this has placed him in a catch-22

situation. If mailed or transferred expeditiously to avoid timeliness admonitions, plaintiff is then

subjected to charges of their incomplete production. Such opposite treatment is actually being

employed to prevent reinstatement involving two former clients despite the lack of prejudice.

(39) Client cases necessarily abandoned because of the challenged license suspension

orders are now being exploited by defendants Duffy, Torncello and Zayas to assert plaintiff’s

purported neglect or prejudice to their success. This scheme is based not on any public purpose

but upon the superior ethics and conscience exercised by plaintiff. Numerous civil rights victims

and former clients have had their cases needlessly dismissed or held in limbo pending plaintiff’s

reinstatement after two years of suspension caused by the above summarized abuses of authority.

(40) Contrasting his performance over a prior 23 year period, there has not been a

substantive order, decision or appeal granted in the plaintiff’s favor in the state’s unified court

system since discovery of his public criticisms other than one in January, 2011. Defendants

Mercure, Rose, Malone, Kavanagh and Stein went so far as to knowingly confirm a false finding

of a disciplinary referee shown to be manufactured by a facial comparison of referenced

documents in the record. In short, these defendants knowingly convicted an innocent person.

11

(41) For its part, the City of Utica has long engaged in retribution practices due to

plaintiff’s monetary recoveries against it together with public challenges in civil rights matters.

As relevant here, plaintiff argued a civil rights case before this court during the same month as

the above referenced January 19, 2010 forum. Both featured a longstanding victim of racist city

practices inflicted by a former city corporation counsel, current mayor and three police officers.

A reserved decision resulted in a ruling against these same named defendants in July, 2010 after

plaintiff’s first suspension in February, 2010. The entire action was then dismissed while under

representation by another lawyer in December, 2011 during the subject reinstatement period.

(42) Defendant city has failed to properly train and supervise its agents to observe civil

rights laws. In conformity with related invidious practices, said defendant has provided advice

and tactical assistance to other adversaries acting in concert with them resulting in damage to

plaintiff’s domestic relations cases. It has also refused to act upon criminal charges lodged by

plaintiff and joint complainants to protect business interests in contrast with those filed by others.

(43) Examples include a former city mayor and his associates who were able to have city

police process felony charges against a former employee for charging $16 to a city gas card as

his weekly reimbursement two hours after discharge. One year later, plaintiff and his associates

lodged criminal charges with the same city police department against a discharged lawyer for

misappropriating more than $10,000. The first matter proceeded to a jury trial resulting in an

acquittal with plaintiff as defense counsel. Gas card charges were later dismissed by district

attorney motion. In contrast, the second matter involving plaintiff was referred to civil recourse.

(44) Defendant’s select treatment enabled the lawyer criminal to continue his crimes at

another law office in Syracuse. With plaintiff’s assistance, he was prosecuted and convicted in

12

another county. Shortly thereafter, he became the subject of a police chase on the streets of Utica

where he was eventually arrested with controlled substances found in his vehicle.

(45) Despite multiple convictions and eventual disbarment, an extortionist grievance by

this criminal, filed in 2005 against plaintiff, was featured in the above referenced ethics

investigation and held open until recent months when it was dismissed on its face after seven

years. A January 31, 2012 Internal Report personally shared by plaintiff with the defendant’s

police chief involves similar activity. It has been neglected, treated in bad faith or otherwise left

in limbo given opposite treatment to other contemporaneous complaints and a district attorney

investigator who expressly noted city jurisdiction and the report’s serious nature.

(46) In similar invidious fashion, ethics complaints by plaintiff against lawyers which

included the city’s former corporation counsel were suppressed or ignored by defendant

colleagues despite more egregious violations of relevant codes. In addition to the divorce lawyer

and lawyer-witness complicit with the Brown client in contempt and disciplinary proceedings,

defendant William Koslosky lodged charges in a scheme to impair plaintiff’s reinstatement.

(47) Among these is a sworn affidavit submitted to the Fourth Department court in

August, 2011 which contained a manufactured claim that plaintiff had sought to “revoke” the

higher court’s authority over attorneys by seeking restoration of his law license in Family Court.

Such a petition or process is nowhere to be found in any Family Court record and it could only

have derived from an agreement or concerted activity with the 21st judge assigned to plaintiff’s

petitions. It was and remains designed to undermine plaintiff’s fitness as a lawyer and advocate.

(48) The support violation order was removed by the August 23, 2010 stipulation order

submitted by defendant Daley to both the Third and Fourth Departments to effect a lifting of the

first suspension order given the confusion and delays caused by the transfer orders referenced at

13

paragraph 10. This pattern resembled a 2009 scheme by judges of the Unified Court System to

disqualify themselves from state legislator cases in retaliation for judicial pay raise deprivations.

The scheme was abandoned only upon intervention by a state judicial conduct commission.

(49) On January 26, 2012, the Fourth Department lifted the support-based suspension

order caused by defendant Daley after the Third Department failed to act on its pertinent

component in plaintiff’s October 4, 2011 reinstatement application. This outcome was being

cited among numerous inquiries of defendants Zayas and Torncello since the time of application.

The one year suspension by the Third Department was completed on September 23, 2011, and

plaintiff’s reinstatement remains subject to the events described throughout this Complaint.

(50) As a result, nearly eight months license suspension have already been tacked on to

the earlier two periods without formal charge or legitimate cause. Such a period exceeds a six

month suspension imposed upon a local attorney, G. Stephen Getman, who spent more than

$7,000 in client funds. He is currently serving the defendant court system as a Family Court

magistrate and his misconduct during plaintiff’s support violation process was insulated by

defendant Daley in his coercion of the referenced stipulation order after two years of abuse.

(51) During this indefinite period, plaintiff has been made subject to a succession of

inquiries, including repetitious ones and an anonymous complaint citing an anonymous post in a

community gossip site (a double anonymous). This post headlined plaintiff’s fictitious lawsuit

against Dunkin Donuts in 2008 (when plaintiff was fully licensed). It was patently a satire upon

plaintiff’s civil rights actions against defendant city which warranted no official recognition.

Defendants Torncello and Zayas, and those unknown persons acting in concert with them,

nevertheless fished it out from public discourse to unduly burden reinstatement.

14

(52) Other inquiries, resurrected from long neglected grievances, including one closed in

2002, were earlier addressed to the same defendants or found in the record transferred from the

Fourth Department grievance committee. In the other half of merged processes, such transfers

were further exploited to delay domestic petitions on numerous appeals caused by the

institutional bias developed against plaintiff. It rendered crucial ones moot. As an additional

condition, plaintiff completed a professional responsibility bar examination, with more than 25

points over the 85 passing score, which had been similarly completed a quarter century earlier.

(53) These conditions produced further dilemmas impairing plaintiff’s protected liberties

from an economic, childrearing and mobility standpoint. The second suspension order, which

referenced the earlier one, effectively upended the process undertaken by defendant Daley to

repair the harm he had caused. Lifting of the earlier order was rendered moot by the second one,

and the consequential employment picture necessitated a downward support petition before the

22nd trial judge (support magistrate) assigned in November, 2011 to plaintiff’s petitions.

(54) This petition was denied, like virtually every other one filed, through the use of a

highly abused revenue generating policy known as imputed income. It is among those challenged

in plaintiff’s reform efforts based on Title IV-D of the Social Security Act as it enables state

support magistrates to meet performance based quotas to fund their operations irrespective of the

harm caused to parent-child relationships and without counsel for children.

(55) As part of this non-judicial custom or practice, plaintiff was held to the same

earnings capacity as he enjoyed at the conclusion of his 23 year law practice after only six weeks

since the one year suspension was imposed. As relevant here, by delaying reinstatement, support

arrears continue to accrue to cause yet another license suspension order to be piggy-backed on

the current (third) one which is destined to cause terminal support incarceration.

15

(56) Family Court review of the magistrate’s decision was foreclosed by transcript

delays of a stenographer recommended for hire by the 21st judge in a listing handed to plaintiff in

open court. As the delays continued over a period of only weeks, the production issue was

relayed to the judge but the case was nevertheless dismissed days later. It was again presented to

the 25th judge after further recusals and again denied in contrast with other orders. Stay relief was

then denied by a Third Department judge, and the appeal was abandoned on futility grounds.

(57) This institutional bias is now reflected in the reinstatement process directed by

defendant Third Department judges. Due to the lack of any defined scope, it is not being

monitored for timeliness purposes while plaintiff is invidiously harmed in his liberty, livelihood

and childrearing interests. There is no authority under CPLR article 78 or any other state statute

to review the actions of an Appellate Department and no appeal lies from the determinations or

inactions of subordinate defendants. In lieu of formal action, they have issued more inquiries.

(58) The latest inquiries, dated April 13, 2012, purport to assert violations of a

disciplinary rule, specifically New York Code Rule 8.4(d) which vaguely prohibits an attorney

from engaging in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In plaintiff’s case,

this rule can and is being exploited to mean anything which defendants find offensive such as

plaintiff’s reform efforts which by design and recourse will prejudice their revenue sources.

(59) For example, the entire “Chief Attorney’s Inquiry” encompasses matters properly

divided between the exercise of free speech prior to the first license suspension order which is

subject to no state jurisdiction and self representation thereafter in a civil rights case which is

uniquely the subject of federal court jurisdiction. Relevant defendants are named in that case,

Parent v State, and by their inquiries, they seek to explore plaintiff’s pro se litigation strategy.

16

(60) As such, these defendants are functioning as counsel of record and otherwise

usurping authority exclusively assigned by federal law to the United States Second Circuit Court

of Appeals where the case is now set for deliberation. In the process, additional ethics rules are

being violated by defendants’ failure to communicate with plaintiff through attorneys

representing their interests in the ongoing case. A response by plaintiff implicates the same

ethics rules and any failure to respond subjects him to additional charges for lack of cooperation.

(61) In addition, plaintiff is under no ethical, legal or moral duty to disclose his legal

strategy in a pro se action any more than he can be compelled to divulge similar information if he

was actually representing a client. The inquiries all relate to complex legal decisions of plaintiff

caused by defendants’ joint misconduct and a precedent seeking opinion which cited a single

1984 district court ruling in another circuit on the salient issue of 11th Amendment waiver.

(62) The inquiries are allegedly based upon “information contained in files and records

maintained by (defendant Committee)”. However, the first question reflects the involvement of

an outside source acting on behalf of other defendants. Specifically, the disciplinary defendants

challenge plaintiff’s conduct in the “January 19, 2010 Civil Rights Forum” described earlier in

this pleading as having its focus on race discrimination by the City of Utica. They then demand

that plaintiff “advise if (he) made the audience aware that (he) was a suspended attorney.”

(63) In defendants’ repeat prior inquiries, the first license suspension order of February

5, 2010 is expressly acknowledged and its removal was made a primary condition for

reinstatement. Hence, plaintiff did not advise the audience that he was a “suspended attorney”

because he was not a “suspended attorney” at the time of the public forum he sponsored. If the

question was answered honestly, it would constitute an admission to contempt of defendant

judges’ suspension order and a further ethics violation within the framework of this inquiry.

17

(64) The foregoing demonstrates defendants’ additional violations of ethical rules

requiring a minimal degree of competency and preparedness in paid legal services to the people

of New York. It also belies any jurisdiction defined by the inquiry itself. Section 806.4 of the

Third Department rules is cited for defendants’ authority and it requires the Chief Attorney to

make a formal determination of an ethics violation as a condition for the inquiry which then

serves to commence the investigation itself. No such determination was rationally made here.

(65) The next 14 of 15 inquiries which complete the latest phase of reinstatement all

relate directly to the content of record and decision in the above mentioned case. For purposes of

this pleading, select inquiries will be identified to show the unlawful interference with federal

court jurisdiction involving a pro se plaintiff against these same defendants in pending litigation.

(66) Inquiry #7 requires plaintiff to “explain why (he) did not meet the statutory

prerequisite of filing a notice of claim for (his) state law trespass claim (against municipal

defendants)”, referenced at paragraph 33. In fact, plaintiff did meet this prerequisite as the

relevant claim was timely filed before commencement of the November 10, 2010 (member) case.

(67) The duly stamped claim is found in public records, reprinted on plaintiff’s

monitored website, and contained in the joint appendix filed with the Second Circuit. As proper

grounds for appeal, the lower court failed to acknowledge this claim in opposition papers to

dismissal and misrepresented the record in its May 24, 2011 public opinion. Defendants’

appellate counsel is aware of this clear error, and it is not opposed in appellate briefs. In short,

plaintiff is being held accountable for a nonexistent ethics violation caused by a federal judge.

(68) Other inquiries demand explanations behind municipal “policy” which was properly

shown by “custom” alternatives in the actions of state actors and ratification of superiors (i.e.

county defendants Chudyk and Soldato participating in the filing of a support violation petition

18

beyond any lawful jurisdiction, the defect created by case transfer to another county with the

parties nevertheless residing in the same county, as confirmed by support magistrate Getman).

(69) Personal involvement of other named defendants was adequately shown through

peculiar and concerted actions which left no other logical conclusion. Such claims are routinely

made out through a circumstantial chain of events. In plaintiff’s extraordinary case, an ever

complicated setting arose from events which were left unrestrained due to the money interests

implicated. Federal litigation was necessitated by the lack of any other rational forum. As

explained in plaintiff’s brief, salient case law was nevertheless disregarded in the lower decision.

(70) The balance of inquiries relate to precedent seeking endeavors continued in pro se

fashion after defendants dismantled plaintiff’s other test cases. One attacks plaintiff’s fundraising

efforts and outside requests to create a class action necessitating retention of counsel. Such a

lawsuit can be certified through later motion practice. Conspiracy claims naturally flowed from

systemic bias, joint counsel, police monitoring and judges conducting non-judicial functions.

(71) Equal protection precedent was sought along the lines set by Thurgood Marshall

when he challenged a century of established legal doctrine known as “separate but equal”

treatment of the races. In this case, “separate but unequal” parenting is being challenged based

on long discredited but retained “tender years” doctrine in play over the same period. Respect for

the subject federal court decision is reflected in the pleadings here which omit virtually all of the

earlier named defendants despite common facts and ripened claims since November 10, 2010.

First Cause of Action

(72) Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if

set forth here in full. The same paragraphs are similarly incorporated into all succeeding causes

of action except where otherwise indicated.

19

(73) On April 5, 2012, plaintiff delivered a letter to New York’s chief judge at the Court

of Appeals in Albany which respectfully asked for the removal of a political poster featured on

the wall of the public clerk’s office. It lauded a disgraced former chief judge, Sol Wachtler, as a

man of integrity campaigning for judgeship. Plaintiff found it offensive on multiple grounds

including Wachtler’s pre-conviction directives of paid court staff to investigate a New Jersey

lawyer in order to prevent licensure as part of his stalking agenda and illicit love affair.

(74) The poster was first discovered when serving the federal member case pleading in

November, 2010 and was thereafter criticized in videos and news releases. These were featured

on plaintiff’s monitored website, Leon Koziol.com which defendants have cited to prevent

reinstatement. Video reproductions from plaintiff’s “January 19, 2010 Civil Rights Forum” were

also featured to the time of this Complaint. A copy of the chief judge letter was submitted to

defendant Mercure, and when no responses were obtained, copies were delivered to offices of the

United States Congress by concerned parents as part of a recent march and lobby initiative.

(75) Consistent with the entire pleading here, the “Chief Attorney’s Inquiry”,

institutional bias, and ongoing retributions impair plaintiff’s exercise of free speech, free press,

free access to our public courts, and other protected activities in violation of the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ethical Rule 8.4(d), additionally exploited to

facilitate these violations, is vague, overbroad and similarly unconstitutional.

(76) The foregoing chain of events has led to a conclusion that defendants are

orchestrating grounds for permanent exclusion of plaintiff from the legal profession. This has

necessitated alternate income development which, in turn, has been and continues to be

invidiously harmed by the terms of suspension orders in effect since February 5, 2010.

20

(77) Their common overbroad terms prohibit plaintiff from giving “an opinion as to the

law” directly or indirectly in any context. Discourse with defendant Zayas intended to discern a

scope for this prohibition was left to trial and speculation with no guiding authority provided.

Trivial, frivolous and anonymous inquiries and complaints relevant to plaintiff’s website, court

filings and speaking engagements over the past two years confirm this provision to be a prior

restraint on free speech and other protected activity.

(78) Opinions on the law comprise a routine of the people in a diverse range of non-

lawyer conduct such as teaching, lobbying and public speaking. Plaintiff has been approached to

reconsider public office in light of his former employment as a city councilman, endorsed runs

for state Senate and county executive, and divorce mediation in light of the aforesaid disciplinary

experience of Judge Getman. Such opinions are inevitable and incidental to employment and free

discourse in the community, private childrearing and a complete range of human activity.

(79) As a consequence of the human rights violations here and related abuses of

authority described throughout this pleading, plaintiff has suffered reputation injuries, emotional

distress, economic losses and opportunity costs. He is entitled to an award of monetary damages

in the amount of $25 million. Relief is also sought declaring the challenged rule, orders and

processes unconstitutional on their face or as applied to plaintiff. Injunctive relief is necessitated

to enjoin their enforcement and continuation. Finally, an order is sought vacating all license

suspension orders, including one lifted on January 26, 2012, and an order directing reinstatement

of plaintiff to the practice of law in the courts of New York and this federal district.

Second Cause of Action

(80) Since undertaking protected activities critical of bench and bar practices in domestic

relations litigation, plaintiff has elected to avoid membership in bar associations and bar

21

functions. Instead, he has associated himself with minorities and groups seeking to remedy civil

rights violations and unethical practices upon children, their parents and extended families.

(81) On information and belief, other lawyers mentioned in this Complaint have joined

and/or participated in bar activities while avoiding association with reform minded people and

groups out of a fear of retribution or in furtherance of their lucrative practices. As a consequence,

they have enjoyed privileged treatment by defendant judges, disciplinary agents and New York’s

Unified Court System. The concerted and invidious treatment of plaintiff violates his rights of

free association under the First Amendment to the American Constitution.

Third Cause of Action

(82) Due to the institutional bias and combined retributions, plaintiff is unduly impaired

in his right to petition government for a redress of grievances and his rights of access to both

federal and state courts. These public institutions were created by the people to substitute for

anarchy and self help remedies. Defendants have individually and/or collectively violated

plaintiff’s rights under the final clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Fourth Cause of Action

(83) The defendants’ collective activities have invaded every aspect of privacy enjoyed

by plaintiff. With each petition, inquiry and process needlessly imposed to chill the exercise of

basic rights, plaintiff was and remains forced to disclose private matter and impair sensitive

relationships. The extrajudicial monitoring of plaintiff, his children, fiancée and mother of his

children is “conduct which shocks the conscience” of a civilized society in violation of the

Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments and other related provisions of the American Constitution.

(84) Plaintiff’s children cannot be deemed to have consented to defendant Koslosky’s

misconduct designed to reach subject matter outside the scope of state assignment authority and

22

their genuine “best interests”. They cannot be treated as consensual citizens to a fraudulent

scheme to defame and incarcerate their only natural father while functionally and permanently

removing traditional parenting figures for purely vindictive, self serving and unrelated purposes.

Fifth Cause of Action

(85) The extraordinary events visited upon plaintiff have produced systemic retributions

and institutional bias in the New York Unified Court System. Due to the exercise of a citizen’s

rights of self representation and valid criticisms of a hybrid enterprise of state government,

plaintiff cannot seek relief in the courts of his native state. Every form of relief necessitates a

background of subject matter found in these pleadings. Plaintiff has consequently been remanded

to a form of permanent house arrest without rational capacity for pursuing a livelihood or family.

(86) Accordingly, plaintiff seeks an order declaring the processes and dispositions

challenged by this Complaint to be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Under the same clause, plaintiff seeks a comparable order on substantive grounds

based on the “totality of circumstances” summarized in this pleading. The bizarre scrutiny

perpetrated by defendants Daley, Koslosky, Torncello, and Zayas alone has forced plaintiff to

alter aspects of his daily routine as part of an ongoing chilling effect upon protected activity.

Sixth Cause of Action

(87) The select application of attorney ethics code has created a “class of one” violation

of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has lodged formal and

informal complaints, directly or indirectly, against the non-disciplinary lawyers identified in this

pleading. Since the time of investigation arising from appellate arguments described at paragraph

15 of this Complaint, there has not been the slightest indication of disciplinary action or interest

23

conveyed by the New York Unified Court System. The pertinent lawyer’s serious misconduct

was described, among other things, as a clear “prejudice to the administration of justice”, to wit:

(a) repeat violations of court directives resulting in protectionorders issued against the lawyer, his client and entire law office;

(b) filing of papers concededly “in the wrong court” resulting in dismissalof his client’s case and costly renewal one year later at her expense;

(c) drafting of a divorce decree, corrected by the plaintiff-father, whichhad his client guilty of cruel and inhumane treatment of her opponentcontrary to an uncontested petition filed prior to his interference;

(d) maliciously delayed disclosure of fraudulent support bills whichcollapsed his client’s signed settlement, causing more costly conflict;

Seventh Cause of Action

(88) In order to further impair and chill the plaintiff’s exercise of protected activity,

defendant judges, Duffy, Torncello , Zayas, Daley and Koslosky have directly, indirectly or by

ratification required the plaintiff to announce himself as a “suspended attorney” as opposed to

“non-practicing attorney”, “former attorney” or similar functional designation. Such stigma

continues to be required in all public, professional and even private activity, including alternate

employment searches. It has caused plaintiff to resort to confusing “Dr.” or “J.D.” titles.

(89) The pretext for this peculiarity, under further penalty of incarceration, lies in a

presumption of plaintiff’s unlawful practice of law even in situations where it is utterly

concocted, impossible to occur or incidental to casual conversation. This presumption has been

invidiously applied to plaintiff to cause a dwindling of resources needed to exercise all other

protected activity. By way of comparison, convicted child molesters are made subject to

registration mandates but they are not required to announce their status in public speech.

(90) This requirement has been caused, influenced or enforced to stigmatize plaintiff’s

longstanding reputation and competency as a means for discrediting and suppressing the reform

24

message described throughout this pleading. Despite long satisfaction of a one year suspension

term and lifting of earlier punishments, the status label has been employed to impair background

summaries released by plaintiff prior his 2011 national parenting convention, to prevent

reinstatement through timeless and excessive inquiries, and to cause support incarceration

through foreclosure of alternate employment endeavors after nearly a quarter century of

successful law practice. As such, this requirement violates the Eighth Amendment to the

Constitution in addition to the foregoing provisions.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff seeks judgment as follows:

1) An award of compensatory damages in the amount of $25 million against defendants

Torncello, Zayas, Daley, Koslosky and City of Utica on the first, second and third causes of

action;

2) An award of compensatory damages against defendants Torncello, Zayas, Daley and

Koslosky in the amount of $25 million on the fourth, fifth and seventh causes of action;

3) An award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million against defendants

Torncello, Zayas, Daley and Koslosky on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh causes

of action;

4) A judgment declaring New York Code Rule 8.4 (d) vague and overbroad on its face or

as applied to plaintiff on the first cause of action and an order enjoining enforcement of same;

5) A judgment declaring defendant “Chief Attorney’s Inquiry” dated April 13, 2012

unconstitutional and excessive on its face or as applied to plaintiff on all causes of action and an

order enjoining their enforcement by defendants Duffy, Torncello, Zayas and others acting in

concert with them;

25

6) A judgment declaring the license suspension orders entered on February 5, 2010 and

September 23, 2010 unconstitutional on their face or as applied to plaintiff together with

remedial orders vacating both and permanently enjoining the processes or practices described in

all causes of action against all defendants.

7) An order immediately reinstating plaintiff to the practice of law in this court and the

courts of the State of New York;

8) Orders which may become necessary to add parties and state law claims based on

discovered information and a conspiracy to violate the federal rights stated in this pleading;

9) An award of attorneys fees, costs and disbursements under the circumstances, and

10) Such other relief as may be just and proper.

Date: May 17, 2012

LEON R. KOZIOL, J.D.Plaintiff, pro se1518 Genesee StreetUtica, New York 13502(315) 796-4000