Leisure craftS A F E T Y D I G E S T2nd Edition

This Safety Digest draws the attention of the leisure community to some ofthe lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. It contains facts

which have been determined up to the time of issue, and is published toprovide information about the general circumstances of marine accidents and

to draw out the lessons to be learned.

The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidentshappening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative andsubject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability.The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves

to ensure the maximum value can be achieved.

This Safety Digest is comprised of 23 articles written in the past four years.

Extracts can be published without specific permission, providing the source is duly acknowledged.

The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.

Extract from The Merchant Shipping(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is an independent part of the Department for Transport. The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is

responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport.

The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining thecauses and circumstances of accidents, and working with others to reduce

the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.

If you wish to report an accident or incident please call our24 hour reporting line on 023 8023 2527.

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500.

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459.The e.mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are also available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under theseregulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim

of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in thefuture. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is

necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

Index

Chief Inspector’s Foreword 5

Sailing vessels

Case 1 The Tragic Consequences of Not Wearing a Lifejacket 8

Case 2 Poor Decision-Making Leads to the Death of a Skipper 10

Case 3 Knockdown and Total Loss off the Portuguese Coast 12

Case 4 Catamaran Capsize in Solent 13

Case 5 The Sailing “Taster” that Left a Bitter Taste 14

Case 6 Winter Storm in Biscay Claims Life 17

Case 7 Anything But Plain Sailing! 20

Case 8 How Safe is Your Safety Boat? 22

Case 9 To Sail or Not to Sail? 24

Case 10 Dangers of Rotating Machinery 27

Case 11 A Cheap but Priceless Early Warning 29

Case 12 Double Tragedy 31

Case 13 Steering Seizure 33

Power vessels

Case 14 Fishing for Disaster 37

Case 15 Alcohol Ends a Weekend Pleasure Trip 39

Case 16 Early Warning Headaches 42

Case 17 Don’t Underestimate the Familiar 43

Case 18 Kill Cords Save Lives, When Used Properly 45

Case 19 Ouch! One Very Badly Cracked RIB 48

Case 20 Perilous Propellers 51

Case 21 Lookout – Above and Below the Water 52

Case 22 Relaxing Canal Trip Ends in Tragedy 53

Case 23 Fatal Injuries From Propeller 55

List of leisure craft accident reports published since 2004 56

Chief Inspector’s Foreword

5

For those who have not read one, the MAIB produces thrice yearly a Safety Digest,containing anonymised accounts of accidents and incidents at sea, together withthe lessons that seafarers should learn from each case. Believing in the principlethat it is better to learn from others’ mistakes than finding out the hard way foroneself, the MAIB is not in the business of blame or litigation, but is purelyinterested in future safety.

This Safety Digest is a compendium of 23 cases of leisure craft accidents culledfrom our regular Safety Digests of the past four years. It is offered to all who enjoyboating of any size or shape, at sea or on inland waters. I urge you to read throughboth the sailing and the power sections – there are lessons for all of us in bothsections.

With this number of cases, it would be simplistic for me to try to stress any lessonas more or less important than any other. What I would ask is that in preparationfor each trip you give a thought to safety. “Risk Assessment” has got a bad press,so let us think about risk awareness! A quick mental check of the risks – and howyou would avoid them – would make everyone’s life safer: How do I ensure no onefalls overboard – and how will we deal with it if someone does? What is theweather forecast and are we equipped for both the forecast weather and anyunexpected squalls? What will we do in the case of mechanical breakdown?How will we raise the alarm if required – who will raise the alarm for us if wecan’t? What are the navigational hazards – and how will we ensure we miss them?None of this is difficult, but it is important. And please always brief your crew sothat they know what to do in an emergency, particularly if you becomeincapacitated.

Take safety seriously and be safe on the water.

Stephen MeyerChief Inspector of Marine Accidents

If you find this interesting and instructive, think about putting your name on the distribution list for ourregular Safety Digest – it is free!

7404-DfT-MAIB Leisure Craft Safety Digest-Text 12/2/08 11:07 Page 5

S A F E T Y D I G E S T 2 0 0 3

Sailingvessels

CASE 1

8

Narrative

A sailing club was holding its regular summerWednesday evening race for the keelboatmembers of its club. That evening, a force 5–6was anticipated outside the harbour breakwater.After a short discussion with the race officer todecide on a particular course, the yacht crewsprepared their boats to race. Seven boats tookpart in the race, the majority of which werecruiser/racers.

One of the racers was a distinctly different type ofboat. This was an 8m sportsboat, equipped withan asymmetric spinnaker on a retractable bowspritwhich enabled it to plane at speeds over 20knots. The boat did not have an inboard enginefitted but, as required by class rules, did have asmall outboard which was stored inside the hullnear the mast.

The sportsboat had a crew of six on the eveningof the accident. Earlier in the year, the sportsboathad been bought jointly by five of the crew onboard. The helmsman was a very experienced andaccomplished sailor who had sailed a variety ofdifferent craft over many years. The rest of the co-owners had only crewed sailing boatsoccasionally prior to buying the sportsboat. Thesixth member of the crew had been invited alongby the helmsman. He was an experienced racingcrew, but this was his first time on the sportsboat.All of the crew were wearing sailing waterproofs.Two of the crew were wearing no personalbuoyancy: the helmsman, who had chosen not towear a lifejacket, and a crewman who had left hislifejacket in his car.

Prior to the race, the crew on the sportsboatcompleted some practice manoeuvres, including

raising and lowering the asymmetric spinnaker.The race then began and the sportsboat, with theasymmetric spinnaker flying, crossed the startingline on a starboard tack (sails on the port side).Sometime later, the crew successfully gybed thesportsboat on to a port tack (sails on thestarboard side) and set course to pass the end ofthe breakwater into the open sea. The sailing wasexhilarating and everyone on board was enjoyingthemselves.

Just as the sportsboat cleared the end of thebreakwater, the retractable bowsprit pole snappedat the point where it passed through the hull. Theboat slowed down and the crew lowered thespinnaker and retrieved the broken bowsprit overthe open transom on the starboard side. Thehelmsman asked if everyone was content tocontinue racing under the main and jib only, towhich they all agreed. The helmsman then tried togybe to head for the first racing mark, but couldnot as the boat was moving too slowly. All of thecrew apart from the helmsman were on thestarboard side of boat clearing the spinnaker.After attempting to gybe on two occasionswithout success, the boat suddenly did gybe andheeled heavily to port. As a result, the helmsmanfell overboard from his position on the portquarter.

The crew noticed the helmsman in the water, justas he shouted to them to turn the boat around.The guest crewman took the helm, but wasunable to manoeuvre the boat as it had turnedbow into wind and was caught ‘in irons’. Thecrew shouted to another yacht that was racing toraise the alarm. That yacht then started hisinboard engine and, leaving his sails to flog, made

The Tragic Consequences

of Not Wearing

a Lifejacket

9

towards the man in the water. The skipper on thisvessel also called the coastguard, and the inshorelifeboat was requested. Unfortunately, therescuing yacht missed the man in the water on itsfirst pass.

Meanwhile, on board the sportsboat, anothercrewman had taken the helm to try and steer theboat towards the casualty, while two crewmembers stood on the foredeck looking for him.While steering, the helmsman also tried to unlockhis VHF hand-held radio in order to changechannels to channel 16, but with only one handfree was unable to do so.

The man in the water was spotted floating face-down 10–12m away. One of the crewmen on theforedeck, who was wearing a buoyancy aid, divedin and started swimming towards the casualty.The sportsboat then started to make someprogress towards the casualty and passed theswimming crewman. As it approached the man inthe water, two of the crew grabbed hold of him,but were unable to hold him because the boatwas still moving. One of the crewmen – who was

wearing no personal buoyancy – jumped in whenhe realised he couldn’t hold on. He tried to holdon to a line trailing behind the boat, but had tolet go. The swimming crewman arrived at aboutthe same time, and took the casualty from thecrewman with no personal buoyancy to allow himto swim to the now nearby rescuing yacht andclimb out of the water. The rescuing yacht thenmanaged to come alongside the casualty andcrew in the water but, with a freeboard of 0.9m,the crew on board the yacht only managed tohold the unconscious casualty vertically, half outof the water with the aid of a rope.

The lifeboat arrived soon afterwards, the casualtywas taken on board and first-aid administered –some 10 minutes after the casualty had fallen inthe water. The sportsboat crew, meanwhile, hadfitted their outboard on to the stern bracket, butthe engine would not start.

The casualty was winched aboard a rescuehelicopter and taken to hospital, where he waspronounced dead.

The Lessons

1 The sportsboat had a lowfreeboard and sea conditionswere moderate to rough, so thechances of someone fallingoverboard were significant. Asthis was a keelboat race, therewas no rescue boat. Personalbuoyancy was, therefore,important to ensure anyonefalling into the water stayedafloat. In this case two menrisked their own lives in anattempt to rescue a man whowas not wearing a lifejacket.

Don’t be selfish, wear yourlifejacket!

2 The man who fell in thewater was the only experiencedhelmsman on board thesportsboat. No man overboarddrills (MOB) had been carriedout since buying the vessel andnone of the crew knew what todo in the event of someonefalling in. Ensure that at leasttwo members of your crew cancarry out an MOB recoveryeffectively.

3 Although not a contributingfactor to this accident, there wassome difficulty using the radiothat was on board thesportsboat. The crewman at thehelm trying to retrieve the MOBowned the radio, and the rest of

the crew were not readily ableto use it. All your crew shouldbe familiar with using the VHFradio, sufficient to raise thealarm in an emergency.

4 In this case, no first-aidresuscitation could be carriedout on the casualty until he wasin the lifeboat because neitherof the boats involved in therescue had an effective meansof recovering an unconsciousperson from the water.

Think about how you might getan unconscious person back onboard your boat. It could meanthe difference between life anddeath.

CASE 2

10

Narrative

An 11.2m yacht, drawing 1.5m was beingprofessionally delivered from south-eastern Spainto the East Coast of the UK. There was a crew ofthree, including the skipper who had aYachtmaster Offshore qualification with acommercial endorsement.

The voyage took longer than planned due topersistent, often light, headwinds and poorperformance under power. They were unable tomotor at more than about 3 knots.

They began the final leg of their journey in poorvisibility, having had a tiring voyage up-Channel.All three were awake in the early hours of themorning, one on the helm, another keeping alookout, and a third monitoring the radar. Theywere crossing a major river estuary on the EastCoast, notorious for shallows and shifting banks,and were doing so on a falling tide. There was nowind, the sea was smooth, and with the tide intheir favour they were making about 4 knots overthe ground.

The skipper was navigating using a chart with ascale of 1:250,000, and a small portable GPSchartplotter temporarily fixed just forward of thewheel. They were following a route on thechartplotter to a waypoint several miles distantthat would take them into very shallow water.They ran aground with about 11⁄2 hours of tidestill to fall, which would have amounted to about60cm.

Attempts were made to refloat using the engine,and by heeling the yacht by putting the boom toport and adding weight to the end. When thisfailed, the skipper elected to strip to his

underclothes and go over the side with a line tiedaround his waist, attached to the starboardquarter. This was with the intention of findingdeeper water and laying a kedge anchor withwhich they might winch themselves off.

Later, when in the water, the skipper wasspeaking to the crew who was on the helm, andhad instructed him to leave the engine runningastern. Suddenly the line that was round his waistbecame caught around the propeller and shaft.The skipper was dragged underneath the yacht,where he was trapped below the water with theline tight around him.

The other crew, who had been working with theanchor, quickly went over the side, carrying aknife. He dived underneath, but found it verydifficult to free the skipper. Despite the crewhimself becoming very tired in the water, on thefourth attempt he managed to free the skipperand bring him to the surface. He was able to bebrought back into the cockpit but, despiteattempts at resuscitation, he showed no sign of

Poor Decision-Making

Leads to the Death of a

Skipper

Folding prop with entangled rope

11

life. It is probable that he had been underwaterfor 10 minutes.

A “Mayday” call had been put out as soon as theskipper became trapped and, in due course, twolifeboats and a helicopter arrived. The skipper wasflown to hospital where it was confirmed that hehad died. The two surviving crew were takenaboard one lifeboat while the other took theyacht in tow.

After the yacht had been lifted out of the water,to remove the rope that had been around theskipper, a further line was found tangled in thefolding propeller that was preventing it fromproperly deploying. The line showed signs ofhaving been there some time, and was probablythe cause of their reduced speed under enginepower.

The Lessons

1 The danger of being in thewater, attached to a rope, closeto a turning propeller cannot beoverestimated. To reduce thehazard, the engine should havebeen disengaged. Better still, itshould have been switched offaltogether while someone wasover the side.

2 Thorough passage planningis important at all times; inshallow tidal waters it isessential. The track of the yachtand the waypoints being usedwere stored in theGPS/chartplotter, and wereanalysed by the MAIB. The routebeing followed took the yachtstraight over an area of shallowwater with charted depths ofless than 1 metre, and at onepoint, a drying area.

3 Charts must be of thecorrect scale. The 1:250,000chart showed no soundings forthe area being transited, andwas better suited to longerrange route planning. Thechartplotter vector chartingcontained sufficient detail solong as the chart display was setto the correct scale. This was theprime means of navigationbeing used, but had a screensize of just 7.5cm x 5.7cm,making it very difficult to seethe wider picture.

4 Fatigue was an importantfactor. The skipper had intendedto carry out the voyage withfour people on board, but haddecided to go with three whenone dropped out. Although it isnot unusual for a yacht to benavigated shorthanded overlong distances, proper rest isessential. It seems very likelythat the skipper’s decision-making was affected by fatigue.

5 Whenever any type of vesselgrounds, it is vital to carry out aquick but rational riskassessment. The action takenwill be different if you are beingblown onto a dangerous leeshore, compared with gentlyrunning onto a bank in calmconditions with no swell, andthe prospect of the height oftide and the direction of streambeing able to float you off in acouple of hours. The decision bythe skipper, to go over the sidein the way that he did, was illthought through.

6 It is important to recognisethe differences betweennavigating in largely non-tidalwaters such as theMediterranean, and the shallowtidal waters that characterise theEast Coast of England. It ispossible to gain commerciallyacceptable sailing

qualifications without havingpractical experience of shallowestuaries and shifting banks.There are different challengespresented by the variety of typesof waters found throughout theworld, but if they are unfamiliarto you, as skipper, extra caremust be taken at the passageplanning stage.

N.B.The portable GPS/chartplotterbeing used on board this yachtwas found to have an unusualcharacteristic within its chartdisplay. As with most units ofthis type, it was possible tochange the units through whichspeeds, depths, and heightswere displayed. As a result ofthis, the unit was set to displaysoundings in metres, but dryingheights in feet on the samechart. This almost certainly hadno bearing on the circumstancesof the accident, but in othersituations could easily causeconfusion.

Units of this type are sold as anaid to navigation, with strongadvice to use them inconjunction with paper charts.It is important to be aware ofthe multitude of functions andoptions available so that it is anaid rather than a hindrance.

CASE 3

12

The Lessons

1 The decision to continue toan alternative port further southwas understandable, but anapproach to any port on a leeshore in the conditions carriedrisks. Although unpalatable tothe crew, staying out at seawould probably have saved the

yacht. The MAIB has looked intoother accidents where the crewwere less fortunate, and suchaction would have saved lives.

2 Leaving experiencedstudents aboard without theirinstructor has the value of

ensuring that the skipper knowshe or she really is in charge, andmust stand or fall by thedecisions made. However, theinstructor should carry out aparticularly thorough riskassessment with the fullinvolvement of the students.

Narrative

An 11.3m sailing yacht was being used for anintensive 13 week Yachtmaster training course.The instructor and four crew had already spentalmost 2 months on board sailing on the southcoast of England and then to the Channel Islands,Brittany and western France before heading acrossthe Bay of Biscay for Spain and Portugal in mid-November.

By this time, the students had amassed a gooddeal of experience and the instructor decided itwas time for them to skipper the yacht withouthim being on board. A passage of around 75miles southwards down the coast was planned,and the instructor stepped ashore. Winds wereforecast to be a force 4 westerly, veering northerlyforce 5.

However, while on passage, the winds increasedto gale force from the north-west. The skipper onboard phoned the instructor ashore and it wasagreed that the original destination was going tobe too dangerous to approach in the prevailing

conditions as there was a bar at the harbourentrance and the pilot book suggested this maybe dangerous. An alternative destination wasagreed, which was thought to offer a saferapproach but which was another 30 miles furthersouth.

The designated skipper became incapacitated withseasickness as the severe conditions continued, soanother student, the most experienced of thefour, took over. With sails furled and the engineon, they made their approach but were knockeddown to an estimated 110° by a breaking wave.

The acting skipper was on the helm and waswashed overboard. He had been clipped on butwas unable to get back on board. The next wavetook the yacht past the harbour entrance, andshortly afterwards she hit the beach. The actingskipper suffered cracked ribs, but he and the restof the crew were otherwise unscathed. The yachtwas damaged beyond repair.

Knockdown and Total Loss

off the Portuguese Coast

Catamaran Capsize in Solent

13

The Lessons

1 The importance of correctclothing for the conditionscannot be over emphasised. Allfour members of the crew werewearing thermal underclothing,midlayer garments, as well asheavy weather jackets and hightrousers. They were also wearinglifejackets and harnesses.Despite low sea and airtemperatures, all four survivedeleven hours on the upturnedhulls relatively unscathed.

2 Locate the grab-bagsomewhere so that it can bereached if the boat becomesinverted. This is obviouslyparticularly important with amulti-hull, which, once inverted,will stay inverted.

3 An EPIRB mounted in thecockpit would have raised thealarm within minutes of thecapsize, and would have spared

the crew a long, cold andextremely uncertain night.

4 The skipper told the MAIBthat he was grateful that theyhad all eaten a good mealbefore departure, and hadstayed away from alcohol. Healso highlighted the importanceof keeping morale high and“believing in the rescue”..

Narrative

A catamaran was being sailed by her new ownerswho had taken delivery from Portsmouth. Theskipper and three crew were experienced andwere wearing suitable clothing for a blustery Aprilevening. The boat was equipped with VHF radioand a good selection of emergency equipment,although no EPIRB was carried.

It was getting dark, and with the wind blowing20 to 25 knots from SSW, the crew were sailingunder a double-reefed mainsail and reefedheadsail. They tacked on to starboard and soonafterwards an unusual wave pattern hit theweather hull, reported to be travelling against thedirection of the wind and swell. It lifted the hullso far that the boat lost stability and capsized.

The catamaran inverted almost immediately,leaving the crew to find safety on the upturnedhulls. Because the capsize had happened soquickly, there had been no time to retrieve the‘grab-bag’ containing flares and other equipment.The VHF was now out of action, as well as beinginaccessible, and the mobile telephones weredown below.

Skipper and crew had no option but to huddle together for warmth, and hope for a rescue. Luckily, they were less thana mile offshore from Stansore Point in the Solent,but it was now completely dark.

It was not until about 0700 the following day, asit grew light, that their distress signals (raised andlowered arms) were spotted from the shore andthe alarm was raised. All four were taken off bythe inshore lifeboat, and taken to hospitalsuffering from mild hypothermia. Fortunately, allmade complete recoveries.

CASE 4

CASE 5

14

Narrative

Nine people from a social and adventure activitiesgroup booked a 1-day “sailing taster”, suitablefor novices, which was to provide the opportunityto act as crew.

An IMX 38 yacht was designated for the trip. Itwas certified to carry up to 10 people in Category2 waters (up to 60 miles from a safe haven).Regulations required it to be manned by theskipper and one other designated crewdetermined to be “one other person on boarddeemed experienced by the skipper”. Theoperating company had conducted some riskassessments, but none specific for operating witha totally inexperienced crew.

The group arrived at the marina at 0830, full ofexpectations. For most, this would be a newexperience and they were looking forward totesting their sea legs.

Things did not go well from the outset. There wasno one to meet and greet the group. Thenominated vessel had been changed, but thegroup were not told this. When they eventuallyfound the yacht, the nominated skipper said thathe was unwell and was waiting for thereplacement skipper (who was also the director ofthe company) to arrive. To make matters worse,the boat had been out of the water for 8 monthsand little had been done to prepare it: the yachtwas dirty, both below and between decks; ropeswere tangled, some were covered in algae andthe locking cleats did not work properly; the deckwas slimy; and the impression was, that the yachthad been uncared for and very poorly prepared.

The replacement skipper arrived at about 0920.He agreed that the unwell skipper could remainon board in his bunk during the trip. The skipperthen introduced himself and was advised that

there was a Day Skipper qualified person amongthe group, but he was unaware of the group’sexperience prior to this.

A superficial safety briefing followed. The skipperemphasised the need to keep low under theboom and that the lifelines were to be alwaysclipped onto the jacklines. Contrary to theCompany’s Safety Policy, there was no mention ofthe use of liferafts, flares, radio operation or howto start the engine, and the Day Skipper foundthe VHF radio to be switched off. At this point,some of the group were on the point of leaving,but they decided to see the day out; after all, theywere due back alongside at 1700.

There were further delays as the mainsail andgenoa were rigged. Fuel and water were thenloaded before the yacht finally left the pontoon at1130 – 21⁄2 hours behind schedule. The group weredisgruntled, but at least they were on their way.

Once into the wide channel, the group were morerelaxed and they settled down to the business ofsailing. The Day Skipper was by now on the

The Sailing “Taster” that

Left a Bitter Taste

Figure 1 – Position of engine control lever

15

wheel, with his safety harness clipped onto therod backstay. A light lunch was made, and at1350 the yacht came about and made a straightrun back down the channel. The wind was fromthe WNW at force 6–7 and the yacht was makingbetween 7–8 knots over the ground. As the yachtwas heeling to port, the skipper instructed threeof the group to sit on the high side to try to bringthe vessel onto an even keel. Being inexperiencedthey felt uneasy about this.

As the yacht approached the channel entrance,the weather had worsened. It began to rain, thewind was gusting force 8 and there were whitehorses on the wave tops – the group wereobviously unsettled. The skipper suddenly decidedto return to the marina and, with that, thingsimmediately took a dramaticturn for the worse.

At 1426 the yacht was tackedback up the channel. Theskipper then asked the DaySkipper to start the engine. TheDay Skipper unclipped his safetyline as he prepared to checkthat the engine control was inneutral, but he found the leverto be seized (Figure 1). He spentthe next 2 minutes releasing it;he then moved in front of thewheel to go down below tostart the engine, but he wasbrought to an abrupt halt. Hisfoot became entangled in thetraveller because his safety linebecame taut (Figure 2). His linehad not been released as first

thought. The skipper, now distracted, turnedround to release the safety line and, at the sametime, the yacht conducted an inadvertent gybe.The boom moved rapidly from starboard to port,trapping the Day Skipper’s leg with the mainsheet,causing multiple fractures to his right leg. Theboom immediately returned to the starboard side.

The Day Skipper clambered to the forward part ofthe cockpit. At the same time, another of thegroup, with the help of the unwell skipper,managed to start the engine. At about 1432, asthe tension increased, the skipper mentioned theneed to lower the mainsail, but he did not directhis instruction to anyone in particular. The ladyoperating the traveller stood up, possibly to helpwith the sail, and at the same time the yachtconducted its second inadvertent gybe. The boommoved rapidly from starboard to port, hitting thelady on the right side of her head, causing hersevere injuries and forcing her partially overboard.The skipper and two of the group pulled her backinboard. Bleeding profusely from her ears, noseand mouth, her situation was potentially lifethreatening. The skipper now busied himself intrying to get the sail down. A GPS trackidentifying the accident points is at Figure 3

The injured lady was then attended by the group.They kept her airways clear, but it was a further 5minutes before a VHF “Pan Pan” call wastransmitted to the coastguard. The yacht thenmotored to a nearby jetty where the emergencyservices attended to the casualties.

Figure 3 – Detailed GPS track showing key accident points

Figure 2 – Day skipper’s leg position on the traveller rig

CASE 5Continued

16

The Lessons

The Day Skipper sufferedmultiple fractures to his leg, andthe lady was in a criticalcondition for a lengthy period.Happily, they both made a fullrecovery.

The accidents were caused by acombination of the skipperbeing distracted and thepossible snagging of the DaySkipper’s lifeline around thewheel, as well as inattention tothe weather conditions.

The organisation for the daywas very poor, the yacht was illprepared for the trip, and themanning was insufficient tocope with an emergency anddid not comply with theregulations. There was noexcuse for the very poor safetybriefing, which is fundamentalto preparing those on board for

an emergency. The delay inalerting the coastguard to anobvious very serious injury wasavoidable, and the safetybriefing should have includedthe use of the radio, aspromulgated by the company’sown Safety Policy.

In this case, the skipper failed topay sufficient attention to thewind conditions and thelimitations of the novice crew.Time spent in preparing thevessel and those on board, istime well spent. Inadequatepreparations and planning makestressful situations worse. Oncethings start to go wrong, anxietylevels increase while confidencefails and apprehensioncompromises the ability to makeclear decisions – think and planwell ahead.

The following lessons can bedrawn from this accident:

1 Ensure that vessels areproperly prepared and equipped.

2 Take time to give a thoroughsafety briefing.

3 Ensure that manning levelsare sufficient and in accordancewith the regulations.

4 Risk assessments should becomprehensive and cover use ofthe vessel with a completelynovice crew.

5 Alert the coastguardpromptly about injuries to crew.

6 Wherever there is a seriousinjury, a “Mayday” call would beappropriate.

CASE 6

17

Winter Storm in BiscayClaims LifeNarrative

A 24 year old skipper died following an abortiveattempt to carry out a transatlantic deliveryvoyage from a popular sailing port on the westcoast of France in December.

He and his two crew had spent several dayspreparing the new 15m yacht for the voyage thatwas expected to take up to a month and wouldtake them via the Canaries and the trade windsroute to the Caribbean. There, the yacht was tobe chartered by a holiday company. The onlysafety equipment provided was a liferaft, with theskipper and crew being responsible for providingtheir own lifejackets, harnesses and foul weathergear. The skipper was being paid for the trip via a

UK-based agency and, as is common in the delivery industry, was being paid a lump sum fromwhich all expenses had to be met. This extendedto other safety items such as flares, and only aminimal set of hand-held flares was purchased.The skipper brought along his own EPIRB,registered in his name, and other safety measuressuch as jack-lines on the deck were improvised.

On the day of departure, the early morningweather forecast from the French weather serviceMétéo-France, posted up by the marina office,gave SW becoming NW 6-7. It was felt this wasgoing to be a little unpleasant, but would notworry them unduly given the size of the yacht and

CASE 6Continued

18

the experience of the crew – they were allqualified RYA Yachtmasters. They sailed at 1200without seeing the updated forecast at the marinaoffice which showed that the weather situationwas deteriorating, with the forecast wind strengthhaving increased to force 8–9.

The UK Met Office had mentioned the possibilityof wind strengths up to force 9 in its earlymorning forecast, and by lunchtime it wasforecasting SW veering NW 7–9, occasionallyforce 10. However, the crew of the yacht had nolong wave radio receiver on board and were thusunable to pick up the UK forecasts. Their Frenchwas not good enough for them to understand thelocal radio forecasts so, once they sailed, they hadno means of receiving updates.

By 1800 they were 30 miles offshore and thewind had risen to SW force 9–10. Because thewind had increased quickly, the short steep seawas kicking up and they were having difficultykeeping the yacht under control. With no stormsails on board, they were sailing with a double-reefed mainsail (there was no third reef) and asmall amount of headsail unfurled. It was nowdark and a large wave knocked the yacht down,throwing the two crew who were on deck, flat inthe cockpit.

Shortly after this the headsail sheet broke,presumably under the strain of the conditions.It was deemed too dangerous to try to reeveanother sheet, so the sail was furled awaycompletely. At this point they decided to turnback to seek shelter in the port from where theyhad sailed.

Broad reaching under reefed main the return legwas uneventful until they began to pick up thelights that they hoped would lead them to safety.Close to the harbour entrance, and motoring, alarge wave caught them and capsized the yacht.

One crew felt himself pinned under the wateruntil his combined lifejacket/harness broke,allowing him to swim to the surface. The othercrew had had to cut his harness line to freehimself – however, he managed to stay on boardthe yacht when she righted herself. The skipperwas in the water with his lifejacket inflated.

The two in the water were about 100m from theyacht but could see she had been dismasted in thecapsize in relatively shallow water. Swimmingcloser, they shouted to the crew in the cockpit toset off the EPIRB. Hand flares were also set off.The VHF radio was now useless as the aerial hadbeen at the top of the mast – they had no back-up.

However, they were unable to get close enoughto the yacht to have a chance of being recovered,and eventually lost contact. The crew whoselifejacket had been ripped off him was beinghelped to stay afloat by the skipper, and theydecided to try to swim to the shore. By the timethey reached shallow water, with surf breakingaround them, the skipper had lost consciousnessand appeared to have stopped breathing. Thecrew attempted to resuscitate him, but wasforced to leave him clear of the water, on a rock,while he sought help. No-one was to be found ina nearby caravan site that was closed for thewinter, and the crew collapsed in a servicebuilding that had been left open. He remainedunconscious for several hours until recovering toflag down a car to take him to raise the alarm.

By that time, the French search and rescueauthorities, having been alerted by the EPIRBsignal relayed to them by HM Coastguard atFalmouth, had rescued the other crew from thenow grounded yacht, and had found theskipper’s body on the beach. Both crewrecovered in hospital.

The Lessons

1 A yacht equipped primarilyfor cruising in the Caribbean isnot necessarily going to be ableto handle everything a winterstorm in the Bay of Biscay canproduce. There are particularproblems facing a deliveryskipper of a new yacht in thesecircumstances. Owners will notwant to spend money onequipment that is only likely tobe needed on the deliveryvoyage. Delivery skippers willnot want to cut into their profitfor the trip by having to buycostly safety items such as flareswhich they won’t be able torecover or use again – suchitems cannot easily be taken onaircraft. Storm sails are heavy,bulky and impractical for askipper to take from yacht toyacht. However, had this yachtbeen better equipped, theoutcome might have beendifferent.

2 It is important to have ameans for receiving andunderstanding weatherforecasts. An inexpensive LWreceiver would have been ableto pick up UK Met Officeforecasts at least to the latitudeof the Straits of Gibraltar.

On a trans-ocean passage itmight be tempting to imaginethat you will have to put upwith whatever the weather willthrow at you when over athousand miles from a safehaven, but in the case of thisvoyage, the most hazardous partwas in the first few hundredmiles.

3 Approaching any lee shorein storm force conditions isgoing to be hazardous. Thedecision to return to the port ofdeparture was understandable,but events proved that stayingout at sea would probably havebeen safer. There were otheroptions on the west coast ofFrance, but all had their hazardsand none were familiar to theskipper or crew. The UK MetOffice forecast, broadcast ataround the time they decided toturn back, was alreadypredicting that the wind woulddrop to force 5–7 within thenext 24 hours. Had they beenable to receive this, they mighthave chosen to press on.

4 Having a storm jib and trisailwhich can be properly riggedare essential items for any trans-

ocean passage. A mainsail withonly two sets of reefing points isnot going to be suitable forsailing in storm force conditions.A deep third reef at the veryleast would have been helpful inthese circumstances. A roller-reefing headsail – even if it isalmost completely furled away –is not a good substitute for aheavily constructed storm jib.

5 Anyone considering workingas a delivery skipper or crewshould be aware of the potentialproblems that exist owing to thefact that a yacht may be beingdelivered between two relativelysheltered cruising groundsacross open ocean. Someyachts, generally those that havealready been owned by safetyconscious owners, will beadequately equipped. Many,particularly new yachts, will notbe. There is therefore asignificant difference for therecently qualified Yachtmasterbetween working for a UK-based sailing school or chartercompany where the yachts haveto comply with MCA Codes ofPractice, and the delivery ofcraft where none of these safetymeasures apply.

19

CASE 7

20

Narrative

A lone sailor set off early in the morning in his22ft yacht, which he had caringly restored andhad sailed during the summer months over theprevious 4 years. This was his first trip of theseason in the boat. The intended passage to anearby yacht haven about 15 miles away requiredhim to cross a narrow channel frequently used bylarge ships. The sailor wore a lifejacket, but didnot carry either flares or a VHF radio.

As the yacht approached the narrow channel, herskipper saw a large ship leaving the port about 2miles away. The wind was north-west at 20 knots,and the yacht was on a close haul, heading in awesterly direction. The skipper was aware thatlocal regulations required him to keep out of theway of the outbound ship. To comply, he adjustedcourse to the south-west, which brought theyacht onto a beam reach and increased her speedto about 6 knots.

By this time, the yacht had been spotted by thepilot of the outbound ship, which was constrainedby her draught. He was content that the yachtwould remain clear of the ship providing theyacht’s heading was maintained. However, as aprecaution he asked the escorting harbour launchto proceed to the yacht and advise her skipper tokeep going towards the south-west. This messagewas passed by the harbour launch by a loudhailer. The skipper heard the loud hailer but,although the launch was very close, he did notunderstand the message. Nevertheless, heassumed that the launch would only contact himif it wasn’t content with the avoiding action hewas taking. Consequently, he decided to tack, andhead to the north of the channel. As he did this,he stalled into wind, and lost all headway.

The pilot of the outbound ship, which was nowhalfway through a 135° to port turn towards theyacht, saw what had happened, and increased theship’s rate of turn to try and avoid her.

The two vessels were now extremely close and thepilot lost sight of the yacht under the bow. Theyachtsman decided that collision was imminent,and dived off the yacht. He passed down the portside of the ship and was then recovered by theharbour launch. The yacht passed down the ship’sstarboard side before being swamped by her washand foundering. The yachtsman’s lifejacket did notinflate because it was not fitted with a CO2 bottle(Figure).

Anything But Plain

Sailing!

CO2 bottle missing

The Lessons

1 Sailing or motor cruisingclose to large ships cannot beavoided within the confines ofmany harbours and theirapproaches. However, thegeneral rule that smaller vesselsmust keep clear of vesselsnavigating a narrow channel orfairway, is frequently easier saidthan done. The visualperspective of a large ship froma small craft can be verydeceiving, and it is often veryhard to accurately determinehow close a large ship will pass,particularly when the large shipis manoeuvring. Also, a plannedpassing distance can beunexpectedly reduced for sailingvessels by a sudden wind shiftor lull, and for motor cruisers bya mechanical failure. Therefore,stay clear of narrow channelswhenever possible, particularlywhen they are being navigatedby large ships. On the occasionswhen this is not possible,remember that a large container

ship will probably not be able tosee a small craft within 500m ofher bow, and she will possiblyneed up to twice that distanceto stand a chance ofmanoeuvring successfully toavoid a collision with a smallcraft ahead.

2 The first trip of the season issomething to look forward to.Consequently, there is usually anatural wish to get onto thewater and get going as soon aspossible. However, a fewminutes of re-familiarisation ofthe rigging, and practising ofkey manoeuvres is time wellspent before venturing into abusy shipping area. Otherwise,the first tack of the seasonmight also be the last!

3 A lifejacket that does notinflate is potentially a deathjacket. Regular checks are notjust recommended, they areessential. If in doubt, consult an

approved service agent.

4 Although a VHF radio is avery useful means of raising analarm, it is not practical formany yachts to carry one.However, flares are very easy tocarry, and can be just aseffective in summoningassistance in coastal areas.When neither are carried, thereis a reliance on other marinersbeing in very close proximity.There is always a risk that nonewill be.

5 There are numerous reasonswhy a harbour launch or asafety boat might try andcommunicate with small crafton the water. For variousreasons, it is sometimes difficultto understand the messagebeing passed. On theseoccasions, it pays to ensure thatyou fully understand themessage before taking anyaction.

21

CASE 8

How Safe is Your

Safety Boat?

Narrative

Two young boys were undertaking some sailingtraining on a privately-owned Hobie Cat dinghy insheltered waters. Although they had bothpreviously sailed monohull dinghies together, itwas their first time in a Hobie Cat. They thereforespent the morning with a sailing coach, whohelped them familiarise themselves with thedinghy and then accompanied them in a rigidinflatable (RIB) safety boat from a nearby sailtraining centre while they got used to thecatamaran’s characteristics.

The boys continued to sail the dinghy into theafternoon. Although the coach had by now beendropped off ashore, the safety boat, with twoqualified Royal Yachting Association (RYA) safetyboat handlers on board, continued to keep stationabout 50 metres ahead of them. All was well untilthe helm of the safety boat noticed that one of theboys was in the water, with the dinghy still upright.

As the safety boat manoeuvred close, it wasevident that the boy helming the dinghy wasstruggling to recover the other boy, whosetrapeze harness was catching on the lip of thedinghy’s starboard hull.

Given their ongoing difficulties, the crew of thesafety boat decided to help. The helmsman placedthe engine in neutral and the crewman began tomove across the boat to assist. However, as he didso, he slipped and inadvertently grabbed hold of

the throttle to prevent his fall. This forced theengine into gear. Although he immediately pulledthe kill cord, the stern of the RIB momentarilyslewed to port before the engine stopped, andthe propeller struck the boy’s left leg, causingserious injuries.

The safety boat crewman immediately called foran ambulance using his mobile phone, and theinjured boy was recovered to the safety boat andtaken back to the sailing centre. The boy wassubsequently transferred to a local hospital, wherehis left leg had to be amputated above the knee.

22

Stern view of the safety boat

23

The Lessons

1 This accident highlights thedangers posed by unprotectedrotating propellers. Had apropeller guard been fitted tothe safety boat, the terribleinjuries would probably havebeen prevented. Such guardscan lead to reducedacceleration, speed andmanoeuvrability of the boat;however, the benefits of a safelyguarded propeller have to begiven consideration compared tothe boat's potential loss inperformance. It is suggestedthat the requirement for apropeller guard will depend onthe exact role and particularoperational conditions that asafety boat is likely toencounter.

2 The throttle on thisparticular RIB was in a relativelyexposed position, which made itvulnerable to unintentionaloperation, as so tragicallydemonstrated here. Extracaution must be taken whenmoving around the area whereexposed throttles are situated,particularly when people arenearby in the water.Consideration should also begiven to the fitting of guards orrails around such throttles toreduce the risk of accidentaloperation.

3 If you are in a safety boatwhich is attempting to recover aperson from the water, try toturn the boat's bow towards the

person. This will shield themfrom the propeller as much aspossible. When conditions allow,ideally the engine should beshut down when approachingsomebody in the water. This willremove the chance of itsinadvertent operation.

4 Although both of the boyswere familiar with generalmanoverboard drills, they hadnot practised these in thisparticular design of dinghy.Had they done so, they wouldprobably have been aware ofthe problem with the harnessand the lip of the hull, andfound a way of overcoming it.

CASE 9

24

To sail or Not to sail?

Narrative

Three friends in their 60s and 70s joined severalyachts from their local sailing club for a summertrip to mainland Europe in a bilge keeled yacht.The trip was intended to take 3 weeks, with theyacht owner’s son joining them at some point.

The 11m yacht had been bought new earlier thesame year and was described in the owner’smanual as “exceeding the minimum requirementsfor category “A” offshore”. It was thereforesuitable for the voyage.

The skipper of the yacht had sailed since his youthand had owned progressively larger yachts duringthe last 25 years. He had sailed his yacht onseveral occasions along the English coastline inmixed conditions. The other two original crewmembers were experienced sailors, with manyyears of sailing around the UK coastline andoccasional trips to mainland Europe, although onewas physically limited in his ability to move quicklyaround the boat.

The voyage across was uneventful and veryenjoyable, with everything going as planned. Theskipper’s son joined the party of three on board.Planning to return by themselves, they partedcompany with the other yachts from the sailingclub.

Some days later, the yacht arrived at its last portbefore sailing to the UK. The crew was in no rushto return home and, having read the weatherforecast for the area, decided not to sail and toreview the weather later on. The following day,the midday shipping forecast predicted windsveering north force 5 to 7, perhaps gale 8 laterin the west, becoming cyclonic, 4 in the east.A further forecast received on a mobile phonepredicted winds of maximum force 6, weakeninglater.

The yacht departed port at lunch time, motoringinto winds of force 4 to 5 from the west, with nosails set. The crossing was expected to take about30 hours. Overnight, as the wind decreasedslightly, the jib was unfurled to steady the boatand provide some additional way. The earlymorning weather forecast the next day gave theforecast wind as increasing to force 7 or gale 8.

During the morning, the weather deteriorated,the wind increased and the yacht crew decided towear lifejackets on deck and use lifelines whenoutside of the cockpit. The sea conditionscontinued to worsen as the wind, now gusting at40 knots, was against the tide. The wavesappeared to the skipper to be “the size ofhouses”. Despite the heavy seas and theconditions being worse than any of theyachtsmen had previously experienced, the yachtseemed to be handling well and the steeringremained in autopilot.

Figure 1

As the wind increased, the skipper attempted tocontact the coastguard to let them know hisposition and planned destination. On the thirdattempt, his call was intercepted by a rig supportvessel in the area and relayed to the coastguard.The coastguard passed the report to the RNLI,who agreed to launch a lifeboat to escort theyacht back to safety. The rig support vesselheaded towards the yacht to monitor progressand provide a means of communication until thelifeboat arrived.

Meanwhile, one of the yacht’s crew had gonebelow to change into dry clothes when the vesselwas unexpectedly “knocked down”, rollingheavily to port. The three crew in the cockpit,including the skipper, were washed overboard.

The skipper, by chance, had his hand-held VHF inhis hand, and had sent a brief “Mayday” messagebefore being swamped by a wave. The remainingcrewman on board also attempted to send a“Mayday” call, but realised the yacht’s VHF sethad failed. As the “Mayday” message wasincomplete, the rig support vessel was unable toconfirm the origin of the call, although the radiodirection bearing was similar to the heading onwhich they were proceeding. Shortly after, thecoastguard established with the rig support vesselthat they had heard a brief “Mayday” distressmessage, so the rescue helicopter was requested.

Of the three crewmen in the water, two wereconscious, with their lifejackets inflated, the thirdwas unconscious and his lifejacket had notinflated. One of the survivors managed to

manually inflate this lifejacket, but it rode upunder the casualty’s arms.

The rig support vessel reached the yacht and afterseveral attempts managed to manoeuvre close tothe vessel. The rescue helicopter was now also onscene. A call by loud-hailer finally confirmed thatthere were three crew members in the water. Therig support vessel gave the last known position ofthe yacht to the rescue helicopter which, sevenminutes later, found the three men in the water andwinched them on board. The three men had beenin the water for almost an hour. The unconsciouscrew member was declared dead on arrival athospital. The skipper and his son both made fullrecoveries. The remaining crew member on boardthe yacht was transferred to the RNLI lifeboat andthen transferred to hospital for observation.

Figure 2 – Video still of yacht taken after the 3 crew werelost overboard.

(Image courtesy of the RAF)

25

CASE 9Continued

26

The Lessons

The professional and proactiveactions of the rig support vesselundoubtedly saved the lives oftwo of the three men washedoverboard. In monitoring theprogress of the yacht, theyensured their vessel was at thescene as quickly as possiblewhen disaster struck. By notingthe radio bearing of the yacht,and persevering incommunicating with theremaining crew member byloud-hailer, they were able todirect the rescue helicopter tothe position of the casualties inthe water and ensured theirrapid removal to hospital.

1 Weather forecasts must becarefully studied beforeembarking on long trips,bearing in mind that conditionsmay become much worseduring the passage. Poorweather options should be

considered, including turningback, heading for ports ofrefuge and “heaving to”, andthese should be reviewedregularly during passages whenthe weather deteriorates.

2 Do not rely on the autopilotto helm in heavy seas. Ahelmsman can react quickly andalter course for individual wavesto minimise the risk ofbroaching.

3 Before commencing apassage with the prospect ofbad weather, ensure the physicalability of ALL crew is taken intoaccount. Setting a sensibleweather limit is the prudent andsafe approach to take.

4 Lifelines should not only beused on deck in heavy weatherbut also while in the cockpit. Aknockdown following a rogue

wave is always a possibility insteep heavy seas.

5 Make sure your lifejacket isfitted correctly and has a crotchstrap. A badly fitted lifejacketwill severely hamper you in thewater, at which point it isvirtually impossible to makeadjustments.

6 When making longer seapassages, ensure your boat hasan appropriate level of safetyequipment. A liferaft, in thisaccident, could have beendeployed by the crewman onboard to provide bothprotection from the sea and actas a marker for the rescuehelicopter. An EPIRB would havemade certain the rescue serviceswere alerted when out of VHFrange.

27

Dangers of RotatingMachineryNarrative

A substantial 10 metre yacht had recently beenrecommissioned after her winter lay up. Theengine had been run and the owner had nippedup the stern gland during one short trip.

On a later occasion, the owner was on board withhis son, and was motoring the boat a few cablesfrom her mooring to a marina to take on storesfor a weekend’s sailing. The weather wasexcellent, with negligible wind and a flat calm sea.

During this relatively short run, the owner decidedto again check the stern gland. After checking thecuffs of his jacket were properly secured, he liftedthe hatch to the stern gland/propshaft space. Togain the best indication of the rate of wateringress through the stern gland, he decided toremove a small amount of water that hadcollected in the bilge space beneath. To do this,he used a sponge, wringing it out once saturated.He did this a couple of times without problems.

Unfortunately, on the nextoccasion, the left sleeve of hisjacket became entangled with a coupling on the rotating propellershaft (see photograph).

His arm was dragged around the shaft and,before he could free it, was very seriously injured.

The owner’s shouts were heard by his son on thehelm, who promptly stopped the engine andimmediately used his mobile telephone to dial 999and ask for coastguard assistance. He then usedthe boat’s first-aid kit to dress his father’s arm,using a wooden spatula from the galley as a splintand cottonwool pads to stem the flow of blood.The injury was serious, with a length of brokenbone exposed.

Emergency services were very quickly on scene,with helicopter and lifeboat both available toevacuate the casualty. It was decided to use thelifeboat to transfer the owner to an ambulanceand then hospital. Because of the benign weatherconditions, the owner was able to climb, unaided,from his boat onto the lifeboat.

Engine/propshaft coupling arrangements

CASE 10

CASE 10ContinuedCASE X

28

The Lessons

1 However smooth andpolished they might sometimesappear, spinning propeller shaftsshould still be considered asrotating machinery, capable ofcausing serious injury. It isalways safest to stop machinerywhenever hands, clothing etc.are close to exposed movingparts.

2 The securing arrangementsof this coupling could have beenrather less hazardous. Thesquare-headed screws, shown in

the figure with ‘locking wire’through their heads, mightreasonably be replaced by itemsthat protrude less. ‘Grub’ screwsof suitable length, tightenedwith a hexagonal ‘Allen’ key,could be fitted so that their endsare flush with the coupling’souter surface. Alternatively, oreven additionally, a metal guardover the shaft and couplingwould keep personnel safe andwould prevent other parts of theboat’s safety critical systems,such as water or exhaust hoses,

from coming into contact withthese moving parts.

3 The response of the owner’sson in this emergency showedgreat presence of mind. Inparticular, his use of the spatulaas a splint was an example ofclear thinking that we all wouldhope to demonstrate in such anemergency; but probably withless success.

CASE 11

29

A Cheap but Priceless Early WarningNarrative

A new, 14m sailing yacht was being manoeuvredfrom her berth at the beginning of a weekend’ssailing. The skipper used the engine and, for just afew seconds, her 12 volt, motor-driven bowthruster, installed in a compartment beneath thedouble bunk in the forward cabin. She had justcleared her berth when the smoke alarm soundedin the empty forward cabin.

The crew found smoke coming from the spacebeneath the bunk. They lifted the bedding clear,removed the compartment’s covers and pulled outthe spare sails and other gear. Using a dry powderextinguisher, they extinguished burning andsmouldering material.

Meanwhile, the skipper requested assistance andmanoeuvred back to the berth, where shore

firefighters assisted in making the vessel safe.Negligible damage was caused to the boat, butmost of the bedding and spare kit was affected byfire, heat or smoke.

A closer examination found that a metal cover tothe brush gear of the bow thruster’s motor hadbeen displaced. The cover had then made contactwith a terminal on one of the motor’s powercables, causing arcing (Figure 1). This sparking hadignited a sail bag.

Figure 1 – Bow thruster showing exposed power cablesand fire damage

Figure 2 – Machinery space with no viable warnings canbe easily mistaken for a storage locker

CASE 11Continued

30

The Lessons

1 The owner had fitted asmoke alarm in the forwardcabin as a sensible precaution.By alerting the crew early, itsvalue was clearly shown and itspurchase price of a few poundsshowed a handsome return.

2 Kit had been so tightlypacked into the space that itenveloped the bow thruster’smotor. The resultant loss ofcooling air circulating aroundthe motor had the potential tocause overheating, which wouldnormally show when the motor’sthermal cut-out tripped, possiblyafter just a few minutes ofoperation. This could cause theloss of the bow thruster at anawkward stage of events.

3 The vigour with which gearhad been packed around thebow thruster moved theprotective cover of the motor’sbrush gear. Apart from exposing

moving parts of the motor,itself.potentially dangerous, itgenerated a short circuit and asource of ignition as soon aspower came on the main cablewhen the thruster was used.

4 The manufacturer’sinstructions for the bow thrusterwere on board the vessel. Theyquite clearly stated that nothingshould be stored close to themotor. When a new boat istaken over, it may not always bepossible to read and understandthe significance of every detailedinstruction, in every instructionbook, for all the equipmentfound on a modern vessel.However, the principle thatnothing should be stowed closeto machinery is universal.

5 Spaces having everyappearance of being stowagelockers, as in this case (Figure 2),almost invite gear to be

crammed in them, and it iscertainly very tempting to do so.Without clear warnings that thespace contains machinery, thepotential hazards may not beobvious or recognised. Thiscould be overcome by labels onthe doors or covers, of spacesthat may not have been seen asobviously containing machinery,designating the space as amachinery space and not forstorage purposes.

6 Bow thrusters are beingfitted into many existing yachtdesigns. Such retrofits or designmodifications are not always aswell considered as they couldbe. If you have, or are buying, ayacht with a bow thruster (orany other additional mechanicalor electrical device) ensure thatthey are properly protected fromaccidental contact.

CASE 12

31

Narrative

When on a short coastal passage, a 4m trailer-sailer capsized about 1300 metres from thenearest point of land. On board were its owner,an adult crewman and two children. All weredressed in shorts and ‘T’ shirts. The owner waswearing a lifejacket, and the remainder of thecrew wore buoyancy aids. Following capsize, twoattempts were made to right the boat, which hadfully inverted. Despite the wind being betweenforce 5 and 6, and waves at a height of about1.5m, the boat was rotated to an upright positionon both occasions, but quickly capsized andinverted again.

Following the attempts to right the boat, it wasnoticed that the boat's owner had not been ableto inflate his lifejacket. Consequently, the adultcrewman located and pulled the toggle fitted tohis lifejacket (Figure 1), which then inflated.However, the lifejacket did not appear to be fittedcorrectly, and the owner struggled to keep his

mouth clear of the water. He died from acombination of hypothermia and drowning about10 minutes after the initial capsize.

The remaining crew held onto the upturned hull,until they were seen by a passing charter fishingvessel, and recovered on board. They had spent atleast 11⁄2 hours in the water. Both children weretaken to hospital by helicopter, but the youngestchild was pronounced dead on arrival; he diedfrom hypothermia. The boat was towed to theshore and beached in its inverted condition. Theflares carried inside the boat's cabin were foundto be out of date.

Double Tragedy

Figure 1 – Owner’s lifejacket

Figure 2 – Test report photograph – small trailer-sailerbeing capsized

CASE 12Continued

32

The boat was purchased at a boat show 4 monthsbefore the accident. Its crew was veryinexperienced, and was not aware of thepredicted wind or sea conditions. Affixed to theboat was a builder’s plate which indicated that itsmaximum occupancy was three persons, and thatthe boat conformed to the stability and buoyancyrequirements of the Recreational Craft Directivefor a boat of Design Category C (Inshore Waters).However, tests conducted after the accident (seefigures) showed that the boat did not meet theserequirements. Although a generic manual relatingto maintenance was provided with the boat,information specific to the operation of the boatwas not. Figure 3 – Test report photograph – cockpit fully swamped

The Lessons

1 Although the conditionsmight appear to be benignwhen taking to the water, it iswise to bear in mind that theycan change very quickly. Manyboat owners have been caughtout in this respect. Beforeputting to sea, where adverseconditions threaten the safety ofmany small boats, the checkingof the local inshore weatherforecasts, via the radio, internet,local newspapers, or coast radiostations, is a simple and costfree precaution to take.

2 When putting on alifejacket, take a few seconds toensure it is worn correctly. If it isnot, the jacket will tend to rideup when inflated, and will bemore of a hindrance thanassistance. This will decrease,rather than increase, anindividual’s chances of survival.

3 Even in the summer, whenthe temperature of the seaaround the UK is about 16°C, its

debilitating effects should notbe under-estimated. This is still20°C below body temperature,and well below the temperatureof most swimming pools. Whenin boats such as sailing dinghies,where the danger of capsize isever present, and when inremote areas where assistance isnot readily at hand, the effectsof cold water immersion mustnot be ignored when decidingwhat clothes to wear.

4 Flares need to be accessibleand in date if they are to be ofuse when needed.

5 Experience cannot betaught, however many of thedangers associated with sailingand power-boating, along withthe tips of the trade, can belearned through various levels ofRYA training courses. Thecompletion of such coursesprovides a sound foundationfrom which to start, and toincrease proficiency in theseactivities.

6 The maximum loading of aboat should be shown on thebuilder’s plate affixed to its hull,and in the owner’s manualprovided by its manufacturer.The risk of capsize andswamping is increased when thisis exceeded.

7 When buying a boat, it isimportant that the purchaser isfully aware of its limitations. Fornew under 24m recreationalcraft, purchased within the EU,this information should beavailable on: the affixed builder’splate; the owner’s manualprovided by the manufacturerspecific to the boat model; andthe manufacturer’s declarationof conformity with theRecreational Craft Directive. It isworth taking the time to checkthis information, and wheresuch information is incomplete,or contains anomalies thatcannot be reconciled by thevendor, further investigation isprobably warranted beforecompleting the purchase.

CASE 13

33

Narrative

Three crew on board their 11m yacht left theirhome port in the early morning, havingdetermined that the weather should be good fortheir intended passage. The wind was south westforce 5-6 and good progress was made, the yachtsailing first on a beam reach and then a broadreach. The mainsail had one slab reef taken in,and the roller reefing foresail was also reduced.

Some way into the passage, when the yacht wasabout 1 mile off a lee shore, the steering wheelmechanism started to make a clicking noise. Soonafterwards, the mechanism jammed completely,leaving the yacht with no steering.

The boat gybed, and swung round 180 degrees,through the wind and into a hove-to position with

the genoa secured on the windward side. Thecrew rigged the emergency tiller, but the rudderwould not budge. At this time, the depth ofwater was 25m, but the yacht only had 20m ofanchor chain attached to the anchor.

The crew tried to investigate the steeringmechanism further, but at 1350 the skipperdecided to make a “Mayday” call, followingwhich the local lifeboat and SAR helicopter werelaunched. The yacht drifted inshore, but once in awater depth of 15m, the jib was furled and theanchor let go. Despite using the engine toalleviate the drift, the snatching of the anchor onthe bottom caused such loads that the ropeconnecting the bitter end of the chain to theanchor locker failed and the anchor was lost.

Steering Seizure

Figure 1

CASE 13Continued

34

Lessons

1 If your yacht has wheelsteering, make sure you are fullyconversant with the emergencytiller system. The chances ofneeding it are probably remote,but solving a steering problemquickly will keep you out oftrouble. Pay particular attentionto the linkage between therudder stock and the wheelbecause, as was the case in thisaccident, disconnecting the twocan be the only way the rudderbecomes free to move.

2 Be alert to navigationaldangers and, where possible,keep well clear of a lee shore.On this occasion, there was nogreat need to be sailing 1nm offa very rocky coast. Standingfurther off will give you extrabreathing space to deal withemergencies and theunexpected.

3 Ensure you have sufficientchain and rope attached to your

anchor, and that it is of thecorrect size. For the yacht in thisaccident, 20m of chain was halfthe amount recommended. Ifweight is a major considerationon your yacht, then rope andchain can be used; but ensureyou have sufficient chain toassist holding. The prudentmariner will also carry a kedgeanchor, which can be used as aback-up in an emergency.

With nothing now to restrain it, the yachtcontinued to drift ashore.

At about 1415, and with the lifeboat in sight, theyacht beached. The lifeboat manoeuvred in closeto the shore to try and pass a tow line, butgrounded on a small reef. After freeing itself, thelifeboat stood further offshore and the crew fireda rocket speed line to the yacht. It missed, but apasser-by ashore helped get the speed line to thecrew on the yacht, which allowed a tow line to bepassed. The tow line was secured and the lifeboat

started to pull the yacht off the beach but,unfortunately, the line parted and the yachtbeached once again.

At this stage, the lifeboat coxswain decided thatthe risk to the yacht’s crew was too great, and theywere evacuated from their vessel by helicopter. Thecrew suffered no injuries during their ordeal, andreturned to the vessel at low tide to salvage somebelongings. The yacht, however, was not able to besalvaged and became a total Narrative

Figure 2

35

Powervessels

CASE 14

Fishing for DisasterNarrative

An amateur fisherman and his teenage neighbourset out on a pre-dawn mid winter fishing trip in arecently acquired and repaired, 5 metre long,relatively old speedboat. They launched in arelatively sheltered area, but had intended tomove out to a more exposed position on the coastto fish. They wore warm clothing, waders and oldsolid buoyancy aids. They also carried a spareoutboard engine and a torch.

When the two men set out, within the shelteredarea a 25 knot wind was blowing, gusting to 35knots, there was a significant wave height of0.8m and the sea was between 6 and 8°C. Thetide was on the ebb.

About 40 minutes after launching the boat, a 999call was made from the fisherman’s mobiletelephone. The caller requested the telephoneoperator to put him through to the coastguard.He provided no information to the operator on hislocation.

The call was quickly transferred to the localcoastguard station, but the station officers couldhear only the noise of the wind and sea during

the brief remaining time of the call. Theyattempted to return the call, but without success.Without any further information available, andbearing in mind hoax and accidental calls are notuncommon, no further action was taken.

Later that day, the family of the fisherman raisedthe alarm that he had not returned at theexpected time. A large-scale search and rescueoperation began immediately, involving manysearch and rescue units over a considerable area.Only scant information was available on theprobable destination of the fishing trip, and thelength of time involved between the two menlaunching the speedboat and the time of thealarm being raised, meant that the area to becovered by the search units was extensive. Despitethe efforts of the rescue services, the search wasunsuccessful, and the two men were not found.

A day and a half later, a buoyancy aid was foundwashed ashore, which was identified by the familyof the fisherman. About 10 days later, the body ofthe teenager was washed ashore, still wearing hisbuoyancy aid and chest-high waders.

37

CASE 14Continued

38

Lessons

1 The fisherman and his friendwere inexperienced in boatoperations. The boat’s historywas unknown; what is known,however, is that repairs hadbeen carried out to its hull andengine. Without any trialshaving been carried out in a safeenvironment, it was launched indarkness, in mid winter and inpoor weather conditions. Also,the boat did not carry therequired navigation lights. Thedecision to launch it was, at thevery least, unwise.

2 Survival equipment consistedof warm clothing, old solidbuoyancy aids and a torch.Additionally, a spare engine wascarried on board. The wadersthat were worn, probably toprotect the fishermen from thecold and sea spray, would havecounteracted any usefulbuoyancy afforded by the oldbuoyancy aids. The boat wasnot properly equipped for theplanned activity.

3 A relative had been toldwhen the two fishermen wereexpected home, about 10 hours

after their launching time. Thisalerted the coastguard to theirplight and is good practice. Itwould have been better,however, if the skipper hadagreed to call in every hourthroughout the day.

4 The mobile telephone wasthe only method ofcommunication available to thepair. This was inadequate and isnot advised for maritime usebecause it causes genuinedifficulties for the emergencyservices. A VHF radio cantransmit emergency calls viachannel 16 (the emergencychannel) directly to thecoastguard, and a quickresponse can be assured. Othermethods of raising the alarminclude personal locatorbeacons, which are readilyavailable and are becomingincreasingly cheaper.

5 The RNLI provides a free,friendly and confidential seasafety advice (SEACheck) service,which is available countrywidethrough a system of co-ordinators and volunteers.

This service can provideguidance on effective lifesavingapparatus (LSA), and otherequipment that would proveuseful in different seaconditions, as well as distressand emergency procedures.Other free guidance for leisurecraft users is available from theMaritime and CoastguardAgency (MCA).

6 It’s not always easy to cancela planned and eagerly awaitedfishing trip at the last moment,but commonsense and goodseamanship must prevail. Thedecision to launch should bebased on such things as theweather, sea conditions,experience of the crew, state ofthe boat and adequacy of theequipment. When difficultdecisions need to be taken,never ever forget that the powerand danger of the sea should berespected at all times.

CASE 15

39

Narrative

Four married couples set out from a marina for aweekend trip on board an 8 metre long, fastmotor boat. Their destination was a popular smallharbour, where they intended to stay overnight ina hotel.

The couples were in high spirits, and they hadbrought with them alcohol and food for the trip.During the passage, one of the men water skiedbehind the motor boat, and they stopped at alanding stage and had lunch in a waterside hotel.Later in the afternoon, they anchored the boat ina bay, and two of the wives went swimming.

Alcohol was consumed throughout the passageand at the hotel.

The owner of the boat had taken the helm formost of the day, but, as they approached theirdestination, one of the other husbands took over.They entered the harbour, and the boat was madefast to one of the pontoons. The couples wentashore and enjoyed an evening of singing,dancing, eating and consuming more alcohol.

At 12.30am, three of the couples took the boatout again, to visit a prominent tourist feature

Alcohol Ends aWeekend Pleasure Trip

Figure 1 – A view looking forward from the stern of the cockpit area

Engine throttle control

CASE 15Continued

40

about 2 miles away. They reached the feature andthen began their return to the harbour. Theowner was sitting in the port cockpit chair, withthe other man sitting in the starboard chair and incontrol of the steering and the engine throttlecontrol. One of the wives was standing betweenthem. It became cold during the return passage,so the other two wives and one of the husbandsmoved forward and stood behind the chairs totake shelter behind the windscreen. The boatturned into the outer harbour, which funnelleddown to a narrow entrance to the inner harbour.As the boat approached the entrance, it made asharp turn to starboard and crashed into an unlitlow cliff.

A yachtsman had seen the navigational lights ofthe motor boat travelling at speed andapproaching the harbour. The boat disappearedfrom view and he heard a loud crash.

Realising something had happened to the boat,the yachtsman called the emergency servicesimmediately. He and his crew headed for thestricken motor boat. When they reached it, theyfound it lying heavily in the water, with only oneman and one woman still conscious. They tookthem on board the yacht and, concerned that themotor boat was in danger of sinking, the yachttowed the motor boat to a slipway on the otherside of the harbour where medics and ambulanceswere waiting.

Three of the boat’s occupants were killed duringthe accident; the other three sustained seriousinjuries.

The survivors cannot remember the events at oraround the time of the accident, so it is notknown why the motor boat turned suddenly tostarboard.

Figure 2 – Damage to starboard forefoot and bow forward

Post accident investigations found:

� The three fatalities resulted from severe chestinjuries, which were caused by being thrownagainst the forward part of the cockpit at thetime of the impact with the low cliff.

� The severe damage to the motor boat, and thespread of debris field on the low cliff, showedthat it must have been travelling at high speedwhen it approached the narrow entrance.

� The toxicology tests at the post mortemexaminations showed that those who lost theirlives had levels of alcohol in their bloodstreamswhich were more than twice the legal limit fordriving a car.

� There were no other vessels moving either inthe outer harbour, or the inner harbour, and thenavigational light at the entrance to the innerharbour was clear and un-obscured.

� There were no mechanical faults with the boat.

� The weather was fine and calm, and thevisibility was good.

� The owner and the helmsman had many yearsof experience on motor boats and yachts, andheld RYA Powerboat Level 2certificates.Narrative

The Lessons

1 Don’t drink and drive – onland and water.

2 Travelling in restrictedwaters, in darkness and at highspeed, requires good vision,good judgment and quickreaction times. Alcohol causesreduced vigilance, lowerinhibitions, poor night vision,

affected perception anddeterioration of judgment: all ofwhich played a large part in thisaccident.

3 Even experienced andqualified people, travelling onwell founded vessels, can makefundamental mistakes whenadversely affected by alcohol.

4 It is wise to gradually reducea boat’s speed whenapproaching a narrow entrance,where manoeuvrability isrestricted. This gives those incontrol more time to assess thesituation and the hazards tonavigation.

41

CASE 16

42

Lessons

1 A simple carbon monoxidedetector in the cabin could havegiven an early warning of theproblem.

2 In the absence of a detector,complaints of headaches or sorethroats from anybody on board

should be taken seriously whenany gas or oil-fired cabin heateris in use. It is better to turn offthe heater, and shiver, than tosuffer fatalities.

3 Because of the dangers thatmay be caused by poor or

defective installations, it isalways prudent to use qualifiedand experienced personnel toinstall and routinely check thesesystems to ensure safeoperation.

Early Warning Headaches

Narrative

Four members of a family were on their 15 tonne,twin screw motor yacht for a winter holiday. Shewas berthed at a marina. It was cold, so theyturned on the oil-fired cabin heater during oneevening.

While the family was having an evening meal, twoof them complained of feeling unwell. It wassuspected that they were suffering from the earlystages of ‘flu and they went to bed withheadaches and sore throats. The cabin heatingwas turned off overnight, and all felt fine the nextmorning.

The following evening, the heating system wasagain used. This time, all four members of thefamily began to feel unwell. It was at this stagethat suspicion fell on the heating system.

These suspicions were confirmed when aprofessional examination showed that there werevarious defects which allowed exhaust gases fromthe heater to be drawn into the cabin.

It is most fortunate that nobody suffered anythingworse than a headache. Fatalities from carbonmonoxide poisoning could so easily have resulted.

CASE 17

43

Don’t Underestimatethe Familiar

Narrative

On a windy spring morning, two professionalmariners from a popular, small, estuary harbourwent out within the mouth of the estuary to lay ayacht mooring, which was required for thefollowing holiday weekend.

Both men were very experienced in small boatwork and knew the area intimately. The weatherconditions were, however, very poor. The springtide was in full ebb, running about 6 knots, andthe winds were gusting up to force 7, against thetide. This led to breaking crested wavesthroughout the harbour and especially at theestuary mouth. The sea temperature was 9°C.

One of the men was wearing a dry suit and swamout to his boat, a 4.5m dory, on its moorings nearthe quay. Having prepared the boat, he thenmotored to the quay to collect his assistant whowas wearing jeans and a hi-vis jacket. They thenloaded the mooring onto the dory.

The mooring consisted of two legs of chain, eachleading from a mid-link to an anchor. A chain riserthen ran from the mid-link to a hippo buoy. Thecomplete mooring weighed 240kg and wasplaced on the bow of the dory (see photo).

Once loaded, they were seen motoring away fromthe quay towards the mouth of the estuary, whichthey would have to cross to reach the intendedsite of the mooring.

When they could not be found at 5 o’clock thatevening, the alarm was raised. Tragically, anddespite an extensive search and rescue operation,they were not found until their bodies werewashed ashore some time later. Both men haddrowned.

One of the men’s lifejacket was found washedashore on the evening of the accident and, whileit was inflated, the seat belt-style buckle was notdone up. The other man was not wearing alifejacket, but was relying on a buoyancy aid; thistoo was found washed ashore that evening.

The outboard motor on the dory had failed on anumber of occasions in the past and, based on itscondition after the accident, it is likely that itfailed as the dory was crossing the mouth of theestuary. The vessel would have been swept outinto rougher water very quickly and foundered.The position in which the dory and the mooring(which was recovered from the seabed) weresubsequently found supports this scenario,although it will never be known exactly whathappened.

Photograph showing the mooring placed on the bow ofthe dory

CASE 17Continued

44

Lessons

1 The more senior of the twoprofessionals was veryconscientious and had (as partof his job) assessed the risks ofthe harbour during a series ofwritten risk assessments. He hadrevised these only monthsbefore the accident, and theyhad covered all of the dangerspresent on the day of theaccident. Specifically, they madereference to the danger of smalldinghies capsizing, or beingcarried away to heavy seas atthe mouth of the estuary, bystrong tidal streams within theharbour, especially during springtides or in the event ofmachinery breakdown. Thecontrol measures identified forthese risks included to arrange asystem to establish successfultransit with someone ashore andfor people to wear lifejackets.Unfortunately, these riskassessments were aimed atleisure users of the harbour, and

he had not assessed the risksinvolved in his own work.

2 The dory was completelyunsuitable for the task of layingmoorings. While it was designedas a stable platform for fishing,it was not designed to have240kg of steel sitting on thebow. It was not overloaded, butthe loading led to very littlefreeboard forward, and the boat would have been shipping aconsiderable amount of water inthe prevailing conditions. Thiswould have made the boat lessstable and brought the outboardmotor closer to the water,allowing it to become swampedmore easily.

3 While one of the men waswearing a dry-suit, it wouldseem that his lifejacket waseither not done up or not worn.The other man was not wearingappropriate clothing or a

lifejacket. Buoyancy aids arenever suitable replacements forlifejackets.

4 Had a specific riskassessment been done on thework to be carried out that day,it is likely that the dangers ofthe weather, the unsuitability ofthe boat and the need forappropriate clothing andlifejackets would have beenaddressed. Unfortunately, thiswas not done and twoexperienced professionals diedas a result.

5 Quite apart from the tragicconsequences of this accident,professional mariners who workclosely with the public have aduty to lead by example. Theymust ensure that they are seento be taking all the necessarysafety precautions and applybest practice at all times.

CASE 18

45

Narrative

It was a lovely sunny, calm day in spring, just rightfor taking a boat out for a spin. This boat was arigid-hulled inflatable boat (RIB) with a 225hpoutboard engine. The owner and a friend plannedto take it out for an hour or so and then stop offfor a meal before returning to a local boatyardwhere they could leave the RIB for the night.

In the early afternoon, they stopped off at amarina, and after a lengthy meal with winestarted the return journey. The boat was wellmaintained. As they set off, both occupants werewearing flotation devices and the driver hadlooped the engine kill cord around his wrist. Theboat left the harbour and initially steered astraight course, but the RIB unexpectedly swervedto port, throwing the two people into the water.

It is thought likely that the driver had seen anobject in the water close in front of the boat, andhis instinctive reaction had been to turn to avoidit. This had occurred at high speed and at a timewhen the passenger had momentarily released hisgrip on the steadying grab handles to retrieve anobject from the floor of the boat. While the boatheeled in the sudden turn, the driver reachedacross the controls to try to steady his friend. Thisleft neither the driver nor the passenger holdingon tightly, and resulted in both men being tippedfrom the boat. In reaching to steady his friend,the kill cord had become entangled with thethrottle controls, and despite the cord beingstretched as the driver entered the water, itslipped off his wrist before it acted to stop theengine.

Kill Cords Save Lives,When Used Properly

Figure 1 – RIB photographed after accident

CASE 18Continued

46

The RIB continued at high speed, constantlyturning in a spiral and, fortunately, moving awayfrom the people in the water. It grounded atspeed and climbed to eventually come to rest on afootpath on top of a sea wall (Figure 1).

At first, the two friends spoke to each other in thewater, but soon, the driver stopped talking andthe two drifted apart. The passenger was not astrong swimmer and only had a 50N buoyancy aidon. The driver had been wearing a manuallyinflatable 150N lifejacket which, for someunknown reason, he did not inflate. After about30 minutes, they were seen from a passing ferry,which used its rescue boat to pull them from the

water. The passenger was unhurt, but sufferingfrom the cold. Unfortunately, it was not possibleto revive the driver.

The postmortem report on the driver confirmedthat, at the time of the accident, he had beenalmost twice the legal alcohol limit for driving carson British roads.

Figure 2 – Vessel’s actual GPS track after incident

Figure 4 – Stretched kill cord in comparison with new item

Figure 3

47

The Lessons

A number of factors to thisaccident have also beencontributory in other recentleisure craft accidents. Most areobvious, and they include:

1 Don’t drink alcohol and thentake a high speed boat onto thewater. You never know whenyou may need quick reactionsand all your wits to save yourown or someone else’s life.Furthermore, if you do end up inthe water for any reason, yoursurvival time will be significantlyreduced if you have alcohol inyour blood stream.

2 The engine kill cord shouldbe connected to the driver’s legor lifejacket harness. Had the killcord operated correctly in this

case, the boat would haveremained in the immediatevicinity to provide a possiblelifesaving platform. If neitherman had been hurt, they mighteven have been able to reboardthe boat and restart the engine.It is also worth noting that theconsequences in this case couldhave been even worse had theboat circled, as a number havedone in the past, and then runover the people in the water.

3 A boat should be equippedwith safety equipment that isappropriate for the area ofintended operation. In this case,the use of buoyancy aids duringan offshore passage is notadvised; they are only designed

for use “by those who can swim and are close to help”. Whenyou purchase any flotationdevice, check it is up to the taskyou are going to use it for andthat it is approved to CEstandards. There should alwaysbe a picture or writteninformation which identifies itsintended use (Figure 3). If indoubt, discuss what you aregoing to use it for with thevendor.

4 It is so easy to underestimatethe reaction this type ofperformance vessel will have to ahigh speed turn. Get to knowthe limitations and capabilities ofyour craft, preferably through anapproved familiarisation course.

CASE 19

48

Narrative

It was another very pleasant, balmy summer’s dayin a popular seaside resort; just the sort of day totake the family out for a short, exhilarating, boattrip. Indeed, what better way to round off aholiday than to do this onboard a high speed, 12passenger, 9 metre, Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB)(Figure 1).

Full of expectations and a little trepidation, 12passengers, 6 of whom were children, were givena rudimentary safety briefing by the fiancée of theRIB’s skipper. She had no marine experience. Thebriefing only covered the use of the lifejackets,and emphasised that the “red” manual inflationtoggle should not be pulled while in the RIB.Unfortunately, the passengers were not told whenthe toggle should be pulled. With the passengersnow safely on board, the skipper and his fiancéetook up their positions at the steering console.

The skipper rounded off the safety briefing byinstructing his passengers to raise a hand shouldthey become concerned at any time during thetrip.

The skipper connected his engine kill cord to thesteering console, started the engines and left theharbour entrance, while the passengers settleddown for their big treat. They were notdisappointed. With the wave height at about 0.5metre, the skipper conducted a number ofexhilarating, high speed manoeuvres beforereversing his course to pass the nearby headlandand into more open seas.

By now, the wave height had increased to about1 metre. The passengers, now a little morenervous, were being bumped about their seats as

they passed a nearby, small, single handed fishingvessel at about 25 knots, but none raised a handto indicate concern. After manoeuvring off anearby beach, the skipper set his course to returnto the harbour. Soon after, the RIB drove into theback of a wave in the following sea.

The skipper felt the RIB’s handling characteristicschange. The deck heaved slightly, there was aloud crack and the forward part of the hullmomentarily adopted an angle of about 45degrees from the horizontal. The front bench seatwas torn from its deck mountings, plunging twoof the children into the water (Figure 2). Onefemale passenger also trapped her legs between

Ouch! One Very

Badly Cracked RIB

Figure 1 – Broad on, port perspective

49

the split sections of the marine ply deck beforebeing pulled back by her husband. In themeantime, the skipper ran forward, the enginesstopped as the kill cord was activated, and hedropped both his anchors and launched thelifeboat, although he was unsure how to do this.The RIB, although still afloat, had its bow sectionfully open to the sea, with port and starboardsplits to the hull extending to over half the RIB’slength (Figure 3).

Luckily, the two children in the water were quicklyrecovered by their father, who had dived into thesea to rescue them. The skipper of the fishingvessel saw the RIB in difficulties and immediatelyhauled in his lines and made his way towards theRIB. Lifeguards from the nearby beach also spedto the scene on a jet ski as the emergency serviceswere activated.

The passengers were transferred to the fishingvessel, a jet ski, and the inshore lifeboat, andwere landed at the harbour shortly afterwards.Surprisingly, none suffered serious injury.

The subsequent investigation found that the RIBwas supposedly built to the European CraftDirective’s standards, but there was nodocumentation to support this claim. In particular,there was no specification for the hull structure orits construction to justify its designation to copewith 4 metre seas, the structure lackedlongitudinal stiffness and was of extremely lightconstruction (Figure 4). As this vessel was used forcommercial purposes, it was subjected to detailedexamination under the auspices of the MCA.However, in common with many other RIBs,there was no access to the under deck areas, soit was very difficult to assess the true conditionof the hull.

It was also found that the operating companyhad conducted no risk assessments of theiroperation, and neither was it aware of the needto do so. The skipper lacked some of themandatory qualifications and endorsements, andthe local harbourmaster was unaware of thequalifications required for the RIB’s operation,despite having endorsed the venture. Althoughthe RIB had been examined for commercial use,the required certification had not been issued.While this had no impact on the accident, thevessel was, nevertheless, ineligible to carry feepaying passengers.

Figure 2 – Front bench

Figure 3 – Hull lifted to expose split

Figure 4 – Construction

CASE 19Continued

50

The Lessons

The owner of the RIB operatingcompany identified a niche inthe leisure market for high speedboat rides. He purchased the RIB,and operated it in good faith,believing that it had been builtto the European RecreationalCraft Directive (RCD) standards(which came into force in 1996for recreational craft between2.5 and 24 metres). As such, thecraft should therefore have beenable to withstand the loadsexpected for its intendedoperation. This assumption wasfurther reinforced because theRIB had been examined forcommercial use.

Fee paying passengers shouldexpect to be carried in a safemanner, in a seaworthy vesselcapable of coping with thepredicted in service loads.Equally, they should expect thatthe operation has been assessedas being safe, part of whichincludes the skipper being fully

trained and qualified for his rolein order that he can competentlydeal with emergency situations.

In this case, the crew andpassengers were very lucky toescape serious injury.

This accident has highlighted thefollowing lessons appropriate tooperators of small, high speedleisure craft, especially for thosein commercial use:

1 If you are considering buyinga boat that has been built since1996, ensure that it carries a CEidentifying plate confirming it hasbeen built to the RCD standards.

2 Purchasing a new buildvessel is a major financialundertaking – check with thebuilder that he holds acomprehensive Technical Filesupporting his build process. Thisshould contain the necessarycalculations proving the hull

strength is suitable for theintended operation.

3 If considering buying a re-saleboat, you will wish to check thecondition of the hull structure.This is often difficult with a GRPRIB as under deck access isfrequently impossible. If this isthe case, the builder may wellhave a set of photographs takenduring build. These, coupled withthe information in the TechnicalFile, will aid you and yoursurveyor to determine thesuitability of the vessel’sconstruction for your needs. It isalso wise to check the vessel’shistory for any major hull repairs.

4 Are you aware of thequalifications and endorsementsrequired to skipper a commercialcraft, and of the need for riskassessments? These are laid outin the MCA’s Marine GuidanceNote 280(M) colloquially knownas the “Harmonised Code”.

CASE 20

The Lessons

1 The Maritime andCoastguard Agency’s Code doesnot cover the safety ofrecreational diving operations; itis concerned primarily with thesafety of the boat and those onboard. A boat’s compliance withthe Code does not automaticallyindicate its suitability for diving.

2 Many Coded boats stilloperate with just a skipper; hemay have no second crewman.A skipper working alone may notalways be able to take steps toensure his boat’s safety, and atthe same time monitor divers atthe surface or coming to the

surface. If possible, any of thedive party already on the boatshould act as a second pair ofeyes for the skipper, monitoringdivers at or near the surface andmaking the skipper aware oftheir position.

Perilous PropellersNarrative

A 12 metre long, twin screw charter boat washired by a team of divers for 2 days of diving. Thisvessel had been used by one of the team on aprevious occasion, with good results. It wasknown to some of the others by reputation andwas operated under the Maritime and CoastguardAgency’s Code of Practice; it was a Coded boat.

The boat’s skipper met with the team the eveningbefore the first dives and discussed buddyarrangements and dive sites.

The following morning all met at the boat, whichthen headed for the area of the first dive. This wasjust off an area of rocks where seals were common.Once at the site, the boat’s skipper gave the diveteam a briefing. This included details of theunderwater terrain, an area of possible strong tidalstreams, the use of delayed surface marker buoysand procedures to be followed after surfacing.Water depth was between 20 and 24 metres.

Four pairs of divers entered the water. Surfaceconditions were reasonable, with only a slightswell and breeze. After about 30 minutes, theybegan to surface close to the rocks. The swell hadincreased noticeably, as had the wind, which wastending to blow the boat towards the rocks; a leeshore. As instructed in the briefing, they swamtowards the boat, and the first pair of diversboarded without incident.

One of the second pair to surface had difficultygetting on the boarding ladder. On the firstattempt, he slipped off, largely because of theboat’s movement in the swell. He again swamtowards the boat for a second attempt. However,the skipper was concerned that his boat wasbeing pushed too close to the rocks. Thinking thediver was still on the ladder, having not seen himslip off, he put his engines in reverse gear tomove away from the rocks.

The diver quickly found himself beneath the boat,with his regulator knocked out. He tried to losebuoyancy, to get clear of the boat, but before hecould do so his legs became caught in one of thepropellers. He lost one leg and seriously injuredthe other.

Another, much faster boat in the area recoveredthe injured man and his buddy, and landed themashore. During this short trip, the coastguard wasalerted by VHF radio and arranged for both anambulance and an air ambulance to attend.

51

CASE 21

52

Lookout – Above and

Below the Water

Narrative

A 30 foot (9.1m) yacht was returning to the UK atthe end of a charter period, heading for abreakwater entrance.

Eight divers from a diving vessel positionedbetween the yacht and the breakwater entrancehad begun diving operations.

Weather conditions were good, the windnortherly at 15 knots and visibility excellent.The yacht was on a north easterly heading andmaking good a speed of about 7 knots. It wasclose hauled and intended to pass to the northof a ‘fishing boat’ that the skipper and his crewhad already identified.

Similarly, the diving vessel had identified theyacht and assessed that it was heading for thewestern breakwater entrance, and continuedmonitoring diving operations; the skipper hadprobably underestimated the speed made goodby the yacht.

The diving vessel was displaying clearly andconspicuously the international code flag Alpha,drawing attention to the fact that it was engagedin diving operations and that vessels were to keepwell clear and pass at slow speed.

As a precautionary measure, the dive vessel wasalso displaying the American Territories flag,orange with a white diagonal stripe, which hadthe same meaning as flag Alpha. Both flags were1m2 and were hoisted 2.5 metres above deck levelbut, contrary to the Collision Regulations, flagAlpha was not displayed as a rigid replica andmeasures had not been taken to ensure its allround visibility.

As the yacht approached, the divers released twoorange inflatable delayed surface marker buoys,which indicated that they were returning to thesurface. Although the marker buoys were shieldedby the sails, the skipper had identified two orangemarkers and assumed that they were lobster potmarker buoys. His intention was to clear them, allbe it at close range.

At no point prior to the incident had the skipperpositively identified the flags displayed by thediving vessel. As a result, the yacht passed overthe top of the divers as they surfaced, blissfullyunaware of the diving operations beneath them.Attempts by the Coastguard and the dive vesselto contact the yacht by VHF radio failed.Thankfully on this occasion there were no injuriessustained by any of the diving party.

The Lessons

1 A proper lookout must bemaintained by all vessels at alltimes. Remember that a properlookout means not onlyidentifying the presence ofanother vessel, but also checkingwhether that vessel is displayinglights, shapes or flag signals thatindicate it is engaged in specialoperations.

2 Once the lookout hasidentified a shape or flag, theskipper and the crew must befamiliar with its meaning.Specifically, crews should activelyfamiliarise themselves with theInternational Code of Signals.

3 Maintaining a good VHFlistening watch should be a

standard part of every vessel’swatchkeeping arrangements.Owners spend significant sumsof money to purchase the latesthi-tec radio equipment; unlessthe radio is turned on and set tothe correct frequencies, with thevolume control properly adjusted,it is of little use to anyone.

Dive vessel displaying the Alpha flag andthe American Territories flag

CASE 22

53

Relaxing Canal TripEnds in TragedyNarrative

Two elderly couples and an elderly gentlemanhired a 20m narrowboat for a 1-week holiday.They were all experienced at canal boating, andalthough the single gentleman was partiallyparalysed on his right-hand side, he was still veryable to helm a canal boat using his left hand.When he was on the helm, another member ofthe crew would operate the throttle.

The party loaded their stores on to the hired canalboat and then completed the safety handoverwith a member of the boat yard staff. The briefdid not include any mention of manoverboardaction, or the use of the life-ring, which wasstored amidships on top of the canal boat, andthe party declined lifejackets when offered. Theboat had a semi-traditional stern, which had norail around the transom.

Two days into the holiday, the party were headingdownstream in a meandering section of a river,which was flowing relatively quickly due to recentrain. The weather was windy with frequent heavyshowers. The partially paralysed gentleman wassteering, standing on the right side, helming with his left hand. One of the ladies was sitting downoperating the throttle as needed.

The boat entered a particularly sharp right-handturn, and it became apparent that they were notgoing to get round in one go. Astern thrust wasapplied, but at the same time the wind caughtthe bow and the boat gently bumped into theleft-hand bank of the river. The stern, pushed bythe current, edged closer to the right-hand bank.At some point, the gentleman on the tiller lost his footing and fell off the right-hand side of theboat, into the river, and drifted downstream.There was a cry of ‘man overboard’, and the ladywho had been down below dived into the river to help. She swam to the casualty and attempted tokeep his head above water. Meanwhile, anothergentleman climbed on top of the canal boat to

deploy the life-ring. The lanyard for the life-ringwas wrapped around it like a yo-yo.Unfortunately, the life-ring lanyard didn’t unravelas it was thrown, resulting in the life-ringdropping into the water beside the boat. Thelanyard was pulled back in, and fully unravelled,before a second attempt at a throw was made.The throw did not reach the pair in the water, thelady having now managed to raise the casualty’shead above water.

The gentleman on top of the canal boat thenuntied the life-ring lanyard from its securing pointon the boat, and took the life-ring on to the left-hand riverbank so that he could get into a betterposition to throw it again. Two farmers, whohappened to be in a nearby field, then helped inthe rescue, throwing the life-ring and pulling thetwo people out of the water. The emergencyservices were called and CPR was administered tothe elderly gentleman.

The accident site was quite remote, so paramedicsarrived sometime later. The gentleman was flownto hospital by helicopter, where he waspronounced dead. After hospital checks, the otherfour members were released shortly afterwards,with only the lady who entered the water havingsuffering mild hypothermia.

Aft section of the narrowboat

Demonstrating use of the life-ring

CASE 22Continued

54

The Lessons

1 Make sure you have amanoverboard procedure andthat you know how to use thesafety equipment on your hireboat. Throwing the life-ringcorrectly might have ensured vitalseconds were saved while thosein the water were trying toremain afloat. It was very lucky,in this case, that the rescuer whodived in did not also perish.

2 Lifejackets, although oftenseen as unnecessary on a canalboat, are really essential if thereare any non-swimmers orphysically impaired members inyour party. Diving into a river toassist a weak or non swimmercan put you at great risk.

3 Ensure you hire a canal boatthat is suitable for your party.

For example, you may wish toconsider:� a cruiser stern, which includes

a rail around the stern� easier access steps into cabin� other child-friendly safety

features if travelling withchildren.

Fatal Injuries From Propeller

Narrative

A family were enjoying their first narrow boatholiday together on a hired boat. The hirecompany had provided buoyancy aids and shownthe family how to manoeuvre the boat andoperate the locks on the canal before they set off.

Two days into their holiday, the family approacheda lock which was obscured from their view by abend in the canal and a bridge immediately aheadof the lock gates. Their boat came level withanother hire boat moored in the lock waitingarea, and the family realised that they needed tomove astern to moor and wait their turn for thelock. With the wind blowing down the canal,from bow to stern, the helmsman put thepropeller into reverse, but was unable to preventthe bow being skewed at an angle across thecanal. The boat then made contact with the sternof the moored narrow boat and a family memberjumped from the stern to the bank using the sternmooring line to help secure the boat safely.

The boat then made contact with the canal bank,and the helmsman was seen to tip over the guardrail, which was at about knee height and fittedround the cruiser style stern. He managed to holdon briefly, with his legs hooked over the rail, before dropping into the water on the outboardside. The crewman with the stern line jumped

back on board and stopped the engine, but couldnot see the helmsman in the water. Althoughbuoyancy aids were available on the boat, thehelmsman was not wearing one. A lifebuoy wasthrown into the water, but with no sign of thehelmsman, the crewman jumped into the canal toassist. The crewman quickly found the helmsman’sleg, but could not pull him free. Another familymember and the helmsman of another boatjumped into the waist deep water to assist, butthe helmsman was entangled in the propeller.

The crewman climbed back on board andremoved the weed hatch in the enginecompartment to gain access to the propeller. Hecould see the helmsman was trapped by tornclothing, with his head and arm caught in thepropeller. Using scissors, he managed to free thehelmsman, and with the assistance of theemergency services, who had quickly arrived atthe scene, the helmsman was recovered to thecanal bank. He had suffered severe injuries to theback of his shoulders and head, and his left armwas very nearly severed. He was pronounced deadat the scene.

The Lessons

1 Although serious accidentsare rare on the inland waterways,boaters, and particularly thosenew to boating, should be awareof the potential hazard posed bya rotating propeller.

2 All responsible people onboard should be familiar with the actions to take in an emergency,

and be able to stop the propellerquickly if needed.

3 Boaters should check canalmaps for potential obstaclessuch as locks and bridges, andslow down if the view ahead isobscured to avoid having tomake difficult manoeuvres atshort notice.

4 Although hand rails are notrequired on narrow boats, wherethey are fitted, they should be ofan appropriate height to preventpeople from falling overboardnear the propeller.

CASE 23

55

56

List of leisure craft accident reports published since 2004

Accident Date Vessel Name Accident Details

3 February Hooligan V Investigation of the keel failure, capsize, and loss of one crew 2007 member from a Max Fun 35 yacht, 10m miles south of Prawle

point.

20/21 August Ouzo Investigation of the loss of a sailing yacht and her three crew, 2006 south of the Isle of Wight, during the night of 20/21 August

2006.

20 May Roaring Meg Investigation of two serious injuries on board a IMX 38 yacht in 2006 of Cowes Southampton Water, 3.3 cables south-west of Hamble Point Buoy

17 March Pastime Loss of one man overboard from a sailing yacht in the English 2006 Channel.

2 July Mollyanna Capsize of a sailing dinghy with two fatalities, off Puffin Island, 2005 North Wales.

22 August Albatros Accident on board commercial sailing vessel, in the Thames 2004 Estuary resulting in one fatality.

SAILING VESSELS

Accident Date Vessel Name Accident Details

20 January Lindy Lou Investigation of a fire on board a canal boat at Lyme View 2007 Marina, Adlington, Cheshire, resulting in 1 fatality on 20 January

2007.

26 August Big Yellow Hull failure of a rigid inflatable boat, Porthmeor Beach, St Ives 2005 Bay, Cornwall.

7 August Ribeye Serious injury sustained when falling overboard from a RIB, off 2005 Open Tender Abersoch Beach, Wales.

450 RIB

16 July Carrie Kate Collision between Carrie Kate and Kets resulting in one fatality 2005 and Kets near Castle Point, St Mawes, Cornwall.

10 July Sea Snake Grounding at high speed of a leisure powerboat near the 2005 entrance to Tarbert harbour, Loch Fyne with the loss of three lives.

19 June 2 Sorcerer Collision between 2 powerboats during a junior racing event at 2005 Powerboats Portland Harbour.

13 March High-speed Investigation of two people being thrown from a high-speed RIB 2005 rigid with the loss of their lives in Milarrochy Bay, Loch Lomond,

inflatable Scotland.boat

3 September Unnamed Swamping of a cabin cruiser in Lady Bay on Loch Ryan, and 2003 cabin cruiser associated wave generation issues.

19 July Breakaway Capsize of a hire boat on the River Bure, Norfolk resulting in one 2003 5 fatality.

12 July 4.6m grp open Swamping and foundering of a 4.6m grp open sports boat2003 sports boat with the loss of three lives on Loch Ryan south-west Scotland.

POWER VESSELS

Safety Digest 1/2007: Published – April 2007Safety Digest 2/2007: Published – August 2007Safety Digest 3/2007: Published – December 2007

Copies of all these reports and Safety Digests areavailable free of charge on request from the MAIB.Tel: 023 8039 5500 www.maib.gov.uk

Produced by the Department for Transport for the Marine Accident Investigation Branch© Crown Copyright 2008.

Printed in the UK December 2007 on material containing 75% post-consumer waste and 25% ECF pulp.Product code X/XXX/XXX