legres final paper

8/4/2019 LegRes Final Paper

1/32

Jack Doe and Jill Doe vs. Imperial Bucket Corporation

This is a case filed by the Plaintiffs, Jack Doe and Jill Doe, both minors, against

Defendant, Imperial Bucket Corporation. They allege that (1) they suffered grievous and

permanent injuries when a steel bucket manufactured by the defendant proved to be of unsafe

design and manufacture, and without proper safeguards, so as to allow it to be operated in an

unsafe manner by these minors; and (2) the Defendant is guilty of such gross product liability as

to be responsible for these injuries and therefore should compensate Jack and Jill for a sum

greater than five million pesos (P 5,000,000).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Plaintiffs were both completely untrained in the proper operation of the bucket,

referred to as the pail, manufactured by Defendant, Imperial Bucket Corporation. The

said pail was made of steel and weighed 1.6 pounds when empty. It was designed to be

carried by a rounded metal handle, or bail. Depending on the material used to fill the

pail, the weight of such pail could vary between 1.9 pounds (cotton) and 61.0 (pig iron).

Unless one received proper instruction in the use of this pail, it could easily be

overloaded, causing it to become unstable. It does not include directions for safe use,

warnings of any kind about the potential danger of the pail, and even safety devices to

protect individuals from suffering injuries when using this pail. Due to this, minors

operating the pail could not possibly be aware of the inherent dangers in the defective

design of this pail and would thus be subject to injury.

The plaintiffs testified that as they were skipping up the hill, they hold on to the

pail, which swung precariously between them. Upon reaching the top of said hill, they

filled up the pail with water, which the weight of the latter will be affixed through

laboratory testing. Both minors had no idea that the defective design of this pail permitted

it to be filled with water to an unsafe level. As Plaintiffs began carrying the now

hazardous steel pail down the side of the hill, the water began shifting inside the pail,

causing the weight to be unevenly distributed. This motion caused a partial reduction in

the contents of the pail, adding to the unbalanced state of the pail. Since Jack and Jill

were not experienced in controlling the weight of a pail with water down a hill, both

minors individually and simultaneously did lose their balance owing entirely to the

instability of the pail.


2/32

According to the police reports, Jack apparently lost control of the pail and fell

down the hill. Jill, a young female weighing approximately 48 pounds, could not possibly

have been expected to retain control of the pail without assistance and immediately came

tumbling after.

By reason of the foregoing and of the Defendants negligence, Plaintiffs were severely

bruised, injured, and wounded. They suffered, still suffer, and will continue to suffer for some

time, physical and mental pain and great bodily injuries. Specifically, Jack broke his crown in

three different places in addition to fracturing his ribs and right arm. Jill sustained bruises and

contusions to her legs, ankles, and wrist. Some of these injuries may be of a permanent nature so

as to affect the lives of these minors.

The Imperial Bucket Corporation, being aware for an indeterminate time that the bucket

they callously manufactured and offered to market had serious design flaws and under certain

conditions could cause severe injury, nevertheless did continue to manufacture and market such a

bucket to the public. They failed to take the necessary steps to inform the public of the potential

for injury inherent in the use of their product. That they did so, and continue to do so, indicates a

disregard for the public welfare, for which punitive damages might be deemed appropriate.

The law applicable for this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, specifically Book IV

which pertains to Obligations and Contracts. The damages caused by Defendant Imperial Bucket

Corporation are based on quasi-delict. According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-

existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the

provisions of this Chapter.1

Moreover, Article 2187 same law states that, Manufacturers and processors of

foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by

any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them

and the consumers.2

This provision is new. No similar provision is found in the Spanish Civil Code. The

framer of present Civil Code based this provision on the rule obtaining in most states of the

United States to the effect that a consumer may recover damages against a manufacturer for the

1 Article 2176 of the Civil Code2 Article 2187 of the Civil Code


3/32

negligent preparation or manufacture of food irrespective of any contractual relations between

the parties. For example, in the United States it has been held that a manufacturer was liable for

negligently bottling beer with broken glass in the bottle. Another manufacturer was held liable

for negligent preparation of mincemeat put up in a package. And still in another case a

manufacturer was held liable for the careless and negligent canning of spoiled meat.3

The liability imposed by Art. 2187 of the Civil Code is limited only to manufacturers of

foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods for death or injuries caused by any noxious o

harmful substances used. In the United States the principle generally accepted is that a seller or

other supplier of chattels for a consideration may be liable for harm to the person or property of

third person who may be expected to be in the vicinity of the chattels probable use if he has

failed to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied. 4

Thus, in the leading case of MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 217, N.Y. 382, 111 N.Y. 1050, it

appeared that plaintiff was hurt when an automobile which he had bought from a retail dealer

collapsed as a result of a defective wheel. Defendant was the manufacturer of the automobile

though not of the wheel. It was established that had the defendant employed due care in

inspecting the parts before assembling the vehicle, the defect would have been discovered.

Plaintiff recovered damages. Justice Cardozo speaking for the court said:

We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas vs. Winchester is not limited to poisons,

explosives, and things of like nature to things which in their normal operation are implements of

destruction. If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in

peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the

consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing

will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective

of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.5

3 Jarencio, H.U. Torts and Damages in Philippine Law, Chapter II: Quasi-Delicts4 Jarencio, H.U. Torts and Damages in Philippine Law, Chapter II: Quasi-Delicts5 MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 217, N.Y. 382, 111 N.Y. 1050


4/32

The following cases, although decided in the United States, will illustrate the application

of Article 2187 of the Civil Code.

Boyd vs. Coca Cola Bottling Works

132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80

Facts: Plaintiffs husband bought for her a sealed bottle of Coca Cola from a

retail dealer in Nashville. He carried the bottle home and poured a potion of its

contents into a glass. His wife drank the liquid poured out, and immediately

became intensely nauseated and suffered seriously from its effect. The husband,

upon examining the bottle, found therein a cigar stub about two inches long which

had apparently been in the liquid for some time. Complaint was made about the

incident to an agent of Coca Cola Bottling Works who said the company had

employed some Negroes who were careless about washing bottles into which

Coca Cola was poured. There was proof to the effect that the defendant was

accustomed to buying empty bottles around town and to refill them. A physician

testified as to the poisonous effects of a fluid impregnated with nicotine from a

cigar stub.

Held: Upon a person who undertakes the performance of an act, which if not

done with care and skill will imperil the lives of others, the law imposes the duty

of exercising the requisite care and skill. In such matters such a person is liable to

others suffering from his negligence.

This liability does not depend on contract or privity, but arises from a breach of

the legal duty, to which we have just referred. A tort is committed, a legal right

invaded by practice which prejudices anothers health.

So when the manufacturer of this beverage undertook to place it on the market in

sealed bottles, intending it to be purchased and taken into the human stomach,

under such circumstances that neither the dealer nor the consumer had

opportunity for knowledge of its contents, he likewise assumed the duty of

exercising care to see that there was nothing unwholesome or injurious contained

in said bottle. For a negligent breach of this duty, the manufacturer became liable

to the person damaged thereby.


5/32

Practically all the modern cases are to the effect that the ultimate consumer of

foods, medicines, or beverages may bring his action against the manufacturer for

injuries caused by the negligent preparation of such articles. This is certainly true

where the articles are sold in sealed packages and are not subject to inspection.

Some of the cases place the liability on the general grounds heretofore stated.

Others place it on pure food statutes. Other say there is an implied warranty when

goods are dispensed in original packages, which is available to all damaged by

their use, and another case says that the liability rests upon the demand social

justice

Defendant was held liable.

Ward Baking Co. vs. Trizzino

161 N.E. 557

Facts: Trizzino purchased a cake made by Ward Baking Co. from a grocer. He

suffered injuries from a needle embedded in a cake and sued the maker thereof for

damages.

Held: Considerations of public policy demand that the utmost care and caution

be exacted from the manufacture of articles of food, who not only manufactures

the same but causes the same to be delivered to grocery men, bakeries, and so

forth for the purpose of general distribution and sale to members of the general

public. The consumer has a right to rely upon the implied representation of the

baking company that these articles bearing its name are not only free from

injurious substance, but are fit for consumption as food.

That court also pointed out that in one case it was held that the evidence that a

manufacturer of soap placed the same upon the market with knowledge that poisonous and

injurious substances were necessary in its preparation, and if too much of the poisonous

ingredients was used, and not neutralized in manufacturing, injury was liable to result from its

use and did in fact result sufficiently showed negligence in its manufacture which rendered it

liable to one who purchase it from a retail dealer, for injuries which resulted from its use; that the

liability does not rest upon any contract or privity between the manufacturer and the person

injured, but upon the duty imposed by law upon the manufacturer not to put upon the market a


6/32

commodity that was unsuitable for use by the public, and which the public could not use without

injury.

Another applicable law which can be used by Jack and Jill against Imperial Bucket

Corporation is the Consumer Act of the Philippines, specifically Article 77 which states that:

Art. 77. Minimum Labeling Requirements for Consumer Products.

XXX

The following may be required by the concerned department in accordance with the rules

and regulations they will promulgate under authority of this Act:

(a) whether it is flammable or inflammable;

(b) directions for use, if necessary;

(c) warning of toxicity;

(d) wattage, voltage or amperes; or

(e) process of manufacture used if necessary.

Any word, statement or other information required by or under authority of the

preceding paragraph shall appear on the label or labeling with such conspicuousness as

compared with other words, statements, designs or devices therein, and in such terms as

to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary

conditions of purchase or use.

The above requirements shall form an integral part of the label without danger of being

erased or detached under ordinary handling of the product.

On the other hand, the Imperial Bucket Corporation may use Article 2180 of the Civil

Code as defense against Jack and Jill. The first, second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of

the Civil Code provide:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2175 is demandable not only for one's own

acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the

damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who

are under their authority and live in their company."


7/32

The above-quoted provisions of the present Civil Code are similar to the provisions of

the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code.

The liability imposed by these provisions is based on the principle that since children and

wards do not have the capacity to govern themselves, their parents and guardians have the duty

of exercising special vigilance over them so that damage to third persons due to the ignorance ,

lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and

guardians fail to comply with that duty imposed upon them by law, they will be held liable for

the damage caused by their negligence. The liability of parents and guardians for the damage

which may be caused to third persons by their children or wards is based on their own negligence

in failing to properly care or supervise them so as to prevent their causing such damage. This is

the necessary consequence of the provision of the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code

which states that "The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein

mentioned prove that they observed all diligence of a good father of a family to prevent

damage".

If the minor or insane person causing the damage has no parent or guardian, the minor or

insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him in which case a

guardian ad litem is appointed.

The following cases illustrate the meaning and the application of the law:

Cuadra vs. Monfort

35 SCRA 160

Facts: Plaintiff's daughter Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and defendant's daughter

Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates and friends in Grade Six. On July 9,

1962 their teacher assigned them to wee4d the grass in the school premises. While

thus engaged defendant's daughter fount a plastic headband and jokingly she said

aloud that she wound an earthworm. To frighten plaintiff's daughter she tossed the

object at her and hit her right eye. Plaintiff's daughter rubbed her eye and treated

it with some powder. The eye became swollen and although she underwent

medical treatment and surgical operation she lost the eye. Plaintiff instituted this

action for damages against the father of Monfort.


8/32

Held: "The legal issued posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act

of his minor child which cause damage to another under the specific facts related

above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176

and 2180 thereof, which read:

'Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being

fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault of

negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is

called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."

'Art 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for

one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is

responsible.

The father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for

the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

x x x x x

'The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein

mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family

to prevent damage.

"The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or

negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or

intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for

whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article

2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or omission, there being no

willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omissions that of

one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable

under Article 2180, I the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the

father or the mother under circumstances above quoted. The basis of this

vicarious almost primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault of negligence,

which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission.

The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the

clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article

2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease


9/32

when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a

good father of a family to prevent damage."

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof

necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and

how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child,

especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there

can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the

diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." It implies a consideration of the

attendance circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of

such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

"In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the

defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that

he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to

foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at

school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to

expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the

act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual

among children at play and which no parent, however, careful, would have any

special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any

mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would

reflect unfavorable on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed

to her parent.

"The victims, no doubt, deserves no little consideration and sympathy for the

tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her

suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the

moral compulsion of good conscience."

Plaintiff could not recover.


10/32

Exconde vs. Capuno

101 Phil. 843

Facts: Dante Capuno was a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He

attended a parade in honor of Rizal upon instruction of the city school supervisor.

From the school Dante with other students boarded a jeep and when the same

started to run he took hold of a wheel and drove while the driver sat on his left

side. The jeep turned turtle and two passengers died. This action was brought

against Dante and his father Delfin Capuno for damages.

Held: "Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages

in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter

committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a

minor and was then living with his father and inasmuch as these facts are not

disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the

lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted "teachers or

directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or

apprentices while they are under their custody.' Buy this provision applies to an

institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.

Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, and as

part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose

Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection

with the parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while

driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances it is clear that neither the

head of the school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the

negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts

and trades as provided for by law.

"The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and in case of his death

or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor child

who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental

authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents "duty of

supporting them, keeping them in their company, educate them and instructing


11/32

them in proportion to their "means"; while, on the other hand, gives them the

"right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Article 154 and 155, Spanish

Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is

if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to

prevent damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Civil Code). These defendants

failed to prove."

Defendants Dante Capuno and his father Delfin Capuno held jointly and severally liable

to plaintiff.

Mercado vs. Court of Appeals

108 Phil. 414

Facts: Plaintiff Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and defendants Augusto Mercado, 9

years old, were students in the Lourdes Catholic School. They quarreled over an

empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. Augusto Mercado wounded

Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor blade.

Quisumbing, Jr. and his father brought an action for damages against Augusto

Mercado and his father. Defendant Mercado contended that since the incident

occurred while his son was in school it should be the teacher or the head of the

school and not Mercado the father who should be held responsible.

Held: "This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs.

Capuno and Capuno, G.R. No. L-10134, promulgated June 30, 1957, but we

held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted teachers or

directors of art and trades are liable for damage caused by their pupils or

apprentices while they are under their custody,' but this provision only applies to

an institution or arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests

his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as

follows:

'Art. 2108.


12/32

'Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for

damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they

remain in their custody."

"It would seem that the clause 'so long as they remain in their custody',

contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such

that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the

parents. In these circumstances, the control or influence over the conduct and

action of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so

would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear

in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and get

back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation

contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does

paragraph 2 of said article, which makes the father or mother responsible for the

damages caused by their minor children. The claim of the petitioner that

responsibility should pass to the school must therefore, be held to be without

merit."

Defendant Mercado, the father was held liable.

Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez

56 Phil. 177

Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while

attempting to pass each other on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South Road in

Las Pias, Rizal. As a result of the collision a passenger in the truck, Narciso

Gutierrez suffered a fracture in his right leg. The truck was owned by the

defendant Saturnino Cortex. The automobile was operated by Bonifacio

Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother,

Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this case. At the time of the

collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother together with several other

members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in the car. The court found

that both drivers of the truck and the car were negligent.


13/32

Held:"In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the

Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an

incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that,

on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his

negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son

was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for

the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Article

1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would

be liable for the damages caused by the minor."

Defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, the truck driver, and Saturnino Cortez,

were held jointly and severally liable for P5,000 to plaintiff.

Salen & Salbanera vs. Balce

107 Phil.748

Facts: Gumersindo Balce, a minor below 15 years and son of defendant Jose

Balce, killed Carlos Salen, a minor son of plaintiffs. Gumersindo Balce was

convicted of homicide. Plaintiffs brought an action for damages against defendant

Jose Balce, father of the minor Gumersindo Balce. The trial court dismissed the

case stating that the civil liability must be determined under the provisions of the

Revised Penal Code and not under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff

appealed.

Held: "It is true that under Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code, a father is made

civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an

insane, under 9 years of age, or over but under 15 years of age, who acts without

discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This

is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law

exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivision 1, 2 & 3, Revised Penal

Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpublished but to attach certain

civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority

or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from

criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability


14/32

of his parent should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the

general law which is our Civil Code.

"The particular law that governs this case is Art. 2180, the pertinent portion of

which provides: 'The father and, in case of his death, or incapacity the mother, are

responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.'

To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only

covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise

from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where

mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for

the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is

caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void which apparently exists in the

Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code as

may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or

identical cases."

Decision of the trial court reversed.

Fuellas vs. Cadano

3 SCRA 361

Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito

Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates. While they were in school they

had a quarrel. Their teacher separated them and told them to go home. After going

down the schoolhouse Rico Fuellas held Pepito Cadano by the neck and pushed

him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right-side with his right arm under his body,

whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. Pepito's right arm was broken. Elpidio

Cadano, father of Peipito, filed two separate actions: (a) One filed on October 1,

1954 for damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico, and (b) the

other on November 11, 1954 against Rico Fuellas for serious physical injuries.

The cases were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956 Rico Fuellas was convicted of the

offense charged in the criminal case. No pronouncement was made in the criminal

case on his civil liability the court stating that the same shall be determined in the

civil case. On May 25, 1956 the same court rendered a judgment in the civil case


15/32

holding Agapito Fuellas liable in damages in the total amount of P9,600 under

Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by

reducing the moral damages. Agapito Fuellas appealed to the Supreme Court

contended that since the act of his minor son was deliberate and international Art.

2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable. Fuellas also contended that the only

way by which a father can be made responsible for the criminal act of his son

committed with deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based on the

provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of parents.

Held: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor

children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations

arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.

The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children

who act with discernment is determined under the provisions of Art 2180, New Civil Code and

under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations

which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would

result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or

mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would

attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Judgment affirmed.

Elcano vs. Hill

77 SCRA 100

Facts: Reginald Hill son of defendant Marvin Hill was charged criminally for the

killing of Agapito Elcano son of plaintiffs the Elcano spouses. At the time of the

killing Reginald Hill was a minor, married and was living with his father Marvin

Hill and receiving subsistence from him. Reginald Hill was acquitted on the

ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill coupled with

mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action for damages against

Reginald Hill and his father Marvin Hill arising from the killing of their son. The

case was dismissed by the lower court on defendants' motion to dismiss and

plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was whether

the father of the minor who was already married but living with, and receiving


16/32

subsistence from said father was liable in damages for the crime committed by the

minor.

Held: "Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Marvin Hill, his

father, it is also considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. hill

is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld

"While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the

child (Article 327 Civil Code) , and under Article 397, emancipation takes place

"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to

Article 399 emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.

Thus emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate

parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer

his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or

encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.

He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or

guardian.

"Now under Article 2180, 'the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one

is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are

responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their

company." In the instant case, it is not controvert that Reginald, although married

was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the

occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and

dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

"It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint

and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is

that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to

prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand the clear

implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage

may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that

such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do


17/32

any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else

invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while still

a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while

still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the

parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or

encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child

without their consent. Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2170 applies

to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of

equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son."

Order of the lower court reversed.

If I were to choose a party/position that I would support, I would prefer the Defendant,

Imperial Bucket Corporation. The parents should be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil

Code. It is the responsibility of the parents to take care of their child and they should not let their

children use things that are not safe without their supervision. In the case at bar, the parents of

Jack and Jill let them use an unsafe bucket without adult supervision, hence, making them

(parents) liable for the damages suffered by their children.

The Imperial Bucket Corporation should not be held liable for the damages of minors,

Jack and Jill Doe. The persons liable are the minors parents which should be supervising them

while using the pail to get water up the hill.


18/32

Petition for Guardianship and Other Legal Relief in the Matter of Beauty, Sleeping

The case at bar is filed by petitioner, Mr. King, requesting that an order be issued by the

court prohibiting any or all extraordinary or heroic measures being taken now or at any time in

the future to resuscitate, awaken, or in any way revive or sustain by artificial means their relation

by blood, Sleeping Beauty; and that no experimental treatment be administered and no persons

unknown to the Court through its trustees be permitted access to said Beauty. In addition,

petitioner and his spouse are requesting that they be named legal guardians of the subject,

trustees of all assets, and, in the event of her death, executors of her estate.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Sleeping Beauty has been surviving for seventy-one years in a trance-like state

consistent in every way with the medical condition coma. This state was induced by an

unknown drug injected into her system with a needle. The unknown chemical substance,

injected either knowingly or unwittingly on or about the subjects sixteenth birthday, did

cause grievous damage to her central nervous system and brain stem. This hallucinogenic

substance did also cause similar harm to others engaged in the service of Beauty and

believed to have had marginal physical contact with the subject. The immediate result of

such drug introduction was a total and complete loss of consciousness, the inability to

communicate in any form whatsoever with any persons and the complete and total

cessation of all bodily functions save breathing. There is no proven antidote to this drug.

The source of this drug is unknown to the petitioner. Sleeping Beauty remains in such a

trance-like state as described to this date. She has not responded to any attempt to revive

her with traditional, proven, safe, and accepted means of resuscitation.

The petitioner claims knowledge that a person or persons not specifically known

to petitioner have made or will make heroic attempts to revive Sleeping Beauty using a

highly experimental treatment medically referred to as artificial respiration, commonly

known as mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. There is no evidence of any kind to support

the use of said treatment in this case. Additionally, as the drug known to have caused the

subjects condition has officially been labeled a dangerous drug, whose properties have

not sufficiently been tested, and which drug is proved to have caused the onset of similar

symptoms to persons having only casual contact with Beauty, there exists a clear and


19/32

present danger to the general populace that any type of physical contact with the subject

may result in controlled spread of such symptoms.

Petitioner thereby, to protect the general well-being, requests a court order be

issued immediately prohibiting such experimental treatment by any and all persons

whosoever. He also requests the Court decree that should the physical state of the subject

change in any way, shape, or form, no measures except those currently accepted by the

medical community as immediate aid to lessen pain and suffering be employed in her

behalf. It is the wish of the petitioners that no artificial or mechanical means of any kind

known now or at any time in the future be used in this case to extend the condition in

which Beauty currently resides.

At the commencement of this drug-induced trance, Sleeping Beauty was in possession of

a substantial amount of material goods, including but not limited to items of pure gold, jewelry,

acreage, and a castle (one). Such holdings were out into a trust to be administered by her blood

relatives at the commencement of this current state. Those people charged with supervising said

trust have perished through primarily natural causes, such as age and war. In the absence of

supervision, the value of such holdings has substantially increased, but without proper legal

authority to oversee such holdings, there exists significant risk of loss or depreciation of the

value of such holdings. The petitioner hereby declares to the Court that any and all members of

the immediate family of the subject, Beauty (including but not limited to father, mother, siblings

of any gender, cousins by blood first through sixth, aunts, and uncles), have perished and the

petitioner is the sole surviving blood relation. The petitioner voluntarily relinquishes all rights to

privacy for matters relating to this claim and will make available to this Court samples necessary

for the scientific establishment of this blood link through any and all known means.

As the sole surviving blood relation of Sleeping Beauty, the petitioner requests that the

Court appoint him legal guardian of Beauty with full power of attorney and such access to herein

described trust to enable full and proper management of these assets to the benefit of Beauty, her

heirs, and her estate in total.

In the event of the untimely death of Sleeping Beauty, the petitioner humbly requests that

the Court appoint the petitioner sole executor of the estate of the subject, with full powers to take

such actions as necessary to benefit the estate of Beauty.


20/32

The Rules of Court on Special Proceedings, specifically Rules 92-97, is applicable in the

case at bar. The Petitioner must adhere to these rules and their subsections in order to be

appointed as the guardian of Sleeping Beauty and to be granted as the successor to her

properties.

RULE 92

VENUE

Sec. 1. Where to institute proceedings. - Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor

or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province, or in the

justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court of the chartered

city where the minor or incompetent person resides, and if he resides in a foreign country,

in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein his property or part thereof is

situated; provided, however, that where the value of the property of such minor or

incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal court, the

proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance.

In the City of Manila, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court.

Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the

word "incompetent"includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are

hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those

who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being

of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,

cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming

thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

Sec. 3. Transfer of venue. - The court taking cognizance of a guardianship proceeding,

may transfer the same to the court of another province or municipality wherein the ward

has acquired real property, if he has transferred thereto his bona-fide residence, and the

latter court shall have full jurisdiction to continue the proceedings, without requiring

payment of additional court fees.


21/32

RULE 93

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

Sec. 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. - Any relative, friend,

or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful

guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court

having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or

both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the

United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the

Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of

an isolated leper.

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must

show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient;

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of

the persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render

void the issuance of letters of guardianship.

Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing; Notice thereof. - When a petition for the

appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing

the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned

in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or

the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be

given.

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition. - Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,

contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the

alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and


22/32

may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or

to any suitable person named in the opposition.

Sec. 5.Hearing and order for letters to issue. - At the hearing of the petition the alleged

incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required

notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in

support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor, or

incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the

powers and duties hereinafter specified.

Sec. 6. When and how guardian for nonresident appointed; Notice. - When a person

liable to be put under guardianship resides without the Philippines but has estate therein,

any relative or friend of such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or

otherwise, may petition a court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian for

the estate, and if, after notice given to such person and in such manner as the court deems

proper, by publication or otherwise, and hearing, the court is satisfied that such

nonresident is a minor or incompetent rendering a guardian necessary or convenient, it

may appoint a guardian for such estate.

Sec. 7.Parents as guardians. - When the property of the child under parental authority is

worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court

appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more

than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the

child's property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall

file the petition required by section 2 thereof. For good reasons the court may, however,

appoint another suitable person.

Sec. 8. Service of judgment. - Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served

upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person

resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

RULE 94

BONDS OF GUARDIANS


23/32

Sec. 1.Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. - Before a

guardian appointed enters upon the execution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue,

he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete

inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his

possession or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person for him;

(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate

according to these rules for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper

care, custody, and education of the ward;

(c) To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all

proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the

same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the court directs; and

at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over

all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on such

settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.

Sec. 2. When new bond may be required and old sureties discharged. - Whenever it is

deemed necessary, the court may require a new bond to be given by the guardian, and

may discharge the sureties on the old bond from further liability, after due notice to

interested persons, when no injury can result therefrom to those interested in the estate.

Sec. 3.Bonds to be filed; Actions thereon. - Every bond given by a guardian shall be filed

in the office of the clerk of the court, and, in case of the breach of a condition thereof,

may be prosecuted in the same proceeding or in a separate action for the use and benefit

of the ward or of any other person legally interested in the estate.

RULE 95

SELLING AND ENCUMBERING PROPERTY OF WARD

Sec. 1.Petition of guardian for leave to sell or encumber estate. - When the income of an

estate under guardianship is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family, or to

maintain and educate the ward when a minor, or when it appears that it is for the benefit

of the ward that his real estate or some part thereof be sold, or mortgaged or otherwise


24/32

encumbered, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive

security, or in the improvement or security of other real estate of the ward, the guardian

may present a verified petition to the court by which he was appointed setting forth such

facts, and praying that an order issue authorizing the sale or encumbrance.

Sec. 2. Order to show cause thereupon. - If it seems probable that such sale or

encumbrance is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward, the court shall make an

order directing the next of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to

appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified to show cause why the prayer of

the petition should not be granted.

Sec. 3.Hearing on return of order; Costs. - At the time and place designated in the order

to show cause, the court shall hear the proofs and allegations of the petitioner and next of

kin, and other persons interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or refuse the

prayer of the petition as the best interests of the ward require. The court shall make such

order as to costs of the hearing as may be just.

Sec. 4. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance, and how long effective; Bond. - If,

after full examination, it appears that it is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward,

to sell or encumber the estate, or some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or

encumbrance and that the proceeds thereof be expended for the maintenance of the ward

and his family, or the education of the ward, if a minor, or for the putting of the same out

at interest, or the investment of the same as the circumstances may require. The order

shall specify the causes why the sale or encumbrance is necessary or beneficial, and may

direct that estate ordered sold be disposed of at either public or private sale, subject to

such conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security where a part of the

payment is deferred, as in the discretion of the court are deemed most beneficial to the

ward. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the proper

appropriation of the proceeds of the sale, but the judge may, if deemed expedient, require

an additional bond as a condition for the granting of the order of sale. No order of sale

granted in pursuance of this section shall continue in force more than one (1) year after

granting the same, without a sale being had.

Sec. 5. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of estate. - The

court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or


25/32

encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his hands, in real estate or

otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may make such other

orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as

circumstances may require.

RULE 96

GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS

Sec. 1. To what guardianship shall extend. - A guardian appointed shall have the care and

custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management

of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall

have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court

other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the

guardianship.

Sec. 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. - Every guardian must pay the ward's just debts

out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not, then out of

his real estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance thereof.

Sec. 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for ward. - A

guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, and receive all debts

due him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and give

discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just dividend of the estate and effects;

and he shall appear for and represent his ward in all actions and special proceedings,

unless another person be appointed for that purpose.

Sec. 4.Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. - A

guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the

income and profits thereon, so far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable

maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be

insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon

being authorized by order so to do, and apply so much of the proceeds as may be

necessary to such maintenance.

Sec. 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after hearing. - The

court may authorize the guardian to join in an assent to a partition of real or personal


26/32

estate held by the ward jointly or in common with others, but such authority shall only be

granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of the ward as the court may direct,

and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action.

Sec. 6.Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing property of

ward. - Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or

prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is

suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or

interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite

the suspected person to appear for examination touching such money, goods, interest, or

instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement,

concealment or conveyance.

Sec. 7.Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement of estates. - A guardian

must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within three (3) months

after his appointment, and annually after such appointment an inventory and account, the

rendition of any of which may be compelled upon the application of an interested person.

Such inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. All the estate of the

ward described in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the appraisement the court

may request the assistance of one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers. And

whenever any property of the ward not included in an inventory already rendered is

discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward, like proceedings shall be had for

securing an inventory and appraisement thereof within three (3) months after such

discovery, succession, or acquisition.

Sec. 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. - Expenses and compensation

allowed. Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often

thereafter as may be required, a guardian must present his account to the court for

settlement and allowance. In the settlement of the account, the guardian, other than a

parent, shall be allowed the amount of his reasonable expenses incurred in the execution

of his trust and also such compensation for his services as the court deems just, not

exceeding fifteen per centum of the net income of the ward.


27/32

RULE 97

TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP

Sec. 1.Petition that competency of ward be adjudged, and proceedings thereupon. - A

person who has been declared incompetent for any reason, or his guardian, relative, or

friend, may petition the court to have his present competency judicially determined. The

petition shall be verified by oath, and shall state that such person is then competent. Upon

receiving the petition, the court shall fix a time for hearing the questions raised thereby,

and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the guardian of the person, so declared

incompetent, and to the ward. On the trial, the guardian or relatives of the ward, and, in

the discretion of the court, any other person, may contest the right to the relief demanded,

and witnesses may be called and examined by the parties or by the court on its own

motion. If it be found that the person is no longer incompetent, his competency shall be

adjudged and the guardianship shall cease.

Sec. 2. When guardian removed or allowed to resign; New appointment. - When a

guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable

therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, of failed for thirty (30) days after it is

due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the

guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person

found to be lawfully entitled thereto. A guardian may resign when it appears proper to

allow the same; and upon his resignation or removal the court may appoint another in his

place.

Sec. 3. Other termination of guardianship. - The marriage or voluntary emancipation of a

minor ward terminates the guardianship of the person of the ward, and shall enable the

minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money

or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or

guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or

guardian. The guardian of any person may be discharged by the court when it appears,

upon the application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer

necessary.


28/32

Sec. 4.Record to be kept by the justice of the peace or municipal judge. - When a justice

of the peace or municipal court takes cognizance of the proceedings in pursuance of the

provisions of these rules, the record of the proceedings shall be kept as in the court of

first instance.

Sec. 5. Service of judgment. - Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served

upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person

resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

The following are cases on petition for guardianship:

Guardianship of James E. Stegner vs. Stegner

G.R. No. L-8532 October 11, 1957

Facts: W.A. Stegner left a will nominating and appointing the Philippine Trust

Company executor of the trustee and as guardian of his children. In 1936, the

Court appointed Juanita T. Stegner, mother of the minors, as guardian over the

persons of the minors and the Philippine Trust Company as guardian of

theirproperties. When the Philippine Trust Company filed a final consolidated

statement of account and petition for discharge containing a detailed statement of

cash receipts and disbursement made, Catherine and Mildred Stegner opposed this

petition alleging that it did not explain why the minors should be prejudiced by

the sum of P15,117.29 allegedly invalidated and that as the loans were in the

name of the Philippine Trust Company and not in the names of Catherine and

Mildred Stegner, these wards should not be prejudiced by the payments made by

the mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P15,117.29 which was

declared invalidated.

Held: Consolidating the related questions raised by oppositors, the main issue in

the instant case is whether the Philippine Trust Company could be held liable for

the investments of the funds of the wards made without securing the previous

authorization of the Court and which resulted in the loss of P15,117.29.

Section 5, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

SEC. 5. COURT MAY ORDER INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS AND DIRECT

MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE. The Court may authorize and require the


29/32

guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his

ward's money in his hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best

interest of all concerned, and may make such orders for the management

investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may

require.

Although the authority referred to in this Section may not have been secured prior

to the investment of the properties of funds of the ward, yet We believe that the

court's approval of the annual inventories and accounts submitted by the guardian,

with the conformity and/or acquiescence of the U. S. Veterans Administration and

the mother of the minors, wherein the questioned investment was mentioned and

accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance

with the provisions of section 5, Rule 96 aforecited. The Court finds no merit in

the imputation of negligence on the guardian with respect to said assets after

taking into consideration the satisfactory explanations made by said guardian.

Wherefore, the order of the Court, a quo of July 29, 1954, appealed from is

hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Nario vs. Philamlife Insurance Company

20 SCRA 434

Facts: Mrs. Nario applied for and was issued a life Insurance policy (no. 503617)

by PHILAMLIFE under a 20-yr endowment plant, with a face value of 5T. Her

husband Delfin and their unemancipated son Ernesto were her revocable

beneficiaries. She then applied for a loan on the above policy with PHILAMLIFE

w/c she is entitled to as policy holder, after the policy has been in force for 3

years. The purpose of such loan was for the school expenses of Ernesto. The

application bore the written signature and consent of Delfin in 2 capacities: (1) as

one of the irrevocable beneficiaries of the policy; (2) as father-guardian of Ernesto

and also the legal administrator of the minors properties pursuant to Article 320

of the Civil Code. PHILAMLIFE denied the loan application contending that

written consent of the minor son must not only be given by his father as legal

guardian but it must also be authorized by the court in a competent


30/32

guardianship proceeding. Mrs. Nario then signified her decision to surrender her

policy and demand its cash value which then amounted to P 520. PHILAMLIFE

also denied the surrender of the policy on the same ground as that given in

disapproving the loan application. Mrs. Nario sued PHILAMLIFE praying that

the latter grant their loan application and/or accept the surrender of said policy in

exchange for its cash value. PHILAMLIFE contends that the loan application and

the surrender of the policy involved acts of disposition and alienation of the

property rights of the minor, said acts are not within the power of administrator

granted under Article 320 in relation to Article 326 Civil Code, hence court

authority is required.

Held: SC agreed with the trial court that the vested interest or right of the

beneficiaries in the policy should be measured on its full face value and not on its

cash surrender value, for in case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are

paid on the basis of its face value and in case the insured should discontinue

paying premiums, the beneficiaries may continue paying it and are entitled to

automatic extended term or paid-up insurance options and that said vested right

under the policy cannot be divisible at any given time.

SC also agreed with TC that the said acts (loan app and surrender) constitute acts

of disposition or alienation of property rights and not merely management or

administration because they involve the incurring or termination of contractual

obligations.

Under the laws (CC and rules of Court) The father is constituted as the minors

legal administrator of the property, and when the property of the child is worth

more than P2T (as in the case at bar, the minors property was worth 2,500 his

share as beneficiary), the father a must file a petition for guardianship and post a

guardianship bond. In the case at bar, the father did not file any petition

for guardianship nor post a guardianship bond, and as such cannot possibly

exercise the powers vested on him as legal administrator of the minors property.

The consent give for and in behalf of the son without prior court authorization to

the loan application and the surrender was insufficient and ineffective and

PHILAMLIFE was justified in disapproving the said applications.


31/32

Assuming that the property of the ward was less than 2T, the effect would be the

same, since the parents would only be exempted from filing a bond and judicial

authorization, but their acts as legal administrators are only limited to acts of

management or administration and not to acts of encumbrance or disposition.

Mendezona vs. Ozamiz

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002

Facts: Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita

Mendezona own a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozamiz. They

initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their respective titles of ownership caused

by the inscription thereon of the notice of lis pendens which came about as a

result of an incident in a special proceeding for guardianship over the person and

properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents Julio Ozamiz, Jose

Ozamiz, Paz Montalvan, Ma. Terresa Zarraga, Carlos Fortich, Jose Roz, Paulita

Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. The respondents alleged that Carmen Ozamiz, then

86 years old, after an illness on July 1987, had become disoriented and could no

longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing

health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Both parties agreed that Carmen

needed a guardian over her person and her properties. Thus, as guardians,

respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz filed their Inventories and

Accounts of Carmens properties and other assets including the parcel of land

bought by the petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscription on the titles of

petitioners a notice oflis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles

filed by petitioners. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners;

however, the appellate court reversed it.

Held: A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the

condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the

other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary

is shown. The respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the

Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz.

However, there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by


32/32

Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by

the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of

Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts

assessment that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of

Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages

them." Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

Petitioner, as a guardian of Sleeping Beauty, has the care and custody of the person of

Beauty and the management of her estate. Since he has the care and custody of Beauty, he has

the right to request an order prohibiting any or all extraordinary or heroic measures being taken

now or at any time in the future to resuscitate, awaken, or in any way revive or sustain by

artificial means their relation by blood, Sleeping Beauty. He can also manage her estate, as a

guardian, since Sleeping Beauty is incompetent to manage the said properties.

legres final paper

Documents