legitimation of structural inequality

8/8/2019 Legitimation of Structural Inequality

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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY:REFORMULATION AND TEST OF THESELF EVALUATION ARGUMENT*JOHN F. STOLTE

Northern Illinois UniversityWhy does a disadvantaged actor, as well as an advantaged actor, often accept astructure of inequality as right, reasonable, and legitimate? The self-evaluationargument proposes that variation in objective resource level produces variation inself-evaluation, which, in turn, leads both deprived and privileged actors to accepttheir respective positions as legitimate. The argument is clarified through areformulation that links exchange structural inequality, negotiation, andself-efficacy. The reformulation is experimentally tested. Though the resultsdiametrically oppose a key implication of the reformulation, they stimulate thinkingthat further illuminates this core issue in the social psychology of stratification, andthey lay a basis forfurther research.

How do "legitimationsof stratificationbe-come part of the consciousness of individualswho make up society?"(DellaFave, 1980:959)An adequate answer to this question wouldhelp to explain, in part, the perpetuationofstructural nequalitiesin power, wealth, andprestige. It is easy to understandwhy a personwitha positionaladvantage ends to supportastratifiedsystem, but more difficult to com-prehend why one with a positionaldisadvan-tage also frequentlytends to support t. DellaFave (1980)proposes"the self-evaluationhy-pothesis"to answerthis question.Raisingcru-cial issues in the social psychology of stratifi-cation, his analysisis important,but it must beconceptually refined and empiricallytested.Pursuing hese goals, this paper(a) examinesand appraisesthe argument,(b) reformulatesandtests it, and(c)reconsiders t in lightof theresults.LEGITIMATION:THESELF-EVALUATIONARGUMENTDifferent nmanyways, Marx'sradicalconflicttheory (1886), Mosca's elite conflict theory

(1939),and Parsons'sfunctionaltheory(1949)are similarin one respect. Each describes animportantprocess in stratification:structuralinequality is ideologicallyjustified so as to"allocate feelings of potency, competence,and, above all, importanceand self-worth n amanner congruent with (the distributionof)primaryresources"(power, wealth,and pres-tige) (Della Fave, 1980:959). Della Faveamplifies this insight, synthesizingideas fromMead's (1934)theory of the self-concept andBem's (1967)theory of self-perception.Accordingto Mead, objectivity of self-viewis promotedby seeing oneself from the per-spectiveof the "generalizedother," a compos-ite conception of attitudes and expectationsheldingeneralby otherstowardthe self. Meadused theeconomicmarketplaceo illustrate heimpact of the "generalizedother"on the self-concept (Reck, 1964). A person learns the"objective"value of aneconomic goodthroughobservingthe priceothersregularlypay for it.Similarly,a persongets a sense of self-worththrough the reflectedappraisals,high or low,receivedgenerallyacross a career of symbolicinteractions.Mead's theory is compatible with Bem's(1967)self-perception pproach,subsumedas aspecial case within attribution heory(Kelley,1967).A person looks at his/her own behavioras something o explain. S/he makes udgmentsabout (attributionsof) causes, in a mannertaken to be reasonable with reference to anexternal,objectiveobserver,thusachievingan

*Directall correspondence o:JohnF. Stolte, De-partment f Sociology, Northern llinoisUniversity,DeKalb, IL 60115.This paperis a muchrevised versionof one pre-sentedat the meetingsof the AtnericanSociologicalAssociation, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979. I amgrateful to Dick Emerson, Buzz Zelditch,MichaelEpelbaum, and two anonymousreferees who con-tributed o thispapereitherthroughdirectcommentsorthrough timulating onversations.Also, I wishtothank the GraduateSchool, NorthernIllinois Uni-versity for funds it provided in support of the re-searchreported here. Finally, I express my warmappreciation o Carol Ann Stolte for her skilled ef-forts in typingand proofingthe manuscript.

I Mead'sprocess approach o the self is thusjux-taposedwiththestructural oncernsof stratification,an effort complementedby a wider backgroundofsocial psychological work. For example, Stryker(1980)connects a symbolic nteractionheory of selfwith a role theory of social structure.American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (June:331-342) 331


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332 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWexplanation.Della Fave arguesthat the "ex-ternalobserver"of attributionheory is closelyanalogousto "the generalizedother"of sym-bolic interaction heory.2Consideredin the context of structural n-equality, the two theories link self-evaluationand legitimation. f it is evidentto a personthats/he occupies a favorablesocial position,s/hewill develop a favorableself-evaluation.Theevident facts of the situationand the positivereflectedappraisalsconfirmthat self-view. Toan objective observer ("the generalizedother"),it would seem reasonable o attributethe advantagedposition to the "objective"superiority of the self in competence, inmorality, etc. The person thus comes to be-lieve that s/he deserves to-occupya privilegedposition.Conversely,if it is apparent o a per-son that s/he occupies a disadvantaged ocialpositions/he will developan unfavorable elf-evaluation. The negative reflected appraisalsandthe obvious facts of the situation ead thepersonto attributehis/herrelativedeprivationto the "objective"inferiorityof the self. Con-sequently,the personwill come to believe thats/he deserves to be located where s/he is lo-cated in the structureof inequality.Both ad-vantaged and disadvantagedactors will there-fore come to accept the structureof inequalityas legitimate,right, and reasonable.Critical AppraisalIn general thrust, Della Fave's analysis isrichlysuggestive,fixingattentionon a signifi-cant process, but it needs to be clarified."Structural nequality"and "self-evaluation"must be more sharply specified. Truly,"structuralnequality"has been a centralcon-cern in the sociologicalclassics, and the au-thor's languageconnotes this core concern.But can the meaning,determinants,and con-sequences of "structural nequality"be for-mulated more exactly? Also, " self-evaluation,"as discussedby DellaFave, is toobroad and loose. The self-concept is intricate.Are there not differentkinds, sources, andef-fects of "self-evaluation"FranksandMarolla,1976;Rosenberg, 1979)?Whatare the recip-rocal effects of self and situation nthe contextof social inequality?These and other questions must be consid-eredto make theoreticalprogress.While DellaFave's analysisis a usefulpointof departure,tmust be explicated and empiricallyrefined.

Though he researchdescribedbelow does notresolve all relevant questions, it deals withsome important irst issues suggestedby theself-evaluationargument.A REFORMULATION:EXCHANGESTRUCTURE,NEGOTIATIONPROCESS,SELF-EFFICACYStructural Inequality: Position, Power,StratificationA fruitfulstartingplace is an exchangetheory(Emerson,1972)of structuralnequality Stolteand Emerson, 1977). In this theory, an ex-changenetworkis conceptualizedas a config-uration of establishedexchange relations, inwhich a set of actors are linked directly andindirectly. Figure 1 depicts two kinds of ex-change network. Each network (Figure 1-Aand Figure 1-B) containsfour actors, A, . . .A4and B1 ... B4, respectively.LettersA andB represent kinds of resources. A resourcecould be virtuallyany action, object, or eventvalued by and transferredbetween humanac-tors in social exchange. For example,"socialsupport"consisting of various "favors"is acommon resource exchangedin varioussocialnetworks. Networks of professionals andbusinesspersonswho provide mutualfavors,networksof politicianswho give mutualpoliti-cal support,and networksof organizedcrimi-nals who bestow mutual assistance areeveryday-lifeillustrations.In any such exam-ple, "An exchangestructure s an opportunitystructure for each party located within thestructure" Stolte and Emerson, 1977:120).Concern here is limited to a network inwhich a single kind of resource ("A" or "B")A. A Unilateral Monopoly Exchange Structure

A2 A3

A1

A4

B. A Closed Social Circle Exchange StructureB1 B2

B3 R4Figure 1.

2 Della Fave also carefullyconsiders"status attri-bution theory" (Berger et al., 1972)and "equitytheory" (Cook, 1975),but limitshis focus to Mead'sand Bem's formulations,which avoid the cognitiveconsistencyassumption.


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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 333is exchanged. "Social support"suffices as anexample and will be used throughout.Thetheoryassumes thateach actor in the networkplaces equal value on a resourceunit, i.e., a"favor." And it assumes that each actor can-provide o one or moreactors in the networkone or moreunitsof the resource, i.e., one ormore"favors."3In Figures 1-A and 1-B, each exchangere-lationis representedby a line signifyinga lon-gitudinal eries of discretetransactions,acrosswhich varyingnumbers of resourceunits aremutuallyexchanged.An establishedexchangerelationwillpersistonly if it is reciprocalnthelong run. Put differently,while resource unitsmightbe given by one persononly to the otherin a given transaction, resource units wouldhave to be given in returnby the recipient insome subsequent ransaction,or the exchangerelation would eventually extinguish. How-ever, given such reciprocity,the relativenum-bers of resourceunits(e.g., "favors")mutuallygiven across a longitudinal et of transactionsneed not be and often are not equal. Thus, aminorMafia boss might give fifteen favors inexchangefor two favors received froma majorMafiachieftainacross a series of transactionsin an exchange network among organizedcriminals. Across time, the chieftain wouldbenefitmoreinfavors received thanthe minorboss, and thus the terms of exchange ("theexchange ratio")of resource units given andreceived would be relatively more favorablefor the Mafiachieftain.A fundamentalask, therefore,is to explainwhyanyexchangeratio,regardlessof the kindof networkor the kind of resource,eitherre-mainsequalor comes to favorone actoroveranother across a series of transactions.Thetheorydelineatesan important tructural auseof variation in exchange ratios: positionalpower. This concept impliesthat whilean ex-changenetwork s anopportunity tructure-foreachactorin it, not all actorsnecessarilyhaveequalopportunity.Structural differences between exchangenetworks, entailing differences in exchangeopportunities,also entaildifferences n depen-dence (andthus power). Each networkshownintheFigure I1-Aand 1-B) is characterized ya distinctconfiguration f exchangerelations.Actor A1 is linkedin three relations to actorsA2, A3,andA4, whileactorsA2,A3, andA4 areeach linked in one relationonly, that whicheach has with A1.In contrast, B1,B2,B3, and

B4areeach linkedin threerelations,andeachactor has access to every other actor in thenetworkas an opportunity or exchange. Fol-lowing Emerson (1972:76-82), the structureshown in Figure1-A willbe labelleda "unilat-eralmonopoly"andthatshown inFigure1-B a"closed socialcircle."The labelsdesignateex-change structureswhich differ fundamentallyin the relativepositionalpower to whichactorshaveaccess. In Figure1-A, partyAl occupiesa monopolistic position in the opportunitystructurenrelation o A2,A3,andA4.ActorAlhas a relative positional power advantagebasedon the threealternativeopportunities orexchanges/he has in comparisonwith the oneopportunity achotheractor has. Onthe otherhand, in Figure 1-B, no party occupies amonopolistic position in the opportunitystructure inceeachactor hasanequalnumberof alternativeexchangeopportunities.Thus, inFigure 1-B, no actoroccupiesa moreadvanta-geous power positionthan another.4The positionalpoweradvantageenjoyed byactor Al in Figure 1-A will tend to be usedlongitudinally in exchange. Acrosstransactions,should A1meet resistancein ob-taining avorable ermsof exchange, s/heis in apositionto seek better terms from alternativeexchange opportunities n the network.Rela-tive to the other actors in the network,A, canovercome more resistance (i.e., "use morepower")in a given transactionto achieve fa-vorableterms of exchange.Within he "closedsocial circle" depicted in Figure 1-B, on theother hand, actors occupy positions of equalstructuralpower, and no actor can overcomemore resistance (use more power) intransactions than another actor. The theorypredictsthat withina "unilateralmonopoly,"the exchange ratioin each relationwillchangelongitudinally o the favor of anactorwith po-sitionalpoweradvantage.However,thetheoryargues that within a "social circle" the ex-change ratio-in each relation will stabilize atterms which favoreach actorequallyacross alongitudinal series of transactions. Thatstructural oweradvantage an andwilltend tobe used in exchangehas been empirically up-

3 Stolte and Emerson(1977) refer to a single re-source network as an "intra-category"exchangestructure, in contrast to an "inter-category"ex-change network n which unitsof differentresourcedimensions(e.g., labor and pay) are exchanged.

4 An exchangenetwork,by definition,consists of"connected" exchange relations. Two "exchangerelationsareconnectedif thefrequency,probability,or magnitude f exchangein one is contingent-uponexchange in the other" (Stolte and Emerson,1977:123).A positive connection implies that ex-change none relationwill increasewithexchange nanotherrelation,while a negativeconnection mpliesthatexchangein one relationwill decreasewithex-change n anotherrelation.-The resentdiscussion islimited to negativelyconnected relations in intra-categoryexchange networks(see footnote 3).


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334 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEWported (Stolte and Emerson, 1977;Cook andEmerson, 1978).This social exchange formulationof posi-tional power and stratificationis explicitlystructural in character.5 By careful design, ituses behavioraland sociologicalprinciplestounderstandsocial processes in complex ex-changenetworks(Emerson,1976).As a result,the formulation by itself tells us virtuallynothing about processes of "cognition,""awareness," or, more generally, "knowl-edge" and its role in networks of social ex-change.6Clearly,however, if we are to beginto understand herelationshipbetweenthe selfand legitimation,which necessarilyimplicates"ideologicalfactors,"the cognitiveaspects ofexchangein networksmust be dealt with ex-plicitly. A step in this directioninvolves thejudiciousincorporation f conceptsand princi-ples drawnfrom researchon negotiation.In Emerson's heory,anexchangerelation sa longitudinal eries of "transactions" hroughwhichunitsof a valuedresource (suchas socialsupport)areexchanged.Buta transactionwilloften entail more thana finalarrangementorresourceexchange.It will frequently nvolveadynamicset of actions and reactions, "socialnegotiation," hroughwhich the specific termsof exchangecome to be settled. For example,the terms surroundinga request for and theprovisionof afavor, its nature,its timing,etc.,are mattersto be raisedand settled beforethetransaction s complete.Social NegotiationSome researchhas focused directlyon cogni-tive processes in social exchangeandnegotia-tion. Thus, "bargaining"has been concep-tualizedas a communicationprocess throughwhich meanings are built, modified, andtransmittedacross time (Ikl&,1973).Though twouldbe misleading o overemphasize he de-liberateness of the calculation in social ex-changeandnegotiation, t is heuristic o "beginwith the premisethat humanactors have per-ceptions of objects and events in their envi-

ronment, . . . [and] . . . that these perceptionsare orderedby the actorsto forma subjectivelymeaningfulcontext in which intelligentactionis possible" (Singelmann,1972:517).mportantfeatures of an exchange relationand the net-work as a whole are constructedthroughandconstrainedby the individualand collectivecognitivecontentthat emergesin social negoti-ation and exchange.7The self-conceptis a centralcognitiveentityoperating n negotiationandexchange,and, asDellaFave (1980)haspersuasivelyargued, t iscrucial for understanding he legitimationofstructuralinequality. But a third line of re-searchmustbe considered to clarifythe linksamong exchangestructural nequality,negoti-ation, and the self, as relatedto legitimation.Self-Efficacy: Cognition In Social LearningAn individualacts not on the basis of a single,broad "self-evaluation"process, but ratheronthe basisof differentself-dimensions temmingfrom differentsources. Self-efficacy is a dis-tinct aspectof the self andmust be demarcatedfrom other aspects such as self-esteem.Relevantbecause it pertainsto perceptionsof resourcecontrol, self-efficacyis the extentto which a person perceives him/herselfablesuccessfully to produce rewarding action-outcomes within a specified action domain.Bandura(1977)formulatesa cognitive sociallearningtheory aroundthis concept and dis-cusses several of its sources. Among these,

5 "Structural"s opposedhere to "voluntaristic."The power-use principlesays that the actions of in-dividualswill be governed generallyby structuraldeterminants implicit in a surroundingexchangestructure.While such voluntaristic vents as an ac-tor's beliefs, intentions, and personalitytraits mayoccasionally affect the deliberateuse or nonuse ofpower, the principlerests on underlyingstructuraldeterminantsoften unseen or only dimly seen byactors.6 While Emerson,with deliberatecare, chose notto include cognitive processes, nowhere does heargue that such processes must be excluded (Emer-son, 1972:87).

7Relevant to this pointis a basiccomplementaritybetween symbolicinteraction heory and social ex-change theory, recently recognizedand promoted:"Commonalities re frequentlyhiddenby differencein language. Yet there are affinities between ex-change theoryandsymbolicinteraction heorybothin the sense of havingsome of the same intellectualforebearsandin the sense of buildingwith compara-ble underlying ideas and concepts" (Stryker,1977:156).Also, many contributions llustratebroadlinkages between these two theoretical schools.Goode (1960)uses the concept of "rolebargaining"to analyzerole-conflictresolution.Scheff(1968)ex-amines the process of reality negotiation n the psy-chiatric interview. Goslin (1969) integratesdiversebodies of socializationtheory and research,using"role negotiation" as a key organizing concept.Weinstein (1969)borrowsconcepts from exchangetheory and symbolic interactiontheory to analyze"identitybargaining."Harr6and Secord(1972)sug-gest, intheirethogenic ramework,hatsocialrealityis constructedthroughnegotiation. Strauss (1978)developsa negotiatedorderapproach o the studyofformalorganizations.McCallandSimmons 1978:16)examinehow personsnegotiateidentitiesand allo-cate "life resources" among"associates, activities,times, and locales." An attemptto synthesize thetwo perspectives s providedby Singelmann 1972).


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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 335"direct feedback from performanceaccom-plishments" s consideredthe most important.The theoryconcernsthe relationshipbetweena personand a specifiedactiondomain,e.g., aneducationalsetting,a worksetting,a marriageand family setting,a recreational etting,etc. Ifs/he acts instrumentallyo solve a problemoraccomplisha task withinthat domain,action-contingent eedbacksignifyingsuccess or fail-ure willresult.S/he mightstudyand get a goodor poorgrade,mightexpendeffortat work andachieve high or low praise, etc. If, across aseries of such instrumental cts, the feedbacksignals increasingsuccess, the person's self-efficacy with reference to that domainwill in-crease. If, on the other hand, the feedbacksignalsa steady lack of success, the person'sself-efficacy with respect to the domain willdecrease. If a person's currentlevel of self-efficacy is high,s/he will tendactivelyto initi-ate and persist in adaptive, problem-orientedactions despite obstacles, failures,and short-term setbacks. If self-efficacyis low, s/he willaccept his/her incompetencewith respect tothe problemdomain,willbecome apatheticandpassive, will stop expendingproblem-solvingefforts in that domain.Linking elf-efficacy,socialnegotiation,andexchangestructural nequalitycan clarify im-portant aspects of the self-evaluationargu-ment. An actor's positionin an exchangenet-workdetermineshis/herrelativepower,which,in turn, determineshow favorablehis/herex--changeratiowill become acrosstime. Anactorwith positionaladvantagewilltendto negotiateanincreasinglyavorableexchangeratio,whilean actor with a positional disadvantagewilltend to settle for one which is increasinglyun-favorable.Besides being a vehicle for resource ex-change, social negotiationunderliesthe con-struction, use, and disseminationof knowl-edge. Power and stratificationare amongthenetworkconditionsthat become known withvaryinglevels of clarity and accuracy. Often(perhapsmost of the time) the knowledgeac-tors have about such conditions is implicit,vague.The valid facts of structuralnequality,its extentandcauses, are typicallyunclearanddistorted. However, an actor, usually in-terested to know such facts as clearlyas possi-ble, will form and test hypotheses with frag-ments of information btained throughnegoti-ation.Anobjectof specialconcern,aboutwhich anactorhas considerableknowledge,is the self.An important ource of self-knowledge s thepatternof changes in the exchange ratio s/heachieves through transactions negotiated invarious networks. If, in a given network, anactor has a positionalpower advantage,and

thus regularlynegotiatesa favorableexchangeratio, s/he will develop high self-efficacy nthatsetting. However, if an actor has a positionalpower disadvantageand repeatedlynegotiatesan unfavorable exchange ratio, s/he will de-velop low self-efficacy in that exchange con-text.Following Della Fave's reasoning,stratifica-tion in an exchange network and resultingself-efficacy perceptionsare likely to lead ac-tors to form beliefs about the fairnessof therelative terms of exchange. One who achieveshigh self-efficacy will come to judge his/herown relativelymore favorableexchangeratioas right and reasonable. Likewise, one whoachieves low self-efficacy will come to judgehis/her own relatively less favorable terms ofexchangeas legitimate.HYPOTHESESThe argument, as reformulatedhere, can beempiricallyassessed by testing the followinghypotheses:'Withina specifiedexchangenetworksituation:

(1) The extent to which an exchange ratiocomes to favor an actor will be directlyproportionalo that actor's relativeposi-tionalpower.(2) The level of self-efficacy an actorachieves through negotiation across aseries of transactions will be directlyproportionalo that actor's relativepo-sitionalpower.(3) The perceptionsof fairness an actorhaswith referenceto his/her exchangeratiowill not vary with that actor's relativepositional power.

AN EXPERIMENTALTEST OF THEHYPOTHESESSubjectsThirty-six 4-person exchange networks (N =144)wereformed,allparticipantsWeingemalecollege studentsrecruited at a large midwest-ernuniversity.A uniform ee of $3.50waspaidto each subject, plus an additionalamountvarying between $1.00 and $1.50 which waspaid for "profit points" negotiated during anexperimentalsession.An Experimental SessionFoursubjectsarrivedat an interaction abora-tory and, without meeting one another face-to-face, were ushered individually nto sepa-raterooms. Eachpersonwas seated at a deskon which was found: (a) a push-button ele-phone (intercom), (b) an experimentalclock,


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336 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW(c) a packageof experimentalforms ("profitschedules"),and (d) a set of detailedwritteninstructions describing a negotiation task.Eachsubjecthadtelephoneaccess to the threeother subjects. As coordinatedby the exper-imental clock, an interpersonalnegotiationsession began. The basic task was for eachsubject to initiatecontact with or wait to becontactedby any one of the three other sub-jects at a time duringeach of a longitudinalseriesof "transactionperiods."Duringa givenperiod, though numerous contacts could bemadewith other subjects, only one exchangeagreement ould be made. Eachsubjecthadahypothetical resource, and during a givencontact subjects attempted to negotiate anagreementto exchange different amounts oftheirrespectiveresources. Duringa given pe-riod,each pairof subjectscould settle on anyone of sixty-six possible, fixed-quantityex-change agreements. A different number ofprofitpointswas associatedwitheach possibleagreement.The amountof profitthatcould bemade by one subjectwas negativelycorrelatedwith the amount hatcould be madeby anothersubject. Subjects were encouraged tomaximize their negotiated profit by makingoffersandcounteroffers nd by usingany otherpersuasivetactics that promisedto be effec-tive. Eachsubjecthad access only to her ownprofitschedules, andshe knew for certainonlythe profit she would make from variousagreements. Subjects were sensitized to theprobable use of deceptive tactics by othersubjects. Data showing a series of resourcetransactions between each pair of subjectsacross the longitudinal negotiation sessionwere recorded. A session was divided intothree 30-minute egmentspunctuatedby briefrest breaks. Each segmentwas dividedinto 11transactionperiods, each lasting2.5 minutes.Subsequentto the negotiations,each subjectfilled out a postexperimentalquestionnaire.The Manipulation of Positional PowerThrough prearrangementf the experimentalprofit schedules, it was possible to establisheither of two kinds of exchangerelationsbe-tween pairsof subjects.A relationof extendedprofitoverlap permitted13profitpoints to bedistributedvariously between persons in atransaction, dependingupon which exchangeagreementwas negotiated.One subjectmightmakethe maximum f 12points,andthe othersubjectmightmakethe minimum f 1point.Ortwo subjectsmightnegotiatean agreementre-sulting in a more equal distributionof profitpoints, e.g., 6 for one and 7 for the other. Arelation of short profit overlap, on the otherhand,permitted hedistribution f only3 profit

points in a given transaction,and a subjectcould make either 1 or 2 points, dependingupon the agreementnegotiated.These proceduresallowedthe experimentaloperationalization f the essential features ofthe "unilateralmonopoly"andthe "closed so-cial circle" exchange networks depicted inFigures 1-A and 1-B. For the "unilateralmonopoly,"profitscheduleswereconstructedso that one subject (Al in Figure 1-A) waslinkedto three subjects nrelationsof extendedprofitoverlap,whileeach of these others (A2,A3, and A4 in Figure 1-A) was linked in arelationof extendedprofitoverlapto only oneperson(Al). Subjectsin positionsA2, A3,andA, were linkedto one anotherin relationsofshort profitoverlap.The subjectat positionAlin this kind of exchange structurethus has apositionalpoweradvantage nnegotiationsrel-ative to the other subjects. In the "closed so-cial circle" network, profit schedules wereconstructedso thatsubjects(B,, B2,B3,andB4in Figure 1-B) were linkedto one anotherinrelationsof extendedprofitoverlap.Subjects,in this kindof structure hereforedo not differinrelativepositionalpower.8All subjectswererandomlyassignedto positions in 18 "unilat-eral monopoly"structuresand 18"closed so-cial circle"structures stablished or thestudy.

No subject "knew" the objective shape ofthe network o which shewas assigned,nordidshe know anythingat theoutset abouther rela-tive positionalpower. However,a subjectwasable to discover during he processof negotia-tionvarioussubtle interpersonaleaturesof herpositionalpower as it influencedthe processand the outcome of negotiation.Dependent VariablesOnedependentvariablewas the relativetermsof exchange (the "exchangeratio")a subjectnegotiated. A subject's average number ofprofitpoints was used as an indicator.Duringthe longitudinalprocessof negotiation, he ex-change agreements reached and the profitpoints negotiatedduringeach transactionpe-riodwere recorded oreach subject.The meannumberof profitpoints achievedper transac-

8 The exchange-negotiation networks opera-tionalizedhere, in contrast to the communicationnetworks studied by Bavelas (1968) and others,entaila "mixed-native"ask, where each actorpur-sues his/her self-interest,and where each pair ofactors is linked both cooperativelyand competi-tively. For eitherparty to benefit ("makea profit")some cooperativeagreementmustbe negotiated.Butparties face conflictful competition, because theamount of benefit ("profit")achieved by one isnegatively correlated with that achieved by theother.


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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 337tion was calculatedfor subjectsin all relationsof extendedprofit overlap.Averageprofitwascalculated separately for each of the threenegotiationsegmentstaken singly, and acrossthe three segments taken as a whole.

A seconddependentvariablewas the level ofa subject's perceived self-efficacy. FollowingFranksandMarolla 1976),thepotencydimen-sionof the semanticdifferentialOsgoodet al.,1957)was used as an indicator.After the finaltransactionperiod, each subject answeredapostexperimentalquestionnaire n which "myself in the experiment"was listed as a conceptto be ratedon a series of semanticdifferentialscales. On each of a set of bipolaradjectivescales (e.g., "weak-strong," "delicate-rugged,"etc.), a subjectchecked one of sevenspaces. An average self-efficacy (potency)score was computedfrom the responseseachsubject made to the separate scales. Themaximum core was7 andthe minimumwas 1,and higherscores implya higherlevel of per-ceived self-efficacy.A third dependentvariable was a subject'sjudgmentof the fairnessof her own terms ofexchange. Semantic differential procedureswere used to construct an indicator. In thepostexperimental uestionnaire,"myown totallevel of profit"was listed as a concept to beratedon a set of bipolaradjectivescales con-sisting of "fair-unfair" and "inequitable-equitable."An averagejudged fairness scorewas computed rom the responseseachsubjectmade to the separate scales. The maximumscorewas 7 and theminimumwas 1, andhigherscores imply higher evels of fairness imputedby subjects to the terms of exchange eachnegotiated.9AnalysisDatadescribing ubjects ocated atpositionA1,andpositionsA2,A3,andA4in the "unilateralmonopoly"networksas well as datadescribingsubjects at B1 in the closed social circle net-works were used in the analysis. Regressiontechniques (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973)were appliedto test the hypotheses. The ma-

9 The use of semantic differentialprocedurestoscale"fairness"s not an ideal solution.The reliabil-ity of such a measure s not known. However,suchprocedureshavestrong acevalidity nthe contextoftheproblembeing investigated,andI am awareof noalternativewell-testedprocedures or measuringheperceived fairness of an experimental exchangeratio.Traditionally, quity has been conceptualizedand operationalizedin terms of objective input/outputratios. Whatever he valueof this traditionalobjectiveapproacho measuring quity,itwill not dofor studyingfairness as it relates to subjectivelysensed legitimacy.

nipulated positional power variable wasdummy coded in two ways: one procedureprovided a within-structure comparison, wherethe A, position (N = 18) was coded 1 and theother positions (A2, A3, and A4) (N = 54) weregrouped and coded 0; a second dummy codingprocedure provided a between-structure com-parison, where position A, in the "unilateralmonopoly" (N = 18) was coded 1, and positionB1 in the "closed social circle" (N = 18) wascoded 0. When relative mean profit was re-gressed on positional power, the dummy cod-ing procedure reflecting between-network dif-ferences was used, because within-networkdifferences in profit level are not statisticallyindependent (i.e., one subject's profit fixeswhat the other can achieve). However, whenthe analysis focused on perceptions of self-efficacy and fairness, which are statisticallyindependent within networks, the dummycoding procedure showing within-networkcomparisons was used.'0Results: Effect of Relative Positional Power onTerms of ExchangeThe data displayed in Table 1 support the firsthypothesis, which predicted that the extent towhich the terms of exchange will favor an actoris directly proportional to that actor's relativepositional power. Relevant to this prediction isthe comparison of the mean profit levelsnegotiated by subjects at position A, in the"unilateral monopoly" network with the meanlevel of profit negotiated by subjects in posi-tions A2, A3, and A4 in the same structure. Asshown in Table 1, for the negotiation segmentstaken singly' and taken together, the meanprofit achieved per transaction by subjects atposition A, was higher than that achieved bysubjects at positions A2, A3, and A4. Whilethese mean profit levels are not statisticallyindependent, each was shown to depart signifi-cantly (by a single-sample t-test) from the ex-pected value (6.5), under the assumption of nodifference. Thus, the within-network datashow a consistent, marked effect of relative

10 Explicitknowledgeof relativeexchange ratioswas also manipulated. nhalf the networks,subjectswere providedwith information bout the exchangeratios that were actuallynegotiatedrightafter thenegotiationsand before they filled out the postex-perimental questionnaire. Analysis showed thatknowledgehad small(mainand interaction) ffects.In general, knowledge simply confirmedwhat thesubjects alreadystronglysuspectedon the basis ofthe give-and-take f negotiation.Since the effectsofthis variableare tangential o the presentwork, theresultsof the analysis including t are not reportedhere. The results of that analysis are, however,availablefrom the authoron request.


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338 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWTable 1. Mean RelativeTerms of Exchange(Profit)by PositionalPower and Negotiation Segment

PositionsA2, A3, A4PositionAl in the in the Position B1in theUnilateralMonopoly UnilateralMonopoly Closed CircleRelative Terms (N = 18) (N = 54) (N = 18)of Exchange X SD X SD X SDFirstSegmentof Negotiation 8.46* 1.95 3.13 1.45 6.45** 1.53Second Segmentof Negotiation 9.18* 2.42 2.44 1.38 6.57** 1.25ThirdSegmentof Negotiation 9.13* 2.46 2.47 1.29 6.52** 1.16Across the ThreeSegmentsofNegotiation 8.89* 2.20 2.65 1.23 6.53** 1.16

* Different rom the expected value (6.5) under the assumptionof no differenceby single-sample -test(p < .01).** Not significantlydifferent rom expected value (6.5).positional power.on the relative terms of ex-change negotiatedby subjects.Otherdata shownin Table 1and data shownin Table 3 are also relevant to Hypothesis 1.Table 1 contrasts the average profit levelachieved by subjects at position A1 in the"unilateralmonopoly"with that achieved bysubjects at position B1 in the "closed socialcircle." For eachnegotiationsegment,and forthe segmentstaken as a whole, subjectsat po-sitionA1negotiateda meanprofit evel signifi-cantly higherthanthat negotiated by subjectsin position B1. Thus, the between-networkcomparisonsalso support he first hypothesis.Bivariate regressions were calculatedto de-termine he magnitude f the effect. As Table 3shows, positionaccounts for between26 and33percentof the variance nprofit evel acrossthe three segments of negotiation. Again,thedatashow the expectedeffect of relativeposi-tionalpowerontherelativetermsof exchange.Results: Effects of Positional Power onSelf-Efficacy Perceptions and Judged Fairnessof Own Terms of ExchangeThe second hypothesis predicted hat the levelof self-efficacy an actor achieves throughnegotiationacross a series of transactionswillbe directly proportional o thatactor'srelativepositional power. As indicated in Table 2,subjects located in positionA, in the "unilat-

eralmonopoly:'hada higher evel of perceivedself-efficacy(X = 5.15) than subjects ocatedinpositions A2, A3, andA4 in that structure X =4.33). Further, he regressionresults displayedin Table 3 show'that positional power had asignificant effect on self-efficacy perceptions,as predicted,and that position accounts for10percentof the variancein those perceptions.The third hypothesis predicted that a sub-ject's perceptions of the fairness of her ownterms of exchange (negotiatedexchangeratio)would not vary withthat actor's relative posi-tional power. The data presentedin Tables 2and3 are clearlycontrary o this expectation.As Table 2 shows, subjects in position Aljudged the fairnessof their own terms of ex-change to be higher (X = 5.52) than did sub-jects inpositionA2,A3,andA4 (X = 4.55).Theregression data presentedin Table 3 show thedifference to be significant, with positionalpower accountingfor 10 percent of the vari-ance ina subject'sperceptionsof fairness.Theresults are clear. Hypothesisthree is not sup-ported.CONCLUSIONSWhile the resultsdo not supportthe reformu-lated self-evaluationargument, hey stimulatefurther hinkingwhichcan shed additionalighton the topic at issue and lay a basis for futureresearch. An account of the data must ac-

Table 2. MeanPerceivedSelf-EfficacyandJudgedFairnessof OwnTermsof Exchangeby PositionalPowerPositionAl in the Unilateral Positions A2, A3, A4 in theMonopoly (N = 18) Unilateral Monopoly (N = 54)X SD X SD

Perceived Self-Efficacy 5.15 .88 4.33 1.12JudgedFairness of OwnTerms of Exchange 5.52 1.11 4.55 1.34


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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 339Table 3. Regressionsof RelativeTermsof Exchange,PerceivedSelf-Efficacy,andJudgedFairnessof OwnTerms of Exchangeon PositionalPower

Metric StandardizedRelativeTerms Coefficient Coefficientof Exchange b B d/f F r2FirstSegment 2.56 .51 1/34 11.86** .26SecondSegment 3.33 .57 1/34 16.55*** .33ThirdSegment . 3.49 .57 1/34 16.52*** .33Across All Segments 3.83 .57 1/34 16.66** .33PerceivedSelf-Efficacy .90 .38 1/70 7.90** .10JudgedFairness of OwnTerms of Exchange .89 .30 1/70 7.65** .10

* p < .05.** p < .01.*** p < .001.

knowledge limitationsin the study reportedhere. Some importanteatures of everydayso-cial stratificationwerenotadequatelycapturedin the experiment. However, it will be in-structiveto interpret he findings, with a keeneye to the contrastbetweentheexperimentandthe worldbeyondthe laboratory.First, a theory by Kimberly (1977) helpsmake sense of the findings.This formulationsconcerned, npart,with a person'sreactions oinconsistencies between the bases of stratifi-cation (positions, performances, skills, andmotivations) and the stratified structuresofprestige, power, and wealth. Cognitive con-sistencyand reward-costmechanismsare em-ployed to account for such reactions. Thesemechanismsdeterminewhat a person takestobe fair andlegitimatewith reference to his/herstatus in a stratified system. The theory as-sumes that a person will form, graduallyandacrosstime, a stableself-conceptionof ability.If s/he becomes situatedin a position that isinconsistentwithhis/herself-conceivedability,the net reward evel ("reward-costoutcome")obtainedthroughactions in that positionwillbe out-of-linewith his/her customaryand ex-pected net reward level ("CL, comparisonlevel"). Thefelt inconsistencywill lead the in-dividual ojudgethe reward-costoutcome s/heobtainsas unfair.It is likely that the student subjects in theexperiment had relatively high, stable self-conceptions of negotiating ability. Whenplaced in disadvantaged positions, theynegotiatedexchangeratios ("reward-costout-comes")below their"CL's," and consequentlyjudgedtheirreward evels as unfair.Kimberly'sheory suggests that anindividu-al's self-concepthas a fundamental mpactonhis/her reactionsto stratification.This notionwas not adequately ncorporatedn the refor-mulationorexperiment.A person'sexperienceof inequality s examinedagainst expectationsformed in the past and broughtinto the im-mediate situation. The "higher" processes of

self-conceived abilities or expected rewardrights go beyond self-efficacy perceptions,which are bound to an immediatesocial situa-tion. As Kimberlydoes, it is necessary to ask:What meaning is placed by the person on his!her personal experiences of stratification?'"While Kimberly uses cognitive consistencytheory to answer this question, one might al-ternatively use causal attribution heory (Kel-ley, 1967). Suppose a person locatedin a posi-tion of structuraldisadvantage negotiates anunfavorable exchange ratio and forms lowself-efficacyperceptions.If s/hewereto attrib-ute these personalfacts to the self, s/he mightwell accept them as legitimate and fair. Evi-dently, the disadvantaged ubjects in the pres-ent experiment attributed heir relative depri-vation to the surrounding tructure nsteadofthemselves, and thus did not accept it aslegitimateandfair. The reformulation mittedthe vital process throughwhich an individualexplains the causes of his/her exchange ratioand perceived self-efficacy in a stratifiedstructure. n future research, procedures o in-duce disadvantaged ubjectsto attribute heirrelative deprivationo themselvesmightbe de-vised, and the effects on the judged fairness ofexchangeratios mightbe monitored.Using the attributionperspective,it is intri-guing to ask: What conditions probablyobtainin real social life to induce a disadvantagedindividual to attribute relative deprivationto

I Besides Kimberly'swork, the "status value"approach o justice (Bergeret al., 1972)and equity(Cook, 1975)are suggestivefor furtherresearchonlegitimation.Also, Psathasand Stryker(1965)andStryker 1972)havenotedthat a subjectwill enteranexperimental ituationwith a socializedpredisposi-tion to "make sense of' the situation. S/he will"read"cues andinfermeaningswith reference o theexperimenter, he instructions,and the interaction,beingparticularlyensitiveto signsof unequalpowerand status. Such inequalitieswill be judgedagainst"normsof equity" mportedby subjects ntothe situ-ation. Subjectstypicallyexpect equal payoffs.


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340 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEWhimself/herselfand thus accept it as rightandreasonable?Partof the answer may lie in theclass-related socialization experiences thatpersons have across the lifecycle (Rosenberg,1979; Stolte, 1978). Such experiences mayshape "attributional styles" (Ickes andLaydon, 1978),such that some persons, as amatter of individualbent, come to attributerelative deprivation to the self, while otherscome to attributet "to the system" (or anotherexternal source). The "disadvantaged"sub-jects in the present study, most of whomcamefrom middle-class backgrounds, might havereacted to the experimental deprivation interms of a class-related attribution style,locatingits cause not in themselvesbut in thesurrounding ituation.

Also relevant to attributiontheory, a per-son's knowledgeof everydayinequalitydiffersfromthe knowledge subjectshadof inequalityin the experiment.One'sgraspof society-widestratification is typically unclear, vague,whereas a subject's graspof the experimentalstratificationtructurewas probably learer.Inthe everydaycontext, one mightwell act as a'naive scientist"formingand testing hypothe-ses. However, informationis frequently ab-sent, or is so complex, that incorrect infer-ences, distorted causal attributions esult. At-tribution heorycandisclosemuchabout"falseconsciousness." Because knowledge hasboundaries McCalland Simmons, 1978),andaperson tends to live in "consonantcontexts"(Rosenberg, 1979), s/he has only limited,biased "data"uponwhichto base attributions.A disadvantagedndividualneverydaysocietymight overestimate the accomplishmentsofhighstatus persons and underestimatehis/herown potential,thus acceptingrelative depriva-tion as fair and legitimate.Finally, symbolic interaction theory(Stryker, 1980) s a frameworkwell-suitedforexplaininghow a person places meaningonpersonalexperiences of stratification.Addedinsightsinto the presentfindingsemergeespe-cially from Strykerand Gottlieb's(1981)con-trast between attribution heory and symbolicinteraction heory.The two perspectivessharea concernwiththe "meaningof meaning,"ad-dressingthe same basic question:"Whatis itthat peopleseek to infer,analyze, andinterpretas they carry on their everyday lives?"(Strykerand Gottlieb, 1981:440)The perspec-tives differ, however, in how they frame an-swers to this question.For attributionheory,meaningderives from inferences abouta hard,objectiverealitywhich is "out there"in a fac-tual sense. For symbolic interactiontheory,meaning "is neither inferred nor externallypredetermined;t is negotiated"(StrykerandGottlieb, 1981:447).Further, within certain

versions of symbolic interaction theory, themeanings(e.g., identities)negotiatedare par-tially determined by external structuralcon-straints. That is, the surroundingcontext, inwhich the interaction s embedded,partly de-termines the resources (e.g., the priormean-ings, identities, roles, vocabulariesof motive)at the disposalof those who negotiate.Thepresentstudy,though ramed ntermsofsocial exchange theory, can be reconsideredfrom this symbolic interactionistperspective(see footnote 7), because symbolicinteractiontheory andsocialexchange theoryconvergeonthe notion of "negotiation." The explicit taskfaced by the experimental subjects was tonegotiateresourceexchanges, and the proce-dures were limited to recordingsuch negotia-tions. It is probable,however,that thesubjectsalsoengaged nsubtle,"higher-order"meaningnegotiations.Though not monitored,varioussymbolicactions and reactions wereprobablyoccurring.Subjectsprobably presentedthem-selves strategically, used altercasting, ac-counts, and disclaimers, attempting tonegotiate favorable exchange ratios. Con-formingwith the "definitionof the situation,"subjects fulfilled the situational role-requirements prescribing self-interested, ra-tional bargaining behavior. Negotiated ex-changeratiosand sensedself-efficacyprobablywere symbolicobjects. Following Della Fave,the kindof meaningone wouldhave expectedsubjectsto attach to these objects of negotia-tion experience is clear: a disadvantaged ub-ject would have been expected to infer a self-identity congruent with her positionalpowerand thusacceptherrelativedeprivationas fairand legitimate.However, as the datasuggest,the subjectsapparentlydid not construe them-selves in this way, forthey did notaccepttheircircumstancesas fair.Again, contrastingthe experimentwith thereal world of inequalitys useful.Subjectswereprobablybetterable to resist a definitionof selfas inferior,implied by the experiment,than isoften possible in real-life inequalitycontexts(Stryker and Gottlieb, 1981:450).While theoutcomes of resource negotiationswere de-terminedstructurallyor the subjects,the out-comes .ofmeaningnegotiationsevidentlywerenot thus determined. Two importantqualitiescharacterizing real-life inequality were notadequatelyrealizedin the experiment: a) highsignificance of others, and (b) a well-formulated,consensualdefinitionof the situa-tion prescribingandjustifying inequalitiesinexchangeratios.Society-widestratificationdi-rectly experiencedby personsin everydaylifeis often surrounded with collectively con-structed, widely shared definitions, whichoftenexplainandjustify privilegeanddepriva-


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THE LEGITIMATIONOF STRUCTURALINEQUALITY 341tion, high and low self-efficacy. In many in-stances such definitionsconstitute"falsecon-sciousness" but are frequently accepted as"reasonable"and"objectivelyaccurate,"par-ticularlywhensharedandvoicedby significantothers. Symbolic interactionistshave under-scored "consensualvalidation" Stryker,1980)as a motivationalbasis for acceptingviews ofself heldbyothers.12Ifanexperimentalubjectwould have encountereda definitionsharedandvoiced by significantothers,justifyingherrelative deprivation,she mightwell have ac-cepted her circumstances as legitimate andfair. However, the significanceof the exper-imental others is questionable,given the adhoc, short-termrelationshipsentailed. Also,there was no consensualdefinitionprescribingandjustifyingunequalexchangeratios. In fu-ture experimental work, significant others(e.g., familymembers,friends)mightserve assubjects, anddefinitionsof inequalitymightbemanipulatedperhapsby using confederates).Effects on the judged fairness of exchangeratios could then be measured.In sum, Kimberly'swork emphasizesan en-duringself and consistencies (or inconsisten-cies) amongpast andpresentinequality xperi-ences. Attribution heory also focuses on theself (an acquiredattribution tyle), notingtheimportanceof one's knowledgebase for attri-butions about inequality.Symbolicinteractiontheory stresses meaning negotiationand defi-nitions, constructed n concertwithsignificantothers, that shapeone's self-conceptwith ref-erence to inequality.Thoughsimilarin theirconcern with "higher-order"socio-cognitiveprocesses, these frameworksdiffer in manyways. At this stage, a choice amongthem isneitherpossiblenor desirable.It is likelythat anewperspectivecombining nsights romtheseapproacheswill be necessary to advanceourunderstanding f how stratifiedstructuresbe-come legitimated.REFERENCESBandura,Albert1977 "Self-efficacy: oward a unifying heoryofbehavioral hange."PsychologicalReview84:191-95.Bavelas, Alex1968 "Communication atternsin task-orientedgroups."Pp. 503-11 in DorwinCartwright

and AlvinZander eds.), GroupDynamics.New York:Harper& Row.

Berm,Daryl1967 "Self-perception: n alternative nterpreta-tion of cognitive dissonancephenomena."PsychologicalReview 74:183-200.Berger, Joseph, MorrisZelditch,Bo AndersonandBernardCohen1972 "Structural spects of distributiveustice:astatus value formulation."Pp. 119-46 inJoseph Berge'r,Morris Zelditch, and BoAnderson (eds.), SociologicalTheories inProgress, Vol. 2. Boston: HoughtonMifflin.Cook, Karen1975 "Expectations, evaluations, and equity."AmericanSociologicalReview 40:372-88.Cook, Karen and RichardEmerson1978 "Power, equity, and commitmentin ex-change networks." American SociologicalReview43:721-39.

Della Fave, Richard1980 "The meek shall not inherit he earth:self-evaluationand the legitimacyof stratifica-tion." American Sociological Review45:955-71.Emerson, Richard1972 "Exchange theory Parts I and II." Pp.38-87 in Joseph Berger, MorrisZelditch,and Bo Anderson (eds.), SociologicalTheories in Progress, Vol. 2. Boston:HoughtonMifflin.1976 "Social exchange theory." AnnualReviewof Sociology2:335-62.Franks,David andJosephMorolla1976 "Efficaciousaction and social approvalasinteracting dimensions of self-esteem."Sociometry39:324-41.Goffman,Erving1961 Asylums. New York: Doubleday.Goode, William1960 "A theory of role-strain." AmericanSociologicalReview 25:483-96.Goslin, David1969 "Introduction."Pp. 1-21 in David Goslin(ed.), Handbook of SocializationTheoryand Research. Chicago:RandMcNally.Harr6, Romand Paul Secord1972 The Explanationof Social Behavior. To-tawa, NJ: Rowman& Littlefield.Ickes, Williamand MaryA. Layden1978 "Attribution styles." In John Harvey,William Ickes, and Robert Kidd (eds.),New Directions in AttributionResearch.Vol. 2. Hillsdale,NJ: Erlbaum.Ik1, Fred1973 "Bargainingndcommunication."n IthielDe Sola Pool and WilburSchramm eds-.),Handbook of Communication. Chicago:RandMcNally.Kelley, Harold1967 "Sttributionheory in social psychology."Pp. 192-240 in David Levine (ed.), Ne-braskaSymposiumon Motivation,Vol. 15.Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress.Kerlinger,Fredand ElazarPedhazur1973 Multiple Regression in Behavioral Re-search.New York:Holt, Rinehart& Win-ston.

12 One is reminded f Goffman's 1961)analysisofthe "moralcareerof the mentalpatient," n which aconsensualdefinition s constructed n a forming o-alition among"the complainant,""mediator,"and"next-of-relation,"raduallyconvincinga reluctantpatient-to-behat s/he is "mentally-ill."


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342 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEWKimberly,James1977 "Inconsistency among components ofstratification ndcognitiveconsistency andreward cost processes." Pp. 385-407 inRobert Hamblinand John Kunkel (eds:),Behavioral Theory in Sociology. New

Brunswick,NJ: Transaction.Marx, Karl1886 Capital, Volume One. Translated bySamuel Moore and EdwardAveling. NewYork: Humboldt.McCall, George and J. L. Simmons1978 IdentitiesandInteractions.Second edition.New York: Free Press.Mead, George H.1934 Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press.Mosca, Gaetano1939 The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill.Osgood, Charles, George Suci and Percy Tannen-baum1957 The Measurement f Meaning.Urbana,IL:Universityof IllinoisPress.Parsons, Talcott1949 "An analyticapproach o the theory of so-cial stratification."Pp. 69-88 in TalcottParsons (ed.), Essays in SociologicalTheory. New York:Free Press.Psathas, George and Sheldon Stryker1965 "Bargainingbehavior and orientationsincoalition formation." Sociometry28:124-44.Reck, Andrew(ed.)1964 G. H. Mead: Selected Writings. In-dianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.Rosenberg, Morris1979 Conceiving the Self. New York: BasicBooks.

Scheff, Thomas1968 "Negotiating eality:notes on power in theassessment of responsibility."Social Prob-lems 16:3-17.Singelmann,Peter1972 "Exchange as symbolic interaction."AmericanSociological Review 37:414-23.Stolte, Johnand RichardEmerson1977 "Structural nequality:position and powerin network structures." Pp. 117-38 inRobert Hamblinand John Kunkel (eds.),Behavioral Theory in Sociology. NewBrunswick,NJ: Transaction.Stolte, John1978 "Internalization: bargainingnetwork ap-proach."JournalFor the Theory of SocialBehavior8, 3:297-312.Strauss, Anselm1978 Negotiations. San Francisco:Jossey-Bass.

Stryker, Sheldon1972 "Coalition behavior." Pp. 338-80 inCharles McClintock (ed.), ExperimentalSocial Psychology. New York: Holt,Rinehart& Winston.1977 "Developments in two socialpsychologies."Sociometry40:145-60.1980 SymbolicInteractionism.Menlo Park, CA:Berjamin/Cummings.Stryker,Sheldon and Avi Gottlieb1981 "Attribution heory and symbolic interac-tionism:a comparison."Pp.425-58 inJohnHarvey, William Ickes, and Robert Kidd(eds.), New Directionsin AttributionRe-search. Vol. 3. Hillsdale,NJ: Erlbaum.Weinstein, Eugene1969 "The developmentof interpersonalcom-petence."Pp.753-75 in DavidGoslin(ed.),Handbookof SocializationTheoryand Re-search. Chicago:RandMcNally.

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