legislation and terrorism

8/9/2019 Legislation and Terrorism

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The Effects of Anti-Terrorism Legislation on Animal Rights

Radicalism

Final Paper

INTL650


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Introduction

In November of 2006, the federal government adopted the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act

(AETA) in an attempt to become more effective in the fight against a animal rights extremist groups like

the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Such groups were described as the highest domestic terrorism

investigative priority for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in May of 2004.1 The AETA was an

enhancement of earlier anti-terrorism legislation which was designed to increase the options available to

investigate and prosecute crimes federally and allow for enhanced penalties for those who target a wide

range of companies that use animals in their business. The intent of the legislation was to create a

significant enough set of disincentives that potential animal rights (AR) radicals2would refrain from their

criminal activities.

Reaction by the ALF, their supporters and other AR activists has generally been defiant. A

review of communiqus issued by ALF cells since the acts passage revealed that the AETA or those

prosecuted under it are routinely mentioned as inspirations for their actions. 3 In those cases along with

accompanying press releases, ALF members were defiant and claimed that legislation would not cause

them to cease their activities. Similarly, message boards and websites frequented by supporters of the

extremist animal rights movement dont reflect any significant discussion about giving up on their cause.

It is certainly possible that the radical AR community will view the AETA as another attempt by

government and industry to restrict freedoms and crush dissent. Research has indicated that for extremist

groups and gangs the main sources of gang cohesiveness are external to the gangs, and the police will

1 Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality, 108th Cong. 2004. Testimony of John E. Lewis. Retrieved 20 May 2010from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:98179.pdf2Regarding the terminology used throughout the paper I have tried to avoid using the word 'terrorist' given itspejoritive and legal implications. 'Activists' are assumed to include people who are involved in a wide range ofpolitical activity that need not, and indeed usually is not, illegal. 'Radicals' and 'extremists' should be assumed tothat subset of activists that engage, at least occasionally, in illegal activity.3 North American Animal Liberation Front Press Officehttp://www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/Communiques.htm (accessed 30 May 2010) Only actions which tookplace in the United States were considered in the review.

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often perform that function.4 If, therefore, law enforcement can not disrupt the ALF and similar

networks sufficiently for them to disintegrate, they could respond to increased attention by further

radicalizing and becoming more violent. In short, legislation and suppression efforts by law enforcement

might have the unintended consequence of making the animal rights radicals more violent and destructive

rather than less.

This paper will examine the hypothesis that legislative action like the AETA will make AR

radicals more violent and destructive rather than less. This escalation of violence will be the result of two

factors: the further radicalization of existing AR extremists through the perception that there are fewer

alternatives to direct action and the attractiveness of an increasingly demonized movement to individuals

psychologically predisposed to violent and destructive behavior regardless of its ideology.

Background

Animal rights radicals, insofar as they can be generalized about, see themselves as being one part

of a broad spectrum of activists designed to end what they term animal exploitation. Only through

applying a wide variety of tactics against different pressure points throughout society do AR radicals

believe they can achieve progress in their struggle. Lobbying, protesting, education and other legal forms

of activism by legitimate organizations have their role as do property destruction and releasing

(liberating in their terminology) captive animals.

Animal rights radicals that are the subject of this paper occupy that part of the animal movement

spectrum that includes illegal activities which can be divided into three general categories: property

damage, animal liberation and harassment. The aims of property damage (which ranges from graffiti to

arson) and animal liberation are to make a companys operations prohibitively expensive through costs

associated with replacing/repairing damaged equipment and animals, increased insurance premiums or

4 Tore Bjorgo, How Gangs Fall Apart: Processes of Transformation and Disintegration of Gangs Paper presentedat the 51st Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Toronto, Canada, November 1999.http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/How_Do_Violent_Youth_Gangs_Fall_Apart.pdf(accessed 30 May 2010)

3
http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/How_Do_Violent_Youth_Gangs_Fall_Apart.pdfhttp://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/How_Do_Violent_Youth_Gangs_Fall_Apart.pdf


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enhanced security procedures. Harassment on the other hand, which may include destruction of a targets

personal property, is designed to induce so much anxiety and fear in the target and her family that she

decides to sever her relationship with the company engaged in using animals.

The involvement of AR radicals in violent activity has been a matter of discussion, both within

the movement and among those studying it, for quite some time. One of the community's central tenets

is: To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human.5 Further, the

literature is filled with rejections of violent activity in general terms and distinguish themselves from

groups that advocate violent activity such as the Animal Rights Militia, Revolutionary Cells and Justice

Department (and operate almost exclusively in Europe) which they describe as ultra-radical groups.6

Countering their claims of non-violence, there have been a number of high profile extremists and

sympathizers who have advocated the need to escalate their activities and engage in physical violence.

Those who have recommended violent action include national level 'spokespeople' or activists who have

gained attention from the media. A psychological study of these individuals is beyond the scope of this

paper but would be helpful in identifying differences (if any) between them and average members.

Most 'active' AR radicals require secrecy and anonymity in order to be successful and its not at all clear

if sympathizers publicly proclaiming the need to consider using violent tactics are serving the needs of

their movement or addressing personal needs of self fulfillment.

Ultimately, the arguments in favor of the AR community committing violent activity dont seem

to resonate with rank and file members. Despite justifications from well known movement sympathizers,

it does not seem as if calls to commit violent activity, even if by well known AR advocates, are

particularly influential. There have been no significant acts of violence attributed by AR radicals in the

United States to date according to information from the National Counterterrorism Center7

despite calls

from self-proclaimed spokespeople offering encouragement. That may be because AR radicals generally

5 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) Frequently Asked Questions. http://www.hedweb.com/alffaq.htm (accessed 5 Jun10)6 Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II, Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Animal Liberation Front in Terroristsor Freedom Fighters ed. Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II (New York: Lantern) 2004.7http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html 12 Jun 10.

4
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seem to operate locally8 and may be unwilling to commit violence against people from their own

community or who, on some level, they can empathize with. It can also be that the AR radicals, more so

than their spokespeople, see value in and adhere to the dictum of non-violence which have remained

unchanged for well over a decade.9

It was within this environment of clandestine and illegal, yet non-violent activity that that AETA

was born. It attempted to close a perceived loophole by including economic damage within the definition

of terrorism.10 This designation has generated a great deal of controversy within the general AR

community appears to be based on the theory that AR radicals can be deterred through a cost benefit

analysis in which the threat of increased criminal penalties would outweigh any potential benefit of their

continued criminal activity.

Methodology

Despite events of the past nine years, research about terrorist motivation, organization and

dissolution remains scare and conflicting. The lack of suitable data becomes even more pronounced

when examining decentralized networks generally and animal rights groups specifically. Most efforts

thus far have either focused on radical Islamist groups, which are seen as the most significant terrorist

threat we face or harken back to Marxist inspired terrorist groups active in Europe from the 1960s to the

1980s as they are a relatively rich source of data for study. The report will attempt to circumvent that

potential obstacle by using two distinctly different sorts of data in its examination of the hypothesis.

First, there are two sets of quantitative data available for use. The Report to Congress on the

Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises was commissioned

8 Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal LiberationFront (ALF), 108th Congress 2005. Testimony of David Martosko. Exhibit 24. From:http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=2378269 Rachel Monaghan Animal Rights and Violent Protest Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9 No. 4 (Winter1997) pg. 106-1610 The FBI defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate orcoerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or socialobjectives." FBI Counterterrorism Policy and Guidelines. http://jackson.fbi.gov/cntrterr.htm(accessed 5 Jun 2010)

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by congress after the passage of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) in 1992. The act directed

the Attorney General to conduct a study on the extent and effects of domestic and international terrorism

on enterprises using animals for food or fiber production, agriculture, research, or testing11. Covering

animal rights extremism from 1977 until June 30, 1993 the writers of the report relied heavily upon

interviews with government and private agencies, industry trade organizations and law enforcement to

accumulate their statistical and anecdotal data. Only the final report was available for study so the

underlying data, when not displayed in the report, could not be independently validated or subjected to

additional analysis.

The second data set used was a database of animal rights activity collected by the Foundation for

Biomedical Research (FBR), an industry trade organization which lobbies for increased protection from

animal rights extremists.12 The FBR gathers its data from open sources and uses the internet as its

primary collection tool. While they claim to track illegal incidents as far back as 1981, their lack of

alternative collection tools means that trends and totals prior to the mid-90s (if not later) must be viewed

as partial at best. The accompanying report, in fact, remarks on a significant spike in illegal AR activity

after the mid-90s but its not at all clear if that truly reflects an increase of activity or just an increase in

reporting of AR activity by media, AR activists, law enforcement and others. Prior to the widespread use

of the internet, it is entirely likely that minor AR activities would have escaped the notice of the sources

the FBR used to gather their data. The FBR provided their entire data set of raw data for this study.

Unfortunately, after 2006 the FBR appears to have limited it's collection and dissemination of AR

activity to a very small number of websites. This has meant that their data from 2007 to the present has

11 U.S. Dept. of Justice,Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism onAnimal Enterprises , Oct 1993. pg.2. http://www.eskimo.com/~rarnold/doj_report.htm(accessed 30 May 2010).The Department of Justice used to maintain this report on their website but has since removed it and the report is nolonger available from the federal government.12 The FBR describe themselves in the following way: Established in 1981, the Foundation for BiomedicalResearch (FBR) is the nation's oldest and largest organization dedicated to improving human and veterinary healthby promoting public understanding and support for humane and responsible animal research. FBR is the leadingvoice of scientific reason and medical progress in the ongoing, sometimes violent debate that surrounds animalresearch. http://www.fbresearch.org/aboutfbr/tabid/423/default.aspx (accessed 30 May 2010)

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even less credibility than their earlier data-set. This underlies the hazards of policies designed to deter

and suppress the activities of AR activists: There simply is such a paucity of data that such policies are

little better than guesses.

Both sets of data, but particularly the FBR set, are likely to under represent the number of minor

criminal activities associated with AR extremism. Graffiti, vandalism and other forms of minor property

damage might not warrant an official report to law enforcement officials or a claim of responsibility and

therefore might not make it into either of these reports. This would have the effect of making it appear

that AR activists are more likely to commit serious crimes then they actually are. While the FBI claims to

have identified over 1200 incidents of animal rights/eco terrorism in the United States with an estimated

cost of over $200 million13 there is no publicly accessible database of all of those AR/ecoterrorism

incidents or cost estimates available.

One way to test the validity of the two data-sets is to compare them over the twelve years of

overlap (1981-1993) that they share. The initial results of such a comparison are not encouraging. The

1993 congressional report identified 307 incidents while the FBR report only lists 123. Throughout much

of the time period, there doesnt seem to be any correlation between the two data sets. Notable

exceptions are the first three years (1982-1984) and the last three (1991-1993) where incidents seem to be

moving in the same direction even if not always in the same proportions. Figure 1 shows the numbers of

incidents reported in each of the reports by year.

13 United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. A Second Hearing on Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) Hearing 26 Oct 2005. 108th

Congress http://www.furcommission.com/resource/SFresources/SHAChearing.pdf(accessed 30 May 2010)

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Fig 1. Comparison of Illegal Activity by Eco and Animal Rights Extremists (1982-1993)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

#

ofIncidents

Congressional Report

FBR

I assumed at this point that the discrepancy between the two reports was a reflection of the

congressional reports more complete coverage of minor AR incidents. Therefore, it was necessary to

compare the two reports according to the number of incidents that could be considered significant by

both studies14. The congressional report lists incidents where the direct costs were estimated to exceed

$10,000 in damages. The FBR report estimates damages in excess of $10,000 but its not clear if those

include only direct costs (repair and replacement of damaged equipment, clean up, etc.) or also includes

secondary costs (increased security, lost productivity, etc.). Despite these uncertainties, there does

appear to be a stronger correlation between these two data sets and those tracking all AR activities (see

Figure 2). The $10,000 limit is important since it was the threshold at which crimes could be punished

under the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992. Crimes that resulted in damages below that amount

had to be prosecuted under other criminal statutes.

14 Significant incidents will be defined throughout this paper as any criminal activity which is estimated to exceed$10,000 in damages.

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Fig. 2 Incidents in Excess of $10,000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

#

ofIncidents

Congressional Report

FBR

This would seem to add weight to the argument that AR incidents that cause significant amounts

of damage are easier to track both because it is more likely that there will be a claim of responsibility

(making attribution easier) and also mare likely to be reported through the media, law enforcement and

other outlets. Since the FBR data seems to track serious AR related incidents in proportion with the

official data from the U.S. Department of Justice for the years 1982-1993, this report assumes that the

FBR data will similarly reflect such events accurately from 1993-2006.

I hypothesized that the higher rate of reporting of high cost incidents on the part of the FBR is the

result of their including of secondary costs in their damage estimates. It should be kept in mind that the

FBR is a pro-industry group and therefore has a vested interest in depicting the threat by AR groups

against their industry a grave as possible. One of their goals is to lobby governmental agencies for stricter

punishments against those who might interfere with the industry's business interests. Therefore, FBR data

9


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should be considered a high end estimate of illegal AR activity but there's no reason to think the general

trends of activity they track would be altered by self interest.

While very little time has passed since the adoption of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, hints

regarding its effect on AR extremist activity may be uncovered by examining trends of such activity after

the passage of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act in 1992. This report will therefore look at incidents

attributed to AR extremists since the AEPA came into effect as well as other significant milestones which

may have suppressed or encouraged illegal AR activity.

Results

The AR incident data was separated into several categories in order to see how each reacted to

significant events during the period studied as well as if there were any correlations between incident

types. All property damage crimes with damages in excess of $10,000 were combined because there

were no significant differences in trends between those crime types over the years examined.

Additionally, non-property crimes such as harassment, personal attacks, denial of service and unlawful

protests were tallied and graphed as separate crime types since their nature is so different.. While the

FBR data attempts to break these crime types down into levels of severity, the subjective nature of any

such division raises numerous problems. Therefore, this report includes all such incidents. The resulting

graph of incidents across the time frame examined may be seen in Figure 3.

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Several significant events which occurred during the period studied shed light on spikes and declines in

AR activity.

1992: Passage of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act. Passage of the act had no noticeable

effect on AR activity. The AEPA was regarded by some within the law enforcement as difficult

to implement and having relatively minor penalties.15

1996-1997: Operation Bite Back 2. The beginning of a focused effort by the ALF to target the

fur industry, primarily in the Western United States.16 While the ALF claims that Bite Back 2

continues, it appears as if the activity related to the operation dropped off in 1998.

15 Radical Animal Rights Group Convicted of Inciting Violence and Stalking.

http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News(accessed May 30, 2010).

16Biteback 2. http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/biteback2.htm (accessed 30 May, 2010).

11

Fig 3. AR Incidents 1993-2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

#

ofIncidents

Incidents in Excess of $10,000 Total Incidents Harassment Denial of Service Personal Assaults Unlawful Protest

Passage of AEPA9/11 attacks

Beginning of SHAC

campaign in U.S.

Arrest/Trial of

SHAC members

Operation 'Bite

Back'

Passageof

AETA

First Prosecution

Under the AEPA
http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News%20http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News%20http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News%20http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/biteback2.htmhttp://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News%20http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Other_Extremism/shac_convicted.htm?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_the_News%20http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/biteback2.htm


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1998: The first use of the AEPA in criminal prosecutions. Peter Daniel Young and Justin

Clayton Samuel were arrested for AR activity targeting the fur industry, possibly as part of

Operation Bite Back 2. The prosecution and arrest likely led to the decrease in property crime

incidents in 1998.

1999-2001: A surge of significant property crimes that lasted until the terrorist attacks on 9/11.

Given the heightened awareness of law enforcement and the general public in the months

following the attacks we would expect the most comprehensive reporting of AR extremist

activities of the entire period. The dramatic decline of activity at the end of this period therefore,

is particularly significant. The decline in activities may be the result of increased law

enforcement activity, a general (if only temporary) rejection of illegal methods by AR extremists,

or some other unidentified factor or combination of factors.

2003: A campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), a company which conducts animal

testing for other companies, which began in the United Kingdom in 1999 migrated to the United

States. Pressure from AR groups in the U.K. forced HLS to move its financial operations to the

United States and a facility it operates in New Jersey became the focus of several groups

dedicated to forcing the company out of business.

2004: In May six individuals who were members of an organization named Stop Huntingdon

Animal Cruelty (SHAC) were indicted under the AEPA for their activities targeting HLS. They

were convicted of the charges against them in 2006.

2006: The passage of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act. The act broadens the types of

activity that can be considered terrorism

2006: Eleven individuals were indicted on a variety of crimes surrounding a string of arsons in

the Western U.S. that took place between 1996-2001.17 While the individuals werent charged

17 Eco-Terror Indictments: Operation Backfire Nets 11. http://www.fbi.gov/page2/jan06/elf012006.htm(Lastaccessed 30 May 2010)

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under the AETA or AEPA the criminal activities were regarded as animal and eco terrorist

motivated.

When looking at non-property crimes throughout the time period examined, both personal

assaults and denial of service attacks remained infrequent. Denial of service18 attacks may require

equipment and expertise that makes it unattractive to potential AR activists, there may be concerns about

the ability of perpetrators to remain anonymous or it may not be seen as a valuable tactic. The lack of

physical assaults is not particularly surprising given the movements repeated statement of non-violent

activity but interesting given repeated warnings of violent activity by law enforcement and industry

groups.

Unlawful protests accounted for a significant portion of total illegal activity in 1996 and 1997

but precipitously dropped off after that and have remained at very low levels ever since. Animal rights

literature and electronic message boards frequently mention anti-terrorism legislation as having a chilling

effect on speech and civil disobedience. It may be that the 1998 prosecutions under the AEPA and

threats of expanded law enforcement activity have discouraged illegal protesting in favor or legal

methods of expression or, alternatively, discouraged visible forms of protest altogether.

Harassment traditionally occurred at low levels without a great deal of variation until the

beginning of the SHAC campaign in 2003. The campaign marked the beginning of widespread use of the

tactic of secondary and tertiary targeting in which the extremist group targets parties with direct or

indirect business links to the organization that is the focus of an extreme campaign the 'primary

target'.19

Since the SHAC campaign garnered so much attention and utilized the internet extensively

since its inception, the data collected by the FBR can be considered essentially complete for all types of

activity.

18 Denial of service refers to attacks designed to incapacitate electronic equipment like phones, faxes or computersystems.19 National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit. NETCU | Glossary. http://www.netcu.org.uk(accessed May

30, 2010).

13
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The broad category of harassment encompasses a wide range of activity, some criminal and

some only socially distasteful, designed to annoy and frustrate the target. Actions in this category may

include prank phone calls, subscribing to numerous periodicals in the name of the target, protests

outside of personal residences, or posting personal information about the target on the internet. In

addition to the actual act of harassment, victims often feel there is a more sinister subtext to the event.

Victims often feel that by conducting harassment outside of the workplace animal rights extremists are

making an implicit threat that there will be no place safe for the target or their families.20

Secondary and tertiary targeting proved to be a very effective tactic for the SHAC campaign and

there is evidence that the use of harassment as a tactic inhibited or supplemented the use of property

crimes by AR activists. Every incident of harassment reported by AR extremists in 2004 was attributed

to the SHAC campaign as were eleven of the thirteen incidents in 2005. When the SHAC campaign

began in 2003, there were two incidents of significant property damage (one of theft and one of

vandalism) and five incidents of minor vandalism. In May of 2004, the six primary individuals associated

with the SHAC campaign were charged under the AEPA with conspiracy to cause physical disruption to

the functioning of HLS, an animal enterprise, and intentionally damage and cause the loss of property

used by HLS, in an amount exceeding $10,000.21 After the arrest, harassment incidents declined while

vandalism (both minor and significant) increased dramatically (see figure 4).

Since criminal activity by animal rights extremists was not new in either 1998 or 2004, it appears

that law enforcement agencies were prompted to use the AEPA against these extremists because of the

type of activity they were engaged in. Prior to both prosecutions there was a significant increase in

crimes which centered upon expression rather than property destruction or physical violence (see Figure

5).

20United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. A Second Hearing on Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) Hearing 26 Oct 2005. 108th

Congress http://www.furcommission.com/resource/SFresources/SHAChearing.pdf(accessed 30 May 2010)

21 United States District Court, District of New Jersey. Indictment. The United States of America VS. SHAC. Pg

5

14
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Fig. 5 AR Non-Property Crimes 1993-2006

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

#

ofIncidents

Harassment Denial of Service Personal Assaults Unlawful Protest

Such activity, by its very nature, is more likely to attract the attention of a wider audience than

other AR tactics and therefore may have been the impetus to seek prosecutions under terrorism legislation

rather than other criminal statutes. While the SHAC prosecution is far too recent to uncover long term

trends, the 1998 prosecution did succeed in virtually eliminating unlawful protests from the AR activists

toolkit. There is no reason to assume that a similar pattern wont occur at least with regards to the more

public forms of harassment (which may, in fact, overlap in some cases with the unlawful protest

category).

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Property damage does not seem to be correlated with the use of the AEPA prosecutions (see

Figure 6). While both prosecutions are accompanied were accompanied with a dip in property crimes, the

years 1999-2001 witnessed a dramatic spike in high damage property crime. In fact, six of the eight years

after the arrest and prosecution of ALF members in 1998 had property crime rates that exceeded the

levels of the 1996-1997 Operation: Bite Back 2. This supports the argument that use of anti-terrorist

legislation to restrict expression crimes will lead to more destructive criminal activity. Significant

property damage crime outpaced minor property damage crime for four years (1998-2001) and given the

lack of other significant variables, would have likely maintained that trend had the terrorist attacks of 9/11

not occurred. Since all the significant property crime (by definition) was punishable under the AEPA it is

possible that such attacks were intended as a message from elements within the radical AR community

that they would not be dissuaded from their goals.

16

Fig. 6 AR Property Damage Incidents

1993-2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

#

ofIncidents

Incidents in Excess of $10,000 in Damage Incidents of Less Than $10,000 in Damage Total Property Damage Incidents

AEPA

Prosecutions


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Reliable data regarding animal rights criminal activity is, oddly enough, impossible to get via

open source methods. Therefore extending trend lines beyond 2006 is highly problematic. The data from

the FBR which simply collates claims of actions by a few AR websites is all there is to study so

conclusions based on that should be considered highly suspect without corroboration. That being said,

according to the FBR summary, 2007 saw a slight dip in total AR incidents while 2008 saw a spike to

2003 levels.22This would appear to suggest that just like in the wake of the adoption of the AEPA,

attempts to suppress AR activists through expanding police powers only results in short term reductions.

Conclusion

It appears that the use of the Animal Protection Enterprise Act did result in the reduction of

crimes of expression (illegal protests, harassment, etc.) but it was not effective in any long term

reduction of property crimes. The most plausible explanation for this is that it is nothing more than a shift

in tactics to avoid law enforcement. There is no reason to believe that either the AEPA or the AETA will

deter AR activists from continuing their campaigns against their targets.

Government attempts at suppressing extremist AR activity are, at least partially, offset by a string

of victories theyve experienced over the years. Pressuring companies to cease animal testing, stop

doing business with others that continue testing or just avoiding being caught by law enforcement after

being declared the most serious domestic terrorism threat in the United States all provide positive

reinforcement to continue their activities. Finally, given that the FBI estimates over 1,200 AR incidents

have occurred23and there have only been two sets of prosecutions for AR crimes under these statutes in

the past 15 years it is likely that there is little deterrent effect in such legislation.

The United Kingdom has also attempted to address AR extremism through legislation and

suppression techniques and have achieved similarly unimpressive results. By applying a broad brush in

22http://www.fbresearch.org/aboutfbr/tabid/423/default.aspx (accessed 30 May 2010)23Frieden, Terry. FBI, ATF address domestic terrorism. CNN.com, May 19, 2005.http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/19/domestic.terrorism/index.html (accessed . 30 May 2010)

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lumping all activists concerned with animal rights into the extremist camp rather than identifying and

engaging with non-radicals, the British government and life science industry has failed to address the

underlying concerns of the movement. One researcher has described the resulting situation as one of

'stalemate' and unlikely to achieve any long term solution.24

Legislation which specifically targets AR groups does have a very profound, although

unintended, effect however. Given the AR communities strong ties to anarchist and left leaning political

traditions, legislation which seems to target expression is another item on a growing list of proofs that

the government is attempting to restrict the rights of free speech and protest and make progressive social

movements impotent. The focus of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on AR activities are seen

as a new wave of McCarthyism with environmentalists taking on the role of communists. Dubbed the

Green Scare, animal and environmental radicals see the current environment one as one in which they

are demonized in order for the government to tighten their control on society.

In an interview with Will Potter, a journalist who covers the activities of Animal Rights activists

and the governmental response to them, has indicated that introduction of the AETA has produced a

'chilling effect' throughout the animal welfare community. Even advocates who exclusively rely on legal

forms of political expression have expressed concern at being labeled terrorists due in part to ambiguity

of the law and questions of how the criminal justice system might decide to apply it.25

Attempts at suppression may be based on at least two assumptions of dubious reliability. The

first is that AR extremists undergo a process of radicalization that begins with legal protest and escalates

to increasingly radical and illegal behavior. Research has indicated that there is little systematic

evidence linking peaceful political action to political violence. Indeed a recent survey study that

24Metcalfe, David. The Protest Game: Animal Rights Protests and the Life Sciences Industry Negotiation

Journal. Apr 2008; 24, 2.

25Potter, Will Personal communication. 25 May 2010.

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included members of U.S. activist groups found that intentions for legal activism were little

related to intentions for illegal and violent political action.26

The second risk of demonizing AR extremists as terrorists is that, for a small portion of people,

such attention may actually motivate them to more extreme and violent behavior. Jerrold Post has

hypothesized that some terrorists are not primarily motivated by ideology but rather, they are drawn to

the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence.27 In this theory, individuals seeking

justification for committing acts of terrorism look for some suitable outlet for their desires. Some may

gravitate towards right-wing extremism or religious terrorism but the underlying message of the AR

movement with its focus on injustice to helpless creatures, social equality and anti-authoritarianism may

find greater resonance within a post 9/11 America than alternative choices. The increased attention that

AR and ecological extremists have received from local, state and the federal government over the past

years has increased the visibility of both movements and may have raised a banner for those looking for

justify their destructive tendencies to rally around. Unfortunately, research has not sufficiently examined

this question but given the generally poor state of research into terrorist motivation it must be considered.

By labeling the wide range of activities that animal rights extremists engage in as terroristic, the

government is, perhaps intentionally, isolating those individuals from the rest of society. By doing so

however they risk tapping into psychological factors that Franco Ferracuti identified as contributing to the

extremism and violence of Italian terrorists from 1969-1986:

belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society at largereinforces the terrorists ideology and strengthens their motivations.

Deviants tend to group together and to cut their ties with society whichis seen as the alien and hostile enemy - and to engage in a fantasy war

26Moskalenko, Sophia & McCauley, Clark. Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism

and Radicalism. Terrorism and Political Violence. 21:231-260. 2009.

27 Jerrold Post, Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces in Origins ofTerrorism ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990),25.

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with it a war whose reality seems enhanced when that society engagesin repressive action. Such actions reinforce the terrorists deviance andmake it difficult for such people to make an exit from the life ofterrorism.28

For the dedicated supporters of the AR ideology, the threat of fines or imprisonment is simply not

effective. Evidence suggests that incarceration makes most terrorists more connected to their cause and

they do not hesitate to restart their activities upon release.29

Radical AR advocates see the consequences of failure in their mission as the reinforcement of

violence in human behavior, the death of billions of living creatures (each one as morally entitled to life

as any human) and complete ecological catastrophe. The stakes are so high, in the view of the most

radical AR activists, that it is too late for compromise or moderation and direct action is the only way to

achieve success. Threats of prison terms and being labeled the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat in

the country are likely to do little more than feed their perceptions that there are no effective, legitimate

alternatives to encourage change within society. Instead of feeding feelings of persecution and opposition

there may be utility in exploring alternate means of changing their behaviors such as engagement and

cooperation. While the most radical are unlikely to be open to compromise, there is evidence that a mix

of suppression and engagement can minimize the risk of violent and illegal political activity without

infringing upon legal activism.

28 Franco Ferracuti, Ideology and repentance: Terrorism in Italy in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990),61.29 Borum, Randy.Psychology of Terrorism. (Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida), 2004. 39

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