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Advanced Topics in National Security Law

Legal and Policy Issuesof the Indo-China War

Professor John Norton MooreProfessor Robert F. TurnerUniversity of Virginia School of Law

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First ClassAugust 25, 2010

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Administrative Information

• No prerequisites • Background to Seminar• Guest Lecturers• Paper Requirement (can satisfy Advanced Legal

Writing requirement)

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Background to Seminar

• Field of “National Security Law” began at Virginia more than forty years ago as a result of Prof. Moore’s interest in the Indochina War.

• Center for National Security Law (CNSL) established April 1981 by Moore & Turner.

• Center has funded seminars on arms control and intelligence law taught by visiting experts.

• In late 1980s, decided to co-teach a series of “Advanced Topics in National Security Law” seminars, starting with Indochina War and then War & Peace.

• Original seminar was so successful we have kept the topic (now every second Fall term).

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Purpose of Seminar

• It is important for Americans to understand what reallyhappened in Vietnam so we can draw the right lessons.

• Even if you have no special interest in Vietnam per se, the war provides a useful test case to examine the laws governing aggression and defense, treatment of prisoners of war, war crimes, and a range of other issues of great relevance today.

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Guest Lecturers—Past Years

We have been very fortunate over the years to have brought to Charlottesville leading experts on Vietnam, including:

• William E. Colby (former Director of Central Intelligence and Saigon Station Chief for CIA 1959+)

• Adm. Thomas Moorer (former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff during final years of war)

• Hon. James Schlesinger (Secretary of Defense and DCI)• Gen. Al Grey (former Commandant of Marine Corps)• Maj. Gen. John Singlaub (former C.O. MAC SOG - ran covert

operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam)• Col. Harry Summers (author On Strategy, Vietnam Almanac, etc.)• Prof. Norman Graebner (distinguished UVA diplomatic historian)

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Guest Lecturers—This Year

This year our scheduled guest lecturers are:

• Hays Parks (top Pentagon LOAC expert • Sept. 29)• Prof. Robert O’Neil (UVA Pres.; Dir., Jefferson Center • Oct. 13)• Dr. Lewis Sorley (Author, A Better War • Oct. 20)• Paul Galanti (former POW • Oct. 27)• Dr. Gary Solis (Marine JAG, author books on war crimes • Nov. 3)• Lt. Col. James G. Zumwalt (retired Marine, author of Bare Feet, Iron

Will • Nov. 10)• Dr. Marin Strmecki (helped to write Pres. Nixon’s book Why Vietnam?

• Nov. 17)

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Syllabus

• The syllabus is a “game plan,” not a statute book, so don’t be alarmed if we depart from it on occasion.

• We may have to make adjustments to accommodate the schedules of busy guest lecturers, and not every topic we will address fits neatly into a two-hour block.

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Paper Requirements

• In an effort to be helpful, we have put some thoughts on this issue in writing for you.

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Paper Deadlines

• Sept. 29— short written outline of proposed paper due.

• Nov. 10 — First draft of paper due.• Dec. 16 — Final paper must be submitted in

Prof. Moore’s office before 5:00 PM EST.

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IMPORTANT

• YOUR PAPERS ARE DUE IN PROF. MOORE’S OFFICE, SL 348, BEFORE 5:00 PM ON THE LAST DAY OF EXAMS (THURSDAY, DEC 16, 2010).

• INDIVIDUAL FACULTY MEMBERS DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE.

• IF YOU ARE LATE, THE PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE FACULTY ARE CONSIDERABLE. (PLEASE DON’T PUSH YOUR LUCK—GET THEM IN EARLY.)

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IMPORTANT

• Anticipate risks:• Don’t let your dog or pet rabbit near your homework.• Failure to back-up files can be a painful learning

experience (but better now than when a client’s liberty or funds are at risk).

• December snowstorms can knock out power for your computer.

• There is normally a long waiting line at the copy center all afternoon on the last days of exams.

• Etc., etc., etc.• You may find the correct time at

http://www.time.gov/timezone.cgi?Eastern/d/-5/java

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Another Reason toSubmit a Good Paper

• In 2006, we published a collection of 11 of the best papers submitted in this seminar over the years.

• Ross Fisher, who took this seminar 6 years ago, was one of the editors.

• We may do a revised edition or second volume in the future.

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Dealing with Controversy

Few topics have more polarized the American people than the Vietnam War, and scholars are still far from in agreement about many of the facts.

In this seminar, we are engaged in a search for truth. Neither the instructors nor the guest lecturers pretend to have a monopoly on the truth.

Free debate and open inquiry are essential in the pursuit of truth. You will not be penalized here for having the courage to ask hard questions or reach conclusions that differ from our own.

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Dealing with Controversy

“This institution [U.Va.] will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.”

—Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe27 December 1820

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Introductions(Let’s go around the room)

Our bios are in the back of the syllabus. Let’s take a minute or two for each of you to tell the class your name, background, and any special interest you may have in this issue.

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Origins of the Vietnam War

Prof. Robert F. TurnerAssociate Director

Center for National Security LawUniversity of Virginia School of Law

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He had hair once!

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1971 Reunion of Senor Viet Cong DefectorsBen Tre, South Vietnam

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Bui Cong TuongChief, Propaganda, Education, Culture & Training

Ben Tre Province (VC)

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Bui Cong TuongChief, Propaganda, Education, Culture & Training

Ben Tre Province (VC)

In my view he was probably the most important political defector in the war.

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Nguyen Van BeMajor Emulation Hero for Communists (actually POW)

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Communist poster honoring Nguyen Van Be.

�Nguyen Van Be reads about his alleged exploits in Liberation Army newspaper.

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North Vietnamese Stamp

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American Propaganda Leaflet

My old office in Vietnam put out this leaflet:

“The 'Late Hero' Nguyen Van Be reads about his own death”

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American Propaganda Leaflet

My old office in Vietnam put out this leaflet:

“The 'Late Hero' Nguyen Van Be reads about his own death”

We have put a more detailed story about Nguyen Van Be on the class web site in case you are interested.

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First Major English-languageHistory of Vietnamese Communism

• “Turner’s volume is certainly one of the most refreshing to appear in several years on the subject of Vietnam, and it rekindles confidence that there is quality work again appearing after an interlude of emotional and severely biased pieces. In fact, Turner’s work must rank as a landmark in the treatment of Vietnamese communism.”

• —American Historical Review

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First Major English-languageHistory of Vietnamese Communism

“. . . definitive account of Vietnamese Communism”

—American Political Science Review

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The Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefields of Indochina but on the

streets of San Francisco and Washington, DC, and in the halls of Congress. We

lost the Political Struggle because Americans didn’t know the facts.

Why Spend Time on Background?

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Common Perceptionsabout the Vietnam War - 1

• Ho Chi Minh was primarily a “nationalist”, and while he may have accepted aid from communists to liberate his country he would at worst have been an “Asian Tito” - a valuable buffer against the PRC or Soviet expansion into SE Asia.

• The U.S. first became involved by trying to help France regain her former colony after WW II.

• Even President Eisenhower agreed Ho Chi Minh would have won the elections scheduled for July 1956 under Geneva Agreement, and the U.S. violated the Agreement by preventing free elections and supporting a puppet regime.

[Continued on next slide . . . ]

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Common Perceptionsabout the Vietnam War - II

• The people of South Vietnam ultimately had no choice but to take up arms to fight for their freedom.

• Hanoi became involved reluctantly to help the NLF in the face of Diem’s human rights abuses and oppression. People in South Vietnam were imprisoned in tiny underground “tiger cages” for simply calling for “peace.”

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Common Perceptionsabout the Vietnam War - II

• LBJ and Nixon violated the Constitution by denying Congress its rightful role in deciding upon “war.”

• The U.S. bombing campaign dropped several times more bombs on North Vietnamese cities than had been dropped by all sides in WW II.

• Nevertheless, in the end the Viet Cong defeated the American Army and “liberated” Saigon in 1975.

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The Debate Continues . . . (1993)

“The U.S. first intervened heavily in Vietnam after World War II in support of a French recolonization effort. When we replaced the French in 1954, it was well known to U.S. officials (and was explicitly stated in President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s autobiography) that Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh party had massive popular support and would have won a free election handily. For that reason, America imported its own Vietnamese leader from the U.S., Ngo Dinh Diem, to rule the southern part of Vietnam, and refused to hold the unifying elections called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords.”

- Edward S. Harman, “Morality and Vietnam - it’s not just a matter of MIA’s” Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 August 1993, p. 9.

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Legal and Policy Issuesof the Indo-China War

HISTORICALOVERVIEW

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A 1000-Year History of Unity?

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Ho Chi Minh:George Washington or Benedict Arnold?

“Ho is sometimes called the George Washington of Vietnam.”

- Dr. Spock on Vietnam 17 (1968)

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Ho Chi Minh’s 1920Conversion to Leninism

“What I wanted to know . . . was which International sides with the peoples of colonial countries? . . . A [French Socialist Party] comrade gave me Lenin’s ‘Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions’ . . . to read.”“There were political terms difficult to understand in this thesis. But by dint of reading it again and again, finally I could grasp the main part of it. What emotion, enthusiasm, clear-sightedness and confidence it instilled in me! I was overjoyed to tears. Though sitting alone in my room, I shouted aloud as if addressing large crowds: ‘Dear martyrs, compatriots! This is what we need, this is the path to our liberation!”

- 4 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works 449 (1962)

�In December 1920, Ho became a cofounder

of the French Communist Party

�In December 1920, Ho became a cofounder

of the French Communist Party

This fact is affirmed by numerous biographies and histories published in Hanoi.

�In the mid-1920s, Ho traveled around the USSR with other “revolutionaries” working for the Comintern

(Communist International)

�In the mid-1920s, Ho traveled around the USSR with other “revolutionaries” working for the Comintern

(Communist International)

One of the people who often traveled with Ho was Bertram Wolfe, a colleague of mine when I was a fellow at the Hoover Institution (1971-74).

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Bertram WolfeSenior Fellow, Hoover Institution (1966-77)

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Bertram WolfeSenior Fellow, Hoover Institution (1971-74+)Bertram Wolfe at 5th World Comintern Conference, Moscow (1924)

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Bertram WolfeSenior Fellow, Hoover Institution (1971-74+)

Bert Wolfe had been a co-founder and chief theoretician of the Communist Party USA, and wrote most of its Manifesto.

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Bertram WolfeSenior Fellow, Hoover Institution (1971-74+)

Bert Wolfe had been a co-founder and chief theoretician of the Communist Party USA, and wrote most of its Manifesto.

He was expelled from the Comintern following a dispute with Stalin in 1928 – and held under house arrest for 6 months in Moscow.

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Leninist Strategy:Temporary Alliances, Divided Enemies - I

“[T]he whole history of Bolshevism, both before and after the October Revolution, is full of instances of maneuvering, making agreements, and compromising with other parties, bourgeois parties included!The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only be exerting the utmost effort, and without fail by most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully using every, even the smallest, “rift” among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. Those who fail to understand this, fail to understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern Socialism in general

[Continued on next slide . . . ]

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Leninist Strategy:Temporary Alliances, Divided Enemies - II

“[F]rom all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, . . . for the Communist Party . . . to resort to manoeuvres, agreements, and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters . . . To tie our hands beforehand, openly to tell the enemy, who is at present better armed than we are, whether we shall fight him, and when, is stupidity and not revolutionism. To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and the political leader of the revolutionary class who is unable to ‘manoeuvre, agree, and compromise’ in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous battle, is absolutely worthless.”

- V.I. Lenin“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder 64-65, 72 (1920)

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Leninist Strategy:Temporary Alliances, Divided Enemies - II

“[F]rom all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, . . . for the Communist Party . . . to resort to manoeuvres, agreements, and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters . . . To tie our hands beforehand, openly to tell the enemy, who is at present better armed than we are, whether we shall fight him, and when, is stupidity and not revolutionism. To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and the political leader of the revolutionary class who is unable to ‘manoeuvre, agree, and compromise’ in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous battle, is absolutely worthless.”

- V.I. Lenin“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder 64-65, 72 (1920)

I have seen this excerpt quoted literally dozens of times in Vietnamese Communist writings — it is probably the single most often quoted excerpt from Lenin’s writings by Vietnamese Communists.

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Ho Returns to Vietnamand Establishes Viet-Minh Front (1941)

• Using numerous names, Nguyen Ai Quoc/Ho Chi Minh worked for the Comintern during 1920s-1940s.

• Official biographies note that he was present at founding of ICP as the “Comintern representative.”

• Ho did not set foot inside Vietnam between 1911 and 1941, when Moscow ordered creation of “national united fronts” and sent him back to establish “Viet Minh” Front.

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A Recent BookWith New Information on this Period

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Another useful source . . .

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Pentagon Papers on the Viet-Minh Appeal

“The announced program of the Viet Minh called for a wide range of social and political reforms designed mainly to appeal to Viet patriotism. Emphasis was placed on an anti-Japanese crusade . . . not on Communist cant. . . . The ICP [Indochinese Communist Party] was during the war the hard core of the Viet Minh, but the bulk of the Viet Minh membership were no doubt quite unaware of that fact: they served the Viet Minh our of a patriotic fervor.”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 44 (1971).

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Pentagon Papers onHo Chi Minh

“Ho Chi Minh was an old Stalinist, trained in Russia in the early ‘20s, Comintern colleague of Borodin in Canton . . . [and a man who presumably] spoke with authority within the upper echelons of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 261 (Gravel ed. 1971)

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Ho Chi Minh and the OSS(1945)

Unlike Chinese “Warlords,” Ho did not demand money for helping the Office of Strategic Services [OSS - predecessor to the CIA]; instead, he merely sought:

• An autographed photograph of American General Claire Chennault

• Six .45 caliber Colt pistols• Assorted other weapons, communications

equipment, and supplies “to fight the Japanese” in Vietnam.

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Ho Chi Minh and the OSS(1945)

Those six .45 pistols were more valuable to Ho than millions in cash, as they reinforced his claim to be “America’s guy” in a Post-WW II Vietnam.

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The OSS Took Part in Ho’s Ceremony Declaring Independence for Vietnam

(September 2, 1945)

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Ho Chi Minh Declares Independence2 September 1945

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DRV Declaration of Independence

“‘All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States

of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live and to be happy and free. . . .

- reprinted in DRV, Vietnamese Studies No. 24, pp. 195-99

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Purges of Nationalists Duringthe August Revolution (1945)

Various sources estimate the number of nationalists killed by the Viet Minh during the Fall of 1945 at between 5,000 and 10,000 in the Hanoi area alone.A 25 November 1945 ICP Central Committee Directive proclaimed that it was “an urgent task of the Party and people to . . . do away with the domestic traitors.”

- Turner, Vietnamese Communism 44 (1975)

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ICP Sec. Gen. Truong Chinh on“Mistakes” of the August Revolution

“Here is the third weakness of the August Revolution. Immediately after the establishment of revolutionary power, we did not firmly eliminate the various categories of traitors. . . . [I]t is to be regretted that energetic, timely and necessary measures to counteract all possible dangers in the future were not taken immediately . . . For a newborn revolutionary power to be lenient with counter-revolutionaries is tantamount to committing suicide.”

- Truong Chinh, The August Revolution 39-41 (Hanoi: 1947)

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Ho Invites French to Return to Indochina(6 March 1946 Modus Vivendi)

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Conventional Wisdom is that Ho Assumed French Would Give Vietnam True “Independence”

• Ho Chi Minh was no fool.• He invited the French back in order to:

• get the Chinese Nationalists (who supported the opposition VNQDD) out of the north; and

• buy time to eliminate opposition leadership and insure Communist control of the resistance before going to war with France.

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Party First Secretary Le Duanon Ho’s 1946 Modus Vivendi with France

[Following the “shrewd recommendation of Lenin” to fight only one enemy at a time] “We would at one time reach a temporary compromise . . . with the French in order to . . . wipe out the reactionaries . . . thus gaining time to consolidate our forces and prepare for a nationwide resistance to French colonialist aggression, which the party knew was inevitable.”

- Le Duan, The Vietnamese Revolution: Fundamental Problems, Essential Tasks 39-40 (Hanoi: FLPH, 1970).

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Pentagon Papers: Ho Chi Minh Worked with French to Eliminate Nationalist Rivals

“On 6 March 1946, Ho signed an Accord with the French providing for French re-entry into Vietnam for five years in return for recognizing the DRV as a free state within the French Union. This Accord taxed Ho’s popularity to the utmost, and it took all Ho’s prestige to prevent open rebellion. . . .[I]n mid-June, the Viet Minh, supported by French troops, attacked the Dong Minh Hoi and the VNQDD [nationalist groups], as ‘enemies of the peace’ effectively suppressed organized opposition, and asserted Viet Minh control throughout North Vietnam.”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 46 (Gravel ed. 1971)

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Did the United States Seek to ReimposeFrench Colonialism in Vietnam?

Assessing one of the myths that fueled the Anti-War Movement

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Professor Howard Zinnon U.S. Support for French Colonialism

“And what was United States policy? In view of American claims today that its policy is to support self-determination and independence, the answer is both illuminating and troubling: The United States fully supported the French effort to maintain its power in Indochina against the nationalist struggle for independence.”

- Professor Howard Zinn,Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal (1967).

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William J. Ledereron U.S. Support for French Colonialism

“The U.S. self-deception began in earnest in 1945 when we first started helping the French to regain their Indochina colonies.”

- William J. Lederer,Our Own Worst Enemy

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President Roosevelt on RestoringFrench Colonial Rule in Indochina

“I saw [British Ambassador] Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indochina should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country . . . for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.”

- FDR Memo to Sec. State Cordell Hull (24 Jan. 1944),in 1 Pentagon Papers 10 (1971)

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French General Jean SaintenyComplains of OSS Resistance (1946)

“[I am] face to face with a deliberate Allied maneuver to evict the French from Indochina . . . At the present time the Allied [U.S.] attitude is more harmful than the Viet Minh.”

- Radio Message to superiors in Calcutta,quoted in Bernard B. Fall,

The Two Viet-Nams 68-69 (Rev. ed. 1964).

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Pentagon Papers: United States OpposedFrench Colonialism Prior to 1950

“[T]he U.S. steadfastly refused to assist the French military effort, e.g., forbidding American flag vessels to carry troops or war materiel to Vietnam. . . . The U.S. in its representations to France . . . urged meaningful concessions to Vietnamese nationalism. However, the U.S., deterred by the history of Ho’s communist affiliation, always stopped short of endorsing Ho Chi Minh or the Viet Minh. . . .

Continued . . .

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Pentagon Papers: United States OpposedFrench Colonialism Prior to 1950

“U.S. diplomats were instructed to ‘apply such persuasion and/or pressure as is best calculated [to] produce desired result [of France’s] unequivocal and promptly approving the principle of Viet independence.’ France was notified that the U.S. was willing to extend financial aid to a Vietnamese government [that was] not a French puppet.”

1 Pentagon Papers 3, 4 (Gravel ed. 1971)

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What Circumstances Led U.S. to Support French in 1950?

• 1949—China fell to Mao• January 1950—It became apparent to many

that “Ho Chi Minh” was really old Comintern agent Nguyen Ai Quoc.

• June 1950—North Korea invaded South Korea to begin Korean War.

• Defending Vietnam became part of “Containment” doctrine.

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Pentagon Papers: U.S. Rationale forFunding French in Indochina (1950)

“[T]he rationale for the decision to aid the French was to avert Indochina’s sliding into the communist camp, rather than aid for France as a colonial power or a fellow NATO ally. . . . A reading of the NSC memorandum of the French-American diplomatic dialogue of the time indicates that Washington kept its eyes on the ultimate goal of the de-colonization of Indochina. Indeed it was uncomfortable in finding itself - forced by the greater necessity of resisting Viet Minh communism - in the same bed as the French.”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 77 (Gravel ed. 1971)

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Pentagon Papers: U.S. PressuredFrance for Concessions in 1954

“In keeping open the option of united [military] action [in Indochina], the Administration, no less during May and the first half of June than in April [1954], carefully made direct [U.S.] involvement conditional on a range of French concessions and promises. . . . Dulles proposed, and Eisenhower accepted, a series of “indispensable” conditions to American involvement that would have to be met by Paris. . . . (4) A French guarantee of complete independence to the Associated States, including unqualified option to withdraw from French Union at any time . . . .”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 122-24 (Gravel ed. 1971).

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The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954)

Its military and political significance

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Dien Bien Phu as anIntelligence Failure

“The Viet Minh do not have, and probably cannot develop within the period of this estimate, the capability to make such effective use of heavy equipment - artillery, armor, and aircraft - from the Chinese Communists as to permit successful attacks against strong concentrations of regular French forces.”

- 1953 [U.S. CIA] National Intelligence Estimate on“Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1954,”

reprinted in 1 Pentagon Papers 398 (1971)

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The Was a Reasonable Assessment of the Difficulty Faced By the Viet Minh

It was “reasonable,” but it was WRONG!

Sadly, it wasn’t the last time westerners would underestimate

the Vietnamese Communists.

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Viet-Minh Trenches Near Airfield (1954)

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The mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu were too far away for effective small arms fire . . .

. . . but the arrival of Chinese artillery was decisive.

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French Surrender (May 7, 1954)

(Viet Minh could have overrun Dien Bien Phu in March, but Chinese advisers said to wait. Geneva Conference took up Indo-China on May 8.)

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US Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on Importanceof Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954)

[French General Paul Ely] “recognized the great political and psychological importance of the outcome both in Indochina and in France, but considered that Dien Bien Phu, even if lost, would be a military victory for the French because of the cost to the Viet Minh and the relatively greater loss to the Viet Minh combat forces. Politically and psychologically, the loss of Dien Bien Phu would be a very serious setback to the French Union cause, and might cause unpredictable repercussions both in France and in Indochina.”

1 Pentagon Papers

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The Military Consequencesof the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

With a ten-to-one numerically superior force, the Viet Minh suffered:

• three-and-a-half times as many fatalities• nearly twice as many total casualties

as did the French in the struggle over Dien Bien Phu.

- Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place 329 (1968)

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Political Importance of theBattle of Dien Bien Phu

Dien Bien Phu “was to take on a political and psychological importance far out of proportion to its actual strategic value because of the upcoming Geneva Conference.”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 97 (1971).

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The Political Consequencesof the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

• May 7, 1954—Dien Bien Phu falls• 12 June 1954 - French Government of Joseph

Laniel and Georges Bidault collapses• 17 June 1954 - Radical-Socialist Pierre Mendès-

France is named Premier after promising FrenchChamber of Deputies:“I pledge . . . to tender my resignation if within a month, by 20 July, I have been unable to arrange a cease-fire in Indochina.”

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Lesson for the Future

If you are facing a difficult negotiation, it is a great idea to inform your adversary that if you can’t reach agreement within 30 days you will lose your job.

This strategy is right out of the new best seller:

Getting to Yes By Giving Away the Store

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Reassessing theConventional Wisdom

Was Ho Chi Minhreally a potential “Asian Tito”?

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Was Ho Chi Minha Potential “Asian Tito”?

• In a 1924 Report to the Comintern, Ho referred to “my country, Indochina”

• Most followers of Ho’s Viet Minh Front were motivated by Nationalist appeals

• Ho tried to conceal his Comintern past, and “dissolved” the ICP in 1945 (it went underground)

• In 1959, Ho referred to his “family” as being “the working class throughout the world”

• Ho’s May 1969 “Last Will and Testament” anticipated “the day when I go and join venerable Karl Marx, Lenin, and other revolutionary elders”

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Ho Chi Minh’s Governmentand Tito’s Yugoslavia (1950)

• 14 January - Ho Chi Minh announced a desire to establish diplomatic relations with “all countries”

• 21 February - Tito’s Government announces it has accepted Ho Chi Minh’s offer to establish diplomatic relations

• 22 February - The New York Times proclaims this was “the most sensational victory over the Soviet Government” since Tito’s split with Stalin

• 27 February - Hanoi sends Tito telegram saying “We take good note of your answer to our telegram asking recognition by the democratic nations.”

• 16 March - The New York Times reports Hanoi denounces Tito as “a spy for American imperialism.”

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Ho Chi Minh on VWP Resolution ApprovingSoviet Invasion of Hungary (1956)

“This declaration testifies to the international solidarity between our country and the Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union.”“The Vietnamese people are very glad to see that the brotherly Hungarian people, with the just help of the Soviet Army, have united and struggled to frustrate the dark schemes of the imperialists.”

- 4 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works 220 (1962).

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North Vietnamese 1957 Attack on ‘Revisionism’following Visit to Tito’s Yugoslavia

“All frenzied attacks of imperialism in every form, particularly under the signboards ‘national communism’ or ‘revisionism,’ aimed at sowing discord among and destroying the forces of socialism will certainly be smashed by the monolithic solidarity of brotherly parties and countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.”

- Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), 8 September 1957

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VWP First Secretary Le DuanAttacks “Titoism” (3d Party Congress, 1960)

“The modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique in Yugoslavia are trumpeting that the nature of imperialism has changed. . . . [I]f we want to lay bare the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism . . . the Communist . . . parties must necessarily direct their main blow against revisionism. . . . It is precisely the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, which has most brilliantly carried into effect the teachings of the great Lenin.”

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Vietnamese Communists EndorseInvasion of Czechoslovakia (1968)

“In response to the call of the Czechoslovakian Communists who wished the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene and stop the conspiracy of the Czech reactionaries, the USSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany sent their troops into this country.The attitude of our Party is to support the action taken by the USSR since it was a legitimate and essential action which symbolized such noble principles as to protect by all means the Socialist Bloc and the Socialist Revolution.”

- “Special Circular Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia” - distributed in South Vietnam by COSVN

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ICP Secretary GeneralTruong Chinh on “Nationalism”

“We must oppose every manifestation of bourgeois nationalism, the enemy of proletarian internationalism, which isolates our country.”

- Forward Along the Path Charted by K. Marx p. 4 (1969)

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The Pentagon Papers onHo Chi Minh as an Asian “Tito”

“Ho’s well-known leadership and drive, the iron discipline and effectiveness of the Viet Minh, the demonstrated fighting capability of his armies, a dynamic Vietnamese people under Ho’s control, could have produced a dangerous period of Vietnamese expansionism. Laos and Cambodia would have been easy pickings for such a Vietnam. . . . Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and even Indonesia, could have been next. It could have been the ‘domino theory’ with Ho instead of Mao . . . The path of prudence rather than the path of risk seemed the wiser choice [for the US to follow].”

- 1 Pentagon Papers 52 (1971).

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Ho as Tito:The Key Issue

The real question was not whether Ho Chi Minh “loved his country” (his Comintern name “Nguyen Ai Quoc” translated roughly “Smith who loves his country”), but whether Ho was an “internationalist” favoring the exportation of armed revolution around the globe or a “revisionist” (like Tito after 1948) who opposed Moscow’s control of Communist parties and favored a “peaceful transition to Socialism.” A strong “Titoist,” it was argued, could actually have been a “buffer” to Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia. But Ho sided with Mao on “armed struggle.”

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Reassessing the“Ho as Tito” Analogy

Professor R.J. Rummel concludes in Death by Government that the Tito Government killed more than one million of its citizens between 1944 and 1987 - and during a four year period during World War II it killed more than 2% of its population each year, making it the third most lethal regime in the world during the twentieth century.

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Reassessing the“Ho as Tito” Analogy

Interestingly, according to Professor Rummel’s data, in terms of actual numbers, Communist Vietnam killed 1,670,000 of its own people versus a more modest 1,072,000 for Tito’s Yugoslavia.

One might add that Pol Pot (whom Prof. Rummel estimates killed more than 2 million Cambodians—about 31% of the population—viewed himself as a “Titoist” and studied in Yugoslavia during the Tito regime.

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ANY QUESTIONS?

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Professor Moore

• U.Va. Law Faculty since 1966 (Walter L. Brown Prof. of Law)• 20 years as Director, Graduate Law Program• Principal author of 1966 legal brief on the Indochina War approved by

ABA House of Delegates• Frequent debater and writer during the war • Counselor on Int’l Law to U.S. Dep’t of State• U.S. Ambassador to UNCLOS III• Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Law & National Security (4

terms); currently Counselor• Vice Chairman for Public Int’l Law of ABA Sect. on Int’l Law and

Practice

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Professor Moore

• 20 years on Advisory Board of American Journal of International Law (now Honorary Editor)

• Seven presidential appointments, including as (first) Chairman of the Board, U.S. Institute of Peace

• Author or editor of more than 15 books, including 5 of Indochina War

• Helped argue several cases for United States before International Court of Justice (ICJ)

• Finalist in selection of most recent U.S. judge appointed to serve on ICJ

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Professor Turner

• Wrote 450-page undergrad honors thesis on Vietnam War (Indiana University, 1967)

• First went to Vietnam in 1968 as “journalist” (student)• Served twice in Vietnam as Army Lt. & Captain (working

on terrorism and related issues in North Vietnam/Viet Cong Branch of US Embassy)

• During 5 trips to VN, visited 42 of 44 SVN provinces plus Laos & Cambodia)

• Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

• National Security Adviser to U.S. Senator Robert P. Griffin (SFRC) for five years (last in VN final evac.)

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Professor Turner

• Special Assistant to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy• Counsel, President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State• Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Law & National Security (3

terms)• First President, U.S. Institute of Peace• Author of Vietnamese Communism (1975) and more than a dozen

other books.• U.VA. JD, SJD