lecture two for engendering compassion through interactive digital media

COMM: 107S ENGENDERING COMPASSION

LECTURE 2, JUNE 26TH, 2013

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, SUMMER QUARTER

1Wednesday, June 26, 13

EMPATHY IS....

AN ABILITY

A MOTIVATION


READING EMOTIONS

EMOTIONS ARE EXPRESSED VERBALLY AND NON-VERBALLY

FACIAL EXPRESSIONS ARE KEY TO EMPATHY

WHAT OTHER WAYS DO WE EXPRESS EMOTION?


EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

WHAT IS THIS FACE IS EXPRESSING?


ONLINE RAMIFICATIONS

COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION ELIMINATES SOME REAL-WORLD CONTEXT CLUES FOR SHARING EMOTION

HOWEVER, IT CAN ALSO BE HYPERPERSONAL (WALTHER)

Hian, Chuan, Trevor, and Detenber's 2006 study found that “relational intimacy” increased at a faster rate in CMC than in Face-to-Face interactions


WHY DO WE HAVE EMPATHY?

BIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS - TOM, MIRROR NEURONS (PROXIMATE BASES OF EMPATHY)

MOTIVATIONS - EGO-CENTERED OR ALTRUISTIC

COGNITION - IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP PREFERENCE (EXAMPLE OF ULTIMATE BASE OF EMPATHY)


Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases

Preston, de Waal (Optional Reading)

ULTIMATE BASES: “Empathy increases with:

Familiarity

(subject's previous experience with object)


SIMILARITY

Similarity can be manipulated (red team vs. blue team)

(perceived overlap between subject and object e.g. species, personality, age, gender),


LEARNING

Learning

(explicit or implicit teaching)


PAST EXPERIENCE

Past experience

(with situation of distress)


SALIENCE

(strength of perceptual signal e.g. louder, closer, more realistic etc.)


BATSON ET AL.’S ABSTRACT

Three experiments tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victim's joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victim's welfare (the empathy-altruism hypothesis). In Experiment 1, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy person's condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the person's condition having improved—and of their experiencing empathic joy—was 20%, was 50%, or was 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.


STUDY DESIGN (1)

2 X 3 DESIGN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

low empathy/no info

low empathy/

no feedback

low empathy/feedback

high empathy/ no info

high empathy/

no feedback

high empathy/feedback


PERSPECTIVE-TAKING

“To manipulate empathy, some subjects were asked to adopt an objective perspective while watching (low-empathy condition), and others were asked to imagine how the young woman felt (high-empathy condition).”

Perspective-taking as a method for increasing empathy

IMAGE FROM PRESTON, DE WAAL HTTP://COGPRINTS.ORG/1042/1/PRESTON_DE_WAAL.HTML


EMPATHIC-JOY HYPOTHESIS

“We reasoned that if empathically aroused individuals are egoistically motivated to gain empathic joy, then their desire to hear from the needy person again should be a direct function of the likelihood of obtaining empathic joy, which should in turn be a direct function of the likelihood that the needy person would be better.”

Empathic-altruism: “altruistically motivated individuals should want to hear how the needy person is doing even when the chances of improvement are not great.”


DEPENDENT MEASURES

Dependent measure: Volunteering to help Katie418 BATSON, BATSON, SLINGSBY, HARRELL, PEEKNA, TODD

dence from these two checks, we concluded that the empathymanipulation was successful.

Relationship of self-reports of empathy, distress, and sadness.In keeping with the measurement issues raised earlier and theprevious observations of the relative indistinguishability of self-reports of empathy and distress in response to the need situa-tion used in this study (Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al, 1988), aprincipal-components analysis of responses to the six empathyadjectives, eight distress adjectives {alarmed, grieved, troubled,distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, and perturbed), and foursadness adjectives {low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, andsad) revealed that with the exception of perturbed, all of theseadjectives loaded on a single component. Omitting perturbedfrom the list produced a one-component solution (eigenvalue =11.13). All 17 adjectives loaded .60 or higher on this component.This one-component solution suggested that in response to thepresent need situation, the so-called empathy, distress, and sad-ness adjectives actually measured a single underlying dimen-sion.

One interpretation of this dimension was, as Batson et al.(1989) and Batson et al. (1988) suggested, that the distress andsadness adjectives were at least as good an index of empathicfeelings for Katie as were the empathy adjectives. This interpre-tation seemed even more plausible in light of the highly signifi-cant main effect of the empathy manipulation on an index cre-ated by averaging responses to all 17 adjectives (Ms = 3.14 and4.92 for the low- and high-empathy conditions, respectively),F{\, 66) = 51.41, p< .0001 (Fs < 1.0 for the feedback manipula-tion and the interaction). Other interpretations were that thesingle dimension reflected general arousal or either distress orsadness. In any case, the lack of clear differentiation betweenempathy and distress responses called into question the appro-priateness of creating an empathy-minus-distress index in re-sponse to this need situation.

Effect of anticipated feedback on the empathy-helping rela-tionship. Helping responses were coded in two ways. First, theproportion of subjects who volunteered any amount of timeserved as a dichotomous measure of helping (0 = no help, 1 =help); second, scores on the 4-point scale of number of hoursvolunteered {0 = 0hr,l = 3-5 hr, 2 = 6-8 hr, and 3 = 9-10 hr)served as a continuous measure. Scores on the continuous mea-sure were badly skewed (29 subjects did not help, 33 subjectsvolunteered 3-5 hr, 5 subjects volunteered 6-8 hr, and 5 subjectsvolunteered 9-10 hr) and indicated an underlying dichotomy ofresponses. Therefore, we adopted the dichotomous measure asour major index of helping. As a check, we also analyzed thescaled measure.

Table 1 contains the proportion of subjects volunteering tohelp Katie in each cell of the 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3(no information, no feedback, feedback) design. Means on thescaled measure are also reported.

An analysis of variance on the proportion of subjects volun-teering to help Katie in each cell (normal approximation usingthe arcsine transformation; see Langer & Abelson, 1972; Winer,1971) revealed a reliable empathy main effect, x2(l, N=12) =5.04, p < .025. This main effect was, however, qualified by amarginally significant interaction, x2(2, N= 72) = 4.87, p <. 10.Inspection of cell means and tests for simple main effects re-vealed evidence of the empathy-helping relationship predicted

Table 1Proportion of Subjects Agreeing to Help Katiein Each Cell of Experiment 1

Empathycondition

LowProportionM

HighProportionM

No informationabout feedback

.420.67

.751.00

Information about feedback

No feedback

.330.33

.831.17

Feedback

.670.92

.580.75

Note, n = 12 per cell. The means are those for the scaled measure ofhelping, ranging from no help (0), 3-5 hr (1), 6-8 hr (2), to 9-10 hr (3).

by the empathy-altruism hypothesis in both the no-informa-tion (replication) condition (z = 1.69, p < .05, one-tailed) and theno-feedback condition (z = 2.62, p < .005, one-tailed). Thesignificant difference in the no-feedback condition was con-trary to the prediction of the empathic-joy hypothesis.

Unexpected by both the empathic-joy hypothesis and the em-pathy-altruism hypothesis, there was no evidence of an em-pathy-helping relationship in the feedback condition. We con-ducted further analyses to determine why. Although the rate ofhelping in the high-empathy/feedback cell was somewhat lowerthan the rate in the other two high-empathy cells, neither ofthese differences approached statistical significance (both zs <1.40). Instead, the lack of an empathy-helping relationship inthe feedback condition seemed to be due primarily to the rela-tively high helping among the low-empathy subjects led to antic-ipate feedback; there was a marginally significant increase inthe proportion of low-empathy subjects helping in the feedbackcondition (.67) compared to the no-feedback condition (.33; z =1.66, p < .10, two-tailed). Rather than the helping of high-em-pathy subjects dropping to the level of low-empathy subjects inthe no-feedback condition, as had been predicted by the em-pathic-joy hypothesis, the helping of low-empathy subjects roseto the level of high-empathy subjects in the feedback condition.Low-empathy subjects, not high-empathy subjects, were theones whose helping increased with anticipation of feedback.

In retrospect, this unexpected increase seemed entirely rea-sonable. Empathic emotion is, of course, not the only source ofmotivation to help, and it seemed reasonable that low-empathysubjects, less focused on Katie's welfare than high-empathy sub-jects, would be more focused on the potential social and self-re-wards for helping, including the vicarious pleasure of knowingKatie was better. Perhaps they, rather than high-empathy sub-jects, had, in Smith et al.'s (1989) words, "enhanced sensitivity tovicarious joy" (p. 642), and so helped "in order to be happy"(p. 641).

Finally, note that contrary to the assumption of Smith et al.(1989), subjects' responses in the no-information condition par-alleled those of subjects explicitly told that they would not re-ceive feedback more than those of subjects told that they wouldreceive feedback. The scaled measure of helping patterned ex-actly as did the dichotomous measure, although effects weresomewhat weaker.


ANALYSIS

An analysis of variance on the proportion of subjects volunteering to help Katie in each cell revealed a reliable empathy main effect, x2(l, N=12) = 5.04, p < .025. This main effect was, however, qualified by a marginally significant interaction, x2(2, N= 72) = 4.87, p <. 10.

x2 - Chi-squared, ANOVA

degrees of freedom, (d-1)

p - significance, importance of .05

N - number of participants


SYMHEDONIASympathy for another’s good fortune


WHY THIS PAPER?

7 STUDIES

WHY ARE WE COVERING THIS PAPER: “sympathy is a concept capable of dual affective tone, its dominant meaning remains that of a negative emotional state anchored in and tending toward the alleviation of another’s misfortune.”

However, it can also be involved in positive affect.

METHODS: QUESTIONNAIRES ABOUT ATTACHMENT, SYMPATHY, AND “FEELING GOOD FOR ANOTHER”


IVS, DVS, AND FINDINGS

IVS?

DVS?

FINDINGS?


FINDINGS, STUDY 7

Not an experiment, “none of them manipulated attachment directly”

FINDINGS: WHAT IS Y-AXIS?

To test for possible effects of attachment, type of sympatheticresponse, and the interaction between the two, we performed a 2(order: sympathy first vs. symhedonia first) ! 2 (attachment level:best friend vs. casual acquaintance) ! 2 (type of sympatheticresponse: sympathy vs. symhedonia) mixed ANOVA, with orderand attachment as between-groups factors and type of sympatheticresponse as a within-group factor. The analyses revealed twosignificant main effects and one significant interaction effect. Onemain effect was the within-group effect of response type, F(1,156) " 30.20, p # .001, with sympathy stronger than symhedonia.The second main effect was the between-groups effect of relation-ship type, with higher total sympathy and symhedonia for the bestfriend than for the casual acquaintance, F(1, 156) " 76.60, p #.001, one-tailed. Most critically, the predicted interaction wassignificant; sympathy ratings for the best friend (M " 85.85) andthe casual acquaintance (M " 69.87) were closer to each other thanthe corresponding ratings for symhedonia (best friend, M " 83.53;casual acquaintance, M " 56.74), F(1, 156) " 12.07, p # .001,one-tailed (see Figure 2). No other effects were significant.

A further set of analyses was performed to assess a possiblerelationship between sympathy, symhedonia, and attachment levelwithin the casual-acquaintance category. There were significantcorrelations between attachment and symhedonia, r(78) " .63, p #.001, one-tailed; attachment and sympathy, r(78) " .34, p " .002,one-tailed; and sympathy and symhedonia, r(78) " .55, p # .001,one-tailed. Applying a test of significance for nonindependentcorrelations (Howell, 1997, p. 265), the difference between thefirst two correlations proved statistically significant, t(75) " 3.42,p # .01, one-tailed. Sympathy, though somewhat more intensethan symhedonia, appears to be more independent of priorattachment.

General Discussion

Conclusions, Concerns, and Caveats

We conducted a series of exploratory studies testing variousaspects of the attachment-contingency hypothesis by tapping intotwo potential sources of sympathy and symhedonia in everydaylife, actual and imagined (simulated) experiences of others. Ourfindings are most consistent with the attachment-contingency hy-pothesis: Sympathy and symhedonia differed in the extent of theirattachment sensitivity or communal bias, with symhedonia beingthe more selective, partial, or attachment sensitive of the two.

On the other hand, our results do not fit well with the symhe-donia lower costliness hypothesis. They also challenge the sym-hedonia scarcity hypothesis. It is true that in Study 7, the ratedintensity of sympathy (M " 78.06) exceeded the rated intensity ofsymhedonia (M " 70.48). But both means were high in absoluteterms, with the overall sympathy being only 1.11 times higher thanthe overall symhedonia. In short, in direct contradiction to thesymhedonia scarcity hypothesis, symhedonia appears be some-what (but nonsignificantly) less common and only trivially lessintense than sympathy.

Consistent with the equal contingency hypothesis, the reportedintensity of both sympathy and symhedonia was significantlyhigher when the target person was the best friend rather than acasual acquaintance (Study 7). Also, consistent with the equalcontingency hypothesis, the likelihood of experiencing symhedo-nia seems biased toward high-attachment targets (Studies 1–3, 5).On the other hand, contrary to this hypothesis, the likelihood ofexperiencing sympathy did not seem to vary consistently as afunction of prior attachment (Studies 1–3, 5). Moreover, the equalcontingency hypothesis is not equipped to account for the findingsof sympathy’s greater range, robustness, or the relatively weak tie

Figure 2. Sympathy and symhedonia intensity as a function of relationship type.

90 ROYZMAN AND ROZIN


QUICK GROUP WORK (3~PPL)WE’VE LOOKED AT BATSON’S WORK, ROYZMAN AND ROZIN, PRESTON AND DE WAAL....

USING SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AS A FRAME AND CONTEXT, COME UP WITH A GENERAL EXAMPLE OF WHERE/WHEN EMPATHY OR SYMHEDONIA ARE POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY AFFECTED AND WHY

SPECULATE ON WAYS TO ENHANCE THE POSITIVE OR MITIGATE THE NEGATIVE

SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES INCLUDE: TWITTER, FACEBOOK, RENREN, GAIA ONLINE, LINKEDIN, ETC.

YOU CAN APPROACH THIS FROM A PROXIMATE POSITION OR AN ULTIMATE BASE POSITION


7-10 MINUTES


SHARE

POSITIVE INSTANCES: MORE PEOPLE TO FEEL SYMHEDONIA WITH,

NEGATIVE INSTANCES: NOT CENSORING SELF,

VARIANCE OF SYMPATHY AND THEY MIGHT FEEL BAD THAT THEY CAN’T HELP

FACEBOOK DEATH MINIMIZES IMPORTANCE

EASIER TO SHARE (POS AND NEG)

EXTERNAL VALIDATION (POS AND NEG)


PROMPT FOR ONE-PAGER

FROM A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE, BUT UNDERPINNED BY WHAT WE LEARNED ABOUT EMPATHY THIS WEEK, HAVE YOU WITNESSED SPECIFIC INSTANCES WHERE EMPATHY WAS UNDERMINED BY TECHNOLOGY OTHER THAN SOCIAL NETWORKING? PLEASE DESCRIBE TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY AND USE NEW TERMINOLOGY WHERE APPROPRIATE.


QUESTIONS?


lecture two for engendering compassion through interactive digital media

Technology