lecture title: east asia and the end of the cold war 冷戦の終

Lecture Title: East Asia and the End of the Cold War [冷戦の終わり]

The Tiananmen Square Massacre [六四天安門事件] of June 1989 •  Despite the successes of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms [鄧小平の改革], at the domestic political level (中国の国内政治の中で), tensions (政治的緊張) over the pace [速度] and direction [方向] of change in China began to re-surface [再浮上する].

•  Hard-line [強硬な] left-wing [左派] individuals within the CCP

[中国共産党] complained about ‘bourgeois liberalism’ [ブルジョア自由主義] and ‘spiritual pollution’ [精神的な汚染] increasingly infiltrating [ますます浸潤している] Chinese society as it gradually became more affluent [中国の社会は徐々により裕福になりました], more open to foreign influences [外国の影響], and more liberal [自由主義的な] (see 1983 ‘Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign’ [反精神的な汚染キャンペーン] Poster ).

•  Despite his support for economic development [経済発展] based around free market economics [自由市場経済], Deng did not tolerate [容認しませんでした] discussions about Western democracy or multiparty elections [自由主義 / 複数の政党選挙]. The priority [優先] was maintaining the CCP’s authority [中国共産党の権威] over the huge country.

Lecture 14 Presentation 1

•  As a result of China’s economic rise [中国の経済台頭の結果

として], many young Chinese people were more educated [教育のある], informed about international events [国際的なイベントについての知識], middle class [中産階級], urban [都市], more influenced by Western ideas [西洋の思想の影響を受けて], and less willing [不本意である] than their predecessors [先人] to reflexively accept [反射的に受け入れる] the dictates [訓令] of the CCP (中国共産党) [see photo]. A more numerous intellectual class　[もっと数多くの知的クラス] in China also evolved [進化した] in the 1980s.

•  The mid to late 1980s was a time of major political change (主要な政治的変化) in places such as Eastern Europe [東ヨーロッパ], the Philippines [1986], South Korea [1987], Taiwan [1987-1988], and the Soviet Union (ソビエト連邦) [1985 - 1991]. Note ‘Glasnost and Perestroika’ policy [グラスノスチとペレストロイカのソ連の改革政策] in the USSR.

•  In the PRC [中華人民共和国], there were divisions [分裂]

between political elites [政治的なエリート] who were sympathetic [同情的な] to the idea of limited political liberalization [限られた政治的自由化], and political elites who believed that such reforms would be disastrous [悲惨な] for China. A notable [著名] example of this division [分裂] within the party elite [中国の共産党エリート] was the case of Hu Yaobang [胡耀邦 /こようほう] (Party General Secretary [中国党書記長] from 1982 until 1987) [see photo of Hu during the Tiananmen Square protests (六四天安門のデモ) in the April to June period in 1989].

Lecture 14 Presentation

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•  The unexpected death [突然死] of Hu Yaobang [胡耀邦 /こよ

うほう] on April 15th 1989, became the catalyst [刺戟] for demonstrations [デモ] in central Beijing’s massive Tiananmen Square [天安門広場]. Within a few days, tens of thousands of Chinese citizens [何万もの中国の市民], most of them students, had set up camp [野営した] in the square to honour [敬う] Hu, a man they regarded [看做した] as a supporter of political freedom [自由主義] [see photos].

•  By May, Deng had run out of patience [根負けした] and demanded action [行動を要求した]. For Deng, the protests reminded [思い出した] him of the days of the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命] (1966 to 1976), and represented a major obstacle [重大な障害] to the PRC’s smooth [問題のない] and successful economic rise [経済発展].

•  On June 4th, 1989, PLA soldiers [人民解放軍という中国の軍事組織], backed up [兵士は戦車でバックアップされた] by tanks, finally entered Tiananmen Square [天安門広場] and its surrounding areas [周辺], and killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of demonstrators, most of them young people (多くのデモ参加者を殺しました) [see photo].

•  The PRC suffered diplomatically [外交的に] as a

consequence [結果として] of the Tiananmen Massacre [天安門虐殺]. The US and other powerful countries placed sanctions and other punitive measures [強圧手段] on China [中華人民共和国に経済的制裁を適用した].


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•  The global reaction [グローバルな反応] seemed at first to undermine [覆す] Deng’s economic reform program [鄧小平の経済改革プログラム] after foreign loans and new foreign investment [外国投資] dramatically decreased [劇的に減少した]. [see photo of ‘tank man’ (無名の反逆者) near Tiananmen Square (天安門広場)].

•  Deng [鄧小平], however, was adamant [断固とした] that he had made the

correct decision [正しい選択] – the top priority [ 優先] was stability and order [国内安定性 / 治安を保持すること], which he believed necessitated [必要とした] a strong and disciplined [統制の] government and not political chaos [政治的混乱]. Within a number of months and years [多数の月と年以内に], the world’s most powerful countries began to gradually lift their sanctions [制裁を解除すること] and to benefit once again from the huge profits [莫大な利益] and potential of the Chinese marketplace [中華人民共和国の市場] (see photo of Deng thanking Chinese army officers a few days after the Tiananmen Square Massacre [六四天安門事件])

•  As Cohen argues, ‘Deng’s choices had been vindicated [その後の成り行きで彼に対する嫌疑は完全に晴れた]. China was too big, too powerful, too promising [有望な] a market for goods and capital [資本] to be isolated [孤立する]. The growth of its economy resumed [経済成長は再開しました] at an exceptionally high rate [非常に高い率], its people grew more prosperous [繁栄], and many of them, too, seemed prepared to accept the contract the state offered　[政府の公約]: forget politics and enjoy the good life’ [政治を忘れて善良な生活を楽しむこと] (Cohen, 2000:453).

•  After the Tiananmen Square Massacre [六四天安門事件], relations between the US and the PRC [中華人民共和国] remained strained [緊張関係] and arguably never returned to their heyday [全盛期] in the 1970s and 1980s. (See photo of a disappointed PRC Olympic Committee [中国のオリンピック委員会メンバー] in 1993 after Beijing’s bid to host the Olympics in 2000 [北京の招致運動] lost by only two votes)


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Democratic Reforms in Taiwan •  From the early 1970s until his death in 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo [蒋経国 -しょ

うけいこく] (1910 – 1988), Chiang Kai-shek [蒋介石] (1887 – 1975)’s son, was the Premier [内閣総理大臣] and then the President of Taiwan [see photo].

•  Though a devoted supporter [献身的なサポーター] of the KMT system (中国国民党), Chiang Junior (Jnr.) proved himself more adaptable [融通のきく人] to change [変化に適応できる] than his father.

•  He refused to crush [圧し折る] the technically illegal （法的には違法）

opposition (野党) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) [民主進歩党] (established [設立されました] in 1986) even though KMT hardliners [中国国民党の硬派] wanted him to do so. The DPP [民主進歩党] continued to field candidates [候補者を擁立] in elections and won up to twenty per cent of the vote [投票の20パーセント] in 1986.

•  In the following year (1987), Chiang Junior [蒋経国] ended 38 years of martial law [戒厳令] in Taiwan, and allowed greater freedom of expression [表現の自由]. When he died in 1988, he was succeeded by [に受け継がれた] vice-president Lee Teng-hui [李登輝 -りとうき、リー・テンフェ][see photo].

•  Under Lee’s leadership, the island’s democratic reforms continued and economic development progressed [前総統の李登輝は国民党の独裁政治を廃し台湾内での民主化を導いた。/経済発展は進行した]. A number of DPP candidates [候補者] controversially advocated [論争的に提唱した] official and formal independence [公式や正式な独立] for Taiwan.

•  The Tiananmen Square massacre [六四天安門事件] in June 1989 also further

eroded [浸食した] any interest amongst the Taiwanese for reunification [再統一] with the non-democratic [非民主的な] and communist [共産の] People’s Republic of China (PRC) [中華人民共和国] (see photo of Taiwanese activists [政治活動家] remembering the Tiananmen Square massacre – June 2014 ).


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Democratic Reforms [民主改革] and the Nuclear Threat [核の脅威 /核兵器の脅威] on the Korean Peninsula [朝鮮半島] •  Following increased demands [需要が増えた] for

political liberalization [政治的自由化] and workers’ rights [労働者の権利] since the early 1980s, the South Korean military leadership (韓国の軍のリーダーシップ) finally relented [折れた] in 1987 and promised to allow free elections [自由選挙] [see photo from the Gwangju Uprising [5.18光州民主化運動] in South Korea in 1980 -光州広域市（クァンジュこういきし)].

•  In early 1988, free presidential elections [自由名大統領の選挙] were held in South Korea [see photo of a workers’ strike (争議) in South Korea in 1987 – note the June Democracy Movement (6月民主抗争)]. In 1988, the Olympic Games [近代オリンピック大会] were held in Seoul [ソウル] (see photo).

•  In 1991, in a sign of the new post-Cold War era [冷戦後], North Korea and South Korea were accepted as members of the United Nations [国際連合の加盟国]. The PRC [中華人民共和国] also normalized relations [国交を正常化した] with South Korea in August 1992.


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•  The end of the Cold War [冷戦の終わり] and the collapse of the USSR [ソ連の崩壊] caused serious difficulties [重大な困難] for the North Korean dictatorship [北朝鮮の独裁] because the country was diplomatically and economically isolated [外交的、経済的に孤立した]. It desperately depended on [必死に依存した] Chinese aid and assistance [中国の補助と援助]. North Korea also felt vulnerable [北朝鮮は弱いと感じました] in terms of its defence and security [防御と保安].

•  After the early 1990s, in order to address [問題に対処すること] its economic and security vulnerabilities [脆弱さ], North Korea, a desperately poor country [非常に貧しい国], made serious efforts [真剣に努力した] to build nuclear weapons [核兵器を開発すること]. It then used its nuclear weapons development programs [核兵器] as a way to blackmail [恐喝] economic assistance [経済援助] and security assurance [セキュリティ保証] from the outside world, in particular the USA [see photo of Kim Jong-il (金正日 -キム・ジョンイル) and a North Korean rocket launch (ロケット打ち上げ /ロケット発射)].

•  This nuclear threat [核兵器の脅威] has been a major

destabilising effect [主要な不安定化効果] on the security of North-east Asia [北東アジア] throughout the 1990s and to the present day [現代]. [see map of North Korean missile ranges – (ミサイルの射程 / 北朝鮮のミサイルの範囲)].


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Changes in Southeast Asia [東南アジアの変化] •  In 1967, Southeast Asian (SEA) states came together to form the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[東南アジア諸国連合]. [アセアン / 東南アジア諸国連合）は、東南アジア10か国の経済・社会・政治・安全保障・文化に関する地域協力機構].

•  ASEAN’s success in helping to end the Vietnamese occupation

of Cambodia [カンボジアのベトナムの占領 / note the influence of the Vietnam - Cambodia War (カンボジア・ベトナム戦争) 1975 – 1989)] in the late 1980s and the early 1990s earned it a lot of respect [尊敬を受けた] in the region. The years after the end of the Cold War [冷戦の終わり] saw a dramatic increase [劇的な増加] in the number of states becoming members of ASEAN. (See chart showing ASEAN Plus Three [ASEANプラス3] since 1997).

•  By the late 1980s and early 1990s however, a new threat had appeared on the horizon [新しい脅威が地平線上に現れた]. This time, it was China’s activities in maritime areas (海上) such as the South China Sea [南シナ海] [see map], and the massive rise [大規模な上昇] in its defence spending [防衛費] (particularly in naval upgrades [海軍のアップグレード] for the People’s Liberation Army Navy [中国人民解放軍海軍] or PLAN) which created anxieties [不安] throughout all of East Asia, north and south.


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•  In 1992, Beijing [北京] also passed a law [法律を可決した]

which claimed most of the East China Sea [東シナ海] (including Taiwan and the Pinnacle (Senkaku Shoto [尖閣諸島) or Diaoyudao) Islands) as well as most of the South China Sea [南シナ海] as irrefutable Chinese territory [反駁できない中国の領土]. Beijing also claimed that it reserved the right [権利を主張した] to use military force [軍事力を使う] to defend its claims [中国の領土を守るために] if necessary.

•  In 1993, ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [ASEAN地域フォーラム（ARF）] in order to prevent [防止するために] possible skirmishes [小競り合い] or warfare [戦争] by asking Beijing to engage in multilateral talks [多国間協議に従事する] over political and security issues of concern in the region [東アジアの政治問題とセキュリティ問題] (see map).

•  Despite such diplomatic endeavours [外交努力], the issue of how to address maritime disputes [海上紛争] and China’s increased activities [中国人民解放軍海軍の活動] in East Asian waters continued to be one of the most important security issues [ も深刻なセキュリティ問題] of the 1990s (and up to the present day [現代]) in East Asia (see photo of a ship-ramming incident in the East China Sea [東シナ海] in 2010 -尖閣諸島中国漁船衝突事件).


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Key Points •  By the 1980s, most communist governments [共産主義の政府] (but not

China) had failed to improve the living standards [生活水準] of their citizens [国民]. This was particularly true in countries that had adopted [採用していた] strictly communist economic policies [厳密に共産主義経済政策]. For example, North Korea [北朝鮮].

•  The collapse of communism [共産主義の崩壊] in Eastern Europe symbolised [象徴した] by the fall of the Berlin Wall [ベルリンの壁の崩壊] in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR [ソ連の崩壊] in 1991 represented the ultimate [究極の] global political and economic failure of the communist ideology [共産主義のイデオロギーの失敗].

•  In the USSR [ソ連], Gorbachev’s [ゴルバチョフ] attempts [試み] at

promoting economic growth via his glasnost [グラスノスチ] and perestroika [ペレストロイカ] policies [政策] proved to be disastrous failures [悲惨な失敗] that contributed to the eventual destruction [ 終的な破壊] of the Soviet Union [ソ連]. This outcome [結果] also provided Beijing with some important lessons [(失敗に)懲りること] for how to approach political reform [政治改革] and regional autonomy [地域自治] [see map showing China’s different ethnic groups (民族)].

•  The Tiananmen Massacre [天安門虐殺] of June 1989 highlighted [表示し

た] the weakness of communism [共産主義の弱さ] to hold the China together, and to unite [結合する] the people behind the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [中国共産党という,中国の政党]. More emphasis [重点を置く] was therefore placed afterwards on alternatives [代替] such as nationalist pride [ナショナリスト誇り / 民族主義] (see photos), territorial integrity [領土の保全], and economic prosperity [経済繁栄].


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•  After the Cold War [冷戦の終わり] ended, and the USSR collapsed [ソ連が

崩壊した], the US and the new Russian Federation [ロシア連邦] (previously the Soviet Union [ソ連]) significantly reduced [著しく減少した] their military forces [軍隊] in East Asia in the early 1990s. As a result [結果として], there was a security vacuum [セキュリティの空白] in the region.

Challenges in East Asia in the Years after the Cold War [冷戦終の新たな挑戦] •  North Korea [北朝鮮] continues to use missiles tests [ミサイルテスト] and

the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation [核兵器拡散の脅威] to increase its leverage [力点] and bargaining power [交渉力] in multi-lateral negotiations [多国間交渉].

•  Japan’s economic bubble era [バブル経済] ended in the late 1980s and

early 1990s. This development represented the beginning of a decade of economic decline [経済の衰退の十年] (the ‘lost decade’) [失われた10年] [see picture] and political instability [政治不安]. A major consequence [主要な結果] of this was a loss in Japanese confidence [日本人の自信の減少], and a greater sensitivity [感受性] to the rising power of China [昇る中国].

•  In the years after the Cold War ended [冷戦終], there was a rise in nationalist sentiment [ナショナリストの感情の上昇] in East Asia. This development complicated approaches to the resolution [紛争は複雑になりました] of historical controversies [歴史論争], disputes [紛争] over Taiwan, in the South China Sea [南シナ海], the East China Sea [東シナ海], and the Sea of Japan [日本海] (East Sea) [see photo of a anti-Japanese demonstration (反日デモ) in South Korea (韓国), and former Japanese PM (首相) Koizumi (小泉純一郎) visiting the controversial [議論の] Yasukuni Shrine (靖国神社)].


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•  There have been some serious frictions [深刻な摩擦] between

the US and China. Examples included the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis [台湾海峡危機], the 1998 Embassy bombing in Belgrade [中国大使館爆撃事件 /ベオグラード・セルビア], the 2001 Hainan Island spy plane incident [海南島事件], and disagreements about the freedom of navigation [航行の自由] in the South China Sea [南シナ海] (see Chinese fishing ships blocking a US navy ship (米国の軍艦) in the South China Sea).

•  There was an increase in tensions [摩擦の増加] over territorial

disputes [領土紛争], especially in maritime areas [海上] such as the South China Sea [南シナ海]. Amongst other reasons, energy competition [エネルギー競争] for oil, gas, and other resources essential for economic growth [経済成長のために不可欠な資源] played a major role in these maritime frictions [海上の摩擦] (see anti-Chinese protests [反中国デモ] in the Philippines [フィリピン]).

•  There are many uncertainties [不確実性] about China’s rise [中国の台頭]. For example, issues like the dramatic rise in the PRC’s military spending [中国の軍事支出の劇的な上昇 – see chart (図表)] and military capabilities [軍事力], the higher frequency [高周波化] in frictions in maritime areas [海域の摩擦], Beijing’s defence strategy [防衛戦略], worries about how the Chinese may deal with energy and natural resource shortages [エネルギーと天然資源の不足], political reforms [政治改革] within the PRC, and the sustainability [持続可能性] of China’s present economic growth [経済成長].


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lecture title: east asia and the end of the cold war 冷戦の終

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