lecture seven
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Updated: 24 April 2007. FINA 522: Project Finance and Risk Analysis. Lecture Seven. Managing Contingent Liabilities. Contingent Liabilities In Infrastructure: East Asian Experience Philippines Experience Indonesian Experience Malaysian Experience. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Lecture Seven
FINA 522: Project Finance and Risk Analysis
Updated: 24 April 2007
Managing Contingent Liabilities
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Contingent Liabilities In Infrastructure: East Asian Experience
• Philippines Experience• Indonesian Experience• Malaysian Experience
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Contingent LiabilitiesMain Source of Infrastructure Contingent Liabilities, The Philippines
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Sources of Contingent Liabilities
Transportation – Road Projects- Government guaranteed minimum
revenues- Problem with overly optimistic demand
projections- Cost overruns
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Malaysia - Transportation
- Two Kuala Lumpur light rail projects- Extensive toll road program - 26 projects- Government has provided extensive
guarantees of revenues to private investor- Guarantee of loan against default
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Monte Carlo Estimates of Contingent Exposure to Transport Projects in Malaysia
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From Contingent to Real Liabilities:Malaysia's North-South Highway (PLUS)
Under the 1986 concession agreement for the North-South Highway, automatic toll increases equal to the greater of 6 percent or the annual increase in the consumer price index. If the eligible toll increase is denied, the concessionaire must be compensated an equivalent amount by the government. Permitting a formula-driven toll rate increase creates a contingent liability for the government that grows with each additional year the eligible increase is denied. Since 1996, the government has denied the full increase permitted under the concession agreement. The government budgets for this expense, which for the PLUS concession average 80.5 million for 1996 and 1997 and which increased sharply to MYR145 million for 1998 (because of the cumulative denial of rate increases for successive years).
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Electric Power Sector
- Contingent liabilities arise through “take-or-pay” contracts
- IPP strategy allows for rapid expansion of generation capacity
- However, contingent liabilities can be large of demand electricity does not naturalize
- Has been disputes in Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand
- No disputes in Philippines
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Malaysia - Electricity
Tenaga – the public utility (largely government owned)
- Tenaga signed long term take or pay contracts for IPPs
- Exchange rate devalued in 1998- Ringgit cost of dollar denominated debt of
IPPs rise and this is passed on contract to Tenaga in higher power changes
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Malaysia – Electricity cont’d
- Tenaga could not raise electricity rates to customers so much
- Tenaga’s financial position worsened- Electricity demand stayed strong- To reduce interest cost of borrowing
Tenaga swapped dollar denominated debt for Yen- denominated debt to get lower interest rate
- Took on risk of Yen appreciation
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Indonesia - Electricity
- Public electric utility PLN signed 26 long-term take-or-pay contracts with Independent power produces
- Cost of power high relative to what it can change its customers
- Rupial value of US dollar denominated debt rise rapidly as Rupial depreciated in economic crisis
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Indonesia – Electricity (cont’d)
- Energy demand fell with economic crisis in 1997-1998 hence, excess capacity and revenues did not keep up with growth in costs
- Situation got worse for PLN as more IPPs got build and came on stream
- PLN not able to meet its obligations- Government stopped negotiations for more
capacity- Government had to take over PLN’s obligations
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How to Manage Risk Contingent Liabilities Better
- Should have more competition in power generation sector
- Past contracts far too costly- Electricity distribution rates to final
customers have to be more flexible not so much price capped
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Malaysia – Sanitation PPPIWK contract took over sewerage services from local
governments- Private firm selected for contract without competitions- Initially yielded a larger improvement in investment and
service- Customer’s protested the high rates IWK changed- Contracts signed with people who (IWK) were politically
connected. Customers did not think rates changed were fair.
- Poor rate of collection of bills for sewerage from customers
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Malaysia Sanitation
- Size of rehabilitation investment underestimated by IWK
- Concession agreement not complete- Poor tariff and compensation structure- No interim performance targets- Government had to give MIR 450 million in
additional long-term soft loans to IWK- Government eventually had to take over
the company
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Malaysia Sanitation Mistakes:- No competitive bidding- Awarded Single Contract for whole country, hence,
government did not have ability to compare performance of different operations
- Government guaranteed to a minimum rate of return. Hence, no incentive to contain costs
- Should not have separated water utility from sewerage utility
- People willing to pay for water sewerage is just a negative externality of water systems
- Impossible to disconnect sewerage lines if customer doesn’t not pay.
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How Much Risk do Malaysian Project Sponsors Really Take?
Private participation in Malaysia is less than the value of the “private” projects.
Government has provided support through several mechanisms: “soft” loans, equity investments, directed lending through banks and provident funds, and various explicit and implicit guarantees
- Government soft loans – carry low interest rates- Equity participation – is carried out through government- owned
holding companies- Government guarantees - minimum revenue of traffic volume is
guaranteed, the take-or-pay capacity payment arrangements, stands ready to compensate lenders and project equity providers in the event of project termination, a minimum rate of return to the equity holders.
- Lending by domestic financial institutions (Including EPF (EMPLOYMENT PROVIDENT FUND (PENSIONS FUND) and other government- directed entities) has been a strength of Malaysia infrastructure development
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Risk Management - Reducing the risk of source- Transfer risk to parties better able to bear the risk- Monitor and manage any residual riskActions:- Need to reduce vulnerability of country to shocks - Chile used privatization for less risky sectors - electricity - used more competition to reduce costs - privatization done to reduce costsMalaysia:- Privatized Sectors that were hard to serve- risky-
transportation and sewerage- Costs were not controlled were privatized
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Management of Contingent Liabilities
1. Macroeconomic stability is very important• A stable growing economy reduces the incidence
of contingent liabilities coming due• E.g. exchange rate, market risk
2. Political Risk• governments need to avoid creating political risks• If greater macroeconomic instability or political
risk, then private sector will require greater rate of return. This creates an economic cost to the country because the consumers will have to pay a higher price
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• Market risk is dangerous for contingent liabilities– There should be clear evidence of adequate
demand before PPP is implemented– Perhaps better for government to make
investment and then let it out as a concession if demand for the project is uncertain
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• Cost Overruns– Usually cost overruns are a function of poor
quality of work done at pre-feasibility and feasibility stages and project design.
– There needs to be full information shared by all the parties
– Surprises are costly– Ability of PPP sponsor and SPV to implement
the project is critical
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• Accounting for Contingent Liabilities• There needs to be transparent
accountability for all contingent liabilities borne by the government
• Surprises cause capital outflows, therefore leading to exchange rate fluctuation and banking crisis that increases the financial and business risks of the project
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• Matching of Life of Project and Terms of financing
• PPPs in infrastructure have lives of 15 to 30 years
• Often financing can only be obtained with 7 to 10 years term
• This forces high tariffs to be charged in early years of the project
• If prices higher than quantity demanded will decrease causing a cashflow deficiency