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  • 8/6/2019 Lecture 9 Trusted Clouds

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    Trusted Clouds

    Dr. Zahid Anwar

    Trusted ComputingMS-CCS-3

    Credits: 3 0

    Spring 2011

    Dr. Zahid Anwar

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    2

    Lets hear from the experts

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    3

    The infinite wisdom of the crowds (via Google Suggest)

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    Weve redefined Cloud Computing

    to include everything that we

    already do. . . . I dont understand

    what we would do differently in the

    4

    Larry Ellison,

    founder of Oracle

    ig t o C ou Computing ot er t an

    change the wording of some of our

    ads.

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    Its stupidity. Its worse

    than stupidity: its a

    marketing hype campaign

    5

    Richard Stallman

    GNU

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    Cloud Computing will

    become a focal point of

    our work in security. Im

    6

    Ron Rivest

    The R of RSA

    optimistic

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    Tremendous Buzz

    Cloud computing achieves a

    quicker return oninvestment

    (Lindsay Armstrong ofsalesforce.com, Dec 2008)

    Economic downturn, theappeal of that cost advantage

    will be greatly magnified"

    (IDC, 2008)

    Not only is it faster and moreflexible, it is cheaper. [] the

    emergence of cloud models radicallyalters the cost benefit decision

    (FT Mar 6, 2009)

    No less influential than e-business

    (Gartner, 2008)

    Revolution, the biggest upheaval since the invention ofthe PC in the 1970s [] IT departments will have little left to

    do once the bulk of business computing shifts [] into thecloud

    (Nicholas Carr, 2008)

    The economics are compelling, with businessapplications made three to five times cheaper and

    consumer applications five to 10 timescheaper

    (Merrill Lynch, May, 2008)

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    So, What really is Cloud Computing?

    Cloud computing is a new computing paradigm,involving data and/or computation outsourcing,with

    Infinite and elastic resource scalability

    On demand just-in-time provisioning

    No upfront cost pay-as-you-go

    8

    That is, use as much or as less you need, use only when you

    want, and pay only what you use,

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    The real story

    Computing Utility holy grail of computer

    science in the 1960s. Code name: MULTICS

    9

    Why it failed?

    Ahead of time lack of communication tech.

    (In other words, there was NO (public) Internet)

    And personal computer became cheaper and

    stronger

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    The real story

    Mid to late 90s,

    Grid computing

    was proposed to

    link and share

    computing

    resources

    10

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    The real story continued

    Post-dot-com bust, big

    companies ended up with large

    data centers, with low

    utilization

    11

    Solution: Throw in virtualization technology, and sell

    the excess computing power

    And thus, Cloud Computing was born

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    Cloud computing provides numerous

    economic advantages

    For clients:

    No upfront commitment in buying/leasing hardware

    Can scale usage according to demand

    Barriers to entry lowered for startups

    For providers:

    Increased utilization of datacenter resources

    12

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    Delivery Models

    Software as a Service (SaaS) Use providers applications over a network SalesForce.com

    Platform as a Service (PaaS) Deploy customer-created applications to a cloud

    AppEng

    Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

    Rent processing, storage, network capacity, and otherfundamental computing resources EC2, S3

    13

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    Cloud computing means selling X as a

    serviceIaaS: Infrastructure as a Service

    Selling virtualized hardware

    aa : a orm as a serv ce

    Access to a configurable platform/API

    SaaS: Software as a service

    Software that runs on top of a cloud

    14

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    Cloud computing architecture

    e.g., Web browser

    SaaS , e.g., Google Docs

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    PaaS, e.g., Google AppEngine

    IaaS, e.g., Amazon EC2

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    Different types of cloud computing

    IaaSPaaS

    16

    Amazon EC2

    Clients can rent

    virtualized hardware,can control the

    software stack on the

    rented machines

    Google AppEngine

    Provides a

    programmableplatform that can scale

    easily

    Microsoft Azure

    Clients can choose

    languages, but cant

    change the operating

    system or runtime

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    So, if cloud computing is so great, why

    arent everyone doing it?Clouds are still subject to

    traditional data confidentiality,

    integrity, availability, and

    privacy issues, plus some

    additional attacks

    17

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    Companies are still afraid to use clouds

    18

    [Chow09ccsw]

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    Anatomy offear

    Confidentiality

    Will the sensitive data stored on a cloud remain

    confidential? Will cloud compromises leak

    confidential client data i.e., fear of loss of control

    over data)

    Will the cloud provider itself be honest and wontpeek into the data?

    19

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    Anatomy offear

    Integrity

    How do I know that the cloud provider is doing

    the computations correctly?

    stored my data without tampering with it?

    20

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    Anatomy offear

    Availability

    Will critical systems go down at the client, if the

    provider is attacked in a Denial of Service attack?

    business?

    21

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    Anatomy offear

    Privacy issues raised via massive data mining

    Cloud now stores data from a lot of clients, and

    can run data mining algorithms to get large

    amounts of information on clients

    22

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    Anatomy offear

    Increased attack surface

    Entity outside the organization now stores and

    computes data, and so

    between cloud provider and client

    Cloud provider employees can be phished

    23

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    Anatomy offear

    Auditability and forensics

    Difficult to audit data held outside organization in

    a cloud

    Forensics also made difficult since now clients

    dont maintain data locally

    24

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    Anatomy offear

    Legal quagmire and transitive trust issues

    Who is responsible for complying with regulations

    (e.g., SOX, HIPAA, GLBA)?

    clouds, will the data still be secure?

    25

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    Recall: Cloud Architecture

    ClientSaaS / PaaS

    Provider

    26

    Cloud Provider(IaaS)

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    Attackers

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    Who is the attacker?

    Insider? Malicious employees at client

    Malicious employees at Cloud provider

    Cloud provider itself

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    Outsider?

    IntrudersNetwork attackers?

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    Attacker Capability: Malicious Insiders

    At client

    Learn passwords/authentication information

    Gain control of the VMs

    At cloud provider

    Log client communication

    29

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    Attacker Capability: Cloud Provider

    What?

    Can read unencrypted data

    Can possibly peek into VMs, or make copies of

    Can monitor network communication, application

    patterns

    30

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    Attacker motivation: Cloud Provider

    Why?

    Gain information about client data

    Gain information on client behavior

    Sell the information or use itself

    Why not?

    Cheaper to be honest? Why? (again)

    Third party clouds?

    31

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    Attacker goals: Outside attackers

    Intrusion

    Network analysis

    Man in the middle

    Cartography

    33

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    What we need is to

    Adapt well known techniques for resolving

    some cloud security issues

    clouds secure

    34

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    Final quote

    [Cloud Computing] is a

    security nightmare and it

    can't be handled in

    35

    .

    John Chambers

    CISCO CEO

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    An Open-source Software

    Computing

    Eucalyptus Systems Inc.

    805-845-8000

    www.eucalyptus.com

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    Whats in a name?

    Elastic Utility Computing Architecture LinkingYourPrograms

    To Useful Systems

    Web services based implementation of elastic/utility/cloud

    computing infrastructure

    Linux image hosting ala Amazon ow o we now t s a c ou

    Try and emulate an existing cloud: Amazon AWS

    Functions as a software overlay

    Existing installation should not be violated (too much)

    Focus on installation and maintenance

    System Administrators are people too.

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    Architecture

    Client-side API

    Translator

    Cloud Controller

    Client-side Interface (via network)

    Database Walrus (S3)

    Cluster ControllerNode Controller

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    Further Reading

    Armbrust et al., Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing, UC Berkeley

    Tech Report UCB/EECS-2009-28, February 2009.

    Chow et al., Cloud Computing: Outsourcing Computation without Outsourcing

    Control, 1st ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop, November 2009.