lecture 16: suicide bombings

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Have to consider individual and organizational dimensions Definition: Intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal To be distinguished from: High-risk missions Fooled couriers Suicide – without homicide – for a political cause

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Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings. Have to consider individual and organizational dimensions Definition: Intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal To be distinguished from: High-risk missions Fooled couriers - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Have to consider individual and organizational dimensions

Definition: Intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal

To be distinguished from: High-risk missions Fooled couriers Suicide – without homicide – for a political cause

Page 2: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers (pioneers & innovators) Israel: 0.5% of attacks, 56% of fatalities. U.S.: 9/11 – 10 times more deadly than any

previous terrorist attack in history.

• Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon– 1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut – 1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks

• US Embassy -- Feb• 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct

– Simultaneous attack on French

• Cars, grenades and explosive belts

• Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon– 1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut – 1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks

• US Embassy -- Feb• 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct

– Simultaneous attack on French

• Cars, grenades and explosive belts

Page 3: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Exponential growth over the last two decades - more global, more frequent, more lethal

Suicide attacks account for < 5 percent of terrorist events, but 50 percent of casualties due to suicide attacks.

Gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of national life and international relations

Also gets more media coverage than most other forms of attack

Trends: 1980s-2012

Page 4: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

How

Suicide bombs can be delivered by multiple means, complicating security measures

Vehicle bombs: USMC barracks in Beirut, 1983; Embassy attacks in Africa, 1998; Bali and Jakarta bombs; Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

Boat bombs: Sri Lanka, 1990s; USS Cole, 2000; the MV Limburg, 2002

Airborne: 9/11, Marseille plot, 1994

Individual-borne bombs: the primary method of attack in Israel since 2000; Attacks in London, 2005

Page 5: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Mostly civilian targets (shopping malls, buses, restaurants).

Approx. 85% civilian fatalities, 15% security forces

Military bases are on the “A-List” for targeting by terrorists, but difficult to penetrate

Page 6: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Al Aqsa Martyr BrigadesPalestinian Islamic JihadHamasAl QaidaPKK/Kongra GelAnsar al IslamLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar-e-Taiba . . . and a few others . . .

Page 7: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Personal attributes are not the key. The critical factor is the group. Suicide terrorism is a group phenomenon.

All suicide attacks have been carried out by groups. None by individuals on their own whim.

Main goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible

Objectives include: Causing widespread fear and panic Demonstrating the targeted government’s

“weakness”

Page 8: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Perception -- seemingly irrational act From the perspective of a terrorist

organization it’s a strategy that is: Well planned

Logical

Designed to achieve specific political objectives

Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?

Perception -- seemingly irrational act From the perspective of a terrorist

organization it’s a strategy that is: Well planned

Logical

Designed to achieve specific political objectives

Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?

Page 9: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Strategic Advantages

Traditional concepts of security are based on

deterring terrorist attacks

Assumes the terrorist fears death or capture

But, suicide attacks depend on the death of the terrorist

The suicide bomber doesn’t care about his/her death,

imprisonment or torture at the time of the attack

No need for an escape plan, traditionally the most difficult

part of a terrorist operation

The terrorist group wants to succeed The suicide bomber does not want to die for nothing If a target is too tough, they will choose another =

Ultimate smart bomb

Page 10: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Suicide terrorism is always part of a larger terrorist campaign

Sacrificing its “best and the brightest” signals the organization’s costly commitment to the community, whether transnational (Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah) or national (Hamas, Hizbollah).

This underpins trust in the organization, thus increasing the organization’s political “market share” in the community.

(M. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 2005)

Influence on terrorist group’s decisions

Influence on the number of volunteers for terrorist activity in general and suicide attacks in particular

Often, competing claims for particular suicide attacks

Page 11: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

PAPE: In 6 of the 11 campaigns that ended terrorists achieved at least partial political gains Represents 55% success rate

Target states Fully or partially withdrew from territory Began negotiations Released a terrorist leader

Suicide campaigns have been successful against a variety of democratic governments -- even hawkish ones Reagan Administration Netanyahu

Succeeded despite military raids to kill or Succeeded despite military raids to kill or arrest terrorist leadersarrest terrorist leaders

Page 12: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

With standard military coercion stronger states pressure weaker states

Suicide attacks work because they have a different structure

With suicide terrorism model the weaker acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target

Target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

Page 13: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Suicide attacks do not achieve goals central to security or wealth

Even with a complete gain – US withdrawal from Lebanon – US had only humanitarian interest at stake

Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, but troops remained in security buffer

1994 – 1995 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and West Bank Settlements increased IDF have no trouble going back when they believe

necessary

Page 14: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Unique phenomenon in the world of political violence

Driven by group strategies, decisions, and relies on public support

Traditional concepts of deterrence and security are ineffective

Requires combination of intelligence, counterideology and diminished public support to defeat

Page 15: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Religious fanaticism Poverty Ignorance Revenge for personal

suffering Brainwashing Psychopathology

None of these explanations are supported by significant data

Page 16: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Media accounts Interviews with captured would-be suicide

bombers Interviews with trainers/launchers “Psychological autopsy” of dozens of

Palestinian, Tamil and other suicide bombers (interviews with families) Jerrold Post Ehud Sprinzak Mia Bloom Scott Atran et al.

Page 17: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Age Marital status Gender Socio-economic level Education

Hanadi Jaradat

• No real profile– Most are male and single. BUT:– Can be any race, color, sex– Can be older, married people– Bombers often alter their appearance to “blend in” -

Terrorist groups will employ bombers and disguises most likely to defeat security measures…or profiling

Wafa Idris

Sri Lankan Sri Lankan suicide suicide bomber bomber “Dhanu,” “Dhanu,” moments moments before killing before killing former Indian former Indian PM Rajiv PM Rajiv Gandhi, Gandhi, herself, and herself, and 17 others17 others

Page 18: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Religious fanaticism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor

Most of the suicide attacks in Lebanon were

carried out by secular groups.

The LTTE and Fatah are not religious groups.

The PKK and the PFLP are pseudo-Marxist groups.

Most Hamas & PIJ members do not mention religion as main cause.

Page 19: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

The most common result of research indicates a pattern of “normalcy”— the absence of any unique attribute or identifier that would distinguish one individual from another

“ . . .rarely mad, and very few suffer from personality disorders” (Andrew Silke)

“Many of the personal traits or characteristics . . . are neither specific to the terrorist nor serve to distinguish one type of terrorist from another.” (John Horgan)

“30 years of research has found little evidence that terrorists are suffering from psychopathology” (Clark McCauley)

Page 20: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

Media accounts of suicide terrorists should be read/viewed with caution; too often they rely on assumptions than on empirical data and scholarly research

The majority of suicide terrorist are no more “abnormal” than you or me

Combating suicide terrorism requires strategic communications and counterideology narratives that discredit and deligitimize this tactic Until families are embarrassed, not honored, to

have a martyr, the problem will not go away

Messenger matters – the effort to eradicate this tactic must involve community, religious leaders (more than government officials)

Page 21: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings