lebanon- ayatollah fadlallah's death and the expansion of iranian hegemony- shimon shapira

8/9/2019 Lebanon- Ayatollah Fadlallah's Death and the Expansion of Iranian Hegemony- Shimon Shapira

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No. 578 July-August 2010

Lebanon: Ayatollah Fadlallah's Death and the Expansion of Iranian Hegemony

Shimon Shapira

Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah played a leading role in the

increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the foundations for Hizbullah's

ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel. He endowed the need to employviolence with religious sanction.

When Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini's Tehran in the 1980s and swept up the Shiites

in Lebanon into jihadagainst Israel and the West, Fadlallah provided them with a guide. Heserved as a leading ideologue and supplied an organized doctrine for the mujahidwho is ready

to sacrifice his life for the Imam.

According to Fadlallah, Death for those (Muslim fighters) is not a tragedy....Death has been

transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not

exist together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive. It came as no surprise thatFadlallah praised the murder of eight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in

Jerusalem in 2008.

Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing theaspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Fadlallah was not prepared to

recognize the status of Irans Khamenei asvilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent) because he didnot view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had beeninvented by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Irans quest to establish an Islamicrepublic in its own image in Lebanon. Indeed, Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to

incorporate Fadlallahs memory under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his

flesh and blood.

The death of Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah gave rise to a wave of

eulogies, publications, and manifestos that continued even after he was brought for burial at his mosquein the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut where he preached, rather than in Najaf, Iraq, where he was born

in 1935 and where his father and grandfather are buried.1

The general tone of the eulogists devotees and critics alike emphasized the moderate, scholarly,moral, and progressive aspects of his activity since his arrival in Lebanon in 1966. At first he operated

in the shadow of Imam Musa Sadr, who led the Shiite community in Lebanon until his mysteriousdisappearance in summer 1978 in Libya. Seven months later, immediately after the Islamic revolution

in Iran, Fadlallah became the most influential cleric in Lebanon.2

A Leader in the Radicalization of Lebanese Shiites


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He played a leading role in the increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the

foundations for Hizbullah's ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel that brought him to

the television screens and front pages of newspapers throughout the world. In the 1980s, an irate

Fadlallah poured fire and brimstone on the unbelievers, and endowed the need to employ violence withreligious sanction.

In death he was transformed into the sweet Fadlallah who concerned himself with the status ofwomen and gave women the right to stand up against wife-beating husbands. Yet Fadlallah knew full

well that a smiling and moderate face would not enable him to attain the exalted status ofmarja al-taqlid(source of imitation) in the Lebanon of the 1980s. Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini'sTehran and swept up the Shiites in Lebanon intojihadagainst Israel and the West.

Fadlallah provided them with a guide. He spoke their language and supplied them with an organized

doctrine and the perfect ideology for the mujahidwho is ready to sacrifice his life for the Imam. TheIsraeli entry into Lebanon in 1982 (and for a brief period that of an international force in Beirut)

greased the wheels of an Islamic revolution in Lebanon, one in which Fadlallah served as its leading

ideologue.

In his book Islam and the Logic of Force, which Fadlallah wrote when shells are falling in the

background and by candlelight during the Lebanese civil war in 1976, he laid out the basicinfrastructure. In his preface to the 3rd edition in 1984, Fadlallah explained the concept of terror which

his acolytes were accused of perpetrating:3

Civilization (hadara) does not mean that one contends against a rocket with a stick, against

a combat aircraft with a kite, and against a warship with a sailboat....Against the force of

oppression, one rises up with equal force or superior force; for the legitimate defense of

man, the soil, the nation or fate, all means are legitimate.

As his believers united around his charismatic image, his sermons and lectures riveted thousands who

drank in his words with an unquenchable thirst. Similar to Khomeini's technique, Fadlallah's speecheswere recorded on cassettes and disseminated throughout Lebanon, in this way reaching a broader

public that did not necessarily read his writings or hear him speak in Beirut. His speeches and lectures

were also disseminated as proclamations and pocket-sized books.4

A Theology of Resistance

One of Fadlallah's most important lectures published in this fashion was al-Mukawama al-Islamiya

(The Islamic Resistance) against Israel. It was delivered in summer 1984 in the midst of Hizbullahs

armed struggle against Israeli forces in south Lebanon, and was intended to lay the theoretical base forthe Islamic struggle against Israel.5 With militant Shiite fervor, Fadlallah analyzed the change that had

come over the Muslims in Lebanon. Fadlallah complained that they had become accustomed to

acquiescence, spawning a generation that had no inkling of the term resistance. The result, saidFadlallah, was that when Israel entered south Lebanon [to eliminate PLO terrorist bases], it was

regarded as a savior...and it scattered sleeping pills that instilled upon the fatigued residents a sense of

tranquility. But...Israel began to disclose its true face.

At a certain point a change occurred. We did not have any experience in the struggle against Israel,

wrote Fadlallah, but after the initial attempts we began to sense that the Israeli could be killed, he runs


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away, lives in fear. This surprised people...and provided them with strength. The legend of the

invincible soldier collapsed. Here he was killed by a bullet and there by a roadside bomb, and all the

people began to feel their power, a power that began to find new modes of expression. Since they did

not have the ability to operate using classical means, they developed small-scale, guerrilla warfare.Against that, the enemy could not use tanks and planes. This is how our people in the south discovered

their strength.6

Death and Martyrdom

Fadlallah discussed the current Islamic struggle at length, without ambiguity. Death for those (Muslim

fighters) is not a tragedy and does not represent a psychological state choked with emotion. Death has

been transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not exist

together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive. Fadlallah voiced his opposition to thosewho take issue with suicide attacks in Beirut, in the south, and other places (and argued) that they (the

suicide bombers) lived in an atmosphere bereft of feeling and underwent brainwashingwhen they

contemplate sweet dreams and detach themselves from thought, sensing themselves suspended in theatmosphere of the Garden of Eden.7

The problem with psychology, argued Fadlallah, is that this science investigates concretephenomena in laboratory conditions, whereas there are things you cannot understand unless you

experience them.Someone who does not understand oppression cannot understand freedom. The

psychologists cannot understand how a person can work on behalf of a cause that fills his heart, beliefand essence.8

Later, Fadlallah argued, We do not see in this (self-sacrifice) the result of brainwashing or

unconscious activity, as the intelligence services attempt to hint to the world. They do not want topresent to the world the example of a person who wants to die by taking action on behalf of his

liberty.They do not want the world to honor such a person, because this would constitute a problem

for all imperialist governments. For Fadlallah, a person senses spiritual joy when he is going to dieand is not, as the media describes him, the laughing suicide bomber. Such a person does not laugh

facially and with his lips but in his heart, and not on the basis of the sweet dreams that he experiences,

but on behalf of the objective that he knows that he can advance one step forward.9

Subsequently, Fadlallah argued that he never issued a fatwa (a religious ruling) permitting istishhad

(self-sacrifice).10 However, given his concepts, his followers did not require a fatwa to understand how

their guide was directing them. It came as no surprise, therefore, that Fadlallah praised the murder ofeight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem in 2008.11

Standing Against Iran in Lebanon

Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing the bruisingaspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. As long as Khomeini was alive,

Fadlallah tiptoed around the issue. Both sides needed each other to build the new Shiite society in

Lebanon. Iran knew how to restrain its demands on Fadlallah and understood how to utilize hisinfluence on Shiite believers in Lebanon and channel them to broad support for Hizbullah. Iran's

emissaries in Hizbullah respected the rules of the game that were set in Iran.


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When Ali Khamenei replaced Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the rules were shattered. Ayatollah

Fadlallah was not prepared to recognize the status of Khamenei as vilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent)because he did not view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had

been invented by Khomeini. Fadlallah also did not recognize the religious authority of Iran's leader. Hebuilt up his own religious authority and in 1995 he was recognized as the marja al-taqlid. His office

became a workshop for issuing religious decrees in the various spheres of life of the believers. His

superior scholarship now found practical expression. The masses turned to him with questions andawaited his dicta. Hizbullah could not stand aside, and imposed organizational discipline on its

members. Whoever sought to join Hizbullah had to (and still has to) recognize the religious and

political authority of Irans Khamenei as the marja al-taqlidin Lebanon, as a religious obligation thatthe believer must fulfill.

Fadlallah rebelled. He was not willing to play Khamenei's game, even when he was subjected to false

accusations, based on fraudulent documents, that he had espoused heretical opinions. HeadingFadlallahs opponents were Khamenei and his protg in Lebanon, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

One of the senior security offices of Hizbullah was even suspected of trying to assassinate Fadallah. A

Shiite religious figure close to Fadlallah described the bad blood between Tehran and Fadlallah: All ofthe money Iran spent fighting Fadlallah was greater than the amount it spent on fighting Israel during

all the years of the occupation from 1982 until the victory in 2000.12

The Second Lebanon War in summer 2006 led to a rapprochement between Hassan Nasrallah and

Fadlallah, whose house had been struck by an Israeli bomb. Iran, too, understood Fadlallah's value in

Hizbullah's difficult moments and his role in assisting the movement in regaining mass sympathy whensome blamed Hizbullah for the loss of their homes and assets during the war. Fadlallah was willing to

hug Hizbullah leader Nasrallah, his former student, but continued to reject the vilayat-i faqih a

fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic. He persisted in his refusal to recognize the religious

authority of the Iranian leader and Iranian aspirations to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

Khamenei never forgave Fadlallah for this. In a letter of sympathy after his death sent by the Iranian

leader, Fadlallah was called al-alam al-kabir and al-mujahidand by Nasrallah ab hakim and murshid

hakim, but both ignored his status as marja al-taqlid. In his condolence letter, Nasrallah noted that for

the entire resistance public, theirmarja was Irans Imam Khamenei.13 All this did not prevent Nasrallah

and senior Iranian representatives from standing before Fadlallahs coffin and for Hizbullah to arrangethe funeral ceremonies as if for one of their own. If he had been present, Fadlallah would have been

amazed by the manifestations of sorrow, mourning, and grief displayed by the Hizbullah leaders.

Death Removes an Obstacle to Iran

Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Irans quest to establish an Islamic republic inits own image in Lebanon. As long as the erosion of the Lebanese state continues and the central

government fails to impose its authority in the regions under Hizbullah control (southwest Beirut,

southern Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley), Iran's efforts to realize its strategic objectives in Lebanonwill intensify. This process may be expected to accelerate now that there is no longer any figure of

political or religious stature among the Shiite community in Lebanon that can challenge or obstruct Iran

and its emissaries in Lebanon. This also applies to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who formally holdsthe most important Shiite position in the Lebanese state.

During his life, Fadlallah prepared no disciple or heir who could fill his shoes. This is not the Shiite


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custom. Iran as well will not seek to groom any Lebanese heir to Fadlallah who might later compete

with Khamenei. Interest in Sheikh Afif Nabulsi,14 a minor cleric from south Lebanon, as a possible

successor to Fadlallah does not appear serious. It would appear that Shiite believers will have to turn to

Ali al-Sistani of Iraq or Ali Khamenei in Iran.

Nevertheless, Fadlallahs office continues to operation under direction of his son, Ali, to offer advice

and guidance to the believers. Fadlallahs website announced immediately following his death: To theemulators of the late religious authority, His Eminence Sayyed Muhammed Hussein [Fadlallah]: it is

permissible to continue to emulate a deceased (marja) based on a fatwa of a living religious authority

who fulfills all the conditions of such a post and who deems it permissible to continue to emulate adeceased (marja). Furthermore the office of His Eminence is considering issuing a detailed explanation

of the issue. Meanwhile, we will continue to answer your inquiries in accordance with the opinions of

His Eminence.15

While Fadlallahs many institutions will continue to operate in the coming months, as time passes, it

can be expected that his son, Ali, will find it difficult to raise money and to continue to operate his

fathers network at its current capacity. The main concern of Fadlallahs successors will be theunbridled efforts of Iran and Hizbullah to take control of the widespread Fadlallah network, which he

built up over many years. Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to incorporate Fadlallahs memory

under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his flesh and blood.

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Notes

Two unusual events were the tasteless words of Brtish Ambassador to Beirut Frances Guy

regarding Fadlallah's personality, followed by her apology, and the surprise firing of CNNcorrespondent Octavia Nasr after her words in reaction to his death were publicized. Kim

Ghattas, Ayatollah Fadlallah Tributes Divide Opinion, BBC News, Washington, July 10,

2010.On Fadlallah's initial path, see Shimon Shapira, Hizbullah, Between Iran and Lebanon (Tel

Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 2000), pp. 102-105, 120-123, 130-131 (hereafter, Shapira); Jamal

Sankari,Fadlallah, The Making of a Radical Shiite Leader(London: Saqi, 2005).Shapira, p. 152.

Shapira, p. 156.

Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, al-Mukawama al-Islamiya, June 18, 1984.Ibid., pp. 4-6.Ibid., p. 16.Ibid., pp. 17-18.Ibid., pp. 18-19Interview with Fadlallah, al-Mustaqbal, Paris, July 6, 1985.

Shimon Shapira, Lebanon's Ayatollah Fadlallah and the Mercaz Ha-Rav Yeshiva Attack in

Jerusalem,Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 7, no. 35, March 10, 2008.Facts About the Relationship between Fadlallah and Hizbullah, www.alshiraa.com, July 7,

2010.Al-Manartelevision, July 5, 2010.David Schenker, Passing of Shiite Cleric Fadlallah Spells Trouble for Lebanon, Christian

Science Monitor, July 9, 2010.

The web site of the religious authority Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah


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english.www.bayynat.org.lb.

* * *

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the HYPERLINK

"http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?

DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=112&FID=568&PID=0&IID=429" Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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