Learning From Bad Experiences

REVIEW BY LOUIS KRIESBERG

Syracuse University

Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East. Edited by Daniel C.Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008. 291 pp.,$16.500 (ISBN 978-1-6012730-6).

The authors of this small but remarkable book provide a concise assessment ofUS efforts since the end of the Cold War to bring peace between Arabs andIsraelis, and the lessons to be garnered from that assessment. They begin withthe assertion that an analysis of those diplomatic efforts ‘‘reveals an alarmingpattern of mismanaged diplomacy. Missteps in US diplomacy have been strategicand tactical’’ (p. 4).

The analysis of this ‘‘devastating failure’’ was made by a distinguished studygroup of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The study group wasco-directed by Daniel Kurtzer, former US Ambassador to Egypt and to Israel,and by Scott Lasensky, USIP senior research associate. Three area experts consti-tuted a core team for the study group: William Quandt, Steven Spiegel, andShibley Telhami. Starting in 2006, members of the study group met with morethan a hundred current and former officials, academics, and civil society leaderswith experience related to Israeli-Arab conflicts; they included Americans, Arabs,Israelis, and Europeans. The authors report matters of general consensus andalso note some differences within the study group and among the persons theyconsulted. This is the first product of the project, and in-depth examinations ofseveral significant periods in peace efforts between Israelis and other peoples inthe Middle East may be undertaken in the future.

In one brief chapter, the authors forthrightly evaluate US diplomacy in theMiddle East during the Presidencies of George H. W. Bush (Bush 41), of WilliamJ. Clinton, and of George W. Bush (Bush 43). Overall, they give high marks tothe Bush 41 administration’s active and sustained diplomacy related to Arab–Israeli peacemaking, characterizing it as having a clear strategy that it pursued ina disciplined and effective manner. Clinton is credited with some accomplish-ments, notably the October 1998 Wye summit, but also some failures relating tothe Israeli–Syrian track and particularly in connection to what they regard as theill-conceived Camp David II summit in July 2000. They are highly critical of Bush43’s administration’s actions and inactions in Middle East peacemaking, pointingto a lack of strategic purpose and failure to follow up any initiative that wasmade.

In the major chapter, the authors set forth 10 sensible lessons to guidefuture US diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. The lessons, which derivefrom the authors’ analysis and consultations, pertain to four areas: the strate-gic context, style and substance; the foreign policy process; and US domesticpolitics; and the negotiator’s toolkit. For example, they emphasize the impor-tance of ensuring compliance to agreements that are reached, of building adiverse and experienced negotiating team, and of maintaining broad domesticsupport.

� 2008 International Studies Association

International Studies Review (2008) 10, 810–812

In addition to these chapters, the authors make recommendations for futureUS administrations, noting the severe conditions that the new president will beinheriting from Bush 43’s policies. They argue that the Israeli–Palestinian peaceprocess need not be drowned out by the many grave problems the president willface; rather, giving it high priority soon after taking office can help deal withmany other challenges. Strikingly, the authors stress the importance of what theycall nontraditional diplomacy, of unofficial track II meetings and bottom-up aswell as top-down peace efforts.

The book also includes useful reference materials: a highly detailed timelinefor Israeli–Arab relations, 1967–2007, numerous documents and primary sources,online documents and sources, detailed maps of Israel and Palestinian territo-ries, and a wide-ranging list of references. These materials and the authors’assessments and recommendations can be useful for future US negotiators andalso members of the attentive public who judge and try to influence US policy inthe Middle East.

There are very many publications relating to the Oslo peace process, its origins,its proceedings, and its breakdown, constituting the ‘‘What Went Wrong’’ genre.They present accounts and explanations from various perspectives, often includingattention to the role of the US government. They have been written by personsdirectly engaged in the negotiations and by journalists and scholars (Hanieh 2001;Malley and Agha 2001; Kriesberg 2002; Ross 2004; Quandt 2005; Wittes 2005). Thediplomatic efforts during the Bush 43 years have not been subjected to as muchscrutiny, as yet. The book under review is unique in focusing on assessing Americandiplomacy and setting forth guidelines for future conduct.

The authors of this book synthesize the judgment of persons who have beenengaged in Arab–Israeli peace efforts for decades. They clearly describe the mis-takes that were made and hold accountable the US political figures who boreresponsibility for US diplomacy. This is a useful service. The judgments theymake should encourage the public to hold past, present, and future leadersresponsible for their foreign policy actions and inactions.

The authors do not try to explain why the mistakes were made. In future, workfrom this project, such analyses will be undertaken, which should help informways to avoid making similar mistakes. Furthermore, more analyses might resultin altering the lessons to be learned and the recommendations proposed for thefuture. The lessons and the recommendations in this work generally remainwithin the realm of past US policy goals, prior to Bush 43.

The severe consequences of the past failures and the legacy of Bush 43’s for-eign policies, however, may require more fundamental changes. The US mayremain an indispensible actor in negotiating Israeli peace agreements in theMiddle East, but that might be best manifested in working collaboratively inregional and global contexts. This probably entails negotiating with regionalpowers with which the US government has significant differences. It may meanrecognizing that regional actors make accommodations with each other thatseem necessary to them. Many conflicts are interlocked in the Middle East andsome elements of an Israeli-Palestinian peaceful accommodation will requireregional solutions; this pertains to refugees, security, Jerusalem, and water. Thisbook should provoke realistic, thoughtful discussions in many American circles.

References

Hanieh, Akram. (2001) The Camp David Papers. Journal of Palestine Studies 30(2):75–97.Kriesberg, Louis. (2002) The Relevance of Reconciliation Actions in the Breakdown of Israeli–Pales-

tinian Negotiations, 2000. Peace and Change 27(4):546–571.Malley, Robert, and Hussein Agha. (2001) Camp David: A Tragedy of Errors. In The New York

Review of Books, August 9, 2001, Vol. 48 (13).

811Louis Kriesberg

Quandt, William B. (2005) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967.3rd edition Washington, DC and Berkeley, CA: Brookings Institution Press and University ofCalifornia Press.

Ross, Dennis. (2004) The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New York:Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Wittes, Tamara Cofman. (2005) How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of theOslo Peace Process. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

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