leadership without formal authority

ARLYN J. MELCHERTHOMAS A. KAYSER

Leadership WithoutFormal Authority

The Project Department

LEADEBSHIP OF A PROJECT GROUP is diflBcult andlittle understood. The project director is faced withtwo sets of problems. First, there is the problem ofbuilding a team that is directly under his control.Second, he must obtain the cooperation from otherdepartments outside his authority. The project di-rector is held responsible for the project but oftenwith little or no formal authority over groups thatprovide essential information and services. Theseother departments typically are under pressuresfrom responsibilities directly assigned to them andfrom other groups who press for service. A projectdirector's job is to build his team, obtaining the nec-essary services from other groups without jeopardiz-ing future relations with top management and ser-vice units.

This is an intensive case study of a project direc-tor in action. The focus is how he built cooperativerelations with other departments, and the factorsthat tended to undermine this cooperation. It is a

WINTER / 1970 / VOL. XIII / NO. 2

profile of a leader who enthusiastically undertookmajor responsibilities, achieved a large degree ofsuccess, but at a critical point lost the support heneeded. The story undoubtedly is being told and re-told in Research and Development units and otherproject groups across the country.

In 1961 the Dunhill Container Corporation, alarge diversified manufacturer, established a newproducts department (The name of the firm, indi-viduals in the firm, and the product mix are dis-guised. ) Its responsibilities entailed sustained long-range attention, in particular bridging the gap be-tween the Research Center, which generated prod-ucts tliat might have marketability if developed fur-ther, and the Marketing Department, which focusedon distributing market-tested products. The projectdepended upon other departments at both the cor-porate division levels for needed services. The proj-ect director did not, however, have formal authorityover these units.

57

The focus is upon a synthetic material that hadpotential for development into a major consumerproduct. The study covers a six-year period fromthe point a product was selected for developmentuntil the decision was made to go to market. Atten-tion is directed to organizational and behavioralfactors affecting that period of development ratherthan toward those technical problems whichmarked the evolving product.

Tlie first four and one-half years were accompa-nied by slow but steady progress. Team relations,intergroup relations, and relations with top manage-ment were excellent. The director of the New Prod-ucts Department referred to this period as "theColden Years." Relations with top management andwith other groups deteriorated later and were ac-companied by sharp conflict. This article developsthe factors that contributed both to the "ColdenYears" and to the later period of stress and conflict.Attention is upon leadership style and conditionsthat affected these relationships.

Harold Scott was brought in from outside thefirm to head the department. He had an excellentbackground in marketing and developing consumerproducts. His first step was to revie'w the productsthat had been developed by the research group todetermine which had the greatest potential. Thefirst product selected for sustained attention was aconsumer product, later named Ferlin. It was a non-cumbustible synthetic fabric that had great poten-tial use in the garment industry.

The product had been under technical develop-ment off and on for about seven years. It reached apoint, though, where the research laboratory hadshelved the project. As expressed by the inventor ofthe product:

I wrote a report to the council for R & D Policy stat-ing that I'd tried out all the ideas for improving theproduct but none of them really worked. I didn't haveany other possible ideas to suggest, so Ferlin wasshelved. That is where it would have stayed if the NewProducts Department had not become involved. Theybrought the project to the attention of the corporate ex-ecutives, and obtained funds to get the project movingagain.

Scott had to maneuver in a difficult context indealing with other corporate units. The New Prod-ucts Department needed information and assistancefrom several groups yet it had no authorit}' torequisition these. It was dependent upon vital in-

puts from corporate departments, including thecontroller, legal, market research, personnel, engi-neering, advertising, and from the divisions.

Leadership StyleScott used several techniques to obtain coopera-

tion. He obtained top management's interest andsupport for the project and subsequently culti-vated this support. Close friendships were devel-oped with key personnel; he further capitalized onthe contacts his subordinates had in the firm. He ac-tively conveyed the project's importance to keygroups, emphasizing their contributions to the totalteam, involving them in decisions, and representingthem when dealing with top management. Further,he made a series of accommodations to adjust to thespecial views of other departments when a directapproach wasn't feasible. Wlien these didn't work,he was prepared to challenge their decisions athigher levels.

As a critical first step, he obtained the support oftop management Scott sought to gain and hold sup-port for the project at the executive level. To do thishe presented Ferlin's potential at management meet-ings during the formative months of the team. Amain item in Scott's campaign to win top manage-ment's interest was that the potential consumermarket was totally untapped. Scott stressed that avast new market awaited the first company thatcould crack the market with a new material. Usinginformation from a trade journal, they projectedthat the consumer market would rise to sales of$125 million in eight years. The product was ap-pealing also because the demand did not fluctuatewith the business cycle. It offered the possibility ofsmoothing sales and profits for the firm.

The president of the firm and the major execu-tives became personally interested in the product.Scott systematically cultivated their support as theproject developed. He enthusiastically representedFerlin at management meetings, keeping manage-ment Informed of the project's progress and itsproblems. He developed the idea of "the BlueBook" which was submitted to the R & D ExecutivePolicy Council at the beginning of each year. Itcontained four major sections: (1) accomplish-ments of the past year—what management got forits money; (2) objectives of the coming year—whatthe project team would try to accomplish; (3) the

58 California Management Review

program for meeting the objectives; (4) the budgetfor the coming year—how much management wasasked to spend for the project

Every three months a supplementary written re-port was sent to the Executive Council. Wheneverthere were major deviations from the plans outlinedin the Blue Book, the written report was accompa-nied by an oral presentation of why objectivesweren't being met, or why the Ferlin team wasn't fol-lowing its program. Scott made these oral presenta-tions alone, or was accompanied by the appropriatespecialist when discussing particular problems.

Support from top management was critical in anumber of ways. The various departments reahzedthe project had top management backing so filledthe team's requests for help partly to protect them-selves.

Mike Badalich, the first section leader of tlie Fer-lin project, commented on what may have moti-vated the cooperation;

I suspect the majority of our cooperation resultedfrom the fact that certain members were more inter-ested in protecting themselves than they were in aidingthe project. In oQier words, if you were head of theCardboard and Styrofoam Division and you knew thisproject had received a blessing from the president, youmight not be interested in the project but you knewdarn well that you'd better cooperate officially or you'dfind yourself doing a lot of explaining to the corporateofiicers. It's a simple matter. When projects come to thepersonal attention of the president of the company andthe board, then magically, everyone is aware of this andmakes sure that no one will accuse them of not cooper-ating.

One method widely used by Scott to build his in-fluence was to develop close friendships with influ-ential men within the company. After gaining theirfriendships, Scott enHsted their support to obtain in-formation that was useful in working with their de-partments and top management. Especially in theearly years (but later on as well), Derek Van Pelt,Director of R & D Operations and Secretary of thepowerful Executive Council for R & D Pohcy,helped to get things done. Scott discussed VanPelt's importance to him:

Derek, having been here a while, knew where thevarious skeletons were. He was able to supply me withinformation on who to see and where to go to get prob-lems resolved or to get things done. Furthermore, hewas quite sensitive and helpful in deteiinining the tim-ing on when to go.

Van Felt also gave Scott leverage with other de-partments. As developed by Van Pelt:

After I became secretary of the Executive Council forR & D Policy, I could help "Scotty" by going with himto talk to people. They reafized that I had the responsi-bility for following technical efforts throughout thewhole company. If they failed to cooperate, it might bebrought to the attention of the Executive Council as areason the project was delayed.

Besides developing personal friends, Scott also re-lied upon the influence of his subordinates. An ex-ample illustrates tlie approach. Before the pilotplant was built, the fibers had to be spun on pro-duction equipment in a plant in one of the divi-sions. Mike Badalich, one of Scott's subordinates,had two friends in the plant, the Director of Devel-opment, and a plant engineer. Scott encouraged Ba-dalich to obtain help from these men whenever itwas necessary to make runs of the Ferlin material.Badalich did get good cooperation from the Direc-tor of Development, who was able to exert enoughinfluence to remove other production from the lineto make equipment available.

A useful method for securing cooperation fromother groups was to emphasize the importance ofthat group's contributions. Scott brought the headsof otlier departments together, pointing out howeach department had a vital role in the overall suc-cess of the project. Scott commented on this methodof selling the project:

. One device-.u' pd tQ get these various staff functionsgung-ho into our act was periodic meetings. These wereheld every six to nine months. Here we would give aprogress report, complete with fiip-fiops and samples ofthe product (just as if we were selfing to a customer).Meetings were held with accounting people, personnelpeople, legal people, production people, engineeringpeople, and so on. A marketable consumer material wasthe final goal always emphasized at these meetings. Iwanted each department to know what we were shoot-ing for, how they could contribute, and the pride thatthey would feel by knowing they had a part in helpingFerlin reach a successful end. This was, generallyspeaking, a device to try to sell the people whom weinternally needed to help us do the job.

An example that illustrates the effectiveness ofSjiOtt's techniqnp; fnr selling f»t>>prs fm fbp

project is shown by his following; remark concerning..a new

(A phone call interruptsinterview.)

the scheduled

WINTER / 1970 / VOL. XIII / NO. 2 59

Well, there we were interrupted by a perfectly goodexample of what I have done by getting Personnel in-volved and enthusiastic about Ferlin. This happened tobe a personnel problem that came up in connection withFerlin. I am being fed infoi-mation by a man that I havedone nothing but buy a lunch for one day and sell himon why he should be gung-ho about Ferlin. It was apersonal sales job to get him involved. Since that lunch-eon, he's done more for me than I've been able to getdone in some areas of Personnel since I've been con-nected with this project.

Scott also used participation. He commented onthe value he saw associated with this method:

I would say that there is a noticeable change in theelevation of morale among individuals when they partic-ipate in the decision-making processes that directly af-fect their jobs. For example, if we're talking about aclothing-wear test that we want to conduct, Paul How-ard (as the marketing manager) could go ahead and setup the trial on his own, conducting it without the coop-eration of Research Center personnel. However, bybringing them into the picture and making them feelthat they are a part of the decision-making process insetting up the trial, we not only improve motivation andmorale but also increase the cooperation we receive. Af-ter all, the results of the clothing-wear test would justbe passed on to research so they could improve certainaspects of the material. And, if they've had some say inconducting the test, they were more strongly motivatedto perform their research task than if the results simply ;were handed to them by the marketing department. jA-

Another method of building the team in relationwith other units was to represent their interests ac-tively to top management. Late in the project, asthe pressure from top management increased anddelays were regarded witli greater alarm, tliis be-came more important. When deadlines were missed,Scott's defense of the technical branch illustratesthe point. Even though Scott felt that technical waspartly as fault in missing the deadlines, he said:

^ . as the stakes got bigger and the game moved intothe major leagues, there tended to be a covering oftracks~on the part of technical; they were having difiS-culties meeting their product goals, in an ettort to main-t:ain haiTnony and to provide as press^ire-free an atmo-sphere as possible, i took responsiHIIty^for these misseddeadlines.

Now, to clarify, I didn't say that it was my fault. Idid, however, point out to management that these weretough goals, that research was doing a good job, andthat they should not be castigated too severely becauseof the missed deadlines.

Another thing, I really did happen to feel that theydid not have enough people to try to solve the prob-lems. I made that quite clear to the research director,

but I didn't go over Joe to management and say, "Hey,research doesn't have enough people," and get theminto hot water.

Scott made adjustments in liis approach to a de-partment when it had a restricted or special view ofits role. Steven Howard, one of the team members,commented on how they obtained cooperation fromthe Controller's Department. The Products Croupwanted the accountants to work up some projectcosts.

The latter was u,sed to working with fairly precisefacts and figures. That is what they wanted from theproject team, precise facts and figures concerning thecost of making Ferlin fiber, the amount of productionexpected during a given period of time, the cost of laborinvolved, etc. We could not give exact figures in thesearea,s. We could talk only in "ball park" figures. Wesolved this problem by submitting two or three figuresfor each area, along with a set of assumptions for eachfigure; that is, assuming this t)'pe of equipment, assum-ing this composition of the fiber at this cost per roll, as-suming this number of direct labor hours at this rate,and so forth, what should be the selling price to obtainX percent return on investment? Thus we would submitfigures with a corresponding set of assumptions andwould receive several economic rollouts, one for everyset of assumptions.

At times, Scott formally challenged^ecisions^_of_other departments or devised methods to work,around them. Relations with thement illustrate this approach. Scott explained thenature of the confiicts:

Personnel, in its subjective wisdom, at first consis-tently put jobs in the Ferlin group on lower job levelsthan they should have. I know they are too low. In try-ing to find people I knew what job level and salary theyhad and what job level and salary they would have ifthey came aboard. This was true for about three years.We thought maybe we could live with it, but it becameprogressively worse. As a result, I started some tablebanging and finally got another policy adopted. Wewould find the right people for Ferlin, and then wewould set up the job levels.

Scott also explained how he dealt with PersonnelDepartment in obtaining more money for Ferlinteam members.

When it came to merit raises and job promotions, Ihad to fight the good fight with all my might to getthose through. In the Personnel Department we findthere's a natural stumbling block (well, it's not natural,but anyway it's normal) where they get the fence upand presumably you can't get over it. Consequently, Ifound a way to go around it. This was to use a combina-


tion of merit increase in salary and job classification ad-vancement. In that way I could get them some doughthat they otherwise wouldn't get on the straight meritsystem. There are some people that get mad at me as anindividual, but my people are taken care of, that's theimportant thing.

Often a leader operating within the formal struc-ture will run into roadblocks that are hard to elimi-nate. One method of creating a more cooperativeclimate is to modify the formal structure. Scott useda low-key approach to reduce the team's depen-dence upon other departments. He campaigned toget men assigned directly to the team from criticaldepartments even though they remained on thepayroll of the other department. Eor example, indi-viduals for Market Research, Patent Law, and Ad-vertising were assigned full time to work with Prod-ucts group. One from the Controller's departmentwas assigned part time. He thus did not have to ne-gotiate continually for their help. They representeda bonus to Scott in that they also had entree to thefacihties and other persoxmel within their own de-partments.

Environmental Setting

During the first four and one-half years Scott suc-cessfully advanced the Eerlin project. His tech-niques for obtaining the inputs from other depart-ments upon which the team depended and formaintaining top management support and enthusi-asm were effective.

Aside from his leadership style, several factorscontributed to a favorable climate.

• It was relatively easy to keep top management en-thusiastic during the initial years of the project's devel-opment. Management was experimenting with the proj-ect team idea and was wilHng to give the team ap-proach a fair chance to prove itself.

• The idea of the Ferlin fiber was exciting to topmanagement. They believed there was a large marketwith potentially large profits. Delays and missed dead-lines were accepted as part of the price.

• Financial expenditures for plant equipment andpersonnel were still relatively moderate. The projectcould be aborted without large losses.

Arlyn J. Melcher is a Professor of Maiiagementat Kent State University. He has published onindustrial relations, statistics, researchmethodology, and organization theory.

• Scott's immediate supervisor was marketing ori-ented throughout most of this period. This meant he al-ways had strong support at the coi^porate level. Whilethe technical director of the Ferlin project was a chem-ist, he also realized the importance of market consider-ations in achieving ultimate success with Ferlin. Hefully supported Scott in his dealings with other units.

• There were no competitors in the market exertingpressures upon the finn at the beginning of the periodand only one later in the period. Intergroup working re-lations could be canied out in a relaxed atmosphere.There was a change in all of these factors over a rela-tively brief period of time.

Late in the period, the Columbia Chemical Com-pany marketed Dylan, a good competitive material.There was a brief setback on the Eerlin team asmembers adjusted to the unpleasant fact that theywere not going to comer the market first. However,they saw some distinct advantages to being secondin the market place.

Derek Van Pelt explained:

Being second in the market was not as critical to_theFerlin team as it first appeai'^d. CulliniBia had to breakdown consumer resistance to the product. They hadspend millions ot dollars tor mibal udvtirUtJJLli . Theyhad to make the public aware that a svnthetic productcould do the job better than natural fibers.

However, witli the passing of time, this factor be-gan to exert pressure on tlie Eerlin project team.Columbia Chemical became more and more en-trenched in the market as their product began togain wide acceptance with manufacturers and con-sumers. At Dunhill, teclinical problems continued toplague the team, causing further delays in the mar-ket introduction. Still, Dunhill seemed assured ofbeing second in the market. But suddenly, threeother large companies appeared on the horizon andtheir materials seemed to be at almost the samelevel of development as Dunhill's. Revised eco-nomic rollouts indicated the project payout wouldtake longer to achieve. The pressures on the Eerlinteam became intense. After spending six years and$18 million to research and develop Ferlin they feltthey had to be second in the market. Missed dead-lines no longer were overlooked by a restive top

Thomas A. Kayser is an Instructor ofManagement at the University of South Florida.He is presently co-authoring a book entitledPlanned Change in Organizations.


management. They called upon Scott for explana-tions. It became mandatory to meet goals on time.

Scott, commenting on the changed attitude of topmanagement after a change in key personnel at thetop said:

There has been a lack of team spirit among some ex-ecutives. Just recently we started up meetings with keyexecutives again; however, the character of these meet-ings changed. We formerly had used such meetings forinforming these executives, making them gung-ho, andgetting help from them. Now we had a highly central-ized authoritarian body cross-examining and interrogat-ing us to the point that the meetings turned into nothingbut inquisitions.

The pressures from management brought to tlieforefront a dispute over whether the project wasready for market, Scott and his team said "no"; thetechnical-production people and some key corpo-rate executives said "yes." The diametrically op-posed answers to this one question spawned seriousconflict. Scott characterized the differences:

Management apparently thinks that we have a greatproduct. But, they don't recognize some of the product'sweaknesses. There's almost a view that if Dunhill makesit, with its great research and production capabiHt}', thatany potential customer would be a fool not to buy it ingreat quantity. This is not the name of the game whendealing with a consumer product. It is, indeed, thename of the game in some of the industrial orientedbusinesses through which our management grew. Weare faced with Ferlin having to be right for the market.When I mentioned that I have resisted the increasedcentralization I mean that I have not accepted every de-cision handed down by top management. I'm referringto their overriding pressure toward goals of immediatesales and profits, at the expense of a good product. Mypersonal resistance here follows the line that the salesand the profits will follow when we have the productand not before. The resistance movement that I lead isagainst centralized decision making at tlie top manage-ment level. I do not think this project should be forcedinto going to market until the product is ready.

As pressure on the group increased it affected notonly tlie relationship between the group and topmanagement, but also between technical (researchcenter) and marketing (product team members).Scott offered an analogy in referring to the deterio-ration of the relationships:

Early in the game the duet of marketing and techni-cal gave forth gorgeous music. As the chips got biggerand the game started moving into the major leagues, afew sour notes crept into this duet. There tended to be acovering of tracks on the part of technical because they

were having difficulties meeting their product goals-such things as having the product ready for market in-troduction, or having a summer weight fiber ready formarket introduction on such and such a date, and so on.Finally, although this duet continued to sing, the musichad more discord than harmony in it.

Several personnel changes occurred in position-both within and outside the team. The ones thathad a substantial effect were changes in personnelat the vice president level and at lower levels in theproduct research group.

The section leader of the Ferlin project was re-placed by a man far less marketing oriented. He be-lieved that marketing and technical should remainas distinct units interacting only on the formal basis.The vice president and director of Products Re-search was replaced by a man who felt that anyproject team should be run from a technical ratherthan a marketing orientation. Earlier, the vice presi-dent of marketing and material services had beenreplaced by a man with a technical background butwho appreciated the value of marketing. He in turnwas replaced by the previous president of DunhillInternational, who was technically oriented.

The difference in orientation of these key person-nel rapidly had an effect. Scott was frank in discuss-ing his feelings about his new superior:

Dr. Tomanek came into the project at a critical time,coming aboard just after the decision was made to go tomarket. Now, since Dr. Tomanek came in from DunhillInternational, he had no idea what the Ferlin projectwas. He knew only that something was going on. He hadmany new responsibilities added to his job all at once.Quite naturally, he was not in a position to devote asmuch time to learning about Ferlin as would be neces-sary for anyone to give direction and management in-spiration to the project. Through a series of meetings Itried to update and educate him on what we were tryingto accomplish. I haven't gotten through to him and afterthese meetings I've heard comments that he isn't surewe're on the right tiack. He wants to go back to funda-mentals, but he never explains what he means by funda-mentals.

I don't understand what role he would like to play inFerlin. I'm trying to find this position, to help to bringhim in. And naturally I want all the help I can get. Butwe cannot continue to spend long arduous horns goingover the past, always looking at yesterday and never to-morrow. Dr. Tomanek has decided that he can givemanagement inspiration and leadership without consult-ing with me by simply second guessing my every pastmove.

Tlie marketing and technical subgroups began


to withdraw from what Howard called a "close-knitmarriage." In the past, team members had visitedthe R & D Center informally to discuss research anddevelopment decisions with research personnel.Now, each team member was called upon to con-centrate his efforts in his own area, rather than todabble in aspects that were beyond the require-ments of his particular job. The new technical di-rector believed in specialization and drew lines ofdemarcation early in his administration. He said:

At present the marketing people, in no way that I canthink of, interfere with the technical development of theproduct. They provide excellent assistance in evaluatingthe properties that cannot be measured in the lab. Butthis represents a change over the situation as it existedwhen I first became associated with the project in 1964.At that time, the leadership permitted the marketingpeople to direct activity, so to speak. When I assumedthe technical effort I set about trying to correct the situ-ation. It has happened gradually, but it has happened.

This change was achieved in spite of the view ofthe team. It was the marketing specialist's viewthat:

At present, although marketing inspects only the ap-pearance and feel characteristics, we should have a sayin setting tlie specification limits for the physical proper-ties. The specifications which are in effect now at theR & D Center were set up by production on the basis ofwhat Ferlin material they were able to produce. I feelwe must look at this from the marketing standpoint andset specifications based on what the customer will ac-cept.

During the first four-and-a-half years the Ferlinproject team operated in a decentralized atmo-sphere aside from the broad restrictions manage-ment placed upon Scott and his department. Thesewere that: for capital funds in excess of $10,000Scott had to go to the Executive Council for CapitalAppropriations, for personnel to the ExecutiveCouncil for Employee Relations, and for operatingexpenditures to the Executive Council for Researchand Development.

All of the day-to-day product decisions, and eventhe policy decisions concerning the goals of Ferlinwere delegated. Scott said, "By giving me my headthe two superiors I had during the first four-and-a-half years said, 'This is your program. You work itout. Come to me when you need management ap-proval.' "

Centralization increased with the new superior.As the project grew in size, the greater expenditures

increasingly fell outside the limits of his signing au-thority. He had to obtain management's approvalfor the funds, equipment, or people he needed moreoften. Management did not deny his requests, buthe was placed in a defensive position.

Scott commented on this change to centralization:

The name of the game now is the centralized decisionmaking at the Executive Council for R & D, ExecutiveCouncil for Capital Appropriations, and so on. In theearly days I was invited to these meetings to state mycase and strike the balance, and to subject myself toquestions concerning Ferlin. The questions varied byoccasion, and by the subject to be discussed. In that at-mosphere was a certain contribution to motivation.

Recently the good doctor [his immediate superior]decided that he will be spokesman for Ferlin at thesecouncils or executive meetings, and he does not wish tohave me participate. I have had to go along with deci-sions that are made for me, but not in consultation withme. This is an area that has materially retrogressed.

In this final stage of the product, Scott's positionconcerning decision acceptance by higher levelmanagement changed. He said:

When the team started out, I accepted top manage-ment decisions with an open mind, or tried to, in allcases. Today my attitude is more reluctant. I find that Ido not take anything, communications or decisions (andthis even pre-dates Tomanek to a degree), with an openmind. I look at opinions, suggestions, and decisions withcaution to be sure that they jibe with my estimate of thesituation as it exists. I also look in terms of the possiblelack of complete knowledge by tlie decision-maker oropinion-giver. If I don't agree, then I go topside to fightthe good fight. A good example is not accepting man-agement's overriding pressures toward the goals of im-mediate sales and profits at the expense of a good prod-uct.

Top management's and technical's position finallyprevailed and a decision was made to go into mar-keting. The original members of the product teamhad nearly all left the firm by this time, partly be-cause of the opportunities elsewhere and probablybecause of the reduced attractiveness of the project.Subsequently, the product manager resigned to lookfor another position. The commercial success of theproduct was unknown at tlie end of the study andstill is unknown. Columbia Chemical dominates themarket partly because of its early entry and partlybecause it offers a broad spectrum of materials.Dunhill has been able to offer a material that onlysatisfies one portion of the market. It still is at-tempting to resolve this problem, but price cutting,principally initiated by a Japanese firm, has caused


payoff periods to be extended further. Most of theother potential competitors, however, have at leasttemporarily withheld their products from the mar-ket.

Conclusion

The development of this product illustrates theinteraction of a number of factors that affect prod-uct development. Pressure from the environment,management reaction to pressure, formal organiza-tion, leadership style, and complementary key per-sonnel were each important in influencing individ-ual, group, and intergroup relations.

Where the context is permissive, an adaptive per-suasive leadership style should be able to elicitcooperation patterns, particularly if top manage-

ment indicates its interest in the project. Comple-mentary personnel and formal authority over otherunits may be useful but not necessary. When thepressure is on to meet difficult goals and standards,carefully built relationships are likely to erode rap-idly, particularly if there also are changes in keypersonnel at the operating and general managementlevel. Greater attention to formal organizational ar-rangements would lay a better basis for continuityof relations when pressures increase. When a newproject group is introduced it minimizes immediateconflict to assign it responsibility without changingtraditional authority relationships. This is, however,likely to be associated with the greater cost ofmaking it more difficult for the director of a newgroup to carry out these responsibilities.


leadership without formal authority

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