leadership and political compromise
TRANSCRIPT
Leadership and Political Compromise: Presidents Reagan and Obama, Speakers O’Neill and Boehner
University of Colorado School of Public AffairsLeadership and Professional EthicsProf. Aden Hogan
December 2, 2011
Alice BartonIain HydeAndrew Lindstad
Introduction
Leaders at the pinnacle of American politics, namely the president and members of the
U.S. Congress, drive the nation’s agenda and have the authority and responsibility to enact
change to improve the lives of the American people. At a number of junctures throughout
American history, these leaders have been forced to confront daunting and complex challenges.
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill found themselves
at the center of such a juncture, as soaring inflation and interest rates, rising unemployment,
increased costs of entitlement programs, and the cold war required creative and collaborative
problem solving across party lines. Likewise, President Barack Obama and Speaker John
Boehner, along with Congress are currently faced with a severe economic crisis, rising
unemployment, two wars and an unprecedented rise in federal deficits.
This paper will examine the leadership employed by Presidents Reagan and Obama, and
House Speakers Tip O’Neill and John Boehner. In particular, it will evaluate the political and
policy environments surrounding these men, analyze the leadership traits they employed, and
describe the resulting solutions (or lack thereof) that resulted from their leadership. It will
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consider the visions of those leaders, as well as the viewpoints of those who disagreed with their
vision as a solution for the difficult problems at hand. As will become evident through these case
studies, change leaders often face stiff resistance when trying to implement their vision. Mario
Cuomo said that engaging debate was to, “state the claim of a 'more perfect union' against the
demand for 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' once again” (Cuomo, 2001). How Reagan,
O’Neill, Obama and Boehner approach resistance and dissention from their vision ultimately
plays a significant role in their success as leaders and their achievement of the goal of a more
perfect union.
Leadership Through Change
The President and Congress are entrusted with positional power but are simultaneously
tempered by the checks and balances included in the American political system. In the context
of this political system, successful leaders have demonstrated that they posses a portfolio of traits
that give them the credibility needed to lead. John Maxwell points to two essential traits needed
to bring about change: “knowing the technical requirements of the change, and understanding the
attitude and motivational demands for bringing it about” (Maxwell, 1993, p. 52). In the context
of policy, this means that leaders must be able to clearly identify and articulate the problem to be
solved, identify solutions that are politically acceptable and technically feasible, and then possess
the interpersonal traits to motivate others to work for that change. Cawsey, Deszca and Ingols
describe the necessity that leaders possess, “a dogged determination to succeed in the face of
significant odds and the resilience to respond to setbacks in a reasoned and appropriate manner”
(Cawsey et al., p. 264). Employing these traits inspires public trust and confidence and provides
the needed foundation for change initiatives to take hold.
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Clear vision is a required first step in successfully leading through times of crisis or
change and managing against potential resistance. John C. Maxwell states that, “…all effective
leaders have a vision of what they must accomplish. That vision becomes the energy behind
every effort and the force that pushes through all the problems” (Maxwell, 1993, p. 139). A
compelling vision from a change initiator enlists support from stakeholders, who in turn can
advocate for, facilitate and implement the change. Inevitably, however the change process will
run into resistance from those that either disagree or are skeptical that the vision is in their best
interest. Maxwell points to multiple factors for resistance to change: Routines might be
disrupted; change can catalyze a fear of unknown outcomes; change can create fear of failure,
and; the rewards associated with change may not match the effort required to institute the
change. (Maxwell, 1993, pp. 56-58). Furthermore, Maxwell points out that negative thinking
can significantly inhibit motivation for change (Maxwell, 1993, p. 59). Cawsey et al. state that,
“If the change leader hopes to enlist [stakeholder] support, or at least minimize their resistance,
the leader needs to capture and consider their perspectives and the underlying rational.” As such,
collaborative, bipartisanship leadership is not simply letting resistors express their viewpoint. As
Maxwell says, “The leader’s attitude helps determine the attitudes of the followers.” ,(1993, p.
106) Leadership, in the spirit of true bipartisanship, entails deliberately and deliberatively
working to understand and consider the reasons for resistance and therefore respecting and
including those opinions in the process of translating vision into policy solutions.
Once a vision has been established and stakeholders have been engaged, solutions to
address the identified problems will emerge. Successful change solutions need to appeal to a
broad enough constituency to reach critical mass. Critical mass can mean that stakeholders with
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fundamentally diverging viewpoints need to find common ground. As such, Maxwell points to a
series of questions that the leader must ask in order to successfully prioritize solutions:
Which solution has the greatest potential to be right? ( In the context of politics - what solution is both politically acceptable and most effective at addressing the problem)
Which solution is in the best interests of the organization? (What solution is in the best interests of the country and not the political party)
Which solution has momentum and timing on its side, and; Which solution has the greatest chance for success?
(1993, p. 93)
Should leaders, both through the evaluation of the merits of their vision, and an understanding
of the viewpoints of supporting, undecided or resistant stakeholders, Maxwell believes the
prospect for success of implementing the vision is more likely.
The Political Environment, 1983
The legacies of Democratic Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill and Republican President
Ronald Reagan can in part be defined by their relationship and leadership styles, which both
strongly influenced the legislative outcomes of their concurrent time in office. Each man’s
leadership style and means of persuasion differed greatly. The telegenic Reagan capitalized on
his comfort with and ability to use television media to speak directly to the American people and
communicate his position clearly. O’Neill, on the other hand was known for his cultivation of
relationships and the impact those relationships had on his ability to manage the Democratic
agenda. Ultimately the outcomes of major policy battles between the two parties often rested on
the ability of each leader to persuade their fellow party members and the American public to
support their policy goals.
Thomas “Tip” O’Neill was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the son of a civil servant.
His father, as well as the previous two generations of his family, had worked hard to claim
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“respectability.” His father taught him the virtues of “loyalty to one’s own, integrity and charity
towards the unfortunate.” (Farrell, 2001) O’Neill’s worldview was further codified watching the
impacts of the Great Depression on himself and those around him. Farrell notes that “The
intensity of the experience, coming as the boys became men, worked like a bellows on their fears
and insecurities, and tested their character.” (Farrell, 2001)
The culmination of the lessons of his childhood and adolescence led O’Neill to a career
in politics, first in the Massachusetts Legislature and then to the United States House of
Representatives. Farrell describes O’Neill as “[T]he quintessential New Deal Democrat –
unrepentant, un-reconstructed and determined to follow the Franklin D. Roosevelt philosophy of
tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect.” (Farrell, 2001) Mario Cuomo notes that
“O’Neill’s strongest weapons in battle were his political skills and the depth of his personal
commitment to the rational for government assistance to the needy.” (Cuomo, 2001). O’Neill
was a master tactician and his likability and ability to cultivate strong relationships were some of
his greatest assets. Furthermore, O’Neill did not shy away from making deals and rewarding
allies. Cuomo notes that O’Neill engaged in quid pro-quo deals and at times would intercede for
both lobbyists as well as his constituents (Cuomo, 2001).
Ronald Reagan came from humble roots. He was born in Tampco, Illinois, and grew up
in the small town of Dixon. (The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library) He
moved to Hollywood, California in 1937, to begin a career as a movie actor where he acted in
numerous films before and after serving in World War II. Following his military service, he
began to focus more of his energy on political causes, including speaking out strongly against
communism in America. In 1947, he became the president of the Screen Actors Guild, where he,
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“…proved himself to be a capable leader, a skillful negotiator and an adept problem solver”
(Reagan Foundation and Library).
Reagan’s participation in political causes eventually led to his election as California’s
Governor in 1966, on a conservative platform. He believed in a limited role of government
where markets and an unencumbered public could find the path to prosperity. While Governor,
Reagan learned that his most effective path to implementing his agenda was to, “not go through”
a hostile legislature, but rather to, “go over their heads right to the constituents” (Reagan
Foundation and Library). His talent for speaking directly to constituents continued to serve him
through the 1980 election, when he defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter. While president, Reagan
effectively engaged in dialogue and negotiation in addition to taking his message directly to the
public. Peterson writes that, “Once in office (with some exceptions), he proved willing and able
to engage in the give-and-take of the political process” (Peterson, 1990, p. 263). As such, he was
effective at persuading Congressional action on a number of policy initiatives, particularly,
“when his proposals involved small policy changes or altered existing programs“ (Peterson,
1990, p. 261).
At the time of Reagan’s election, the country was beleaguered by “a calamitous
combination of political disasters, including double digit inflation and interest rates, increased
unemployment and the inability to orchestrate a return of the hostages from Iran.” Reagan and
O’Neill’s visions for the role of government and how the country might emerge from these
challenges fundamentally differed. Cuomo says, “Theirs was no sophistic debate: these were
world views clashing, hat lava meeting thundering surf.” (Cuomo, 2001) At times, this led to
fierce battles over issues such as tax cuts and social programs such as Social Security, Medicare
and Medicaid. However, as Chris Matthews, O’Neill’s aide while he was Speaker, notes that the
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two men had a genuine mutual respect. Matthews pointed out that the two men occasionally
shared lunches and met annually on St. Patrick’s Day in celebration of their mutual Irish
heritage. After one of those lunches, Reagan wrote, “He can really like you personally and be a
friend while politically trying to beat your head in” (Matthews, 2011). Ultimately, while the men
maintained a fierce political rivalry, they were able to set differences aside to work together and
pass major pieces of legislation reforming Social Security as well as the tax code. At the time of
O’Neill’s retirement from Congress, President Reagan said, “Mr. Speaker, I'm grateful you have
permitted me in the past and I hope in the future that singular honor - the honor of calling you
my friend” (Matthews, 2011).
Reforming Social Security
The compromise between President Ronald Reagan and House Speaker Tip O’Neill on
Social Security was the culmination of a long process that began when Reagan entered office in
1981. The Democratic Party had experienced a disastrous four years under the Carter
Administration and the 1981 election ushered in not only a Republican President, but also the
loss of the U. S. Senate and the loss of 33 seats in the House of Representatives. (Farrell, 2001).
Needing to re-group and out of respect for the electoral process, O’Neill “decided to give
Reagan a chance to offer his legislation and not play games with it, and do it in a very public
way so that [Democrats would not] become the scapegoat, and would not take the blame”
(Farell, 2001, p. 545). Even though, he had the power to delay, O’Neill chose to give the Reagan
tax and budget programs the opportunity to go forward. While the intent may have been to let
the Republicans fail on their own accord, one result was the formation of the cordial and
communicative relationship between the two men. Reagan’s advisors also wanted a mutually
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respectful relationship with Congress and worked to foster communication as well. When
Reagan was shot on March 30, 1981, O’Neill “was the first outsider to visit [him] in the
hospital” (Farrell, 2001, p. 553). This positive foundation in the relationship between the two
would serve them well in spite of their great differences in political ideology.
Ronald Reagan campaigned on and was dedicated to reducing taxes and balancing the
budget while increasing defense spending to counter the Soviet threat. He promised to achieve
this by cutting back on government spending – although without being very specific on what
would be cut back. David Stockman was Reagan’s budget director – he was a man “dedicated to
the task of dismantling as much as he could of the [Roosevelt’s] New Deal and [Johnson’s] Great
Society, to liberate people and financial capital from oppressive bureaucracy” (Farrell, 2001, p.
549). He crafted an itemized budget plan of $467 billion in spending reductions over 6 yeas but
did not specify cuts to programs like social security and Medicare. As a result, Reagan
announced that these programs would remain intact. However the budget did account for what
became known as “the magic asterisk” – a $44 billion dollar amount that was classified as
“future savings to be proposed” (Hayward, 2009, p. 89). It should be noted that Stockman’s
budget also relied on an overly optimistic real annual growth rate of 5% (Farrell, 2001, p. 549).
In spite of this, by lobbying conservative House Democrats, Reagan was successful in getting the
1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act and the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981 passed. These
two bills were the tax reduction, domestic spending reduction and military spending increase that
were the cornerstones of Reagan’s economic polices (The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act retrieved from http://bancroft.berkeley.edu).
While this was a huge defeat for Democrats, O’Neill contacted Reagan and congratulated
him on his success saying “no hard feelings, ol’ pal, it’s a great two party system we have. We
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gave our best and you outdid us…” Reagan responded; “We’re stunned too” (Farrell, 2001, p.
561). But the Republicans made a miss-step. There was still the unaccounted for $44 billion
dollars in reductions paired with the unrealistic growth rate projections that made the budget
feasible. Against the advice of his party, Reagan supported going after Social Security,
unemployment insurance and Medicare – this was Stockman’s original intent, leaving the door
open for O’Neill and his team to step in. The Social Security program alone was costing $200
billion a year and the proposal was to cut back benefits for early retirees. This was roundly
criticized by O’Neill and was met with public outcry (Farrell, 2001). Republicans were in
control of the Senate, which voted 96 to 0 against “any solution that would precipitously and
unfairly penalize early retirees” (Farrell, 2001, p. 572).
O’Neill realized he needed to be able to compete with Reagan, the skilled communicator,
in the media arena and serve as the public spokesman for the Democratic Party. O’Neill had the
ability to attract and hire exceptional people and leverage their talent and wisdom to the best
advantage. Al Hunt, reporter and bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal stated; “I have never
seen a staff like Tip O’Neill’s, there is not even a close second. It said a lot about O’Neill, that
he was an incredibly secure man” (Farrell, 2001, p. 566). O’Neill utilized the skills of people like
Chris Matthews – who was hired by the Speaker to help with media relations. Leveraging the
threat to Social Security, O’Neill began to work publicly to influence popular opinion.
Influencing popular opinion was critical to maintaining democratic leadership in the
house during the 1982 election cycle. The economy continued to falter and the recession would
not end until 1983 – which worked to O’Neill’s advantage as “it savaged Republicans in the fall
election season” (Farrell, 2001, p. 593). After months of encouragement from O’Neill, the press
began to openly criticize Reagan for his “selective use of facts, his gaffes and apocryphal
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anecdotes” (Farrell, 2001, p. 594). The Republicans also made a tactical error by sending out a
pre-election fundraising letter proposing switching Social Security to a voluntary pension
system. O’Neill used this to the full advantage and on November 2, the Democrats picked up an
unprecedented 26 seats in the House (Farrell, 2001, p. 597).
O’Neill then took the opportunity to strike a deal with Reagan to ensure Social Security
would remain in place. Both the Speaker and the President knew that under the existing
structure, Social Security was headed for insolvency (Farrell, 2001 p. 601). A bi-partisan
commission, headed by Alan Greenspan, was appointed. The committee “arrived at a formula:
any bailout plan would consist of both benefit cuts and tax hikes on a 50-50 basis” (Farrell, 2001,
p. 602) and Federal income tax would be applied to the benefits of wealthier people. Cost of
living adjustments were also postponed and previously scheduled payroll taxes were accelerated.
A gradual increase in the retirement age was also established. O’Neill was present the day the
President signed the bill amending Social Security into law on April 20, 1983. Reagan made the
following observation during his comments: “None of us here today would pretend that this bill
is perfect. Each of us had to compromise one way or another. But the essence of bipartisanship is
to give up a little in order to get a lot. And, my fellow Americans, I think we've gotten a very
great deal.” (Reagan, 1983)
The Political Environment 2011
The political landscape in 2011 can be readily defined by intransigence and gridlock.
The Federal government almost shut down over the fiscal year 2011 budget in April of 2011
(Knickerbocker, 2011) and again in September 2011 over the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s Disaster Relief Fund (Kirchgaessner, 2011). This gridlock can be traced in part back
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to conflicting ideology between Democrats and in particular the burgeoning Tea Party
movement, which saw a significant number of representatives affiliated with its worldview
elected to Congress during the midterm 2010 elections. This political environment has created
significant leadership challenges for both President Obama and the Speaker of the House, John
Boehner who have not been able to persuade congress to find significant bipartisan solutions in
the manner that Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan were able to.
John Boehner was sworn in as the Speaker of the House on January 5th, 2011 following
the 2010 midterm election that saw the balance of power switch from Democratic to Republican
control in the House. Boehner has been described as, “a politician’s politician” whose
background more closely resembles that of a manager than a political ideologue. (Garrett, 2011)
Garret states that Boehner is “…constantly taking the temperature of his members, balancing
their interests against each other, checking the polls and coordinating a unified message. (Garret,
2011). Boehner’s priority is to get legislation passed and to avoid jeopardizing that goal by
sensationalizing issues unnecessarily. It is noted that Boehner’s rise in the leadership ranks of
the Republican Party were related in part to his, “…knack for understanding how to maneuver
around virtually any political obstacle” (Garret, 2011).
New Republican members who are tied to pushing agendas inextricably linked to
political ideology have challenged Boehner’s goal of instituting an orderly process for
conducting the House’s business. During the debt debate, it was noted that Boehner was dealing
with two Republican factions who, “in exchange for raising the debt ceiling, want[ed] either a
substantial deficit reduction, come hell or high water, or some level of deficit reduction, as long
as it makes President Obama look bad” (McGregor, 2011). Boehner likely had to resort to tactics
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such as, “shame, embarrassment and pride” as well as telling Republican lawmakers to “get your
ass in line” in order to maintain cohesiveness of his Party’s message (McGregor, 2011). At
times during the debt debate, members of Tea Party groups were calling for a change in
Republican leadership due to dissatisfaction with Boehner’s leadership approach.
President Obama was elected in 2008 on a platform based largely on the broad concepts
of “Hope” and “Change”. Obama’s charisma and rhetorical strengths have often been credited in
his successful bid for the Presidency. Bligh and Coles, in an effort to analyze how Obama’s
charisma played into his eventual election, state that “Charismatic leadership emphasizes the
importance of symbolic behaviors, emotional appeals and making events meaningful for
followers” (Bligh and Coles, 2009, p. 485). Similar to Reagan, Obama is comfortable making
speeches on television or in front of large crowds and communicated a message that resonated
with his supporters. Bligh and Coles say that, “The Obama campaign also employed the
symbolism of greatness and Presidential leadership” (Bligh and Coles, 2009, p. 486.). He was
able to convince a majority of the electorate that he had the vision, skills and ultimately the
greatness to implement his ambitious platform.
Obama’s leadership stylstyle in office contrasts from the one he projected during the
campaign. Rather than proactively shaping the political agenda in Washington, Obama has often
taken a cautious approach setting goals and letting members of Congress develop specific pieces
of legislation. Brownstein says that, “He has identified broad goals but has generally allowed
others to take the public lead, waited until the debate has substantially coalesced, and only then
announced a clear, visible stand meant to solidify consensus” (Brownstein, 2011). Furthermore,
Obama has shown, “unswerving resistance to absolutist public pronouncements and grand
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theories.” Obama’s approach to governing has afforded the president flexibility, when
negotiating ultimate policy outcomes. At the same time, it has left him, “reacting to events
rather than shaping them” (Brownstein, 2011). Obama relies on his position and rhetorical
abilities when trying to prod Congress into passing legislation, however, Feldmann notes that,
“no amount of public jawboning by the president is going to move opinion on Capitol Hill,
especially among the newly elected House hard liners from the Tea Party Movement”
(Feldmann, 2011). Coupled with the fact that Boehner, “has effectively boxed himself in trying
to satisfy his most conservative Republican Party members,” neither Obama nor Boehner have
been able to come to agreement on bipartisan solutions for the struggling economy or
comprehensive debt reduction.
The Debt Ceiling Debate
The summer of 2011 proved challenging for President Obama and the Republican House
Speaker, John Boehner, who struggled against resistance from their respective parties as the
United States faced an August 2 deadline for a vote to increase the federal debt ceiling. The fight
over the debt ceiling turned into a leadership test for the president and the speaker, who are often
pitted as opponents in a divided government (Min Kim, 2011). Both men were trying to agree on
matters such as how much new revenue would be raised, how much would go to deficit
reduction, how much to lower tax rates and, how to enforce the requirement for new tax revenue
(Hulse & Calmes, 2011). The stakes were high in this standoff. If they didn’t pull it off, the
president could go down as the president who lost the country's triple-A credit rating, and
Boehner as the house speaker who let it happen (Min Kim, 2011). The numbers they were facing
were sobering: a $1.5 trillion budget deficit and a national debt that exceeded the $14.3 trillion
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set by Congress, and a jobless figure at 9.2 percent (Associated Press, 2011). The president and
speaker have forged a relationship, although they have a long way to go before they form a
relationship to rival President Ronald Reagan and Speaker Tip O'Neill.
President Obama and Speaker Boehner face many obstacles in their effort to work
together and reach a compromise. Boehner must contendicontend with a caucus focused on no
tax increases, while Obama is concerned with his own re-electability in the 2012 presidential
election and pressure from the left who want to preserve Social Security and Medicare
(Associated Press, 2011). Tensions reached a climax when President Obama delivered a prime-
time address on the issue, and Boehner requested and got television time to follow him. This
dueling effort presented a spectacle usually seen only on the evening of the State of the Union
address (Min Kim, 2011).
During the negotiation process, the president worked to ease concerns from members of
his party, inviting Democratic leaders to the White House. But, the pushback continued from
senior Congressional Democrats, who were upset about some of the president’s concessions, and
about being excluded from the talks altogether. Congressional Democrats expressed concern
publicly that the proposal included too many spending cuts compared to new revenue. Many
Democrats feared a bargain would undercut their party’s ability to use Republicans’ support of
deep cuts in Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security against them. Congressional Democrats
feared the deal was tilted more toward Republican priorities than a bipartisan plan (Hulse &
Calmes, 2011). The president warned that he would veto any final deficit reduction package that
made cuts to Medicare that did not also include a tax increases on the wealthy and corporations
(Mascaro, 2011). However, for large numbers of Republican House members, any kind of tax
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increase was off the table (Associated Press, 2011). Republicans claimed the president’s plan
would raise taxes on small businesses and private capital, and by declining to change the
structure of entitlements, the president was leaving the U.S. vulnerable to credit downgrades
(Mascaro, 2011). Boehner did try to find common ground by stating the two sides could work
together on jobs proposals, free-trade agreements, tax deductions for small businesses and
funding infrastructure projects. President Obama had public opinion on his side. According to
the Pew Research Center, a majority of those polled approve of making high earners’ income
subject to Social Security tax, raising taxes on incomes of over $250,000, reducing military
commitments overseas and limiting tax deductions for large corporations. Republicans were as
likely as Democrats to approve of limiting corporate tax deductions (Associated Press, 2011).
In the end, the negotiations unraveled when Boehner withdrew from the talks. Boehner
blamed the breakdown on Obama's insistence that any deal include new revenues as well as
spending cuts. Boehner met with his party leaders and circulated a letter explaining his decision
to walk away from the talks to the entire House GOP membership,. Obama held a news
conference in which he scolded Republicans, complaining that leaders were unwilling to take on
the party to reach a deficit reduction deal that voters favor (Knickerbocker, 2011).
Analysis
The parties involved in both these situations were and are accomplished politicians in
their own right. Each had a working knowledge of the technical requirements of the change.
Speaker Boehner’s issue is specifically cited as Thean inability to identify solutions that are
politically acceptable. President Reagan and Speaker O’Neill were adept at taking the fight
directly to the American people, while also engaging in dialogue and negotiations with
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lawmakers. President Obama and Speaker Boehner are adept at speaking to the American
people, however they both lack the ability to rally their respective parties to engage and negotiate
with each other. Both seem to lack the interpersonal traits to motivate others to work for that
change. Speaker O’Neill was especially known for his ability to cultivate relationships and
persuade his fellow party members and the American public to support policy ideas. He had the
ability to cultivate strong relationships and had many friends.
President Obama exhibits a lack of leadership in his inability to demonstrate a “dogged
determination” to succeed in the face of significant odds and a resilience to respond to setbacks
in a reasoned and appropriate manner. President Obama is cited as cautiously setting goals and
allowing others to take the public lead, waited until the debate has substantially coalesced to
announce a clear, visible stand meant to solidify consensus.
Reagan and O’Neill understood the attitudes and motivational demands for bringing
change about as well as the rewards associated with change. They also respected and included
other opinions in the process of translating vision into policy solutions. Speaker O’Neill was a
master at making deals and rewarding allies through quid pro-quo deals and would intercede for
both lobbyists as well as his constituents. He was a leader that understood the process and what
motivated key stakeholders while much of the Obama/Boehner negotiations were held in secret.
Conclusion
Times of crisis require leadership that can bring stakeholders with diverging worldviews
together in order to debate and ultimately devise solutions to solve the pressing problem. John
Maxwell outlines a series of steps leaders take in order to solve problems. These steps include:
Identifying, prioritizing and clearly defining the problem; selecting the right people to help in the
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problem solving process; collecting multiple problem solving solutions, and; prioritizing,
implementing and evaluating the best solution. (Maxwell, 1993, PP 86-94) At the end of that
process, it is important to set up a process or devise policies that keep the problem from recurring
in the future.
What separates effective leadership from ineffective leadership will depend on many
factors. To lead through a defensible process such as the one described by Maxwell above,
leaders first and foremost need a strong, clear vision that inspires trust and cooperation. They
must possesses an attitude that inspires confidence. They need to know how to bring people
together to solve problems. Finally, they need “dogged determination” and resilience in the face
of problems that inevitably emerge throughout the process. Neither Obama nor Boehner’s
leadership has been able to command the cooperation of their caucuses or drive the agenda. As a
result, the government almost shut down and the country was on the brink of defaulting on its
debt. Conversely through fierce debate and mutual respect, O’Neill and Reagan were able to lead
their caucuses to devise an acceptable solution to ensure Social Security’s solvency for decades
to come.
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