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    Chapter 5 :EpistemologyTYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

    Although philosophers may differ on how many different types there are they agree that we claim to have

    knowledge of different things. What they may have in common that make them knowledge then becomes the issue.

    Here is one schema for different types of knowledge.

    LOGICAL

    SEMANTIC

    SYSTEMIC

    EMPIRICAL

    What are these about ? Why make these distinctions?

    Consider that you probably would claim to know the following things.

    Examples:

    1. There are three sides to a triangle. The sum of their angles is 180 degrees.

    2. There is a computer in front of you right now.

    3. 23 + 11= 34

    4. A bachelor is an unmarried male.

    5. If a is more than b, and b is more than c, then a is more than c.

    These sentences all make claims that can be determined to be either true or false. They are sentences that express

    propositions. They are claims about which you can come to a judgment as to whether or not they are true. You

    probably know that they are true. Now how is it that you come to know these things? Obviously you come by this

    knowledge in different ways. This relates to the idea of the different types of knowledge.

    LOGICAL example 5

    There is a knowledge that is the result of the understanding of the relationship of ideas to one another. There are the

    rules or laws of logic that permit claims to knowledge that are further statements of ideas consistent with the rulesand the ideas already accepted.

    Here is another example where you do not need to know what I am talking about because you know the

    relationships involved.

    A. All gazintz are gazatz

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    B. All gazatz are garingers

    C. Therfore, all gazintz are garingers.

    You can claim to know that : If A and B are true, then C is true as well. This you know by LOGIC.

    SEMANTIC example 4

    There is knowledge that is the result of learning the meaning of words. Knowledge of words is knowledge of

    definitions. Such definitions are set in dictionaries. So bachelors are unmarried males. You know this. People

    acknowledge this. You can look it up.

    (Are newborn baby boys Bachelors???????? Do people say to the new mother in the hospital nursery: "Oh what a

    beautiful bachelor you have there Ms Jones!" ?)

    SYSTEMIC examples 1 and 3

    There is knowledge of Mathematics and Geometry, which is the result of learning a system of words, or symbols

    and how they relate to one another and the rules of operating in that system and then any claims made that are

    consistent with those definitions and rules is called knowledge.

    EMPIRICAL example 2

    There is a knowledge that comes through our senses. This knowledge is empirical knowledge. Science is the best

    example of a method for ascertaining the accuracy of such knowledge. Scientific knowledge is a result of the

    practice of the method : Observation, abduction of a hypothesis, careful observation, refinement of hypothesis,

    deduction of test for hypothesis, testing and experimentation, confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis.

    What do these four types of knowledge have in common? One of the most popular theories of knowledge of the

    twentieth century holds that KNOWLEDGE does imply a Belief.

    Belief does not Imply Knowledge. Wherever people claim to know that something is true they believe that it is

    so. When people claim to believe that something is so they dont always claim to know that it is so.

    What kind of a belief is KNOWLEDGE.?

    To begin with it must be true. You can not know something that is false, that is not so.

    It must be true and you must claim to know it and it be true not by accident or coincidence but because there is

    evidence to support and enough to warrant or justify the claim to know.

    So, KNOWLEDGE = JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

    WARRANTED TRUE BELIEF

    EVIDENCE is NEEDED for JUSTIFICATION

    CAUTION!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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    WARRANTED TRUE BELIEF may not be knowledge if true by ACCIDENT.

    January 1, 2001 the claim is made: I know that the GIANTS are going to win the SUPERBOWL in 2001!

    It turns out that several weeks later they did win. Can I claim that I knew it on January 1st or was it just a lucky

    guess or a well informed guess?

    How does a person gain the warrant or the justification for the belief?

    Well, depending on the type of belief that it is there are different kinds of warrants.

    MODES of WARRANTY

    LOGICAL

    Warrants found in the rules of Logic. Follow them and the claim is warranted.

    SEMANTIC

    Warrants are found in the dictionaries. Use them, be consistent with them and the claim is warranted.

    SYSTEMIC

    Warrants are found within the system (Math or Geometry) follow the rules be consistent with the definitions and

    rules and the claim is warranted.

    EMPIRICAL

    Warrants are found with evidence. How is the evidence to be gathered, examined and evaluated? Ther will be

    more on this under the topic ofTRUTH

    There are four types of beliefs when considering truth and warrants:

    1. warranted true beliefs : This type is called KNOWLEDGE

    2. warranted false beliefs: This type cannot exist at all.

    3. unwarranted true beliefs These are lucky guesses or coincidences and not knowledge.

    4.unwarranted false beliefs These are just wild unsupported claims or wishes that are not true .

    What is Knowledge: A Debate - Paul Rezendes and Mitch Hodge,

    Why Knowledge is Justified True Belief; JTB.

    Justification , Warranty comes in degrees!

    How much evidence is needed in order to determine whether or not someone knows something or not?

    http://examinedlifejournal.com/articles/template.php?shorttitle=knowdebate&authorid=56http://examinedlifejournal.com/articles/template.php?shorttitle=knowdebate&authorid=56http://examinedlifejournal.com/articles/template.php?shorttitle=knowdebate&authorid=56
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    How much evidence is needed in order to determine whether or not someone has sufficient warrant to make a claim

    to know something or not?

    How much is needed depends on what is riding on the outcome of the claim. For simple matters of little

    consequence humans appear to accept fairly small amounts of evidence. For important matters much more evidence

    is needed.

    EXAMPLE:

    How old is someone? If someone claims to know how old John Smith or Mary Doe is we probably accept the claim

    on their word if it is just gossip. However, if there were a $10 bet on it we would ask for evidence. We might go to

    the person and ask them to confirm the claim. If it were $100 we might want a drivers license. If it were $1000 we

    might want a birth certificate. For $10, 000 we might want to go to the official registry and check the official

    documents ourselves.

    The highest consequences on claims to know: Human Life. At a criminal trial, a capital homicide case, what is the

    standard of proof? It is evidence that is convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. NOT beyond all doubts. But beyond

    reasonable doubts, meaning beyond all doubting or questioning of the evidence that we have reason to doubt or

    question.

    Scientists have their reputation riding on their claims to know things. The standard for the warrant in Science sis

    that heir claims be supported by evidence that other scientists can examine, experiments that others can repeat and

    get the same result and equations that others can examine to check against errors.

    So, claims to know may be accepted depending on amounts of support that may vary in the type and amount

    depending on the type of claim that it is. However, to know something that which you claim to know must be

    TRUE and truth does not have degrees: because a statement p is either true or it isn't

    TRUTH will be examined in the next section.

    Proceed to the next section by clicking here>next section.

    Copyright Philip A. Pecorino 2000. All Rights reserved. Web Surfer's Caveat: These are class notes, intended tocomment on readings and amplify class discussion. They should be read as such. They are not intended forpublication or general distribution.

    Return to: Table of Contents for the Online Textbook

    Types of Knowledge

    Philosophers typically divide knowledge into three categories: personal, procedural, and

    propositional. It is the last of these, propositional knowledge, that primarily concerns

    philosophers. However, understanding the connections between the three types of knowledgecan be helpful in clearly understanding what is and what is not being analysed by the various

    theories of knowledge.

    Personal Knowledge

    The first kind of knowledge ispersonal knowledge, or knowledge by acquaintance. This is the

    kind of knowledge that we are claiming to have when we say things like I know Mozarts

    music.

    http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htmhttp://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htmhttp://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htmhttp://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/default.htmhttp://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/default.htmhttp://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/personal-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/personal-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/personal-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/personal-knowledge/http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/default.htmhttp://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htm
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    Prodecural Knowledge

    The second kind of knowledge isprocedural knowledge, or knowledge how to do something.

    People who claim to know how to juggle, or how to drive, are not simply claiming that they

    understand the theory involved in those activities. Rather, they are claiming that actually

    possess the skills involved, that they are able to do these things.

    Propositional KnowledgeThe third kind of knowledge, the kind that philosophers care about most, ispropositional

    knowledge, or knowledge of facts. When we say things like I know that the internal angles of a

    triangle add up to 180 degress or I know that it was you that ate my sandwich, we are

    claiming to have propositional knowledge.

    [Note: this paper is more than usually half-baked. Epistemology is not my field (although it increasingly

    interests me), and so it is rather simplistic. I beg forgiveness from people who know more about it than Ido: it is written from a pragmatic professional position, rather than a properly rigorous academic one.]

    "OKso you've got a Ph.D. Now, don't touch anything!"(Source unknown)

    "It's all these NVQs (National Vocational Qualifications) nowadays20 years' experience doesn't count for

    anything!"

    (One of our campus gardeners, about to be made "redundant" and required to re-apply for his present

    job. August 2004; he was re-appointed.)

    There are many ways of slicing the idea of knowledge:

    Technical Knowledge vs. Practical Knowledge (Aristotle, Oakeshott)

    Knowing that vs. Knowing how (Ryle)

    Propositional knowledge vs. Procedural knowledge

    (Conscious knowledge) vs. Tacit knowledge (Polanyi)

    Comprehension

    (knowledge about)vs.

    Apprehension (knowledge by direct

    acquaintance) (Kolb)

    There are problems with all these constructs, and most knowledge in the real world is acombination of many forms, but the distinctions are far from sterile.

    For present purposes the major problem is that our educational system values the left-hand

    column much more than the right, for many reasons, including:

    Such valuation being implicit in the establishment of dedicated educational institutions,

    and the transformation or reduction of knowledge into "that which can be taught".(Becker, 1963;Lave and Wenger, 1991)

    The technology of assessment, in the face of constraints such as validity, reliability and

    fairness, not coping well with the right-hand column. (Which is strange, given that

    practical etc. knowledge is more clearly demonstrable through a "product" or a

    http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/procedural-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/procedural-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/procedural-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#BECKERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#BECKERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#BECKERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#LAVE%20and%20WENGERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#LAVE%20and%20WENGERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#LAVE%20and%20WENGERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#LAVE%20and%20WENGERhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#BECKERhttp://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/propositional-knowledge/http://theoryofknowledge.info/what-is-knowledge/types-of-knowledge/procedural-knowledge/
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    "performance" than is propositional knowledge where the assessment can never be

    more than a proxy. Pace the gardener above, the NVQ system in the UK does

    emphasise assessment by direct observation of performance.)

    Hence, in a world obsessed with accountability and qualifications, the left-hand column

    rules. (No, I am not going to make any dubious connections with the left and right

    hemispheres of the brain.)

    The real separation based on this opposition can be seen, for example, in the provisions ofthe 1944 Education Act (UK), under which those who succeeded in the 11+ examination

    went to the grammar schools, whilst the rest went to the secondary technical and modernschools for a more practical or vocational training.

    Hirst (1974) however, argued that allknowledge is of the knowing that variety, and thatthe distinction is therefore spurious. Knowing how knowledge consists of knowing that,

    together with a direct experience. Is that the case? If so: is direct experience is bestthought of as knowledge or not?

    When discussing theknowledgeaboutversusknowledge by acquaintancedistinction with a group of

    doctors, in the context ofKolbs learning cycle, they related readily to it in terms of their patients

    knowledge of the illness (by acquaintance) as opposed to their own (about).

    Direct experience is cognition, but may not be knowledge, in the sense that one

    cannot do anything with it, until it is integrated into some kind of mental model.

    Tulving (1985)makes a useful distinction betweenepisodic memory (the remembered

    narrative of our lives) and semantic memory (our acquired conceptual understanding):direct experience may be known in the sense of having been laid down as part of episodic

    memory, but it cannot be said to have been learned from, until it has been integrated into

    semantic memory. One could argue that the process of learning is this very transformationand integration. Others have suggested the category of "procedural memory" for "know-how" to bridge the two.

    But don't let's get carried away! It is all too easy to mistake command of theoretical

    knowledge for the whole thing. Lave and Wenger, and Becker, cited above, argue that isbecause this theoretical (left-hand side of the table) knowledge is what schools are good atteaching :

    Let me take a couple of examples from my own reflective journal:

    Today I stood in for S. to do a teaching observation of M., since she had to get it in before the end of

    term. ... She works part-time at a College of Further Education, and she was teaching a group of nursery

    nurses ... Their syllabus required them to have studied team-working, particularly in multi-disciplinary

    teams. ... At a technical level, M. is a good teacher: she tried to draw information and ideas out of the

    students (all but about two of them about eighteen), but, since they had little experience to draw on, she

    could not get therightanswers from them. Some of them were making potentially insightful anecdotal

    http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#TULVING%20E%20(1985)http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#TULVING%20E%20(1985)http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/memory.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#TULVING%20E%20(1985)
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    points based on their work placements, but they were slightly off-track. At last, M. put up on the

    whiteboard the three essential components of good team-working ... I thought at first, that was

    interesting. Then I put myself in the position of the students, who were dutifully making notes, and

    thought, they have to remember these points for their exam: there is a lot more to studying in this area

    than I thought. Perhaps I ought to make a note of these points for my own future reference?

    Then Iwokeup. I started my working life in management and organisational development: I have been

    involved in team-working for the past twenty years, working in teams myself, and conducting training and

    consultancy on it. There was nothingwrongwith the three points on the board, but I had never

    conceptualised the issue to myself in that way, and I saw no particular advantage in doing so. They did

    not even represent a particular school of theory, which could be contrasted with other perspectives. They

    seemed to represent the outcome of the text-book authors search for three simple headings under which

    to organise his required thousand words on team-working. But for these students, this was now the

    definitive knowledge on the subject, to which their experience had to be subordinated ... As M. said

    afterwards, it was what they were expected toknow...

    And five years later, with a similar group of students...

    I have just been to observe H. She was teaching a class onkeyskillsoncommunication. The

    requirement to be addressed wasconducting a discussion. After some discussion in the class [note that],

    and a word-shower exercise (apparentlybrainstormis no longer PC) she embarked on ashow and tell

    exercise. This was interesting in its own right, but it was meant (and, I suppose, did) to provide

    evidencethat they coulddiscuss. They then had to write this up in as part of a portfolio for

    assessment. There was no problem with H's competence at all, but she was lumbered with a stupid

    syllabus, and I asked myselfand herwhere the learning was in all this. The students had amply

    demonstrated their ability todiscussin the first part of the session, whether or not they had come up

    with the approved answers, but that somehow did not count. We have reached the situation where self-

    evident skills have been devalued to the point that they do not count until someone has assessedthem.

    In both casesand it is easy to multiply examplesthe left-hand column has been elevatedto the only kind of knowledge which matters. No wonder the students play "surfacelearning" games.

    But this is not merely a tirade against conventional educational wisdom (seethe"heterodoxy"section for that kind of thing). It is a real problem.

    Go back toRiesmanfor a moment. He predicted the growth of the service economy.The "products" of the service economy are not physical objects (such as cars or wheat)

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    but evanescent processes, such as "education", "health care", "financial services" and

    even "entertainment".

    How might the apprentice in such an economy produce a "master-piece" which would

    be available for the scrutiny of all to judge his or her achievement?

    See "Heterodoxy: against formal education"

    So:

    Ifyou are in a formal educational setting, and

    ifyou are subject to a rigorous and sceptical regime of inspection and quality assurance andhence "objectivity"

    Then how do you assess performance with no permanent product?

    Answer: you fall back on the readily-assessable. Knowledge (left-hand column knowledge).

    One of the courses I teach on is at Master's level. All the modules within the course are assessed at that

    levelexcept one. A couple of years ago, a professional body conducted an evaluation of the course for itsformal endorsement. Keen to raise the status of the profession, they wanted everything at "M" (Master's)level. They wanted to know why this module was at "Level 3" (the final undergraduate level, belowMaster's).

    My answer was that I did not know how to assess "Teaching in Practice"at that level. Master's level impliesa degree of expertise, rather than mere competence or proficiency. But this was a course of teachertraining: most of the participants were just starting out on teaching. Assessing them on the so-called"scholarship of teaching" was no problem. It was about what they knew about teaching. But if we were toassess them at the same level on their practice, there would be no chance until they had practised for at

    least five years (and exhibited a "flair"whatever that is for it). We could assess them unproblematically

    on writing about it, but actually doing it? The argument was grudgingly accepted.

    But a few years on, the university has surreptitiously sneaked a "practical", allegedly Master's level moduleinto a new degree. Those responsible claim that nowadays all credit on Master's degree has to be at a post-graduate level. Credit, perhaps, but not the skill which is is supposed to evidence. Presumably one is beingawarded credit for being able write very well and eruditely about why one's actual practice is rubbish.

    (I am wilfully ignoring the "competence-based training" issue here, which maintains that it

    is possible to specify and list these "higher-level" competences at a purely practical level.

    My argument with that is that its reductionism has no way of allowing for context, andhigher-level performance always has to take context into account. The use of terms such as"appropriate" does not get round the problem.)

    See the paper on "expertise"

    Where is this taking us?

    It is going in the direction of making a practical distinction between academic (left side) and

    professional (right side) knowledge for educational purposes. I am forced to acceptthediscourse of "discourse"to carry the argument further. Sorry.

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    In short, there is a fit between the social technology of education and assessment and thediscourse of "knowledge about". That discourse is, in the jargon, "privileged".

    There is no such fit with "know-how". "Competence" just about works, in a strangulated

    fashion, at the "lower" levels, but we have great difficulty beyond the craft skills. In some

    areas of education, such as art and design or performing arts, or even management, great

    convoluted and fudged effort is put into seeking general criteria even for assessment. Wemay recognise exceptional excellence (with a tolerable degree of consensus) when it

    confronts us, but we have little idea of how to operationalise that state-of-the-art goodpractice which is not mould-breaking.

    The classic cop-out, not invented but legitimised by Donald Schn, is"reflection".That isthe cross-over category which is claimed to translate practice into assessable theory. It has

    been latched on for its utility, but it does not really work. It presupposes articulacy, or a

    dual competence in doing something and talking or writing about it: and the evidence of"expert systems" is that it does not work. However, it meets the needs of academe, so weinsist on "reflective journals" which we (think we) can assess.

    It used to be thought thatHoward Gardner's "multiple intelligences"might potentially breakthe mould of conventional assessment, but the notion has proved to be less useful or evenaccurate than previously thought.

    More immediately important than the intractable assessment question. however, is that ofhow we teach on the right-hand side of the table. Learners learn, clearly, but probably inspite of rather than because of their teaching. Craft teachers who respect their own skills

    and have peer recognition, if not that of the establishment, can help; but they are notequipped to act as advocates within the discourses of academe.

    As far as teaching is concerned, read this piece from the New York Times (31 August 09) on experienced

    teachers' judgements on their training.And then this follow-up on a blog. But what strikes me about both

    pieces is the lack of actual content in practically all the courses referred to.

    The solution? I haven't got one.

    It gets worse!

    Sorry! The distinction at the top of this page is over-simplified. Different disciplines havedifferent criteria for what constitutes knowledge. The "left-hand""right-hand" distinction isfar from pure.

    In pure and applied sciences (what are sciences? We'll leave that on one side for the

    moment) advanced knowledge presupposes a considerable underpinning of accepted

    and "given" knowledge. Notionally, "normal" science (Kuhn, 1970) builds on what hasgone before, but while it might question its findings on occasion, it does not questionits questions. I therefore expect a Master's or research student to exhibit a

    comprehensive command of previous work in her field, accompanied by a necessaryskill in constructing and conducting experimental methods. I do not necessarily expecther to analyse the presuppositions of previous work.

    http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#SCH%C3%96Nhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#SCH%C3%96Nhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#SCH%C3%96Nhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/multiple.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/multiple.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/multiple.htmhttp://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/what-teachers-have-learned/http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/what-teachers-have-learned/http://www.eduwonk.com/2009/08/reinventing-ed-school-1-what-courses.htmlhttp://www.eduwonk.com/2009/08/reinventing-ed-school-1-what-courses.htmlhttp://www.eduwonk.com/2009/08/reinventing-ed-school-1-what-courses.htmlhttp://www.eduwonk.com/2009/08/reinventing-ed-school-1-what-courses.htmlhttp://www.eduwonk.com/2009/08/reinventing-ed-school-1-what-courses.htmlhttp://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/what-teachers-have-learned/http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/what-teachers-have-learned/http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/multiple.htmhttp://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/referenc.htm#SCH%C3%96N
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    The same goes for sophisticated disciplines investigating human artefacts, whether

    physical (archaeology) or social (law, politics). In these areas, on the whole,

    knowledge accumulates.

    History? Knowledge certainly accumulates. Some historical scholarship and research isabout unearthing previously unknown or neglected sources, and assimilating them into

    our picture of the past. But some is about accommodating that picture to theevidence: Collingwood pointed out years ago (I'm sorry, it is so far in my past that I

    haven't got the reference) that historyor more accurately, historiographysays as

    much about the preoccupations and values of the present as about the past. Howmuch critical analysis do we look for at a given academic level?

    Social "sciences"? Sociology and anthropology are so wracked by problems of the

    interactions between current and previous thought that they are almost paralysed in

    some sectors. It's not surprisingsociety is changing fast. Any empirical work over tenyears old is suspect, but it is not just that. The assumptions and hence the questions

    underpinning that empirical work have become questionable in a "post-modern" age:

    uncritical citation is a sin beyond "A" level.

    Literature? Cultural studies? Substance seems to matter less than the critical stance

    (or "gaze" to follow Foucault: why did I put that bit in? Discuss.)

    And so to professional studies. It obviously depends on the discipline and its evidence

    base. However, the prescriptive element of professional studies (and it is the presence

    of the prescriptive element which makes them "professional") exists in an uneasyrelationship with its descriptive (or "evidence") base. Even medicine has a problemwith this, and those professional areas which have a less established base are in even

    more trouble. Social work (about which I know a little more than the others) is inthrall to political correctness. Management is pragmatic but prone to the vagaries offashion, often preaching doctrines which have little (respectable) research base, but

    which "seem to work"; or did a couple of decades ago in a different economicclimate... What counts as "advanced knowledge" in such a shifting "Red Queen"

    environment?

    I am not a polymath: I cannot pronounce with authority on most of the disciplines above.But I can testify to the problems of comparing the levels of study/ achievement/

    scholarship. TheQuality Assurance Agencyhas a well-meaning (the QAAwell-meaning?)

    project of "subject benchmarking" to establish what constitute expected levels of knowledgeand competence at undergraduate level, but this is written from within the subjectdisciplines.

    Perhaps it is futile to attempt comparisons, but it is a real problem. I expect critical

    evaluation, and questioning of assumptions from my Master's students: I get dissertationsfrom science-based candidates, who already hold a doctorate, which are scrupulous but

    positivistic in their approach, and I feel obliged to say that they are not good enough. Bywhat right do I say that? Simply on the grounds that "education" is a shaky discipline blownhither and thither by the winds of fashion?

    The new interest in skill acquisition

    However, recently there has been more interest in the kinds of knowledge and skillidentified on the right-hand side of the table, particularly in the form of craft andperformance skills

    http://www.qaa.ac.uk/http://www.qaa.ac.uk/http://www.qaa.ac.uk/http://www.qaa.ac.uk/
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    Ericsson and others (2006) have emphasised the role of deliberate practice in skill acquisition, and were the

    first to come up with the now well-known figure of 10,000 hours of practice. (Seeherefor a comment andthe main reference).

    Richard Sennett has discussed the attributes and the acquisition of craft skillalbeit in rather rarefiedcontexts and a rambling manner.My take here.

    And Matthew Crawford (2010) The Case for Working with Your Hands; or why office work is bad for us and

    fixing things feels goodLondon; Penguin/Viking, published in the USA last year as Shop Class as Soulcraft;an inquiry into the value of workdoes what it says on the tin. Everyone involved in vocational andprofessional education should read it. Read more on thathere.

    And go here for a more practical discussion on what is actually involved in writing at Master's level.

    Read more:Forms of Knowledgehttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFUnder Creative Commons License:Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives

    http://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2011/04/on-deliberate-practice-golf.htmlhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2011/04/on-deliberate-practice-golf.htmlhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2011/04/on-deliberate-practice-golf.htmlhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2008/03/on-deliberate-practice.htmhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2008/03/on-deliberate-practice.htmhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2008/03/on-deliberate-practice.htmhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2010/06/on-manual-work-feedback-and-fulfilment.html#ixzz1O89EYkkWhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2010/06/on-manual-work-feedback-and-fulfilment.html#ixzz1O89EYkkWhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2010/06/on-manual-work-feedback-and-fulfilment.html#ixzz1O89EYkkWhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/academic/m_writing.htmhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/academic/m_writing.htmhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0http://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/tools/forms.htm#ixzz2O7tN3RJFhttp://www.doceo.co.uk/academic/m_writing.htmhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2010/06/on-manual-work-feedback-and-fulfilment.html#ixzz1O89EYkkWhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2008/03/on-deliberate-practice.htmhttp://recentreflection.blogspot.com/2011/04/on-deliberate-practice-golf.html