law on public officers reviewer (dean roy)

Law of Public Officers | Dean Roy 2D 2012

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SESSION 1

I. CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE

1. LAUREL v DESIERTO FACTS During the Aquino administration, an Administrative Order was issued for the formation of a committee that would be in charge of the Centennial celebrations. This was reconstituted during the Ramos administration and was dubbed as the National Centennial Commission. It was to be chaired by Salvador Laurel and was described to be an ad-hoc commission, to be dissolved upon the completion of the centennial celebrations. Consequently, EXPOCORP was incorporated, wherein Laurel was one of the directors/incorporators. On a later date, Coseteng delivered a privileged speech in the Senate alleging anomalies connected with the Centennial celebrations. This was followed by an investigation by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Saguisag commission formed by President Estrada. Both recommended the further investigation and possible prosecution of Laurel. This led to an investigation by the Ombudsman who filed a complaint later on against Laurel. Now, Laurel questions the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, contending that he is not to be considered a public officer. HELD The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The appointment of a portion of sovereign function is the most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not. The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies set forth by law. In relation to the Administrative Order and Executive Order creating the commission, the policies and objectives for its creation was set forth. It was not only primarily for the coordinated planning for a centennial celebration but also for the furtherance of arts and culture as well as enrichment of national economic development. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions and its Chair is a public officer.

2. MATHAY JR. v CA FACTS During his administration, Simon appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the PD wasnt published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didnt become a proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didnt quite reach fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled. The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was no longer approved, prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the previous ordinance issued. HELD The CSC has no authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions. In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine of separation of powers doesnt apply to local governments, which is wrong. The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power to create,


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consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city council. By ordering the mayor to reinstate private respondents, the CSC substituted its own judgment to the appointing power of the mayor. This cannot be done. The CSCs power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It doesnt have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made.

II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

1. FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President. It is the petitioners contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause since the said law didnt repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. HELD Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, doesnt violate the one subject- one title rule. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

2. NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC FACTS Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled. HELD RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to


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exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections

3. KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v ERMITA FACTS Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ongs citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition. HELD First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importancethe citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the Supreme Court. Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete the appointment. The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointeehe must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesnt end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesnt pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesnt provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an appointment.


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III. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS

1. TORNALI v CSC FACTS Tornali was appointed as Department Management Officer II by the then Executive Director of the Office of Muslim Affairs. She assumed her duties four months after and during this time, the records of her appointment werent transmitted to the CSC for approval. Given that her appointment was incomplete, upon the entrance of a new Executive Director, her appointment was revoked and she was replaced by Lucma. This prompted Tornali to question the validity of Lucmas appointment when she was already appointed to the position. She protested this but her protests were dismissed. HELD An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed. Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office canyet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure. It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director, therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better qualified for the position. The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.

2. MALALUAN v COMELEC FACTS Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluans continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en musse denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. HELD We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-


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contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. COMELECs reasoning in awarding the damages in question is fatally flawed. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming that this is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorneys fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly unfounded one under the aforementioned circumstances. Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction. COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that since petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting execution pending appeal, the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper. Petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has haa possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.

3. PEOPLE v GARCIA FACTS Garcia was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and was sentenced to death by Judge Guzman. The judgment was promulgated on the 20th of February. On April of the same year, the judge filed for disability retirement and such was approved. Its effectivity was then made retroactive to the 16th of February. Here now comes the accused assailing the judgment against him, given that Judge Guzman had no longer authority to promulgate judgment given the retroactivity of his judgment. HELD Accuseds contention is without merit. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto A judge de jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the expiration of his term are void. However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.


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SESSION 2 IV. CIVIL SERVICE

1. ANDAYA V. RTC FACTS There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu police Andaya submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to the mayor of Cebu. However, the mayor refused to appoint one because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due to being disqualified. RTC ruled in favor of the mayor, granting the appointment of Sarmiento. ISSUE W/N the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayors protg in the list HELD NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It its the prerogative of the regional director of the police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without intervention from local executives - based on the National Police Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the qualifications of a chief of police. In case of disagreement, the issue should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall resolve the issue within 5 working days. The authority of the mayor is limited, no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the list. The purpose is to enhance professionalism and isolate police service from political domination

2. JAVIER V. REYES FACTS Javier was appointed chief of police in Malolos by Mayor Aldaba. He already took oath and discharged his functions as chief of police. However, the municipal mayor was assumed by Reyes, who recalled his appointed. Reyes even illegally ousted Javier and replaced him with Clements. Javier took this up in CSC. It appears that there were already 2 appointments for the chief of police Javier and Bernardo. The CSC ruled that Javier should be the one appointed, as Bernardo was not confirmed by the counsel of Malolos. But Reyes still refused to instill Javier in the position. ISSUE W/N Javier should prevail as chief of police HELD YES. Javier should be chief of police. He already took oath and performed the functions of his office. This amounts to acceptance by Javier. Javier acted immediately when his position was taken and filed a mandamus suit, this also amounts to acceptance. On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office. He did not even contested Javiers right to the position. His motion to intervene in court was way too late. It seems that there was no acceptance of appointment for his part. Acceptance is important in appointments. It is what makes the appointments complete.

3. DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR FACTS The case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him. The appointment was issued on November 19, 1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following day, the SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991, SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar and declaring void the recall issued by Secretary Santos. Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents (SPES) to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.


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ISSUE W/N Docenas appointment was already complete? HELD YES. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.

4. FABELLA V. CA FACTS On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. ISSUE W/N private respondents were denied due process? HELD YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.


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Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

5. MIRALLES VS GO

FACTS This case is about a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the SAC-Napolcom finding Miralles administratively liavble for grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal. On Dec. 7, 1977 an administrative complaint was filed against Miralles, alleging that Miralles committed grave misconduct by wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with the intent to kill assaulted Pat. Ressurrecion by use of firearms, which directly caused the death of Pat. Resurrecion and Merculio. After the investigation it was recommended that Miralles be dismissed from service, the decision was appealed by Miralles to the Adjudication Board, which was denied. The petitioner then appealed to the Special Appellate Committee of NAPOLCOM. The appeal was also dismissed at this point., subsequently the issue was appealed to the CA, and the CA ruled that the action of Miralles was pre-mature and it should have filed its action before the Civil Service Commission. Despite this procedural error, the CA went on to decide on the case and it affirmed the decision of the lower courts. ISSUES

1. W/N CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2. W/N the dismissal of the petition can be sustained by the evidence presented/used. 3. W/N the petitioner sufficiently establish his alibi of self-defense.

HELD The Court ruled that Miralles should have filed his appeal in the Civil Service Commission first, pursuant to RA 6975. The court found that the contention of Miralles is untenable, he argued that the decision was promulgated in 1989, years before the implementation of RA 6975, therefore he should be not be covered by the said RA. However the Court said that, it is true that the decision was promulgated on 1989, however Miralles only received such copy of the decision sometime in 1991, and by then the RA was already implemented, therefore Miralles should have filed its action before the CSC. The Court went on and say that the right to appeal is a statutory right, therefore one who seeks to avail the right, must comply with the statute or the rile in effect when the right arose, in this case the right arose or vested when the notice was delvered to Miralles, therefore Miralles should have complied with the new rule. Lastly the Court went on to say that the issues is moot and academic. Regarding the evidence used against Miralles, according to him it was all hearsays which should not be entertained by the Court, Miralles alleged that the evidence did not properly identified the persons who executed them, hence such becomes inadmissible. The Court however has a different opinion, it states the except exhibits B and C, the rest of the documents are public documents, hence they are prima facie evidence. Furthermore the contention of Miralles that the testimony of Lamsen was recanted by Lamsen in a cross-examination, the court by searching the record proved that there was no recantation by Lamsen during the cross examination. In fact the said recantation was actually a statement made by Lamsen as a witness for the defense, in which Lamsen was never cross-examined, making his defense testimony inadmissible. Lastly, the Court found that the facts of the case has been consistently the same under the lower court and committees, it ruled that the Supreme Court respects the integrity of the facts finding of the lower court, and according to such Miralles failed to establish his defense of self-defense sufficiently. With all things considered the Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

6. LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY

FACTS Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co-accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary


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by the authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges. The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesnt have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him. ISSUES:

1. W/N the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith.

HELD The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being wilfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner. As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled to backwages.

7. MACALINCAG V. CHANG

FACTS Roberto E. Chang, acting municipal treasurer of Makati, was charged administratively by Lorinda Carlos and Victor Macalincag, acting Finance Secretary, for illegal disbursements as well as failure to remit collections to the Bureau of Treasury. Included in the charge was on Order of Preventive Suspension for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) seeking the implementation of the preventive suspension. The Officer-in-Charge of the MMC furnished Chang a copy of the order through ordinary mail dated October 6, 1989. Chang, on the other hand, filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and in the meantime, the RTC temporarily restrained Carlos and Macalincag from implementing the said order. Upon examination of the pleadings, the RTC denied Changs petition. Chang filed a motion for reconsideration, citing a new argument by invoking Sec. 8 of EO No. 932 which created the Metro Manila Authority and thereby transferred the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The RTC reconsidered and set aside the previous ruling, this time, ruled in favor of Chang.


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Macalincag argues that the order took effect upon the receipt of Chang, which was on October 6, 1989, before the effectivity of EO No.392. On the other hand, Chang argues that the preventive suspension would only be implemented upon the happening of 2 conditions, 1) service of a copy of the order to the respondent and 2) designation of replacement. It is the latters argument which trial court curried favor on. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang? HELD YES. The Supreme Court held that the trial courts ruling is untenable given that the designation of a replacement is not required in implementing preventive suspension. The Order of Preventive Suspension took effect upon the receipt of Chang, hence, the applicability of EO No., 392 would be immaterial. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is under the Department of Finance, hence, Macalincag has the power to suspend Chang. Assuming arguendo that EO No. 932 was applicable, one only has to bring in my mind that department secretaries are alter egos of the President, making it still within the authority of the Macalincag as Secretary of Finance to preventively suspend Chang.

8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. JUDGE MATAS AND EDUARDO TORRES

FACTS Judge Jesus Matas and Eduardo Torres, the OIC Clerk of Court, were accused of violating RA 3019 which caused then Deputy Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano to recommend that the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file administrative charges against the two but said charges will be suspended pending the out come of the criminal case. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas and Torres, in connivance with one George Mercado, concealed from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his knowledge of the petition for issuance of new owners duplicate copies as well as taking cognizance of the case which was allegedly outside of the jurisdiction of his court, the land being in Kapalong, Davao. Notwithstanding that the land in question was owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons, Judge Matas still ordered the posing of the order and ultimately issued instructed the Register of Deeds for the issuance a new owners duplicate to George Mercado. Justice Imperial was tasked with the investigations. Hearing with the OCA commence but after presenting two witnesses, it moved for suspension of the proceedings to amend the complaint adding the grounds of gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law as well as modifying other portions of the complaint. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas and Torres acted with bad faith and partiality in ruling in favour of George Mercado. ISSUE 1. W/N Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case? 2. W/N Judge Matas acted with gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law in ruling in favor of George Mercado? HELD 1. NO. The subject parcel of land was well within the jurisdiction of the court of Judge Matas. The so-called municipality of Sto Tomas in Davao never legally existed because it was created only by then President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. The land was actually part of Kapalong which is within the coverage of Branch 1 of the RTC of Davao del Norte where Judge Matas sits. It was a mere impropriety of venue which may be waived by the parties. 2. NO. There was no gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law given that Judge Matas actually ordered the required posting to give notice. Also, he only ordered the RD to issue a duplicate of copy existing in record of the Registry and not issue new ones in the name of George Mercado. SIDE ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO BE RELATED TO ADMIN LAW: The SC said that the investigating Justice or Judge designated by the Court to Conduct an investigation, submit a report, and make the appropriate recommendation does not have an authority to grant or deny a motion to dismiss the case. Also, the initial recommendation of the Court Administrator regarding the suspension of the administrative proceedings pending the criminal case is inappropriate since administrative cases must be resolved as expeditiously as possible. There are different quantum of evidence, procedure to be followed and sanctions imposed, hence, the finding of one shouldnt be necessarily binding on the other.


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9. SANDOVAL V MANALO

FACTS On or about 12am of May, inside his house in Coron-Province,Palawan, Jermaine Echague shot Alexander Sandoval (hitting the right part of his nose bridge) using an unlicensed 38 caliber revolver, Smith Wesson, without serial number, snub nose (paltik.) The latter died. Thereafter, Echague, in order to hide the body, removed the body of the victim, tied it up with an empty oxygen tank and threw it into the sea. Antonio Sandoval filed a criminal complaint for murder with the MCTC of Palawan against Echague for killing his son. Judge Manalo issued a warrant for the arrest of Echague and recommended no bail. Since Echague did not file the required counter-affidavits and evidence to support his case, the judge issued an order declaring that Echague had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie against him. He forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. Chief of Police also filed against Echague a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms (paltik used) and on the same date, Manalo issued a warrant of arrest for Echague. It seemed however that Echague could not be found nor located. The victims father, Antonio Sandoval, filed a complaint against the presiding judge (Manalo.) The complaint charges the judge with ignorance of law, dereliction of duty and grave abuse of authority for hastily lifting the warrant of arrest previously issued without giving the prosecution reasonable time to file any pleading regarding the motion. Judge Manalo contends that he only lifted the warrant of arrest based on humanitarian considerations. (Echague was only 18 years old; he voluntarily surrendered; his counsel attested that releasing him would not frustrated the ends of justice.) He also contends that as an investigating judge, he had the power to exercise his discretion in issuing warrants in cases during preliminary investigation. Subsequently, Antonio Sandoval filed a desistance to the administrative complaint against the judge stating that he is satisfied with the outcome of the criminal case. He also stated that he didnt know that what his counsel let him sign was a complaint against a judge. He thought that it was just an affidavit to be filed in court in order that the accused would be put back to prison. He did not know that it was a complaint against the judge since it was written in English.

ISSUE W/N the acts of Judge Manalo renders him liable regardless of the desistance of Sandoval HELD YES. Desistance of Sandoval does not affect the truth and integrity of the affidavit-complaint against Judge Manalo. Judge Manalo did not even dispute the facts alleged therein. Disciplinary actions against public officers and employees do not involve purely private or personal matters. They are impressed with public interest by virtue of a public trust character of the public office. Administrative actions are not therefore made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. A mere reprimand is not enough since Manalo did not commit a mere error of judgment but has disregarded the laws and rules governing preliminary investigation of criminal cases cognizable by the RTC. Having thus determined a prima facie case for murder against Echague, Judge Manalo has no legal justification toe release the accused on a mere plea of the latter as the provision that it will not frustrate the ends of justice no longer applies after the conclusion of his preliminary investigation. Judge Manalo deliberately set aside the aforementioned laws and rules on preliminary investigation to accommodate the accused making him liable for misconduct or grave abuse of authority or dereliction of duty. He was fined and warned.

10. GREGO V COMELEC FACTS Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon finding of serious misconduct, for the second time, in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. His retirement benefits were forfeited and the decision of the court included this statement: with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCCs. In 1988, he ran as a candidate for Councilor in Manila and won.


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He sought re-election in 1992 and won again. However, his victory was contested. Another candidate alleged his ineligibility to be elected on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. This was dismissed. Basco, for the third time, ran again for councilor in 1995. His right to office was contested by Grego who filed a petition for disqualification against Basco and prayed for the suspension of Bascos proclamation and Maranans declaration as the citys 6th duly elected councilor. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case. Before the parties were able to submit their respective memoranda, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila (6th place.) Due to the said proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation. COMELECs first division dismissed the petion for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him. COMELEC en banc dismissed Gregos MR. ISSUE W/N the Tordesillas decision barred Basco from running for any elective position. HELD NO. Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person who was previously separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. In light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.

11. CSC V. DACOYCOY

FACTS Pedro O Dacoycoy was charged of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. The Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the supervision of Respondent Dacoycoy. ISSUE

1) W/N Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism? 2) W/N the Civil Service Commission is the property party to appeal the suit.

HELD 1) YES. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. (see page 435 of the case for the exceptions: not really important in the case) To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree f consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Undoubtedly, Respondent can be held responsible for the appointment of his 2 sons. Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator, He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under his immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. 2) YES, SC said that CSC was the proper party to appeal the suit because it was impleaded in the case and that the exoneration of Dcoycoy by the CA seriously prejudiced the civil service system. In this case, the SC expressly abandoned the prior rulings that an aggrieved party refers only to government employees adversely affected by the decision. In other words, the SC overruled prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges Summary of opinions MELO, J., Dissenting and Concurring


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PD. 807 has disallowed appeals by the government in cases of exoneration in an administrative case. Such has not yet been amended. The prerogative to amend such belongs to the Legislature and not to the Judiciary through its interpretations. ROMERO, J., Dissenting PD. 807 included only government employees, either the one who filed the complaint or the one charged, is considered an aggrieved party. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. In this case, CSC or government instrumentalities was not included thus they are not the proper party to appeal the case. Also CSC exercises quasi-judicial function and by analogy a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. PUNO, J., Concurring CSC may appeal the case by certiorari to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the respondent (Judicial Review.) The question at bar is basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws.

12. BONAFE V. ZUBANO

FACTS Petitioner, a policeman of Malilipot, Albay, was suspended by respondent Mayor Marciano Bitara because of four criminal cases filed against him in the Municipal Court of Tabaco, Albay, to wit: assault upon an agent (another policeman) of a person in authority with homicide less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; illegal passion of firearms and alarm and scandal. Before the cases could be tried on the merits, the prosecution moved for their provisional dismissal on account of the desistance of the offended parties who had been paid by petitioner. The motion was granted by the court. Petitioner later sought a modicfication of the provisional dismissal to an absolute dismissal, which was also granted by the court. Petitioner then filed with the CSC a petition for reinstatement and payment of salaries he failed to receive during his suspension invoking Police Act of 1966 which basically says that he is entitled to such when he is acquitted from the criminal case ISSUE W/N petitioner is entitled to backwages based on acquittal HELD NO. Mere dismissal of the case will not suffice to entitle him to backwages. Dismissal does not necessarily amount to acquittal (except in 2 cases: demurrer of evidence and violation of speedy trial.) SC elaborated more on the difference which Im sure you still remember from crimpro. Also the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. His petition for reinstatement was pending in CSC when this case was filed.

13. GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE FACTS The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from service. The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying

o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the

disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the ruling.


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CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments. ISSUE W/N the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments HELD YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC

14. LAYUG v QUISUMBING FACTS Teacher Layug filed charges against Principal Presto for harassment. In counterclaim, Principal Presto filed charges of incompetence and undesirability against Layug. Both locked horns like angry bulls and ultimately Layug found himself suspended. DECS Secretary Quisumbing affirmed the suspension. Later on, the order of suspension was lifted and Layug was reinstated. Unfortunately, he did not receive his old job as a teacher of English and Biology. The poor fella was kicked into the CAT/YDT department. Layug demanded his old job as an English/Bio teacher and Principal Presto asserted that those positions were filled. The petition was denied, and Layug then found himself shuffled to temporary assignment in the Guidance Office. Layug howled again. Presto chastised him saying that if he did not accept, he will be terminated. Layug claims that the law mandates that he be given back his job as a Bio/English teacher since this was his appointment. ISSUE W/N Layug has the right to teach the old subjects HELD NO. Layugs contention, that he should be reinstated to his former assignment as a teacher of English and Biology subjects, has no legal basis. The law only provides that he shall be reinstated in the service, i.e., to his position as a high school teacher appearing in his appointment. A teacher may not be compelled to accept, and neither may he demand to be given, an assignment not specified in his appointment. His appointment is that of a TEACHER. That is all he may demand. The selection of the subjects which Layug may teach is a matter for his principal and the DECS regional director to determine based on his qualifications and the prevailing conditions in the school. As explained by Presto, the English and Biology subjects which Layug used to teach had been assigned to other teachers after Layug's suspension, and, since changing teachers in the middle of the school year would be prejudicial to the students. Presto rightfully assigned Layug to teach YDT/CAT subjects instead (which he rejected). Layugs petition is denied.

15. GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under


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preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them). ISSUE W/N the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated. HELD YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

16. DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the 5 day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six months suspension. However in view of the length of time that the teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without back wages. ISSUE

1. W/N the teachers conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of service. 2. W/N the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3 years pending their appeal deducting the 6 months

suspension eventually meted out to them. HELD

1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return to work order.

2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in administrative disciplinary cases.

17. KENNETH NEELAND V. ILDIFONSO VILLANUEVA

FACTS Sugarland Motor Sales placed the highest bid price of P40,000 for a motor vehicle owned by Kenneth Neeland which was the subject of an auction sale. The Sheriff who conducted the sale turned over the amount of the mortgage obligation to Sugarland. The Clerk of Court, Ildifonso Villanueva (respondent) issued a certificate of sale but failed to turn over the balance to Neeland thus an administrative complaint was filed against the Sheriff and the Clerk of Court. The RTC ruled that both should be dismissed for gross misconduct. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Villanueva should be dismissed


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HELD NO. Although the SC did affirm that Villanueva indeed was remiss in his duties in turning over the balance of the proceeds of the auction sale and the payment of the sheriffs commission in court and thus should be held accountable. However, for lack of previous derogatory record, the penalty was reduced. He was only fined P5,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

18. ARMANDO BERNARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS/ CSC / LBP

FACTS Armando Bernardo entered the government service as Claims Adjuster of Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and became the Head of the Loans and Discount Divisions. He also maintained a Savings Account with the LBP. He deposited P500,000 in his own account and photocopied the page reflecting this in his passbook and on the same day withdrew the same. He then executed, as Treasurer-in-Trust of Markay Trading and Manpower Services (MTMSI) a treasurers certificate certifying that 25% of the authorized capital stock has been subscribed and 25% of the subscription, which was P500,000 had been paid and received y him. He also executed a letter-authority to the SEC authorizing their office to examine and verify the deposit in the LBP in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust for MTMSI. The Articles of Incorporation of MTMSI was signed by Bernardo and he became one of its incorporators and was elected as member in the Board of Directors and as Treasurer. He never opened an account with the LBP for the corporation though he was elected Treasurer and in the meantime he was promoted Assistant Branch Manager of LBP. Because of this, LBP filed a formal charge against Bernardo for gross neglect, grave misconduct, and serious violation of the CSC rules namely engaging in a private business without the permission and authority required by the CS rules and regulations. After the formal investigation, the hearing officer issued a resolution finding Bernardo guilty and be meted out with the penalty of forced resignation. The LBP approved the recommendation which was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB). The CSC likewise affirmed the penalty but based its findings on a different ground, that he made use of his being an employee of LBP to do an irregular act of depositing and withdrawing the paid up capital without the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company. Bernardo filed an MR alleging that the acts used as basis for finding his guilt was not raised in the formal charge thus violating his right to due process and that his acts were not violative of the CSC rules and regulations. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Bernardo violated the CSC rules and regulations HELD YES. The evidence on record shows that not only was he an incorporator, he was also a member of the Board of Directors and was the treasurer of MTMSI. He and his wife even signed vouchers of the corporation. Before he can do this, he must first secure a permit from a competent authority of the LBP but failed to do so. However, the SC found that the CSC erred in finding him guilty of grounds not alleged in the formal charges thus violating his right to be informed of the charges against him. But it did not err in finding him guilty of grave misconduct. The constitution enunciates the policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service and these are not mere rhetorical words but must be taken as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds.

19. SANTIAGO V. COMELEC

FACTS Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly approving applications for legalization of the stay of a number of aliens in the Philippines. She was charged in relation to her position as the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena suspended Miriam from her position as Senator of the Philippines and from any govt position she was holding for 90 days. This is in the form of a preventive suspension pending investigation of the case before the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE Was the act of the Sandiganbayan valid? RULING YES. RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.


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It is also the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. The court reiterated that the preventive suspension is not a penalty since if acquitted, the accused is reinstated to his previous position plus back wages. The order of suspension under RA 3019 is different from the power of Congress to discipline its members under the Constitution. The constitutional provision is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring member. On the other hand, R.A. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. V. AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19, 1960. He was married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 childrenSi Beng, Si Son and Si Lunaall born in China and allegedly out of their marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration admitted into the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong on the basis of the finding that they were children of Sichangco, a Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of Commissioners of Immigration (BCI), it noted the decision. The Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo Order No. 9) setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been collectively deliberating on the cases filed before it. Thus, the BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from the Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these minors, Sichangco filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the BCI excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted the petition. The BCI appealed. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Justice may validly issue Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the BCI HELD YES. The BCI was and still is under the supervision and control of the DOJ. By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, as well as the act of noting of the decision by the BCI. He can even directly exercise the powers of the chief of the bureau or office under him pursuant to Sec. 37, Act No. 4007, which provides that:

The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division, or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division, or service.

Moreover, BCIs act of noting the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was NOT a valid decision of affirmance by the BCI in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under the Immigration Act of 1940. The word noted simply meant that the members of BCI had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

2. GONZALES v RAQUIZA

FACTS In 1967, the Commissioner of Public Highways (Baltazar Aquino) entered into 2 separate contracts for the importation of construction equipment with Continental Ore (Phil.) Inc., which acted as the representative of Huber Corporation (contract #1), and as agent of Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors Corporation (contract #2). Under Contract #1, the Philippines was obligated to pay Huber Corporation $13.39M in the form of irrevocable, confirmed and divisible letters of credit in favor of Continental Ore Corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment and spare parts. Under Contract #2, the Philippines was obligated to pay Continental Ore Corp. $21.08M in the form of irrevocable, confirmed, and divisible letters of credit; Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors Corporation would sell, transfer and convey to the Philippines road construction equipment and spare parts under the same terms and conditions stated in the first contract. Both of these contracts were duly approved by Secretary Raquiza (Public Works and Communications) and the Auditor-General. Upon application of the Bureau of Public Highways for the establishment of letters of credit with PNB, the latter approved such letters of credit provided that these be secured by the guaranty of the national government to be given by the Secretary


18

of Finance and upon approval by the Office of the President. Accordingly, the Office of the President directed the Secretary of Finance to extend the necessary guaranty for the letters of credit in favor of these American corporations. Gonzales, as taxpayer and stockholder of PNB, questioned the validity of the contracts on the ground that there was no appropriation for the payments and no certificate of availability of funds, as required by the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 606, 607, 608), and for being violative of the PNB Charter since the accommodation or loan to the Philippines was beyond the lending capacity of the bank. ISSUE W/N the contracts are valid HELD YES. These contracts do NOT involve directly the expenditure of public funds but a financing scheme under different laws. Sections 606 and 607 of the Revised Administrative Code are without question an implementation of Art. VI, Sec 23, Clause 2 of the 1935 Constitution (then applicable), which provides that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Said provision was restated in toto in the 1975 Constitution and in the present Constitution. The contracts do not involve an immediate payment but a repayment over a period of several years. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. Thus, no money can be taken out of the Treasury without an appropriation, which must be made only for the amounts demandable. These contracts constitute negotiated sale on credit where the Bureau of Public Works is not required to make direct or immediate payment. Without abandoning the constitutional and legal safeguards against the indiscriminate disbursements of the public funds, the Court takes judicial notice of the imperatives of national development that demand immediate implementation of programs, the funding of which cannot be appropriated simply because there are no sufficient funds. Moreover, under RA 4680, the President is authorized to contract indebtedness to finance economic development projects, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon for the purpose of financing economic development purposes or projects authorized by law, including the construction and improvement of highways and bridges. Indeed, RA 4680 authorizes procurement on credit when there are no available funds or appropriation.

SESSION 3

VI. INHIBITIONS

1. MACARIOLA V ASUNCION FACTS Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company. A year after the companys registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging:

that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and

that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte

This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed against him.


19

ISSUE 1. W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which

was among those properties involved in the partition case. 2. W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII

of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer

HELD

1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion.

Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.

2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said provision.

Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are considered to have committed corrupt practices, which include having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision because there is no showing that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the corporation in which he participated has obviously no relation to his judicial office. Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does N

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