law in australia by john wilson

8/14/2019 Law in Australia by John Wilson

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INTRODUCTION

The rights of all Australians are enshrined in the Constitution Act (Vic. 63 and 64) 9th July 1900 which containsthe Australian Constitution in Clause 9. The Constitution Act is a British Act of Parliament and begins:

"WHEREAS the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland; and Tasmania,humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble FederalCommonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the

Constitution hereby established:".

Queen Elizabeth the Second, at Her Coronation, took The Oath to govern the Peoples of Australia and "causeLaw and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed in all (Her) judgments". Then the Moderator of the GeneralAssembly of the Church of Scotland presented Her with the Holy Bible and said: "Our gracious Queen: to keepyour Majesty ever mindful of the Law and the Gospel of God as the Rule for the whole life andgovernment of Christian Princes, we present you with this Book, the most valuable thing that this worldaffords. Here is Wisdom; This is the Royal Law; These are the Oracles of God."

Australia is "one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown". Therefore, we have all the rightsthat our forefathers fought and died for since time immemorial because we are "under the Crown". Those rightsare set down in The Bible, in Magna Carta, in the Bill of Rights 1688 and all of English Common Law. The Queenhas sworn to govern us according to those laws.

However, the banks find that all too inconvenient. They have been systematically and illegally stripping us ofthose rights and protections.

Why? Greed, of course. It is time to awake. It is time to learn of our inheritance.

It is time to fight back.

A war between the banks and the people will not be won by force. The banks are powerful and command asmuch physical strength as would be required to put down any uprising or indiscriminate protest. Nothing pleasesthe banks more than bombings or shootings such as Oklahoma City or Port Arthur. "From disorder comes order".An excuse to swing into action with propaganda through their controlled media to condemn any opposition and

render the entire community defenceless through punitive legislation. Anyone who resists is branded as a "rightwing extremist" or a criminal.

The American Oath of Allegiance includes the pledge to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of theUnited States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."The only way to win against such an all-conquering enemy, who are both "foreign and domestic", is to supportand defend the Constitution Act (Vic. 63 and 64) 1900 which contains the method and the system to bring abouttruth and justice. The enemy have been progressively sabotaging our foundation document for many years withthe assistance of politicians, judges and civil servants who can only be described as "ignorant, corruptor gutless"and as "liars, thieves and traitors".Force is out. Nonviolence is in.

Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) understood the dignity and strength to be achieved by simply standing one'sground in the face of overwhelming firepower. Oh, how we need a Gandhi now!

The banks have the parliaments and the courts in their pocket. They have all the mercenaries, both military andintellectual, at their disposal. But there is an "Achilles' Heel". It is the truth!

And the truth is found in the word, "VARIABLE".

Banks have implemented the system of charging variable interest rates on loans. However, variable meansuncertain and common law demands that, for a contract to be valid, there must be certainty of terms. In otherwords, what the banks are doing is committing fraud.

This book tells of the frustration of trying to reason with and even challenge authorities politely and legally. Formany years I wrote and spoke all to no avail. Taking the issue to court proved the extent of the banks' influencefrom Master Greenwood in the Supreme Court of New South Wales saying, "Thus whilst the amount of the futurerate is uncertain, the rate itself is indeed certain." Through to Sir Daryl Dawson J. in the High Court of Australiasaying, "No, we cannot answer those questions, I am sorry." when I asked, "Your Honours, ... the first question is,'Does variable mean uncertain'?".


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That is the Achilles' Heel.

To keep the truth from the people, the electronic and print media have built a wall of silence around all theproceedings and the judges are refusing allow the matter to go before a jury. The contents of this book will tell ofthe skullduggery employed to those ends.

Now that channels of appeal and methods of redress and remedy have been attempted. Now that law and justicehave been decidedly perverted. Now it is time to "go to the streets" with a campaign of creating awareness anddemanding that truth be enforced.

The people know what is right.

There must be posters/stickers/leaflets/messages saying:

"VARIABLE MEANS FRAUD SO SAYS COMMON LAW".

These words must be seen everywhere. In the vicinity of banks. On carbumpers. Under windscreen wipers.Handed to shoppers in malls.

The banks will ignore it. But it must persist.

It may take a year but the awareness must be created. The banks are our servants and not our masters.

When people see the words, "Variable means fraud so says common law", some will want to know more. Thenthe questioning will start.

Q:"Why is it fraud?"A: To make out a loan contract with uncertainty of terms (i.e.: variable or uncertain interest rates) to be a validcontract is false representation or fraud. To take money by fraud is stealing. The 8th Commandment says: "Thoushalt not steal".

Q: "But agreed to those terms and signed the contract?"A: You cannot agree to be defrauded. Signing a fraudulent document is void and of no effect.

Q:If the interest rates go down, isn't it to my advantage if the bank lowers my rate at the same time?A: The contract is still fraud. It is invalid. If the market interest rates go down, then a memorandum can be addedto a valid contract to fixin the new and lower rate. This must be agreed to and signed by both parties.

Q:And I suppose if the market rates go up then, with a valid contract, i.e.:.: with a fixed rate, the bankcan't make me pay any more!?A: That is correct. You have the protection of a legitimate contract.

Q:What about all those poor individuals who have suffered in the past when the banks changed theinterest on their loans anything up to 23% or more?A: They are entitled to restitution, i.e.: the return of stolen money or property. The Bible says they should get that

plus another one fifth. The actual amount to be returned would have to be calculated in each case.

Q:Why don't the courts recognise the swindle?A: It's called corruption.


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WHAT HAPPENED IN 1981?

The banks had planned their move not unlike the Japanese had 40 years earlier when the then U.S. PresidentRoosevelt described the sneak attack on Pearl Harbour as "a day that will live in infamy".

The sleepy people of Australia were not not aware of what was in store when our politicians passed a Bill calledthe Consumer Credit Act to replace the Moneylenders and Infants Loans Act of 1941. The Moneylenders Actclearly stated that a loan contract shall show the total amount of interest payable which meant that the lenderknew exactly what the loan would cost, i.e.: there was certainty of terms in accordance with common law and thefundamental principles of economics governing the setting of interest to be charged on a loan. This and a fewother qualities of the Moneylenders Act are explained in a leaflet I produced to support a motion I put before aLiberal Party State Convention in 1994 which is reprinted here.

So anxious were the politicians to institute the banks' plan that the new legislation was passed before the old wasrepealed which meant that legislation was passed which was repugnant or incompatible which existing statutelaw. When I pointed this aspect out to some bureaucrats they dismissed it by saying that it didn't matter in whichorder Bills went through the House.

The banks' Consumer Credit Act introduced the system of variable interest rates under the clause "Variation ofContract" which was and remains a clear and irrefutable violation of common law which demands that there becertainty of terms for a contract to be created. The Consumer Credit Act should never have been granted RoyalAssent by the State Governors whose duty it is to reject such legislation which contravenes common law. Theirexcuse for rubber stamping the infamous document is that they "act on the advice of their Ministers". The reality isthat they failed in their duty to the Queen and to the People. They have degraded their role to that of merepuppets being manipulated by politicians who are, in turn, manipulated by the banks. A pathetic state of affairsand one which should enrage all right-minded and patriotic Australians.

The stage was now set for criminal exploitation that would devastate so many ordinary people and swell thecoffers of the banks to unprecedented proportions.

When victims protested and said, "The banks have broken their contract!", the ready reply came back, "But thecontract you signed gives us the right to vary the interest rate without your consent.". The plan worked beautifully.

However, an Act passed by Parliament is called a Statute Law whereas Common Law has evolved independently

over the centuries and based on court precedents accepted by the community.In Australia we have the protection of our Constitutional Monarchy. Common law is the superior law because, iflegislation passed by the Parliament is repugnant to common law, it is the duty of the Queen's Representative torefuse Royal Assent which is necessary for a Bill to become law. The unacceptable nature of a Bill should bemade known to the Governor at the time. If it is not then the Ministers are culpable. If the error is realised later, theAct should be disallowed and struck out. Lawyers will tell you that Statute Law displaces Common Law but that iswrong for the reason I have explained. Lawyers will tell you that Parliament is the ultimate authority but that iswrong, too. The people are the ultimate authority and if legislation does not meet the standard of Due Process,i.e.: that it is in the interests of the welfare of the community, then it must be removed from the Statutes. Lawyershave been brainwashed through their universities and the people have been denied knowledge of their ownConstitution and inherited rights. The ignorance created has been fertile ground for the banks to sow their seedsfor absolute power.

Politicians have already admitted that they lie and must lie to keep their jobs. Now, with the unfolding of my casethrough the courts, judges are just the same.

What happened in 1981?The banks performed their own version of Pearl Harbour. Fortunately, the Americans had the resources toregroup and eventually defeat the enemy.

Similarly, we have the resources, in the form of common law and our Constitutional Monarchy, also to winthrough. All that is needed is the will to do the job. All that is needed is the courage and the spirit of those goodmen and women who have gone before us to fight for truth and our rights.

The following is the leaflet I put together for the Liberal Party State Convention in 1994 and for the information of

the delegates:

A Motion before the 50th Anniversary State Convention of the Liberal Party, the Riverside Theater, Parramatta,19th and 20th November, 1994:


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"that the Consumer Credit Act, 1981, No. 124 should be repealed and the Moneylenders and Infants Loans Act,1941, No. 67 be reinstated."

Put by the Parramatta North Branch.

THE REASON:The Consumer Credit Act is fraudulent in that it makes "use of false representations". It is themeans by which an horrendous swindle (defined as "to cheat a person out of money; a fraudulent scheme; aperson or thing represented as what it is not") has been perpetrated on the people of Australia.

The Consumer Credit Act represents a "loan contract" to be something it is not, i.e.: that it is an agreement whichis not binding in so much as the lender can vary the interest rate. It is "a deliberate misrepresentation of the truthor a fact used to take money, rights, or other privilege or property away from a person or persons"... ipso facto ...fraud.

A ""contract" is an "agreement". An "agreement" is "a contract duly executed and legally binding". "Binding meansunalterable".

A second definition of a ""contract" is one that it is "a business agreement for supply of goods or performance ofwork at fixed price". "Interest" is the price of borrowing money.

At common law, eight elements are essential to the creation of a contract:

FRAUDULET LOAN CONTRACTS :Under COMMON LAW, there are 8 essential elements for the creation of a contract, ie:(1) offer;(2) acceptance;(3) sufficient consideration;(4) intention to enter legal relations;(5) capacity to contract;(6) legality of purpose;(7) genuine consent; and(8) certainty of terms.

VARIABLE INTEREST RATES render a contract void for uncertainty. To make out that an illegal

contract is valid is fraud and obtaining money by fraud is stealing.

""Certainty" means "that which is certain" or "absolutely determined, regular, fixed, sure to happen, ... reliable,unerring ...".

The Act which the Consumer Credit Act replaced, the Moneylenders and Infants Loan Act, by stating that a loancontract, in s.22, "... shall show ... (2) ... (d) the total amount of the interest to be paid", complied with the commonlaw requirement of "certainty of terms". The Consumer Credit Act is in breach of common law.

The Consumer Credit Act says that a loan contract (s.35 (1) (d)) shall include "where, at the relevant date, it ispossible to express the whole of the credit charge as an amount of money, a statement of the total of: (i) the creditcharge; and (ii) the amount financed;" and "(e) a statement of the APR (annual percentage rate) in accordancewith section 37". Section 37 (b) (ii) refers to "the percentage rate determined according to the method set out inSchedule 6 ... (etc.) ... whichever the credit provider determines". In s.75, and spread thoughout the Act, theconcept of "Variation of contract" is indoctrinated.(Section 12 describes what "credit charge" means in 36 lines and cross-references to Section 59 and Schedule 1.Schedule 6 says "the annual percentage rate may be determined in accordance with the formula: 2NF (300C +NF) divided by 2N squared + 300C (N + 1) where "F" is an amount determined in accordance with the formula:100C x T divided by N x A.)"The Consumer Credit Act is 130+ pages of legal gobbledegook and a miriad of cross-references designed toconfuse and repel anyone wanting to examine it.

Due Process?"A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles that have been established in a system ofjurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights ... If a law may reasonably be deemed to

promote the public welfare and the means selected bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate publicinterest, then the law has met the due process standard". (Encyc. Brit.). The Consumer Credit Act meets none ofthese criteria but sacrifices them in favour of the banks.From that time on the borrower has been at the mercy of the lender and been denied any right of appeal when theinterest rates rose "from 5 per cent to 22 per cent" (to quote one example).


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Prohibition of Compound Interest:Another notable feature of the Moneylenders and Infants Loans Act (section 28) is that if the loan contract"provides directly or indirectly for (a) the payment of compound interest; or (b) any increase of interest by reasonof any default" then the contract "shall be illegal".

The Result of Corrupt Legislation:Quote 1, from the Sun-Herald, 18/9/94, p.3: "In the New England area a recent survey estimated 80 per cent offarmers had less than 20 pc equity in their farms, making four out of five farmers in the area highly vulnerable tolosing their homes. I see what it does to families, it's terrible the divorce, the break-ups and the suicides ...".

Quote 2, from Michael Clough (State Member for Bathurst): "Case No. 6 concerns a Commonwealth Bankcustomer who borrowed $530,000 and then had two bad seasons. He has paid back $715,000 plus $70,000 inoverdraft, but still owes $1,239,000 surely an indictment against the Commonwealth Bank. Case No. 7 ... In thiscase the State Bank has been charging interest on interest ..."

Quote 3, from Jeanine McRae of the Union of Farmers: "It is quite common for a farmer to have paid for his farmtwo and three times over the last ten years and still owe more than he originally borrowed."

By manipulating interest rates, the banks can take advantage of and obtain money from innocent clients to pay forbad debts incurred by the failures of other enterprises and other loans.

The Consumer Credit Act was Assented to before the Moneylenders and Infants Loans Act was repealed and allby the Labour Government under Mr. Neville Wran.

You cannot fool all the people all the time. Justice must be restored and the Liberal Party must show that it is trulya government of, by and for the people.

The Consumer Credit Act must be REPEALED and, as a first step, interest rates on existing loans must beFROZEN immediately!

Written by J. Wilson, Liberal Party Membership No. 07-217-2170149


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VARIABLE INTEREST RATES MEANS STEALING

The title of this chapter is the theme of the whole exercise and I am sorry for its repetition. The following leaflet isone of the many which I have used to try to spread the story. Banks, politicians and bureaucrats deny it, ofcourse, but it is really pretty simple. Equally, their denial says it all.

I am not legally trained nor qualified. When the variable interest scam swung into operation in the 80s, I wroteletters to newspapers complaining it wasn't fair that banks could change the interest rates on loans and generallybitched to managers for whom I feel great sympathy. Being a bank manager used to be a position of prestige in

the community but that image rapidly disappeared and some left the profession because of their downgraded andtarnished role.

In one letter I wrote in February 1988, I complained that I had paid, in installments in two years, $37,692.10 on a15-year loan of $94,000.00 and yet the balance owing had risen to $98,138.56.

Others suffered far more than I to the eternal shame of our representatives in government who were supposedlyelected to protect the people. Bank assets skyrocketed while the people and the country plummeted into debt.Politicians betrayed the nation and still refuse to admit guilt or make amends.

Always there was this feeling that it just wasn't fair or right. I started searching for a legal angle at the nearbyMacquarie University Law Library. On the third visit I was browsing the shelves and came across a small,battered, soft-covered version of "The Australian Legal Dictionary "by S. E. Marantelli and under the word,

"contract", found the eight essential elements required by common law to create a contract and Number 8 said,"certainty of terms" EUREKA!

Then came books on contract law and the pieces of the jigsaw came together to form the picture which the bankshave been trying to hide.

More letters to newspapers which were actually published.

Approaches to parliamentarians resulted in the familiar "Thank you for bringing this to my attention" and themerry-go-round of referrals with no intention of doing anything.

Out of frustration, I stood as an independent. Then joined a new party which promised to reform and restore butthey were "easy meat" and were quickly undermined when they threatened by achieving record membership

growth and started scoring at the polls. I was expelled when I suggested changing its name from the ConfederateAction Party to the Constitutional Australia Party to improve voter appeal.

Anyway, I was invited to join the Liberal Party and, after an interview before a panel of the local branch, was votedby 12 to 1 to be allowed to take up membership.

The local branch supported my campaign to wipe out variable interest rate loans and I presented motions at twoState Conventions. However, support of grassroot Liberals and acceptance by the executive are two entirelydifferent things. At the executive level, one comes up against politicians and lawyers ... need I say more?

I resigned from the Liberal Party after a formal debate in their rooms in Parramatta when a lawyer proudly said,"There is certainty. The certainty is the uncertainty." A sick joke which revealed the criminality to which the LiberalParty had sunk.

The only course of action left was to go to court using one of my loans as the test case. Surely judges wouldn't lie!How wrong I was.

The following is a leaflet entitled "Variable Interest Rates Means Stealing "explaining severance and the bonafides method of transacting a loan contract.

VARIABLE INTEREST RATES MEANS STEALING(1) they are ILLEGAL. Under common law, for there to be a contract created, there must be "certainty of terms"as an "essential element". This certainty does not exist if the interest rate is not known and not specifically writteninto the contract. To have a formula whereby a future interest rate is to be applied constitutes lack of certainty andthe contract is void. There is no contract binding the borrower to repay the money. A bank misrepresenting such adocument to be a contract is guilty of fraud and taking money by fraud is stealing. Legislation which allowsvariable interest rates, e.g.: the Consumer Credit Act, etc., is repugnant to common-law and is void andinoperative.

(2) they CONTRAVENE the principles of economics. When a loan is transacted," the level of interest rates isdetermined by the forces of demand and supply for finance in the money market." "The rate of interest charged for


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any particular transaction will depend on such considerations as the purpose and duration of the loan, the amountborrowed, the collateral security offered (if any), and the credit worthiness of the borrower, all factors influencingthe degree of perceived 'risk' involved in making the loan by the lender." (Collins Dictionary of Economics. SecondEdition.) Different interest rates being applied subsequently are levied on the outstanding balance of a loantransacted previously to which the determinants were established at the time, i.e.: there is no new loan to whichthe principles for the reckoning of interest rates can be imposed.

Might I suggest that a lawyer be consulted with a view to asking for "SEVERANCE",", i.e.: "The separation of thegood parts of the contract from the bad, which are rejected. The doctrine of severance applies to any contract that

is void by statute or common law, or even, in some cases, illegal, provided there is no "public policy groundsagainst severing (see void contract). The courts will, if possible, save the contract from total invalidity by severingthe offending part." (Oxford Reference. A Dictionary of Law. New Edition.)

("Public policy. The interests of the community. If a contract is (on common law principles) contrary to publicpolicy, this will normally make it an illegal contract.")

Written by J.Wilson, P.O. Box 4520, North Rocks, NSW 2151.

amortising (extinguishing) a loan (i.e.: without interest being varied):

Example No. 1: a 10-year loan

Years % of total interest paid* % of principal paid*

1 16.6 6.6

2 15.5 (32.1) 6.8 (12.9)

3 14.3 (46.4) 7.5 (20.4)

4 13.0 (59.4) 8.3 (28.7)

5 11.5 (70.9) 9.1 (37.8)

6 19.9 (80.8) 10.1 (47.9)

7 18.0 (88.8) 11.1 (59.0)

8 16.0 (94.8) 12.3 (71.3)

9 13.8 (98.6) 13.6 (84.9)

10 11.4 (100) 15.1 (100)

*each year and running totals


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Example No. 2: a 25-year loan

Years % of total interest paid* % of principal paid*

1 5.9 1.2

2 5.8 (11.7) 1.3 (2.5)

3 5.8 (17.5) 1.4 (3.9)

4 5.7 (23.2) 1.5 (5.4)

5 5.6 (28.8) 1.6 (7.0)6 5.5 (34.3) 1.8 (8.8)

7 5.4 (39.7) 1.9 (10.7)

8 5.3 (45.0) 2.1 (12.8)

9 5.1 (50.1) 2.3 (15.1)

10 5.0 (55.1) 2.5 (17.6)

11 4.8 (59.9) 2.8 (20.4)

12 4.7 (64.6) 3.0 (23.4)

13 4.5 (69.1) 3.3 (26.7)

14 4.3 (73.4) 3.6 (30.3)

15 4.1 (77.5) 3.9 (34.2)

16 3.8 (81.3) 4.3 (38.5)

17 3.5 (84.8) 4.7 (43.2)

18 3.2 (88.0) 5.1 (48.3)

19 3.0 (91.0) 5.8 (54.1)

20 2.6 (93.6) 6.1 (60.2)

21 2.2 (95.8) 6.6 (66.8)

22 1.8 (97.6) 7.3 (74.1)

23 1.3 (98.9) 7.9 (82.0)

24 0.8 (99.7) 8.6 (90.6)25 0.3 (100) 9.4 (100)

*each year and running totals

THE MEDIA, POLITICIANS, PRICES SURVEILLANCEAUTHORITY, POLICE, JUDICIAL COMMISSION, I.C.A.C., et al.

the list goes on and on.

Absolutely nobody in the public service or any organisation is prepared to be honest and stand up to the power of

the banks. I have a filing cabinet full of the correspondence which has gone on between us.

Those who don't "pass the buck" with one of those stereotype letters in reply, actually say they see nothing wrongin the scam.

Politicians say that borrowers have a choice of variable or fixed interest rates. Banks will sometimes allow fixedinterest rates on a loan for periods up to a maximum of 5 years after which the variable cuts in. They deliberatelyset the fixed rate higher than the variable rate to discourage the borrower adopting the fixed rate. All the time theymake out that variable interest rates are legitimate. Not by common law, they are not! The contracts are fraud.The fact that corrupt politicians pass corrupt legislation and spineless, traitorous governors sign on the dotted line,doesn't make the swindle right. And for justice to exist, right must be done.

Once I gave an interview to personnel and camera crews from four television networks on the steps of theSupreme Court surrounded by senior police officers. Nothing went to air because they would not transmit what Isaid.


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I have sent long faxes and more than enough material to the major newspapers documenting what hastranspired. I have argued with editors and managing editors but nothing has appeared in print.

The only time an article appeared was in the Bulletin in which they said that I sought "to prove that the word'variable' means certain, whereas his opponents hold that 'variable' means uncertain.". I phoned them and thejournalist refused to admit he had got it wrong and the managing editor refused to retract anything. I filed fordefamation and, at the first appearance in the Supreme Court, Judge Levine indicated that the case fordefamation was strong and asked that I amend the Statement of Claim to be more descriptive. I duly enlarged onthe circumstances to include the conduct of the judges which would have gone before a jury because all

defamation cases must be heard by a jury. At the next appearance in court, Judge Levine dismissed my casedespite my protest that "to dismiss something which is truthful is a denial of justice". I called Judge Levine corrupt.He warned of contempt. I challenged him and he ordered me from the court. I refused to go and sheriffs werecalled to escort me out of the building. Once they had put me outside the doors in Macquarie Street, I immediatelystepped back inside. The police were called and, by then, the journalists and camera crews had assembled. Theinterview was conducted on the steps, as I have said, and then I was taken in a police car to Day Street Station.No charges were laid and I was driven to the car park where I had left my car earlier. The police were courteousand were sympathetic to my situation when I told them the facts.

On the 26th of November, 1996, I lodged a formal complaint with the New South Wales Judicial Commission thatMaster Greenwood had lied and perverted the course of justice. The complaint was accompanied bydocumentation. They would not allow me to appear before them. Their letter, dated 10th February, 1997, saidthey had decided to dismiss the complaint because there was no evidence to support my accusation.

I sent a fax to the Independent Commission Against Corruption which was acknowledged by a letter giving me aFile Number and saying the matter would be looked in to. A few months later a second letter arrived from themsaying they had decided not to investigate the matter.

Efforts to secure an appointment with the Commissioner of Police, to see if the police would investigate the bankfraud and the corrupt judges, were rejected by his staff. One sergeant told me on the phone that I had beenclassified as a "persistent letter-writer" and never to bother them again.

I put in a submission to the Prices Surveillance Authority for the Bank Fees Enquiry in 1995 and attended to givean oral presentation. The reaction from one of the gentlemen on the panel was to say, " It would be interesting tohear a High Court decision on that." But, when the handsome volumes of the report were published, not one word

of my submission was anywhere to be found."

Admittedly, nothing of another of my submissions to the House of Representatives Report into Fair Trading wasgiven space, either. But they did include my name in the table of persons who had contributed.

Here are examples of the type of letters I have received:

1. From Hon. Wendy Machin, MP, NSW Minister for Consumer Affairs,17th November, 1994:

"Deregulation of the finance market is seen by Governments to produce greater efficiency in that market. Over-regulation was considered to be the direct cause of the limited availability of credit which was seen prior to the

1980s."

"In a competitive environment, financial institutions are able to offer a wide range of products, which may includefixed and variable rates, and to make those products available at a competitive price. This cannot be achieved bya highly regulatory regime."

"I have recently introduced into Parliament consumer credit legislation which is uniform to all States an Territories,and which is seen to be appropriate to the current deregulatory environment. The basis of the legislation is 'truth-in-lending', which requires that financial institutions give prospective purchasers of credit sufficient information tomake informed choices of products. The Bill also provides for strong redress mechanisms if the legislation rulesare breached."

"I believe therefore, that reinstatement of outmoded legislation as proposed by the Parramatta North Branchwould not be a realistic option for the Government."

2. From Tim Fischer, MP, Federal Member for Farrer, Leader of the National Party of Australia, 2ndDecember, 1994:


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"At the outset, I must say to you that I do not equate variable interest rates with corruption. In a modern economy,the price of money will change according to principles of demand and supply in much the same way as pricechanges for other goods and services."

"The price of money is, of course, interest rates."

"Any National Government will seek to utilise monetary policy through the mechanism of interest rates to influenceeconomic growth and general economic health within the economy. The banks and other financial institutionsmake many products available to their customers, including fixed interestrate loans. No one is forced into a

variable rate loan it depends on how much you want the credit."

"Fixed rate loans, it is true, are invariably more expensive. However, they do avoid the vagaries of theGovernment's monetary policy."

"Once again, I do not accept that variable interest rates are either necessarily corrupt or unconstitutional."

3. From A. E. McKenzie, Official Secretary to the Governor of New South Wales, Rear Admiral PeterSinclair, 1st February, 1994:

"I refer again to your several letters about the Consumer Credit Act."."

"I should like to say that the Governor acts on the advice of his Ministers in relation to matter of this nature and itis regretted that there is nothing further that can be done by Government House."

"You should pursue your representations through Government."

IN THE COURTS

The reason for a court case was straightforward, i.e.: to get the court to declare that variable interest rates wereillegal under common law and thereby create a precedent so that past victims could make their claims forrestitution and compensation. But there had to be a reason, at law, to bring the case to a court.

As I said previously, I am not legally trained and, therefore, had to ferret around in the hope of finding something.

In our local shopping mall is a Dymocks bookshop which has a section catering to school children and other

novices. One of the small volumes I bought in this quest was the "Oxford Reference A Dictionary of Law" with"Over 3,000 clear and concise entries".

One of those entries said "severance" which described how, if a contract had any bad bits under statute orcommon law, one could have that element removed from the contract. That became the path to follow.


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3.2. The letter from St.George Bank (2nd April, 1996) refers to a letter I sent to Mr. John Kolyvas on the 6th ofMarch, 1996 in which, the latter, I enclosed a leaflet I wrote entitled, "Variable interest rate loans are badbecause."

3.3 My leaflet says that "certainty of terms" is an "essential element" under Common Law for the creation of acontract. On that basis, variable interest rate loans are repugnant to Common Law and, therefore,thosecontracts are void.

3.4. The St.George letter says that, "At the moment it is proposed to introduce a new uniform Consumer Creditcode ... implemented Australia-wide on 1st August, 1996. This legislation will cover home loans."

3.5. That is one of the reasons for the urgency for orders from the Supreme Court, i.e.: the proposed legislation isintended to legalise the unjust and illegal practice of variable interest rate loans. This action would deny thepeople of Australia their constitutional right to be protected under Common Law. A judgment from the SupremeCourt in this case would go a long way to preventing such a monstrous miscarriage of our legislative process.

3.6. The other reason for expedition is that there is a possibility that St.George Bank will increase the interest rateon my loan by either 2% or 3% (the latter if reduction from 10.9% to 9.9% is also removed) ""on the anniversary ofthe approval" which will be on the 3/8/1996.

3.7. This increase in the interest rate after one year (even though St.George clearly say the interest rate is " fixed"

for five years) could see my monthly repayments go from $2,483.00 to either $2,645.20 or possibly $2,717.43. Itis uncertain.

3.8. When I took the loan from St.George Bank it was after making extensive enquiries to raise money to help payout a previous "interest only" loan I had on my house. The previous loan fell due in September 1995. St.Georgewould not offer any more than five years at the fixed interest rate. An independent financial consultant, Mr. DavidCarroll, confirmed that no one was offering better. Therefore, the choice was accept this ""best" loan, which Iknew to be invalid, or sell my house.

3.9.I took the loan and have been trying constantly to persuade the bank to put right what is wrong in theagreement. This they refuse to do and that is why I am appealing to the Supreme Court to order the relief askedfor in my Statement of Claim.

3.10. This action is appropriate to be brought in the Supreme Court because it is "a matter of public interest".

3.11. The practice of variable interest rate loans has become widespread across Australia. It is unconscionable. Itis rapacious. It has caused misery, hardship and devastation. It is wrong.

3.12. In regard to the quote in my Statement of Claim for the method of determing the interest rate on a loan: bytalking on the telephone with the editor of that reference book, Monica Thorp, in London and explaining I wasusing it in the Supreme Court in a dispute with my bank, permission has been granted for its use. The title of thebook is the Collins Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, with Christopher Pass, Bryan Lowes and LeslieDavids the authors and Harpers Collins, Publishers.

JOHN WILSON

The following is the Judgment of Master Greenwood. (There is no copyright restriction on this document asappears on the transcripts.)

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALESCOMMON LAW DIVISIONMASTER GREENWOOD

TUESDAY, 17th SEPTEMBER, 199620680/96 JOHN WILSON v ST.GEORGE BANK LIMITED JUDGMENT MASTER:

On 22nd August, 1996 the defendant filed a motion seeking that the statement of claim be struck out pursuant toPart 15 r 26, or that the proceedings be summarily dismissed under Part 13 r.5 of the Supreme Court Rules.

I remind myself that in dealing with an application for summary disposal the onus is on the party seeking relief ona summary basis to satisfy the Court that the opponent has no plausible claim or defence.


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Briefly, the facts of the relationship between the parties concern the borrowing by the plaintiff of $150,000 fromthe defendant. The contract was referred to as a "Home Loan Plus".

The Loan Approval, which is annexure A to the affidavit of David Singer, sworn on 21st August, 1996, indicatesthat the loan was for a period of seven years with a five-year period of fixed interest at 10.9 per cent, reducing to9.9 per cent for prompt payment.

The annexure to the loan approval document dealt with the remaining terms of the loan. It is headed "FixedInterest Rate Loan fixed for 1, 2, 3 or 5 Years". The relevant part of that document reads that the interest rate on

the loan approval is fixed for a period of five years. It continues:

"On the fifth anniversary of the first advance of your loan the above fixed interest rate will cease. At that time, thefollowing interest rate options will be available:

(a) A further interest rate period at the rate applicable for St.George's fixed rate residential loans at that time; or(b) St. George's variable residential loan interest rate applicable at that time."

The defendant published from time to time the interest rates for it's various lendings, including the home loaninterest rates. Annexed to Mr. Singer's affidavit are two publications, one is a copy of a publication of the rateswhich is available in branches of the defendant's bank, the second (annexure E) is an example of a publication inThe Sydney Morning Herald of Monday, 29th July, 1996. Mr. Singer deposes that the rates are published in The

Sydney Morning Herald on each Monday.

The plaintiff's statement of claim was filed on 4th July, 1996. It recites in the first eight paragraphs details of theHome Loan Approval. It sets out information which the plaintiff says is relevant to his argument. The statement ofclaim then reads:

"9. There is no certainty as to what 'the rate applicable for St.George's fixed rates residential loans' will be "On thefifth anniversary of the first advance' and, therefore, what the monthly repayment figure will be.

10. There is no certainty as to what 'St. George's variable residential loan interest rate' will be 'On the anniversaryof the first advance' and, similarly, what those monthly repayment figures will be.

11. Variable interest rate loan contracts are contrary to Common Law which demands that 'certainty of terms' arean essential element for the creation of a contract.

12. Variable interest rates contravene basic principles of economics applicable to the determination of 'The rate ofinterest charged for any particular transaction' (Ref. Collins Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition) which willdepend on such considerations as the purpose and duration of the loan, the amount borrowed, the collateralsecurity (if any), and the credit worthiness of the borrower, all factors influencing the degree of perceived 'risk'involved in making the loan by the lender."

Part 13 r 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that where in any proceedings it appears to the Court that thereis no reasonable cause of action disclosed, or the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, ot vexatious, or theproceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court, the Court may order that the proceedings be stayed ordismissed generally, or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings.

Part 15 r 26 provides that:

"Where a pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature ofthe pleading, or has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or is otherwisean abuse of the process of the Court, the Court may ... order that the whole, or any part of the pleading be struckout."The plaintiff's argument is quite simple and clear. He submits that under his contract with the defendant he doesnot know what rate of interes the will have to pay in five years time when the fixed interest component of his loanexpires and he, therefore, does not know what the loan willcost. Thus, the contract is uncertain and must be voidfor uncertainty.In aid of this submission the plaintiff calls on the words of Viscount Maugham in Scammell and Nephew Limited v

Ouston (1941) AC 251 where the learned judge said:

"There was no evidence to suggest that there are any of the well-known usual terms of such a contract, forinstance, as to the interest payable."


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The "terms" to which the judge was referring concern interest rates which were said to be "hire-purchase termspayable over two years" and in the circumstances this term was held to be void for uncertainty and therefore thecontract was held to be void for uncertainty.

The question of the effect on a contract where the future interest rate is uncertain, although specified at the timewhen the contract was entered into, was considered by Smith J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria in TonellivKomirra Pty Limited. It is reported at (1972) VR 737. At page 741 the learned judge wrote:

"The defendant's contention that the sale note was void by reason of uncertainty as to the rate of interest payable

on outstanding purchase money was based on the fact that conditions 2 (A) and 2 (B) provided that the rate ofinterest should be one-quarter per cent above 'the current bank overdraft rate'. It was submitted that what thesewords referred to was a current rate which would have been charged by whatever bank the plaintiff might haveapproached for a loan of the amount of the outstanding purchase money. And it was pointed out that, according tothe evidence, the rate which each bank would have charged any customer upon any loan, whatever the amountor purpose, would have been fixed by negotiation with the particular borrower; so that it was not possible toidentify any rate as being that currently charged by banks for any particular size or class of loan.

"In my view, however, the conclusion that follows from this state of the evidence is not that the provision as to therate of interest was void for uncertainty. It is that the provision does not refer to a rate of interest currently chargedby banks for loans of a certain size or class, but refers to the only uniform rate that did exist, namely, the uniformmaximum bank overdraft interest rate prescribed and published from time to time by the Reserve Bank with theapproval of the Commonwealth Treasurer. Accordingly, this third allegation of uncertainty, like those earlierdiscussed must be rejected."

Turning now to the terms of the loan approval which I have dealt within greater detail earlier, the loan approval isfor the period of seven years, the first five years of interest being fixed at 9.9 per cent, the remaining two years ofinterest on the loan would be set at one of the two options which were available: either the St. George fixedresidential rate applicable at that time; or the St. George variable residential loan interest rate applicable at thattime.

I am of the view that the contract which the parties entered into is not void for uncertainty. The agreementbetween the parties is that at the end of five years the interest rate will be that prescribed and published by thebank for residential fixed interest rate loans, or variable interest rate loans. Uncertainty does not lie in the terms ofthe contract which were agreed between the parties, but in what the rate will be applicable at the expiration of five

years. Thus, whilst the amount of that future rate is uncertain, the rate itself is indeed certain. It has been definedas the rate that is applied in the circumstances which I have earlier setout.

It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff's pleading falls because the gravamen of his complaint, namely, that thecontract is void for uncertainty, is not correct. The contract is certain, certain in its terms. It is the percentage ofinterest to be determined in an agreed way and payable in the sixth and seventh years of the contract which isunknown at this point in time. Now whilst the quantum of the future interest rate is uncertain, its method ofdetermination is not.

As the basis of the plaintiff's claim is built upon the submission that the contract is void for uncertainty, it followsthat the plaintiff's claim cannot stand. I, therefore, dismiss the statement of claim. The plaintiffis to pay thedefendant's costs.It follows from what I have said that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment also cannot stand. I, therefore,dismiss that motion, the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs.

I certify that this and the five preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of MasterGreenwood.S. ArundsenAssociateDated 17th September, 1996

I filed a Notice of Appeal from Master to Judge on 24th September, 1996.I filed more Affidavits to support theNotice of Motion.

On 30 SEP 1996 the hearing was before Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton. Again, copyright restrictions on the

transcript prevent me reproducing it here but the following is his judgment:

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALESCOMMON LAW DIVISIONHAMILTON AJ


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MONDAY, 30th SEPTEMBER, 1996020680/96 JOHN WILSON v ST. GEORGE BANK LIMITED

JUDGMENT PLAINTIFF:

Shouldn't the terms of the contract be established when the contract is made?

HIS HONOUR: No, that is the problem. You see, that is not the law and that is the point of the maxim that I havegiven you, that the law regards as certain something which can be rendered certain provided there is someobjective criterion or objective formula by which at sometime you can obtain certainty. You cannot do it simply bysaying in general terms, well, whatever one party to the contract does binds the other, but you may have areference to either the decision of a third person or to the Consumer Price Index for instance, rents in leases areoften fixed for the future by reference to the Consumer Price Index, which is published from time to time; so that ifa formula is specified whereby in some objective way certainty can be obtained at the relevant time, then in onesense, of course, it is uncertain, but for legal purposes it is not uncertain.

If have heard the submissions that have been made about this matter, I think there is not a great deal for me tosay about the matter, save that Master Greenwood's judgment appears to me to be correct and indeed for thereasons given by the learned Master with which I agree. The appeal will therefore be dismissed.

I certify that this and the one preceding page are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of

The Honourable Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton.AssociateDated 30th September, 1996

I filed a Notice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal on 9th October, 1996.I filed another Affidavit and on 18th October,1996, filed a Notice of Motion asking for injunctions to be placed on the St. George Bank Ltd. to stop them tradingin variable interest rate loans "until this case can be fully heard".

On 21st October, 1996, the opposition solicitors filed a Notice of Motion asking "That leave to the appellant toappeal be refused."

I filed another Affidavit with Annexures that were Press Releases from the Reserve Bank of Australia which were

clear testimony to the uncertainty of future interest rates.

On 28th October, 1996 a hearing was held in the Court of Appeal before Judge of Appeal Clarke and ActingJudge of Appeal Abadee.

Again, the transcript from the Court of Appeal has copyright restrictions but the following four pages are theirjudgment:

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEALCA 40593/96CLARKE JA, ABADEE AJA

MONDAY, 28th OCTOBER, 1996JOHN WILSON v ST. GEORGE BANK LIMITED JUDGMENT

CLARKE JA: Mr. John Wilson has filed a notice of appeal from a decision by Hamilton AJ on 30 September,1996 in which the learned judge dismissed an appeal brought by Mr. Wilson from a judgment of MasterGreenwood given on 17th September, 1996.

In the course of preparation for the hearing both parties seem to have directed their mind to the need to securethe leave of this court to bring the appeal. Quite unusually, St. George Bank Limited, the opponent, has notsought, as I understand it, to strike out the appeal but in a gesture helpful to Mr. Wilson has invited the Court toconsider an assumed application by Mr. Wilson for leave to appeal and to dismiss it.

The factual background is that Mr. Wilson filed a statement of claim in the Supreme Court seeking a declarationthat a loan account that he has with the bank is void; or, alternatively, the severance of part of what is describedas a contract.


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Without going into the detail of the statement of claim, my understanding is that Mr Wilson complains that amortgage which he entered into with the St. George Bank is void, or partly void because in one respect it isuncertain in its terms.

The mortgage provides for the payment of a fixed rate of interest for the first five years of its term and for thefollowing two years make the following provision (I am not quoting from the mortgage but the effect of themortgage).

"On the fifth anniversary of the first advance of your loan the above fixed interest rate will cease. At that time the

following interest rate options will be available:

(a) A further interest rate period at the rate applicable for St. George's fixed rate residential loans at that time; or(b) St. George's variable residential loan interest rate applicable at that time."

The point is that at the end of five years the fixed interest rate ceases and there then is an option available to Mr.Wilson to determine whether, in the ensuing period of the mortgage, he will pay interest at the St. George fixedinterest rate for residential loans, or the St. George variable interest rate for residential loans. His complaint is thatthe provision for interest during the final two years is not fixed, i.e., the interest rate payable in respect of thosetwo years is not known at the time of the mortgage and accordingly there is an uncertainty in the agreementbetween the parties which renders the agreement void or partly void.

The St. George Bank, upon receipt of the statement of claim, moved to strike it out or, alternatively, secure anorder that the proceedings be summarily dismissed on the ground that there was no arguable cause of actiondisclosed in the statement of claim. The argument of the St. George Bank was that it was clear that there was nouncertainty in the terms of the mortgage and that the parties had expressly agreed upon the manner ormechanism by which the interest rate for the mortgage would be fixed in the last two years of its term.Accordingly, there was no substance at all in the complaints in the statement of claim and it should be struck outand the proceedings dismissed.

Master Greenwood heard the application and he on 17th September, 1996, he ordered that Mr. Wilson's claim besummarily dismissed. Mr. Wilson there upon appealed from that judgment and the appeal was, as I have earlierindicated, heard by Hamilton AJ and dismissed.

The Supreme Court Act in section 101(2)(i) provides that an appeal shall not lie to this court, except by leave ofthe Court of Appeal, from a judgment or order of the court in a division on an application for summary judgmentunder the Rules. As I understand the motion considered by Master Greenwood, and upheld by him, it was anapplication for summary judgment. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson can bring an appeal to this Court from Hamilton AJ'sorder only by leave of this Court and, despite the absence of a formal application by him, the Court is disposed inthe circumstances to treat the present hearing as an application for leave to appeal. Clearly, if Mr. Wilson doesnot get leave to appeal he cannot seek any other orders from this court, which acts only the basis of the existenceof pending appeals.

The question then is whether Mr. Wilson should be granted leave to appeal. In my opinion the material before thecourt demonstrates that there was no uncertainty in the terms agreed between the parties, and thereforenoinvalidity of the agreement. The uncertainty that exists in only as to what interest will be payable by Mr. Wilsonfor the last two years of the term. The parties have, however, in their contract provided an agreed mechanism for

determining with certainty what that interest rate will be. Such a method of determination of interest rates andanalogous payments is well known to the law and, provided that the parties have agreed in terms that could bedescribed as certain as to the mechanism which is to be applied in determining what the interest rate or otherpayment should be, the agreement does not fail for lack of certainty.

I regard that proposition as such trite law as to need no authority for its support. It is well established and isapplied as settled in the commercial law of this State on a regular basis.

Although the decision in Tonelli v Komirra Pty Limited (1972) VR 737was somewhat different, it provides anexample of the method by which the law upholds contracts as sufficiently certain where a mechanism is providedfor determining interest rates payable in the future which have not been expressly agreed at the time of thecontract.

In my opinion there is no substance at all in law in Mr. Wilson's complaints and I would be disposed to dismiss theapplication with costs.


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ABADEE AJA: I agree with the orders proposed by Clarke JA and his reasons for them.CLARKE JA: The orders of the court will be that leave to appeal from the judgment of Hamilton AJ is refused withcosts.

I hereby certify that this and the preceding three pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of hisHonour Mr. Justice Clarke and of the Court.AssociateDated 28th October, 1986.

On 7th November, 1996 I lodged an Application for Special Leave to Appeal in the High Court. I submitted all thenecessary Statements, Appeal Books and Summaries of Argument.

Again, because of copyright restrictions, no transcript but here is my Summary of Argument and the Address Imade toHigh Court on 11th April, 1997:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIASYDNEY OFFICE OF THE REGISTRYNo. S190 of 1996

BETWEEN:JOHN WILSONApplicant and St. George BANK LIMITEDRespondent

APPLICANT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Part I:

1. Whether a loan contract, which provides for variable interest rates or a future fixed interest rate not establishedat the time the loan contract was created, is void for uncertainty? "It is a discrete question of law" (letter from theHigh Court, 10/1/97).

Part II:

1.I filed a Statement of Claim with the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 4th

July, 1996 saying that I have a seven-year loan contract with the St. George Bank Limited where the bank wouldonly allow five years maximum at the specified fixed interest rate and then for the final two years I could chooseeither the bank's fixed interest rate applicable at that time or the bank's variable interest rate applicable at thattime.

2.On 17th September, 1996, Master Greenwood dismissed my Statement of Claim saying, "Thus whilst theamount of that future rate is uncertain, the rate itself is indeed certain."

3.I appealed from a Master to a Judge and, on 30th September, 1996, Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton upheld MasterGreenwood's judgment and, when I asked Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton, "Shouldn't the terms of the contract beestablished when the contract is made?", he said, "No, that is the problem."

4.I appealed to the Court of Appeal and at the hearing on 28th October, 1996 Judge of Appeal Clark and ActingJudge of Appeal Abadee refused me leave to appeal on the grounds there was "No arguable cause for action inStatement of Claim."

5.I am now applying to the High Court of Australia for Special Leave to Appeal.

Part III:

11. Master Greenwood said "Thus whilst the amount of that future rate is uncertain, the rate itself is indeedcertain". Master Greenwood's untrue statements and his corruption of the meaning and the Spirit of the Law arean attempt to pervert the course of Justice. To defeat this, keywords should be defined.

12.A "loan" is a "thing, especially money, lent to be returned with or without interest".

13.A "contract" is "an agreement duly executed and legally binding". It is a "business agreement for supply ofgoods or performance of work at fixed price".


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14. Under Common Law, there must be "certainty of terms" for a contract to be valid.

15." Certainty" means "that which is certain" and ""certain" means "absolutely assured, regular, fixed".

16. "Terms" means "conditions, stipulations, price, charge, rate of payment".

17. "Variable" means "apt to change, changeable, uncertain".

18. For a loan contract to be valid, the interest rate must be certain.

19. To make out a contract with uncertainty of terms (e.g.: variable interest rates) to be a valid contract is falserepresentation, i.e.: fraud.

10. The practice of variable interest rate loans has become wide spread across Australia. It is unconscionable. Itis rapacious. It has caused misery, hardship and devastation. It is wrong.

11. Variable interest rates even contravene the basic principles of economics applicable to the determination of"The rate of interest charged for any particular transaction" (Ref: Collins Dictionary of Economics) which "willdepend on such considerations as the purpose and duration of the loan, the amount borrowed, the collateralsecurity (if any), and the creditworthiness of the borrower, all factors influencing the degree of perceived 'risk'involved in making the loan by the lender.".

12. When variable interest rates go up they are penal, i.e.: the borrower is punished by having to pay more whenhe or she has done nothing wrong.

13. When the market rates go down, a borrower should be at liberty to negotiate refinancing with the same lenderor obtain funds elsewhere to pay out the balance of the loan. Then the new rate becomes the new fixed rate andthe contract is valid.

14. My appeal is to have Master Greenwood's judgment overruled because the evidence as to the uncertainty ofthe terms of my loan contract was wrongfully rejected (SCR Part 51 r.16.4).

15. Master Greenwood said: "Uncertainty does not lie in the terms of the contract which were agreed between theparties, but in what the rate will be applicable at the expiration of five years." Is not the interest rate one of theterms of a loan contract?

16. My contract is a loan contract and the terms of a loan contract areas above, i.e.: the "conditions, stipulations,price, charge, rate of payment".".

17. Master Greenwood is saying in one breath that the terms are certain and in the next that the rate is uncertainand yet in another that ""the rate itself is indeed certain".

18. Master Greenwood's judgment is "gobbledegook". It is confused and contradictory. It is a travesty. It isfundamentally erroneous. Master Greenwood makes a mockery of the court. He is in contempt of the court.

19. Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton (30th October, 1996) wrongly applied the legal maxim "certum est quod certumreddi potest" and said that certainty of terms was not necessary when creating a contract. He wrongfully rejectedCommon Law.

20. The Oxford Reference Dictionary of Law says this of the maxim: ""If something is capable of being madecertain, it should be treated as certain." If the interest rate at the expiration of five years was capable of beingmade certain at the time the contract was made then there would be no case. However, "the amount of that futurerate is uncertain" ((Greenwood 17th September, 1996). Therefore, the rate itself is indeed uncertain. Therefore,the contract is void.

21. Annexures "A", "B", "C" and "D" to my Affidavit filed on 23rd October, 1996 is material sent to me by theReserve Bank of Australia and received on 21st October, 1996. They support the argument that there was no

certainty at the time of creating my loan contract as to what any future interest rate might be. This uncertainty stillexists.

22. Master Greenwood said: "Now whilst the quantum of the future interest rate is uncertain, its method ofdetermination is not."


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23. Not even the "method of determination" of future interest rates is certain....not when one reads Annexures "A","B", "C" and "D".

24. Those documents are similarly Annexures "A", "B", "C" and "D" to this Summary of Argument and arenumbered pages 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,15 and 16, 17 and 18.

25. Annexure "A" uses the words: "Following on from the improvement in the financial outlook, the Board hasdecided to reduce interest rates"; "to around 7 per cent."; "This follows deliberations at the Boardmeetingyesterday, and consultations with the Treasurer."; and "The2-3 per cent objective, and its view that the economyhas the capacity to grow a little faster than at present without threatening this objective".

26. Annexure "A" also refers to: (i) "Last week's CPI figure"; (ii) "inflation was running at an annual rate around21per cent";(iii) "other price indicators"; (iv) "The Statistician's series of manufacturing prices"; (v) "The Bank'sforecast suggest"...etc. ... and lists "factors influencing future inflation".

27. Annexure "A" states: "it (the Board) will be ready to increase interest rates if wages and salary developmentsget out of line with that objective."." and "The reduction in rates will help buoy the economy, and make moreprogress over the year ahead in reducing unemployment."

28. Annexure "A" illustrates the fact that the Reserve Bank of Australia makes decisions on what interest rates willbe depending on factors which exist at that time and what the Board decide will be its objective or policy at that

time.

29. Annexure "B" is headed "MONETARY POLICY TIGHTENS" and talks of "taking action this morning to raisecash rates" and "this further tightening has occurred rather sooner than some might have expected.".

30. Annexure "B" talks of "Notwithstanding the effects of the severe drought" and "rising imports" and"employment, which grew by 3.3per cent.".

31. Annexure "B" talks of "consumer prices are increasing by about 2 per cent" and "Rises in labour costs alsohave been quite modest" and "the strengthening international economy".

32. Annexure "B" shows a graph comparing the "Housing rate of major banks" to the "Cash rate" in the period

from 1984 to 1994 which proves that the practice of passing on fluctuations in market rates to the borrower is atthe discretion of the lender in that the fluctuations may be passed on either in full or in part or not at all and eitherimmediately or at a later date.

33. Annexure "C" is headed "MONETARY POLICY TO TIGHTEN" and tells that "The Reserve Bank will beoperating in money markets this morning to increase cash rates by 0.75 per cent, to around 51per cent. Thisaction follows deliberations by the Board over several months, and consultations with the Government."

34. Annexure "C" says "Given these development, the current interest rate regime, which was adopted more thana year ago when the recovery was much less robust, is no longer appropriate." and "At least part of the increasein short term interest rates can be expected to flow through to variable home loan rates. The Bank is announcinganother change of a prudential kind, which, at the margin, is expected to have some influence on home lending."and "The bank is writing to the banks on the details of this change in arrangements, which will apply to all housingloans approved after 5th September, 1994.".

35. Annexure "D" is headed "FURTHER TIGHTENING OF MONETARY POLICY" and talks of "this increase willhelp to avoid overheating of the ecomony further down the track" and "Policy setting, however, must be forwardlooking".

36. These Annexures support the argument of the uncertainty of future interest rate by explaining the changes inand the multiplicity of the factors which are considered and how even policies influence the final rate arrived at ona particular date.

37. When Judge of Appeal Clarke and Acting Judge of Appeal Abadee refused leave to appeal because therewas "No arguable cause of action disclosed in Statement of Claim, that is emphatically untrue. "

38. The Statement of Claim, in paragraphs 9 and 10, says "There is no certainty as to what "the rate applicablefor St. George's fixed rate residential loans" will be "On the 5th anniversary of the first advance" and, therefore,what the monthly repayment figure will be." and the same for "St. George's variable loan interest rate".


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39. In the Statement of Claim I ask for "the severance of the part of the contract contrary to Common Law".

40. There is not simply an "arguable cause for action".

41. Subsequent material I have filed in the Supreme Court leave no doubt of the need for an Australian court toprotect the Australian people against this heinous and fraudulent practice of variable interest rate loans.

42. Under Common Law, "certainty of terms" is an essential element of a contract.

43. Considering what has transpired in the courts to this point in time, the question that demands an answer is:"Does Common Law exist in Australia?".

44. "Honi soit qui mal y pense."

45. "Let right be done."

Part IV:

1. Special leave to appeal should be granted because ""substantial injustice will be done by leaving thaterroneous decision unreversed" (SCR Part 51.3.2).

2. Master Greenwood is wrong and, subsequently, Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton, Judge of Appeal Clark and ActingJudge of Appeal Judge Abadee are wrong.

Part V:

1. If this application is refused, the quest for Truth and Justice does not end there. I shall apply for special leave toappeal to Her Majesty in Council.

2. No order for costs in favour of the respondent should be made and those made should be stuck out becausethe respondent has included in the loan contract a clause to "oust the jurisdiction of the courts" (Ref: Cheshire andFoot. Law of Contract. Chapter 14 (1402), i.e.: even if I should win the St.George Bank will add their costs to myloan. This is confirmed in a letter the respondent's solicitors sent to my wife and dated 9th August, 1996(Annexure "E", page 19, of this Summary of Argument).

Part VI:

1.I rely on Common Law.

Part VII:

1.I would like to supplement this summary with oral argument to ask each judge on the bench of the High Court ofAustralia

(a) "Does "variable" mean "uncertain"?" and (b) ""Does" uncertainty" mean "certainty"?" and to have theopportunity to participate in debate on any issue which may arise.

Dated the 28th day of January, 1997.John Wilson(Signed, Applicant)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIASYDNEY OFFICE OF THE REGISTRYNo. S190 of 1996APPLICANT'S ADDRESS TO THE HIGH COURT (Item 1)

11.I would firstly like to draw your attention to the Notice of Motion I filed on 1st April, 1997. I am reporting thecrime of fraud being committed by the banks in the form of variable interest rate loans. The proof that this is acrime is contained in my Summary of Argument and the Affidavit accompanying the Notice of Motion.


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12.I am also drawing your attention to an illegal Act of Parliament called the Australia Act 1986 which attempts todeny me my right to Appeal to the Privy Council. I have documented the proof that this Act is illegal in mysubmissions.

13. To summarise what I ask: that the Constitution Act 1900 be enforced, that the Bill of Rights 1688 be enforced,and that Common Law be enforced.

14.I want the High Court of Australia to grant Special Leave to Appeal and I move that the orders and thecertificate in my Notice of Motion begranted.

15. In Part III of the Respondent's Summary of Argument they say: ""There is no lack of certainty." The interestrate for the final two years of the loan contract is uncertain as explained in my Statement of Claim.

16. They also say: "There is a clear mechanism for determining the variable interest rate when the time arrives."The loan contract was created in 1995 and the mechanism for determining the interest rate after five years wasnot certain then and it is not certain now. The contract was void for uncertainty then and it is void for uncertaintynow. This I have explained in mySummary of Argument.

17. They also refer to the maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest. This is not applicable here because themaxim means "if something is capable of being made certain then it must be considered to be certain". When the

loan contract was taken out the interest rate for the final two years was not capable of being made certain andeven now it is not capable of being made certain.

18. The case of Tonelli v. Komirra Pty Ltd (please refer to item 2) should be disregarded because there Smith J,said "(at page 741) ... and it was pointed out that, according to the evidence, the rate which each bank wouldhave charged any customer upon any loan, whatever the amount or purpose, would have been fixed bynegotiation with the particular borrower; so that it was not possible to identify any rate as being that currentlycharged by the banks for any particular size or class of loan." and "(atpage 741) ... In my view, ... is that thatprovision ... refers to the only uniform rate that did exist ...".

19. In other words, "the uniform maximum bank overdraft interest rate prescribed and published from time to timeby the Reserve Bank with the approval of the Commonwealth Treasurer" "would have been fixed" into the loancontract and if the interest rate is not variable.

10. When I said to Judge of Appeal Clarke (item 3) that "I repeat that the rate would have been fixed bynegotiation with the particular borrower and that means it is stated quite categorically what that will be."." Judge ofAppeal Clarke said "You are making submissions. IfI repeat your submissions and I disagree with every word ofthem, they are not part of my judgment, except I am reflecting my view that your submissions will not beaccepted."

11. When I said to Judge of Appeal Clarke (item 3) "referring back to that legal maxim ("certum est certum quodreddi potest"), it (the interest rate) is uncertain if it can be referring to something that is not certain", Judge ofAppeal Clarke said "Maxims are useful, but they are tools."

12. The rates for the last two years of my loan contract do not exist.

They are not yet known.They are uncertain.They did not exist when the loan was taken out and the contract made.

13. The Tonelli v Komirra judgment supports my case not the Respondent's.

14.I could not find any case dealing with variable interest rate loans contracts.

15. The Respondent's paragraph 3.3 is wrong, i.e.: my complaint is asto the uncertainty of both choices after thefirst five years and that is clearly explained in my Statement of Claim, i.e.: there is no certainty either way.

16. The Respondent has no defence and, if it were possible, the HighCourt of Australia should give a Summary

Judgment in my favour on the 11th April, 1997.

17. To have a Summary Judgment was, in fact, the direction of the Supreme Court on 2/8/96 (please refer to item4) but the Respondent disobeyed that direction and filed for a Summary Dismissal and, from that point on, I havereceived a series of "wrongful" judgments.


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18. Those "wrongful" judgments being:((1) Master Greenwood 17/9/96,((2) Mr. Acting Justice Hamilton 30/9/96, and((3) Judge of Appeal Clarke + Acting Judge of Appeal Abadee 28/10/96.

19. It's time for the Judiciary to put its house in order.

20.I my Differential Case Management Document, filed on 18th July, 1996, was a letter to the St. George Bankdated 6th March, 1996, which included a copy of a leaflet I was distributing at the time entitled "Variable interestrates are bad because:" It explains "they are ILLEGAL" and how "they CONTRAVENE the principles ofeconomics". (Please refer to item 5).

21. Again I ask that: (a) Special Leave to Appeal be granted,(b) the Injunctions be imposed, and(c) the Certificate be made out.

22. Finally, in my Summary of Argument I have said that I would like to ask each Judge, here today, two questionsand I draw your Honours' attention to item 6 where those questions are laid out. And, with your Honours'permissions I would like to ask them now.


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TRIAL BY JURY

That is what the judges really fear.

In December of 1997 I employed a solicitor who bluntly said, "Judge shave all the power.". "Power corrupts".Never has that adage been more appropriate than here and now.

After the Master Greenwood judgment I made up a leaflet which I faxed to probably 50 or so persons from theGovernor-General down. The leaflet said:

THE SUPREME COURT IS CORRUPT. MASTER TERENCE GREENWOOD OF THE COMMON-LAWDIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES IS CORRUPT AND A TRAITOR.

PROOF IS HIS RULING IN CASE No. 20680/96 (JOHN WILSON v. St. George BANK).).MASTER GREENWOOD ACCEPTED THAT, BECAUSE OF INDETERMINATE CHANGES IN INTERESTRATES, THE COST OF A LOAN TO A BORROWER COULD NOT BE KNOWN BUT DECLARED THAT THISDID NOT CONSTITUTE UNCERTAINTY OF TERMS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE RENDER A CONTRACTVOID UNDER COMMON LAW, I.E.: HE RULED IN FAVOUR OF THE BANKS DEFRAUDING THE PEOPLE OFAUSTRALIA.

John Wilson, P.O. Box 4520, North Rocks, NSW 2151 (18/9/96).

but the only response I got was to be visited by two uniformed policemen to tell me I shouldn't be doing that sortof thing. They were curious to know what was behind the seemingly irrational behaviour and I explained how thebanks were operating their fraud with the protection of the courts. Once they understood what my motives were,they wished me all the best and wanted to know if I was the only person trying to do anything about it.

As the hearings continued, I produced more and more leaflets accusing the judges of corruption and challengingthem to put me in front of a jury. Their silence was deafening.

When the Bulletin article came up and the journalists would not retract, I filed in the Supreme Court on 17th June,1997 for Defamation (which has to have a jury). On 30th June, 1997 Judge Levine said to me that I was"dangerously close to pleading a cause of action in defamation but ((that I was) not quite there" and asked that Iamend the Statement of Claim which I did do. However, on 25th July, 1997, Judge Levine said my amendedStatement was "embarrassing and vexatious" and he struck it out thereby eliminating the possibility of the wholesordid affair (including the conduct of the judges) being brought before a jury.

"Judges have all the power."

On 24th July, 1997 I filed another Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court saying "I am the victim of a terriblecivil wrong, i.e. tort, where a succession of members of the judiciary have lied, supported lies and concealed thetruth with the result that the course of justice has been perverted."

On 4th August, 1997 Registrar Irwin did not strike out the action but sent myself and the opposition to the Duty

Judge, a Judge Barr, who seta hearing date. I asked for a jury, in line with paragraph 3 of my Statement under"The Plaintiff Claims" when I said, "A trial by jury is the only acceptable method of determination in this casebecause of the number of members of the judiciary who are the defendants", but Judge Barr said there was "nojury available".

On 25th August, 1997 Mr. Acting Justice Murray heard the proceedings. After repeated requests he allowed me toread a prepared address to the court. He did not dismiss the case there and then but reserved his judgment. Hereis what I said to the court:

ADDRESS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES:

(Monday, 25th August, 1997)

Your Honour, the seven defendants have abandoned common law.The case I brought against the St.George Bank was on the basis that, under common law, there must be certaintyof terms for a contract to becreated.


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The loan contract in question was for seven years with the first five years being at a fixed interest rate of 9.9% andthe final two years to be either at a fixed rate which would be applicable at that time or at a variable rateapplicable at that time.I claimed that neither of the two alternatives for the final two years were certain at the time the contract was madeand they remain uncertain. Therefore, I asked the court to sever that part of the contract because it was voidunder common law. It was not a contract for a loan at a fixedprice.

"Certainty" means that which is absolutely assured, regular, fixed. And the "terms" of a contract means theconditions, stipulations, charge, price, rate of payment. Whereas "variable" means apt to change, changeable,

uncertain.

The first Defendant, Master Greenwood, said in his judgment that ""the rate itself is indeed certain". However, therate for the final two years is either variable or uncertain.

A "lie" is an intentional violation of the truth.

Master Greenwood's lying judgment has been supported, in turn, by the other six defendants.

During the course of proceedings from the Common Law Division of the New South Wales Supreme Courtthrough to the High Court of Australia I filed 24 documents with Affidavits, etc., repeating the same theme of thecommon law requirement of certainty of terms and pointing out that making out a contract with variable interest

rates or, in other words, uncertain of terms to be a valid contract is false representation or fraud and that takingmoney by fraud is stealing.

All this the seven defendants dismissed.

They have committed a terrible civil wrong.

They are not immune from civil action for their offence because they have abused the process of the court andthe function of a court is toad minister justice.

I would like to quote from Lord Denning (and this quote appears in my Statement of Claim): "In a civilised society,legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It

is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication ofmen's rights or the enforcement of just causes. It isabused when it is diverted from its true course so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort,a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if theycan, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against thewrong doer.".

The solicitors for the defendants have supplied me with some precedents which deal with the issue of immunityand I would like to quote passages from these documents.

In the case of Gallo v Dawson where Wilson J said, "if the judge has accepted bribes or been in the least degreecorrupt, or has perverted the course of justice, he can be punished in the criminal courts."

Here I would like to quote from Halsbury's Laws of Australia on the subject of a judge being "immune from suit inrespect of acts done ...in the performance of judicial duties ...". It says that "A judge acts in the performance of hisor her judicial duties when acting in the bona fide exercise of office and under the belief that he or she hasjurisdiction."

The words, "bona fide", mean in good faith or having honest intentions.

From the text of Rajski v Powell and another Kirby P said, "Suchimmunity rests, as it has been said, uponconsideration of public policy."

"Public policy" means in the interest of the community.

Lying, supporting lies and concealing the truth cannot be considered to be "acting in the bona fide exercise ofoffice" nor in the interests of the community.

Also from Rajski v Powell and another, Kirby P refers to ""redress, through the Judicial Commission".I have tried that path with a complaint against Master Greenwood (thatis Annexure "A" in the Affidavit I filed on 12August, 1997) only to be rejected by a panel of more judges.


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In order to seek redress, I also wrote to the Governor-General of Australia on the 25th April, 1997 only to beturned away with the comment that the Governor-General "cannot intervene".

I sent a petition to Her Majesty the Queen on the 9th May, 1997 only to be rejected with the comment that "she isunable to take any direct action on (my) behalf".

And again, from Rajski v Powell and another, Kirby P quotes from an 1811 case in America of Yates v Yansingwhen Platt Sr said: "Let usbeware that in our zeal for securing personal liberty we do not destroy the virtuousindependence and rightful authority of our courts of justice, and thereby subvert the foundations of social order.

So long as our courts are pure, enlightened and independent, we shall enjoy that greatest of earthly blessings, agovernment of laws; but whenever these tribunals shall cease to deserve that character, the standard of justiceand civil liberty must give place to the sceptre of a tyrant."

"The sceptre of a tyrant"!

These seven defendants have sacrificed truth, law, justice and the rights of the people to appease a tyrant. Theyhave not acted "judicially".

The tyrant, of course, is in the form of the banks.

The Royal coat of arms and the Australian coat of arms have been displaced by bank logos.

Proof of the power of the tyrant was seen in the repealing of an important Statute Law in 1981. The Moneylendersand Infants Loans Act of 1941, which stated that "a loan contract shall show ... the total amount of interest to bepaid" and outlawed compound interest and penalty interest rates, was repealed and a Consumer Credit Actpassed to allow the terms of a contract to be varied by the lender.

This was and remains a violation of common law.

The fraud has persisted and this is what the banks now call a ""contract" I will read from a letter from a majorbank where it says:"Under the contract, the annual percentage rate, the interest free period, the minimum repayment, and the feesand charges may all vary without your consent. New fees or charges may also be introduced without your

consent."

Such a document is no contract.

The banks have trampled common law and these seven judges have abandoned it.

What is at the heart of this case is a fight for democracy and against the tyranny of the banks.

Many, many people know what I am doing farmers, policemen, bank employees and they wish me good luckwhile telling me that I can't win because the banks won't allow it.

It is the simplest of cases. I don't know the price of a loan and nobody can tell me because the terms of the

contract were not fixed when the transaction was made.

If the courts were "pure", that is not corrupt, my application for severance of the part of the contract which is voidby common law should have been granted in the first instance.

But that didn't happen. I have attempted appeals to higher and higher authorities and it has still not beenremedied to this point in time.

The entire system stands condemned in the eyes of the people.

That can be turned around and hope can be restored.

Or the corruption can be further entrenched by yet another denial of truth, law, justice and right.These seven judges gave orders against me to pay the bank's costs for which I have been sent a demand fromtheir solicitors for $32,917.72.


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I ask this court for an order against the defendants for damages and costs and an amount of $32,917.72 tocompensate me for the injury they have caused to me.

If there is any doubt in the mind of this court as to whether the defendants are guilty, then I would simply like tosay that:1. Variable does mean uncertain.2. Uncertainty does not mean certainty.I have been denied common law and I have been denied natural justice.

John Wilson

Ten days later a message was left on my answering machine at work asking me to attend court the next day tohear the decision.

On 5th September, 1997, in the King Street annex of the Supreme Court, I attended but there was norepresentative from the other side. Wasting no time, the judge dismissed the case and I hit him with a smallplastic bag containing a quantity of yellow paint. I was taken into custody and nine and a half hours later wascharged under section 326 of the Crimes Act 1900 which says: "A person who threatens to do or cause, or whodoes or causes, any injury or detriment to any person on account of anything lawfully done by a person: ... (b) asa judicial officer ... is liable to penal servitude for 10 years.".My defence is, of course, that the "judicial officer" had betrayed his Oath of Office and what he did was unlawful,

i.e.: criminal.

I was released on bail to appear at the Downing Centre Local Court on 26 September, 1997. The solicitor for thePublic Prosecutor asked for an adjournment because they had not fully their brief. That solicitor did, however, tellthe court that I was a "danger to the community" and asked that the terms of the bail be increased in theirseverity. I had nothing in those three weeks to justify such action. I had complied with the conditions set down notto go within 500 metres of the Supreme Court nor approach any members of the judiciary. I said changing theconditions was unfair but the Magistrate Williams imposed the additional burden which caused me to beimprisoned at Silverwater for two days until a friend came up with the $5,000 surity and I could be with my familyand go back to work.

According to section 34 of the Crimes Act 1914 it is an offence for a judge or magistrate, "without reasonableexcuse", to act oppr

law in australia by john wilson

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