1

Law and Habits

Sylvie Delacroix1

UCL Laws

`[T]hehorriblethingaboutalllegalofficials,eventhebest,aboutalljudges,

magistrates,barristers,detectives,andpolicemen,isnotthattheyarewicked

(someofthemaregood),notthattheyarestupid(severalofthemarequite

intelligent),itissimplythattheyhavegotusedtoit.Strictlytheydonotsee

theprisonerinthedock;alltheyseeistheusualmanintheusualplace.They

donotseetheawfulcourtofjudgment;theyonlyseetheirownworkshop.’

(G.K.Chesterton,Ontremendoustrifles2)

Wehaveallbeenthere:tofailto`see’beyondroutineappearancesandhencegrasp

themoralsalienceofasituationiseasy.Itismadeeasierstillwhenthatsituationis

structuredaroundanormativeframeworkthatdefinestherolesofitsprotagonists.

Thatnormativeframeworkneednotbelegal.Itmaybeprofessional,conventionalor

otherwise.Yetbecauseofthepervasivereachandspecificnatureofitsinstitutional

structure,alegalframeworkmaywellbeuniquelyconducivetothe`roteblindness’

describedabove.

1TheworkleadingtothispaperwasfundedbytheLeverhulmeTrust.IamgratefulforthecommentsandinsightsofSimonBlackburn,ClareCarlisle,SeanCoyle,MaksDelMar,JakobHolterman,JonathanMontgomery,GeorgiosPavlakos,DanPriel,AndreaSangiovanni,PhilipSchofield,KevinToh,MichaelWilkinson,LorenzoZuccaand,lastbutnotleast,theeditorofthisJournal.2G.K.Chesterton,'TheTwelveMen',TremendousTrifles(TremendousTrifles,Sheed&Ward1955)

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ThisperilisindirectlyrelatedtoaconcernwhichHartformulatesdifferentlywhenhe

referstothe`riskthatthecentrallyorganisedpowermaywellbeusedforthe

oppressionofnumberswithwhosesupportitcandispense,inawaythatthe simpler

regimeofprimaryrulescouldnot’.3Hart’sworryworkslikethis:oneofthedefining

featuresofestablishedlegalordersisthattheycanbesustainedonthebasisof

officialacceptancealone,thankstotheirinstitutionalstructure(thesis1).Becauseof

thisstructure,itmaywellbethecasethatanestablishedlegalsystem(asopposed

toasimplerregimeofprimaryrules)isparticularlyconducivetoasocietythatis

`deplorablysheeplike’-andwherethesheepmightallendup`inthe

slaughterhouse’4(thesis2).Thisarticlearguesthatthesis2iscorrectanddeserves

greaterattention.5Thisisinpartduetothefactthatitismuddledbyitsassociation

withthesis1,whichisunhelpfulatbest,andnotonlybecauseoftheminimalistway

inwhichHartdefinesacceptance.

`Anunreflectinginheritedortraditionalattitude,orthemerewishtodoasothers

do’6clearlyofferslittlesafeguardagainstthe`sheeplike’predicamentHartworries

about.Tomakesenseoftheriskinherentintheemergenceoflaw’scomplex

institutionalstructure,oneneedstoturnupstream,tothecomplexwebofsocial

processesthatshapeandenabletheattitudesencompassedunderHart’sconceptof

`acceptance’.Whileconsiderableworkhasalreadybeendevotedtodelineatingthe

waysinwhich`practices’(conventionalorotherwise7)maygiverisetolegalnorms,

3H.L.A.Hart,Theconceptoflaw(2ndedn,ClarendonPress1994)202.4Ibid.5BothJeremyWaldron,'AllWeLikeSheep'(1999)12CanJL&Jurisprudence169)andLeslieGreen,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'(2008)83NYULRev1035)havehelpedflagupthisimportantaspectofHart’stheory,buthavemostlyconsidereditinthewidercontextoflaw’sseparabilityfrommorality.Thisarticleseekstorefineourunderstandingofthefactorsthatcontributetothe`sheeplike’qualityofbehaviorthatisfacilitatedby(incontrasttothatwhichgenerates)legalinstitutions.6Hart,Theconceptoflaw.7AndreiMarmor,'Legalconventionalism'inJulesColeman(ed),Hart'sPostscript,essaysonthePostscripttotheConceptofLaw(Hart'sPostscript,essaysonthePostscripttotheConceptofLaw,OxfordUniversityPress2001)GeraldJ.Postema,'Coordinationandconventionatthefoundationsoflaw'(1982)11Journaloflegalstudies165GeraldJ.Postema,'Norms,reasonsandlaw'(1998)51Currentlegalproblems149MichaelEBratman,'Sharedcooperativeactivity'(1992)101Thephilosophicalreview327.

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farlessattentionhassofarbeenpaidtothepatternsofrepeatedbehavior-habits-

thatfeedsuchpractices.Mostlegaltheoristswilltellyouthatthereisagoodreason

forsuchscantdevelopments,foreverybodyknowsthat`habitsarenotthe[…]sort

ofthingsthatcanimposeobligations’.8

Thefirstpartofthisarticleexposesthedualistmeta-ethicalpresuppositionsthatlurk

behindsuchanapparentlyunproblematicstatementanddelineatesthecontoursof

a(non-reductive)moralnaturalismthatgivesacentralplacetohabits.Bythrowing

lightonthefullspectrumofhabits(from`mere’ticsandautomatedbehaviourtothe

reflectivehabitsthatconstituteaparticularkindofpractice),thisarticleemphasizes

thequalitativedifferencebetweenthehabitsthatarecapableofgeneratingthe

practicesattheheartofalegalsystemandthehabitsthatthissystem’s`divisionof

normativelabour’isconduciveto.Hart’s`thesis2’iscorrectbecauseandtothe

extentthatlaw’sinstitutionalstructuredoesfacilitatethedevelopmentofrigid

habits,i.e.habitsthathavelosttheiradaptabilityandhencetheirabilitytogenerate

andsupportpractices(conventionalorotherwise).

Thesecondpartofthisarticlestartswiththeintellectualrootsofwhatcouldhave

beenHart’s(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity,wherebythere

wouldbeno`gap’betweenhabitsassocialfactsontheonehandandsocialruleson

theother:agapwhichHartendeavourstobridgeviahisnotionofacceptance.

Section2.2unpacksthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenhabitsandlawwhilesection

2.3drawsuponthelattertobolsterHart’sclaimthatlawisinherentlyconducivetoa

societythatis`deplorablysheeplike’(oncethisclaimisridofitsassociationwith

`officialacceptance’).

8`Fortunately,plansaretherightsortofthings’(ScottJ.Shapiro,'Law,Plans,andPracticalReason'(2002)8LegalTheory387438).

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I.Thenatureofhabitanditsrelationshiptoethicalagency

Habitrequiresrepetition-whetheritberepeatedmovement,orposture,orframeof

thought.Inthepatternshapedbythisrepetition,atsomepointahabitisformed.To

trytoidentifyaprecisemomentintimewhenahabitisbornisdoomedtofailure,

fordiminishedawarenessofthepatternunderlyingitiskeytoitsemergence.9While

onecanintentionallyseektodevelopsomehabit,10thelatterisbornonlyoncethe

behavior,postureorframeofthoughtunderlyingithasbecomesointernalizedthat

ittakesefforttobringitbacktoconsciousawareness.Nowjustasthisnumbingof

one’spassivesensibilitytakesroot,habitconcomitantlybuoysupwhateveractivity

underliesit.WhenIgetusedtobicyclingbetweencarsinthemorningrushhour,I

notonlybecomelesstensewhendoingso;Ialsoacquiresomegenuinedexterity.

ItisthisdoubleeffectofhabitwhichHumereferstowhenheemphasizesthat

`customincreases[sic]allactivehabits,butdiminishespassive,accordingtothe

observationofalateeminentphilosopher[Butler]’.11Whentheyareconsidered

specificallyinthemoralsphere,theactiveandpassiveaspectsofhabitmakeita

double-edgedsword.Whilehabituationiscentraltotheprocessesbywhichwe

cometoacquireatastefor-andoureaseindiscerning-standardsofrightand

wrong,itisalsowhatcanstopusfromwakinguptothedemandsofsuchstandards,

lulledintoacomfortingbutdangeroussenseofroutine.

9Externalobservationnecessarilycomestoolate.10Habitscanbeacquiredinmanyways:intentionally(forinstancetofostertherealisationofaparticulargoal)orunintentionally(throughupbringingorsimplyrespondingtoparticularenvironmentalfeaturesthatshapeone’sbehaviour).11DavidHume,ATreatiseonHumanNature(OxfordUniversityPress1978)424.The`lateeminentphilosopher’HumeisreferringtoisBishopButler,whoemphasiseswhathecalls`thedoubleeffectofhabit’:`Fromthesetwoobservationstogether,thatpracticalhabitsareformedandstrengthenedbyrepeatedacts;andthatpassiveimpressions,bybeingrepeateduponus,growweaker;itmustfollow,thatactivehabitsmaybegraduallyformingandstrengthening,byacourseofactingonsuchandsuchmotivesandexcitements,whilstthesemotivesandexcitementsthemselvesare,byproportionatedegrees,growinglesssensible,i.e.arecontinuallylessandlesssensiblyfelt,evenastheactivehabitsstrengthen.Andexperienceconfirmsthis;foractiveprinciples,attheverytimethattheyarelesslivelyinperceptionthantheywere,arefoundtobe,somehow,wroughtmorethoroughlyintothetemperandcharacter,andbecomemoreeffectualininfluencingourpractice.’(J.Butler,Analogyofreligion,naturalandrevealed,totheconstitutionandcourseofnature(BellandDaldy1857)108).

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`[E]thicsstrivestolegislateaworldinwhichthegoodisdonefluidly,asa

matterofhabituation,ifnotfact,evenasitisrecognizedthattheverything

ethicscanneverbeisanactingthatismerelyhabitormatteroffact.Evenas

ethicsseekstobecomefamiliar,itinsistsonrenderingtheworldunfamiliar.

Theemergenceofethicalobligationbothinsistsonregularityinone’s

conductandresiststhatregularity’.12

Becausehabits’compellingforcetypicallyeludesus13,theymaybeseenasamoral

menace,surreptitiouslycompromisingourautonomy.Hence,formany,`ethicscan

neverbeanactingthatismerelyhabit’(seetheabovequotation):inherseminal

workonhabit14,ClareCarlisletracesaphilosophicalthreadthatlinksKantto

KierkegaardandBergsonvialesswell-knownauthorssuchasMainedeBiran.For

Carlisle,itisdeBiran’sambivalencetowardshabitthatmakeshisaccount

particularlyinteresting.deBiranindeeddeemshabittobethe`generalcauseofour

progressontheonehand,ofourblindnessontheother’.15Becausehabitcaneclipse

reflectivethought,andbecausereflectivethoughtisdeemed(bythoseauthors

withintheKantianthread)toconditiontheexerciseofourfreedom,habitbelongs

firmlytothe`messy’,causal,spaceofdesires,inclinationsandthelike.

12JamesHatley,JaniceMcLaneandChristianDiehm(eds),Interrogatingethics:embodyingthegoodinMerleau-Ponty(DuquesneUniversityPress2006)3.13`[O]fallenemies,habitisperhapsthemostcunning,andaboveallitiscunningenoughnevertoletitselfbeseen,becausethepersonwhoseesthehabitissavedfromthehabit.’S.Kierkegaard,WorksofLove(PrincetonUniversityPress1995)36.14C.Carlisle,'Creaturesofhabit:theproblemandthepracticeofliberation'(2006)38ContinentalPhilosophyReview19,C.Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife'(2010)53Inquiry123,C.Carlisle,Onhabit(Routledge2014).15PierreMaineDeBiran,Theinfluenceofhabitonthefacultyofthinking,vol3(Williams&Wilkins1929)49.CarlisleemphasisestheextenttowhichdeBiran’sambivalencetowardshabitisbornoutofthetensionsunderlyinghismetaphysics’dualistpresuppositions:`Biran’swholeaccountofhabitischaracterisedbytensionsandinconsistenciesthattestifytoakindofstrugglebetweenreasonandhabit:ontheonehand,thereistheinsistenceonadualisticpsychology,andontheotherhandtheacknowledgedfailureclearlytoseparateactivityandpassivity,perceptionandsensation,thevoluntaryandtheinvoluntary’(Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife').

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Now,themetaphoroftwospaceswhichtypicallyunderliesnegativeevaluationsof

habitisfarfromcasual.InKantitexplicitlystructureshisassertionofthepriorityof

freedom,`sothespaceofreasonsisthespaceinwhichourtranscendentalfreedom

operates,inspiteofthedeterministiccourseoftherestofourbeing[including

habits].’16Inlinewiththisdualistframework,theoriesofethicaldevelopment17are

traditionallystructuredaroundagradualdetachmentfromtheemotionaland

habitualrootsofethicalaction,celebratingreflectivereasoning–typicallyalong

Kantianlines-astheculminationofmatureagency.

Thisemphasisonthenecessitytogrowoutofthehabitualthroughcriticalreasoning

translatesakeyassumptionthatstructuresallnon-naturalistaccountsofethical

agency:thereisafundamentaldiscontinuitybetweenthenaturalandtheethical.

Whilenon-cognitivistsdrawfromthegapbetweenthosetwospacestheirskepticism

aboutthetruth-aptitudeofmoralstatements,Kantianaccountsofethicalagency

takethatgaptoconditiontheverypossibilityofassertingourethicalfreedom(and

concomitantresponsibility).Kantindeeddeemedhabit-understoodasmindless,

automaticrepetition,andthusfirmlybelongingtothespaceofcauses-tobeasign

ofhumanenslavement:

16SimonBlackburn,'Normativityalamode'(2001)5JournalofEthics:AnInternationalPhilosophicalReview139140.17Kohlberg’stheoryofethicaldevelopmentisthemostfamousinstantiationofthatKantianperspectiveindevelopmentalpsychology.Whenhedevelopedhistheoryofmoralstagesinthe1950s,thedominant,`socialization’viewclaimedthat`societyispriortotheindividual,bothchronologicallyandmorally.Itisthesourceofallvalues,whichareeventuallyreflectedintheindividual’(MelfordSpiro,'CultureandPersonality:TheNaturalHistoryofaFalseDichotomy'(1951)14Psychiatry19,p.20).Theessentiallypassiveroleattributedtotheindividual–seenasavaluereceptacle–bythissocializationviewworriedKohlberg.Asidefromthedangerofsocialstagnation,Kohlbergwasacutelyawareoftheperilinherentinover-emphasisingadequateadjustmenttosociallyconstitutedhabitsofevaluation.For`toidentifymoralitywithconformityistobeforcedtotakethepositionthataloyalNaziwasbehavingmorally’(LawrenceKohlberg,'Moralstagesandmoralization'inThomasLickona(ed),Moraldevelopmentandbehavior:Theory,research,andsocialissues(Moraldevelopmentandbehavior:Theory,research,andsocialissues,Holt,RinehartandWinston1976),p.3.).Kohlberg’sdefiningmoralmaturitybyreferencetotheindividual’scapacityto`differentiat[e]hisselffromtherulesandexpectationsofothersanddefin[e]hisvaluesintermsofself-chosenprinciples’(ibidem,p.33)isadirectattempttoaddressthisconcern,yetitcameataprice,assuchaKantianstandforcedKohlbergtobeliethespiritofapragmatisttraditionhewasclearlyattractedto.

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‘Anaptitude(habitus)isafacilityinactingandasubjectiveperfectionof

choice.Butnoteverysuchfacilityisafreeaptitude(habituslibertatis);forifit

isahabit(assuetudo),thatis,auniformityinactionthathasbecomea

necessitythroughfrequentrepetition,itisnotonethatproceedsfrom

freedom,andthereforenotamoralaptitude.’18

ThisarticleproblematizesthenarrowKantianunderstandingofhabitasmindless

repetition(whichisstillwidelyinfluentialinlegaltheorytoday–seethequotation

fromShapirointheintroduction)tohighlightthewiderangeofwaysofhavinga

habit,andtheirsignificanceforourunderstandingoflegalnormativity(and,

concomitantly,forourunderstandingofthemoralrisksinherentinlaw’s

institutionalstructure–thisnormativeaspectisdiscussedin2.3).

Becausetheaccountofhabitthatemergesfromthisarticlestandsinthewayofany

non-naturalistefforttopreservethe`gap’between`(mere)nature’andethics,

section1.1.isdevotedtodelineating(inbroadterms19)thetypeofnaturalismthat

stemsfromthisanalysisofhabit.Ofthechallengessuchanaccountraisesin

committingtoanaturalistmethodology,noneismoreimportantthanthetaskof

explainingwhat,ifanything,enablesustostandbackfromandtochallengethe

habitual,whetheritbetoultimatelytriggermoral(andlegal)changeornot.Thiswill

bediscussedinsection1.2.

1.1. Growingwithin(ratherthanoutof)thehabitual:developinganon-reductivemoralnaturalism

18Kant,I.[1797](1996)TheMetaphysicsofMorals,trans.M.Gregor(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),ms.6:407).19Forafullaccountofthehabit-centrednaturalismhintedatinthisarticle,seeS.Delacroix,HabitualEthics?(2018).

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Thetypeofmoralnaturalism20defendedhere,whichgivesacentralplacetohabit,

rejectsbothnon-naturalismandanykindofnaturalismthatletsthecurrentresults

ofournaturalsciencesdefinewhatbelongstonatureandwhatdoesnot.Asforthe

former,onemayusefullydistinguishbetweentwobroadtypesofnon-naturalism.

While`subjectivists’highlighttheman-madenatureoftheethicalrealmtodismissit

aslackinginobjectivity(comparedtothenaturalrealm),`supernaturalist

rationalists’21insistthatatleastsomeethicalvaluesareindependentfrom-and

moreobjectivethan-naturalfacts.

Giventherangeofpossiblewaysofdefining-andarticulatingtherelationship

between-`nature’and`science’respectively,naturalismcancomeinmanyshapes

andcolours.Becauseofsomeversions’scientisticexcesses,`thetideofnaturalism

[which]hasbeenrisingsincetheseventeenthcentury’canbeperceivedasathreat:

`theregionsunderthreataresomeofthemostcentralinhumanlife.’22Toprotect

these`regions’–moralityisoneofthem-anincreasingnumberofcontemporary

philosophers(fromPricetoPutnamviaMcDowellandBlackburn)findthemselves

`onthesame[broadorliberal]sideofthebarricades’23,eveniftheirrespective

naturalismsdifferinsomeimportantways.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,itis

helpfultohighlightthreeconceptualhurdles-defining`thenatural’,`science’and

`internalismaboutreasons’,whichusefullydelineatethekindofnaturalismatstake

(andwhichahabit-centrednaturalismfacesmorefelicitouslythanothers).20Whateverelseitis,naturalisminvolvesatleastone`lowestcommondenominator’commitment.Itsrejectionofanydualistmetaphysicsinvolvesaclaimthat`thereisnounbridgeablespacebetweenwhathappensinthat[natural]orderandanyotherorderinheavenorearth,includingtheorderofourownminds’(Blackburn,'Normativityalamode').Onthisbasis,thechallengewhichanynaturalistaccountofmoralitymustaddressconsistsinunderstandinghowthedemandsandaspirationswecharacteristicallyassociatewithmoralitymaybeunderstoodasoutgrowthsofouranimal(ratherthannoumenal,orgod-likeetc.)nature:`theremustbenounmovedmover:nointerventionofthedivinespark,orgiftsfromunexplainedquarters’(ibid.).21IborrowthisotherwisecumbersometermfromMcDowellasithasthemeritofencompassingawiderangeofpositions,rangingfromPlatonismtointuitionism,vianaturallawtheories(JohnMcDowell,Mind,Value,andReality(HarvardUniversityPress1998)167).22HuwPrice,'NaturalismandthefateoftheM-Worlds'(1997)7ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety247.23PaulRedding,'TwodirectionsforanalyticKantianism'inMarioDeCaroandDavidMacarthur(eds),NaturalismandNormativity(NaturalismandNormativity,ColumbiaUniversityPress2010)271.

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1.1.1. ‘TheNatural’

Therecannotbeanydiscontinuitybetweentheethicalandthenaturalinanaccount

ofethicalagencythatgivesacentralplacetohabit.Andthatisnotbecausethe

ethicalis`merely’naturalbutratherbecause,asHansFinknicelyputsit:`Natureis

nevermerenature.Thatwhichismorethanmereisnature,too’.24Habits(alongwith

thehistorical,theaesthetical,theman-made)areamongthosethingsthatare`more

thanmere’nature.Deweyhasanicewayofillustratingthesortofnaturalismthatis

atworkinanyaccountofethicalagencythatplaceshabitatitscore:

‘Mountainpeaksdonotfloatunsupported;theydonotevenjustrestupon

theearth.Theyaretheearthinoneofitsmanifestoperations.Itisthe

businessofthosewhoareconcernedwiththetheoryoftheearth,

geographersandgeologists,tomakethisfactevident,initsvarious

implications.Thetheoristwhowoulddealphilosophicallywithfinearthasa

liketasktoaccomplish’.25

Whetheritbeforfineartsorforethics,thetaskofthephilosopheristoexplainhow

bothfineartsandethicsaretheoutcomeofwhatwe-nature’sinhabitants-do;how

theyaremadepossiblebyhabits,bothreflectiveandunreflective,andpractices

disturbingthelatterandengenderingnewinstancesoffineartandethicalvalues,

whichinturnfosternewhabitsetc.Thissortofnaturalismentailsthat-toquote

Leiter,himselfreferringtothetypeofnaturalismendorsedbyMcDowell:

‘[T]hereisnospecialproblem(fromthestandpointofanaturalisticworld

view)abouttheepistemicorontologicalstatusofthefacts[includingethical

24HansFink,'ThreeSortsofNaturalism'(2006)14EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy202217.25J.Dewey,Artasexperience(CapricornBooks1958)3.

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values]whoseexistencedependsontheseresponsivecapacities[naturally

developedbyhumanbeings]’.26

WhileIwholeheartedlyendorsetheperspectiveencapsulatedintheabove

renderingofMcDowell’snaturalism,Leiterthinksthelatterdoesnotqualifyas

`naturalism’,forit`rejectstheNaturalisticConceptionofobjectivity.’27Thisdismissal

isworthunpacking,andtodothatonemuststartwithwhatthat“specialproblem”

whichLeiterreferstointheabovequotemightconsistin.FarfromModern28,that

problemgoeshandinhandwithadrivetoconfinethenaturaltothatwhichisthe

resultofelementary,materialforces(asopposedtohumanforces).Sucha

restrictiveunderstandingofnatureinevitablythrowsintosharpfocustheontological

andepistemologicalprecariousnessoftheman-made.29

Nowonemayresisttheconclusionthatthisapparentprecariousnessisatall

problematicbasedonatleasttwodifferentstrategies.Thefirstoneconsistsin

arguingthatwhatdependsonhumanbeings’responsivecapacitiesisno-lessrealor

objectivethanthenatural,albeitinadifferentway.Quineanswillnecessarilybe

suspiciousofsuchalineofargument,atleastinsofarasitpresupposesontological

pluralism.30

Anotherwayofdebunkingthesupposed`specialproblem’abouttheepistemicand

ontologicalstatusoftheman-madeconsistsinpointingoutthatthelatter’s

precariousnessonlyspringsupincontrasttoapeculiarly-andsuspiciously-bare

Nature.NotonlyisitfarfromclearwhethersuchaNaturestrippedbareofthe

26BrianLeiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy(OxfordUniversityPress2007)243.27ibid.28ItplaysacentralroleinPlato’sendeavourtocapturethetensioninherentinphysisinLawsBookX.29The“man-made”isbroadlyunderstood,andrangesfromtheethicaltotheartistic,viathereligious.30Priceusefullydefinesontologicalpluralism(inhisattemptatrescuingsomeofCarnap’sinsights)astheviewaccordingtowhich:“totheextentthatdifferentframeworks[atplayinlanguage]areindependent,anddoingdifferentjobs,theirexistentialquantifiersalsoseemtobedoingdifferentjobs—eachframeworkseemstobringwithititsownnotionofreality.”(HuwPrice,'Carnap,Quine,andtheFateofMetaphysics'(1997)5ElectronicJournalofAnalyticPhilosophy6).

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humantouchisinfactavailabletous;quitewhywewouldwanttohankeraftera

conceptofnaturethatreducessodrasticallytheexplanatoryresourcesatour

disposalwarrantsanexplanation.Thelattergoeshandinhandwithone’s

conceptionofscience.

1.1.2. ‘Science’WhenLeiterremindsusthat,incontrasttooutdatedscientificmodels`usually

drawnfromsomeidealizedversionofphysics’,`scientificaccountsofsocial

phenomenahaveroom,inprinciple,forhermeneuticconcepts’31,hisnaturalism

seemsresolutelyun-`bald’.ThelattertermisMcDowell’s,and`baldnaturalism’has

beengivenvariousdefinitions,amongwhichtheviewaccordingtowhich`realityis

exhaustedbythenaturalworld,inthesenseoftheworldasthenaturalsciencesare

capableofrevealingittous’.32

YetLeiter’swayofengagingwiththeargumentslevelledbyMcDowellagainstbald

naturalismseemstopullhimbacktheotherway.Whenhenotesthat,asa

`Quinean’,it`alllooksverystrange[tohim]’whenMcDowellquestionsthe`reason

tosupposethatnaturalsciencehasafoundationalstatusinphilosophicalreflection

abouttruth—thattherecanbenofactsotherthanthosethatwouldfigureina

scientificunderstandingoftheworld’33,Leitercouldhavesimplygoneontopoint

outthatMcDowellseemstoassumetheoutdated,undulynarrowunderstandingof

naturalsciencesalludedtoabove.Leiter’sretortinginsteadthat`tosimplypushthe

scientificepistemologyasideopenstheontologicalfloodgatestoawholepre-

31Evenifit`doesnotshowthatthey[do]makeroomforthekindsofHermeneuticConceptstowhichconceptualjurisprudentsareattached’.Leiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy.32JohnMcDowell,'Projectionandtruthinethics',Mind,valueandreality(Mind,valueandreality,HarvardUniversityPress1998).33Ibid.

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Enlightenmentconceptionoftheworld’34mayleadthereadertoassumethatthere

isbutoneunderstandingofsciencecapableofsecuringthe`ontologicalfloodgates’.

Thelatterassumptionisworthdebunking,foritcontributestothegrowing

popularityofareductivematerialisttraditionwhoseinfluenceisincreasinglyfeltin

someneuroscientificstudiesofmoralagency.35Ifthemindisbutaby-productof

matter,36ifourmemories,beliefsandmoral,politicalandaestheticjudgmentsareall

aptlyunderstoodasphysicalstatescausedbynerveimpulsesinthebrain,thenmost

`socialscientific’accountsofthelatterwouldneedtobedismissedasontologically

queer.

Incontrast,theconceptionofsciencepresupposedbyahabit-centrednaturalism

notonlyincludesbutgivesacentralroleto`humanistic’contributions.37Amongthe

manychallengeswhichsuchaconceptionofsciencemayusefullytackle,the

followinginstigatedthepresentarticle:thechallengeofseekingtograspwhat

enablesustoperiodicallystandagainstcommonlyacceptedvaluestoinitiatechange

inthewaywethinkof(and,ultimately,implement)thestandardsgoverningourway

34Leiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy.35SeeforinstanceGreene’sendeavourto`sendthesoulpackingforgood’,whichproceedsontheassumptionthatour`moralbusiness’canandshouldbeseenasabrainprocessandnothingmore:`Whatwe[socialneuroscientists]reallywant,Ithink,istoseethemind’sclockwork[…]totruly,deeplybelievethatwearemachines,wemustseetheclockworkinaction.We’veallheardthatthesoulisdead.Nowwewanttoseethebody[…]ifthesoulisnotinthemoraljudgmentbusiness,it’snotinanybusinessatall.And,thus,whatitwouldtaketosendthesoulpackingforgoodisapurelyphysicalaccountofhowthehumanminddoesitsmoralbusiness’.(JoshuaD.Greene,'Socialneuroscienceandthesoul'slaststand'inAlexanderB.Todorov,SusanT.FiskeandDeborahA.Prentice(eds),Socialneuroscience:towardunderstandingtheunderpinningsofthesocialmind(Socialneuroscience:towardunderstandingtheunderpinningsofthesocialmind,OxfordUniversityPress2011)264).Forsomevibrantcriticismofthereductivematerialismatplayintheabovequotation,seeRaymondTallis,ApingMankind:Neuromania,DarwinitisandtheMisrepresentationofHumanity(Acumen2011)359.36“Thereisonlyonesortofstuff,namelymatter–thephysicalstuffofphysics,chemistry,andphysiology–andthemindissomehownothingbutaphysicalphenomenon.Inshort,themindisthebrain”(DanielCDennett,Consciousnessexplained(PenguinUK1993)33).37Farfromthreateningthe`ontologicalfloodgates’,contributionsfromoursocialsciencesandhumanitiesaredeemedessentialtoilluminatingthatwhichdependsonhumanbeings’`responsivecapacities’,whetheritbeintentionality,actionormoraljudgments.Asthatwhichsystematicallyenablesalltheseresponsivecapacities,habitconstitutesanaptfocalpointfortheconceptofsciencethatunderliesthetypeofnaturalismdefendedhere.

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oflivingtogether.Gainingabetterunderstandingofthemanywaysofhavingahabit

(andthemechanismsunderlyingbothhabitacquisitionandhabitmetamorphosis)is

crucialtotheabove,andbothempiricalinvestigationsandphilosophicalanalyses

cancontributetoit.Whiletheformerarestillfewandfarbetween38(thoughIam

hopingtoremedythis39),thelatterhavebenefitedfromrenewedinterestinrecent

years.

1.1.3. NaturalismandInternalismaboutreasons

Renewedphilosophicalinterestinhabitcouldbesaidtostematleastinpartfromits

playingacrucialroleinanyattempttoreconcilenaturalismononehandand

internalismaboutreasonsontheotherhand,twopositionsthataretraditionally

deemedincompatible.Indeeditisbecauseofthissupposedincompatibilitythat

manynaturalists(includingLeiter40)endupfallingbackuponasubjectivistposition,

wherebymoralpropositionsrefertotheattitudesofpeople,ratherthanobjective

factsindependentofhumanopinion.Thisexpressivismresolvesadifficultythatis

inherentinbaldversionsofnaturalism.Thelatter(mistakenly)assumethatthe

`ontologicalcleansing’demandedbynaturalism’srejectionofdualistmetaphysics

leavesthoseattemptingtoexplainhowmoraljudgmentsreliablymotivateuswith

onlybrute`inert’factsasexplanatoryresourcesattheirdisposal.

Thechallengefacedbysuchbaldversionsofnaturalismthenconsistsinexplaining

howsuchfacts–andthebeliefstheygiveriseto-reliablymotivateustoactincertain

38Experimentalstudieswillhavetoovercomethedifficultyinreplicatingahabitualsettinginitsfulldepthwhilelarge-scaleecologicalstudieswillstruggletoisolatetherelevantfactors.Onhabitacquisition,seePhillippaLallyandothers,'Howarehabitsformed:modellinghabitformationintherealworld'(2010)40EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology998.39Anin-progressstudyreplicatesaroutineprofessionalsituationinahighlyimmersivevirtualenvironment.Thestudyaimstograsptheimpactofprofessionalhabituation(andexpertise)onethicalawareness(forthcomingin2017).40`Ofcourse,theNeoHumeannaturalisthasnotexplainedrealnormativity,asScanloncomplains,becauserealnormativitydoesnotexist:thatistheentireupshotofthenaturalistview.Therearenoreasonswhoseexistenceandcharacterisindependentofhumanattitudes;thereareonlyhumanattitudeswhichleadusto`talkthetalk’ofreasons.Andifrealnormativitydoesnotexist,ifonlyfeelingsofinclinationandaversion,compulsionandavoidance,actuallyexist,thenthatmeansthatallpurportedlynormativedisputesbottomoutnotinreasonsbutintheclashofwilloraffect.’BrianLeiter,'NormativityForNaturalists'(2015)25PhilosophicalIssues6474.

14

ways(formostofourfactualbeliefstypicallydonot).Farfromhavingonlyinertfacts

atitsdisposal,thenaturalismdefendedherereliesonhabittoexplainthereliable

connectionbetweenmoraljudgmentandmotivation.Thetermreliableindicatesa

`relaxed’41approachtodrawingaconnectionbetweenmoraljudgmentand

motivationthatreliesonthefactthat`mostofusarecreaturesoftherightsort’.The

latterexpressionisRailton’s,butunlikeRailtonIdonottakethepossibilityofan

absenceofsuchconnectioninpathologicalcases(suchasthechronicallydepressive

personRailtonrefersto)toinvalidateinternalismaboutreasons.

Railton’sargumentworkslikethis:Inorderto`permitplausibleconnectionstobe

drawnbetween,ontheonehand,whatisgoodorrightand,ontheother,what

characteristicallywouldmotivateindividualswhoarepreparedtosubmitthemselves

torelevantsortsofscrutiny’42,thenaturalistmayusefullycomparetwotypesof

practices:thepracticeofbelief-based,everydayconversationandmoralpractice.

DrawinguponGrice’s43`complextheoryofhowthenormsthatgovern

conversationalexchanges-internalizedbyspeakersasmutuallyunderstood

intentionstobecooperativeincommunicating-makeitpossibleforwhatweliterally

saytooneanothertoconveyspokenandunspokeninformation’44,Railtonventures:

‘Mightsomethinglikethisbetrueinthecaseofmorallanguage?Canamoral

factualistarguethatthe`normativelyloaded’,dynamiccharacterofmoral

thoughtandpracticeisattributabletothejointoperationofan

encompassingframeworkofindividualandsharednorms,dispositions,and

41JamesLenman,'MoralNaturalism',TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,2006).42PeterRailton,Facts,values,andnorms:Essaystowardamoralityofconsequence(CambridgeUniversityPress2003)33.43P.Grice,StudiesintheWaysofWords(HarvardUniversityPress1989).44PeterRailton,'Moralfactualism'(2006)Contemporarydebatesinmoraltheory201209.

15

intentions,ontheonehand,andtheparticularfactualcontentofmoral

statements,ontheother?’45

Inthe`jointoperation’describedbyRailton,habit46playsacentralrole,foritishabit

thatpresidesovertheprocessofinternalisationofthenormsthatconditionthe

possibilityofbothmoralpracticesandbelief-based,everydayconversations.Onsuch

anaccount,aphilosophicallyminded,self-proclaimed`amoralist’whodemandsthat

wegiveherareasontobemoraliseitherincoherent47orsuffersfromanimpaired

capacitytoengageemotionallywithhersurroundings.Thelikelihoodofagap

betweensinceremoraljudgmentandactualmotivationalengagementinthelatter,

pathologicalcase48doesnotdetractfromthefactthatmosthumanbeingsare

creaturesoftherightsort.Wedotakeaninterestinnaturalfactsaboutmoral

rightness,becausetheprocessofgrowingupinvolvesdevelopingasensibility`that

includesnotonlyordinarycognitiveandsensorycapacitiesbutalsoamotivating

attitude–acapacitytofindcertainthingssimply“tobedone”.Itwouldfollowthat

thosewhomastermoralconceptswill,whenmakingmoraljudgments,havea

tendencytoactandfeelaccordingly.’49

45`Thiswouldpermitthefactualisttolinkmoraljudgmentandmotivationwhileprovidingthemoststraightforwardexplanationofhowmoraljudgmentcouldbelogicallyandlinguisticallyintegralwith‘ordinaryfactual’judgment,possessingallthemarksoftruth.’ibid.46WhileRailtondoesnotdelvemuchintohabit,hecomesclosetoitinhisdescriptionof`ourcapacityforsuchnonpropositional,bodilycentered,groundedmentalmapsandexpectations’,thankstowhich`weareabletoconnecthumanpropositionalthoughttotheworldviadereanddesebeliefsandintentions.’(PeterRailton,'TheAffectiveDogandItsRationalTale:IntuitionandAttunement'(2014)124Ethics813838).47Onemayarguethatwithouthabitswewouldnotbeabletospeakof`ourselves’atall:`Isn’tthistheanswertothequestion‘whatarewe?’Wearehabits,nothingbuthabits–thehabitofsaying‘I’.Perhapsthereisnomorestrikinganswertotheproblemoftheself.’(GillesDeleuze,EmpiricismandSubjectivity:anessayonHume'stheoryofhumannature(ColumbiaUniversityPress1991)x).48RailtonproposestheexamplesofBrad,whosuffersfromdepression,andTheresa,whose`capacitiesforempathyandengagementonauniversalscalearequitelimited’(Railton,'Moralfactualism').49Ibid.Notethat,inthisquote,RailtonisreferringtoMcDowell’s`internalist’naturalism,whichRailtonisdistancinghimselffrom(unnecessarily,inmyopinion)becauseofthepossibilityofthepathologicalcasesmentionedabove.Theoptimistic,Neo-HumeanpositiondefendedherefindsanechoinMikhail’sworkonso-called`universalmoralgrammar’:`InitialevidenceforUMGcomesfrommultiplesources,includingpsychology,linguistics,anthropologyandcognitiveneuroscience.Althoughnoneofthisevidenceisunivocalorconclusive,collectivelyitprovidesatleastmodestsupportforthehypothesisthathumanspossessaninnatemoralfacultythatisanalogous,insomerespects,tothe

16

Now,theelementthatconditionsthesuccessofsuchan`internalistnaturalism’–i.e.

theprocessofgradualconstructionofone’sethicalsensibilitythroughhabituation

(or`Bildung’)-isalsothesourceofitskeychallenge.Foritisonethingtoaccountfor

thewayinwhichwemaybuildourethicalsensibility(andmoralcompetency)

throughupbringing,andanothertoexplainhow,giventhisdependencyonthe

socio-culturalworldweinhabit,wecanneverthelesspreserveanabilitytostand

againstcommonlyacceptednormsandchallengeroutineperceptions.Thischallenge

isunpackedinthenextsection.

1.2. Whatenablesustostandbackfromhabit?

ReferringtoAristotle’saccountofhowethicalcharacterisformed,McDowell

describestheprocess(whichhecalls`Bildung’)whereby`humanbeingsare

intelligiblyinitiatedintothisstretchofthespaceofreasonsbyethicalupbringing,

whichinstillstheappropriateshapeintotheirlives.Theresultinghabitsofthought

andactionaresecondnature’.50Clearly,the`habitsofthoughtandaction’McDowell

referstointheabovepassagemustbeofaverydifferentkindfromthosedeemed

byKanttobelongfirmlytothe`messy’,causal,spaceofdesires,inclinationsandthe

like?Orarethey?

ThesuccessofMcDowell’snon-reductivenaturalism,itspotentialtodevelopa

narrativethattakesusfromhumanbeingswithneedsanddesires(‘thesphereof

causes’)tointernalizedstandardsofrightandwronghingesuponakeyambiguity

inherentintheconceptofhabit.Seizinguponthisambiguity,BillPollardendeavours

toclarify`howthesameideaofhabitcanbothoccupythespaceofcausesand,at

languagefacultythathasbeenpostulatedbyChomskyandotherlinguists.’(J.Mikhail,'Universalmoralgrammar:theory,evidenceandthefuture'(2007)11TrendsCognSci143).50JohnMcDowell,Mindandworld:withanewintroductionbytheauthor(HarvardUniversityPress1996)84.

17

leastpotentially,beaconstituentofsecondnature’51bydistinguishingbetween`two

waysofhavingthesamehabit’(ratherthanbetweendifferentkindsofhabit52).

Unlikethe`waywhichisavailabletopre-rationalhumansandothernon-rational

animals’theway`availabletohumansoncetheyhaveacquiredthecapacitytoact

forreasons’involvesthecapacityto(hereIquoteMcDowell)`contemplate

alternatives;[and]stepbackfromthenaturalimpulseanddirectcriticalscrutinyat

it’.53Nowthisemphasisoncriticalscrutinyandsteppingbackfromnaturalimpulses

maysoundstrangelyreminiscentoftheKantianaccountsofmoraldevelopment

referredtoearlier.Thedifference-anditiscrucial-liesinwhatistakentoenablethis

capacitytostepback,i.e.whethertheemotional,instinctiveandhabitualaretaken

tocontributeatalltothisability.Thechallengeforanynaturalistaccountofmoral

developmentconsistsinexplaininghowonegrowswithin,ratherthan`out’ofthe

habitual.

Thischallengeismadeallthemorecompellingsinceanaturalistmethodology

forbidsanyreferencetosomeArchimedeanpoint(whetheritbePlatonicforms,

`natural’valuesora-prioriprinciples),referencetowhichcouldsomehowbetrusted

towakeustotheignobilityofsomeofoursocialpractices.Ifallwehavetotrigger

themovementofcriticalscrutiny(whichMcDowellreferstointheabovequote)are

oursociallyconditionedemotionsand`habitsofevaluation’,thentonevertheless

postulatethecapacitytocontemplatealternativestothehabitualascentraltoour

secondnaturesoundsoptimisticatbest.Whatwouldtriggersuchcontemplation?

Emotions?Notiftheyarethemselvesdulledbyhabit:

‘Ifhabitcausesfeelingstodecline,presumablytothepointofexpiration,

thenhowistheroleofemotionalresponse—whetherasacharactertrait;as

51BillPollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'(2005)13InternationalJournalofphilosophicalStudies6976.52As`[a]voidingtalkofkindsofhabitallowsustoseehowtheycanpersistthroughouttheBildungprocess’ibid.53McDowell,'Twosortsofnaturalism'.

18

thepleasureandpainaccompanyingvirtuousandviciousacts;orasa

motivationalfactorinaction—tobeaccommodated?’.54

AnAristotelianaccountofexcellenceinthemoralspherewouldstressthatsituation-

specificdiscernmentisallweneedtokeephabitsattheserviceofourethicallife.A

lothangsonwhethersuchdiscernmentisconceptualisedasresponsivenessto

`affordances’55or,whether,likeMcDowell,oneinsistsontyingadequate

unreflectiveactiontoresponsivenesstoreasons.56Whilebroadlyinagreementwith

McDowellinhisAristoteliananalysisoftheunreflectiveactionsconstitutiveofhabit,

Dreyfusnotes:

‘McDowellconcludesthat,[...t]hankstoourinculcationintoourculture,

webecomesensitivetoreasons,whichtheninfluenceour`habitsofthought

andaction’.Onecaneasilyacceptthatinlearningtobewisewelearnto

followgeneralreasonsasguidestoactingappropriately.Butitdoesnot

followthat,oncewehavegottenpastthelearningphase,thesereasonsin

theformofhabitsstillinfluenceourwiseactions’.57

ThisquotationindirectlyhintsatanormativechallengewhichneitherDreyfusnor

McDowellhaveexplicitlyengagedwith:formostofus(thephronimosexcepted),our

`habitsofthoughtandaction’willbeaptatgeneratingtheirown`self-sustaining

reasons’.Howdoesonebuildintoone’saccountofadequateunreflectiveactionthe

necessarycapacitytochallengesuch`self-sustainingreasons’andmaintainthe54Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife'.55`Affordancesarepossibilitiesforactionofferedbytheenvironment`.ForfulldevelopmentsseeE.Rietveld,'SituatedNormativity:TheNormativeAspectofEmbodiedCognitioninUnreflectiveAction'(2008)117Mind973.56Rietveldrightlyemphasizesthat`unlikeresponsivenesstonormativesignificance,responsivenesstoreasonsisnotexperiencedbyusinunreflectiveaction.Thatmakes`responsivenesstoreasons’anabstract,theory-dependentandpotentiallymisleadingterm`.RietveldgoesontowonderwhetherMcDowells’insistenceontyingadequateunreflectiveactiontoresponsivenesstoreasonsstemsfromhis`fearthatwithoutaroleforconceptualitywewouldnotbeabletoplaceunreflectiveactioninthecategorycalledspaceofreasons,beingratherforcedtoseeitasdeterminedbydisenchantedcausalinteraction.’(ErikRietveld,'McDowellandDreyfusonUnreflectiveAction'(2010)53Inquiry183185).57HubertLDreyfus,Overcomingthemythofthemental:howphilosopherscanprofitfromthephenomenologyofeverydayexpertise(AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation2005)50.

19

`discernment’thatconditionsouravailabilitytotheethicaldemandsthatmay

emergefromnovelsituations?

Pollardemphasisestheimportanceoftheagent’s`capacitytooptout[ofhabit]for

reasons’but,justlikeMcDowell,doesnotdelveintoexactlywhatunderliesthis

capacity`toadoptstrategiestobreakhabits’58.Pollard’sfocusisondelineatingthat

subsetofhabitualactionswhichcanbedeemed`rational’:`[t]hatsubsetwillconsist

ofthosehabitualactionswhichcoherewiththeagent’sworldview’.59

‘Andthatinturnwillbeenoughtoruleoutnail-bitingandcigarettesmoking

whentheyareagainsttheagent’sbetterjudgement.Theseactionsarenot

justifiableintherightsense’.60

Butwillitbeenoughtoruleouthabitsgeneratedbyfrequentrepetitionof

abhorrentpractices(thatwereinitiallyperceivedassuch)?Whensocietalnormsare

pervertedenoughtocondonetheworstatrocities,anagent’sworldviewmightwell

bemalleableenoughtoaccommodate–insomecasesencourage-habitsthatone

couldnotpossiblydeemtobe`rational’.Thefollowingquoteisanexcerptfromthe

diaryofKretschmer,aGermanpharmacistwhojoinedtheNazipartyin193961and

servedinaSonderkommandothattookpartinmassexecutions:

‘AsIsaid,Iaminaverygloomymood.Imustpullmyselfoutofit.Thesight

ofthedead(includingwomenandchildren)isnotverycheering.Butweare

fightingthiswarforthesurvivalornon-survivalofourpeople.[…]Ifit

weren’tforthestupidthoughtsaboutwhatwearedoinginthiscountry,the

58BillPollard,'Habitualactions'inTimothyO'ConnorandConstantineSandis(eds),Acompaniontothephilophyofaction(Acompaniontothephilophyofaction,Blackwell2010)79.59`[T]hisworldviewwillconsistofherbeliefs,interests,projectsandpreferences,anyanyotheritemswhichdisclosehowtheworldisforher.’Pollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'.60Ibid.61KretschmerwasrejectedbytheSSfor`failuretosatisfyrequirementsduringacourseonideology’(Kleeetal.1991,296,quotedinHerlindePauer-StuderandJ.DavidVelleman,'DistortionsofNormativity'(2011)14Ethicaltheoryandmoralpractice329onp.348).

20

Einsatzherewouldbewonderful,sinceithasputmeinapositionwhereIcan

supportyouallverywell.Since,asIalreadywrotetoyou,Iconsiderthelast

Einsatztobejustifiedandindeedapproveoftheconsequencesithad,the

phrase:‘stupidthoughts’isnotstrictlyaccurate.Ratheritisaweaknessnot

tobeabletostandthesightofdeadpeople;thebestwayofovercomingitis

todoitmoreoften.Thenitbecomesahabit.’62

Tofindoneselfinasituationwhereonecandeliberatelychoosetomakeaparticular

typeofbehaviourhabitual(throughsystematicrepetition)isuncommon;particularly

so,onewouldhope,whenthebehaviourinquestionamountstomassmurder.63

Kretschmer’sdeliberaterepetitionstrategymayormaynotsucceedinengendering

a-murderous-habit.Thatsuccesswillinpartbedeterminedbytheintensityofthe

emotionsthataretobedulledbyrepetition.AssumingKretschmerdoescontractthe

desiredhabit,isheinprinciplecapableof`optingoutofitforreasons’?Absolutely.

Wouldthesereasonsbefoundinhis`worldview’,inthe`beliefs,interests,projects

andpreferences,andanyotheritemswhichdisclosehowtheworldisfor[him]?64

Notnecessarily.Infact,giventheextenttowhichthesuccessoftheNaziregime

relieduponadeepinternalisationofapervertedworldview,itisquiteunlikely.

Where,then,doesKretschmer-oranybodywhohascontractedanymorally

significanthabit-findthemomentumnecessarytostandbackandquestionit?`IfI

amnothingbutself,thereisnowayoftranscendingmyself;ifIamnothingbuthabit,

thereisnowayofliberationthroughmyownactions.’65Giventheongoingprocess

ofconditioningthatdynamicallyshapestheself,Carlislesuggests`aversionof

Nietzsche’sideaof`eternalrecurrence’asakindofethicaltest:doyouwillthis

62Ibid.63CarlislenotesthatRavaissongiveslittlethoughttothe`badhabits’towhichournaturalinclinationscanlead:`hewritesofgracebutnotofsin;ofdesireforthegoodbutnotofperversity’(Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife').64Pollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'.65Carlisle2006,p.32.

21

actiontoberepeatedindefinitely?Doyouwillthisactiontobecomeahabit?Doyou

willtobecomethisself?’66

Thesecond-personformulationoftheaboveethicaltestsuggeststhatitisuptoa

thirdpersontoaskthosequestions,toconfrontuswiththehabitswehave

contractedandtheextenttowhichtheyareconducivetoourideaofself.Themore

thisideaisfixed,rigidifiedbysomeoverarchingreligious,ideologicalormoral

discourse,themoreoutofreachthewords-ormerepresence-ofothersbecome.67

Becausetheybypasstheneedtoarticulatewhatitisaboutusconstantlyevolving

humanbeingsthatcallsfordoingthingsinaparticularway,thedualist

presuppositionsunderlyingsuchdiscoursesaffordafixedframeworkthatdefines

theself’srelationshiptoothers.Thisfixedrelationshipinturnencouragesthe

rigidificationofthehabitsthatareconstitutiveofthatrelationship,includingthe

habitsofthoughtandactionthatunderliealegalsystem.Thatthelatterisenabled

by-andenables-ourhabitsisforgotten.Insteadofcomingtotermswiththe

contingency-andresponsibility-inherentinitsbeingasocialartifact,lawis

presentedasanecessity(naturalorotherwise),thusminimisingtheimpactof

criticismsandcallsforchange.

Hartexpressespreciselythisconcern(eventhoughhedoesnotframeitintermsof

habits–seenextsection)whenhehighlightsafundamentalpointofintersection

betweenBenthamandMarx,whoboth:

‘agreedontwofundamentalpointswhicharerelevanttomypresenttheme:

first,thattheirtasksassocialthinkersweretoclearmen'smindsastothe

66Carlisle,'Creaturesofhabit:theproblemandthepracticeofliberation'(myemphasis).67Itmaywellbethat,whenitcomestoawakeningusfromdeeplyentrenchedhabits,`mere’wordsarenomatchforthekindofencounterdescribedinradicaltermsbyLevinaswhenhereferstothe`faceoftheOther’summoningeachandeveryoneofus.Callingforhumilityandopennesstotheunforeseen,Levinas’ethicsisbuiltuponempatheticimagination,a`wisdomthatstilllearnsfromeverynewhumanface’.EmmanuelLevinas,Totalityandinfinity:anessayonexteriority(DuquesneUniversityPress1969).Whenitcomestoawakeningusfromhabits,suchencountersmaybemetaphorical.Itmaybefacilitatedbyapieceofart,orthereadingofagreatnovel.

22

truecharacterofhumansociety,and,secondly,thathumansocietyandits

legalstructurewhichhadworkedsomuchhumanmisery,hadbeen

protectedfromcriticismbymyths,mysteriesandillusions,notallofthem

intentionallygenerated,yetallofthemprofitabletointerestedparties.[…]

Forbothofthemsuchmysterywasmadepossiblebythefailureonthepart

ofordinarymentorealisethattheformsoflawandhumansocietywereat

bottommerelyhumanartefacts,notnaturalnecessitiesbutthingsactually

madebymen,andhencethingswhichcouldbeunmadeandremade.’68

WhenHartbemoansthefactthatanestablishedlegalsystemisparticularly

conducivetoasocietythatis`deplorablysheeplike’-andwherethesheepmightall

endup`intheslaughterhouse’69,heisreferringtoaconcernexpressedindifferent

termsfromthoseusedintheabovequote.Foritisnotsomuchtheprogressive

disregardfortheresponsibility(andpossibilities)entailedbythefactthatlawis

`unmadeandremade’byusthatHartemphasises,butratherthe

disenfranchisementmadepossiblebythefactthat,inanestablishedlegalsystem,

only`officials’needaccepttheRuleofRecognition.

II.Fromlegalinstitutionstothepoliticalmonotonyofrigidified

habits(andtheriskofasheeplikesociety)

Theaimoftheprevioussectionwastohighlighttheextenttowhichone’s

understandingofhabitreflectsone’smeta-ethicalunderstandingofagency.If

autonomyistakentorequiretranscendingone’scausalenvironment(soastoleave

a`safe’distancebetweenthatenvironmentandone’snormativechoices),then

habitsbelongfirmlytotheprovinceofsociology.Theymaybeofinteresttothe

68H.L.A.Hart,'BenthamandtheDemystificationoftheLaw'(1973)36ModLRev26.69Hart,Theconceptoflaw.

23

moralorpoliticalphilosopheronlytotheextentthattheyconstituteathreatto

personalautonomy.

Alternatively,onemaydismisstheconceptualrelevanceofhabitstoour

understandingoflawbecause,asShapiroputsitbluntly:`habitsarenotnormative

activities’.Given`thenormativenatureoflegalactivity’,assertinganyformof

conceptuallinkbetweenlawandhabitswouldfallfoulof`Hume’schallenge’,

supposedlyforbiddingany`derivationofanoughtfromanis’.70Asidefromthefact

thatitisfarfromclearwhetherHumeisrightlyunderstoodtoforbidsucha

`derivation’(Putnamconvincinglyarguesotherwise71),takingHume’sinterdictas

seriouslyasShapirodoesconsiderablyreducestheexplanatoryresourcesatone’s

disposalwhenitcomestograspingthenatureofthe`institutionalfacts’72thatshape

andenableourlegalsystem.

Ona(non-reductive)naturalistunderstandingofethicalagency,habitsnotonly

conditionbutenablenormativechoices.Therefore,theyraiseaconsiderable

challengeforthemoralorpoliticalphilosopher:giventhatslowlyacquiredhabitsof

evaluation-`allthewhirloforganismWittgensteincalls`formsoflife’73-areallwe

havegottotriggerthemovementofscrutinynecessarytoquestioningcommonly

acceptedpractices,howdoesonepreservethepossibilityofcivicresponsibility?

Hartopenlyacknowledgedthefosteringofsuchcivicresponsibilityasa`moraltask’

guidinghistheory.Significantlythough,hefeltunabletoreconcilethatconcernwith

a(non-reductive)naturalistmethodology.Hartstuckinsteadtoanagnosticmeta-70ScottJ.Shapiro,Legality(HarvardUniversityPress2011)2615(loc.).71`Thelogicalpositivistfact/valuedichotomywasdefendedonthebasisofanarrowlyscientisticpictureofwhata`fact’mightbe,justastheHumeanancestorofthatdistinctionwasdefendeduponthebasisofanarrowempiricistpsychologyofideas’andimpressions’.Therealizationthatsomuchofourdescriptivelanguageisalivingcounterexampletoboth(classicalempiricistandlogicalpositivist)picturesoftherealmof‘fact’oughttoshaketheconfidenceofanyonewhosupposesthatthereisanotionoffactthatcontrastsneatlyandabsolutelywiththenotionof`value’supposedlyinvokedintalkofthenatureofall`valuejudgments’(HilaryPutnam,Thecollapseofthefact/valuedichotomyandotheressays(HarvardUniversityPress2002)26).72Incontrast,seeJohnRSearle,Theconstructionofsocialreality(SimonandSchuster1995).73McDowell,'Non-cognitivismandrulefollowing'.

24

ethicalposition(forwantofabettersolutiontohismeta-ethicaldilemma74)andonly

consideredhabitstobetteropposethemtorule-governedpractices.Thisneednot

havebeenso.

Thenextsection(2.1)highlightsHart’sintellectualaffinitiesforwhatcouldhave

beena(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity,wherebytherewould

beno`gap’betweenhabitsassocialfactsontheonehandandsocialrulesonthe

other:agapwhichHartendeavourstobridgeviahisnotionofacceptance.Section

2.2outlinesthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlawandhabits,withaparticular

focusonthedifferenttypesofhabitslawmayfoster.Section2.3thenproceedsto

showhowsuchanaturalistnarrativebolstersHart’sclaimthatlawisinherently

conducivetoasocietythatis`deplorablysheeplike’(oncethisclaimisridofits

associationwith`officialacceptance’).

2.1.Hart’sintellectualaffinitiesfora(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity.

Farfromassumingthathabitsarenotworthyofphilosophicalinquiry,Hartnotesina

bookreviewpublishedin1952:

`Whatmakesbehaviorintelligent(orstupid)isitsrelationtotheagent's

needsorpurpose.[…]ForthepurposeofhisanalysisMr.Holloway[…]

exhibitstheintelligentresponsenotasasharpbreakfromhabitbutasa

developmentandrefinementofit.Fewphilosophers,Ithink,couldfailto

benefitfromthisexaminationoftheintelligentversusstupiddichotomyand

oftheconnectionbetweenhumanintelligence,toooftenportrayedin

absoluteandsplendidisolation,andhabitequipment.’75

74Ihaveoutlinedindetailthisdilemma,andHart’sagnosticwayoutinSylvieDelacroix,'Meta-ethicalagnosticisminlegaltheory:mappingawayout'(2010)1Jurisprudence225.75H.L.A.Hart,'SignsandWords'(1952)2ThePhilosophicalQuarterly5959.

25

TheConceptofLaw’sscantdevelopmentsonhabit(anditsrelationshiptolaw’s

normativeforce)mayhaveproceededinpartfromdidacticconcerns:toadmitthat

habitscanbehadwithsomedegreeofreflexivitymighthavemuddledtheotherwise

ratherneatdistinctionbetweenruleandhabit.Itmayalsohavehadalottodowith

Hart’seffortstodispelAustin’s`habitofobedience’frameworkand`freethe

conceptofarulefromconfusionwiththeconceptsofacommandorahabit’.76

Beyond(andbehind)thesefactors,IbelieveHartmayhavebeeninthegripofa

meta-ethicaldilemmathatjustdidnotallowforanaturalistaccountofnormativity–

despitehisotherwiseclearinclinationsinthatdirection.

Anon-reductivenaturalistaccountoflegalnormativityneedstogofromhuman

beingswithneeds,desiresand-mostimportantly-habitstoafully-fledgednormative

framework(oneexpressedin`oughts’,`musts’and`shoulds’)withoutany

`interventionofthedivinespark,orgiftsfromunexplainedquarters’.77Hartwas

almostthere78-hadheallowedhimselftodelvefurtherintotherelationship

betweenthepracticesthatareconstitutiveofsocialnormsandthehabitsthatoften

underliethem.Therewereatleasttwofamiliarintellectualpathsavailabletohim.

2.1.1TheWittgensteiniantakeon`custom’GivenhisexplicitrelianceonWittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations,Hartcould

havechosentoexpanduponthelatter’sreferenceto`custom’asawayofexplaining

howthecausalprocessesconstitutiveofhabitgettoacquirethesignificancetheydo

whentheyevolveintorule-followingpractices:

`ThencanwhateverIdobebroughtintoaccordwiththerule?’---Letmeask

this:whathastheexpressionofarule–sayasign-post–gottodowithmyactions?

76HerbertLionelAdolphusHart,'AnalyticalJurisprudenceinMid-TwentiethCentury:AReplytoProfessorBodenheimer'(1956)105UPaLRev953958.77Blackburn,'Normativityalamode'.78Hart’saccountoflegalnormativityisdevelopedatlengthinSylvieDelacroix,'Hart'sandKelsen'sconceptionsofnormativitycontrasted'(2004)17RatioIuris501.

26

Whatsortofconnectionistherehere?Well,perhapsthisone:Ihavebeentrained

toreacttothissigninaparticularway,andnowIdosoreact.

Butthisisonlytogiveacausalconnexion,onlytoexplainhowithascome

aboutthatwenowgobythesign-post;notwhatthisgoing-by-the-signreally

consistsin.Onthecontrary,Ihavefurtherindicatedthatapersongoesbyasignpost

onlyinsofarasthereexistsaregularuseofsign-posts,acustom.’79

Wittgenstein’sfocusistoshowthatrule-following’s`bedrock’is`simplywhatwe

do’:`IfIhaveexhaustedthejustificationsIhavereachedbedrock,andmyspadeis

turned.ThenIaminclinedtosay:`ThisissimplywhatIdo’’.80Thisupstreamfocus,

goingfromrule-followingpracticesbacktopatternsofbehaviour,meansthat

Wittgensteinisnotparticularlypreoccupiedwiththefactorsthatenablechangesin

rule-followingpractices.Yetthatisarguablythemosttrickyaspectofnaturalist

accountsofrule-following(seesection1.2.2).Foroneneedstoarticulatethedegree

ofreflexivityneededforsuchchanges,withoutbetrayingthekeynaturalistinsight:

thatanysuchreflexivityisnecessarilyembeddedin,andconditionedby,the

`bedrock’ofcausalconnectionsthatareconstitutiveof`custom’.

2.1.2TheWeberiannarrativeAlternatively,HartcouldhavedevelopedanarrativealongWeberianlines(evenifhe

deniedit,weknowthatHartcarefullyreadWeber’sEconomyandSociety81).Thekey

challengewouldthenconsistinarticulatinganarrativethatbuildsuponWeber’s

typologyofsocialrelationships.Suchanarrativewouldsetforthacontinuumfrom

formsofsocialrelationshipbasedon`usage’(Brauch)and`custom’(Sitte)82,viawhat

79LudwigWittgenstein,PhilosophicalInvestigations(Blackwell1958)para.198.80Ibid.81InherbiographyofH.L.AHart,NicolaLaceyhighlightsHart’sapparent(butunacknowledged)indebtednesstoWeber’ssociology.NicolaLacey,Thenightmareandthenobledream:AlifeofHLAHart(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2004).82Auniformityinsocialactionisausage`insofarastheprobabilityofitsexistencewithinagroupisbasedonnothingbutactualpractice’(MaxWeber,Economyandsociety,anoultineofinterpretive

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Webercalls`conventions’,allthewaytoalegalorder,asaconventionbackedbya

groupofpeopledeemedtohavetheduty(andlegitimacy)toapplysanctionsagainst

thosewhotransgressthelaw.Adistinctivefeatureofthelatterconsistsinthefact

that`thesubjectiveattitudesoftheparticipatingindividualsaredirectedtowards

thebeliefinalegitimateorder’.83WithstrikingsimilaritiestoHart’sinternalpointof

view,Weberillustratestheattitudeshementionswiththefollowingexample:

`[W]henacivilservantappearsinhisofficedailyatafixedtime,hedoesnot

actonlyonthebasisofcustomorself-interestwhichhecoulddisregardifhe

wantedto;asarule,hisactionisalsodeterminedbythevalidityofanorder

(viz.,thecivilservicerules),whichhefulfillspartlybecausedisobedience

wouldbedisadvantageoustohimbutalsobecauseitsviolationwouldbe

abhorrenttohissenseofduty(ofcourse,invaryingdegrees)’84

Farfromaone-wayevolutionarystorythatwouldidentifyformsofsocialorder

basedonusageorcustomas`primitive’,suchanarrativewouldremaintrueto

Weber’sinsightsonlyifitmanagedtoarticulatethedynamicrelationshipbetween

eachformofsocialorder.85Inparticular,Giddenshighlightsthefactthatalegal

ordernotonlybuildsuponusageandcustom,butalsofacilitatestheemergenceof

newformsofusageandcustom:

`Thereisnoclearempiricallinebetweenusageandcustom,andwhatWeber

calls`convention’.Conformityisnot,inthiscase,amatterofthevoluntary

dispositionoftheindividual.[…]Theempiricalrelationshipbetweencustom,

conventionandlawisanintimateone.Eventheholdofsheerusagemaybe

verystrong.Thosewhoframelawstocoverconductwhichwasformerly

sociology(UniversityofCaliforniaPress1978)vol.1).Acustomisausagewhichhasbeenestablishedforalongtime.83AnthonyGiddens,Capitalismandmodernsocialtheory:AnanalysisofthewritingsofMarx,DurkheimandMaxWeber(CambridgeUniversityPress1971)154.84Weber,Economyandsociety,anoultineofinterpretivesociology.85Inmostempiricalcases,elementsfromeachformofsocialorderwillnotonlyco-existbut`dynamically’facilitate(orhinder)theirrespectivedevelopment.

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merely`usual’frequentlydiscoverthatverylittleadditionalconformitytothe

prescriptioninquestionisattained.However,usageandcustomdoinmost

casesprovidetheoriginofruleswhichbecomelaws.Thereversealsooccurs,

althoughlessfrequently:theintroductionofanewlawmayeventuateinnew

modesofhabitualconduct.’86

Thenextsection(2.2)outlinesthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlawandhabits,

withaparticularfocusonthe`reverse’movementdescribedabove.

2.2.Frompatternsofbehaviourtolegalnorms,via(reflective)habitsand/orpractices–andback.

Thediagrambelowoutlinesacontinuumthatstretchesfromcollectivepatternsof

behaviourallthewaytolegalnorms,viahabitsand/orpractices.Practices(whether

theycanbecharacterisedas`reflectivehabits’ornot)stemfromcollectivepatterns

ofbehaviour,andtheypresupposeareflectiveawarenessoftheneedsorpurposes

servedbythosepatternsofbehaviour,withaconcomitantabilitytochangethose

patternsinlightofthoseneedsorpurposes.Thosepracticesthatarenotreflective

habitsdistinguishthemselvesfromthelatterbytheirgenesis,whichpresupposes

somedeliberativeagency87allthewaythrough.Mostlegalphilosopherswhohave

soughttocapturethewayinwhichthefoundationsoflawaresocialpracticeshave

beeninfluencedeitherbyBratman’s`sharedcooperativeactivity’modelorbyLewis’

`coordinationconvention’model.88Thesemodelshaveincommonthefactthatthey

86Giddens,Capitalismandmodernsocialtheory:AnanalysisofthewritingsofMarx,DurkheimandMaxWeber.87`Weexercisedeliberativeagencywhenwedeliberateorreflectonwhatweoughttodo,attemptingtoevaluateourreasonsforactioninthelightofourvalues,convictions,andbeliefsabouttheworld.Thiskindofagencyhasrightlyimpressedphilosophers—largely,wesuspect,becausedeliberativeagencyseemstobeuniquelyhuman—butinfactonlyasmallproportionofouractionsinvolvemuchinthewayofdeliberationorreflection.’(N.LevyandT.Bayne,'Doingwithoutdeliberation:automatism,automaticity,andmoralaccountability'(2004)16IntRevPsychiatry209).88Bratman,'Sharedcooperativeactivity';DavidK.Lewis,Convention:aphilosophicalstudy(HarvardUniversityPress1963).

29

requireboth`commitmenttoconceptualandepistemicagreement’89and`strong

practicalcommitment’.MatthewSmithhighlightsthesignificanceofsuch

assumptionsandraisesimportantdoubtsabouttheextenttowhichsuch

`hypercommital’modelsareaptatconceptualisingthebulkofsocialpracticesatthe

rootoflaw’sinstitutionalstructure.

Whatmatters,forourpurposes,istodebunkthedominant(andintellectualist)

assumptionthatthesocialpracticesgivingrisetolawmustpresupposesome

deliberativeagencyallthewaythrough(orroute`3’inthediagrambelow).Notonly

arethesetypesofsocialpracticesunlikelytoaccountforthevastmajorityofthose

socialprocessesthatgiverisetolaw;suchexclusivefocusonthisnarrowtypeof

socialpracticeshasalsohinderedourchancesofconstructingarichunderstanding

oflegalnormativity.Foronlybybuilding(reflective)habitsintothecontinuumthat

leadsfrompatternsofbehaviourtolegalnormscanweaccountfortheroleplayed

bylaw’sinstitutionalstructureinfosteringthereturnmovementsdescribedin`7’

and`8’below(aswellasthenormativeimplicationsflowingfrom`9’).Before

unpackingtheseinthenextsection,definingeachofthevectorsinthediagram

belowprovidesanopportunityforaneatsummaryofourdiscussionsofar:

89`[W]hatisrequiredforsharedintentionandsharedactionisnotonlythatthereisconceptualagreementwithrespecttoconceptsdeployedwithrespecttotheactivitytobesharedbutthattheagentshavemoreorlesscorrectbeliefsabouteachother’ssubplansandintentions’(MatthewNoahSmith,'TheLawasaSocialPracticeAreSharedActivitiesattheFoundationsofLaw?'(2006)12LegalTheory265282).WhileIfindSmith’sargumentsinrelationtoBratman’stheoryofsharedcooperativeactivitiesconvincing,IamlesssurethathisargumentsapplyequallywelltoLewis’analysisofconventions.

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`1’:Therepetitionofaparticularpatternofbehaviourleadstoitsbecoming

automaticonthepartofthoseinwhomahabithastakenhold.Suchautomaticityis

concomitantwithareductionintheawarenessofbehavinginthatparticularway.90

`2’:Areflectivehabitrequiressomecriticaldistanciationfromtheinternalised

patternofbehaviour,whichisevaluatedinthelightoftheneedsorpurposesofthe

agent(s).

`3’:Apracticecanemergeoutofasharedcommitmentorendeavourtodo

somethingtogether,withouthavingtoinvolveanydegreeofautomaticagency.91

90`Theparadigmofsuchbehaviouristheover-learnedaction.Oneisusually(fully)consciouswhenperforminganover-learnedaction,butoneisnotconsciousoftheover-learnedactionitself.’(LevyandBayne,'Doingwithoutdeliberation:automatism,automaticity,andmoralaccountability').91LevyandBaynehelpfullydistinguishbetweenautomaticagency(`Automaticagencyinvolvesanabsence—oratleastareduction—oftheexperienceofdoing`)andautomatisticagency,withinwhichtheydistinguishbetweenglobalautomatismsandlocalautomatisms:`Globalautomatismsinvolveaglobaldisruptionofconsciousness;theyoccurinthecontextofsomnambulism[etc.]Individualsin

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Thiswayofconceptualisingthegenesisofsocialpractices-whichneednotmakeany

referencetohabit-hasdominatedlegaltheorysofar,inpartthankstothe

considerableinfluenceofbothBratman’sandLewis’theories.

`4’:Withrepetition,apracticemaycometobeinternalisedinawaythatgivesriseto

thetypeofautomaticagencycharacteristicofhabit,yetwithoutthegoal-oriented

adaptabilityandcriticaldistanciationassociatedwithreflectivehabits.

`5’:Thevaluesassociatedwithsomepracticeleadtopeer-pressuretoconformand

widespreadsocialcondemnationofanydeviationfromthatpractice,thusmarking

theemergenceofasocialrule.

`6’:Aninstitutionalstructureisbuilttosupportthecontinuousadaptation,

implementationandadjudicationofsuchsocialrules.

`7’:Somelegalnormsorinstitutionsgiverisetonovelpractices,someofwhichmay

disruptacommunity’shabitsofthought(orbehaviour).

`8’:Otherlegalnormsorinstitutionspromptwidespreaddisengagementfromsocial

/communityissuesthatwouldotherwisehavetriggeredreflectivepracticeswithin

thatcommunity.

`9’:Insomecases,thoseinchargeofcontinuouslyadaptingandgeneratinglegal

normsinaparticulardomainaresoalienated92fromtheinstitutiontheyserve(and

thevaluesthatinstitutionpromotes)thattheyareabletocontributetothe

modificationoftheapplicablelegalregimeinthatdomainwithoutanydeliberative

engagementontheirpart.

thesestatesperformfairlycomplexactionsina‘robotic’manner.Theirenvironmentalawarenessislimited[…]Whatwecall‘localautomatisms’,bycontrast,involveonlyadisruptionofconsciousnessandcontroloveraparticularkindofaction.Apersonwithalocalautomatismisfullyconscious,buttheyexperiencenosenseofagencyoveraparticularcomplexandapparentlyvoluntaryaction.’(ibid.).92Smith,'TheLawasaSocialPracticeAreSharedActivitiesattheFoundationsofLaw?'.

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Thenextsection(2.3)unpacksthe`moralrisk’inherentinthedevelopmentoflaw’s

institutionalstructurenotablybyreferringtothe`returnmovement’

encapsulatedin`8’(incontrastto`7’),andthetypeofalienationthatmayresult

fromit.

2.3.Laws’inherentmoralriskandthetypesofhabitslawmayfoster

`Withoutlaw,socialorderrequiresconsiderablebuy-infromthegeneral

population:Thepeopleareregulatedbynormsthataremoreorless

accepted.[…]Withtheemergenceoflaw,however,peoplearealso

regulatedbynormsthatmeetofficials'criteriaofvalidityandareenforcedby

specializedagencies.Thisdivisionoflaborcanalienatepeoplefromthemost

importantrulesthatgoverntheirlives-rulesthatthreatentobecome

remote,technical,andarcane.Thatisonemorereasonwhytheruleoflawis

notanunqualifiedhumangood:Itisinthenatureoflawtoposesuchrisks,

andtheruleoflawcannoteliminatethem.’93

BuildinguponHart’sownanalysisofthe`risks’concomitantwiththeemergenceof

institutionalizedrules94,LeslieGreenproceedstoarguethatthemoralimportof

suchrisks(inherentintheverynatureoflaw)disprovesHart’sseparabilitythesis.95

Perhapsbecauseofhisfocusonthelatter,Greendoesnotdwellonhowexactly

peopleget`alienated[…]fromthemostimportantrulesthatgoverntheirlives’,save

forreferringtoHart’sown(unfortunate)phrasingintermsofacceptance:`where93Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'.94`Thestepfromthesimpleformofsociety[…]intothelegalworld[…]bringsitssolidgainsatacertaincost.Thegainsarethoseofadaptabilitytochange,certaintyandefficiency,andtheseareimmense;thecostistheriskthatthecentrallyorganisedpowermaywellbeusedfortheoppressionofnumberswithwhosesupportitcandispense,inawaythatthesimplerregimeofprimaryrulescouldnot’(Hart,Theconceptoflaw).95Asit`marksaconnectionbetweenlawandmoralityofareversekind’(Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals').

33

thereisaunionofprimaryandsecondaryrules[…]theacceptanceoftherulesas

commonstandardsforthegroupmaybesplitofffromtherelativelypassivematter

oftheordinaryindividualacquiescingintherulesbyobeyingthemforhispart

alone’96(inapre-legalsociety,bycontrast,acceptanceoftheruleshastobe

widespread).

Wilkinsonvoicesdoubtsasto`whetherwidespreadacceptancecanbesaidto

precludetheviceofalienation,ifacceptanceisgivennofurtherspecification’.97

GiventheminimalistwayinwhichHartdefinesit(acceptancemaybebasedon`an

unreflectinginheritedortraditionalattitude,orthemerewishtodoasothersdo’98),

acceptanceiscertainlynosafeguardagainstthe`sheeplike’predicamentHart

worriesabout.Tomakesenseofthetypeofengagementthatmaymakea

`slaughterhouse’endinglesslikely,onemustlookattheoppositeofsuch

engagement,andunpacktheexactnatureofthealienationthatisclaimedtobean

endemicriskconcomitantwiththeemergenceoflaw’sinstitutionalstructure.

Amongthe`fivevariantsofalienation’describedbyMelvinSeeman,`powerlessness’

encapsulatesoneaspectofthealienationweareconcernedwith:initsMarxian

origins,alienationreferredtotheextenttowhich`theprerogativeandmeansof

decisionareexpropriated[fromtheworker]bytherulingentrepreneurs’.99

ExtendedbeyondtheindustrialspherebyWeber,thistypeofalienationaptly

capturesthewayinwhichthetransitionfromacustomaryordertoafully-fledged

legalstructuremaybesaidtotakeawayfrommost`theprerogativeandmeans’of

shapingalegallandscapethatisnotdeemedtobe`theirs’anymore.Thisaspectof

alienationtiesinwithwhatHartbemoanedas`thefailureonthepartofordinary

mentorealisethattheformsoflawandhumansocietywereatbottommerely

96Hart,Theconceptoflaw.97MichaelA.Wilkinson,'IsLawMorallyRisky?Alienation,AcceptanceandHart’sConceptofLaw'(2010)30OxfordJournalofLegalStudies441451.98Hart,Theconceptoflaw.99MelvinSeeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'(1959)Americansociologicalreview783784.

34

humanartefacts,notnaturalnecessitiesbutthingsactuallymadebymen,andhence

thingswhichcouldbeunmadeandremade.100

Yettodaythatfailuretocometotermswithourrole(andresponsibility)asauthors

ofthoseverypracticesthatcanultimatelygiverisetolawstemsatleastinpartfrom

anothervariantofalienation.Itisonethatisconnected-butnotreducibleto-what

Seemandescribesas`meaninglessness’:

`Thissecondtypeofalienation,then,referstotheindividual'ssenseof

understandingtheeventsinwhichheisengaged.Wemayspeakofhigh

alienation,inthemeaninglessnessusage,whentheindividualisunclearasto

whatheoughttobelieve-whentheindividual'sminimalstandardsforclarity

indecision-makingarenotmet.’101

Asasocietyevolvesfromatight-knit,smallcommunity,thenumberandcomplexity

oftheissuestobeaddressedtocontinuallyseek(better)waysoflivingtogetheris

daunting–andthe`minimalstandardsforclarityindecision-making’mentioned

abovearearguablyrarelymet.Legalinstitutionsaredesignedtotacklesuch

complexity.Freeingtheindividualfromthetaskofbalancingacomplexsetof

reasons,lawistomediatebetweenitssubjectsandthereasonsthatapplyto

them.102The`secondaryrules’thatcomewithlegalinstitutionsestablishhowlegal

changemayoccur.Relinquishingresponsibilityforthisfundamentalaspectof

`normativelabour’comesataprice,foritisalltootemptingtorelaxandenjoythe

benefitsofinstitutionalauthority(ratherthanactivelypartakeinthe`normative

labour’facilitatedbysuchinstitutions).

100Hart,'BenthamandtheDemystificationoftheLaw'.101Seeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'.102`Theadvantageofnormallyproceedingthroughthemediationofrulesisenormous.Itenablesapersontoconsiderandformanopiniononthegeneralaspectsofrecurrentsituationsinadvanceoftheiroccurrence.Itenablesapersontoachieveresultswhichcanbeachievedonlythroughanadvancecommitmenttoawholeseriesofactions,ratherthanbycasetocaseexamination’.JosephRaz,Themoralityoffreedom(ClarendonPress1986)58.

35

Razvividlycapturesthosebenefitsinhis`serviceconceptionofauthority’:whenlaw

succeedsinitsclaimtoauthority,itissupposedtogiveusreasonsforactionthat

replacethesetofdependentreasons,andthussimplifyourpracticalreasoning.Toa

largeextenttheefficiencyofalegalsystemdependsonthis`de-mobilisation’of

practicalreasoning-anditsconcomitantfosteringofhabituatedbehavior.Butof

coursethereisanothersidetoRaz’stheory.Law’sclaimtoauthorityistosucceed

onlyifitislegitimate.Sowearenotmeanttorelaxfortoolong.Wearesupposedto

keepcheckingthatlawstillhasa`sufficientlyhighnormaljustificationscore’103,i.e.

thatitdoesbetterenableustocomplywiththedemandsof`rightreason’.104Inso

doing,thehopeisthatwemay,touseWilkinson’sphrase,`reclaimlaw’s

authority’.105

Theworryisthat,inpractice,fewerandfewerofuswillbother;thatmoreandmore

ofuswillsurrendertothecomfortofdemobilisedpracticalreasoning.Iftrustingin

legalinstitutionstohavefiguredouttherightcourseofactioninparticular

circumstanceswasinitiallyachoice(thatmaybebornoutofnecessity),thattrust

canbecomesohabitualastoforgetitself–andthepossibilityofanalternative.This

aspectofalienation-`meaninglessness’-isconnectedtothe`powerlessness’aspect

discussedearlier:

“[I]nsomeimportantdegree,theviewthatonelivesinanintelligibleworld

maybeaprerequisitetoexpectanciesforcontrol;andtheunintelligibilityof

103EmranMian,'Thecuriouscaseofexclusionaryreasons'(2002)15CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence99107.104`Insuchcasesconformitywiththeunderlyingreasonsissecuredbycomplyingwiththerule,orratherabetterdegreeofconformitythancanotherwisebeachievedissoobtained.Thiscanjustifycomplyingwiththeruleevenwhenitrequiresactionwhichtheunderlyingreasonsdonot.Suchcompliancemaystillbethebeststrategytomaximiseconformitywiththeunderlyingreasons’.JosephRaz,PracticalReasonandNorms(rev.ed,withpostscriptedn,PrincetonUniversityPress1990)194.105`ContrarytoRaz’simageoflawasanofficialauthority,inthemoderndemocraticorderweareallimplicit‘mouthpieces’ofthelaw,aninsistenceonwhichmightbegintoinculcateasenseoflegalandsocialresponsibilityandperhapsinmoreradicalguise,asocialpurpose,toreclaimlaw’sauthority.’(Wilkinson,'IsLawMorallyRisky?Alienation,AcceptanceandHart’sConceptofLaw').

36

complexaffairsispresumablyconducivetothedevelopmentofhigh

expectanciesforexternalcontrol(thatis,highpowerlessness)’106

Inourcontext,estrangementfromthepoliticalandsocialpracticesthatempower

eachandeveryoneofustoshapeourlegallandscapemaybesaidtostematleastin

partfromresignationinthefaceofthatlandscape’ssheercomplexity.This

resignationinturnallowsforone’sretrenchmenttohabitualframesofthought,

uncriticallyadoptingwhateverlegalframeworkisapplicable,asdescribedinvector

`8’inthediagramdiscussedin2.2.

Atthisstagethedistinctionbetweendifferentwaysofhavingahabitdevelopedin

section1.2.becomesparticularlyrelevant.Foritmaywellbethatwhatis

distinctivelyalienatingaboutalegalregimeisnotsomuchthepossibilityofnon-

acceptance,butratherthewayinwhichalegalsystemisconducivetothe

developmentofrigid,unreflectivehabits.Unlikethegoal-oriented(henceadaptable)

habitsthatgiverisetolegalpractice,therigidhabitswhicharefacilitatedbythe

emergenceofalegalsystemareformedonthebackofthelegalsystem’s

institutionalizedadaptationtochange.

Inapre-legalworld,bycontrast,peopleareregulatedbynormsthat`haveno

particularoriginintheenactmentofanindividualoraninstitution’107:theyfindtheir

origininapatternofcollectivebehaviorthatacquiresparticularsignificanceinlight

ofthepurposeithascometobeassociatedwith.Whileitishabitualinnature,that

patternofbehaviorcannotgiverisetothekindofpracticeconstitutiveofalegal

systemunlessitiscapableofadaptingtochangingaspirations.Intheabsenceofa

`secondaryrule’establishinghowlegalchangeoccurs,suchchangecanonlyhappen

organically.Peopledon’t`accept’butrather`liveby’thenormstheyneedtofostera

betterwayoflivingtogether.Thataspirationinturngeneratesapracticewhose

perceivedsocialvaluemaycallforthispractice’sinstitutionalisation.106Seeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'.107Marmor,'Legalconventionalism',194.

37

Thetroubleisthatlegalinstitutions–becauseofthedivisionofnormativelabour

theyenable-encourageashifttowardswidespreadpassivity,orwhatonemaydeem

a`leisurely’attitude108towardsournorm-making(andnorm-sustaining)practices.de

TocquevilleanticipatesthisshiftinhisprescientanalysisofAmerica’snascent

democracy:

`Thus,therulingpower,havingtakeneachcitizenonebyoneintoits

powerfulgraspandhavingmoldedhimtoitsownliking,spreadsitsarms

overthewholeofsociety,coveringthesurfaceofsociallifewithanetworkof

petty,complicated,detailed,anduniformrules[…]Itdoesnotbreakmen’s

willsbutitdoessoften,bend,andcontrolthem;rarelydoesitforcemento

actbutitconstantlyopposeswhatactionstheyperform;itdoesnotdestroy

thestartofanythingbutitstandsinitsway;itdoesnottyrannizebutit

inhibits,represses,drains,snuffsout,dullssomucheffortthatfinallyit

reduceseachnationtonothingmorethanaflockoftimidandhardworking

animalswiththegovernmentasshepherd’.109

LeslieGreenhasawonderfullynaturalistwayofsummingthingsup:`Abitlike

unstableisotopes,politicalinstitutionshavestandardpatternsofdecaythatare

explainedbythenatureofthethingthatisdecaying’.110Hart’sinsight(inlinewithde

Tocqueville’s)wastohighlighttheextenttowhichlegalinstitutionsareinherently

conducivetowhathecalled`sheeplike’behavior.Hadhedelvedfurtherintothe

mutuallyenablingrelationshipbetweenlawandhabit,hemighthavebeenableto

substantiatethisinsightinawayinwhichhisreferencetothepossibilityofnon-

108`It[theimmenseandprotectivepowerthatstandsabovemen]providestheirsecurity,anticipatesandguaranteestheirneeds,suppliestheirpleasures,directstheirprincipalconcerns,managestheirindustry,regulatestheirestates,dividestheirinheritances.Whycanitnotremovefromthementirelythebotherofthinkingandthetroublesoflife?Thus,itreducesdailythevalueandfrequencyoftheexerciseoffreechoice;itrestrictstheactivityoffreewillwithinanarrowerrangeandgraduallyremovesautonomyitselffromeachcitizen.’AlexisdeTocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica(Penguin2003)805.109Ibid.110Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'.

38

acceptancecouldnot.Despitehisaffinitiesforanon-reductive,naturalistaccountof

legalnormativity,Hart’sinsistenceonanalyzingthe`stepintothelegalworld’by

reference,instead,toanoverlycognitivenotionof`acceptance’betraystheappeal

ofanentrencheddualistandintellectualisedconceptionofagency.111

III.Conclusion

EversinceHart’sswiftcritiqueofAustin(introducingthe`internalpointofview’to

distinguishrulesfrommerehabits),legaltheoryhasmostlyproceededonthe

assumptionthatanyaccountofthenormativityoflawmustbedeliberativeallthe

waythrough:tolethabitsimpingeuponsuchanaccountwouldfallfoulof`Hume’s

law’andsabotagethelot.Thisassumptionreflectsadualismwhoseholdon

contemporarylegaltheoryisconcomitantwithaone-sidedviewofhabit:inits

negative(ratherthanenabling)aspect,habitisindeedwhatcanstandinthewayof

ourlivinguptoourresponsibilityasnormativeanimals.Thisresponsibilitystems

fromthecharacteristicallyhumancapacitytooccupythe`spaceofreasons’,whichin

turnenablesustoseehowtheworldcanbemadebetter,tomakenormativeclaims

thatwillguideourmoralorpoliticalagenda.Forthoseinthralltothismetaphorof

twospaces,itistheverypossibilityofournormativefreedom-noless-thathangson

thosetwospacesbeingkeptdistinct.

Onanon-reductivenaturalistunderstandingofethicalagency,accountingforour

normativefreedomisnolessimportant.Onlythechallengeconcomitantwithsuch

anexplanationisgreater.Foronecannotcountonany`gap’betweenspacesto

explainwhatenablesustostepbackandconfrontcommonlyacceptedpracticesto

declarethemwanting.Tounderstandwhatconditionsthepossibilityofsuch

reflexivescrutiny,attentionmustbepaidtowhattypicallyhampersit:habit.

111Foracandid,contemporary,formulationofsuchadualistframeworkappliedtoHart’sinternalpointofview,see:VeronicaRodriguez-Blanco,'PeterWinchandHLAHart:TwoConceptsoftheInternalPointofView'(2007)20CanadianJournalofLaw&Jurisprudence45313.

39

That’sallverywell,somelegaltheoristsmightsay,butwhat’sinitfor

jurisprudence’sendeavortograspthenatureoflaw?Doesn’ttherealmoflawstart

preciselywherehabitends?Thisarticle’sanswertosuchskepticismistwofold.

Conceptuallyspeaking,atheoryoflawthatdismissestheimportanceofhabitsends

upwithapoorerconceptofethicalagencyandaconcomitantlytruncatedaccountof

legalnormativity.

Fromanormativeperspective,anaccountofthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlaw

andhabitiscrucialtograspingthedangerinherentinlaw’sparticularinstitutional

structure.Because(andtotheextentthat)suchastructureinstitutionalizes

mechanismsforchangeandsuccessfullysimplifiesourpracticalreasoninginrelation

tokeysocietalconcerns,wemayinadvertentlyfindourselvesenjoyingever-longer

normativeholidays.Whatifourabilitytoadoptareflectivestancetowardsour

habitsiscompromisedbythelackof`normativeexercise’inducedbysuchholidays?

Thecontinuumthatgoesfromcollectivepatternsofbehaviourallthewaytolegal

normsviahabitsandpractices-andback-wouldbecompromised.Thelegal

structurewouldmostlyfostersheeplike,unreflectivehabits.Notonlyaresuchhabits

incapableofgeneratingthetypeofpracticesgivingriseto(novel)legalstructures.

Suchunreflectivehabitsarealsoalltooeasilyexploitedbyunscrupulousshepherds

bentona`slaughterhouse’ending,touseHart’smetaphor.

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