LATEST DEVELOPMENTS INSAFETY MANAGEMENT

SAFEmap Africa (Pty) Ltd

FRANCOIS SMITH

LEBEAUX MULDER

SACMA AGM

01 OCTOBER 2004

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Corrie Pitzer

Non executive

Chairman

Francois Smith

Executive

CEO

Eric Ratshikhopha

Non executive

Director

SAFEmap Africa (Pty) Ltd

SAFEmap Clients

SAFEmap Africa (Pty) Ltd

•• Placer DomePlacer Dome

•• CadburyCadbury

•• TransfieldTransfield

•• Thiess Thiess

•• BHPBillitonBHPBilliton

•• BOC GassesBOC Gasses

•• Xstrata AlloysXstrata Alloys

•• SasolSasol MiningMining

•• Anglo CoalAnglo Coal

•• KumbaKumba ResourcesResources

•• Total SATotal SA

•• TicorTicor SASA

•• HarmonyHarmony

•• De BeersDe Beers

Content of PresentationContent of Presentation

• Historical Development of Safety Management

• Current reality

• Integrated SHEQ Management

• Latest Developments

• Fatal Risk Management

• Behaviour Based Safety

• Self Assessment

• Risk / Competence Based Safety

THE ERAS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENTTHE ERAS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT

1900 1900 –– Design and physical cleanDesign and physical clean--upup

1931 1931 –– Unsafe acts (88%) & unsafe conditions (10%) (Heinrich)Unsafe acts (88%) & unsafe conditions (10%) (Heinrich)

1950 1950 –– Safety management systemsSafety management systems

1960 1960 –– Training and developmentTraining and development

1970 1970 –– OHS Act and Minerals Act (Accountability)OHS Act and Minerals Act (Accountability)

1980 1980 –– Psychology of safety (BBS)Psychology of safety (BBS)

―― Human Factors ApproachHuman Factors Approach

―― Risk ManagementRisk Management

1990 1990 –– OrganisationOrganisation cultureculture

-- Mine Health and Safety ActMine Health and Safety Act

-- HIRA / FRMHIRA / FRM

2000 2000 –– Self assessmentSelf assessment

―― Risk Based SafetyRisk Based Safety

A brief history of Safety ManagementA brief history of Safety Management

So why do So why do accidents still accidents still happen?????happen?????

SafetySafety bybybehaviourbehaviour

•• Finally Psychologists Finally Psychologists tried to shape the tried to shape the behaviour of people....behaviour of people....

SafetySafety bybyorganizationorganization •• Then Engineers developed & Then Engineers developed &

improved operational improved operational procedures and processes & procedures and processes & trainers developed skills.... trainers developed skills....

Safety Safety bybydesigndesign

•• First Engineers tried to create First Engineers tried to create a safe & foolproof design....a safe & foolproof design....

Current RealitiesCurrent Realities•• Too many fatal incidents in mining Too many fatal incidents in mining –– avg. 16 per monthavg. 16 per month•• Production pressure, deep level mining, challenging strata Production pressure, deep level mining, challenging strata •• Rand / Dollar exchange rateRand / Dollar exchange rate•• Competency levels, staff complimentCompetency levels, staff compliment•• Mining Charter, sustainable developmentMining Charter, sustainable development•• South African uniquenessSouth African uniqueness--risk taking, crime and road accidents.risk taking, crime and road accidents.•• Current Corporate Initiatives (Systems Related):Current Corporate Initiatives (Systems Related):

EBMSEBMS--SAPSAPSystems Approach Systems Approach (14001, 9001 )(14001, 9001 )OHSAS 18001OHSAS 18001Corporate StandardsCorporate StandardsBBSBBS

No matter the intent, effort, energy, drive, previous statisticsNo matter the intent, effort, energy, drive, previous statistics; if fatalities ; if fatalities continue the total Safety Management System loose credibility wcontinue the total Safety Management System loose credibility with legal, ith legal, union, public and shareholder pressureunion, public and shareholder pressure

FFR - All Mines (South Africa)

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

Fata

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All Mines 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.35

Underground 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.65 0.56 0.60 0.53 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.41

Surface 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.24

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

}1

10

30

600

Traditional SHEQManagement with Full Systems Approach

1

10

30

600

Traditional ApproachTraditional Approach

•• Systems implementation cumbersome and separate initiative Systems implementation cumbersome and separate initiative from from behaviourbehaviour and vise versaand vise versa

•• The 10, 30 & 600 never effectively managed (too much data, The 10, 30 & 600 never effectively managed (too much data, too much paperwork, too little effort.)too much paperwork, too little effort.)

•• Not focused Not focused (20 / 80 principle) (20 / 80 principle) –– procedures cover every possibilityprocedures cover every possibility

•• Fatalities / serious incidents do not decrease sufficiently,Fatalities / serious incidents do not decrease sufficiently,sometimes it increases.sometimes it increases.

•• Mostly reMostly re--active focus on fatalities & other incidentsactive focus on fatalities & other incidents

•• Generic measurement / protocols, often open for Generic measurement / protocols, often open for interpretationinterpretation

ConcernsConcerns

1

10

30

600

AT RISK BEHAVIOURS

Fatal Risk Managementapproach with specificfocus on the critical few}

} Behaviour Based Safetyfocussing on compliance

Self Assessment / Integrated Systems Approach

Latest DevelopmentsLatest Developments

1

10

30

600

AT RISK BEHAVIOURS } Behaviour Based Safety Or

Human Factor Safety

BehaviourBehaviour Based SafetyBased Safety

Consequences

Direction

Motivation

Behaviour

Activators

Behaviour

WHAT INFLUENCES HUMAN BEHAVIOUR?WHAT INFLUENCES HUMAN BEHAVIOUR?ACCORDING TO THE BEHAVIOURISTSACCORDING TO THE BEHAVIOURISTS

+ +=

=

OBSERVATION ANDDATA COLLECTION/

FEEDBACK

DATA MANAGEMENT

PROBLEM SOLVING

STEERING GROUP

JOB

THE CONVENTIONAL BBS PROCESSTHE CONVENTIONAL BBS PROCESS

OBSERVER CHECKLISTOBSERVER CHECKLIST

1

10

30

600

AT RISK BEHAVIOURS

Fatal Risk Managementapproach with specificfocus on the critical few}

Fatal Risk ManagementFatal Risk Management

High Risks(80/20)

The Strategy to Improve Safety should have:The Strategy to Improve Safety should have:

VERSUS

A FOCUSED APPROACHA FOCUSED APPROACH

““focusedfocused”” ““shotshot--gungun””

Risk Controls

Strategy to Improve Requires:Strategy to Improve Requires:

EMPHASIS ON PRIORITIES

Fatal Risk Management Fatal Risk Management -- Steps In The ProcessSteps In The Process

Main Steps:Main Steps:1.1. Identify fatality risksIdentify fatality risks

2.2. Determine key controlsDetermine key controls--MSE and technical guidelinesMSE and technical guidelines

3.3. Establish and develop fatality prevention standards, guidelines,Establish and develop fatality prevention standards, guidelines, awareness awareness

material and protocolmaterial and protocol

4.4. Conduct analysis on fatal risk complianceConduct analysis on fatal risk compliance

5.5. Provide feedback on % complianceProvide feedback on % compliance

6.6. Clarify discipline and action on poor performanceClarify discipline and action on poor performance

7.7. Implement corrective actions and control measureImplement corrective actions and control measure

8.8. Establish timetable for reviews and conduct reEstablish timetable for reviews and conduct re--assessmentsassessments

1

10

30

600

AT RISK BEHAVIOURS

Self Assessment / Integrated Systems Approach

Self Assessment / Systems ApproachSelf Assessment / Systems Approach

DESIGN THE APPROACH

DEPLOY THE STRATEGY

IMPROVE CONTINUOUSLY

STEERING GROUP

JOB

The Self Assessment (Review)The Self Assessment (Review) ProcessProcess

GROUP DEVELOPS INTENT

MEASURE THE RESULTS

ENABLERS

• Policy and strategy• Processes / Practices• Objectives & targets• Total SHE culture• Sustainable development (CI)

RESULTS• No injuries / illnesses• Positive community

impact• Satisfied customers• SHE fr iendly

environment• People satisfaction• Supplier and

partnership performance

• Improved profits-Business results

SHEEXCELLENCE

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Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Stage 5

Mining Industry Specific RequirementsMining Industry Specific Requirements

•• Manage SafetyManage Safety•• Prevent FatalitiesPrevent Fatalities•• Maximum output Maximum output –– minimum inputminimum input•• Simple, focused and easy to manage systemsSimple, focused and easy to manage systems•• Cost effectiveCost effective•• Practical & easy to follow rules and guidelinesPractical & easy to follow rules and guidelines•• Easy to measure (self measurement)Easy to measure (self measurement)•• Incorporate Incorporate behaviourbehaviour initiativesinitiatives•• Fewer initiatives, better efficienciesFewer initiatives, better efficiencies

1

10

30

600

AT RISK BEHAVIOURS

The Proven SolutionThe Proven Solution

Dynamic Safety

DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING –– REASONREASON

SKILLS BASED DECISIONS

DYNAMIC SAFETYKNOWLEDGE BASED

DECISIONS

RULE BASED DECISIONS

LEGISLATION / SYSTEMS

FLY – FIX - FLY

=

=

=

Risk Taking Behaviour

Accident

HazardsCoincidence

Accident

HazardsCoincidence

RISKYPROCEDURES

6

5 RISK-TAKING REWARDED4

RISK IGNORED

RISK UNDERESTIMATED2

3RISK ACCEPTED

Bad Risk Taking

RISK OVERLOOKED

1

Hazard

RISK

Risk Taking Behaviour

Accident

HazardsCoincidence

INFLUENCE

Opportunity

Benefit

Low Risk

Risk Taking Behaviour

Accident

HazardsCoincidence Identify / Analyze Critical Risks

CONTROL

Identify Technical Controls

Identify Critical Behaviours

Identify Critical Training

Develop Protocol Implement and Measure

Risk Taking Behaviour

Accident

HazardsCoincidence

Identify / Analyze Critical Risks

Identify Technical Controls

Identify Critical Behaviours

Identify Critical Training

Develop Protocol Implement and Measure

Opportunity

Benefit

Low Risk

Assessment

Rapid Risk Reduction

Design Processes

Implementation

Measure / CI

Risk Taking Behaviour

SAFEmap ProcessesHazards

Identify / Analyze Critical Risks

Identify Technical Controls

Identify Critical Behaviours

Identify Critical Training

Develop Protocol Implement and Measure

Opportunity

Benefit

Low Risk

HIRA Training In-section Coaching

Fatal Risk Protocols Behaviour Observations

Safety Coach Team Observations

Management ToursAssessments / Reviews

Step Back 2 x 2 Risk Calculator

Scratch Cards Safety Draw

LATEST DEVELOPMENTSLATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Focussed ResearchFocussed ResearchPrePre--studystudySubjective assessmentSubjective assessmentObjective assessmentObjective assessmentAnalysis and interpretation Analysis and interpretation InterventionsInterventions

Safety performance Safety performance measurementmeasurement

PrePre--activeactiveLeading indicatorsLeading indicatorsProcess variablesProcess variables

Hazard recognition trainingHazard recognition training33--D TrainingD TrainingRisk patternsRisk patternsCognitive dissonance Cognitive dissonance

Process safetyProcess safetySystems safetySystems safety66thth SigmaSigmaOHSAS 18000OHSAS 18000Human factors approachHuman factors approachSafety through designSafety through designKing II reportKing II reportCorporate Manslaughter Corporate Manslaughter

QUESTIONS????QUESTIONS????

FRANCOIS SMITHFRANCOIS SMITH

fsmithfsmith@@telkomsanettelkomsanetfsmithfsmith@@safemapsafemap.com.com

083 609 1262083 609 1262