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Lapuz v Eufemio FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

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Matubis v Praxedes

Procedural History: Plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and changed of surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes. The Court dismissed the suit based on Art. 102 of the new Civil Code and Article 100 of the new Civil Code. An appeal is hereby made to review the decision. Statement of Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. The couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement (Exhibit B) stating that both of them will relinquish their right over the other as legal husband and wife, that both cannot prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from the separation, that both are no longer entitled for any support from the other, and that neither of them can claim anything from the other from the time they verbally separated. In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said defendant (Exh. C.).It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community. Issues: Whether or not the action had not yet prescribed. Whether or not there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.

Answer: No. An action for legal separation had already prescribed as provided for under Article 201 of the new Civil Code. Yes. The written agreement between them is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation. Reasoning: Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred. Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in Exhibit B, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court’s sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Holding: We find that the decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter. The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

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People v Zapata Statement of Facts: On March 14, 1947 Andres Bondoc filed a complaint against his wife Guadalupe Zapata, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to the date of the filing of the complaint. Guadalupe Zapata entered a plea of guilty and is sentenced to suffer four months imprisonment. On September 17, 1948 the plaintiff then again filed the same complaint to the defendants for the period from March 15, 1947 to the date of the filing of the second complaint on the ground that defendants continues to do such acts despite of the filing of the complaint. The defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Issue: Does the second complaint of the plaintiff connotes double jeopardy? Holding: No. It does not connotes double jeopardy. The Supreme Court ruled that for a crime to be considered as continuous and be marked as one there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time but that period of time is affected by the filing of the complaint. Therefore , acts made after the filing of the complaint are separate and the doer shall be liable of which separate from the acts made prior to the complaint.

Araneta v Concepcion

Plaintiff Luis Ma. Araneta filed complaint for legal separation against Defendant Emma Benitez Araneta on the ground of adultery. After the issues were joined, defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P 5,000, and return of her passport; to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff denied said allegations and prayed that parties be required to submit respective evidence in the determination of custody and support. Respondent Judge Hon. Hermogenes Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to the defendant including support (P2,300 monthly allowance, P300 for a house, and P2,000 for attorney’s fees). In denying plaintiff’s motion for submission of evidence, Respondent Judge invokes Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads: ―Action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.‖ Plaintiff instituted this petition for certiorari against said order of the Judge and for mandamus to compel him to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. ISSUE: W/N the respondent Judge should have required the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition YES. Article 103 is a mandatory provision. The introduction of any evidence is prohibited in keeping with the intention of the law to preserve the family and home from utter ruin. Admitting evidence exposes such families to the danger of making reconciliation difficult, if not impossible.

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The period of six months fixed in the said article is intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses, and to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But, this practical expedient does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the children and alimony and support pendente lite. Evidence of all the disputed claims (allegations of adultery –letter of authenticity as evidence—abandonment of conjugal abode) should be allowed the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force, provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody. FALLO: The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The court’s order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed.

Ocampo v Florenciano

FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several

occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955. ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code. HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed

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Samosa v Vamenta

FACTS: Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the ground of concubinage on the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of her paraphernal and exclusive property. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for preliminary injunction were heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent judge Vamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit HELD: NO. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. . That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall

continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.

Pacete v Cariaga

FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named

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Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita. HELD: The Civil Code provides that ―no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.‖ The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of

uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must ―in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,‖ obviously in order to provide the parties a ―cooling-off‖ period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, ―if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.‖

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De la Vina v Villareal

FACTS: On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña for divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month. Geopano and De la Viña got married in 1888, but since 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff. Because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected Geopano from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established as her habitual residence. Scorned by her husband, Geopano had no means of support and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters. Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Geopano presented a motion alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership between her and De la Viña and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain and prohibit De la Viña in the premises. CFI granted preliminary injunction, but De la Viña appealed, claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile, and that the judge has exceeded his power and authority in granting the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from

alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of an action for divorce instituted by the wife. RULING: Yes. Under Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 164, Act No. 190, an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is an issue, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the husband from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action. Although the husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal property, the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by is not the right to administer the conjugal property, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Sabalones v CA

Facts: Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park

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property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife. Issue: W/N the preliminary injunction is valid? Held: Yes. Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge. Injunction was used to prohibit petitioner from administering the land. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the

existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

Yangco v Rohde

Lerma v CA

FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. The application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was amended in an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the

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adultery charge he had filed against the respondent On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite. The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant proceeding for review. ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondent’s application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said application. HELD: Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal separation between the parties.

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.

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People v Sansano

Doctrine: In adultery, a party cannot institute a criminal proceeding if he has given his consent, either expressly or impliedly, to its commission. Facts: April 29, 1919- Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married. Shortly after the marriage, Ventura left her for three year. She cohabited with Mariano Ramos. 1924- Mariano Ventura came back, filed an adultery charged against Sensano and Ramos. The two were found guilty and was sentenced to serve the punishment of arresto mayor. She tried to make amends with Ventura, but the latter refused to forgive the former and told her ―(you) could go where you wished, (I) have nothing more to do with (you), and (you) could do as (you) pleased‖. He left again for Hawaii. 1931 (after 7 years)- Ventura again came back, instituted another adultery proceeding against the two for him to be able to obtain divorce. Issue: Whether or not Sensano and Ramos can still be prosecuted for adultery? Held: No. Art. 344 of the RPC states that the offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution for adultery if he ―shall have consented or pardoned the offenders‖. The statement Ventura made, and his conduct warrant the inference that he had consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused. That being the case, he cannot institute another criminal proceeding against his wife and its paramour.

People v Schneckenburger

Doctrine: Prior consent before the commission of the crime is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. Facts: March 16, 1926- Rodolfo Schneckenberger married Elena Cartagena. They agreed to live separately after 7 years and executed a document stating the same on May 25, 1935. June 15, 1935- Rodolfo secured divorce decree from Mexico, he married Julia Medel on May 11, 1936. As the divorce decree is not valid, people filed a case against him for bigamy and concubinage. Rodolfo was found guilty of bigamy. In the concubinage case, he contended that it was double jeopardy, the Court however did not give credence to his statement and found him guilty of the said offense as charged. Issue: Whether or not the case of concubinage must be dismissed by reason of the prior consent given by Elena to Rodolfo in the document they executed prior to the commission of the crime? Held: Double jeopardy is not present in the case at bar as Rodolfo was not tried for the same offense. Material to the case, the case of concubinage must be dismissed because of the prior consent given by Elena Cartagena in the document they executed on May 1935. Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

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Ginez v Bugayong

FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college. Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department. In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.

HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Brown v Yambao

Doctrine: Decree of legal separation may not be given to plaintiff whose acts also constitute for the grounds on which the complaint was based. Facts: July 14, 1955- William H. Brown filed a legal separation suit against Juanita Yambao on the ground that the latter had contracted extra-marital affairs while the former was interred at the UST during WW2. Juanita Yambao did not respond to the court despite dure service of summons. The Court later on order the State fiscal to determine whether there is collusion between the parties. Through cross examination, it has been established that Brown is not an innocent party (he had lived martially with another woman after his liberation) and that there has been connivance and that his actions to sue had already prescribed as stated under Article 102 of the NCC since it was shown that he knew of his wife’s actions in 1945 but only filed the proceeding in 1955.

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Thus the petition was denied. Issue: Whether or not legal separation may be given to a plaintiff spouse whereby the same spouse also does the ground where the complaint was based? Held: No. Recrimination is where an accused party in a case makes a similar accusation against the plaintiff. (Simply put, it as a situation where the accused can say ―you too or eh ikaw din naman eh‖) In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Juanita Yambao had committed adulterous acts. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Brown committed also the same acts. Therefore, Brown cannot use the ground of ―committing adulterous acts‖ against Juanita Yambao because that would constitute recrimination. The evidence of misconduct of the plaintiff spouse and failure or default of the other to set it up by way of defense are proper subject of inqury and may justifiably considered circumstancial evidence of collusion between the parties.

Republic v CA

Facts: Eduardo De Quintos and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Issue: 1. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not there was collusion between the parties. Held: Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she

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must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to

psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50, 000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part. The payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo. To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence m determining the issue of collusion between the spouses. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30,2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

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Matute v Macadaeg

FACTS • Armando Medel brought an action for legal separation against his wife, Rosario Matute, upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother, Ernesto Medel • Nov 6, 1952 – CFI Manila granted decree of legal separation and awarded to Armando the custody of their four minor children, then 12, 10, 8, and 4 years of age. • Armando then went to the US, and left the children in Davao with his sister, Pilar Medel. Rosario eventually lived there as well to be with her children • Late 1954 – Armando returned to the Philippines • March 1955 – children joined their father in Cebu • April 1955 – With Armando’s permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father, on the condition that she would return the children within two weeks • HOWEVER, Rosario did not return the children, and INSTEAD… • June 10, 1955 – Rosario filed civil case for custody of the children and support of Armando in school fees and allowances

do not want to go back to their father because he is living with a woman other than their mother • Armando opposed the motion, and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario frefusal to restore custody of the children • June 29, 1955 – Judge Macadaeg issued an order absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court because she secured the consent of Armando before bringing the children to Manila, but denying her motion for custody, and ordering her to deliver the children to Armando. Rosario filed for certiorari and prohibition

ISSUE Whether or not Rosario should be granted custody of her children HELD NO. 1. Writ of certiorari and prohibition do not lie, because Judge Macadaeg did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction‖ or with ―grave abuse of discretion.‖ If he made mistakes, these are simply ―errors of judgment.‖ These are not ―errors of jurisdiction,‖ but errors in the exercise of jurisdiction that the lower court admittedly had. - - Order of June 29, 1955 enforced award in Nov 6, 1952 Order - Decisions re custody of minor

subject to review at any time that the Court may deem it for the best interest of said minors; until reviewed and modified, said award must stand - Since no modification has been made, respondent Judge has the duty to execute and implement award. - Rosario obtained permission of

holds it in the name, on behalf, and by authority of Armando, she is the agent; he may demand their return, and she cannot question such authority 2. Children over 10 years of age whose parents are living separately may choose which parent to live with, unless parent is unfit due to ―moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty‖ (ROC 100, sec. 6) - Rosario is without means of livelihood, and she lives on the charity of her brothers; no home of her own, and would shelter children under the roof of her brothers. - Rosario is unfit to take care of the children or made it unwise to place them under her care PETITION DENIED.

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Quiao v Quiao

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term ―Net Profits Earned.‖ RTC held that the phrase ―NET PROFIT EARNED‖ denotes ―the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.‖ It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits

earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO. 3. Is the computation of ―net profits‖ earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of ―net profits‖ earned in the absolute community? NO. RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: ―All

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property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.‖ While one may not be deprived of his ―vested right,‖ he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as ―net profits,‖ pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been

established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the ―net profits.‖ And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, ―the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.‖ From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

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Laperal v Republic

FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

Macadangdang v CA

FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation. HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining

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properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Republic v Molina FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is

indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

- burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

- root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

- such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

- such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage

- such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

- decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

- court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

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Goitia v Campos-Rueda

FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs

and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Arroyo v Vasques-Arroyo

Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed Issues and Ruling: (1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven; (2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife.

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The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney’s fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses—a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. (3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not

entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

Cuaderno v Cuaderno

FACTS: • Petitioner Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno filed a complaint for support against her husband, respondent Angel Cuaderno on August 14, 1957 on the basis of maltreatment and abandonment by Angel

o The couple have been living separately since November 1956, as a result of injuries inflicted by Angel upon Lourdes during a quarrel; Angel took Lourdes to her mother’s house where she stayed until the filing of the complaint • Angel opposed, contending that it was Lourdes who left the conjugal dwelling; hence she is not entitled to support

o However, during the hearing, he declared that, "all the trouble she (the wife) has given me is enough for me to turn my back to her," • The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court decided in favor of Lourdes, ordering Angel to give her monthly support of P150 from the date of the filing of the complaint, attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs • The CA reversed the decision of the JDRC "so that (in the language of the court) appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation which they are hereby admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife."

o CA decided upon the belief that conditions were such that cohabitation between the spouses is not yet impossible

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ISSUE: Whether Lourdes may claim support without being compelled to live with Angel HELD: YES. The decision of the JDRC is revived. The Court ordered the sum of P150.00 for the Lourdes's monthly support. As the separation has been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place. • It would be taking an unrealistic view to compel or urge them to live together when they, specially the husband are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation. • While marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this jurisdiction. • In this case, the infliction of the physical injuries upon the wife by the husband gave rise to their separation. It was also the husband who took his wife to her parents’ home where he left her. • The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from accepting any later because she was allegedly demanding for more, only indicates that even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already providing something for the separate maintenance. • Continued support would not be unreasonable, considering that the wife has no income while the husband was employed.

Ilusorio v Bildner

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is

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withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Abella v COMELEC

Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the

Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. IN RELATION TO DOMICILE: The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle ofINTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDIevidenced by her

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continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." (Petition, Rollo, p. 40) As can be gleaned from the questioned decision, the COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her husband maintain separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The second division of the COMELEC in its decision dated February 14, 1991 states: xxx xxx xxx But there is the more fundamental issue of residence. The only indications of a change of residence so far as respondent is concerned are: the address indicated in the application for cancellation filed by respondent indicating her postal address as Kananga, Leyte, the annotation in her Voter's affidavit for Precinct No. 15 that her registration was cancelled due to lack of residence; the testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag that she entered into a contract of lease with option to buy with the spouses Emeterio and Inday Larrazabal over two parcels of land the witness owned in Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte; that she sees the spouses in the leased house in Kananga, that she was informed by Inday

Larrazabal that the spouses had decided to buy their property because she wanted to beautify the house for their residence. She attached as annex the written contract signed by her and the spouses; and the testimony of Adolfo Larrazabal Exh. "10" cousin of the spouses that 'at a family meeting ... the political plan of the Larrazabal clan was discussed, among which were (sic) the problem of Terry's residence in Ormoc City' and that it was decided in said meeting ... that Inday Larrazabal, wife of Terry, will transfer her Ormoc Registration as a voter to Kananga, Leyte (so) she will be able to vote for Terry and also help me in my candidacy; that they have been staying in Kananga, very often as they have properties in Lonoy and a house in Mahawan. The references to residence in the documents of cancellation and registration are already assessed for their evidentiary value in relation to the documents themselves above. The question must therefore be addressed in relation to the testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag and Adolfo V. Larrazabal. The gist of the testimonies is that they leased properties in Mahawan, Leyte and that they are seen in the house on the land leased. But the contract of lease with option to purchase itself indicates as to where the legal residence of the Jarrazabal is. The pertinent portion states: SPS EMETERIO V. LARRAZABAL AND ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, both of legal age, Filipino, andresidents of Ormoc City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES. The acknowledgment also indicates that Emeterio V. Larrazabal presented his Residence Certificate No. 155774914 issued in Ormoc City. The testimony of Adolfo Larrazabal reenforces this conclusion. It admits, as of the second or third week of November, that the residence of Emeterio Larrazabal was Ormoc City and that Inday Larrazabal was

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going to transfer her registration so she may be able to vote for him. For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode. (COMELEC decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo – 100710, pp. 67-69; Emphsis supplied)

SSS v Delos Santos

Story: Husband (fil) and first wife (fil) separated in fact only as divorce decree obtained NOT VALID. Wife married another. When husband died, first wife claimed SSS benefits. Is she still a dependent and therefore a proper beneficiary? SC: No. She no longer is a dependent. Basis: Jurisprudence, SSS v Aguas Na: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision, awarding SSS benefits to Gloria delos Santos

Facts: 1. 29 April 1964: Antonio and Gloria delos Santos married in Mla 2. Feb 1965: Gloria left Antonio, then cohabited with another man (Domingo Talens) in N.Ecija 3. 1969: Gloria returned to husband and lived with him until 1983. They had three children. 4. 1983: Gloria left Antonio and went to the US. 5. 21 May 1983: Gloria signed a document waiving all her rights to conjugal properties 6. 8 May 1986: filed divorce vs Antonio

granted 7. 23 May 1987: Antonio married Cirila del los Santos in Albay had one child born on 15 May 1989 8. 11 July 1987: Gloria married Larry Thomas (US Citizen) 9. 15 May 1989: Antonio changed his SSS beneficiaries to Cirila and their child 10. 1 Mar 1996: Antonio retired 11. 15 May 1999: Antonio died 12. Dec 1999: Cirila applied for SSS pension and benefits. She started receiving such. 13. 21 Dec 1999: Gloria claimed Antonio’s death benefits (biatch). 14. 1 Sep 2000: SSS denied because Gloria is not a qualified beneficiary. SHE IS NOT A DEPENDENT. 15. 23 Feb 2001: Gloria elevated case to Social Sec. Commission (SSC) 16. SSC: sought Cirila as respondent. Cirila: Motion to dismiss as: a. Gloria is not a dependent as evidenced by Antonio’s E-4 form re. dependents b. Gloria already married to an American c. Cirila is the legal wife (Meow, Cirila) d. Authority to determine validity of marriage is with regular courts

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17. Gloria’s counterclaim: divorce decree issued INVALID as she was still a Filipino then 18. SC: Dismissed Gloria’s petition and awarded the benefits 100% to Antonio’s and Cirila’s offspring. Ratio: a. Gloria left husband and married another. She thus failed to satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the law. b. Antonio and Cirila’s marriage being void, their child is the only remaining beneficiary. Since she has already reached age of majority, she can receive the benefits 100%. 19. CA: awarded benefits to Gloria as the legal wife Issue: W/N CA erred in granting the benefits to Gloria. Ratio: 1. The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from the deceased (sec 8 of RA 8282): a. The legal spouse ; b. Leg, illeg, adopted children who are unmarried and unemployed, and not yet 21 y.o; c. Parent receiving regular support from member 2. Gloria is still the LEGAL SPOUSE, but SHE IS STILL DISQUALIFIED to be Antonio’s primary beneficiary. Jurisprudence: SSS v Aguas: a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period. Conclusion: a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Disposition: Petition granted and CA decision is reversed.

SSS v Favila

Calderon v Roxas

Yasin v Sharia

FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court inZamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.‖ Therespondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petitionas it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rulesof Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to beadopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include allthe names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is notcovered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resumethe use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriageby divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, andafter marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondentcourt denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if thepetition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname. ISSUE: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorceunder the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husbandis married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of nameand comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

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HELD: NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicialauthority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden firstname. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when themarriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of thehusband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorceeneed not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order torevert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name isoptional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, shedid not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required tosecure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after themarriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during themarriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husbandis permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed bypetitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessaryproceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband isalready married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

Go-Tan v Sps. Tan

Doctrine: The principle of conspiracy in the RPC may be applied suppletorily to RA 9262.

-Tan and Steven Tan were married and they begot 2 children

Prayer for the Issance of a TPO (Temp Protective Order) against Steven and her parents-in-law, R Spouses Tan

o She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with Rs, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses – in violation of RA 9262 or the ―Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004‖

2005: RTC granted P’s TPO prayer. Rs filed Motion to Dismiss = as parents-in-law, they weren’t covered by RA 9262

case; parents-in-law not included under RA 9262 (under the rule of law expressio unius est exclusion alterius = the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another and so, to include Rs would be a strained interpretation of the provision of the law ISSUE: WoN R-spouses may be included in petition for TPO in accordance with RA 9262 Contentions: P: RA 9262 explicitly provides for application of RPC – RPC Art. 8 on ―conspiracy‖ can be applied Rs: They aren’t covered as said RA explicitly provides the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage or a sexual relationship SC Ruling: Yes, they may be included.

be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual/dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of

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conspiracy under the RPC (Sec. 47, RA 9262: ―For purposes of this Act, the RPC and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.‖

statute must be effectuated by the courts, and in instant case, it is the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

ruling partly reversed and set aside.

San Diego v RTC

Facts: On July 13, 2009, San Diego, being the boyfriend of the complainant, used personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder, and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Sec 5(a) of RA 9262. RTC found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. San Diego posted cash bond for his liberty and then files Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash. He said he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent so RA 9262 was inapplicable. Complainant affirmed their relationship had ended prior the said incident. She said that she wanted San Diego to pay her the money she had lent him. She inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her, which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the information. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion, and said it was immaterial that they weren’t dating during that time. Ruled that since they both admitted that they had a prior

dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec 3(a) of RA 9262. ISSUES:

1. WON the act committed falls under RA 9262 Sec3(a). YES.

2. Won RTC has jurisdiction over the offense. YES, not MTC.

3. WON RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused. NO

4. WON the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed. YES. (amend information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship)

HELD: 1&2: Petitioner contests that the act which resulted in physical injuries is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the RPC which falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC. Court ruled in the negative. It falls under RA 9262 Sec 3(a) which states that: It refers to ANY act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with hom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether leg or illeg, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Used the 3 elements of crime of violence against women through harassment in Ang v CA. 1) Offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended

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woman. (2) Commits act of harassment against women; (3) Harrasment causes substantial emotional distress to her. It falls under the RA because it doesn’t state in the law that one limitation to the rule is that the act of violence must be a consequence of their relationship. As long as it’s against women with whom the offender has or had a relationship with, the rule must apply. As the offense is covered by RA 9262, it falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. 3 -> Court ruled that there’s no need to construe the statue in favor of petitioner because there is no ambiguity. Intent of RA is to punish offenders whose acts harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship and/or their children and to promote protection of women and children. 4 -> Court orders RTC to give prosecutor 2 days to amend info to reflect that they were not dating during the commission. PETITION DISMISSED.