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Language and vertical space: On the automaticity oflanguage action interconnections

Carolin Dudschig*, Irmgard de la Vega, Monica De Filippis andBarbara Kaup

Universit€at Tubingen, Tubingen, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 24 June 2013

Reviewed 4 November 2013

Revised 18 December 2013

Accepted 4 June 2014

Action editor Roberto Cubelli

Published online 17 June 2014

Keywords:

Language

Embodiment

Space

Automaticity

Action

* Corresponding author. University of TubinE-mail address: carolin.dudschig@uni-tue

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2014.06.0030010-9452/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights rese

a b s t r a c t

Grounded models of language processing propose a strong connection between language

and sensorimotor processes (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). However, it

remains unclear how functional and automatic these connections are for understanding

diverse sets of words (Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, & K€onig, 2010). Here, we investigate

whether words referring to entities with a typical location in the upper or lower visual field

(e.g., sun, ground) automatically influence subsequent motor responses even when

language-processing levels are kept minimal. The results show that even subliminally

presented words influence subsequent actions, as can be seen in a reversed compatibility

effect. These finding have several implications for grounded language processing models.

Specifically, these results suggest that language-action interconnections are not only the

result of strategic language processes, but already play an important role during pre-

attentional language processing stages.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Grounded models of language comprehension suggest a close

connection between language understanding and sensori-

motor processes (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012).

Diverse empirical evidence supports a close relationship be-

tween language, perception and action. For example, Hauk,

Johnsrude, and Pulvermuller (2004) have shown that the

neural activation during reading action verbs (e.g., kick) re-

sembles the neural activation during the actual performance

of the accordant actions. Additionally, studies have demon-

strated that language processing influences subsequentmotor

gen, Fachbereich Psycholbingen.de (C. Dudschig).

rved.

responses (e.g., Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; Borreggine

& Kaschak, 2006; Boulenger et al., 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008;

Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan &

Taylor, 2006). For example, reading sentences such as “He

opens the drawer” results in faster arm movements towards

one's own body, than away from one's body (Glenberg &

Kaschak, 2002). These language-action compatibility effects

highlight the potential interconnections between language

understanding and motor processes, and are often cited as

important evidence in favor of the grounded language-

processing model (Barsalou, 2008). However, despite sub-

stantial evidence that language and sensorimotor processes

are closely interconnected and even share neural substrates,

ogie, Schleichstr. 4, 72076 Tubingen, Germany.

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0152

it is still unclear how fundamental these connections are for

language understanding and whether they are automatically

activated during comprehension (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).

Further evidencesupporting grounded languageprocessing

models stems from research that investigated direction-

associated words. For example, words referring to entities

with a typical location in the vertical space (e.g., hat ¼ up,

shoe ¼ down) influence subsequent visual target processing in

compatible or incompatible screen locations (Dudschig,

Lachmair, de la Vega, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2012b; Estes,

Verges, & Barsalou, 2008; Gozli, Chasteen, & Pratt, 2013;

Zhang et al., 2013). Similar results have been reported during

verbprocessing (e.g., rise, fall) (Verges&Duffy, 2009) andduring

sentence comprehension (Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, &

Narayanan, 2007). Analog to the findings in studies investi-

gating the effect of linguistic stimuli on perceptual processing,

it has beenshown thatwords referring to entitieswitha typical

location also influence subsequent response-related process-

ing (Lachmair, Dudschig, De Filippis, de la Vega, & Kaup, 2011;

Thornton, Loetscher, Yates, & Nicholls, 2012). In these studies

participantswere required to respondwitheitheranupwardor

downward armmovement toword font color. Responses were

faster if the arm movement was towards the compatible

location (e.g., sun followed by an upward arm movement).

Subsequent studies have shown that eye movements are

similarly influenced by word processing (Dudschig, Souman,

Lachmair, de la Vega, & Kaup, 2013) and that these language-

action associations can also be observed during second-

language processing (Dudschig, de la Vega, & Kaup, 2014). In

addition, such language-action compatibility effects have also

beenreported forverbs (e.g., rise vs fall) (Dudschig, Lachmair, de

la Vega, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2012a) and in studies imple-

menting sentences (Kaup, De Filippis, Lachmair, de la Vega, &

Dudschig, 2012). These compatibility effects have been attrib-

uted to automatic re-activation of experiential traces during

language processing (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan,

2008; Zwaan & Madden, 2005). For example, when we hear

the word bird, this often occurs in situations in which we look

up to the sky, or in which someone points up to the sky. Thus,

when laterhearing theword bird, theseperceptual andmotoric

experiences become automatically reactivated (Zwaan &

Madden, 2005). Pulvermuller (1999, 2005) proposed that Heb-

bian associative learningunderlies these connections between

language and motor activation, as frequently co-activated

neurons strengthen their connections resulting in the devel-

opment of functional cell assemblies. Thus, according to this

view, word processing becomes closely connected to sensori-

motor processing, and these connections are automatically

reactivated when processing language.

The semantic processing demands in the studies summa-

rized above vary with respect to the level of language pro-

cessing required for the task. For example, in some paradigms,

participants had to actively read the words or sentences and

perform sensibility judgments by deciding whether a visually

presented word was a real word or a pseudoword, or whether

a sentencewas sensible or not (e.g. Glenberg& Kaschak, 2002).

In other studies, word meaning was task-irrelevant and par-

ticipants responded to stimuli features such as color (e.g.,

Lachmair et al., 2011). Language-action compatibility effects in

tasks where word meaning is task-irrelevant (e.g., Stroop,

1935) have been interpreted in favor of a highly automated

connection between language and action. It was argued that

automatic access to word meaning, as typically reported in a

Stroop paradigm, is sufficient to trigger compatibility effects.

However, there is an ongoing debate regarding the automa-

ticity of reading within the Stroop paradigm (Besner, Stolz, &

Boutilier, 1997), and it cannot be excluded that participants

strategically access word meaning within the Stroop para-

digm. Thus, it remains unclear whether the reported

language-action compatibility effects are automatic in nature,

or whether strategic processes underlie these compatibility

effects. For example, it is possible that participants recognized

regularities in the experimental stimuli and automatically

categorized the words into up- versus down words. This

categorization might subsequently result in voluntary or

involuntary activation of the compatible motor response. For

basic directional words (e.g., above, below), there is evidence

that these words automatically activate motor processing,

even if no strategic word processing takes place, such as when

words are presented subliminally (Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid,

Grassl, & K€onig, 2010). However, studies investigating less

direct language-action interconnections provide evidence

that these language-action compatibility effects presuppose

rather deep linguistic processing. In line with the findings

regarding pictures (e.g. picture of a mug) facilitating motor

responses (e.g., Vainio & Mustonen, 2011), Bub, Masson, and

Cree (2008) showed that words (e.g., mug) facilitate appro-

priate motor responses (e.g., grasping gesture) if the task

demanded deeper linguistic processing (e.g., lexical decision

task). If the task did not demand linguistic processing, with

participants simply responding to word color, no compati-

bility effectswere reported. This suggests that some language-

action associations are driven by high-level or strategic lan-

guage processing, rather than automatic language-action as-

sociations. It is of great importance for grounded language

processingmodels to establish whether perceptual features of

the entities to which words refer, influence motor responses

even when strategic reading or strategic mapping of words'referent dimensions to response dimensions can be excluded

as the cause of the language-action compatibility effects.

Previous studies investigating the influence on motor re-

sponses by stimuli that are not consciously accessible or

influenced by strategic processing demands have typically

implemented masked-priming paradigms. For example,

Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) presented a subliminal arrow

(pointing to the left or right) that was followed by a target

arrow (pointing to the left or right). Participants responded to

the target arrow with left or right key-presses, respectively.

Motor inhibition was observed in compatible prime-target

conditions (e.g., masked arrow pointing left followed by

target arrow pointing left) when the target followed the prime

by more than 60 msec. In contrast, responses to incompatible

prime-target pairs were facilitated (for a review see Eimer &

Schlaghecken, 2003). The authors attributed this phenome-

non to a self-inhibitory motor control system stopping our

behavior being controlled by task-irrelevant stimuli. In their

view, an initial automatic activation of the motor system by

themasked stimulus is instantly suppressed by this inhibitory

control system. Importantly, these motor inhibition effects

were only reported if the prime was masked, preventing

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0 153

continuous updating of the stimulus information provided by

the prime. In the case of supra-threshold non-masked stimuli,

this suppression mechanism typically fails to inhibit the

activation from the prime arrow, resulting in facilitation ef-

fects. Additionally, reversed compatibility effects have also

been reported in other tasks, such as the Simon task, if the

prime stimuli were masked (Treccani, Umilt�a, & Tagliabue,

2006). In all of these tasks the reversed compatibility effect

did not critically depend on the masked prime being sublim-

inal. Rather, the interruption of the prime information by a

mask seemed to be critical in causing the inhibitory effects

(e.g., Klapp&Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken, Blagrove,&Maylor,

2008). Interestingly, these findings have been recently

extended, and it has been shown that even briefly presented

pictures can result in motor inhibition processes (Vainio,

Hammar�en, Hausen, Rekolainen, & Riskil€a, 2011; Vainio &

Mustonen, 2011). Vainio et al. (2011) showed that 30 msec

picture presentations showing manipulable objects (e.g., a

mug with a handle pointing to the left side) interfere with

subsequent motor responses. Specifically, compatible motor

actions were slowed down after brief picture presentations

(e.g., left hand responses were slower after the picture of a

mug with a handle pointing to the left side). The authors

concluded that during picture processing, motor inhibition

mechanisms become active in a similar fashion to the motor

inhibition effects triggered by briefly presented symbolic cues

(Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). In a recent study inves-

tigating the influence of briefly presented masked action

words (50msec) onmotor responses, it was shown that action

verbs resulted in decreased action preparation as reflected in a

diminished readiness potential (Boulenger et al., 2008). The

readiness potential is an electrophysiological potential that

can be measured over the motor cortex during phases of

movement preparation, reflecting movement planning pro-

cesses in the brain (Kornhuber&Deecke, 1965). In the study by

Boulenger et al. (2008) action words such as throw resulted in a

diminished readiness potential during the movement prepa-

ration phase and in smaller wrist acceleration in the response

execution phase than control words without any motor as-

sociation. Surprisingly, random letter strings resulted in

similar effects on movement kinematics and the readiness

potential as action verbs, thus leaving open the question

whether specific word meaning was the cause of these action

influences, or whether other associations were causing these

effects (for discussion see Boulenger et al., 2008).

As summarized above, direction-associated nouns referring

to entities typically located in the lower or upper visual space

(e.g., sky, ground), activatemotor responses even in tasks that do

not demand semantic processing (Lachmair et al., 2011;

Thornton et al., 2012). However, it remains open whether

these language-action interactions are automatically triggered

during word processing, or whether they are the result of more

strategic languageprocessing.Here,weusedirection-associated

nouns to investigate the automaticity of language-action asso-

ciations, as it has been suggested that language-action associ-

ations grounded in space are particularly strong. Vertical space

is one of the most important organizational structures, and it

has been argued that experiential knowledge about vertical

space is already available to pre-linguistic babies (e.g.

Bowerman, 1996; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Levinson, 2003;

Needham & Baillargeon, 1993; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). In

the present study we decreased the level of strategic language

processing and investigated whether language-action compat-

ibility effects are observed in a masked presentation paradigm

where participants cannot actively access word meaning.

Importantly, such a masking procedure reduces strategic lan-

guage processing to a minimum (Ansorge et al., 2010; Dehaene

et al., 2001; Diaz & McCarthy, 2007). Thus, if direction-

associated words influence motor responses similarly to sym-

bolic cues even under masked conditions, this would be evi-

dence for ratherclose language-action interconnectionsthatare

automatically activated during very early word processing

stages. In contrast, if only clearly visible words influencemotor

responses, this suggests that active processingofwordmeaning

is demanded for the observation of language-action compati-

bility effects. In that case, the language-action connections

might be less automatic than typically claimed, and rather the

result of strategic language processing.

2. Experiment 1

2.1. Method

2.1.1. ParticipantsThirty right-handed participants took part (Mage ¼ 24.25,

SD ¼ 3.67; 8 male). Participants gave informed consent before

taking part in the experiment.

2.1.2. MaterialsIn the present experiment we used 80 nouns referring to en-

tities with a typical location in the upper or lower visual field

(see: Dudschig et al., 2012b; Dudschig et al., 2013; Lachmair

et al., 2011). The 40 up-words consisted of words such as

bird, roof, hat, airplane, etc. The 40 down-words consisted of

words such as shoe, socks, mole, worm, etc. (see Appendix).

These words were rated according to their typical location in

the world on a 5-point Likert scale. Importantly, the two word

categories (up vs down) did not differ with respect to their

frequency (Leipziger Wortschatzportal), t(78) ¼ .37, p ¼ .71, or

their length, t(78) ¼ .45, p ¼ .39 but did differ significantly

regarding their rated position (Mup ¼ 4.69, SD ¼ .28,

Mdown ¼ 1.54, SD ¼ .37), t(78) ¼ 43.02, p < .001.

2.1.3. Apparatus and procedureWe adapted the paradigm from Lachmair et al. (2011). Instead

of requiringparticipants to respond to theword color, theword

stimuliwere separated from the subsequent target stimuli (see

Fig. 1). All stimuli were presented in the center of a 1700 CRTmonitor (85 Hz). The experimental procedure was controlled

using MATLAB, PsychToolbox 3.0 (Kleiner et al., 2007). Stimuli

were displayed in light gray (RGB 220, 220, 220) on a black

background. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixa-

tion cross for 741 msec (size: .5� � .5�). The fixation cross was

replaced by an eleven digit random letter string mask

(188msec),whichwas followedby theworddisplay for 35msec

(size: approx. 3.46� � .76�). An eleven-digit random letter string

backwardmask followed (188msec).Themaskwas replacedby

a colored rectangle (size: 4.77� � .76�, red, orange, blue, green).Two colors were mapped to upward responses, two colors to

Fig. 1 e Example trial procedure in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, a blank screen was displayed instead of the 188 msec

random-letter masks.

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0154

downward responses. Mapping of colors to response direction

was balanced between participants. At the start of each trial

sequence participants pressed the two central keys with their

right and left hands on a self-constructed response apparatus

mounted vertically at the table (see Fig. 1). After the start keys

were held pressed for 1 sec, the trial started with the onset of

the fixation cross. Participants were instructed to fixate to-

wards thefixationcrossandkeep their eyes in themiddleof the

screen until the end of the trial. With the onset of the colored

rectangle participants had to decide whether an upward or

downward response was demanded (according to the color)

and execute the according response. Upward responses

involvedreleasingacentral keyandpressinganupperkeywith

the right or left hand. Downward responses involved releasing

the other central key and pressing the lower key (see Fig. 1). If

no start key was released within 1500 msec the feedback “Too

late” was displayed on the screen and the next trial started.

Hand assignment (left vs right) to upward or downward re-

sponses was balanced between participants. In a second

phase, a conservative prime visibility test was conducted. This

test consisted of 16 practice trials and 160 experimental trials.

These trialswere identical to the test-trials,with thedifference

that instead of a colored rectangle a word was displayed. This

word was either identical to the masked word (50% of the tri-

als), or a different word (50% of the trials). Participants had to

indicate in a forced-choice taskwhether or not thewordswere

identical by pressing the upper- or lower-button, respectively

(key assignment was reversed for half of the participants).

2.2. Results and discussion

Analysis of the prime visibility test showed that participants

could not consciously identify thewords. For each participant,

a sensitivity index (d0; Hautus, 1995; Macmillan & Kaplan,

1985) was calculated. Mean d0 did not significantly differ

from zero, t(23) ¼ 1.73, p ¼ .10, suggesting that participants

were unable to identify the word primes. In order to ensure

that none of the participants could consciously process the

words, we excluded six participants because they out-

performed in the prime visibility test, with d0 exceeding .5

(deviating at least 2SD from the mean d0 (.08) of the remaining

participants; see also Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). Re-

action times (RTs) faster than 200 msec were classified as

outliers (fast guesses) and were excluded from RT analysis

(<.2%). Error exclusion reduced the data set by less than 1.8%.

Subsequently, RTs were analyzed with a 2 � 2 ANOVA with

repeated measurement on the factors word-direction (up

word vs down word) and response-direction (up response

vs down response) in the by-participants analysis (F1) and

repeatedmeasurement on the factor response direction in the

by-items analysis (F2). There was no main effect of response

direction, F1(1,23) ¼ .01, MSE ¼ 1117, p ¼ .93; F2(1,78) ¼ .06,

MSE ¼ 318.4, p ¼ .81, and no main effect of word direction,

F1(1,23)¼ 3.06,MSE¼ 198.4, p¼ .09; F2(1,78)¼ 3.58,MSE¼ 263.9,

p ¼ .06. Importantly, there was an interaction between

response direction and word direction, F1 (1,23) ¼ 4.78,

MSE ¼ 300.4, p < .05; F2(1,78) ¼ 7.29, MSE ¼ 318.4, p < .01. This

interaction was due to compatible responses being slower

(513 msec) than incompatible responses (505 msec) (Fig. 2).

In summary, these findings suggest that briefly presented

words that cannot be identified by the participants influence

subsequent actions. Such findings support grounded models

of language understanding, proposing a tight coupling of

language and sensorimotor processes (Barsalou, 2008;

Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). The findings are in line with pre-

vious studies investigating the effects of briefly presented

action verbs, object pictures or symbolic cues on responding

(Boulenger et al., 2008; Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken,

1998; Vainio et al., 2011). Specifically, in line with the studies

mentioned above, a reversed compatibility effect was found,

suggesting that even masked direction-associated words can

influence subsequent actions.

Fig. 2 eMean reaction times in Experiment 1 for down- and

up-responses and down- and up-words. Error bars

represent the 95% confidence interval according to Loftus

and Masson (1994).

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0 155

3. Experiment 2

Experiment 1 showed that word processing influences sub-

sequent motor responses, even if word meaning was not

actively accessed. Previous studies investigating the influence

of direction-associated words on motor responses in visible

conditions showed facilitation in the case of compatible trials

(e.g., upward responses were faster after words such as sun

compared to shoe). However, in previous studies, the presen-

tation of the target word and the response information (e.g.,

color of the word) were presented simultaneously (e.g.,

Lachmair et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). Thus, it remains

open whether the level of word processing (active reading

vs subliminal word processing) or whether differences in

experimental timing parameters (separation between word

and target stimulus) are responsible for the differences

regarding facilitation or interference effects. Therefore, in

Experiment 2, we used the same paradigm as in Experiment 1

but without the masking procedure, resulting in conscious

word processing (see also Dehaene et al., 2001). If the masking

procedure (and not the interval between stimulus and

response) is responsible for the reversed compatibility effect

in Experiment 1, then we expect to observe facilitation effects

in Experiment 2, as response activation transferred by

unmasked stimuli is not typically inhibited by self-inhibitory

control mechanisms (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). In

contrast, if the timing between the word and the target

stimulus is responsible for the observed inhibitory effects in

Experiment 1, we again should observe interference effects.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. ParticipantsThirty participants took part (Mage ¼ 26.66, SD ¼ 4.38, 4 male, 1

left-handed). One data file was corrupted and was excluded.

Participants gave informed consent before taking part in the

experiment.

3.1.2. MaterialsIdentical to Experiment 1.

3.1.3. Apparatus and procedureThe procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that a

blank screen was displayed instead of the forward and the

backward masks (188 msec duration). This experimental

setup typically results in conscious word processing (e.g.,

Dehaene et al., 2001; Naccache et al., 2005).

3.2. Results and discussion

RTs were analyzed as in Experiment 1. Outlier exclusion

reduced the data set by less than .2%. Erroneous trials were

excluded from analysis (<1.5%). As in Experiment 1, RTs were

analyzed with a 2 � 2 ANOVA with the factor word-direction

(up vs down) and response-direction (up vs down). There

was no main effect of response direction, F1(1,28) ¼ .16,

MSE ¼ 990.3, p ¼ .69; F2(1,78) ¼ .36,MSE ¼ 271.2, p ¼ .55, and no

main effect word direction, F1(1,28)¼ .00,MSE¼ 169.75, p¼ .96;

F2(1,78) ¼ .00, MSE ¼ 222.80, p ¼ .99. Importantly, there was an

interaction between response-direction and word-direction,

F1(1,28) ¼ 4.64, MSE ¼ 242, p < .05; F2(1,78) ¼ 5.23,

MSE ¼ 271.2, p < .05. In contrast to Experiment 1, this inter-

action was due to compatible responses (512 msec) being

faster than incompatible responses (518 msec) (Fig. 3). A be-

tween experiment comparison with experiment as additional

factor showed a significant three-way interaction between

experiment, response direction and word direction,

F1(1,51) ¼ 9.53, MSE ¼ 268.4, p < .01; F2(1,156) ¼ 13.03,

MSE ¼ 282, p < .001, suggesting that the masking procedure

significantly modified the interaction between word direction

and response direction. In line with previous findings, these

results suggest that in the case of supra-threshold word pro-

cessing, motor activation is not suppressed by a self-

inhibitory control mechanism.

4. General Discussion

Previous studies showed that the presentation of words

referring to entities with a typical location in the upper or

lower visual fields influence subsequent sensorimotor pro-

cessing (Dudschig et al., 2013; Estes et al., 2008; Gozli et al.,

2013; Kaup et al., 2012; Lachmair et al., 2011; Thornton et al.,

2012). However, to date it is an open question whether these

interactions between language and the sensorimotor system

are automatically triggered during word processing, or

whether strategic language processing underlies these in-

teractions. Experiment 1 of the current study showed that

subliminally presented direction-associated nouns (e.g., hat,

shoe) influence subsequent responding. More specifically, in

line with previous studies investigating the effect of briefly

presented stimuli on motor processes (Boulenger et al., 2008;

Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Vainio et al., 2011), responses

were slowed down in compatible language-action conditions.

In Experiment 2, we eliminated the masking procedure but

Fig. 3 eMean reaction times in Experiment 2 for down- and

up-responses and down- and up-words. Error bars

represent the 95% confidence interval according to Loftus

and Masson (1994).

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0156

kept the experimental paradigm identical to Experiment 1.

Under these conditions, participants are typically able to

identify the words (see also Dehaene et al., 2001). The results

showed that consciously processed words facilitate response

movements towards compatible locations, even if word pre-

sentation was separated in time from the target stimulus,

suggesting that unmaksed stimuli counteract the influence of

inhibitory control systems (see Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003).

Together, these results show that language influences motor

responses, even if words are presented subliminally,

providing evidence for the automaticity of the in-

terconnections between the language and the action system.

This finding strongly supports the grounded view of language

comprehension, suggesting that language processing is tightly

coupled with sensorimotor processes (e.g., Barsalou, 1999;

Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).

Previous studies concerned with the automaticity of

language-action compatibility effects, or picture-action

compatibility effects showed similar results (e.g., Boulenger

et al., 2008; Vainio et al., 2011). Vainio et al. (2011) reported

that pictures of manipulable objects activate motor inhibition

processes. Whereas symbolic cues only result in motor inhi-

bition if presented in a masked priming experimental setup

(e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998), in the study of Vainio et al.

(2011) these inhibitory effects depended on the duration of

picture presentation rather than on a masking procedure.

Vainio et al. suggested that pictures might be strongly asso-

ciated with inhibitory mechanisms as in everyday life we

constantly need to stop our motor system from interacting

with irrelevant stimuli (e.g., if I want to write something, I

need to grab a pen and I should not be distracted by the mug

on the table), and thus even unmasked pictures can result in

inhibitory phenomena. Boulenger et al. first reported that

action verbs (e.g., throw) interfere withmovement preparation

and movement execution, even if words are presented briefly

(50 msec) in a masked priming setup. Our results clearly

support these findings, and suggest that also direction-

associated nouns (e.g., sun, shoe) automatically activate

motor processes if presented subliminally. In an extension to

previous studies, the words we implemented are less directly

related to motor responses. For example, the word bird does

not directly refer to a motor action and only becomes con-

nected to upward motor responses through experiences (e.g.,

Zwaan & Madden, 2005). Additionally, via the prime-visibility

test we could ensure that participants were not able not

identify the words. This suggests that language-action in-

terconnections are automatically activated during processing

a very wide set of linguistic stimuli, even in paradigms that

limit strategic language processing to a minimum. However,

despite minimizing strategic word processing in masked

priming studies, it cannot be fully excluded that task-driven

processes are affecting participants' performance (e.g.,

Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2003).

For example, Kunde et al. (2003) showed that the way un-

conscious stimuli are processed highly depends on the

structure of the task and the stimulus material that is

consciously processed. In the current experiment there was

no familiarization period where participants were made

familiar with the material, therefore no pre-experimental

classification of the stimulus material has taken place that

potentially affected the way the words were processed un-

consciously. However, even the mounting of the response

apparatus in the vertical dimension might activate specific

response codes that might have influenced how the words

were unconsciously processed. Nevertheless, the current

study provides one important step towards showing that not

purely strategic language processes underlie the language-

action compatibility effects. For example, our paradigm did

not allow participants to consciously categorize the words

into two spatial categories or to consciously map the single

words onto the response dimension. In order to rule out the

possibility that conscious processing of the response dimen-

sion affects the unconscious processing and classification of

the words, future studies could be designed in a way that

stimuli and responses cannot be classified into two categories

referring to opposite meanings.

An important question concerns the mechanisms under-

lying these language-action compatibility effects as observed

in the current experiment. Currently, several explanations

should be considered. According to a grounded model of lan-

guage processing, these compatibility effects might be due to

engagements of the motor cortex in both supraliminal and

subliminal word processing. However, how can the involve-

ment of the motor cortex account for the finding of a reversed

compatibility effect in the case of subliminal word presenta-

tion? There are several possibilities that need to be discussed.

First, supraliminal words might activate the motor cortex and

result in standard compatibility effects, whereas the negative

compatibility effect in the case of subliminal words might be

caused by the inhibition of the compatible response. For

example, Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998, 2003) suggested that

self-inhibitory motor control circuits can inhibit initial motor

activation triggered by subliminally presented stimuli,

whereas unmasked and continuously consciously accessible

stimuli counteract the automatic operation of the self-

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0 157

inhibitory motor control processes (e.g., Eimer &

Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). Importantly, Eimer and

Schlaghecken (1998) provided electrophysiological evidence

directly showing a reversal of initial motor activation in the

case of a masked stimulus presentation. Specifically, the lat-

eralized readiness potential, an electrophysiological mea-

surement of the preparation of a left versus right hand

response (see Coles, 1989; De Jong, Wierda, Mulder, & Mulder,

1988; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988),

showed that the initial activation of a response compatible

with the information transferred by the masked prime was

subsequently reversed. Additionally, Eimer, Schub€o, and

Schlaghecken (2002) showed that the inhibition mechanisms

in masked priming studies affect effector-specific response

processing stages, rather than central response processing,

clearly suggesting a motor-based locus of these inhibitory

phenomena. Critically, in the current study we do not have

direct electrophysiological evidence in favor of the involve-

ment of motor processes and inhibitory processes, and thus

alternative explanations of the observed compatibility effects

need to be discussed. For example, the reversed compatibility

effect could also be caused by an activation of the incompat-

ible response in the case of masked word presentation rather

than an inhibition of the compatible response, or by amixture

of inhibitory and activation processes. Critically, the

compatibility effects might even have a functional-locus at

the central decisional level that delays the selection of the

correct response. Further studies would be needed to clarify

the functional locus of compatibility effects in the case of

language-action interactions, as this would be especially

important for the grounded cognition account.

One challenging alternative account for compatibility ef-

fects as described in this study is the polarity correspondence

principle (e.g., Lakens, 2012; Proctor& Cho, 2006). According to

the polarity account, stimulus-response compatibility effects

can be driven by structural similarities in the coding of the

stimuli and responses. Here, categorical stimuli and re-

sponses are coded along polar dimensions as þ and � poles

(e.g., up-words are coded as þ polar, and down-words are

coded as the � polar endpoint of the same dimension). If a

stimulus and a response correspond in theway they are coded

(e.g., þ polar stimulus and þ polar response), this results in

polarity correspondence, which in turn is supposed to facili-

tate responses. Thus, rather than conceptual similarity be-

tween the stimulus and the response, it is the coding of the

stimuli and response in bipolar dimensions that underlies

word-action compatibility effects. However, can the results of

the current study be explained with the polarity correspon-

dence principle? First, stimuli and responses were identical in

Experiments 1 and 2, but nevertheless, the compatibility ef-

fects are reversed. If pure coding of the stimuli and the re-

sponses results in polarity correspondence, this seems to

speak against a polar coding explanation. In order to assume

that polar coding causes the compatibility effects observed in

Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2, one would need additional

assumptions, for example, that masked stimuli are coded

exactly opposite to unmasked stimuli. Critically, evidence for

the reversal of a compatibility effect has also been interpreted

in favor of the polarity correspondence principle (see Lakens,

2011). Proctor and Cho suggested that it is not immanent

features of the motor or perceptual system that underlie the

coding of the responses as þ or � polar, but that the reference

frame in a specific task can also determine which endpoint of

a dimension is þ or � polar. However, to our knowledge there

is no study suggesting that masking procedures reverse the

way responses or stimuli are coded on a polar dimension.

Previous studies analyzing whether compatibility effects

triggered by subliminal stimuli can also be explained by po-

larity correspondence found no direct evidence for such

mechanisms (Ansorge, Khalid,& K€onig, 2013). Taken together,

we consider it unlikely that the subliminal presentation of the

stimuli resulted in the reversal of the polarity correspondence

effect and therefore do not consider this a plausible alterna-

tive explanation for our results. However, future studies are

clearly needed to investigate in more detail the interaction of

polarity coding and awareness.

Importantly, our findings extend previous studies sug-

gesting that subliminal word processing can activate brain

areas that are also activated during conscious word pro-

cessing (e.g., Boulenger et al., 2008; Dehaene et al., 2001;

Diaz & McCarthy, 2007). In addition to the interconnection

between briefly presented action words and motor areas in

the brain (Boulenger et al., 2008), such automatic in-

terconnections exist for various types of subliminally pre-

sented stimuli and the according brain networks, such as

emotional and number processing networks. For example,

previous studies showed that subliminal processing of

emotional words activates brain areas generally responsible

for emotional processing such as the amygdala (e.g., Bernat,

Bunce, & Shevrin, 2001; Naccache et al., 2005; Ortigue,

Bianchi-Demicheli, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2007). Other

studies showed that even subliminally presented number

words activate specific parietal cortex areas that are typi-

cally involved in conscious processing of numeric informa-

tion (Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). Following these studies,

and in line with the findings by Boulenger et al. (2008), our

results suggest that language-action associations are

already laid down in rather early word processing stages.

These findings, showing a strong interconnection between

single word processing and motor processes, lead to the

question regarding the role of these sensorimotor in-

terconnections during the processing of complex linguistic

structures. For example, how are linguistic operators such

as negation integrated into these processes, or how do these

operators counteract the strong word-based motor activa-

tion? Before concluding that reactivation of experiential

traces underlies not only single word comprehension but

also the understanding of more complex linguistic struc-

tures, many more questions need to be answered. As lan-

guage comprehension relies on more processes than

understanding single words, there are likely various lin-

guistic sub-processes where grounding mechanisms play a

more or less dominant role. To date, our results emphasize

the importance of the sensorimotor interconnections during

single word comprehension.

In conclusion, our studies show that words can affect

subsequent responses to stimuli demanding motor responses

even if presented subliminally. These findings are in line with

the effects of symbolic cues and pictures on themotor system.

Our results support the strength of the interconnection

c o r t e x 5 8 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 1e1 6 0158

between language and sensorimotor processes in the brain

and suggest that these interconnections do not depend on

strategic language processing. This automaticity is of great

importance for grounded models of language understanding,

as it fits well with the idea that sensorimotor interconnections

indeed may be functional for understanding, and not just a

mere by-product of strategic language processes.

Acknowledgements

We thank two anonymous reviewers for very helpful and

detailed comments on previous versions of this manuscript.

This research was supported by a Margarete-von-Wrangell

Fellowship appointed to Carolin Dudschig (European Social

Fund and the Ministry of Science, Research and the Arts

Baden-Wurttemberg) and by the SFB833/B4 project of Barbara

Kaup (German Research Foundation).

Appendix

Material.

UP-Words: Adler (eagle) Alpen (alps) Ballon (balloon) Berg

(mountain) Burg (castle) Dach (roof) Dachbalken (roof beam)

Decke (ceiling) Drachen (kite) Empore (gallery) Falke (falcon)

Flugzeug (airplane) Gebirge (mountains) Giebel (gable) Gipfel

(peak) Palme (palm) Sonne (sun) Spitze (summit) Himmel (sky)

Hochebene (high plateau) Hochhaus (skyscraper) Hochland

(upland) Hochseil (high wire) Hochsitz (high seat) H€ohe

(height) H€ohepunkt (top) Komet (comet) Krone (crown) Mond

(moon) Nest (nest) Planet (planet) Satellit (satellite) Turm

(tower) Vogel (bird) Vogelnest (bird's nest) Weltall (outer

space) Wolke (cloud) Zeppelin (zeppelin) Stern (star) Ufo (ufo).

DOWN-Words: Abgrund (abysm) Boden (ground) Erde

(earth) Erdreich (soil) Fluss (river) Flussbett (river bed) Fuß

(foot) Fußboden (floor) Fußsohle (sole of foot) Gehweg (pave-

ment) Gruft (crypt) H€olle (hell) Katakombe (catacomb) Keller

(celler) Klee (trefoil) Maulwurf (mole) Maus (mouse) Pfutze

(puddle) Schienen (rails) Schlucht (canyon) Schotter (mac-

adam) Sohle (sole) Grab (grave) Graben (ditch) Stein (stone)

Gras (gras) Straße (street) Sumpf (bog) Taucher (diver) Teppich

(carpet) Tiefe (lowness) Tumpel (pool) Tunnel (tunnel) U-Bahn

(underground) U-Boot (submarine) Erdloch (hole in the

ground) Untergrund (underground) Unterwelt (underworld)

Wurm (worm) Wurzel (root).

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