lack of situational awareness and resulting consequential impacts throughout the response of...
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Lack of Situational Awareness and Resulting Consequential Impacts Throughout the Response to Hurricane Katrina
August 2005
By
By: Joanne Robery – De Souza
Submitted as Research paper for MSEM course “Emergency Management Operations”
Massachusetts Maritime AcademyBuzzards Bay, MA 27 December 2016
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Introduction.
Hurricane Katrina has been classified as one of the most catastrophic disasters to ever
have impacted the United States when it struck the Gulf Coast as a Category 5 on Monday,
August 29, 2005. This introductory will cover the entirety of timeline events during the
unfolding of Hurricane Katrina enabling topic support on the issue of lacking situational
awareness and its consequential impacts before, during, and after the disaster.
On Tuesday August 23, 2005 at approximately 4:00 PM, Tropical Depression 12
developed 200 miles “southeast of Nassau in the Bahamas” (Committee on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.67). By Thursday, August 25, the tropical storm elevated into
a hurricane that was named “Katrina”. While Katrina was still 15 miles off the east coast of
Florida, reports produced by the National Hurricane Center (“NHC”) predicted Katrina would
make landfall “between Mobile, Alabama, and Grand Isle, Louisiana” (Committee on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.67) and strengthen as it neared the Gulf of Mexico.
Katrina hit Florida that same Thursday as a Category 1 hurricane.
By Friday August 25, Katrina’s direction was westward and had advanced into a
Category 2 hurricane. On the afternoon of the 25th, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and
Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour both declared a State of Emergency and activated the
National Guard for each of their states. The NHC issued another forecast detailing the direction
of Katrina’s westward track and predicted development into a Category 4 hurricane hitting the
Louisiana-Mississippi area by Monday, August 29th.
Hurricane Katrina had developed into a Category 3 hurricane with a report by the NHC
that predicted direct impact on New Orleans by Saturday, August 27. Around 6:00 AM, FEMA
implemented a 24-hour watch operation from headquarters in Washington DC to track the storm.
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Around approximately 7:30 AM, The National Weather Service (“NWS”) held teleconferences
with Louisiana state and local officials to inform them that Katrina is predicted to directly hit the
metropolitan New Orleans area. The Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan was implemented
and evacuation operations began an hour after the NWS brief urging citizens, especially those in
coastal areas, to evacuate.
During the afternoon of the 27th, Governor Blanco requests a federal disaster declaration
for Louisiana for assistance under the Stafford Act which was immediately granted by President
Bush. During a press conference with Governor Blanco, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin
declared a state of disaster issuing a voluntary evacuation and stated that the Superdome would
open at approximately 8:00 AM the following Sunday for shelter.
Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”) located in Baton Rouge implemented
24-hour operations by 2:00 PM. Around 7:00 PM, NWS issued warnings to the City of New
Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness that levees throughout New Orleans could be
overtopped. Thirty minutes later, NHC Director Max Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco,
Barbour, and Mayor Nagin about Katrina’s possible impact. Mississippi issues mandatory
evacuations for three coastal counties closest to the hurricane impact zone, Hancock, Harrison,
and Jackson. By 10:00 PM, the NHC issued the “first official storm-surge for Katrina, predicting
surge flooding of 15 to 20 feet above normal tides and locally as high as 25 feet (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.68).
President Bush declared federal emergency declarations for Mississippi, Alabama and
Florida on Sunday, August 28. By this time, Hurricane Katrina’s strength has increased
exponentially with an advisory report from the NHC stating that Katrina reached Category 5
strength with winds of 160 mph. At 8:00 AM as planned, the Superdome was opened on the 28th
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as a shelter for special needs populations who could not evacuate. By 9:30 AM, Mayor Nagin
ordered the evacuation of Orleans Parish.
Around 11:00 AM during a teleconference that was held with “the President, DHS
headquarters, FEMA headquarters, FEMA’s regional offices, and representatives from
Louisiana, and Mississippi” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,
pg.68) during which the National Hurricane Director Max Mayfield stated that the levees could
potentially overtop. By 12:00 PM, the Superdome opened as a last resort refuge. At
approximately 4:00 PM, the first forecast regarding the levees in New Orleans was released
warning people that levees could be overtopped.
Monday, August 29, around approximately 12:47 AM, DHS sent an email detailing the
storms potential impact to the White House’s Homeland Security Operations Center (“HSOC”).
From 6:10 AM until 7:00 AM, Hurricane Katrina’s eye “makes landfall at Buras on the
Louisiana coast between Grand Isle and the mouth of the Mississippi River.” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). Water from levees on the east bank of
the river ran over the levees on the west side that caused flooding throughout neighborhoods in
Plaquemines Parish. Catastrophic flooding was evident as Katrina made her way across
southeast Louisiana. Levees became overtopped in east Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes
alongside “breaking of the Industrial Canal levees, and breaks in the 17 th Street and London
Avenue Canal floodwalls” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,
pg.69). During this time, the roof of the Superdome started leaking, the air conditioner was
damaged, and plumbing was destroyed in all levels but the first floor.
Katrina made landfall in Mississippi on the 29th around approximately 10:00 AM with a
storm surge of 20 feet. By the afternoon, New Orleans and Mississippi area first responders had
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lost their communication systems. Around the same time, Search and Rescue missions began
and incorporated the “U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans Police and Fire Departments, the
Louisiana National Guard, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries” (Committee
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). The evening of the 29 th, FEMA
Director Brown promised 500 buses to Governor Blanco to be delivered on August 30th.
On Tuesday, August 30, the New Orleans Convention Center was opened as a refuge for
the public. By 10:30 AM, the decision for the U.S. Northern Command was given to move assets
to the Gulf Coast in order for military assistance to be provided. At approximately 4:00 PM,
“U.S. Army Lieutenant General Russel Honoré is designated Commander of Joint Task Force
Katrina” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). At this point
in time, conditions inside the stadium worsened due to the large crowd, no air circulation, and
poor sanitation. Hurricane Katrina was declared an “incident of national significance”
(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69) by DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff. Chertoff then designated Michael Brown “as the Principal Federal Official
(PFO) to manage the response and recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).
On Wednesday, August 31, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida and Alabama are declared a
public health emergency by Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary Michael Leavitt.
Around 1:30 AM the same morning, FEMA assigned Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to
ship school buses to New Orleans in response to an Executive Order issued by Governor Blanco.
Around 2:30 PM, Governor Blanco and President Bush discussed “the need for military
assistance and the Governor’s command of the Louisiana National Guard in a Unified-command-
structure” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).
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By 10:00 AM Thursday, September 1, buses were evacuating the public from the
Superdome. That evening, Colonel Terry Ebbert (New Orleans Director of Homeland Security &
Public Safety) requested the evacuation of the Convention Center with efforts from the Louisiana
National Guard.
On Friday, September 2nd, President Bush made a first visit to the states impacted by
Katrina and met with the governors of Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi and “Mayor Nagin in
New Orleans” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). During
President Bush’s meeting with Governor Blanco they discussed “command and control for the
military response” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).
The White House sent Governor Blanco a proposal to appoint “a dual-status commander who
would be an active-duty military officer and who would exercise command and control on behalf
of the governor over National Guard forces and on behalf of the President over federal active
duty forces” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).
On Saturday, September 3, Governor Blanco declined the dual-status proposal to retain
command and control of the National Guard in Louisiana. An additional 7,200 troops are ordered
to the Gulf Coast by the President to help with response efforts. Both evacuations of the
Superdome and the Convention Center are completed this same day.
Response Problem.
Situational awareness is the necessary and required responsibility of all emergency
managers or agencies/entities directly involved and engaged with the emergency management
components (protection, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation). They
must be able to identify, process and understand crucial pieces of information in regards to what
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is happening around them to successfully accomplish objectives and goals pertinent to the
overall mission.
Lack of situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina impacted all aspects of the
response resulting in catastrophic consequences. Lack of planning and initiative for credible
information lead to a lack of situational awareness. Numerous consequences arose from this
including; stalled response and resource/personnel allocation and delivery; confusion with
regards to responsibility, operations and mission objectives/goals; poor coordination among
stakeholders; poor communications leading to failure of critical information sharing. Albeit, the
worst consequence due to lack of situational awareness was the overall failure in response to
Katrina.
This problem is evident throughout all phases of Hurricane Katrina. The problem of
lacking situational awareness for Federal Governmental agencies and entities will be broken
down in this paper discussed below.
Impacts from Lack of Situational Awareness – Federal Government.
Homeland Security Operations Center:
Within the Department of Homeland Security is the Homeland Security Operations
Center (“HSOC”) that was created to serve as “the nation’s nerve center for information sharing
and domestic incident management” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
2006, pg.303). By this time, DHS was still a newly created department and Hurricane Katrina
was the first test for the HSOC. The HSOC failed in its handling of the Hurricane Katrina
situation. This failure was due to an overall lack of situational awareness about Katrina’s storm
movement alongside initiative to compile and prioritize information.
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Since Hurricane Katrina was declared an incident of national significance, the HSOC was
tasked with writing and issuing Situational Reports (“sitreps”) at 5:00 AM and 5:00 PM
containing information vital to the comprehension of the incident. In addition to sitreps, HSOC
was tasked with issuing ‘Spot Reports’ on breaking news in between the sitrep distribution
period. The HSOC collected components of information directly from FEMA and other
government agencies and entities to compile information and form reports. Customers that read
the sitrep and Spot Reports included the White House alongside DHS leadership.
HSOC failed in its mission of obtaining and recognizing critical information and reports.
Throughout the day on the 29th, reports were created by the National Weather Service (“NWS”),
White House Homeland Security Council, Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center,
alongside other agencies that described devastating effects of Katrina. Out of fifteen reports, only
seven were received by the HSOC with most these reports issued by the NWS. “These reports
contained some of the earliest indications of levee breaches and catastrophic flooding and were
readily available, NWS’s parent agency, the National Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
maintains a desk in the HSOC” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
2006, pg.307).
Another example of the complete lack of situational awareness was HSOC’s being
completely unaware about the situation at the Convention Center in New Orleans. Media reports
went out Wednesday (August 31) night and video reports were aired Thursday (September 1)
morning of the thousands at the Convention Center and the horrific conditions they were in.
“HSOC reports do not even mention the situation until Friday [September 2] morning”
(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.311). There was even
confusion among DHS leadership mixing up the Superdome with the Convention Center.
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“Skepticism toward media reports in a crisis makes sense, but these were backed up by
video, and media-based reports to DHS leadership and the White House could have
included appropriate caveats. Instead, DHS and the HSOC did not forward media reports,
which left the country’s leadership woefully uninformed” (Committee on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.311).
HSOC also lacked initiative to ensure that the informational sources they were retrieving
information from was credible. A lot of reliance regarding the situation in New Orleans was
based upon Media reports from which information was derived. HSOC took this information as
automatically credible to compile their reports. Media personnel could access only certain areas
(such those areas not as devastated as others due to flooding) creating an illusion further
supporting the perspective that the situation was not as catastrophic as it realistically was.
Failure to obtain relevant, credible, and real time situational information had direct
impacts on the reports sent out by HSOC. Governmental, state, and local agencies/emergency
managers reading these reports would think the situation in New Orleans was not as dire as it
really was. “The 5.pm. sitrep [sent out by HSOC] reflected few of the facts – and none of the
urgency – conveyed by these reports” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs 2006, pg.307).
The impact of poor reports jeopardized adequate response measures that could have been
coordinated and implemented faster in an organized manner to the areas in New Orleans
devastated most. Thus, faster implementation of response operations could have saved more
lives.
DHS Leadership:
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After the 5:00 P.M. sitrep, informational reports were continuously being produced and
issued on the 29th detailing the increasing devastation in New Orleans including the levee
breaches and flooding. Compiling this information, HSOC created and distributed three Spot
Reports via email to those on their email distribution list. Please note that the Spot Reports
created after the 5:00 PM sitrep by HSOC described more accurately the damages occurring in
New Orleans.
Two issues arose with distribution by email; the first being the email distribution list. Not
all pertinent stakeholders were on the distribution list and therefore did not have direct access to
these Spot Reports. The second issue was timeliness of when these reports were accessed. Due
to this, situational awareness was solely dependent upon the timeliness of when the person would
access and read their email. “Though the three Spot Reports listed above were widely distributed
by email, few DHS witnesses recalled seeing them” (Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.309). Further complicating matters, HSOC “made no effort to
ensure that DHS leadership or the White House actually reviewed and understood the messages,
or that they received this critical information” (Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.309).
DHS witnesses including those personnel on the email distribution list for the Spot
Reports stated that they did not know the catastrophic situation in New Orleans or that the levees
had been breached on the Monday Katrina struck until the following Tuesday morning.
Concurrently,
“DHS witnesses suggested that the reports of flooding [that were] received during the day were
‘typical,’ ‘expected,’ ‘standard,’ and the ‘normal typical hurricane background stuff’”
(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.310). Thus, DHS also was
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not concerned with the seriousness of the situation and further dismissed the reports that were
received and of which contained accurate information.
Lacking concern and situational awareness on the part of DHS personnel impacted
response operations directly. Had DHS leadership known earlier that Monday, immediate
measures could have been taken to begin planning for and coordinating response operations by
necessary governmental agencies. Concurrently, had DHS comprehended and paid attention to
the catastrophic events described in accurate reports that they in fact received and read,
governmental agencies would have acted and responded instead of remaining complacent.
However, due to the late access of information and lack of concern, no planning took place
resulting in the ultimate failure to respond adequately the day Hurricane Katrina hit.
Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FEMA failed to provide DHS and the HSOC with critical information in a timely
manner. The HSOC relied heavily upon FEMA for information to compile reports while DHS
required accurate, timely situational information to coordinate correct and necessary response
procedures. The following excerpt describes clearly the lack of initiative on FEMA PFO Michael
Brown’s part:
“Though Brown testified that he provided reports to the White House at several points
during the day of landfall, he did not call Secretary Chertoff because in his view ‘It
would have wasted my time’. He appears not to have communicated with the HSOC at all
about conditions on the ground. It appears also that several significant e-mails were not
forwarded to the HSOC.” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
2006, pg.312)
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Due to FEMA being uncooperative (on PFO Michael Brown’s part) to supply the HSOC
with necessary information from the situation on the ground during Hurricane Katrina, the
HSOC could not compile accurate information to form reports. The whole element of
information sharing creates a kind of ripple effect. Poor/uncooperative communication efforts
lead to lack of accurate information, inaccurate information leads to poor reports, poor reports
result in uninformed Governmental and State agencies. Uninformed Government and State
leadership ends up in slow response/operation efforts.
Addressing Lack of Situational Awareness During Response.
The problem of lacking situational awareness and preparedness on the part of the Federal
Government was not directly evident as the disaster was unfolding. Although the accrual,
compiling, production, and dissemination of situational information was practiced all throughout
Hurricane Katrina, gaps in situational awareness on the part of HSOC, DHS Leadership, and
FEMA (among other agencies/entities) was not completely comprehended until After Action
Reports and reviews of the response to Hurricane Katrina were completed.
The Federal Government was unprepared for the catastrophic disaster that Hurricane
Katrina was as there was no plan in place to deal with all the complexities that were brought
about. Pieces of the puzzle as to why there was such failure in response to Katrina came to light
through these After Action Reports linking such failures and mistakes to many government
agencies/entities. All of them shared a piece of the puzzle. From the realization of these mistakes
came lessons learned that have been documented and recommendations created that may be
practiced and implemented in response to future disasters.
Report Recommendations.
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Core Recommendation #4 is derived from the Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs National Level report “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared”.
The overall mission of Core Recommendation #4 is to “build a true, Government-wide
Operations Center to provide enhanced situational awareness and manage interagency
coordination in a disaster” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,
pg.612). First addressed is the problem of how HSOC failed in its attempts to maintain
situational awareness and ensure DHS leadership had access to accurate and credible information
throughout Katrina.
During federal government response to incidents of national significance, many of these
agencies/entities who share a role in managing emergencies run into the issue of duplicated
responsibilities and efforts. “Currently multiplicity of interagency coordinating structures with
overlapping missions attempt to facilitate an integrated federal response” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).
To limit confusion and reduce duplicated response efforts, the first recommendation
introduces three governmental structures be consolidated into one agency; the Homeland
Security Operations Center (“HSOC”), the National Response Coordination Center (“NRCC”),
and the Interagency Incident Management Group (“IIMG”) joined together to form a new
National Operations Center (“NOC”).
The NOC would be located within the Department of Homeland Security and should
include all pertinent and relevant federal government agencies. The Operations Center should
have the mission of compiling and processing information ensuring situational awareness
throughout the government providing “operational coordination through agency mission
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assignments and the NRP’s Emergency Support Function (‘ESF’) process” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).
Information sharing should be implemented whereby relevant federal, state, and local
government command centers send critical information to the NOC creating a “common
operating picture not just for DHS, but for the entire federal government, as well as states and
local jurisdictions involved in an incident” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs 2006, pg.612).
The NOC should provide a clearly defined emergency management communication
system operating both ways between states and the federal government. “DHS should work with
the NOC to develop protocols for disseminating information on the status of relief efforts to
decision makers, responders, the private sector, and affected individuals” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).
The second recommendation offered is to replace the IIMG with permanent policy staff
“composed of detailees from relevant federal agencies” (Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612) to conduct planning and help resolve conflicts among
different federal agencies/entities. Conflicts that remain unresolved would be forwarded to
higher-ups for resolution. From here, the NOC’s analytic team would sift through information to
determine which pieces would “become part of the common operating picture” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).
The third recommendation is focused on the improved performance in preparation for
future disasters. Strict protocols and procedures should be established by the NOC ensuring
reports sent out are received and reviewed by the relevant customer(s) within a timely manner.
When potential for a major disaster is recognized, plans should be implemented by the NOC for
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“obtaining post-disaster situational awareness, including identifying sources of information and
data particular to the region in which the disaster may occur” and when required, bringing on
individuals who have knowledge and are familiar about that specific region.
Personal Recommendations.
After extensive research on the federal government’s lack of situational awareness in
response to Hurricane Katrina, I have formed some of my own recommendations that may be
implemented for overall improvement for future disasters.
1.) An Emergency Operations Plan should be created and practiced by the HSOC to increase
capacity and capability dealing with tracking and compilation of the complex, continuous
inward/outward flow of information and data that comes with large catastrophic incidents
such as Hurricane Katrina.
2.) Federal Government agencies (such as HSOC, DHS, FEMA) responsible for the compilation
and dissemination of critical, time-sensitive information prior to, during, and after an incident
of national significance should identify and monitor local sources of information.
3.) During times of Crisis, the HSOC should work to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the
“Spot Reports” sent out in between the 5:00 PM and 5:00 AM Situational Reports.
4.) FEMA must work to cooperate with HSOC alongside other government agencies and
personnel to ensure the accurate and timely sharing of critical information to create
situational awareness among relevant leadership.
5.) Attention to detail should be paid to Situational Reports as they are written. Situational
Reports should not only convey facts of the situation but represent the entire scope of the
events and impact endured from the incident. If relevant, urgency must be intertwined within
the language of the document to convey the seriousness of a situation.
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Conclusion.
Lacking situational awareness on the part of the Federal Government directly impacted
all aspects of the response to Hurricane Katrina. The lack of planning on the Government’s part
lead to gaps in response efforts. There was also no initiative to seek and confirm credible sources
that further complicated the process resulting in poor situational awareness due to inaccurate
information.
Confusion among DHS leadership, the White House, HSOC, FEMA and other pertinent
government agencies/entities in regards to accurate information and responsibilities exacerbated
efforts that could have been more productive had the initial response been handled more
carefully from the get-go. The consequences from lack of situational awareness on the Federal
Government’s part lead to a trickle-down effect whereby State and local responders and other
relevant entities/personnel were directly impacted. One stone cast into the water creates
continuous ripples emanating from the main source that do not stop until they reach solid land.
Therefore, the ripples (response efforts of state/local entities/personnel) which emanate from the
main source of where the rock landed (Federal Government’s response efforts) cannot be directly
quantified. Once the ripples strike land however, the impacts from the ripples hitting the
shoreline may be studied and evaluations may be formed (mistakes identified/lessons
learned/recommendations).
“It may never be known for certain how the lack of awareness contributed to the overall
failure of the federal government to respond adequately in a timely manner” (Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.303).
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References:
Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (2006). 109th Congress 2nd Session. Special Report 109-322. “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared”. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Retrieved from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt322/pdf/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf
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