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LABREL | CASE DIGEST | ART 285

CASE TITLE: ELSA S. MALIG-ON vs. EQUITABLE GENERAL SERVICES, INC.KEYWORDS: constructive dismissalDOCTRINE: The rule in termination cases is that the employer bears the burden of proving that he dismissed his employee for a just cause. And, when the employer claims that the employee resigned from work, the burden is on the employer to prove that he did so willingly. Whether that is the case would largely depend on the circumstances surrounding such alleged resignation. Those circumstances must be consistent with the employees intent to give up work.

FACTS: Petitioner Elsa Malig-on (Malig-on) claimed that on March 4, 1996 respondent Equitable General Services, Inc. (the company) hired her as janitress in its janitorial services. The company paid her P250.00 per day for a nine-hour work. After six years or on February 15, 2002 Malig-ons immediate supervisor told her that the company would be assigning her to another client. But it never did despite several follow-ups that she made. Eight months later or on October 15, 2002 the company told Malig-on that she had to file a resignation letter before it would reassign her. She complied but the company reneged on its undertaking, prompting Malig-on to file a complaint against it for illegal dismissal.The company denied Malig-ons allegations. It claimed that she just stopped reporting for work on February 16, 2002 without giving any reason. Consequently, the company wrote her two letters, first on August 23, 2002 and again on September 2, 2002, asking her to explain her continued absence. On October 15, 2002 Malig-on showed up at the companys office and submitted her resignation letter.ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner Malig-on abandoned her work and eventually resigned from it rather than that respondent company constructively dismissed her.HELD: YES, Malig-on did not abandon but rather was constructively dismissed by the employer.According to the company, Malig-on simply dropped out of sight one day on February 16, 2002 for no reason at all. Eight months later or on October 15, 2002 she appeared at the companys office and tendered her resignation. To the companys surprise, three days later or on October 18, 2002 she went to the NLRC office and filed her complaint against the company for illegal dismissal. Clearly, however, these circumstances do not sound consistent with resignation freely made.First, when Malig-on reportedly dropped out of sight and the company had no idea about the reason for it, the natural and right thing for it to do was investigate why she had suddenly vanished. Indeed, the company needed to write Malig-on immediately and ask her to explain in writing why she should not be considered to have abandoned her job so the company may be cleared of its responsibility as employer. This did not happen here.Second, if Malig-on had abandoned her work and had no further interest in it, there was no reason for her to suddenly show up at her former place of work after eight months and file her resignation letter. Her action would make sense only if, as she claimed, she had been on floating status for over six months and the company promised to give her a new assignment if she would go through the process of resigning and reapplying.And, third, that Malig-on went to the NLRC to file a complaint for unjust dismissal just three days after she filed her alleged resignation letter is inconsistent with genuine resignation. It would make sense only if, as Malig-on claims, the company tricked her into filing for resignation upon a promise to give her a new work assignment and failed to deliver such promise.The company evidently placed Malig-on on floating status after being relieved as janitress in a clients workplace. But, as the Court has repeatedly ruled, such act of off-detailing Malig-on was not the equivalent of dismissal so long as her floating status did not continue beyond a reasonable time. But, when it ran up to more than six months, the company may be considered to have constructively dismissed her from work, that is, as of August 16, 2002. Thus, her purported resignation on October 15, 2002 could not have been legally possible.The company of course claims that it gave Malig-on notices on August 23, 2002 and September 2, 2002, asking her to explain her failure to report for work and informing her that the company would treat such failure as lack of interest in it, respectively. But these notices cannot possibly take the place of the notices required by law. They came more than six months after the company placed her on floating status and, consequently, the company gave her those notices after it had constructively dismissed her from work.

CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE VS TORRES G.R. No. 189456 April 2, 2014PEREZ, J.:

KEYWORD: Constructive Dismissal, Teacher in Chiang Kai Shek, ResignationDOCTRINE: There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.

FACTS: Respondent Rosalinda Torres is a grade school teacher in Chiang Kai Shek College. She was accused of leaking a copy of a special quiz given to Grade 5 students of HEKASI. Petitioners learned about the leakage from one of the teachers of HEKASI, Aileen Benabese (Ms. Benabese). Ms. Benabese narrated that after giving a special quiz, she borrowed the book of one of her students, Aileen Anduyan (Aileen), for the purpose of making an answer key. When she opened Aileens book, a piece of paper fell. Said paper turned out to be a copy of the same quiz she had just given and the same already contained answers. Ms. Benabese informed the schools Assistant Supervisor about the incident. Mrs. Koo who is also in charge of HEKASI AREA confronted respondent, who had initially denied leaking the test paper but later on admitted that she gave the test paper to Mrs. Teresita Anduyan, her co-teacher and the mother of Aileen. Respondent explained that she was busy checking the writing workbook when Mrs. Anduyan borrowed her special quiz for HEKASI 5. Thereafter, when she left the Faculty Room for her class, she was not aware that Mrs. Anduyan did not return the copy of the special quiz back to her. Neither did she hand over a copy of the test questions with the answers already indicated therein. Also, she expressed her concern that Mrs. Anduyan could have taken a copy of the test paper without her permission and without her knowledge.Mrs. Anduyan denied that she asked for the special quiz from respondent and that the latter forgot about the paper that she allegedly took. She averred that the respondent willingly handed over her the quiz so that she could see the copy of it. Administrative Hearing: the Investigating Committee found respondent and Mrs. Anduyan guilty of committing a grave offense of the school policies by leaking a special quiz. The Committee had actually decided to terminate respondent but respondent pleaded for a change of punishment from termination to suspension of one month without pay and forfeiture of all the benefits. Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal suspension with the Labor Arbiter. She also sought payment of unpaid salary, backwages, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, damages and attorneys fees.Petitioners Contention: As per respondents letter, she offered to voluntarily resign at the end of the school year, provided that her punishment be changed from termination to suspension. Petitioners claim that respondent, who was faced with immediate termination of her employment, bargained for a better exit. Petitioners deny forcing, coercing or pressuring respondent into writing said letter.Respondents Contention: She averred that petitioner forced her to write the written request for a change of the action on the charges against her, from dismissal to suspension and eventual resignation. Respondent reiterates that she never intended to resign but due to intense pressure from individual petitioner who threatened that she will not receive her monetary benefits, she was pressured to write the alleged resignation letter.Labor Arbiter: Dismissed respondents complaint. The Labor Arbiter held that there was no constructive dismissal because respondent was not coerced nor pressured to write her resignation letter.NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiters findings but ordering petitioners to pay respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service on the grounds of equity and social justice.Court of Appeals: Reversed the NLRC Decision and Resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner did not voluntarily resign but was constructively dismissed. The appellate court cited respondents years in service; her consistent denials of the accusations against her; her alleged resignation letter which did not contain any reason for her resignation; and the unsigned memorandum of termination which militate against the voluntariness of resignation. The appellate court also foreclosed any interpretation that respondent was validly dismissed for a just cause because respondent was already meted the penalty of suspension without pay and forfeiture of her bonuses. The appellate court found it unjust to penalize respondent twice for the same offense.ISSUE: whether or not the schools act of imposing the penalty of suspension instead of immediate dismissal from service in exchange for the employees resignation at the end of the school year, constitutes constructive dismissalHELD : NO. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather than stay employed. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.Given the indications of voluntary resignation, the Court ruled that there is no constructive dismissal in this case. There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.There was here no discrimination committed by petitioners. While respondent did not tender her resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did not give her any other option. With due process, she was found to have committed the grave offense of leaking test questions. Dismissal from employment was the justified equivalent penalty. Having realized that, she asked for, and was granted, not just a deferred imposition of, but also an acceptable cover for the penalty. The fact that she waited until the close of the school year to challenge her impending resignation demonstrate that respondent had bargained for a graceful exit and is now trying to renege on her obligation. Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio accordingly noted that petitioners should not be punished for being compassionate and granting respondent's request for a lower penalty. Put differently, respondent should not be rewarded for reneging on her promise to resign at the end of the school year. Otherwise, employers placed in similar situations would no longer extend compassion to employees. Compromise agreements, like that in the instant case, which lean towards desired liberality that favor labor, would be discouraged. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTEDVICTORINO OPINALDO, Petitioner, v. NARCISA RAVINA, Respondent.

Facts :Respondent Narcisa Ravina (Ravina) is the general manager and sole proprietor of St. Louisse Security Agency (the Agency). Petitioner Victorino Opinaldo (Opinaldo) is a security guard who had worked for the Agency until his alleged illegal dismissal by respondent.The Agency hired the services of petitioner assigned him to PAIJR Furniture Accessories (PAIJR) in Mandaue City.however, the owner of PAIJR submitted a written complaint to respondent stating request to relieve one of company guard and SG. VICTORINO B. OPINALDO For the reason that He is no longer physically fit to perform his duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health condition.Acceding to PAIJRs request, respondent relieved petitioner from his work. Respondent also required petitioner to submit a medical certificate to prove that he is physically and mentally fit for work as security guard.respondent reassigned petitioner to Gomez Construction at Mandaue City after working for a period of two weeks for Gomez Construction and upon receipt of his salary for services rendered within the said two-week period, petitioner ceased to report for work.The records show that petitioners post at Gomez Construction was the last assignment given to him by respondent.petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office in Cebu City for underpayment of salary and nonpayment of other labor standard benefits. The parties agreed to settle and reached a compromise agreement. After almost four weeks from the settlement of the case, petitioner returned to respondents office . Petitioner claims that when he asked respondent to sign an SSS11 Sickness Notification which he was going to use in order to avail of the discounted fees for a medical check- up, respondent allegedly refused and informed him that he was no longer an employee of the Agency. Respondent allegedly told him that when he signed the quitclaim and release form at the DOLE Regional Office, she already considered him to have quit his employment.

Respondent, on the other hand, counterclaims that she did not illegally dismiss petitioner and that it was a valid exercise of management prerogative that he was not given any assignment pending the submission of the required medical certificate of his fitness to work.

LA ruled that it was illegal dismissalNLRC affirmedCA reversed and uphold that the act of employer is valid excercise of management prerogatives.

Issue: whether or not the dismissal is valid.

Held:We disagree, Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the right of the employer to have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative where the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form. However, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. Hence, in the exercise of its management prerogative, an employer must ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the words of petitioner, he had been on a floating status42 for three months. Within this period, petitioner did not have any work assignment from respondent who proffers the excuse that he has not submitted the required medical certificate. While it is a management prerogative to require petitioner to submit a medical certificate, we hold that respondent cannot withhold petitioners employment without observing the principles of due process and fair play. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: (1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and, (2) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act. None of these elements is present in the case at bar.

5. SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. and SKIPPERS MARITIME SERVICES, INC., LTD. v. NATHANIEL DOZA, NAPOLEON DE GRACIA, ISIDRO L. LATA, and CHARLIE APROSTAG.R. No. 175558 February 8, 2012 Carpio, J.

Case Doctrine: Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.

Termination by employee ; No written notice ; SeafarersFACTS: Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De Gracia, Lata, and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star. De Gracia, et al. claimed that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments for almost five months, compelling them to air their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Free Union.Subsequently, De Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV Wisdom Stars and immediately repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, De Gracia, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioners contentions: One day, De Gracia, et al. arrived in the masters cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments due to them. This is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which however bears conflicting dates. Skippers also admitted non-payment of home allotment for one month but prayed for the offsetting of such amount with the repatriation expenses stating that since De Gracia, et al. pre-terminated their contracts, they are liable for their repatriation expenses in accordance with Section 19(G) of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which states that A seaman who requests for early termination of his contract shall be liable for his repatriation cost as well as the transportation cost of his replacement.x x x

LA: The Labor Arbiter dismissed De Gracia, et al.s complaint for illegal dismissal because the seafarers voluntarily pre-terminated their employment contracts by demanding for immediate repatriation due to dissatisfaction with the ship. The Labor Arbiter held that such voluntary pre-termination of employment contract is akin to resignation, a form of termination by employee of his employment contract under Article 285 of the Labor Code.NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.CA: The CA declared the Labor Arbiter and NLRC to have committed grave abuse of discretion when they relied upon the telex message of the captain of the vessel stating that De Gracia, et al. voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and demanded immediate repatriation. The telex message was a self-serving document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. For this reason, the repatriation of De Gracia, et al. prior to the expiration of their contracts showed they were illegally dismissed from employment.

ISSUE: Was there a pre-termination by the respondents-workers, De Gracia, et. al, of their own employment contract?

RULING: NO, there was no termination of employment contract by the respondents-workers. Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.In the present case, there was no written notice served by De Gracia, et. al on Skippers to evidence their alleged resignation. The telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the document.

Consequently, For a workers dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al. regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al. were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract akin to resignation and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is a biased and self-serving document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. If, indeed, De Gracia, et al. voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al. should have submitted their written resignations. For these reasons, the dismissal of De Gracia, et al. was illegal.

SHS PERFORATED MATERIALS VERSUS DIAZ

Mendoza, J. Constructive dismissal, probationary employeeDOCTRINE: Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right of all workers to security of tenure.In using the expression all workers, the Constitution puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee. This means that probationary employees cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees

FACTS: SHS Perforated Materials, Inc., is a start-up corporation registered with PEZA. Petitioner Winfred Harmannshenn, a German national, is its president, in which capacity he determines the administration and direction of the day-to-day operations of SHS. Hinrich Johann Schumacher, treasurer and one of the board of directors, is duly authorized to pay bills, payrolls, and other just debts. He is also the EVP of the European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Both entities have an arrangement where ECCP handles the payroll requirements of SHS to simplify business operations and minimize operational expenses.

Manuel Diaz was hired by SHS as Manager for Business Development on probationary status. He was also instructed by Hartmannshenn to report to SHS office and plant at least 2 days every work week to observe technical processes in the manufacturing of perforated materials. Hartmannshenn expressed dissatisfaction over his poor performance as he failed to make any concrete business proposal or implement specific measures to improve the productivity. In numerous emails, Diaz acknowledged his poor performance and offered to resign.

Hartmannshenn arrived in the Philippines from Germany but Diaz did not show up. The next day, Diaz served a demand letter and a resignation letter for his salary was unpaid and is still currently being withheld albeit illegally. Diaz, on the evening, met Hartmannshenn. The latter averred that Diaz was unable to give a proper explanation for his behavior and accepted his resignation letter, and consequently demanded to surrender all company property. He agreed to the exit conditions through electronic mail but later appealed for the release of the salary. To settle the issue amicably, SHS counsel advised that a check had been prepared but Diaz did not pick his check. Hence, he was dismissed.

Labor Arbiter:LA found that he was constructively dismissed because of the withholding of his salary and had no alternative but to resign because he could not be expected to continue working for an employer who withheld wages without valid cause. LA also held that probationary employment of Diaz as deemed regularized because of failure to conduct a prior evaluation of his performance and to give notice two days prior to his termination.

NLRC: NLRC reversed the ruling and explained that it was a valid exercise of management prerogative. The act was deemed justified since it was reasonable to demand an explanation for failure to report to work and to account for his work accomplishments. Consequently, he could not have been regularized having voluntarily resigned prior to the completion of the probationary period.

COURT OF APPEALS:CA reversed the ruling of NLRC as salary is not a valid exercise of management prerogative. As a probationary employee entitled to security of tenure, he was illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:Whether or not Diaz is a probationary employee who voluntarily resigned prior to the expiration of the probation period

RULING: What made it impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely for Diaz to continue working for the company was the unlawful withholding of his salary. There is no sufficient proof that would warrant the failure of Diaz to be present in the companys factories. It is significant to note here, that Diaz prepared and served his resignation letter right after he was informed that his salary was being withheld. It would be absurd to require Diaz to tolerate the withholding of his salary for a longer period before his employment can be considered as so impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as to constitute constructive dismissal. These circumstances are contrary to voluntary resignation and bolster the finding of constructive dismissal.

Respondent was constructively dismissed and, therefore, illegally dismissed.Although respondent was a probationary employee, he was still entitled to security of tenure.Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right of all workers to security of tenure.In using the expression all workers, the Constitution puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee. This means that probationary employees cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees.

Probationary employees who are unjustly dismissed during the probationary period are entitled to reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement.Respondent is, thus, entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, andother benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. GWENDELLYN ROSE S. GUCABANG.R. No. 153982 July 18, 2011KEYWORD/S: voluntary resignation; reorganization and streamlining plan;PONENTE: PERALTA, J.DOCTRINE: Resignation the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. FACTS:Respondent Gucaban, a licensed civil engineer, joined the workforce of petitioner San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. (SMPI) in 1991. Initially engaged as a construction management specialist, she, by her satisfactory performance on the job, was promoted in 1994 and 1995, respectively, to the position of technical services manager, and then of project development manager. As project development manager, she also sat as a member of the companys management committee. She had been in continuous service in the latter capacity until her severance from the company in February 1998.In her complaint for illegal dismissal filed on June 26, 1998, Gucaban alleged that her separation from service was practically forced upon her by management. She claimed that on January 27, 1998, she was informed by SMPIs President and Chief Executive Officer, Federico Gonzalez (Gonzalez), that the company was planning to reorganize its manpower in order to cut on costs, and that she must file for resignation or otherwise face termination. Three days later, the Human Resource Department allegedly furnished her a blank resignation form which she refused to sign. From then on, she had been hounded by Gonzalez to sign and submit her resignation letter.Gucaban complained of the ugly treatment which she had since received from Gonzalez and the management supposedly on account of her refusal to sign the resignation letter. She claimed she had been kept off from all the meetings of the management committee, and that on February 12, 1998, she received an evaluation report signed by Gonzalez showing that for the covered period she had been negligent and unsatisfactory in the performance of her duties. She found said report to be unfounded and unfair, because no less than the companys Vice-President for Property Management, Manuel Torres (Torres), in a subsequent memorandum, had actuallyvouched for her competence and efficiency on the job. She herself professed having been consistently satisfactory in her job performance as shown by her successive promotions in the company.[ It was supposedly the extreme humiliation and alienation that impelled her to submit a signed resignation letter on February 18, 1998Gucaban surmised that she had merely been tricked by SMPI into filing her resignation letter because it never actualized its reorganization and streamlining plan; on the contrary, SMPI allegedly expanded its employee population and also made new appointments and promotions to various other positions. She felt that she had been dismissed without cause and, hence, prayed for reinstatement and payment of backwages and damages.SMPI argued that it truly encountered a steep market decline in 1997 that necessitated cost-cutting measures and streamlining of its employee structure which, in turn, would require the abolition of certain job positions; Gucabans post as project development manager was one of such positions. As a measure of generosity, it allegedly proposed to Gucaban that she voluntarily resign from office in consideration of a financial package an offer for which Gucaban was supposedly given the first week of February 1998 to evaluate. Gucaban, however, did not communicate her acceptance of the offer and, instead, she allegedly conferred with the Human Resource Department and negotiated to augment her benefits package.SMPI claimed that Gucaban was able to grasp the favorable end of the bargain and, expectant of an even more generous benefits package, she voluntarily tendered her resignation effective February 27, 1998. On the day before her effective date of resignation, she signed a document denominated as Receipt and Release whereby she acknowledged receipt of P1,131,865.67 cash representing her monetary benefits and waived her right to demand satisfaction of any employment-related claims which she might have against management.Addressing in the affirmative the issue of whether the subject resignation was voluntary, the Labor Arbiter found no proven force, coercion, intimidation or any other circumstance which could otherwise invalidate Gucabans resignation. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Finding that Gucaban has been illegally dismissed, it ordered her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages, as well as ordered the award of damages and attorneys fees. SMPI elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The CA found partial merit in the petition. It affirmed the NLRCs finding of illegal/constructive dismissal, but modified the monetary award.ISSUE:Whether Gucaban voluntarily tendered her resignation following the presentation to her of the possibility of company reorganization and of the resulting abolition of her office as necessitated by the companys business losses at the time.RULING:No. Resignation the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. SMPI was unable to discharge this burden.It is not difficult to see that, shortly prior to and at the time of Gucabans alleged resignation, there was actually no genuine corporate restructuring plan in place as yet. In other words, although the company might have been suffering from losses due to market decline as alleged, there was still no concrete plan for a corporate reorganization at the time Gonzalez presented to Gucaban the seemingly last available alternative options of voluntary resignation and termination by abolition of her office. Certainly, inasmuch as the necessity of corporate reorganization generally lies within the exclusive prerogative of management, Gucaban at that point had no facility to ascertain the truth behind it, and neither was she in a position to question it right then and there. Indeed, she could not have chosen to file for resignation had SMPI not broached to her the possibility of her being terminated from service on account of the supposed reorganization. Another argument advanced by SMPI to support its claim that the resignation of Gucaban was voluntary is that the latter has actually been given ample time to weigh her options and was, in fact, able to negotiate with management for improved benefits. Again, this contention is specious as the same is not supported by the availing records. Indeed, as clarified by Gucaban, the increased benefits was the result of practice sanctioned and even encouraged by the mother company in favor of those availing of early retirement and that the increased basic monthly rate in the computation of the benefits is applied to April and retroacts to January.Besides, whether there have been negotiations or not, the irreducible fact remains that Gucabans separation from the company was the confluence of the fraudulent representation to her that her office would be declared redundant, coupled with the subsequent alienation which she suffered from the company by reason of her refusal to tender resignation. The element of voluntariness in her resignation is, therefore, missing. She had been constructively and, hence, illegally dismissed as indeed her continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely under the circumstances.

BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), INC. and JOSE YAP, JR.vs.AIDA C. APARECIO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONFACTS:Petitioner BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. (BMG) is engaged in the business of selling various audio records nationwide. It hired private respondent Aparecio as one of the promo girls in its Cebu branch, working from Monday to Sunday.The version of the petitioners follows:They narrate that Aparecio was initially performing well as an employee but as years passed by she seemed to be complacent in the performance of her job and had been comparing the salaries of promo girls in other companies. It appeared that she was no longer interested in her job. She and two other promo girls, Jovelina V. Soco and Veronica P. Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were intending to resign and were requesting for some financial assistance. BMG made it clear that, as a company policy, an employee who resigns from service is not entitled to financial assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to humanitarian consideration it would accede to the request after they secure their respective clearances. Forthwith, the three employees tendered their resignations, which were accepted. When they processed the required individual clearance, it was found out that they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement, said shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus, Soco and Mutya received their last salary, a proportion of the 13thmonth pay, tax refund and financial assistance less the deductions, and they executed their releases and quitclaims. Except for the financial assistance, Aparecio also obtained the same yet refused to sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the amount deducted from the financial assistance. She was adamant but BMG stood by the previous agreement.The story of the defense is:Aparecio filed a complaint against BMG and its Branch Manager, Jose Yap, Jr., co-petitioner herein, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, etc. She alleged that she was illegally dismissed or terminated from employment; however, she was asked by respondent to resign and will be paidall her benefits due like a one-month pay for every year of service, payment of services rendered, overtime and holiday pay, rest day, 13thmonth, service incentive leave and separation pay and to execute a letter of resignation. She further alleged that she was under respondent's employ for seven (7) years, seven (7) months and twenty-eight (28) days when illegally terminated from her employmentLA: The labor arbiter dismissed Aparecio's complaint.NLRC: The NLRC found that Aparecio was illegally dismissed from serviceCA: On appeal, the CA affirmedin totothe judgment of the NLRC.ISSUE:WON respondents resignation was valid and no vitiation of consent took place.RULING:YES. Reading through the records would ineluctably reveal that the evidence upon which both the NLRC and the CA based their conclusion rests on rather shaky foundation. After careful analysis, this Court finds and so holds that the submissions of Aparecio in all her pleadings failed to substantiate the allegation that her consent was vitiated at the time she tendered her resignation and that petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal.The Court agrees with petitioners' contention that the circumstances surrounding Aparecio's resignation should be given due weight in determining whether she had intended to resign. In this case, such intent is very evident:First, Aparecio already communicated to other people that she was about to resign to look for a better paying job since she had been complaining that employees like her in other companies were earning much more;Second, prior to the submission of her resignation letter, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Soco and Mutya, approached their supervisor, intimated their desire to resign, and requested that they be given financial assistance, which petitioners granted on the condition that deductions would be made in case of shortage after inventory;Third, Aparecio, Soco, and Mutya submitted their duly signed resignation letters, which were accepted by petitioners; andFourth, Aparecio already initiated the processing of her clearance; thus, she was able to receive her last salary, 13thmonth pay, and tax refund but refused to receive the financial assistance less the deductions made.

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