labor law must read cases.pdf

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LABOR MUST READ CASES AY15-16 | 1

LABOR STANDARDS

Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippine Duplicators, Inc, G.R.

No. 154628 December 6, 2006

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor

is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The

commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause of

labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer

when the law is clearly on its side.

People of the Philippines vs. Teresita “Tessie” Laogo.G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that

recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-

holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by

law. When the illegal recruitment is committed against

three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is

deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer

penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic

sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown

that the accused, without being duly authorized by law,

gave complainants the distinct impression that he had thepower or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the

latter were convinced to part with their money in order to

be employed. It is important that there must at least be a

promise or offer of an employment from the person posing

as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC. v.

CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow

Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for

three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,

whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal

protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional

is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it

affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative

as if it has not been passed at all.”

When a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be

cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a

similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was

already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless

circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse

conclusion.

Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Company vs. Carol De Raedt.

G.R. No. 161366; June 16, 2009

To determine the existence of an employer-employee

relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold

test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the

employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of

dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the

employee on the means and methods by which the work is

accomplished. The so-called “control test” is the most

important indicator of the presence or absence of an

employer-employee relationship.

Manila Water Company, Inc. vs. Jose J. Dalumpines. G.R

No. 175501; October 4, 2010

It should be remembered that the control test merely calls

for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily

the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer

actually supervises the performance of duties of theemployee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield

the power.

Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs

Marulas Industrial Corporation. G.R. No. 204406

February 26, 2014

The test to determine whether employment is regular or

not is the reasonable connection between the particular

activity performed by the employee in relation to the usua

business or trade of the employer.

KASAMMA-CCO v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 159828;

April 19, 2006A casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the

passage of time that gives him a regular status.

Jose Y. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

G.R. No. 138051, June 10, 2004

Television-radio talent is not an employee. Relationship o

a big name talent and a television-radio broadcasting

company is one of an independent contracting

arrangement. ABS-CBN engaged Sonza’s services

specifically to co-host the “Mel & Jay” programs. ABS-CBN

did not assign any other work to Sonza. To perform his

work, Sonza only needed his skills and talent. How Sonza

delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded onradio were outside ABS-CBN’s control. Sonza did not have

to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement

required Sonza to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the

shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings

ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of Sonza’s script.

Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013)

Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasona

employees. The Court has consistently held that seasonal

employees may be considered as regular employees

Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from

time to time. The nature of their relationship with the

employer is such that during the off season, they aretemporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer

season or when their services may be needed. They are in

regular employment because of the nature of their job, and

not because of the length of time they have worked.

This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who

have worked for one season only may not be considered

regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are free

to contract their services with other farm owners, then the

former are not regular employees. For regular employees to

be considered as such, the primary standard used is the




reasonable connection between the particular activity they

perform and the usual trade or business of the employer.

FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. (SKILLEX), et al.

v. Jovert Seva, et al., G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014

For an employee to be validly categorized as a project

employee, it is necessary that the specific project or

undertaking had been identified and its period and

completion date determined and made known to theemployee at the time of his engagement. This provision

ensures that the employee is completely apprised of the

terms of his hiring and the corresponding rights and

obligations arising from his undertaking. Notably, the

petitioner’s service contract with Robinsons was from

January 1 to December 31, 2008. The respondents were

only asked to sign their employment contracts for their

deployment with Robinsons halfway through 2008, when

the petitioner’s service contract was about to expire.

Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the

consent of a party was vitiated by mistake, violence,

intimidation, undue influence or fraud, are voidable orannullable. The petitioner’s threat of non-payment of the

respondents’ salaries clearly amounted to intimidation.

Under this situation, and the suspect timing when these

contracts were executed, we rule that these employment

contracts were voidable and were effectively questioned

when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal

complaint. Respondents are thus regular employees.

Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation,

G.R. No. 192394 (2013)

Project employee is deemed regularized if services are

extended without specifying duration. While for first three

months, petitioner can be considered a project employee ofPNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services were

extended without any specification of as to the duration,

made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his status as a

regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was

assigned to several other projects and there were intervals

in between said projects since he enjoys security of tenure.

Alcatel Phils. vs Relos, G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009

However, a project or work pool employee who has been

continuously rehired by the same employer for the same

tasks that are necessary to the usual business of the

employer must be deemed a regular employee.

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R.

No. 204944-45, 03 December 2014

An employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term

contract. The law does not preclude the possibility that a

regular employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract for

valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as long as

it was the employee who requested, or bargained, that the

contract have a “definite date of termination,” or that the

fixed-term contract be freely entered into by the employer

and the employee, then the validity of the fixed-term

contract will be upheld.

GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419

(2013)

Petitioner’s allegation that respondents were merely

substitutes or what they call pinch-hitters (which means

that they were employed to take the place of regular

employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave) does

not change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered

projects within the purview of the law. Every industry, evenpublic offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for

employees who are absent or on leave. Such tasks, whether

performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, canno

be considered separate and distinct from the other

undertakings of the company. While it is management’s

prerogative to device a method to deal with this issue, such

prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems

wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically

deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security

of tenure.

Avelino Lambo vs NLRC. G.R. No. 111042 October 26

1999There is no dispute that petitioners were employees o

private respondents although they were paid not on the

basis of time spent on the job but according to the quantity

and the quality of work produced by them. There are two

categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose

time and performance are supervised by the employer

(Here, there is an element of control and supervision over

the manner as to how the work is to be performed. A piece-

rate worker belongs to this category especially if he

performs his work in the company premises.); and (2) those

whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here, the

employer’s control is over the result of the work. Workers

on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.) Bothclasses of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-

rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories

where work is done in the company premises, while

payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed

in the agricultural industry, such as in sugar plantations

where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult

to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e.

supervised employees.

PCL Shipping Philippine, Inc. and U-Ming Marine

Transport Corporation, vs NLRC. G.R. No. 153031

December 14, 2006

With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, thecorrect criterion in determining whether or not sailors are

entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board

and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working

hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in

excess of said number of hours. In the present case, the

Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to

overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to

prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight

working hours a day.




Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.

151309 October 15, 2008

D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in

consideration of the benefits that the employees will derive

from the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme, thus:

The compressed workweek scheme was originally

conceived for establishments wishing to save on energy

costs, promote greater work efficiency and lower the rate of

employee absenteeism, among others. Workers favor thescheme considering that it would mean savings on the

increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1)

day a week; savings on meal and snack expenses; longer

weekends, or an additional 52 off-days a year, that can be

devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and

other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at

least another day in a week from certain inconveniences

that are the normal incidents of employment, such as

commuting to and from the workplace, travel time spent,

exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for

work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed

workweek of six (6) days is shortened to five (5) days but

prolonging the working hours from Monday to Fridaywithout the employer being obliged for pay overtime

premium compensation for work performed in excess of

eight (8) hours on weekdays, in exchange for the benefits

abovecited that will accrue to the employees. Moreover, the

adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the

company will help temper any inconvenience that will be

caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther

workplace.

Rosario A. Gaa vs CA G.R. No. L-44169 Dec. 3, 1985

The term “wages” differs from the term “salary.” Wages

apply to compensation for manual labor, skilled or

unskilled, paid at stated times and measured by the day,week, month or season; while salary denotes a higher grade

of employment or a superior grade of services and implies

a position or office. By contrast, the term “wages” indicates

a considerable pay for a lower and less responsible

character of employment, while “salary” is suggestive of a

larger and more important service

The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa vs CA was

only for the purpose of Art. 1708 of the Civil Code which

provides that “the laborers’ wage shall not be subject to

execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food,

shelter, clothing, and medical attendance.

Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v.

Alexander Parian, et al., G.R. No. 204651, 06 August

2014

The benefit or privilege given to the employee which

constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic

or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said

benefit or privilege is part of the laborers’ basic wages, it is

a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of

benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given,

but in the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench,

the items provided were given freely by SLL for the purpose

of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while

they were working at their respective projects.

Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the

benefit but on the purpose why it was given by the

employer. If it is primarily for the employee’s gain, then the

benefit is a facility; if its provision is mainly for the

employer’s advantage, then it is a supplement. Again, this is

to ensure that employees are protected in circumstances

where the employer designates a benefit as deductible fromthe wages even though it clearly works to the employer’s

greater convenience or advantage.

Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be

given to the nature of the employer’s business in relation to

the character or type of work performed by the employees

involved.

Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v Glyza

Esteban, G.R. No. 192582, 7 April 2014

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

meanwhile, provides:

SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. – Where the

employer is engaged in a trade, occupation or business

where the practice of making deductions or requiring

deposits is recognized to answer for the reimbursement of

loss or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied

by the employer to the employee, the employer may make

wage deductions or require the employees to make deposits

from which deductions shall be made, subject to the

following conditions:

(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be

responsible for the loss or damage;

(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to

show cause why deduction should not be made;(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable

and shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and

(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does

not exceed 20 percent of the employee’s wages in a week.

Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was

responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for

the year 2005 to 2006 and that Esteban was given the

opportunity to show cause why the deduction from her last

salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the

petitioner’s statement that it is the practice in the retail

industry to deduct variances from an employee’s salary

without more.

Lilia P. Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy. G.R. No

172295 December 23, 2008

Respecting petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills

contends that petitioner failed to prove that she actually

worked during specific holidays. Article 94 of the Labor

Code provides, however, that (a) Every worker shall be

paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except

in retail and service establishments regularly employing

less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require

an employee to work on any holiday but such employee




shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular

rate. The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his

regular rate if he is required to work on a holiday implies

that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on

holidays applies even if he does not work.

BPI Employees union-Davao City-FUBU v Bank of the

Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 174912 (2013)

Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is anexercise of business judgment or management prerogative.

Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or

arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the

exercise of judgment by an employer. BPI’s policy of

contracting out cashiering and bookkeeping services was

considered as a valid exercise of management prerogative

which is further authorized by the Central Bank in CBP

Circular No. 1388, Series of 199.

Central Azucarera De Tarlac vs. Central Azucarera De

Tarlac Labor Union-NLU. G.R. No. 188949, July 26, 2010

Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-

Diminution Rule, mandates that benefits given toemployees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by

the employer because the benefit has become part of the

employment contract, written or unwritten. The rule

against diminution of benefits applies if it is shown that the

grant of the benefit is based on an express policy or has

ripened into a practice over a long period of time and that

the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the

rule will not apply if the practice is due to error in the

construction or application of a doubtful or difficult

question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be

shown that the correction is done soon after discovery of

the error.

Netlink Computer Incorporated v Eric Delmo, G.R. No.

160827, 18 June 2014

With regard to the length of time the company practice

should have been observed to constitute a voluntary

employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced,

diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer,

we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule

requiring a specific minimum number of years. In Davao

Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, the

company practice lasted for six years. In Davao Integrated

Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, the employer, for

three years and nine months, approved the commutation to

cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with paybenefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v. Leogardo,

Jr., the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed

monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to

February 1980, or three years and four months. In Sevilla

Trading Company v. Semana, the employer kept the practice

of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for

unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their

13th-month pay for at least two years.

With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened

into a company practice, there is no way that the

commissions due to Delmo were to be paid in US dollars or

their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the

time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an

unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to

Delmo.

Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade

Unions vs NLRC. G.R. No. 140689 February 17, 2004

Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gapbetween the pay of the old employees and the newly hired

employees, to Our mind said gap is not significant as to

obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentiona

quantitative differences in the salary rates between the

employee group. As already stated, the classification under

the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee, not

on seniority. For this reason, ,wage distortion does not

appear to exist.

Rogelio Reyes vs NLRC. G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007

Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing

Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are

deemed not part of the basic salary:

a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to

Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instruction No. 174;

b) Profit sharing payments; c) All allowances and monetary

benefits which are not considered or integrated as part o

the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the

promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.

Producers Bank v. NLRC. G.R. No. 100701. March 28,

2001

Bonus is not demandable as a matter of right. It is a

management prerogative, given in addition to what is

ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient.

Philipiine Telegraph vs. Laplana. G.R. No. 76645; July

23, 1991

It is the employers’ prerogative, based on its assessmen

and perception of its employees’ qualifications, aptitudes

and competence, to move them around in the various areas

of its business operations in order to ascertain where they

will function with maximum benefit to the company. When

an employee’s transfer is not unreasonable, nor

inconvenient or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a

demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and

other privileges, the employee may not complain that it

amounts to a constructive dismissal.

UE v. PEPANIO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education

teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educationa

institutions involves public interest. The government has a

right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession o

sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are

allowed to teach in such institutions. Government

regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for

protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from

ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required




scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to

take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as

prerequisite to employment.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 125792;

November 9, 1998

In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee

relation exists between the principal and the job

contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to thejob contractor’s employees only for the proper payment of

wages. But in labor-only contracting, an employer-

employee relation is created by law between the principal

and the labor-only contractor’s employees, such that the

former is responsible to such employees, as if he or she had

directly employed them

Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc.,

G.R. No. 200094 (2013)

In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer

becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor

only for the payment of the employees’ wages whenever the

contractor fails to pay the same. On the other hand, in labor-only contracting, the principal employer becomes solidarily

liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful

claims of the employees. In this case, the releases, waivers

and quitclaims executed by employees in favor of the labor-

only contractor redounded to the benefit of the principal.

San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC Integrated Systems. G.R. No.

144672; July 10, 2003

The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made

liable to the employees of the contractor for a more

comprehensive purpose (wages, monetary claims, and all

other benefits in the Labor Code such as SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor is deemed merely an agent.

A finding that a contractor is a “labor -only” contractor is

equivalent to declaring that there is an ER-EE relationship

between the principal and the employees of the “labor-only”

contractor.

Cheryll Santos Leus v St. Scholastica’s CollegeWestgrove, et al., G.R. No. 187226, 28 January 2015

That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational

institution per se does not absolutely determine whether

her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.

There is still a necessity to determine whether the

petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considereddisgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing

norms of conduct. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations

between two consenting adults who have no impediment to

marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out

of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of

morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral

conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Wellcome. G.R. No. 162994;

September 17, 2004

Prohibition of marriage or existing or future relationships

between employees of competing companies is not violative

of the equal protection clause.

Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v National Labor

Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 200575 (2014)

Cabiles’ contention that his employment with Intel HK is a

continuation of his service with Intel Phil alleging that it was

but an assignment by his principal employer, similar to hisassignments to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu is

untenable.

Eugene Arabit, et al. v Jardine Pacific Finance, Inc., G.R

No. 181719, 21 April 2014

It is illogical for Jardine to terminate the petitioners

employment and replace them with contractual employees

The replacement effectively belies Jardine’s claim that the

petitioners’ positions were abolished due to superfluity

Redundancy could have been justified if the functions of the

petitioners were transferred to other existing employees o

the company.

To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractua

employees as replacements necessarily give rise to the

sound conclusion that the petitioners’ services have not

really become in excess of what Jardine’s business requires

To replace the petitioners who were all regular employees

with contractual ones would amount to a violation of their

right to security of tenure.

Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811;

April 24, 2007

Although fighting within company premises may constitute

serious misconduct (possible ground for disciplinaryactions), not every fight with in company premises in which

an employee is involved automatically warrant dismissa

from service.

Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies. G.R. No. 170384-85

March 9, 2007

Halloween invitation sent out by employee for office trick

or-treating without clearance from higher management is

considered misbehavior. The circumstances in the case

were differentiated from Samson vs. NLRC where the

offensive remarks were verbally made during informa

Christmas gathering.

Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Virginia E. Pacia, March

2011

Petitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to

prepare checks for payment of petitioner’s obligations

Respondent did not immediately comply with the

instruction since petitioner employer had no sufficient

funds to cover the checks. Petitioner employer dismissed

respondent employee for willful disobedience. The Court

held that respondent employee was illegally dismissed

Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive o

petitioner employer to prepare checks in payment of




petitioner’s obligations, respondent employee’s initial

reluctance to prepare the checks, although seemingly

disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well

intentioned reasons. Protecting the petitioner employer

from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost

in her mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be

considered an obstinate defiance of company authority. The

Court took into consideration that respondent employee,

despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare thechecks on the same day she was tasked to do it.

Gonzales vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 131653; March 26, 2001

The act constituting the breach must be “work -related” such

as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to

continue working for the employer.

Jardine Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 106915; August 31,

1993

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for

termination of employment there must be a deliberate

unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his

employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mereabsence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt

acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not

want to work anymore.

SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517

(2013)

While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may

indicate that the employees were not coerced into

resignation, this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they

intelligently, freely and voluntarily resigned. To rule that

resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by

themselves, conclusive proof that the employees intended

to relinquish their posts would open the floodgates topossible abuse. In order to withstand the test of validity,

resignations must be made voluntarily and with the

intention of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of

relinquishment. Therefore, in order to determine whether

the employees truly intended to resign from their

respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the

resignation letters, but must take into consideration the

totality of circumstances in each particular case.

Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No.

187214 (2013)

A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must

be of such nature as would severely affect the continuedbusiness operations of the employer to the detriment of all

and sundry if not properly addressed. Sanoh asserts that

cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out

of the Wire Condenser Department, which triggered

retrenchment. Sanoh presented the letters of cancellation

given by Matsushita and Sanyo as evidence of cancelled

orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely established

the connection between the cancelled orders and the

projected business losses that may be incurred by Sanoh.

Hocheng Philippines Corporation v Antonio M

Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, 18 March 2015

Theft committed by an employee against a person other

than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a

cause analogous to serious misconduct. The misconduct to

be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character

and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct

however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with

the employee’s work to constitute just cause for hisseparation.

Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v

Janrie C. Dailig, G.R. No. 204761, 2 April 2014

A floating status of a security guard for more than six

months constitutes constructive dismissal. The temporary

inactivity or “floating status” of security guards should

continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security

agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal

The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work

assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes

it liable for constructive dismissal.

Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation and/or

Ma. Teresa Marcelo v Armando D. Serrano, G.R. No

198538, 29 September 2014

It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately

declare the mere lapse of the six-month period of floating

status as a case of constructive dismissal, without looking

into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the security

guard’s failure to assume another post. This is especially

true in the present case where the security guard’s own

refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was

not given an assignment within the six-month period. The

security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable for

constructive dismissal.

Philippine Sheet Metal Workers’ Union vs. CIR. G.R. No

L-2028; April 28, 1949

Reduction of the number of workers in a company’s factory

made necessary by the introduction of machinery in the

manufacture of its products is justified. There can be no

question as to the right of the manufacturer to use new

labor-saving devices with a view to effecting more economy

and efficiency in its method of production.

Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corp. vs. Fuentes. G.R

No. 151818. October 14, 2005

Standards to Justify Retrenchment:The losses expected should be substantial and not merely

de minimis in extent;The substantial loss apprehended

must be reasonably imminent. It be reasonably necessary

and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses;The

employer should have taken other measures prior or

parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses;The alleged

losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses

must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.

BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION DAVAO, G.R. No. 164301

October 19, 2011




By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-

surviving corporation’s existing employment contracts by

the surviving corporation in a merger, the Court

strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of

tenure of employees affected by a merger and avoids

confusion regarding the status of their various benefits

which were among the chief objections of our dissenting

colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair

the right of an employer to terminate the employment of theabsorbed employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the

right of such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise

sever his employment, whether before or after the merger,

subject to existing contractual obligations. In this manner,

Justice Brion’s theory of automatic assumption may be

reconciled with the majority’s concerns with the successor

employer’s prerogative to choose its employees and the

prohibition against involuntary servitude.

King of Kings Transport vs. Mamac. G.R. No. 166208.

June 29, 2007

In order to intelligently prepare the employees for their

explanation and defenses, the notice should contain adetailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will

serve as the basis for the charge against the employee – a

general description of the change will not suffice.

Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club. G.R. No. 173012.

June 13, 2012

The law does not require that an intention to terminate

one’s employment should be included in the first notice. It

is enough that employees are properly apprised of the

charges brought against them so they can properly prepare

their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the

intention to terminate one’s employment should be

explicitly stated

Lavador vs. “J” Marketing Corporation and Soyao. G.R.

No. 157757; June 28, 2005

A hearing or conference should be held during which the

employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if the

employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to

the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence

presented against him.

AGABON v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due

process by the private respondent warrants the payment of

indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount ofsuch damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the

court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.

Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar,

we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this

form of damages would serve to deter employers from

future violations of the statutory due process rights of

employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or

recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter

under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot. G.R. No. 151378.March

28, 2005

If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282

but the employer failed to comply with the notice

requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should

be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect

initiated by an act imputable to the employee. On the other

hand, if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under

Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with thenotice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because

the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s

exercise of his management prerogative.

Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et

al., G.R. No. 180636 (2013)

Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s

full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other

benefits or their monetary equivalent. It is the obligation of

the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or

worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus al

other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which

he would have been normally entitled had he not beendismissed and had not stopped working.

Reyes, et al. v RP Guardian’s Security Agency, Inc., G.R

No 193756 (2013)

Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct

reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in order to

alleviate the economic damage brought about by the

employee’s dismissal. “Reinstatement is a restoration to a

state from which one has been removed or separated” while

“the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores

the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful

dismissal.” Therefore, the award of one does not bar theother.

Crisanto F. Castro, Jr. vs Ateneo De Naga University, et

al., G.R. No. 175293, 23 July 2014

The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the

petitioner was not rendered moot and academic. He

remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA’s

order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. In Islriz

Trading v. Capada, we even clarified that the employee

could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when

the failure to reinstate him was without the fault of the

employer.

Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner

only in November 2002, and that their inability to reinstate

him was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his

salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e.

September 3, 2001) until his reinstatement in November

2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to

exercise their option to choose between actual or payrol

reinstatement at that point because the order of

reinstatement was immediately executory.




Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Reynaldo V. Paz, G.R. No.

192924, 26 November 2014

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement

salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision

granting him said relief. The test is two-fold: (1) there must

be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement

pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and

(2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified

act or omission. If the delay is due to the employer’sunjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to

pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor

Arbiter’s decision.

A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the

delay in reinstating the respondent was not due to the

unjustified refusal of PAL to abide by the order but because

of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. The

inopportune event of PAL’s entering rehabilitation

receivership justifies the delay or failure to comply with the

reinstatement order of the LA. In light of the fact that PAL’s

failure to comply with the reinstatement order was justified

by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, therespondent may no longer claim salaries which he should

have received during the period that the LA decision

ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it

was overturned by the NLRC.

Globe Mackay v. NLRC. G.R. No. 82511; March 3, 1992

When the employer can no longer trust the employee and

vice-versa, or there were imputations of bad faith to each

other, reinstatement could not effectively serve as a

remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions which

require trust and confidence.

Wenphil Corporation vs. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, 7 April

2014

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and

into the mundane realities of human experience, the

“refund doctrine” easily demonstrates how a favorable

decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a

dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends

meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received

during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to

refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is

mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of

insolvency.

Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013)

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for

any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the

Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In

exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted

separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of

“social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances,

it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious

misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character

of the employee. In this case, the transgressions were

serious offenses that warranted employees’ dismissal from

employment. Hence, employee is not entitled to separation

pay.

Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Corp. et al vs

Jueber P. Siazar, G.R. No. 177970 August 25, 2010

In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed

employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be

awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every

year of service reckoned from the first day of employmentuntil the finality of the decision. Payment of separation pay

is in addition to payment of backwages. And if separation

pay is awarded instead of reinstatement, backwages shall

be computed from the time of illegal termination up to the

finality of the decision.

Zenaida Paz v Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., et

al., G.R. No. 199554, 18 February 2015

The award of financial assistance to an employee who

rendered almost three decades of dedicated service to an

employer without a single transgression or malfeasance o

any company rule or regulation, coupled with her old age

and infirmity which now weaken her chances ofemployment is justified and allowed under specia

circumstances. These circumstances indubitably meri

equitable concessions, via the principle of “compassionate

justice” for the working class.

Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative Inc. vs NLRC

G.R. No. 163561, July 24, 2007

Although long years of service might generally be

considered for the award of separation benefits or some

form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of

termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for

generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior

decisions. The fact that private respondent servedpetitioner for more than twenty years with no negative

record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does

not call for such award of benefits, since his violation

reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of

the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be

regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty o

dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for

disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and

undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks o

undesirables.

Conrado A. Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No

201483, 04 August 2014No essential change is being made (in a final judgment) by

a recomputation because such is a necessary consequence

which flows from the nature of the illegality of the dismissal

To reiterate, a recomputation, or an original computation, i

no previous computation was made, as in the present case

is a part of the law that is read into the decision, namely

Article 279 of the Labor Code and established

jurisprudence. Article 279 provides for the consequences of

illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of ful

backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified only by

jurisprudence when separation pay in lieu of reinstatemen




is allowed, where the finality of the illegal dismissal

decision instead becomes the reckoning point.

The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that

backwages continue to add on until full satisfaction. The

computation required to reflect full satisfaction does not

constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision

being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands.

Thus, in the present case, a computation of backwages until

actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle ofimmutability of final judgments.

Zuellig Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO.

173587 (2013)

In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions

which effectively bar the availment of retirement benefits

once the employees have chosen separation pay or vice

versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly states that any

payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against

separation pay. Clearly, respondents cannot have both

retirement gratuity and separation pay, as selecting one will

preclude recovery of the other. To illustrate the mechanics

of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery, if theemployees choose to retire, whatever amount they will

receive as retirement gratuity will be charged against the

separation pay they would have received had their

separation from employment been for a cause which would

entitle them to severance pay. These causes are enumerated

in Section 3, Article XIV of the CBA (i.e., retrenchment,

closure of business, merger, redundancy, or installation of

labor-saving device). However, if the cause of the

termination of their employment was any of the causes

enumerated in said Section 3, they could no longer claim

retirement gratuity as the fund from which the same would

be taken had already been used in paying their separation

pay. Put differently, employees who were separated fromthe company cannot have both retirement gratuity and

separation pay as there is only one fund from which said

benefits would be taken. Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV

effectively disallows recovery of both separation pay and

retirement gratuity. Consequently, respondents are entitled

only to one. Since they have already chosen and accepted

redundancy pay and have executed the corresponding

Release and Quitclaim, they are now barred from claiming

retirement gratuity.

Grace Christian High School, represented by its

Principal, Dr. James Tan v Filipinas A. Lavandera, G.R.

No. 177845, 20 August 2014RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992,

amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the

rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector

employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the

establishment. The said law states that “an employee’s

retirement benefits under any collective bargaining

[agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less

than those provided” under the same – that is, at least one-

half (½) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of

at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year

– and that “[u]nless the parties provide for broader

inclusions, the term one-half (½) month salary shall mean

fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month

pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days

of service incentive leaves.”

The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no

CBA or other applicable agreement providing for

retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or

other applicable agreement providing for retirementbenefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily

the determining factor in choosing which retirement

scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits

provided.

The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

has recently affirmed that “one-half (½) month salary

means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-

twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5

days for [SIL].” The Court sees no reason to depart from t his

interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that the 5 days

SIL should be likewise pro-rated to their 1/12 equivalent

must fail.

Noriel R. Montierro v Rickmers Marine Agency Phils.

Inc., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015

When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury

while on board the vessel, his fitness for work shall be

determined by the company-designated physician. The

physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to

make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the

seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company

designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be

agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer

whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., et al. v Arnel G. Dela

Torre, G.R. No. 214132, 18 February 2015

For the purpose of determining “temporary total disability”

the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employmen

medical examination by a company-designated physician

within three working days upon his return except when he

is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written

notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as

compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the

mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his

forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor

appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a

third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employerand the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final

and binding on both parties.

LABOR RELATIONS

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon

Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No

162355, August 14, 2009

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor

organization as “any union or association of employees

which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective




bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms

and conditions of employment.” Upon compliance with all

the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or

Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor

organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the

roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor

organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be

entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to

legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of thecertificate of registration.

T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation,

et al. v T&H Shopfitters Corporation Corporation/Gin

Queen Workers Union, et al., G.R. No. 191714 (2014)

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and

coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-

organization, is, whether the employer has engaged in

conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere

with the free exercise of employees’ rights; and that it is not

necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee

was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats

of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that theanti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse

effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon.

Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No.

162355, August 14, 2009

A bargaining unit is a “group of employees of a given

employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body

of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,

indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights

and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining

provisions of the law.” The f undamental factors in

determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity

and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial

similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation

and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests

Rule);

(3) prior collective bargaining history; and

(4)

similarity of employment status.

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc., vs DOLE. G.R. No.

157117,November 20, 2006

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory

employees are not eligible for membership in a labor union

of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are

allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed tojoin the rank-and-file union because of potential conflicts of

interest. Further, to avoid a situation where supervisors

would merge with the rank-and-file or where the

supervisors’ labor union would represent conflicting

interests, a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed

to affiliate with the national federation of unions of rank-

and-file employees where that federation actively

participates in the union activity within the company. Thus,

the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors

wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition

extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for

membership in a national federation the members of which

include local unions of rank-and-file employees.

San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors

and Exempt Union. G.R. No. 146206. August 1, 2011

The general rule is that an employer has no standing to

question the process of certification election, since this is

the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand

that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certificationelections. The bargaining representative of employees

should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of

management. The only exception is where the employer

itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258 of the

Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.

Holy Child Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R.

No. 179146 (2013)

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers

except when the employer itself has to file the petition

pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but

even after such filing its role in the certification process

ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employerclearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has

no right to interfere at all therein.

Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization

seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file

employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate

labor organization.

NUWHRAIN ‐ MPHC v. SLE. G.R. No. 181531, July 312009

It is well-settled that under the “double majority rule” for

there to be a valid certification election, majority of the

bargaining unit must have voted and the winning unionmust have garnered majority of the valid votes cast

Following the ruling that all the probationary employees

votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the

supervisory Ees should be excluded, it follows that the

number of valid votes cast would increase. Under Art. 256

of the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes

cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole

exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the

appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1.

Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Worker’s

Union‐PAFLU. G.R. No. L‐24711, April 1968

The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract withtheir Er by the simple expedient of changing their

bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract

It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly

certified CB agent automatically assumes all the persona

undertakings of the former agent-like the “no strike clause”

in the CBA executed by the latter.

Takata Philippines Corporation vs Bureau of Labor

Relations, G.R. No. 196276, 4 June 2014

For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent

it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false




statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or

ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments

thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with

the election of officers, the minutes of the election of

officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these

documents together with the list of the newly elected-

appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the listof those who participated in the organizational meeting

would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel

respondent’s certificate of registration. The cancellation of

a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension

on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and

misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union

registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud

and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling

enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union

members.

Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free

workers vs. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515.June 6, 2011

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother

federation, absent any showing that the same is prohibited

under its constitution or rules. Such disaffiliation, however,

does not result in it losing its legal personality. A local union

does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is

affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association

owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act

of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own

personality, neither does it give the mother federation the

license to act independently of the local union. It only gives

rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in

representation of the latter. In the present case, whether theFFW went against the will of its principal (the member-

employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the

MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent employer to

determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their

own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.

Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union

dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an

action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the

union or a rival labor organization, but not the employer as

in this case.

Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang

Manggagawa ng Legenda. G.R. No. 169754, February 23,2011

The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union

registration does not preclude collective bargaining, and

that an order to hold a certification election is proper

despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the

union’s registration because at the time the respondent

union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to

perform such act absent an order cancelling its registration.

The legitimacy of the legal personality of respondent cannot

be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification

election proceeding but only through a separate action

instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it.

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization

shall be deemed registered and vested with lega

personality on the date of issuance of its certificate o

registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a

union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collatera

attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petitionfor cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of

Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.

Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 170007

7 April 2014

The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a

proposal or to make any concession. While the purpose of

collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement

between the employer and the employee’s union resulting

in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to

reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a

reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. Thelaws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract

but do not compel one. For after all , a CBA, like any contract

is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As

such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to

reach an agreement.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing‐United Workers of the Phils v. NLRC. G.R. No. 113856

Sept. 7, 1998

There is no perfect test of good faith (GF) in bargaining. The

GF or BF is an inference to be drawn from the facts and is

largely a matter for the NLRC’s expertise. The charge of BF

should be raised while the bargaining is in progress. Withthe execution of the CBA, BF can no longer be imputed upon

any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are

supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated

therein by the parties. This is not a case where private

respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards CB

because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity o

petitioner union. The CBA is good enough that private

respondent exerted “reasonable effort of GF bargaining.

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General

Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) Vs. Sama

samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity

of Independent and General Labor Organization(SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO. G.R. No. 176249, November 27

2009

While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s origina

five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any

such amendment or term in excess of five years will not

carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective

bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted

Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go

beyond five years and the representation status is a legal

matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other

words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more




than five y ears, either as an original provision or by

amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining

status is effective only for five years and can be challenged

within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s

first five years.

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc., v.

Confessor. G.R. No. 111809, May 5, 1997

The signing of the CBA does not determine whether theagreement was entered into within the 6 month period

from the date of expiration of the old CBA. In the present

case, there was already a meeting of the minds between the

company and the union prior to the end of the 6 month

period after the expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such

meeting of the mind is sufficient to conclude that an

agreement has been reached within the 6 month period as

provided under Art. 253-A of the LC.

Teodoro S. Miranda, Jr. vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. and

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009

A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position

within the union, and not within the company. A shopsteward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or

plant and serves as representative of the union, charged

with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of

employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the

representative of the union members in a building or other

workplace. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a shop steward

as a union official elected to represent members in a plant

or particular department. His duties include collection of

dues, recruitment of new members and initial negotiations

for the settlement of grievances. A judgment of

reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop

Steward would have no practical legal effect since it cannot

be enforced. Based on the requirements imposed by lawand the APCWU-ATI CBA, and in the nature of things, the

subsequent separation of the petitioner from employment

with respondent ATI has made his reinstatement to union

Shop Steward incapable of being enforced.

Herminigildo Inguillom, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales,

Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009

“Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and

comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of

membership” or any other form of agreement which

imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain

union membership as a condition affecting employment.

There is union shop when all new regular employees arerequired to join the union within a certain period as a

condition for their continued employment. There is

maintenance of membership shop when employees, who

are union members as of the effective date of the agreement,

or who thereafter become members, must maintain union

membership as a condition for continued employment until

they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit

or the agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other

hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by

agreement between the employer and his employees or

their representatives, no person may be employed in any or

certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or

she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement

remains a member in good standing of a union entirely

comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a

part.

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing

the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to

determine and prove that:(1) the union security clause is applicable;

(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union

security provision in the CBA; and

(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union’s

decision to expel the employee from the union or company

Standard Chartered Bank v. Confessor. G.R. No. 114974

June 16, 2004

Whether or not the union is engaged in blue-sky bargaining

is determined by the evidence presented by the union as to

its economic demands. Thus, if the union requires

exaggerated or unreasonable economic demands, then it is

guilty of ULP. In order to be considered as unfair laborpractice, there must be proof that the demands made by the

union were exaggerated or unreasonable. In the minutes o

the meeting show that the union based its economic

proposals on data of rank-and-file employees and the

prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees

from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines

and other branches of the bank in the Asian region. Hence

it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ULP for blue-

sky bargaining.

General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-

Tupas vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No

178647. Feb. 13, 2007Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers

right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related to the

workers’ right to self -organization and to the observance o

a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not

unfair labor practices.

Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139940, September 19, 2006

To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be

gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the

Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to

comply with the economic provisions thereof. Evidently, the

University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faithmerely heeded the above-said request of Union members.

Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L‐22456, Sep. 27, 1967

Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude

qualified applicants for membership and a closed- shop

applicants provision will not justify the employer in

discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an

employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to

membership without any reasonable ground thereof.

Phil. Can Co. v. CIR. G.R. No. L‐3021, July 13, 1950




A coercive measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their

demands. The idea behind a strike is that a company

engaged in a profitable business cannot afford to have its

production or activities interrupted, much less, paralyzed.

Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., etc. vs.

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union

of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant, etc., G.R. No.

165756, June 5, 2009The requisites for a valid strike are:

(a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the

intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP;

(b) a strike

vote approved by a majority of the total union membership

in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot

in a meeting called for that purpose; and

(c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least

seven (7) days before the intended strike. The requirements

are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith

renders the strike illegal.

Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R.

No. 168406, January 2015The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states the

company’s counter-proposal shall be attached to the notice

of strike “as far as practicable.” In this case, attaching the

counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of

the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the

union to produce the company’s counter-proposal which it

did not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was

impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time

the union filed a notice of strike.

NSFW vs. Ovejera. G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982

The cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strikeban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264 (f)

were meant to be mandatory. The law provides that “the

labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain

unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days

from the filing of the notice”, this clearly implies that the

union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off

period. The cooling-off period is for the Ministry of Labor

and Employment to exert all efforts at mediation and

conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. The mandatory

character of the 7-day strike ban is manifest in the provision

that “in every case” the union shall furnish the MOLE with

the results of the voting “at least 7 days before the intended

strike.” This period is to give time to verify that a strike votewas actually held.

In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed

within the cooling-off period, the 7-day requirement shall

be counted from the day following the expiration of the

cooling-off period.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield

v. Ramos. G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000

A no strike/lockout clause is legal, but it is applicable only

to economic strikes, not ULP strikes. As a provision in the

CBA, it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be

invoked by an employer (Er) only when the strike is

economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage

or other concessions from the Er that are not mandated to

be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to

prevent a strike which is grounded on ULP.

Interphil Laboratories Ees Union‐FFW v. Interphi

Laboratories, Inc. G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001The concept of a slowdown is a “strike on the installment

plan.” It is a willful reduction in the rate of work by

concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting

the output of the employer (Er), in relation to a labor

dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a

complete stoppage of work, retard production or their

performance of duties and functions to compe

management to grant their demands. Such a slowdown is

generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable

because while the employees (Ees) “continue to work and

remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to

them,” they at the same time “select what part of their

allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition orrefuse openly or secretly, to the Er’s damage, to do other

work;” in other words, they “work on their own terms.

Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph

International, et al. vs. Secretary of Department of

Labor and Employment, et al./Triumph International

(phils.), Inc. vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng

Triumph International, et al., G.R. No. 167401, July 5

2010

The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor

Secretary under Article 263(g) is not limited to the grounds

cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have

preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to theincidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may

have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction”

connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor

Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the

dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or

lockout, including cases over which the labor arbiter has

exclusive jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 75271‐73, June 27, 1988

Where the return to work order is issued pending the

determination of the legality of the strike, it is not correct to

say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may

be disregarded if illegal. Precisely, the purpose of the returnto work order is to maintain the status quo while the

determination is being made.

Manila Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE, G.R. No

140518, Dec. 16, 2004

Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but

there must be showing of special circumstances rendering

actual reinstatement impracticable, or otherwise not

conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing

for assumption of jurisdiction by the SLE in a labor dispute

that affects the national interest.




Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid

Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its Dismissed

Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R.

No. 159461, November 15, 2010

Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a

strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the

Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or

certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike duringthe pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the

strike. In the present case, there is no dispute that when

respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6,

2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were

still pending as both parties filed motions for

reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly,

respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by

holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. Vs. Jackbilt Employees Workers

Union-Naflu-KMU, G.R. No. 171618-19, March 13, 2009

Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person

engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress toand egress from the employer’s premises. Since respondent

was found in the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to have

prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from

petitioner’s compound, respondent’s officers and

employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the

March 9, 1998 strike. The use of unlawful means in the

course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore,

pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the

March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a

petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods

Corporation/Monterey Foods Corporation v. Bukluranng mga Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW, et al., G.R. No.

178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011

A distinction exists between the ordinary workers’ liability

for illegal strike and that of the union officers who

participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be

terminated for merely participating in the strike. There

must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its

conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be

terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated

in the illegal strike. Moreover, the participating union

officers have to be properly identified. In the present case,

with respect to those union officers whose identity and

participation in the strike having been properly established,the termination was legal.

Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No.

86000, Sep. 21, 1990

No backwages will be awarded to union members as a

penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. As for the

union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal

strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be

terminated from employment and they are not entitled to

any relief.

MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA, G.R. 128632, Aug. 5, 1999

The innocent by stander must show: Compliance with the

grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and That

it is entirely different from, without any connection

whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore

its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

Victor Meteoro, et al. v. Creative Creatures, Inc. G.R No

171275, July 13, 2009

In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor

inspector during and after the inspection and raised issues

the resolution of which necessitated the examination o

evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course o

inspection. Hence, the Regional Director was divested of

jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the

appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Considering

however, that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by

petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an

employer-employee relationship was also raised, the CA

correctly ruled that such endorsement was no longer

necessary.

Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical

Specialist and Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 204142, 19

November 2014

The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax

matters. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to

rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the

propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly

tax matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact

they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as

they pertain to questions of law on the application o

Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the

application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the

MOA and/or company personnel policies.

The University of the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs

NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011

Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor

practices and termination disputes fall within the origina

and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. As an

exception, under Article 262 the Voluntary Arbitrator, upon

agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other

labor disputes including unfair labor practices and

bargaining deadlocks. For the exception to apply, there

must be agreement between the parties clearly conferring

jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement

may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreementHowever, in the absence of a collective bargaining

agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on record

showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary

arbitration.

Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 162385 (2013)

The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissa

did not necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissa

could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the

submission of verified position papers by the parties should




they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the

inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the

complaint or position paper from the time of their

submission by the parties. In view of this, respondent’s

cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of

his complaint alone but also from a consideration and

evaluation of both his complaint and position paper.

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. vs.Estanislao Surio, et al. G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012

Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10,

transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear

and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino

workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did

not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases

and other special cases administrative in character

involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act

No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving

all administrative matters affecting and involving such

workers. The NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review

the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involvingoverseas contract workers.

People’s Broadcasting Service vs. The Secretary ofLabor and Employment. G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012

If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee

relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a

complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a

claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the

Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which

provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive

jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay,

hours of work, and other terms and conditions of

employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an

existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is

properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however,

may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime Corporation

and/or Western Shipping Agencies. G.R. No. 175209.

January 16, 2013

There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of

Procedure when the respondents PAL Maritime

Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. filed,

albeit belatedly, the Joint Declaration Under Oath, which isrequired when an employer appeals from the Labor

Arbiter’s decision granting a monetary award and posts a

surety bond. Under the NLRC rules, the following requisites

are required to perfect the employer’s appeal: (1) it must be

filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be under

oath, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and

the posting of a cash or surety bond; and (3) it must be

accompanied by typewritten or printed copies of the

memorandum of appeal, stating the grounds relied upon,

the supporting arguments, the reliefs prayed for, and a

statement of the date of receipt of the appealed decision,

with proof of service on the other party of said appeal. If the

employer posts a surety bond, the NLRC rules further

require the submission by the employer, his or her counsel

and the bonding company of a joint declaration under oath

attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it

shall be in effect until the final disposition of the case.

In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond

equivalent to the monetary award and filed the notice ofappeal and the appeal memorandum within the

reglementary period. When the NLRC subsequently

directed the filing of a Joint Declaration Under Oath, the

respondents immediately complied with the said order

There was only a late submission of the Joint Declaration

Considering that there was substantial compliance with the

rules, the same may be liberally construed. The application

of technical rules may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the

demands of substantial justice.

Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013)

While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the

employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) themotion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious

grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the

monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the

filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the

running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification

effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the

reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary

period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or

surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day

period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for

reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the

correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond

already posted by the employer within the 10-day period.

AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid vs. Melanio B

Yuag. G.R. No. 195033, October 12, 2011

On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for

Certiorari despite the prescribed Motion for

Reconsideration with the NLRC, the SC found that the CA

committed error when it entertained the petition for

certiorari and explained that when respondent failed to file

a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC’s 30 November

2006 Resolution within the reglementary period, the

Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified

by the Court of Appeals. Untimeliness in filing motions or

petitions is not a mere technical or procedural defect, asleniency regarding this requirement will impinge on the

right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from

the laying to rest of the controversy.

MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866

September 16, 1998

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P

No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme

Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and

refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65

Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be




initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of

the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate

forum for the relief desired.

Manila Pavilion Hotel, etc. vs. Henry Delada. G.R. No.

189947, January 25, 2011

In Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator

Magsalin, the Supreme Court ruled that the voluntary

arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority tointerpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the

scope of his own authority – subject only, in a proper case,

to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. It was also held in

that case that the failure of the parties to specifically limit

the issues to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to

assume jurisdiction over the related issue. In Ludo & Luym

Corporation v. Saornido, the Supreme Court recognized that

voluntary arbitrators are generally expected to decide only

those questions expressly delineated by the submission

agreement; that, nevertheless, they can assume that they

have the necessary power to make a final settlement on the

related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the

adjudication of disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court ruledthat even if the specific issue brought before the arbitrators

merely mentioned the question of “whether an employee

was discharged for just cause,” they could reasonably

assume that their powers extended beyond the

determination thereof to include the power to reinstate the

employee or to grant back wages. In the same vein, if the

specific issue brought before the arbitrators referred to the

date of regularization of the employee, law and

jurisprudence gave them enough leeway as well as

adequate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the

employees to higher benefits in accordance with the finding

of regularization. Indeed, to require the parties to file

another action for payment of those benefits wouldcertainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the

constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor

and speedy labor justice.

Philippine Electric Corporation v Court of Appeals, et

al., G.R. No. 168612, 10 December 2014

The rule is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or decision

shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10

days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the

aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration

with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed

within the same 10-day period since a motion for

reconsideration is filed “within the period for taking anappeal.

People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) v.Secretary of Labor, et al. GR No. 179652, May 8, 2009

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its

visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a

determination of the existence of an employer-employee

relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however,

cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement

power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely

preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary

function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The

determination of the existence of employer-employee

relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is

the meaning of the clause “in cases where the relationship

of employer-employee still exists” in Art. 128(b).

Thus, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give

effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code

or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLEthat there is an existing employer-employee relationship

the DOLE exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC

If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee

relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a

complaint is filed with the DOLE , and it is accompanied by

a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with

the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code

which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and

exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages

rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions

of employment, if accompanied by a claim for

reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and

there is still an existing employer- employee relationshipthe jurisdiction is purely with the DOLE. The findings of the

DOLE, however may still be questioned through a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Manolito Barles, et al. v. Hon. Benedicto Bitonio, et al

GR No. 120270, June 16, 1999

The BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act,

at their own initiative or upon request of either or both

parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. As

already held by the Court in La Tondena Workers Union v

Secretary of Labor, intra-union conflicts such as

examinations of accoutns are under the jurisdiction of the

BLR. However, the Rules of Procedure on MediationArbitration purpose and expressly separated or

distinguished examinations of union accounts from the

genus of intra-union conflict and provided a different

procedure for the resolution of the same. Origina

jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union

accounts is vested on the Regional Director and appellate

jurisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with the

BLR. This is apparent from Sections 3 and 4 of the Med-

Arbitration Rules as already mentioned. Contrast these two

sections from Section 2 and Section 56 of the same rules

Section 2 expressly vests upon Med-Arbiters original and

exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide inter alia “all other

inter-union or internal union disputes.” Section 5 states thatthe decisions of the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the

DOLE Secretary. Without a doubt, the rules of Procedure on

Mediation-Arbitration did not amend or supplan

substantive law but implemented and filled in details of

procedure left vacuous or ambiguous by the Labor Code and

its Implementing Rules.

Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No

194169 (2013)

The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally

irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require




that where further computation of the award in the decision

is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings,

no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the

computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an

order issued after the parties have been duly notified and

heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was

as yet no order approving the computation made by the

NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a

pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by ClubFilipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it

raised valid issues that required determination in order to

arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would

be unjustly enriched.

Virgilio Anabe v. Asian Construction. GR No. 183233,

December 23, 2009

To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is

essential to ascertain the time when the third element of a

cause of action transpired. Stated differently, in the

computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a

determination must be made as to the period when the act

constituting a violation of the workers’ right to the benefitsbeing claimed was committed. For if the cause of action

accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the

money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in

accordance with Article 291.

George A. Arriola v Pilipino Star .Ngayon, Inc. and/or

Miguel G. Belmont, G.R. No. 175689, 13 August 2014

This court ruled that Callanta’s complaint for illegal

dismissal had not yet prescribed. Although illegal dismissal

is a violation of the Labor Code, it is not the “offense”

contemplated in Article 290. Article 290 refers to illegal acts

penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any

of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts, unfairlabor practices, and illegal recruitment activities. The three-

year prescriptive period under Article 290, therefore, does

not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal.

Instead, “by way of supplement,” Article 1146 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines governs complaints for illegal

dismissal. Under Article 1146, an action based upon an

injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within four

years. This court explained:

. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job

or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the

legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, inessence, an action predicated “upon an injury to the rights

of the plaintiff,” as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New

Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for

backwages, not the three-year prescriptive period under

Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for backwages,

according to this court, may be a money claim “by reason of

its practical effect.” Legally, however, an award of

backwages “is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally

dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC

to render inhis favor as a consequence of the unlawful act

committed by the employer.” Though it results “in the

enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the

award of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but

rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to

make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.”

Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise

actions “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.” Article

1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore, governsthese actions.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION

SSS v. Aguas. G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006

A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband

cannot be said to be “dependent for support” upon the

husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, i

it is proved that the husband and wife were still living

together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume

that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless

it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Bernardina P. Bartolome v Social Security System, et al.

G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014

Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive

petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from

John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s

untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by

adoption already died, then the death benefits under the

Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to

herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary. The

rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents

is contrary to law.

The phrase “dependent parents” should, therefore, includeall parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether

by nature or by adoption.

Hacienda Cataywa, et al. v Rosario Lorezo, G.R. No

179640, 18 March 2015)

To be exempted from the coverage of SSS Law on the basis

of casual employment, the services must not merely be

irregular, temporary or intermittent, but the same must no

also be in connection with the business or occupation of the

employer. The primary standard, therefore, of determining

a regular employment is the reasonable connection

between the particular activity performed by the employee

in relation to the usual business or trade of the employerThe test is whether the former is usually necessary or

desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The

connection can be determined by considering the nature o

the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the

particular business or trade in its entirety.

GSIS vs. De Leon. G.R. No. 186560; November 17, 2010

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility

requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is

protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a



LABOR MUST READ CASES AY15 16 | 18

protected property interest whenever they acquire a right

to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a

pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have

become due as provided under the terms of the public

employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person

of his pension rights without due process of law, that is,

without notice and opportunity to be heard.

GSIS vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128524; April 20,1999

The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly

applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a

police officer but only to those which, although not on

official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service

in character.

Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. ECC. G.R. No. L-26341.

Nov. 27, 1968

When the injury is sustained when the employee is

proceeding to or from his work on the premises of the

employer, the injury is compensable.

Enao v. ECC G.R. No. L-46046; April 5, 1985

The company which provides the means of transportation

in going to, or coming from the place of work, is liable to the

injury sustained by the employees while on board said

means of transportation.

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