PALACOL VS. FERRER-CALLEJA

Petitioners cited Galvadores v. Trajano wherein it was ruled that no check-offs from any amount due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount, purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction.

Galvadores provides "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent."

GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR CORPORATION VS. DRILON

Generally, a judgment on a compromise agreement puts an end to a litigation and is immediately executory. However, the Rules [of Court] require a special authority before an attorney can compromise the litigation of [his] clients. The authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and should be duly established by evidence.

As aptly held by the Secretary of Labor, the records are bereft of showing that the individual members consented to the said agreement. Undoubtedly, the compromise agreement was executed to the prejudice of the complainants who never consented thereto, hence, it is null and void. The judgment based on such agreement does not bind the individual members or complainants who are not parties thereto nor signatories therein.

Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for them.

It should perhaps be made clear that the Court is not here saying that accrued money claims can never be effectively waived by workers and employees. What the Court is saying is that, in the present case, the private respondents never purported to waive their claims to accrued differential pay. Assuming that private respondents had actually and individually purported to waive such claims, a second question would then have arisen: whether such waiver could be given legal effect or whether, on the contrary, it was violative of public policy. Fortunately, we do not have to address this second question here.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. CASIO

In Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, the Court held that notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that the federation undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting from the dismissal of several employees, the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter.

LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA

Once a union acquires a legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

Section 11, Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for the dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of a labor organization only in the following instances:

(1) appellant is not listed by the Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of legitimate labor organizations; or

(2) appellant's legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality. 

Since appellant is listed in the registry of legitimate labor organizations, and its legitimacy has not been revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its petition for certification election is proper.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER) VS. CHARTER CHEMCIAL AND COATING CORPORATION.

The inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. The appellate court’s reliance on Toyota is misplaced in view of this Court’s subsequent ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima, we explained at length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway under the altered state of the law and rules applicable to this case, viz:

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlopand reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of

any question pertaining to its individual members.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., EMPLOYEES ASSOCATION-NATU VS. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended.

For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.

Perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate the company from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the company delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the company had chosen xxx to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that the chosen company employees — having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.

It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.

Where the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.

And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.

AHS/PHIIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW) VS. NLRC

Concededly, retrenchment to prevent losses is considered a just cause for terminating employment 22 and the decision whether to resort to such move or not

is a management prerogative. 23 Basic, however, in human relations is the precept that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights, and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observed honesty and good faith." 24

Art. 284 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Sec. 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, provides:

Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to present losses, or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one [1] month before the intended date thereof. ... In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one [1] month or at least one-half [1/2] month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six [6] months shall be considered one [1] whole year.

In the case at bar, the company offered to pay the 31 dismissed employees one month salary in lieu of the one [1] month written notice required by law. This practice was allowed under the termination Pay Laws whereby if the employee is dismissed on the basis of just cause, the employer is not required to serve advance written notice based on the number of years the employee has served the employer, nor is the employer required to grant termination pay. It is only where the dismissal is without just cause that the employer must serve timely notice on the employee, otherwise the employer is obliged to pay the required termination compensation, except where other applicable statutes provide a different remedy. 27 Otherwise stated, it was the employer's failure to serve notice upon the employee, not the cause for the dismissal, that rendered the employer answerable for terminal pay. 28 Thus, notice may effectively be substituted by payment of the termination pay.

Under the New Labor Code, however, even if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Art. 284, the one-month written notice to both the affected employee and the Minister labor is required, on top of the separation pay.

SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION, PETITIONER, VS. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Indrustrial Peace Act; Scope of management prerogative; Effect of collective bargaining agreement.—It is to be admitted that the stand of ShelI Company as to the scope of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated. The growth of industrial democracy fostered by the institution of collective bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented by a union of their choice, has no doubt contracted the sphere of what appertains solely

to the employer. What was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.

Same; Collective bargaining agreement must be respected.—The crucial question is whether the then existing collective bargaining contract running for three years from August 1, 1966 to December 31, 1069 constituted a bar to such a decision reached by management? The answer must be in the affirmative. As correct stressed in the brief for the petitioner, there was specific coverage concerning the security guard section in the collective bargaining contract, It is found not only in the body thereof but in the two appendices concerning the age schedules as well as the premium pay and the night compensation to which the personnel in such section were entitled. It was thus an assurance of security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime of the agreement. For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, terms of which should be binding on both parties. One of them may be released, but only with the consent of the other. The right to object belongs to the latter; and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs should continue during the existence of the contract. Only thus may there be compliance with and fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting agreement.

Same; Failure to comply constitutes an unfair labor practice.—The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. Such a doctrine first found expression in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-20303, Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226.

In the industrial Peace Act, an unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer'. However, the collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice. 

Same; Right of labor to strike.—Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. Rightly, labor is justified in making use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the Industrial Peace Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of unionization and collective bargaining would not be thwarted. It would, of course, file an unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations. It is not precluded, however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort on the part of an employer.

There is this categorial pronouncement from the present Chief Justice: "Again, the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from — which is supported by substantial evidence — to the effect that the strike had triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the

discrimination, resorted to by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of employees due to union activities, as well as the refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith."  It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike.

The right to self-organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." 

As a matter of fact, a strike may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the Court of industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction against the laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended).

Same; When to strike.—Necessarily so, the choice as to when such an objective may be attained by striking likewise belongs to it. There is the rejection of the concept that an outside authority, even if governmental, should make the decisions for it as to ends which are desirable and how they may be achieved. The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to strike may be availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with management. It is true that there is a requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. Such a requisite however, as has been repeatedly declared by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case of unf air labor practice strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful.

Same; How strike to be conducted.—What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such as objective. For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peacef ul ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unf air labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.

Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives. It is

only to show awareness that is labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance, the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call for loss of employee status.

Strikes are usually attended by "the excitement, the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof ...." There is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party.

even if there was a mistake in good faith by the Union that an unfair labor practice was committed by the Shell Company when such was not the case, still the wholesale termination of employee status of all the officers of the Union, decreed by CIR, hardly commends itself for approval. Such a drastic blow to a labor organization, leaving it leaderless, has serious repercussions. The immediate effect is to weaken the Union. New leaders may of course emerge. It would not be unlikely, under the circumstances, that they would be less than vigorous in the prosecution of labor's claims. They may be prove to fall victims to counsels of timidity and apprehension. At the forefront of their consciousness must be an awareness that a mistaken move could well mean their discharge from employment. That would be to render the right to self-organization illusory.

Same; State protection to labor.—The plain and unqualified constitutional command of protection to labor should not be lost sight of. The State is thus under obligation to lend its aid and its succor to the efforts of its labor elements to improve their economic condition. It is now generally accepted that unionization is a means to such an end. It should be encouraged. Thereby, labor's strength, what there is of it, becomes solidified. It can bargain as a collectivity. Management then will not always have the upper hand nor be in a position to ignore its just demands. That, at any rate, is the policy behind the Industrial Peace Act. The judiciary and administrative agencies in construing it must ever be conscious of Its implications. Only thus may there be f idelity to what is ordained by the f undamental law. For if it were otherwise, Instead of protection, there would be neglect or disregard. That is to negate the fundamental principle that the Constitution is the supreme law.

The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by respondent company. Even if it were otherwise, however, this Court cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright dismissal of all union officers, a move that certainly would have the effect of considerably weakening a labor organization, and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act to encourage unionization.

Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. More specifically, it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies.

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NLRC

The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo." The remark was made in the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work.

The case fell within the jurisdiction of the of the NLRC, not the BLR. The question extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto. Necessarily, when the hotel decides the recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny. Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly, violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice.